Split manual pages into per-action page and use AsciiDoc format

Use pre-generated man pages in make dist.

[Added fixes and updates from Ondrej Kozina and Milan Broz]
This commit is contained in:
daniel.zatovic
2022-05-25 15:13:36 +02:00
committed by Milan Broz
parent fec2517386
commit a2afe0396f
42 changed files with 3849 additions and 2874 deletions

1
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ Makefile.in.in
*.la *.la
*.o *.o
*.so *.so
*.8
**/*.dirstamp **/*.dirstamp
.deps/ .deps/
.libs/ .libs/

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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ sbin_PROGRAMS =
man8_MANS = man8_MANS =
tmpfilesd_DATA = tmpfilesd_DATA =
pkgconfig_DATA = pkgconfig_DATA =
dist_noinst_DATA =
include man/Makemodule.am include man/Makemodule.am
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4
DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS = \ DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS = \
--with-tmpfilesdir=$$dc_install_base/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d \ --with-tmpfilesdir=$$dc_install_base/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d \
--enable-internal-argon2 --enable-internal-sse-argon2 \ --enable-internal-argon2 --enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
--enable-external-tokens --enable-ssh-token --enable-external-tokens --enable-ssh-token --enable-asciidoc
distclean-local: distclean-local:
-find . -name \*~ -o -name \*.orig -o -name \*.rej | xargs rm -f -find . -name \*~ -o -name \*.orig -o -name \*.rej | xargs rm -f

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@@ -52,6 +52,27 @@ AS_VAR_COPY([$1], [pkg_cv_][$1])
AS_VAR_IF([$1], [""], [$5], [$4]) AS_VAR_IF([$1], [""], [$5], [$4])
]) ])
]) ])
dnl ==========================================================================
dnl AsciiDoc manual pages
AC_ARG_ENABLE([asciidoc],
AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-asciidoc], [do not generate man pages from asciidoc]),
[], [enable_asciidoc=yes]
)
AC_PATH_PROG([ASCIIDOCTOR], [asciidoctor])
if test "x$enable_asciidoc" = xyes -a "x$ASCIIDOCTOR" = x; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Building man pages requires asciidoctor installed.])
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_ASCIIDOC], [test "x$enable_asciidoc" = xyes])
have_manpages=no
AS_IF([test -f "$srcdir/man/cryptsetup-open.8"], [
AC_MSG_NOTICE([re-use already generated man-pages.])
have_manpages=yes]
)
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_MANPAGES], [test "x$have_manpages" = xyes])
dnl ========================================================================== dnl ==========================================================================
AC_C_RESTRICT AC_C_RESTRICT

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@@ -1,16 +1,139 @@
EXTRA_DIST += man/cryptsetup.8 man/integritysetup.8 man/veritysetup.8 man/cryptsetup-reencrypt.8 ADOCFILES = \
man/common_options.adoc \
man/common_footer.adoc \
man/cryptsetup.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-open.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-close.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-reencrypt.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-status.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-resize.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-refresh.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksFormat.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksSuspend.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksResume.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksAddKey.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksRemoveKey.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksConvertKey.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksKillSlot.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksChangeKey.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-erase.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksUUID.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-isLuks.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksDump.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksHeaderBackup.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-luksHeaderRestore.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-token.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-convert.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-config.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-tcryptDump.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-bitlkDump.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-repair.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-benchmark.8.adoc \
man/cryptsetup-ssh.8.adoc \
man/veritysetup.8.adoc \
man/integritysetup.8.adoc
man8_MANS += man/cryptsetup.8 man/cryptsetup-reencrypt.8 dist_noinst_DATA += $(ADOCFILES)
CRYPTSETUP_MANPAGES = \
man/cryptsetup.8 \
man/cryptsetup-open.8 \
man/cryptsetup-close.8 \
man/cryptsetup-reencrypt.8 \
man/cryptsetup-status.8 \
man/cryptsetup-resize.8 \
man/cryptsetup-refresh.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksFormat.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksSuspend.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksResume.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksAddKey.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksRemoveKey.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksConvertKey.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksKillSlot.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksChangeKey.8 \
man/cryptsetup-erase.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksUUID.8 \
man/cryptsetup-isLuks.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksDump.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksHeaderBackup.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksHeaderRestore.8 \
man/cryptsetup-token.8 \
man/cryptsetup-convert.8 \
man/cryptsetup-config.8 \
man/cryptsetup-tcryptDump.8 \
man/cryptsetup-bitlkDump.8 \
man/cryptsetup-repair.8 \
man/cryptsetup-benchmark.8
CRYPTSETUP_MANLINKS = \
man/cryptsetup-create.8 \
man/cryptsetup-plainOpen.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksOpen.8 \
man/cryptsetup-loopaesOpen.8 \
man/cryptsetup-tcryptOpen.8 \
man/cryptsetup-bitlkOpen.8 \
man/cryptsetup-luksErase.8
VERITYSETUP_MANPAGES = man/veritysetup.8
INTEGRITYSETUP_MANPAGES = man/integritysetup.8
SSHPLUGIN_MANPAGES = man/cryptsetup-ssh.8
MANPAGES_ALL = \
$(CRYPTSETUP_MANPAGES) \
$(CRYPTSETUP_MANLINKS) \
$(VERITYSETUP_MANPAGES) \
$(INTEGRITYSETUP_MANPAGES) \
$(SSHPLUGIN_MANPAGES)
MANPAGES =
MANLINKS =
if CRYPTSETUP
MANPAGES += $(CRYPTSETUP_MANPAGES)
MANLINKS += $(CRYPTSETUP_MANLINKS)
endif
if VERITYSETUP if VERITYSETUP
man8_MANS += man/veritysetup.8 MANPAGES += $(VERITYSETUP_MANPAGES)
endif endif
if INTEGRITYSETUP if INTEGRITYSETUP
man8_MANS += man/integritysetup.8 MANPAGES += $(INTEGRITYSETUP_MANPAGES)
endif
if SSHPLUGIN_TOKEN
MANPAGES += $(SSHPLUGIN_MANPAGES)
endif endif
if SSHPLUGIN_TOKEN if ENABLE_ASCIIDOC
EXTRA_DIST += man/cryptsetup-ssh.8 EXTRA_DIST += $(MANPAGES_ALL)
man8_MANS += man/cryptsetup-ssh.8 man8_MANS += $(MANPAGES) $(MANLINKS)
SUFFIXES = .8.adoc .8
.8.adoc.8:
$(AM_V_GEN) test -f ./$@ || \
$(ASCIIDOCTOR) -b manpage \
-a 'release-version=$(VERSION)' \
--base-dir=$(abs_srcdir) \
--destination-dir $(abs_builddir)/man $<
$(MANLINKS): $(MANPAGES)
gen-man: $(man8_MANS)
gen-man-dist:
@list=`find -name *.adoc -not -path "*/man/common_*" | sed -e 's/\.adoc//g'`; \
missing=`for p in $$list; do test -f $$p || echo $$p; done`; \
if test -n "$$missing"; then \
$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) $$missing; \
fi;
# !ENABLE_ASCIIDOC
else
if HAVE_MANPAGES
EXTRA_DIST += $(MANPAGES_ALL)
man8_MANS += $(MANPAGES) $(MANLINKS)
endif endif
gen-man:
gen-man-dist:
endif
dist-hook: gen-man-dist

16
man/common_footer.adoc Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
== REPORTING BUGS
Report bugs at mailto:cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev[*cryptsetup mailing list*]
or in https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/issues/new[*Issues project section*].
Please attach output of the failed command with --debug option added.
== SEE ALSO
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions[*Cryptsetup FAQ*]
*cryptsetup*(8), *integritysetup*(8) and *veritysetup*(8)
== CRYPTSETUP
Part of https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/[*cryptsetup project*].

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man/common_options.adoc Normal file

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@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
= cryptsetup-benchmark(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_BENCHMARK:
== Name
cryptsetup-benchmark - benchmarks ciphers and KDF
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _benchmark_ [<options>]*
== DESCRIPTION
Benchmarks ciphers and KDF (key derivation function). Without
parameters, it tries to measure few common configurations.
To benchmark other ciphers or modes, you need to specify *--cipher* and
*--key-size* options or *--hash* for KDF test.
*NOTE:* This benchmark uses memory only and is only informative. You
cannot directly predict real storage encryption speed from it.
For testing block ciphers, this benchmark requires kernel userspace
crypto API to be available (introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38). If you
are configuring kernel yourself, enable "User-space interface for
symmetric key cipher algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section
(CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
*<options>* can be [--cipher, --key-size, --hash].
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
= cryptsetup-bitlkDump(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_BITLKDUMP:
== Name
cryptsetup-bitlkDump - dump the header information of a BITLK (BitLocker compatible) device
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _bitlkDump_ [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Dump the header information of a BITLK (BitLocker compatible) device.
*<options>* can be [--dump-volume-key --volume-key-file].
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
= cryptsetup-close(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_CLOSE:
== Name
cryptsetup-close - removes the existing mapping <name> (and the associated key)
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _close_ [<options>] <name>*
== DESCRIPTION
Removes the existing mapping <name> and wipes the key from kernel
memory.
For backward compatibility, there are *close* command aliases: *remove*,
*plainClose*, *luksClose*, *loopaesClose*, *tcryptClose* (all behave
exactly the same, device type is determined automatically from the active
device).
*<options>* can be [--deferred] or [--cancel-deferred]
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
= cryptsetup-config(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_CONFIG:
== Name
cryptsetup-config - set permanent configuration options (store to LUKS header)
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _config_ <options> <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Set permanent configuration options (store to LUKS header). The _config_
command is supported only for LUKS2.
The permanent options can be _--priority_ to set priority (normal,
prefer, ignore) for keyslot (specified by _--key-slot_) or _--label_ and
_--subsystem_.
*<options>* can be [--priority, --label, --subsystem, --key-slot,
--header].
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
= cryptsetup-convert(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_CONVERT:
== Name
cryptsetup-convert - converts the device between LUKS1 and LUKS2 format
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _convert_ --type <format> [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Converts the device between LUKS1 and LUKS2 format (if possible). The
conversion will not be performed if there is an additional LUKS2 feature
or LUKS1 has unsupported header size.
Conversion (both directions) must be performed on inactive device. There
must not be active dm-crypt mapping established for LUKS header
requested for conversion.
The *--type* option is mandatory with the following accepted values: _luks1_ or
_luks2_.
*WARNING:* The _convert_ action can destroy the LUKS header in the case
of a crash during conversion or if a media error occurs. Always create a
header backup before performing this operation!
*<options>* can be [--header, --type].
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
= cryptsetup-erase(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_ERASE:
== Name
cryptsetup-erase, cryptsetup-luksErase - erase all keyslots
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _erase_ [<options>] <device>* +
*cryptsetup _luksErase_ [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Erase all keyslots and make the LUKS container permanently inaccessible.
You do not need to provide any password for this operation.
*WARNING:* This operation is irreversible.
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
= cryptsetup-isLuks(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_ISLUKS:
== Name
cryptsetup-isLuks - check if a device is a LUKS device
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _isLuks_ [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Returns true, if <device> is a LUKS device, false otherwise. Use option
-v to get human-readable feedback. 'Command successful.' means the
device is a LUKS device.
By specifying --type you may query for specific LUKS version.
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
= cryptsetup-luksAddKey(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSADDKEY:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksAddKey - add a new passphrase
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksAddKey_ [<options>] <device> [<key file with new key>]*
== DESCRIPTION
Adds a new passphrase. An existing passphrase must be supplied
interactively or via --key-file. The new passphrase to be added can be
specified interactively or read from the file given as the positional
argument.
*NOTE:* with --unbound option the action creates new unbound LUKS2
keyslot. The keyslot cannot be used for device activation. If you don't
pass new key via --volume-key-file option, new random key is generated.
Existing passphrase for any active keyslot is not required.
*NOTE:* some parameters are effective only if used with LUKS2 format
that supports per-keyslot parameters. For LUKS1, PBKDF type and hash
algorithm is always the same for all keyslots.
*<options>* can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size,
--new-keyfile-offset, --new-keyfile-size, --key-slot, --volume-key-file,
--force-password, --hash, --header, --disable-locks, --iter-time,
--pbkdf, --pbkdf-force-iterations, --pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel,
--unbound, --type, --keyslot-cipher, --keyslot-key-size].
