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Fix CVE-2021-4122 - LUKS2 reencryption crash recovery attack
Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online reencryption extension crash recovery. An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently decrypt part of the LUKS device. This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but no knowledge of user passphrases. The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata. There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened (except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with possible modification of revealed plaintext. The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect against intentional modification but such modification must not cause a violation of data confidentiality. The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots. For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0.
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Milan Broz
parent
5a17d677c4
commit
0113ac2d88
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct luks2_reencrypt {
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static int reencrypt_keyslot_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
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const struct luks2_reencrypt *rh)
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{
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int r;
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json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj_area_type;
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struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
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@@ -124,7 +125,11 @@ static int reencrypt_keyslot_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
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} else
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log_dbg(cd, "No update of reencrypt keyslot needed.");
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return 0;
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r = LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(cd, hdr, rh->vks);
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if (r < 0)
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log_err(cd, "Failed to refresh reencryption verification digest.");
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return r;
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}
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static json_object *reencrypt_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, unsigned new)
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@@ -2484,6 +2489,10 @@ static int reencrypt_init(struct crypt_device *cd,
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if (r < 0)
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goto out;
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r = LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(cd, hdr, *vks);
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if (r < 0)
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goto out;
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if (name && params->mode != CRYPT_REENCRYPT_ENCRYPT) {
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r = reencrypt_verify_and_upload_keys(cd, hdr, LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_old(hdr), LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(hdr), *vks);
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if (r)
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@@ -2614,20 +2623,28 @@ static int reencrypt_context_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
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static int reencrypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
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uint64_t device_size,
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const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
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struct volume_key *vks,
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struct luks2_reencrypt **rh)
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{
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int r;
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struct luks2_reencrypt *tmp = NULL;
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crypt_reencrypt_info ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
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if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
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log_err(cd, _("Device not marked for LUKS2 reencryption."));
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return -EINVAL;
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} else if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
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return -EINVAL;
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r = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN)
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r = reencrypt_load_clean(cd, hdr, device_size, &tmp, params);
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else if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH)
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r = reencrypt_load_crashed(cd, hdr, device_size, &tmp);
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else if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
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log_err(cd, _("Device not marked for LUKS2 reencryption."));
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return -EINVAL;
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} else
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else
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r = -EINVAL;
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if (r < 0 || !tmp) {
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@@ -2876,7 +2893,7 @@ static int reencrypt_load_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
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rparams.device_size = required_size;
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}
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r = reencrypt_load(cd, hdr, device_size, &rparams, &rh);
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r = reencrypt_load(cd, hdr, device_size, &rparams, *vks, &rh);
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if (r < 0 || !rh)
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goto err;
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@@ -3096,13 +3113,6 @@ static reenc_status_t reencrypt_step(struct crypt_device *cd,
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{
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int r;
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/* update reencrypt keyslot protection parameters in memory only */
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r = reencrypt_keyslot_update(cd, rh);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot update failed.");
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return REENC_ERR;
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}
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/* in memory only */
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r = reencrypt_make_segments(cd, hdr, rh, device_size);
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if (r)
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@@ -3370,6 +3380,15 @@ int crypt_reencrypt_run(
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rs = REENC_OK;
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/* update reencrypt keyslot protection parameters in memory only */
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if (!quit && (rh->device_size > rh->progress)) {
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r = reencrypt_keyslot_update(cd, rh);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot update failed.");
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return reencrypt_teardown(cd, hdr, rh, REENC_ERR, quit, progress, usrptr);
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}
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}
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while (!quit && (rh->device_size > rh->progress)) {
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rs = reencrypt_step(cd, hdr, rh, rh->device_size, rh->online);
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if (rs != REENC_OK)
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@@ -3409,7 +3428,7 @@ static int reencrypt_recovery(struct crypt_device *cd,
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int r;
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struct luks2_reencrypt *rh = NULL;
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r = reencrypt_load(cd, hdr, device_size, NULL, &rh);
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r = reencrypt_load(cd, hdr, device_size, NULL, vks, &rh);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_err(cd, _("Failed to load LUKS2 reencryption context."));
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return r;
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