eessppeelllloo/cryptsetup
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git synced 2025-12-05 16:00:05 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Harden and limit access to volume key internals.

Browse Source 
The volume key structure may often be in configuration
where 'key' member does not contain real data. Some
examples:

- volume key acquired by querring device-mapper where key
  was originaly passed by kernel keyring reference.

- volume key allocated by crypt_alloc_volume_key(size, NULL)

With this patch access to internal 'uninitialized' data result
in failed assert().

For use cases where key data are not needed (keyring reference wrapper,
key length info only) we do not have to allocate and lock the safe
buffer in memory.

Further improvements might to completely hide the volume key internals
and access only via setter and getter functions.
This commit is contained in:
Ondrej Kozina
2025-02-03 16:59:19 +01:00
committed by Milan Broz
parent f86ab28ad6
commit 6ee76934fa
12 changed files with 288 additions and 127 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

33
lib/setup.c
View File

@@ -289,16 +289,17 @@ static int process_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *hash_name,
struct volume_key **vk)
{
int r;
void *key = NULL;
if (!key_size)
return -EINVAL;
*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
if (!*vk)
return -ENOMEM;
if (hash_name) {
r = crypt_plain_hash(cd, hash_name, (*vk)->key, key_size, pass, passLen);
key = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size);
if (!key)
return -ENOMEM;
r = crypt_plain_hash(cd, hash_name, key, key_size, pass, passLen);
if (r < 0) {
if (r == -ENOENT)
log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported."),
@@ -306,17 +307,27 @@ static int process_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *hash_name,
else
log_err(cd, _("Key processing error (using hash %s)."),
hash_name);
crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
*vk = NULL;
crypt_safe_free(key);
return -EINVAL;
}
} else if (passLen > key_size) {
crypt_safe_memcpy((*vk)->key, pass, key_size);
*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key_by_safe_alloc(&key);
} else if (passLen >= key_size) {
*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, pass);
} else {
crypt_safe_memcpy((*vk)->key, pass, passLen);
key = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size);
if (!key)
return -ENOMEM;
crypt_safe_memcpy(key, pass, passLen);
*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key_by_safe_alloc(&key);
}
return 0;
r = *vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
crypt_safe_free(key);
return r;
}
static int isPLAIN(const char *type)