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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= cryptsetup-luksChangeKey(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSCHANGEKEY:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksChangeKey - change an existing passphrase
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksChangeKey_ [<options>] <device> [<new key file>]*
== DESCRIPTION
Changes an existing passphrase. The passphrase to be changed must be
supplied interactively or via --key-file. The new passphrase can be
supplied interactively or in a file given as the positional argument.
If a key-slot is specified (via --key-slot), the passphrase for that
key-slot must be given and the new passphrase will overwrite the
specified key-slot. If no key-slot is specified and there is still a
free key-slot, then the new passphrase will be put into a free key-slot
before the key-slot containing the old passphrase is purged. If there is
no free key-slot, then the key-slot with the old passphrase is
overwritten directly.
*WARNING:* If a key-slot is overwritten, a media failure during this
operation can cause the overwrite to fail after the old passphrase has
been wiped and make the LUKS container inaccessible.
*NOTE:* some parameters are effective only if used with LUKS2 format
that supports per-keyslot parameters. For LUKS1, PBKDF type and hash
algorithm is always the same for all keyslots.
*<options>* can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size,
--new-keyfile-offset, --iter-time, --pbkdf, --pbkdf-force-iterations,
--pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel, --new-keyfile-size, --key-slot,
--force-password, --hash, --header, --disable-locks, --type,
--keyslot-cipher, --keyslot-key-size].
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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= cryptsetup-luksConvertKey(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSCONVERTKEY:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksConvertKey - converts an existing LUKS2 keyslot to new PBKDF parameters
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksConvertKey_ [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Converts an existing LUKS2 keyslot to new PBKDF parameters. The
passphrase for keyslot to be converted must be supplied interactively or
via --key-file. If no --pbkdf parameters are specified LUKS2 default
PBKDF values will apply.
If a keyslot is specified (via --key-slot), the passphrase for that
keyslot must be given. If no keyslot is specified and there is still a
free keyslot, then the new parameters will be put into a free keyslot
before the keyslot containing the old parameters is purged. If there is
no free keyslot, then the keyslot with the old parameters is overwritten
directly.
*WARNING:* If a keyslot is overwritten, a media failure during this
operation can cause the overwrite to fail after the old parameters have
been wiped and make the LUKS container inaccessible.
*<options>* can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size,
--key-slot, --hash, --header, --disable-locks, --iter-time, --pbkdf,
--pbkdf-force-iterations, --pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel,
--keyslot-cipher, --keyslot-key-size].
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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= cryptsetup-luksDump(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSDUMP:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksDump - dump the header information of a LUKS device
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksDump_ [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Dump the header information of a LUKS device.
If the --dump-volume-key option is used, the LUKS device volume key is
dumped instead of the keyslot info. Together with the --volume-key-file
option, volume key is dumped to a file instead of standard output.
Beware that the volume key cannot be changed without reencryption and
can be used to decrypt the data stored in the LUKS container without a
passphrase and even without the LUKS header. This means that if the
volume key is compromised, the whole device has to be erased or
reencrypted to prevent further access. Use this option carefully.
To dump the volume key, a passphrase has to be supplied, either
interactively or via --key-file.
To dump unbound key (LUKS2 format only), --unbound parameter, specific
--key-slot id and proper passphrase has to be supplied, either
interactively or via --key-file. Optional --volume-key-file parameter
enables unbound keyslot dump to a file.
To dump LUKS2 JSON metadata (without basic heade information like UUID)
use --dump-json-metadata option.
*<options>* can be [--dump-volume-key, --dump-json-metadata, --key-file,
--keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size, --header, --disable-locks,
--volume-key-file, --type, --unbound, --key-slot].
*WARNING:* If --dump-volume-key is used with --key-file and the argument
to --key-file is '-', no validation question will be asked and no
warning given.
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
= cryptsetup-luksFormat(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSFORMAT:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksFormat - initialize a LUKS partition and set the initial passphrase
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksFormat_ [<options>] <device> [<key file>]*
== DESCRIPTION
Initializes a LUKS partition and sets the initial passphrase (for
key-slot 0), either via prompting or via <key file>. Note that if the
second argument is present, then the passphrase is taken from the file
given there, without the need to use the --key-file option. Also note
that for both forms of reading the passphrase from a file you can give
'-' as file name, which results in the passphrase being read from stdin
and the safety-question being skipped.
You cannot call luksFormat on a device or filesystem that is mapped or
in use, e.g., mounted filesystem, used in LVM, active RAID member, etc. The
device or filesystem has to be un-mounted in order to call luksFormat.
To use LUKS2, specify _--type luks2_.
*<options>* can be [--hash, --cipher, --verify-passphrase, --key-size,
--key-slot, --key-file (takes precedence over optional second argument),
--keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size, --use-random | --use-urandom, --uuid,
--volume-key-file, --iter-time, --header, --pbkdf-force-iterations,
--force-password, --disable-locks].
For LUKS2, additional *<options>* can be [--integrity,
--integrity-no-wipe, --sector-size, --label, --subsystem, --pbkdf,
--pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel, --disable-locks, --disable-keyring,
--luks2-metadata-size, --luks2-keyslots-size, --keyslot-cipher,
--keyslot-key-size].
*WARNING:* Doing a luksFormat on an existing LUKS container will make
all data in the old container permanently irretrievable unless you have a
header backup.
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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= cryptsetup-luksHeaderBackup(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSHEADERBACKUP:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksHeaderBackup - store a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksHeaderBackup_ --header-backup-file <file> [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Stores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area. +
Note: Using '-' as filename writes the header backup to a file named
'-'.
*WARNING:* This backup file and a passphrase valid at the time of backup
allows decryption of the LUKS data area, even if the passphrase was
later changed or removed from the LUKS device. Also note that with a
header backup you lose the ability to securely wipe the LUKS device by
just overwriting the header and key-slots. You either need to securely
erase all header backups in addition or overwrite the encrypted data
area as well. The second option is less secure, as some sectors can
survive, e.g., due to defect management.
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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= cryptsetup-luksHeaderRestore(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSHEADERRESTORE:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksHeaderRestore - restore a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksHeaderRestore_ --header-backup-file <file> [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Restores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area from the
specified file. +
Note: Using '-' as filename reads the header backup from a file named
'-'.
*WARNING:* Header and keyslots will be replaced, only the passphrases
from the backup will work afterward.
This command requires that the volume key size and data offset of the
LUKS header already on the device and of the header backup match.
Alternatively, if there is no LUKS header on the device, the backup will
also be written to it.
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
include::man/common_footer.adoc[]

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= cryptsetup-luksKillSlot(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSKILLSLOT:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksKillSlot - wipe a key-slot from the LUKS device
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksKillSlot_ [<options>] <device> <key slot number>*
== DESCRIPTION
Wipe the key-slot number <key slot> from the LUKS device. Except running
in batch-mode (-q) a remaining passphrase must be supplied, either
interactively or via --key-file. This command can remove the last
remaining key-slot, but requires an interactive confirmation when doing
so. Removing the last passphrase makes a LUKS container permanently
inaccessible.
*<options>* can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size,
--header, --disable-locks, --type].
*WARNING:* If you read the passphrase from stdin (without further
argument or with '-' as an argument to --key-file), batch-mode (-q) will
be implicitly switched on and no warning will be given when you remove
the last remaining passphrase from a LUKS container. Removing the last
passphrase makes the LUKS container permanently inaccessible.
*NOTE:* If there is no passphrase provided (on stdin or through
--key-file argument) and batch-mode (-q) is active, the key-slot is
removed without any other warning.
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
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= cryptsetup-luksRemoveKey(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSREMOVEKEY:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksRemoveKey - remove the supplied passphrase from the LUKS device
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksRemoveKey_ [<options>] <device> [<key file with passphrase to be removed>]*
== DESCRIPTION
Removes the supplied passphrase from the LUKS device. The passphrase to
be removed can be specified interactively, as the positional argument or
via --key-file.
*<options>* can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size,
--header, --disable-locks, --type]
*WARNING:* If you read the passphrase from stdin (without further
argument or with '-' as an argument to --key-file), batch-mode (-q) will
be implicitly switched on and no warning will be given when you remove
the last remaining passphrase from a LUKS container. Removing the last
passphrase makes the LUKS container permanently inaccessible.
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
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= cryptsetup-luksResume(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSRESUME:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksResume - resume a suspended device and reinstate the key
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksResume_ [<options>] <name>*
== DESCRIPTION
Resumes a suspended device and reinstates the encryption key. Prompts
interactively for a passphrase if no token is usable (LUKS2 only) or
--key-file is not given.
*<options>* can be [--key-file, --keyfile-size, --header,
--disable-keyring, --disable-locks, --token-id, --token-only,
--token-type, --type]
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
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= cryptsetup-luksSuspend(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSSUSPEND:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksSuspend - suspends an active device and wipes the key
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksSuspend_ [<options>] <name>*
== DESCRIPTION
Suspends an active device (all IO operations will block and accesses to
the device will wait indefinitely) and wipes the encryption key from
kernel memory. Needs kernel 2.6.19 or later.
After this operation, you have to use _luksResume_ to reinstate the
encryption key and unblock the device or _close_ to remove the mapped
device.
*WARNING:* Never suspend the device on which the cryptsetup binary
resides.
*<options>* can be [--header, --disable-locks].
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
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= cryptsetup-luksUUID(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_LUKSUUID:
== Name
cryptsetup-luksUUID - print or set the UUID of a LUKS device
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _luksUUID_ [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Print the UUID of a LUKS device. +
Set new UUID if _--uuid_ option is specified.
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
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man/cryptsetup-open.8.adoc Normal file
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= cryptsetup-open(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_OPEN:
== Name
cryptsetup-open, cryptsetup-create, cryptsetup-plainOpen, cryptsetup-luksOpen, cryptsetup-loopaesOpen, cryptsetup-tcryptOpen, cryptsetup-bitlkOpen - open an encrypted device and create a mapping with a specified name
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _open_ --type <device_type> [<options>] <device> <name>*
== DESCRIPTION
Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
Device type can be _plain_, _luks_ (default), _luks1_, _luks2_,
_loopaes_ or _tcrypt_.
For backward compatibility there are *open* command aliases:
*create* (argument-order <name> <device>): open --type plain +
*plainOpen*: open --type plain +
*luksOpen*: open --type luks +
*loopaesOpen*: open --type loopaes +
*tcryptOpen*: open --type tcrypt +
*bitlkOpen*: open --type bitlk
*<options>* are type specific and are described below for individual
device types. For *create*, the order of the <name> and <device> options
is inverted for historical reasons, all other aliases use the standard
*<device> <name>* order.
=== PLAIN
*open --type plain <device> <name>* +
plainOpen <device> <name> (*old syntax*) +
create <name> <device> (*OBSOLETE syntax*)
Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
*<options>* can be [--hash, --cipher, --verify-passphrase,
--sector-size, --key-file, --keyfile-offset, --key-size, --offset,
--skip, --device-size, --size, --readonly, --shared, --allow-discards,
--refresh]
Example: 'cryptsetup open --type plain /dev/sda10 e1' maps the raw
encrypted device /dev/sda10 to the mapped (decrypted) device
/dev/mapper/e1, which can then be mounted, fsck-ed or have a filesystem
created on it.
=== LUKS
*open --type luks <device> <name>* +
luksOpen <device> <name> (*old syntax*)
Opens the LUKS device <device> and sets up a mapping <name> after
successful verification of the supplied passphrase.
First, the passphrase is searched in LUKS tokens. If it's not found in
any token and also the passphrase is not supplied via --key-file, the
command prompts for it interactively.
*<options>* can be [--key-file, --keyfile-offset, --keyfile-size,
--readonly, --test-passphrase, --allow-discards, --header, --key-slot,
--volume-key-file, --token-id, --token-only, --token-type,
--disable-external-tokens, --disable-keyring, --disable-locks, --type,
--refresh, --serialize-memory-hard-pbkdf, --unbound].
=== loopAES
*open --type loopaes <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile>* +
loopaesOpen <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile> (*old syntax*)
Opens the loop-AES <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.
If the key file is encrypted with GnuPG, then you have to use
--key-file=- and decrypt it before use, e.g., like this: +
gpg --decrypt <keyfile> | cryptsetup loopaesOpen --key-file=- <device>
<name>
*WARNING:* The loop-AES extension cannot use the direct input of the key
file on the real terminal because the keys are separated by end-of-line and
only part of the multi-key file would be read. +
If you need it in script, just use the pipe redirection: +
echo $keyfile | cryptsetup loopaesOpen --key-file=- <device> <name>
Use *--keyfile-size* to specify the proper key length if needed.
Use *--offset* to specify device offset. Note that the units need to be
specified in number of 512 byte sectors.
