mirror of
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git
synced 2025-12-05 16:00:05 +01:00
Fix typos found by codespell.
Thanks Dimitri Papadopoulos Orfanos for the patch. Fixes: #734.
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Ondrej Kozina
parent
d3ad18ad81
commit
773fc0195f
6
FAQ.md
6
FAQ.md
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
|
||||
security model BEFORE you face such a disaster! In particular, make
|
||||
sure you have a current header backup before doing any potentially
|
||||
dangerous operations. The LUKS2 header should be a bit more resilient
|
||||
as critical data starts later and is stored twice, but you can decidely
|
||||
as critical data starts later and is stored twice, but you can decidedly
|
||||
still destroy it or a keyslot permanently by accident.
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG COMMANDS: While the --debug and --debug-json options should not
|
||||
@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@
|
||||
that is intact.
|
||||
|
||||
In order to find out whether a key-slot is damaged one has to look for
|
||||
"non-random looking" data in it. There is a tool that automatizes this
|
||||
"non-random looking" data in it. There is a tool that automates this
|
||||
for LUKS1 in the cryptsetup distribution from version 1.6.0 onwards. It
|
||||
is located in misc/keyslot_checker/. Instructions how to use and how to
|
||||
interpret results are in the README file. Note that this tool requires
|
||||
@@ -2730,7 +2730,7 @@ offset length name data type description
|
||||
safe under these circumstances, then you have bigger problems than this
|
||||
somewhat expected behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
The CVE was exagerrated and should not be assigned to upstream
|
||||
The CVE was exaggerated and should not be assigned to upstream
|
||||
cryptsetup in the first place (it is a distro specific initrd issue).
|
||||
It was driven more by a try to make a splash for self-aggrandizement,
|
||||
than by any actual security concerns. Ignore it.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ See ``./configure --help`` and use ``--disable-*`` and ``--enable-*`` options.
|
||||
|
||||
For running the test suite that come with the project, type ``make check``.
|
||||
Note that most tests will need root user privileges and run many dangerous storage fail simulations.
|
||||
Do **not** run tests with root privilege on production systems!
|
||||
Do **not** run tests with root privilege on production systems! Some tests will need scsi_debug kernel module to be available.
|
||||
|
||||
For more details, please refer to [automake](https://www.gnu.org/software/automake/manual/automake.html) and [autoconf](https://www.gnu.org/savannah-checkouts/gnu/autoconf/manual/autoconf.html) manuals.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Important features
|
||||
|
||||
Integritysetup is intended to be used for settings that require
|
||||
non-cryptographic data integrity protection with no data encryption.
|
||||
Fo setting integrity protected encrypted devices, see disk authenticated
|
||||
For setting integrity protected encrypted devices, see disk authenticated
|
||||
encryption below.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that after formatting the checksums need to be initialized;
|
||||
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
|
||||
in kernel (more on this later).
|
||||
NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
|
||||
in kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
|
||||
randomly generated IVs (the collison probability is not negligible).
|
||||
randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
|
||||
For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
|
||||
|
||||
* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for dm-integrity journal.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ Changes since version 2.3.3
|
||||
|
||||
If users want to use blake2b/blake2s, the kernel algorithm name includes
|
||||
a dash (like "blake2s-256").
|
||||
Theses algorithms can now be used for integritysetup devices.
|
||||
These algorithms can now be used for integritysetup devices.
|
||||
|
||||
* Fix crypto backend to properly handle ECB mode.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Definitions of common constant and generic macros fo libcryptsetup
|
||||
* Definitions of common constant and generic macros of libcryptsetup
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Milan Broz
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
|
||||
* It's supposed to be used only with symbols that are exported in at least
|
||||
* two versions simultaneously as follows:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - the latest version is marked with _NEW variant and oll other compatible
|
||||
* - the latest version is marked with _NEW variant and all other compatible
|
||||
* symbols should be marked with _OLD variant
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Examples:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* cryptsetup 1.0 did not align keyslots to 4k, cannot repair this one
|
||||
* Also we cannot trust possibly broken keyslots metadata here through LUKS_keyslots_offset().
|
||||
* Expect first keyslot is aligned, if not, then manual repair is neccessary.
|
||||
* Expect first keyslot is aligned, if not, then manual repair is necessary.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (phdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset < (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
|
||||
log_err(ctx, _("Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."));
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ maximum is 4294967295 (maximum for 32bit unsigned integer).