Use *--skip* to specify the IV offset. If the original device used an
offset and but did not use it in IV sector calculations, you have to
explicitly use *--skip 0* in addition to the offset parameter.
Use *--hash* to override the default hash function for passphrase
hashing (otherwise it is detected according to key size).
*<options>* can be [--key-file, --key-size, --offset, --skip, --hash,
--readonly, --allow-discards, --refresh].
=== TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt
*open --type tcrypt <device> <name>* +
tcryptOpen <device> <name> (*old syntax*)
Opens the TCRYPT (TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt compatible) <device> and sets
up a mapping <name>.
*<options>* can be [--key-file, --tcrypt-hidden, --tcrypt-system,
--tcrypt-backup, --readonly, --test-passphrase, --allow-discards,
--disable-veracrypt, --veracrypt-pim, --veracrypt-query-pim, --header,
--cipher, --hash].
The keyfile parameter allows a combination of file content with the
passphrase and can be repeated. Note that using keyfiles is compatible
with TCRYPT and is different from LUKS keyfile logic.
If *--cipher* or *--hash* options are used, only cipher chains or PBKDF2
variants with the specified hash algorithms are checked. This could
speed up unlocking the device (but also it reveals some information
about the container).
If you use *--header* in combination with hidden or system options, the
header file must contain specific headers on the same positions as the
original encrypted container.
*WARNING:* Option *--allow-discards* cannot be combined with option
*--tcrypt-hidden*. For normal mapping, it can cause the *destruction of
hidden volume* (hidden volume appears as unused space for outer volume
so this space can be discarded).
=== BitLocker
*open --type bitlk <device> <name>* +
bitlkOpen <device> <name> (*old syntax*)
Opens the BITLK (a BitLocker compatible) <device> and sets up a mapping
<name>.
*<options>* can be [--key-file, --readonly, --test-passphrase,
--allow-discards --volume-key-file].
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
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.TH CRYPTSETUP-REENCRYPT "8" "January 2021" "cryptsetup-reencrypt" "Maintenance Commands"
.SH NAME
cryptsetup-reencrypt - tool for offline LUKS device re-encryption
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B cryptsetup-reencrypt <options> <device>
.SH DESCRIPTION
.PP
Cryptsetup-reencrypt can be used to change reencryption parameters
which otherwise require full on-disk data change (re-encryption).
You can regenerate \fBvolume key\fR (the real key used in on-disk encryption
unclocked by passphrase), \fBcipher\fR, \fBcipher mode\fR.
Cryptsetup-reencrypt reencrypts data on LUKS device in-place. During
reencryption process the LUKS device is marked unavailable.
\fINOTE\fR: If you're looking for LUKS2 online reencryption manual please read cryptsetup(8)
man page instead (see reencrypt action). This page is for legacy offline reencryption
utility only.
\fIWARNING\fR: The cryptsetup-reencrypt program is not resistant to hardware
or kernel failures during reencryption (you can lose your data in this case).
\fIALWAYS BE SURE YOU HAVE RELIABLE BACKUP BEFORE USING THIS TOOL.\fR
.br
The reencryption can be temporarily suspended (by TERM signal or by
using ctrl+c) but you need to retain temporary files named LUKS-<uuid>.[log|org|new].
LUKS device is unavailable until reencryption is finished though.
Current working directory must be writable and temporary
files created during reencryption must be present.
For more info about LUKS see cryptsetup(8).
.PP
.SH OPTIONS
.TP
To start (or continue) re-encryption for <device> use:
.PP
\fIcryptsetup-reencrypt\fR <device>
\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-batch-mode, \-\-block-size, \-\-cipher | \-\-keep-key,
\-\-debug, \-\-device-size, \-\-hash, \-\-header, \-\-iter-time | \-\-pbkdf\-force\-iterations,
\-\-key-file, \-\-key-size, \-\-key-slot, \-\-keyfile-offset, \-\-keyfile-size,
\-\-volume\-key\-file, \-\-tries, \-\-pbkdf, \-\-pbkdf\-memory, \-\-pbkdf\-parallel,
\-\-progress-frequency, \-\-use-directio, \-\-use-random | \-\-use-urandom, \-\-use-fsync,
\-\-uuid, \-\-verbose, \-\-write-log]
To encrypt data on (not yet encrypted) device, use \fI\-\-new\fR in combination
with \fI\-\-reduce-device-size\fR or with \fI\-\-header\fR option for detached header.
To remove encryption from device, use \fI\-\-decrypt\fR.
For detailed description of encryption and key file options see \fIcryptsetup(8)\fR
man page.
.TP
.B "\-\-batch-mode, \-q"
Suppresses all warnings and reencryption progress output.
.TP
.B "\-\-block-size, \-B \fIvalue\fR"
Use re-encryption block size of <value> in MiB.
Values can be between 1 and 64 MiB.
.TP
.B "\-\-cipher, \-c" \fI<cipher-spec>\fR
Set the cipher specification string.
.TP
.B "\-\-debug"
Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output
lines are always prefixed by '#'.
.TP
.B "\-\-decrypt"
Remove encryption (decrypt already encrypted device and remove LUKS header).
\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
.TP
.B "\-\-device-size \fIsize[units]\fR"
Instead of real device size, use specified value.
It means that only specified area (from the start of the device
to the specified size) will be reencrypted.
If no unit suffix is specified, the size is in bytes.
Unit suffix can be S for 512 byte sectors, K/M/G/T (or KiB,MiB,GiB,TiB)
for units with 1024 base or KB/MB/GB/TB for 1000 base (SI scale).
\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation.
.TP
.B "\-\-hash, \-h \fI<hash-spec>\fR"
Specifies the hash used in the LUKS1 key setup scheme and volume key digest.
\fBNOTE:\fR if this parameter is not specified, default hash algorithm is always used
for new LUKS1 device header.
\fBNOTE:\fR with LUKS2 format this option is only relevant when new keyslot pbkdf algorithm
is set to PBKDF2 (see \fI\-\-pbkdf\fR).
.TP
.B "\-\-header\fR \fI<LUKS header file>\fR"
Use a detached (separated) metadata device or file where the
LUKS header is stored. This option allows one to store ciphertext
and LUKS header on different devices.
\fBWARNING:\fR There is no check whether the ciphertext device specified
actually belongs to the header given.
If used with \fI\-\-new\fR option, the header file will created (or overwritten).
Use with care.
.TP
.B "\-\-iter-time, \-i \fI<milliseconds>\fR"
The number of milliseconds to spend with PBKDF2 passphrase processing for the
new LUKS header.
.TP
.B "\-\-keep-key"
Do not change encryption key, just reencrypt the LUKS header and keyslots.
This option can be combined only with \fI\-\-hash\fR, \fI\-\-iter-time\fR,
\fI\-\-pbkdf\-force\-iterations\fR, \fI\-\-pbkdf\fR (LUKS2 only),
\fI\-\-pbkdf\-memory\fR (Argon2i/id and LUKS2 only) and \fI\-\-pbkdf\-parallel\fR
(Argon2i/id and LUKS2 only) options.
.TP
.B "\-\-key-file, \-d \fIname\fR"
Read the passphrase from file.
\fBWARNING:\fR \-\-key-file option can be used only if there is only one active keyslot,
or alternatively, also if \-\-key-slot option is specified (then all other keyslots
will be disabled in new LUKS device).
If this option is not used, cryptsetup-reencrypt will ask for all active keyslot
passphrases.
.TP
.B "\-\-key-size, \-s \fI<bits>\fR"
Set key size in bits. The argument has to be a multiple of 8.
The possible key-sizes are limited by the cipher and mode used.
If you are increasing key size, there must be enough space in the LUKS header
for enlarged keyslots (data offset must be large enough) or reencryption
cannot be performed.
If there is not enough space for keyslots with new key size,
you can destructively shrink device with \-\-reduce-device-size option.
.TP
.B "\-\-key-slot, \-S <0-MAX>"
Specify which key slot is used. For LUKS1, max keyslot number is 7. For LUKS2, it's 31.
\fBWARNING:\fR All other keyslots will be disabled if this option is used.
.TP
.B "\-\-keyfile-offset \fIvalue\fR"
Skip \fIvalue\fR bytes at the beginning of the key file.
.TP
.B "\-\-keyfile-size, \-l"
Read a maximum of \fIvalue\fR bytes from the key file.
Default is to read the whole file up to the compiled-in
maximum.
.TP
.B "\-\-volume\-key\-file, \-\-master\-key\-file (OBSOLETE alias)"
Use new volume key stored in a file.
.TP
.B "\-\-new, \-N"
Create new header (encrypt not yet encrypted device).
This option must be used together with \-\-reduce-device-size.
\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
.TP
.B "\-\-pbkdf"
Set Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF) algorithm for LUKS keyslot.
The PBKDF can be: \fIpbkdf2\fR, \fIargon2i\fR for Argon2i or \fIargon2id\fR for Argon2id.
For LUKS1, only \fIpbkdf2\fR is accepted (no need to use this option).
.TP
.B "\-\-pbkdf\-force\-iterations <num>"
Avoid PBKDF benchmark and set time cost (iterations) directly.
.TP
.B "\-\-pbkdf\-memory <number>"
Set the memory cost for PBKDF (for Argon2i/id the number represents kilobytes).
Note that it is maximal value, PBKDF benchmark or available physical memory
can decrease it.
This option is not available for PBKDF2.
.TP
.B "\-\-pbkdf\-parallel <number>"
Set the parallel cost for PBKDF (number of threads, up to 4).
Note that it is maximal value, it is decreased automatically if
CPU online count is lower.
This option is not available for PBKDF2.
.TP
.B "\-\-progress-frequency <seconds>"
Print separate line every <seconds> with reencryption progress.
.TP
.B "\-\-reduce-device-size \fIsize[units]\fR"
Enlarge data offset to specified value by shrinking device size.
This means that last sectors on the original device will be lost,
ciphertext data will be effectively shifted by specified
number of sectors.
It can be useful if you e.g. added some space to underlying
partition (so last sectors contains no data).
For units suffix see \-\-device-size parameter description.
You cannot shrink device more than by 64 MiB (131072 sectors).
\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
Use with extreme care - shrunk filesystems are usually unrecoverable.
.TP
.B "\-\-tries, \-T"
Number of retries for invalid passphrase entry.
.TP
.B "\-\-type <type>"
Use only while encrypting not yet encrypted device (see \-\-new).
Specify LUKS version when performing in-place encryption. If the parameter
is omitted default value (LUKS1) is used. Type may be one of: \fBluks\fR (default),
\fBluks1\fR or \fBluks2\fR.
.TP
.B "\-\-use-directio"
Use direct-io (O_DIRECT) for all read/write data operations related
to block device undergoing reencryption.
Useful if direct-io operations perform better than normal buffered
operations (e.g. in virtual environments).
.TP
.B "\-\-use-fsync"
Use fsync call after every written block. This applies for reencryption
log files as well.
.TP
.B "\-\-use-random"
.TP
.B "\-\-use-urandom"
Define which kernel random number generator will be used to create the volume key.
.TP
.B "\-\-uuid" \fI<uuid>\fR
Use only while resuming an interrupted decryption process (see \-\-decrypt).
To find out what \fI<uuid>\fR to pass look for temporary files LUKS-<uuid>.[|log|org|new]
of the interrupted decryption process.
.TP
.B "\-\-verbose, \-v"
Print more information on command execution.
.TP
.B "\-\-version"
Show the program version.
.TP
.B "\-\-write-log"
Update log file after every block write. This can slow down reencryption
but will minimize data loss in the case of system crash.
.SH RETURN CODES
Cryptsetup-reencrypt returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.
Error codes are: 1 wrong parameters, 2 no permission,
3 out of memory, 4 wrong device specified, 5 device already exists
or device is busy.
.SH EXAMPLES
.TP
Reencrypt /dev/sdb1 (change volume key)
cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1
.TP
Reencrypt and also change cipher and cipher mode
cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 \-c aes-xts-plain64
.TP
Add LUKS encryption to not yet encrypted device
First, be sure you have space added to disk.
Or alternatively shrink filesystem in advance.
.br
Here we need 4096 512-bytes sectors (enough for 2x128 bit key).
fdisk \-u /dev/sdb # move sdb1 partition end + 4096 sectors
(or use resize2fs or tool for your filesystem and shrink it)
cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 \-\-new \-\-reduce-device-size 4096S
.TP
Remove LUKS encryption completely
cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 \-\-decrypt
.SH REPORTING BUGS
Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on
the cryptsetup mailing list at <cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev>
or in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website.
Please attach the output of the failed command with the
\-\-debug option added.
.SH AUTHORS
Cryptsetup-reencrypt was written by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>.
.SH COPYRIGHT
Copyright \(co 2012-2022 Milan Broz
.br
Copyright \(co 2012-2022 Red Hat, Inc.
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
.SH SEE ALSO
The project website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup\fR

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= cryptsetup-reencrypt(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_REENCRYPT:
== Name
cryptsetup-reencrypt - reencrypt LUKS encrypted volumes in-place
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _reencrypt_ [<options>] <device> or --active-name <name> [<new_name>]*
== DESCRIPTION
Run LUKS device reencryption.
There are 3 basic modes of operation:
* device reencryption (_reencrypt_)
* device encryption (_reencrypt_ --encrypt/--new/-N)
* device decryption (_reencrypt_ --decrypt)
<device> or --active-name <name> (LUKS2 only) is mandatory parameter.
Cryptsetup _reencrypt_ action can be used to change reencryption parameters
which otherwise require full on-disk data change (re-encryption). The
_reencrypt_ action reencrypts data on LUKS device in-place.
You can regenerate *volume key* (the real key used in on-disk encryption
unclocked by passphrase), *cipher*, *cipher mode* or *encryption sector size*
(LUKS2 only).
Reencryption process may be safely interrupted by a user via SIGINT
signal (ctrl+c). Same applies to SIGTERM signal (i.e. issued by systemd
during system shutdown).
For in-place encryption mode, the _reencrypt_ action aditionally takes all
options available for _luksFormat_ action for respective LUKS version (see
cryptsetup-luksFormat man page for more details). See *cryptsetup-luksFormat*(8).
*NOTE* that for encrypt and decrypt mode, the whole device must be
treated as unencrypted -- there are no quarantees of confidentiality as
part of the device contains plaintext.
*ALWAYS BE SURE YOU HAVE RELIABLE BACKUP BEFORE USING THIS ACTION ON LUKS DEVICE.*
*<options>* can be [--batch-mode,
--block-size,
--cipher,
--debug,
--debug-json,
--decrypt,
--device-size,
--encrypt,
--force-offline-reencrypt,
--hash,
--header,
--hotzone-size,
--iter-time,
--init-only,
--keep-key,
--key-file,
--key-size,
--key-slot,
--keyfile-offset,
--keyfile-size,
--tries,
--pbkdf,
--pbkdf-force-iterations,
--pbkdf-memory,
--pbkdf-parallel,
--progress-frequency,
--progress-json,
--reduce-device-size,
--resilience,
--resilience-hash,
--resume-only,
--sector-size,
--use-directio,
--use-random,
--use-urandom,
--use-fsync,
--uuid,
--verbose,
--volume-key-file,
--write-log]
== LUKS2 REENCRYPTION
With <device> parameter cryptsetup looks up active <device> dm mapping.
If no active mapping is detected, it starts offline LUKS2 reencryption
otherwise online reencryption takes place.
To resume already initialized or interrupted reencryption, just run the
cryptsetup _reencrypt_ command again to continue the reencryption
operation. Reencryption may be resumed with different --resilience or
--hotzone-size unless implicit datashift resilience mode is used: either
encrypt mode with --reduce-device-size option or decrypt mode with
original LUKS2 header exported in --header file.
If the reencryption process was interrupted abruptly (reencryption
process crash, system crash, poweroff) it may require recovery. The
recovery is currently run automatically on next activation (action
_open_) when needed or explicitly by user (action _repair_).
Optional parameter <new_name> takes effect only with encrypt option
and it activates device <new_name> immediately after encryption
initialization gets finished. That's useful when device needs to be
ready as soon as possible and mounted (used) before full data area
encryption is completed.
== LUKS1 REENCRYPTION
Current working directory must be writable and temporary files created during
reencryption must be present. During reencryption process the LUKS1 device is
marked unavailable and must be offline (no dm-crypt mapping or mounted
filesystem).
*WARNING*: The LUKS1 reencryption code is not resistant to hardware
or kernel failures during reencryption (you can lose your data in this case).
include::man/common_options.adoc[]
== EXAMPLES
*NOTE*: You may drop *--type luks2* option as long as LUKS2 format is
default.
=== LUKS2 ENCRYPTION EXAMPLES
Encrypt LUKS2 device (in-place). Make sure last 32 MiB on _/dev/plaintext_
is unused (e.g.: does not contain filesystem data):
*cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt --type luks2 --reduce-device-size 32m /dev/plaintext_device*
Encrypt LUKS2 device (in-place) with detached header put in a file:
*cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt --type luks2 --header my_luks2_header /dev/plaintext_device*
Initalize LUKS2 in-place encryption operation only and activate the device (not yet encrypted):
*cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt --type luks2 --init-only --reduce-device-size 32m /dev/plaintext_device my_future_luks_device*
Resume online encryption on device initialized in example above:
*cryptsetup reencrypt --resume-only /dev/plaintext_device* or
*cryptsetup reencrypt --active-name my_future_luks_device*
=== LUKS2 REENCRYPTION EXAMPLES
Reencrypt LUKS2 device (refresh volume key only):
*cryptsetup reencrypt /dev/encrypted_device*
=== LUKS2 DECRYPTION EXAMPLES
Decrypt LUKS2 device with header put in head of data device (header file does not exist):
*cryptsetup reencrypt --decrypt --header /export/header/to/file /dev/encrypted_device*
Decrypt LUKS2 device with detached header (header file exists):
*cryptsetup reencrypt --decrypt --header detached-luks2-header /dev/encrypted_device*
Resume interrupted LUKS2 decryption:
*cryptsetup reencrypt --resume-only --header luks2-hdr-file /dev/encrypted_device*
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= cryptsetup-refresh(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_REFRESH:
== Name
cryptsetup-refresh - refresh parameters of an active mapping
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _refresh_ [<options>] <name>*
== DESCRIPTION
Refreshes parameters of active mapping <name>.
Updates parameters of active device <name> without the need to deactivate
the device (and umount filesystem). Currently, it supports parameters
refresh on following devices: LUKS1, LUKS2 (including authenticated
encryption), plain crypt and loop-AES.
Mandatory parameters are identical to those of an open action for
the respective device type.
You may change following parameters on all devices
--perf-same_cpu_crypt, --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus,
--perf-no_read_workqueue, --perf-no_write_workqueue and
--allow-discards.
Refreshing the device without any optional parameter will refresh the device
with default setting (respective to device type).
*LUKS2 only:*
The --integrity-no-journal parameter affects only LUKS2 devices with
the underlying dm-integrity device.
Adding option --persistent stores any combination of device parameters
above in LUKS2 metadata (only after successful refresh operation).
The --disable-keyring parameter refreshes a device with volume key passed in
dm-crypt driver.
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= cryptsetup-repair(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_REPAIR:
== Name
cryptsetup-repair - repair the device metadata
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _repair_ [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Tries to repair the device metadata if possible. Currently supported
only for LUKS device type.
This command is useful to fix some known benign LUKS metadata header
corruptions. Only basic corruptions of unused keyslot are fixable. This
command will only change the LUKS header, not any key-slot data. You may
enforce LUKS version by adding --type option.
It also repairs (upgrades) LUKS2 reencryption metadata by adding
a metadata digest that protects it against malicious changes.
If LUKS2 reencryption was interrupted in the middle of writing
reencryption segment the repair command can be used to perform
reencryption recovery so that reencryption can continue later.
*WARNING:* Always create a binary backup of the original header before
calling this command.
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:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_RESIZE:
== Name
cryptsetup-resize - resize an active mapping
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _resize_ [<options>] <name>*
== DESCRIPTION
Resizes an active mapping <name>.
If --size (in 512-bytes sectors) or --device-size are not specified, the
size is computed from the underlying device. For LUKS it is the size of
the underlying device without the area reserved for LUKS header (see
data payload offset in *luksDump* command). For plain crypt device, the
whole device size is used.
Note that this does not change the raw device geometry, it just changes
how many sectors of the raw device are represented in the mapped device.
If cryptsetup detected volume key for active device loaded in kernel
keyring service, resize action would first try to retrieve the key using
a token. Only if it failed, it'd ask for a passphrase to unlock a
keyslot (LUKS) or to derive a volume key again (plain mode). The kernel
keyring is used by default for LUKS2 devices.
With LUKS2 device additional *<options>* can be [--token-id,
--token-only, --token-type, --key-slot, --key-file, --keyfile-size,
--keyfile-offset, --timeout, --disable-external-tokens, --disable-locks,
--disable-keyring].
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.TH CRYPTSETUP-SSH "8" "June 2021" "cryptsetup-ssh" "Maintenance Commands"
.SH NAME
cryptsetup-ssh \- manage LUKS2 SSH token
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B cryptsetup-ssh
\fI\,<options> <action> <action args>\/\fR
.SH DESCRIPTION
Experimental cryptsetup plugin for unlocking LUKS2 devices with token connected
to an SSH server.
This plugin currently allows only adding a token to an existing key slot, see \fBcryptsetup(8)\fP
for instruction on how to remove, import or export the token.
.SS Add operation
.PP
\fIadd\fR <options> <device>
.IP
Adds the SSH token to \fB<device>\fR.
Specified SSH server must contain a key file on the specified path with a
passphrase for an existing key slot on the device.
Provided credentials will be used by cryptsetup to get the password when
opening the device using the token.
\-\-ssh\-server, \-\-ssh\-user, \-\-ssh\-keypath and -\-ssh\-path
are required for this operation.
.TP
\fB\-\-key\-slot\fR=\fI\,NUM\/\fR
Keyslot to assign the token to. If not specified, the token will be assigned to the first key slot
matching provided passphrase.
.TP
\fB\-\-ssh\-keypath\fR=\fI\,STRING\/\fR
Path to the SSH key for connecting to the remote server.
.TP
\fB\-\-ssh\-path\fR=\fI\,STRING\/\fR
Path to the key file on the remote server.
.TP
\fB\-\-ssh\-server\fR=\fI\,STRING\/\fR
IP address/URL of the remote server for this token.
.TP
\fB\-\-ssh\-user\fR=\fI\,STRING\/\fR
Username used for the remote server.
.IP
.SH OPTIONS
.TP
\fB\-\-debug\fR
Show debug messages
.TP
\fB\-\-debug\-json\fR
Show debug messages including JSON metadata
.TP
\fB\-v\fR, \fB\-\-verbose\fR
Shows more detailed error messages
.TP
\-?, \fB\-\-help\fR
Show help
.TP
\fB\-V\fR, \fB\-\-version\fR
Print program version
.PP
.SH NOTES
The information provided when adding the token (SSH server address, user and paths) will be stored in the LUKS2 header in plaintext.
.SH REPORTING BUGS
Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on
the cryptsetup mailing list at <cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev>
or in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website.
Please attach the output of the failed command with the
\-\-debug option added.
.SH COPYRIGHT
Copyright \(co 2016-2022 Red Hat, Inc.
.br
Copyright \(co 2016-2022 Milan Broz
.br
Copyright \(co 2021-2022 Vojtech Trefny
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
.SH SEE ALSO
The project website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup\fR

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= cryptsetup-ssh(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup-ssh {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
== NAME
cryptsetup-ssh - manage LUKS2 SSH token
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup-ssh <action> [<options>] <action args>*
== DESCRIPTION
Experimental cryptsetup plugin for unlocking LUKS2 devices with token
connected to an SSH server.
This plugin currently allows only adding a token to an existing key
slot. See *cryptsetup(8)* for instructions on how to remove, import or
export the token.
=== Add operation
*add <options> <device>*
Adds the SSH token to *<device>*.
The specified SSH server must contain a key file on the specified path with
a passphrase for an existing key slot on the device. Provided
credentials will be used by cryptsetup to get the password when opening
the device using the token.
Options --ssh-server, --ssh-user, --ssh-keypath and --ssh-path are
required for this operation.
== OPTIONS
**--key-slot**=_NUM_::
Keyslot to assign the token to. If not specified, the token will be
assigned to the first key slot matching provided passphrase.
**--ssh-keypath**=_STRING_::
Path to the SSH key for connecting to the remote server.
**--ssh-path**=_STRING_::
Path to the key file on the remote server.
**--ssh-server**=_STRING_::
IP address/URL of the remote server for this token.
**--ssh-user**=_STRING_::
Username used for the remote server.
*--debug*::
Show debug messages
*--debug-json*::
Show debug messages including JSON metadata
*--verbose, -v*::
Shows more detailed error messages
*--help, -?*::
Show help
*--version, -V*::
Print program version
== NOTES
The information provided when adding the token (SSH server address, user
and paths) will be stored in the LUKS2 header in plaintext.