|
||||
Memory and parallel costs are unused for PBKDF2.
|
||||
For \fBArgon2i\fR and \fBArgon2id\fR, minimum iteration count (CPU cost) is 4 and
|
||||
maximum is 4294967295 (maximum for 32bit unsigned integer).
|
||||
Minimum memory cost is 32 KiB and maximum is 4 GiB. (Limited by addresable
|
||||
Minimum memory cost is 32 KiB and maximum is 4 GiB. (Limited by addressable
|
||||
memory on some CPU platforms.)
|
||||
If the memory cost parameter is benchmarked (not specified by a parameter)
|
||||
it is always in range from 64 MiB to 1 GiB.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -244,10 +244,10 @@ Do not use these options until you need compatibility with specific old kernel.
|
||||
Use inefficient legacy padding.
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B "\-\-integrity\-legacy\-hmac"
|
||||
Use old flawed HMAC calclation (also does not protect superblock).
|
||||
Use old flawed HMAC calculation (also does not protect superblock).
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B "\-\-integrity\-legacy\-recalculate"
|
||||
Allow insecure recalculating of volumes with HMAC keys (recalcualtion offset in superblock
|
||||
Allow insecure recalculating of volumes with HMAC keys (recalculation offset in superblock
|
||||
is not protected).
|
||||
|
||||
.SH RETURN CODES
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ export LANG=C
|
||||
[ ! -x "$CRYPTSETUP" ] && skip "Cannot find $CRYPTSETUP, test skipped."
|
||||
[ -n "$VALG" ] && valgrind_setup && CRYPTSETUP=valgrind_run
|
||||
|
||||
# initial test constructed acccording to current cryptsetup content
|
||||
# initial test constructed according to current cryptsetup content
|
||||
echo "[1] Current state"
|
||||
exp_fail resize NAME --test-passphrase
|
||||
exp_fail close NAME --test-passphrase
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Suppresion file for valgrind
|
||||
# Suppression file for valgrind
|
||||
|
||||
# known problem in libgcrypt
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -132,27 +132,27 @@ cd $START_DIR
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[1] Test basic auto-recovery"
|
||||
RUN luks2-invalid-checksum-hdr0.img "R" "Failed to recover from trivial header corruption at offset 0"
|
||||
# TODO: check epoch is incresed after recovery
|
||||
# TODO: check epoch is increased after recovery
|
||||
# TODO: check only sectors related to corrupted hdr at offset 0 are written (dmstats tool/differ.c)
|
||||
|
||||
RUN luks2-invalid-checksum-hdr1.img "R" "Failed to recover from trivial header corruption at offset 16384"
|
||||
# TODO: check epoch is incresed after recovery
|
||||
# TODO: check epoch is increased after recovery
|
||||
# TODO: check only sectors related to corrupted hdr at offset 16384 are written (dmstats tool/differ.c)
|
||||
|
||||
RUN luks2-invalid-checksum-both-hdrs.img "F" "Failed to recognise corrupted header beyond repair"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[2] Test ability to auto-correct mallformed json area"
|
||||
RUN luks2-corrupted-hdr0-with-correct-chks.img "R" "Failed to auto correct malformed json area at offset 512"
|
||||
# TODO: check epoch is incresed after recovery
|
||||
# TODO: check epoch is increased after recovery
|
||||
# TODO: check only sectors related to corrupted hdr at offset 0 are written (dmstats tool/differ.c)
|
||||
|
||||
RUN luks2-corrupted-hdr1-with-correct-chks.img "R" "Failed to auto correct malformed json area at offset 16896"
|
||||
# TODO: check epoch is incresed after recovery
|
||||
# TODO: check epoch is increased after recovery
|
||||
# TODO: check only sectors related to corrupted hdr at offset 16384 are written (dmstats tool/differ.c)
|
||||
|
||||
RUN luks2-correct-full-json0.img "R" "Failed to parse full and correct json area"
|
||||
# TODO: detect noop (norecovery, epoch untouched)
|
||||
# TODO: check epoch is NOT incresed after recovery of secondary header
|
||||
# TODO: check epoch is NOT increased after recovery of secondary header
|
||||
|
||||
# these tests auto-correct json in-memory only. It'll get fixed on-disk after write operation
|
||||
RUN luks2-argon2-leftover-params.img "R" "Failed to repair keyslot with old argon2 parameters."
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user