== AUTHORS
The cryptsetup-ssh tool is written by Vojtech Trefny.
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= cryptsetup-status(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_STATUS:
== Name
cryptsetup-status - report the status for a mapping
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _status_ [<options>] <name>*
== DESCRIPTION
Reports the status for the mapping <name>.
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= cryptsetup-tcryptDump(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_TCRYPTDUMP:
== Name
cryptsetup-tcryptDump - dump the header information of a TCRYPT (TrueCrypt or VeraCrypt compatible) device
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _tcryptDump_ [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Dump the header information of a TCRYPT (TrueCrypt or VeraCrypt compatible) device.
If the --dump-volume-key option is used, the TCRYPT device volume key is
dumped instead of TCRYPT header info. Beware that the volume key (or
concatenated volume keys if cipher chain is used) can be used to decrypt
the data stored in the TCRYPT container without a passphrase. This means
that if the volume key is compromised, the whole device has to be erased
to prevent further access. Use this option carefully.
*<options>* can be [--dump-volume-key, --key-file, --tcrypt-hidden,
--tcrypt-system, --tcrypt-backup, --cipher, --hash].
The keyfile parameter allows a combination of file content with the
passphrase and can be repeated.
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= cryptsetup-token(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: cryptsetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
:COMMON_OPTIONS:
:ACTION_TOKEN:
== Name
cryptsetup-token - manage LUKS2 tokens
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup _token_ <add|remove|import|export> [<options>] <device>*
== DESCRIPTION
Action _add_ creates a new keyring token to enable auto-activation of the
device. For the auto-activation, the passphrase must be stored in
keyring with the specified description. Usually, the passphrase should
be stored in _user_ or _user-session_ keyring. The _token_ command is
supported only for LUKS2.
For adding new keyring token, option --key-description is mandatory.
Also, new token is assigned to key slot specified with --key-slot option
or to all active key slots in the case --key-slot option is omitted.
To remove existing token, specify the token ID which should be removed
with --token-id option.
*WARNING:* The action _token remove_ removes any token type, not just
_keyring_ type from token slot specified by --token-id option.
Action _import_ can store arbitrary valid token json in LUKS2 header. It
may be passed via standard input or via file passed in --json-file
option. If you specify --key-slot then successfully imported token is
also assigned to the key slot.
Action _export_ writes requested token JSON to a file passed with
--json-file or to standard output.
If --token-id is used with action _add_ or action _import_ and a token
with that ID already exists, option --token-replace can be used to
replace the existing token.
*<options>* can be [--header, --token-id, --key-slot, --key-description,
--disable-external-tokens, --disable-locks, --disable-keyring,
--json-file, --token-replace].
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= cryptsetup(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
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:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
== Name
cryptsetup - manage plain dm-crypt, LUKS, and other encrypted volumes
== SYNOPSIS
*cryptsetup <action> [<options>] <action args>*
== DESCRIPTION
cryptsetup is used to conveniently setup dm-crypt managed device-mapper
mappings. These include plain dm-crypt volumes and LUKS volumes. The
difference is that LUKS uses a metadata header and can hence offer more
features than plain dm-crypt. On the other hand, the header is visible
and vulnerable to damage.
In addition, cryptsetup provides limited support for the use of loop-AES
volumes, TrueCrypt, VeraCrypt, and BitLocker compatible volumes.
For more information about specific cryptsetup action see
*cryptsetup-<action>*(8), where *<action>* is the name of the
cryptsetup action.
== BASIC ACTIONS
The following are valid actions for all supported device types.
=== OPEN
*open <device> <name> --type <device_type>*
Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>. +
See *cryptsetup-open*(8).
=== CLOSE
*close <name>*
Removes the existing mapping <name> and wipes the key from kernel memory. +
See *cryptsetup-close*(8).
=== STATUS
*status <name>*
Reports the status for the mapping <name>. +
See *cryptsetup-status*(8).
=== RESIZE
*resize <name>*
Resizes an active mapping <name>. +
See *cryptsetup-resize*(8).
=== REFRESH
*refresh <name>*
Refreshes parameters of active mapping <name>. +
See *cryptsetup-refresh*(8).
=== REENCRYPT
*reencrypt <device> or --active-name <name> [<new_name>]*
Run LUKS device reencryption. +
See *cryptsetup-reencrypt*(8).
== PLAIN MODE
Plain dm-crypt encrypts the device sector-by-sector with a single,
non-salted hash of the passphrase. No checks are performed, no metadata
is used. There is no formatting operation. When the raw device is mapped
(opened), the usual device operations can be used on the mapped device,
including filesystem creation. Mapped devices usually reside in
/dev/mapper/<name>.
The following are valid plain device type actions:
=== OPEN
*open --type plain <device> <name>* +
create <name> <device> (*OBSOLETE syntax*)
Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>. +
See *cryptsetup-open*(8).
== LUKS EXTENSION
LUKS, the Linux Unified Key Setup, is a standard for disk encryption. It
adds a standardized header at the start of the device, a key-slot area
directly behind the header and the bulk data area behind that. The whole
set is called a 'LUKS container'. The device that a LUKS container
resides on is called a 'LUKS device'. For most purposes, both terms can
be used interchangeably. But note that when the LUKS header is at a
nonzero offset in a device, then the device is not a LUKS device
anymore, but has a LUKS container stored in it at an offset.
LUKS can manage multiple passphrases that can be individually revoked or
changed and that can be securely scrubbed from persistent media due to
the use of anti-forensic stripes. Passphrases are protected against
brute-force and dictionary attacks by Password-Based Key Derivation
Function (PBKDF).
LUKS2 is a new version of header format that allows additional
extensions like different PBKDF algorithm or authenticated encryption.
You can format device with LUKS2 header if you specify *--type luks2* in
*luksFormat* command. For activation, the format is already recognized
automatically.
Each passphrase, also called a *key* in this document, is associated
with one of 8 key-slots. Key operations that do not specify a slot
affect the first slot that matches the supplied passphrase or the first
empty slot if a new passphrase is added.
The *<device>* parameter can also be specified by a LUKS UUID in the
format UUID=<uuid>. Translation to real device name uses symlinks in
/dev/disk/by-uuid directory.
To specify a detached header, the *--header* parameter can be used in
all LUKS commands and always takes precedence over the positional
*<device>* parameter.
The following are valid LUKS actions:
=== FORMAT
*luksFormat <device> [<key file>]*
Initializes a LUKS partition and sets the initial passphrase (for key-slot 0). +
See *cryptsetup-luksFormat*(8).
=== OPEN
*open --type luks <device> <name>* +
luksOpen <device> <name> (*old syntax*)
Opens the LUKS device <device> and sets up a mapping <name> after
successful verification of the supplied passphrase. +
See *cryptsetup-open*(8).
=== SUSPEND
*luksSuspend <name>*
Suspends an active device (all IO operations will block and accesses to
the device will wait indefinitely) and wipes the encryption key from
kernel memory. +
See *cryptsetup-luksSuspend*(8).
=== RESUME
*luksResume <name>*
Resumes a suspended device and reinstates the encryption key. +
See *cryptsetup-luksResume*(8).
=== ADD KEY
*luksAddKey <device> [<key file with new key>]*
Adds a new passphrase using an existing passphrase. +
See *cryptsetup-luksAddKey*(8).
=== REMOVE KEY
*luksRemoveKey <device> [<key file with passphrase to be removed>]*
Removes the supplied passphrase from the LUKS device. +
See *cryptsetup-luksRemoveKey*(8).
=== CHANGE KEY
*luksChangeKey <device> [<new key file>]*
Changes an existing passphrase. +
See *cryptsetup-luksChangeKey*(8).
=== CONVERT KEY
*luksConvertKey <device>*
Converts an existing LUKS2 keyslot to new PBKDF parameters. +
See *cryptsetup-luksConvertKey*(8).
=== KILL SLOT
*luksKillSlot <device> <key slot number>*
Wipe the key-slot number <key slot> from the LUKS device. +
See *cryptsetup-luksKillSlot*(8).
=== ERASE
*erase <device>* +
luksErase <device> (*old syntax*)
Erase all keyslots and make the LUKS container permanently inaccessible. +
See *cryptsetup-erase*(8).
=== UUID
*luksUUID <device>*
Print or set the UUID of a LUKS device. +
See *cryptsetup-luksUUID*(8).
=== IS LUKS
*isLuks <device>*
Returns true, if <device> is a LUKS device, false otherwise. +
See *cryptsetup-isLuks*(8).
=== DUMP
*luksDump <device>*
Dump the header information of a LUKS device. +
See *cryptsetup-luksDump*(8).
=== HEADER BACKUP
*luksHeaderBackup <device> --header-backup-file <file>*
Stores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area. +
See *cryptsetup-luksHeaderBackup*(8).
=== HEADER RESTORE
*luksHeaderRestore <device> --header-backup-file <file>*
Restores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area from the
specified file. +
See *cryptsetup-luksHeaderRestore*(8).
=== TOKEN
*token <add|remove|import|export> <device>*
Manipulate token objects used for obtaining passphrases. +
See *cryptsetup-token*(8).
=== CONVERT
*convert <device> --type <format>*
Converts the device between LUKS1 and LUKS2 format (if possible). +
See *cryptsetup-convert*(8).
=== CONFIG
*config <device>*
Set permanent configuration options (store to LUKS header). +
See *cryptsetup-config*(8).
== loop-AES EXTENSION
cryptsetup supports mapping loop-AES encrypted partition using a
compatibility mode.
=== OPEN
*open --type loopaes <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile>* +
loopaesOpen <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile> (*old syntax*)
Opens the loop-AES <device> and sets up a mapping <name>. +
See *cryptsetup-open*(8).
See also section 7 of the FAQ and http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net[loop-AES]
for more information regarding loop-AES.
== TCRYPT (TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt compatible) EXTENSION
cryptsetup supports mapping of TrueCrypt, tcplay or VeraCrypt encrypted
partition using a native Linux kernel API. Header formatting and TCRYPT
header change is not supported, cryptsetup never changes TCRYPT header
on-device.
TCRYPT extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be available
(introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38). If you are configuring kernel
yourself, enable "User-space interface for symmetric key cipher
algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section
(CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
Because TCRYPT header is encrypted, you have to always provide valid
passphrase and keyfiles.
Cryptsetup should recognize all header variants, except legacy cipher
chains using LRW encryption mode with 64 bits encryption block (namely
Blowfish in LRW mode is not recognized, this is limitation of kernel
crypto API).
VeraCrypt is extension of TrueCrypt header with increased iteration
count so unlocking can take quite a lot of time.
To open a VeraCrypt device with a custom Personal Iteration Multiplier
(PIM) value, use either the *--veracrypt-pim=<PIM>* option to directly
specify the PIM on the command- line or use *--veracrypt-query-pim* to
be prompted for the PIM.
The PIM value affects the number of iterations applied during key
derivation. Please refer to
https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Personal%20Iterations%20Multiplier%20%28PIM%29.html[PIM]
for more detailed information.
If you need to disable VeraCrypt device support, use
*--disable-veracrypt* option.
*NOTE:* Activation with *tcryptOpen* is supported only for cipher chains
using LRW or XTS encryption modes.
The *tcryptDump* command should work for all recognized TCRYPT devices
and doesn't require superuser privilege.
To map system device (device with boot loader where the whole encrypted
system resides) use *--tcrypt-system* option. You can use partition
device as the parameter (parameter must be real partition device, not an
image in a file), then only this partition is mapped.
If you have the whole TCRYPT device as a file image and you want to map
multiple partition encrypted with system encryption, please create
loopback mapping with partitions first (*losetup -P*, see *losetup(8)*
man page for more info), and use loop partition as the device parameter.
If you use the whole base device as a parameter, one device for the
whole system encryption is mapped. This mode is available only for
backward compatibility with older cryptsetup versions which mapped
TCRYPT system encryption using the whole device.
To use hidden header (and map hidden device, if available), use
*--tcrypt-hidden* option.
To explicitly use backup (secondary) header, use *--tcrypt-backup*
option.
*NOTE:* There is no protection for a hidden volume if the outer volume
is mounted. The reason is that if there were any protection, it would
require some metadata describing what to protect in the outer volume and
the hidden volume would become detectable.
=== OPEN
*open --type tcrypt <device> <name>* +
tcryptOpen_ <device> <name> (*old syntax*)
Opens the TCRYPT (a TrueCrypt-compatible) <device> and sets up a mapping
<name>. +
See *cryptsetup-open*(8).
=== DUMP
*tcryptDump <device>*
Dump the header information of a TCRYPT device. +
See *cryptsetup-tcryptDump*(8).
See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt[*TrueCrypt*] and
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt[*VeraCrypt*] pages for more information.
Please note that cryptsetup does not use TrueCrypt or VeraCrypt code, please
report all problems related to this compatibility extension to the cryptsetup
project.
== BITLK (Windows BitLocker compatible) EXTENSION
cryptsetup supports mapping of BitLocker and BitLocker to Go encrypted
partition using a native Linux kernel API. Header formatting and BITLK
header changes are not supported, cryptsetup never changes BITLK header
on-device.
BITLK extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be available
(for details see TCRYPT section).
Cryptsetup should recognize all BITLK header variants, except legacy
header used in Windows Vista systems and partially decrypted BitLocker
devices. Activation of legacy devices encrypted in CBC mode requires at
least Linux kernel version 5.3 and for devices using Elephant diffuser
kernel 5.6.
The *bitlkDump* command should work for all recognized BITLK devices and
doesn't require superuser privilege.
For unlocking with the *open* a password or a recovery passphrase or a
startup key must be provided.
Additionally unlocking using volume key is supported. You must provide
BitLocker Full Volume Encryption Key (FVEK) using the --volume-key-file
option. The key must be decrypted and without the header (only
128/256/512 bits of key data depending on used cipher and mode).
Other unlocking methods (TPM, SmartCard) are not supported.
=== OPEN
*open --type bitlk <device> <name>* +
bitlkOpen <device> <name> (*old syntax*)
Opens the BITLK (a BitLocker-compatible) <device> and sets up a mapping
<name>. +
See *cryptsetup-open*(8).
=== DUMP
*bitlkDump <device>*
Dump the header information of a BITLK device. +
See *cryptsetup-bitlkDump*(8).
Please note that cryptsetup does not use any Windows BitLocker code,
please report all problems related to this compatibility extension to
the cryptsetup project.
== MISCELLANEOUS ACTIONS
=== REPAIR
*repair <device>*
Tries to repair the device metadata if possible. Currently supported
only for LUKS device type. +
See *cryptsetup-repair*(8).
=== BENCHMARK
*benchmark <options>*
Benchmarks ciphers and KDF (key derivation function). +
See *cryptsetup-benchmark*(8).
== PLAIN DM-CRYPT OR LUKS?
Unless you understand the cryptographic background well, use LUKS. With
plain dm-crypt there are a number of possible user errors that massively
decrease security. While LUKS cannot fix them all, it can lessen the
impact for many of them.
== WARNINGS
A lot of good information on the risks of using encrypted storage, on
handling problems and on security aspects can be found in the
Cryptsetup FAQ. Read it. Nonetheless, some risks deserve to be
mentioned here.
*Backup:* Storage media die. Encryption has no influence on that. Backup
is mandatory for encrypted data as well, if the data has any worth. See
the Cryptsetup FAQ for advice on how to do a backup of an encrypted
volume.
*Character encoding:* If you enter a passphrase with special symbols,
the passphrase can change depending on character encoding. Keyboard
settings can also change, which can make blind input hard or impossible.
For example, switching from some ASCII 8-bit variant to UTF-8 can lead
to a different binary encoding and hence different passphrase seen by
cryptsetup, even if what you see on the terminal is exactly the same. It
is therefore highly recommended to select passphrase characters only
from 7-bit ASCII, as the encoding for 7-bit ASCII stays the same for all
ASCII variants and UTF-8.
*LUKS header:* If the header of a LUKS volume gets damaged, all data is
permanently lost unless you have a header-backup. If a key-slot is
damaged, it can only be restored from a header-backup or if another
active key-slot with known passphrase is undamaged. Damaging the LUKS
header is something people manage to do with surprising frequency. This
risk is the result of a trade-off between security and safety, as LUKS
is designed for fast and secure wiping by just overwriting header and
key-slot area.
*Previously used partitions:* If a partition was previously used, it is
a very good idea to wipe filesystem signatures, data, etc. before
creating a LUKS or plain dm-crypt container on it. For a quick removal
of filesystem signatures, use *wipefs*(8). Take care though that this may
not remove everything. In particular, MD RAID signatures at the end of a
device may survive. It also does not remove data. For a full wipe,
overwrite the whole partition before container creation. If you do not
know how to do that, the cryptsetup FAQ describes several options.
== EXAMPLES
Example 1: Create LUKS 2 container on block device /dev/sdX.::
sudo cryptsetup --type luks2 luksFormat /dev/sdX
Example 2: Add an additional passphrase to key slot 5.::
sudo cryptsetup luksAddKey --key-slot 5 /dev/sdX
Example 3: Create LUKS header backup and save it to file.::
sudo cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/sdX --header-backup-file
/var/tmp/NameOfBackupFile
Example 4: Open LUKS container on /dev/sdX and map it to sdX_crypt.::
sudo cryptsetup open /dev/sdX sdX_crypt
*WARNING: The command in example 5 will erase all key slots.*::
Your cannot use your LUKS container afterward anymore unless you have
a backup to restore.
Example 5: Erase all key slots on /dev/sdX.::
sudo cryptsetup erase /dev/sdX
Example 6: Restore LUKS header from backup file.::
sudo cryptsetup luksHeaderRestore /dev/sdX --header-backup-file
/var/tmp/NameOfBackupFile
== RETURN CODES
Cryptsetup returns *0* on success and a non-zero value on error.
Error codes are: *1* wrong parameters, *2* no permission (bad passphrase),
*3* out of memory, *4* wrong device specified, *5* device already exists
or device is busy.
== NOTES
=== Passphrase processing for PLAIN mode
Note that no iterated hashing or salting is done in plain mode. If
hashing is done, it is a single direct hash. This means that low-entropy
passphrases are easy to attack in plain mode.
*From a terminal*: The passphrase is read until the first newline, i.e.
'\n'. The input without the newline character is processed with the
default hash or the hash specified with --hash. The hash result will be
truncated to the key size of the used cipher, or the size specified with
-s.
*From stdin*: Reading will continue until a newline (or until the
maximum input size is reached), with the trailing newline stripped. The
maximum input size is defined by the same compiled-in default as for the
maximum key file size and can be overwritten using --keyfile-size
option.
The data read will be hashed with the default hash or the hash specified
with --hash. The hash result will be truncated to the key size of the
used cipher, or the size specified with -s.
Note that if --key-file=- is used for reading the key from stdin,
trailing newlines are not stripped from the input.
If "plain" is used as argument to --hash, the input data will not be
hashed. Instead, it will be zero padded (if shorter than the key size)
or truncated (if longer than the key size) and used directly as the
binary key. This is useful for directly specifying a binary key. No
warning will be given if the amount of data read from stdin is less than
the key size.
*From a key file*: It will be truncated to the key size of the used
cipher or the size given by -s and directly used as a binary key.
*WARNING*: The --hash argument is being ignored. The --hash option is
usable only for stdin input in plain mode.
If the key file is shorter than the key, cryptsetup will quit with an
error. The maximum input size is defined by the same compiled-in default
as for the maximum key file size and can be overwritten using
--keyfile-size option.
=== Passphrase processing for LUKS
LUKS uses PBKDF to protect against dictionary attacks and to give some
protection to low-entropy passphrases (see cryptsetup FAQ).
*From a terminal*: The passphrase is read until the first newline and
then processed by PBKDF2 without the newline character.
*From stdin*: LUKS will read passphrases from stdin up to the first
newline character or the compiled-in maximum key file length. If
--keyfile-size is given, it is ignored.
*From key file*: The complete keyfile is read up to the compiled-in
maximum size. Newline characters do not terminate the input. The
--keyfile-size option can be used to limit what is read.
*Passphrase processing*: Whenever a passphrase is added to a LUKS header
(luksAddKey, luksFormat), the user may specify how much the time the
passphrase processing should consume. The time is used to determine the
iteration count for PBKDF2 and higher times will offer better protection
for low-entropy passphrases, but open will take longer to complete. For
passphrases that have entropy higher than the used key length, higher
iteration times will not increase security.
The default setting of one or two seconds is sufficient for most
practical cases. The only exception is a low-entropy passphrase used on
a device with a slow CPU, as this will result in a low iteration count.
On a slow device, it may be advisable to increase the iteration time
using the --iter-time option in order to obtain a higher iteration
count. This does slow down all later luksOpen operations accordingly.
=== Incoherent behavior for invalid passphrases/keys
LUKS checks for a valid passphrase when an encrypted partition is
unlocked. The behavior of plain dm-crypt is different. It will always
decrypt with the passphrase given. If the given passphrase is wrong, the
device mapped by plain dm-crypt will essentially still contain encrypted
data and will be unreadable.
=== Supported ciphers, modes, hashes and key sizes
The available combinations of ciphers, modes, hashes and key sizes
depend on kernel support. See /proc/crypto for a list of available
options. You might need to load additional kernel crypto modules in
order to get more options.
For the --hash option, if the crypto backend is libgcrypt, then all
algorithms supported by the gcrypt library are available. For other
crypto backends, some algorithms may be missing.
=== Notes on passphrases
Mathematics can't be bribed. Make sure you keep your passphrases safe.
There are a few nice tricks for constructing a fallback, when suddenly
out of the blue, your brain refuses to cooperate. These fallbacks need
LUKS, as it's only possible with LUKS to have multiple passphrases.
Still, if your attacker model does not prevent it, storing your
passphrase in a sealed envelope somewhere may be a good idea as well.
=== Notes on Random Number Generators
Random Number Generators (RNG) used in cryptsetup are always the kernel
RNGs without any modifications or additions to data stream produced.
There are two types of randomness cryptsetup/LUKS needs. One type (which
always uses /dev/urandom) is used for salts, the AF splitter and for
wiping deleted keyslots.
The second type is used for the volume key. You can switch between using
/dev/random and /dev/urandom here, see *--use-random* and
*--use-urandom* options. Using /dev/random on a system without enough
entropy sources can cause *luksFormat* to block until the requested
amount of random data is gathered. In a low-entropy situation (embedded
system), this can take a very long time and potentially forever. At the
same time, using /dev/urandom in a low-entropy situation will produce
low-quality keys. This is a serious problem, but solving it is out of
scope for a mere man-page. See *urandom(4)* for more information.
=== Authenticated disk encryption (EXPERIMENTAL)
Since Linux kernel version 4.12 dm-crypt supports authenticated disk
encryption.
Normal disk encryption modes are length-preserving (plaintext sector is
of the same size as a ciphertext sector) and can provide only
confidentiality protection, but not cryptographically sound data
integrity protection.
Authenticated modes require additional space per-sector for
authentication tag and use Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data
(AEAD) algorithms.
If you configure LUKS2 device with data integrity protection, there will
be an underlying dm-integrity device, which provides additional
per-sector metadata space and also provide data journal protection to
ensure atomicity of data and metadata update. Because there must be
additional space for metadata and journal, the available space for the
device will be smaller than for length-preserving modes.
The dm-crypt device then resides on top of such a dm-integrity device.
All activation and deactivation of this device stack is performed by
cryptsetup, there is no difference in using *luksOpen* for integrity
protected devices. If you want to format LUKS2 device with data
integrity protection, use *--integrity* option.
Since dm-integrity doesn't support discards (TRIM), dm-crypt device on
top of it inherits this, so integrity protection mode doesn't support
discards either.
Some integrity modes requires two independent keys (key for encryption
and for authentication). Both these keys are stored in one LUKS keyslot.
*WARNING:* All support for authenticated modes is experimental and there
are only some modes available for now. Note that there are a very few
authenticated encryption algorithms that are suitable for disk
encryption. You also cannot use CRC32 or any other non-cryptographic
checksums (other than the special integrity mode "none"). If for some
reason you want to have integrity control without using authentication
mode, then you should separately configure dm-integrity independently of
LUKS2.
=== Notes on loopback device use
Cryptsetup is usually used directly on a block device (disk partition or
LVM volume). However, if the device argument is a file, cryptsetup tries
to allocate a loopback device and map it into this file. This mode
requires Linux kernel 2.6.25 or more recent which supports the loop
autoclear flag (loop device is cleared on the last close automatically).
Of course, you can always map a file to a loop-device manually. See the
cryptsetup FAQ for an example.
When device mapping is active, you can see the loop backing file in the
status command output. Also see losetup(8).
=== LUKS2 header locking
The LUKS2 on-disk metadata is updated in several steps and to achieve
proper atomic update, there is a locking mechanism. For an image in
file, code uses *flock(2)* system call. For a block device, lock is
performed over a special file stored in a locking directory (by default
*/run/cryptsetup*). The locking directory should be created with the
proper security context by the distribution during the boot-up phase.
Only LUKS2 uses locks, other formats do not use this mechanism.
=== LUKS on-disk format specification
For LUKS on-disk metadata specification see
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification[*LUKS1*] and
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs[*LUKS2*].
== AUTHORS
Cryptsetup is originally written by mailto:jana@saout.de[Jana Saout]. +
The LUKS extensions and original man page were written by
mailto:clemens@endorphin.org[Clemens Fruhwirth]. +
Man page extensions by mailto:gmazyland@gmail.com[Milan Broz]. +
Man page rewrite and extension by mailto:arno@wagner.name[Arno Wagner].
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.TH INTEGRITYSETUP "8" "January 2021" "integritysetup" "Maintenance Commands"
.SH NAME
integritysetup - manage dm-integrity (block level integrity) volumes
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B integritysetup <options> <action> <action args>
.SH DESCRIPTION
.PP
Integritysetup is used to configure dm-integrity managed device-mapper mappings.
Device-mapper integrity target provides read-write transparent integrity
checking of block devices. The dm-integrity target emulates additional data
integrity field per-sector. You can use this additional field directly
with integritysetup utility, or indirectly (for authenticated encryption)
through cryptsetup.
Integritysetup supports these operations:
.PP
\fIformat\fR <device>
.IP
Formats <device> (calculates space and dm-integrity superblock and wipes the device).
\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-data\-device, \-\-batch\-mode, \-\-no\-wipe, \-\-journal\-size,
\-\-interleave\-sectors, \-\-tag\-size, \-\-integrity, \-\-integrity\-key\-size,
\-\-integrity\-key\-file, \-\-sector\-size, \-\-progress\-frequency, \-\-progress\-json]
.PP
\fIopen\fR <device> <name>
.br
\fIcreate\fR <name> <device> (\fBOBSOLETE syntax\fR)
.IP
Open a mapping with <name> backed by device <device>.
\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-data\-device, \-\-batch\-mode, \-\-journal\-watermark,
\-\-journal\-commit\-time, \-\-buffer\-sectors, \-\-integrity, \-\-integrity\-key\-size,
\-\-integrity\-key\-file, \-\-integrity\-no\-journal, \-\-integrity\-recalculate,
\-\-integrity\-recalculate-reset,\-\-integrity\-recovery\-mode, \-\-allow\-discards]
.PP
\fIclose\fR <name>
.IP
Removes existing mapping <name>.
For backward compatibility, there is \fBremove\fR command alias
for the \fBclose\fR command.
\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-deferred] or [\-\-cancel\-deferred]
.PP
\fIstatus\fR <name>
.IP
Reports status for the active integrity mapping <name>.
.PP
\fIdump\fR <device>
.IP
Reports parameters from on-disk stored superblock.
.PP
\fIresize\fR <name>
.IP
Resizes an active mapping <name>.
If \-\-size (in 512-bytes sectors) or \-\-device\-size are not specified,
the size is computed from the underlying device. After resize, the
\fBrecalculating\fR flag is set. If \-\-wipe flag is set and the size of the
device is increased, the newly added section will be wiped.
Increasing the size of integrity volumes is available since the Linux kernel
version 5.7, shrinking should work on older kernels too.
\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-size, \-\-device\-size, \-\-wipe]
.SH OPTIONS
.TP
.B "\-\-verbose, \-v"
Print more information on command execution.
.TP
.B "\-\-debug"
Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output
lines are always prefixed by '#'.
.TP
.B "\-\-version"
Show the program version.
.TP
.B "\-\-batch\-mode"
Do not ask for confirmation.
.TP
.B "\-\-progress-frequency <seconds>"
Print separate line every <seconds> with wipe progress.
.TP
.B "\-\-progress-json"
Prints wipe progress data in json format suitable mostly for machine processing.
It prints separate line every half second (or based on \fI\-\-progress\-frequency\fR value).
The json output looks as follows during wipe progress (except it's compact single line):
.EX
{
"device":"/dev/sda" // backing device or file
"device_bytes":"8192", // bytes wiped so far
"device_size":"44040192", // total bytes to wipe
"speed":"126877696", // calculated speed in bytes per second (based on progress so far)
"eta_ms":"2520012" // estimated time to finish wipe in milliseconds
"time_ms":"5561235" // total time spent wiping device in milliseconds
}
.EE
Note on numbers in json output: Due to json parsers limitations all numbers are represented in a string format
due to need of full 64bit unsigned integers.
.TP
.B "\-\-no\-wipe"
Do not wipe the device after format. A device that is not initially wiped will contain invalid checksums.
.TP
.B "\-\-wipe"
Wipe the newly allocated area after resize to bigger size. If this flag is not set, checksums will be calculated for the data previously stored in the newly allocated area.
.TP
.B "\-\-journal\-size, \-j BYTES"
Size of the journal.
.TP
.B "\-\-interleave\-sectors SECTORS"
The number of interleaved sectors.
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity\-recalculate"
Automatically recalculate integrity tags in kernel on activation.
The device can be used during automatic integrity recalculation but becomes fully
integrity protected only after the background operation is finished.
This option is available since the Linux kernel version 4.19.
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity\-recalculate\-reset"
Restart recalculation from the beginning of the device.
It can be used to change the integrity checksum function.
Note it does not change the tag length.
This option is available since the Linux kernel version 5.13.
.TP
.B "\-\-journal\-watermark PERCENT"
Journal watermark in percents. When the size of the journal exceeds this watermark,
the journal flush will be started.
.TP
.B "\-\-journal\-commit\-time MS"
Commit time in milliseconds. When this time passes (and no explicit flush operation was issued),
the journal is written.
.TP
.B "\-\-tag\-size, \-t BYTES"
Size of the integrity tag per-sector (here the integrity function will store authentication tag).
\fBNOTE:\fR The size can be smaller that output size of the hash function, in that case only
part of the hash will be stored.
.TP
.B "\-\-data\-device <data_device>"
Specify a separate data device that contains existing data. The <device> then will contain
calculated integrity tags and journal for data on <data_device>.
\fBNOTE:\fR To not wipe the data device after initial format, also specify \-\-no-wipe option
and activate with \-\-integrity-recalculate to automatically recalculate integrity tags.
.TP
.B "\-\-sector\-size, \-s BYTES"
Sector size (power of two: 512, 1024, 2048, 4096).
.TP
.B "\-\-buffer\-sectors SECTORS"
The number of sectors in one buffer.
The tag area is accessed using buffers, the large buffer size means that the I/O size will
be larger, but there could be less I/Os issued.
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity, \-I ALGORITHM"
Use internal integrity calculation (standalone mode).
The integrity algorithm can be CRC (crc32c/crc32), non-cryptographic hash function (xxhash64) or hash function (sha1, sha256).
For HMAC (hmac-sha256) you have also to specify an integrity key and its size.
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity\-key\-size BYTES"
The size of the data integrity key. Maximum is 4096 bytes.
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity\-key\-file FILE"
The file with the integrity key.
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity\-no\-journal, \-D"
Disable journal for integrity device.
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity\-bitmap\-mode. \-B"
Use alternate bitmap mode (available since Linux kernel 5.2) where dm-integrity uses bitmap
instead of a journal. If a bit in the bitmap is 1, the corresponding region's data and integrity tags
are not synchronized - if the machine crashes, the unsynchronized regions will be recalculated.
The bitmap mode is faster than the journal mode, because we don't have to write the data
twice, but it is also less reliable, because if data corruption happens
when the machine crashes, it may not be detected.
.TP
.B "\-\-bitmap\-sectors\-per\-bit SECTORS"
Number of 512-byte sectors per bitmap bit, the value must be power of two.
.TP
.B "\-\-bitmap\-flush\-time MS"
Bitmap flush time in milliseconds.
.TP
\fBWARNING:\fR
In case of a crash, it is possible that the data and integrity tag doesn't match
if the journal is disabled.
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity\-recovery\-mode. \-R"
Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking).
.TP
\fBNOTE:\fR The following options are intended for testing purposes only.
Using journal encryption does not make sense without encryption the data,
these options are internally used in authenticated disk encryption with \fBcryptsetup(8)\fR.
.TP
.B "\-\-journal\-integrity ALGORITHM"
Integrity algorithm for journal area.
See \-\-integrity option for detailed specification.
.TP
.B "\-\-journal\-integrity\-key\-size BYTES"
The size of the journal integrity key. Maximum is 4096 bytes.
.TP
.B "\-\-journal\-integrity\-key\-file FILE"
The file with the integrity key.
.TP
.B "\-\-journal\-crypt ALGORITHM"
Encryption algorithm for journal data area.
You can use a block cipher here such as cbc-aes or
a stream cipher, for example, chacha20 or ctr-aes.
.TP
.B "\-\-journal\-crypt\-key\-size BYTES"
The size of the journal encryption key. Maximum is 4096 bytes.
.TP
.B "\-\-journal\-crypt\-key\-file FILE"
The file with the journal encryption key.
.TP
.B "\-\-allow\-discards\fR"
Allow the use of discard (TRIM) requests for the device.
This option is available since the Linux kernel version 5.7.
.TP
.B "\-\-deferred"
Defers device removal in \fIclose\fR command until the last user closes it.
.TP
.B "\-\-cancel\-deferred"
Removes a previously configured deferred device removal in \fIclose\fR command.
.TP
The dm-integrity target is available since Linux kernel version 4.12.
.TP
\fBNOTE:\fR
Format and activation of an integrity device always require superuser
privilege because the superblock is calculated and handled in dm-integrity kernel target.
.SH LEGACY COMPATIBILITY OPTIONS
.TP
\fBWARNING:\fR
Do not use these options until you need compatibility with specific old kernel.
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity\-legacy\-padding"
Use inefficient legacy padding.
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity\-legacy\-hmac"
Use old flawed HMAC calculation (also does not protect superblock).
.TP
.B "\-\-integrity\-legacy\-recalculate"
Allow insecure recalculating of volumes with HMAC keys (recalculation offset in superblock
is not protected).
.SH RETURN CODES
Integritysetup returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.
Error codes are:
1 wrong parameters
2 no permission
3 out of memory
4 wrong device specified
5 device already exists, or device is busy.
.SH EXAMPLES
Format the device with default standalone mode (CRC32C):
.B "integritysetup format <device>"
Open the device with default parameters:
.B "integritysetup open <device> test"
Format the device in standalone mode for use with HMAC(SHA256):
.B "integritysetup format <device> \-\-tag\-size 32 \-\-integrity hmac\-sha256 \
\-\-integrity\-key\-file <keyfile> \-\-integrity\-key\-size <key_bytes>"
Open (activate) the device with HMAC(SHA256) and HMAC key in file:
.B "integritysetup open <device> test \-\-integrity hmac\-sha256 \
\-\-integrity\-key\-file <keyfile> \-\-integrity\-key\-size <key_bytes>"
Dump dm-integrity superblock information:
.B "integritysetup dump <device>"
.SH REPORTING BUGS
Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on
the cryptsetup mailing list at <cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev>
or in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website.
Please attach the output of the failed command with the
\-\-debug option added.
.SH AUTHORS
The integritysetup tool is written by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
and is part of the cryptsetup project.
.SH COPYRIGHT
Copyright \(co 2016-2022 Red Hat, Inc.
.br
Copyright \(co 2016-2022 Milan Broz
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
.SH SEE ALSO
The project website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup\fR
The integrity on-disk format specification available at
\fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMIntegrity\fR

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= integritysetup(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: integritysetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
== NAME
integritysetup - manage dm-integrity (block level integrity) volumes
== SYNOPSIS
*integritysetup <action> [<options>] <action args>*
== DESCRIPTION
Integritysetup is used to configure dm-integrity managed device-mapper
mappings.
Device-mapper integrity target provides read-write transparent integrity
checking of block devices. The dm-integrity target emulates an additional
data integrity field per-sector. You can use this additional field
directly with integritysetup utility, or indirectly (for authenticated
encryption) through cryptsetup.
== BASIC ACTIONS
Integritysetup supports these operations:
=== FORMAT
*format <device>*
Formats <device> (calculates space and dm-integrity superblock and wipes
the device).
*<options>* can be [--data-device, --batch-mode, --no-wipe,
--journal-size, --interleave-sectors, --tag-size, --integrity,
--integrity-key-size, --integrity-key-file, --sector-size,
--progress-frequency, --progress-json]
=== OPEN
*open <device> <name>* +
create <name> <device> (*OBSOLETE syntax*)
Open a mapping with <name> backed by device <device>.
*<options>* can be [--data-device, --batch-mode, --journal-watermark,
--journal-commit-time, --buffer-sectors, --integrity,
--integrity-key-size, --integrity-key-file, --integrity-no-journal,
--integrity-recalculate,
--integrity-recalculate-reset,--integrity-recovery-mode,
--allow-discards]
=== CLOSE
*close <name>* +
remove <name> (*OBSOLETE syntax*)
Removes existing mapping <name>.
*<options>* can be [--deferred] or [--cancel-deferred]
=== STATUS
*status <name>*
Reports status for the active integrity mapping <name>.
=== DUMP
*dump <device>*
Reports parameters from on-disk stored superblock.
=== RESIZE
*resize <name>*
Resizes an active mapping <name>.
If --size (in 512-bytes sectors) or --device-size are not specified, the
size is computed from the underlying device. After resize, the
*recalculating* flag is set. If --wipe flag is set and the size of the
device is increased, the newly added section will be wiped.
Increasing the size of integrity volumes is available since the Linux
kernel version 5.7, shrinking should work on older kernels too.
*<options>* can be [--size, --device-size, --wipe]
== OPTIONS
*--progress-frequency <seconds>*::
Print separate line every <seconds> with wipe progress.
*--progress-json*::
Prints wipe progress data in json format suitable mostly for machine
processing. It prints separate line every half second (or based on
--progress-frequency value). The JSON output looks as follows during
wipe progress (except it's compact single line):
+
....
{
"device":"/dev/sda" // backing device or file
"device_bytes":"8192", // bytes wiped so far
"device_size":"44040192", // total bytes to wipe
"speed":"126877696", // calculated speed in bytes per second (based on progress so far)
"eta_ms":"2520012" // estimated time to finish wipe in milliseconds
"time_ms":"5561235" // total time spent wiping device in milliseconds
}
....
+
Note on numbers in JSON output: Due to JSON parsers limitations all
numbers are represented in a string format due to need of full 64bit
unsigned integers.
*--no-wipe*::
Do not wipe the device after format. A device that is not initially
wiped will contain invalid checksums.
*--wipe*::
Wipe the newly allocated area after resize to bigger size. If this
flag is not set, checksums will be calculated for the data previously
stored in the newly allocated area.
*--journal-size, -j BYTES*::
Size of the journal.
*--interleave-sectors SECTORS*::
The number of interleaved sectors.
*--integrity-recalculate*::
Automatically recalculate integrity tags in kernel on activation. The
device can be used during automatic integrity recalculation but
becomes fully integrity protected only after the background operation
is finished. This option is available since the Linux kernel version
4.19.
*--integrity-recalculate-reset*::
Restart recalculation from the beginning of the device. It can be used
to change the integrity checksum function. Note it does not change the
tag length. This option is available since the Linux kernel version
5.13.
*--journal-watermark PERCENT*::
Journal watermark in percents. When the size of the journal exceeds
this watermark, the journal flush will be started.
*--journal-commit-time MS*::
Commit time in milliseconds. When this time passes (and no explicit
flush operation was issued), the journal is written.
*--tag-size, -t BYTES*::
Size of the integrity tag per-sector (here the integrity function will
store authentication tag).
+
*NOTE:* The size can be smaller that output size of the hash function,
in that case only part of the hash will be stored.
*--data-device <data_device>*::
Specify a separate data device that contains existing data. The
<device> then will contain calculated integrity tags and journal for
data on <data_device>.
+
*NOTE:* To not wipe the data device after initial format, also specify
--no-wipe option and activate with --integrity-recalculate to
automatically recalculate integrity tags.
*--sector-size, -s BYTES*::
Sector size (power of two: 512, 1024, 2048, 4096).
*--buffer-sectors SECTORS*::
The number of sectors in one buffer.
+
The tag area is accessed using buffers, the large buffer size means that
the I/O size will be larger, but there could be less I/Os issued.
*--integrity, -I ALGORITHM*::
Use internal integrity calculation (standalone mode). The integrity
algorithm can be CRC (crc32c/crc32), non-cryptographic hash function
(xxhash64) or hash function (sha1, sha256).
+
For HMAC (hmac-sha256) you have also to specify an integrity key and its
size.
*--integrity-key-size BYTES*::
The size of the data integrity key. Maximum is 4096 bytes.
*--integrity-key-file FILE*::
The file with the integrity key.
*--integrity-no-journal, -D*::
Disable journal for integrity device.
*--integrity-bitmap-mode. -B*::
Use alternate bitmap mode (available since Linux kernel 5.2) where
dm-integrity uses bitmap instead of a journal. If a bit in the bitmap
is 1, the corresponding region's data and integrity tags are not
synchronized - if the machine crashes, the unsynchronized regions will
be recalculated. The bitmap mode is faster than the journal mode,
because we don't have to write the data twice, but it is also less
reliable, because if data corruption happens when the machine crashes,
it may not be detected.
*--bitmap-sectors-per-bit SECTORS*::
Number of 512-byte sectors per bitmap bit, the value must be power of
two.
*--bitmap-flush-time MS*::
Bitmap flush time in milliseconds.
+
*WARNING:*::
In case of a crash, it is possible that the data and integrity tag
doesn't match if the journal is disabled.
*--integrity-recovery-mode. -R*::
Recovery mode (no journal, no tag checking).
*NOTE:* The following options are intended for testing purposes only.:
Using journal encryption does not make sense without encryption the
data, these options are internally used in authenticated disk
encryption with *cryptsetup(8)*.
*--journal-integrity ALGORITHM*::
Integrity algorithm for journal area. See --integrity option for
detailed specification.
*--journal-integrity-key-size BYTES*::
The size of the journal integrity key. Maximum is 4096 bytes.
*--journal-integrity-key-file FILE*::
The file with the integrity key.
*--journal-crypt ALGORITHM*::
Encryption algorithm for journal data area. You can use a block cipher
here such as cbc-aes or a stream cipher, for example, chacha20 or
ctr-aes.
*--journal-crypt-key-size BYTES*::
The size of the journal encryption key. Maximum is 4096 bytes.
*--journal-crypt-key-file FILE*::
The file with the journal encryption key.
*--allow-discards*::
Allow the use of discard (TRIM) requests for the device. This option
is available since the Linux kernel version 5.7.
*--deferred*::
Defers device removal in *close* command until the last user closes
it.
*--cancel-deferred*::
Removes a previously configured deferred device removal in *close*
command.
*--verbose, -v*::
Print more information on command execution.
*--debug*::
Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output lines are
always prefixed by *#*.
*--version, -V*::
Show the program version.
*--batch-mode, -q*::
Do not ask for confirmation.
*--usage*::
Show short option help.
*--help, -?*::
Show help text and default parameters.
== LEGACY COMPATIBILITY OPTIONS
*WARNING:*::
Do not use these options until you need compatibility with specific
old kernel.
*--integrity-legacy-padding*::
Use inefficient legacy padding.
*--integrity-legacy-hmac*::
Use old flawed HMAC calculation (also does not protect superblock).
*--integrity-legacy-recalculate*::
Allow insecure recalculating of volumes with HMAC keys (recalculation
offset in superblock is not protected).
== RETURN CODES
Integritysetup returns *0* on success and a non-zero value on error.
Error codes are: *1* wrong parameters, *2* no permission, *3* out of memory,
*4* wrong device specified, *5* device already exists or device is busy.
== NOTES
The dm-integrity target is available since Linux kernel version 4.12.
Format and activation of an integrity device always require superuser
privilege because the superblock is calculated and handled in
dm-integrity kernel target.
== EXAMPLES
Format the device with default standalone mode (CRC32C):
*integritysetup format <device>*
Open the device with default parameters:
*integritysetup open <device> test*
Format the device in standalone mode for use with HMAC(SHA256):
*integritysetup format <device> --tag-size 32 --integrity hmac-sha256
--integrity-key-file <keyfile> --integrity-key-size <key_bytes>*
Open (activate) the device with HMAC(SHA256) and HMAC key in file:
*integritysetup open <device> test --integrity hmac-sha256
--integrity-key-file <keyfile> --integrity-key-size <key_bytes>*
Dump dm-integrity superblock information:
*integritysetup dump <device>*
== DM-INTEGRITY ON-DISK FORMAT
The on-disk format specification available at
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMIntegrity[*DMIntegrity*] page.
== AUTHORS
The integritysetup tool is written by mailto:gmazyland@gmail.com[Milan Broz].
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.TH VERITYSETUP "8" "January 2021" "veritysetup" "Maintenance Commands"
.SH NAME
veritysetup - manage dm-verity (block level verification) volumes
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B veritysetup <options> <action> <action args>
.SH DESCRIPTION
.PP
Veritysetup is used to configure dm-verity managed device-mapper mappings.
Device-mapper verity target provides read-only transparent integrity
checking of block devices using kernel crypto API.
The dm-verity devices are always read-only.
Veritysetup supports these operations:
.PP
\fIformat\fR <data_device> <hash_device>
.IP
Calculates and permanently stores hash verification data for data_device.
Hash area can be located on the same device after data if specified
by \-\-hash\-offset option.
Note you need to provide root hash string for device verification
or activation. Root hash must be trusted.
The data or hash device argument can be block device or file image.
If hash device path doesn't exist, it will be created as file.
\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash, \-\-no-superblock, \-\-format,
\-\-data-block-size, \-\-hash-block-size, \-\-data-blocks, \-\-hash-offset,
\-\-salt, \-\-uuid, \-\-root-hash-file]
If option \-\-root-hash-file is used, the root hash is stored in hex-encoded text
format in <path>.
.PP
\fIopen\fR <data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>
.br
\fIopen\fR <data_device> <name> <hash_device> \-\-root-hash-file <path>
.br
\fIcreate\fR <name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash> (\fBOBSOLETE syntax\fR)
.IP
Creates a mapping with <name> backed by device <data_device> and using
<hash_device> for in-kernel verification.
The <root_hash> is a hexadecimal string.
\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash-offset, \-\-no-superblock,
\-\-ignore-corruption or \-\-restart-on-corruption, \-\-panic-on-corruption,
\-\-ignore-zero-blocks, \-\-check-at-most-once, \-\-root-hash-signature,
\-\-root-hash-file]
If option \-\-root-hash-file is used, the root hash is read from <path> instead
of from the command line parameter. Expects hex-encoded text, without terminating
newline.
If option \-\-no-superblock is used, you have to use as the same options
as in initial format operation.
.PP
\fIverify\fR <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>
.br
\fIverify\fR <data_device> <hash_device> \-\-root-hash-file <path>
.IP
Verifies data on data_device with use of hash blocks stored on hash_device.
This command performs userspace verification, no kernel device is created.
The <root_hash> is a hexadecimal string.
If option \-\-root-hash-file is used, the root hash is read from <path> instead
of from the command line parameter. Expects hex-encoded text, without terminating
newline.
\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash-offset, \-\-no-superblock, \-\-root-hash-file]
If option \-\-no-superblock is used, you have to use as the same options
as in initial format operation.
.PP
\fIclose\fR <name>
.IP
Removes existing mapping <name>.
For backward compatibility there is \fBremove\fR command alias
for \fBclose\fR command.
\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-deferred] or [\-\-cancel\-deferred]
.PP
\fIstatus\fR <name>
.IP
Reports status for the active verity mapping <name>.
.PP
\fIdump\fR <hash_device>
.IP
Reports parameters of verity device from on-disk stored superblock.
\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash-offset]
.SH OPTIONS
.TP
.B "\-\-verbose, \-v"
Print more information on command execution.
.TP
.B "\-\-debug"
Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output
lines are always prefixed by '#'.
.TP
.B "\-\-no-superblock"
Create or use dm-verity without permanent on-disk superblock.
.TP
.B "\-\-format=number"
Specifies the hash version type.
Format type 0 is original Chrome OS version. Format type 1 is current version.
.TP
.B "\-\-data-block-size=bytes"
Used block size for the data device.
(Note kernel supports only page-size as maximum here.)
.TP
.B "\-\-hash-block-size=bytes"
Used block size for the hash device.
(Note kernel supports only page-size as maximum here.)
.TP
.B "\-\-data-blocks=blocks"
Size of data device used in verification.
If not specified, the whole device is used.
.TP
.B "\-\-hash-offset=bytes"
Offset of hash area/superblock on hash_device.
Value must be aligned to disk sector offset.
.TP
.B "\-\-salt=hex string"
Salt used for format or verification.
Format is a hexadecimal string.
.TP
.B "\-\-uuid=UUID"
Use the provided UUID for format command instead of generating new one.
The UUID must be provided in standard UUID format,
e.g. 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc.
.TP
.B "\-\-ignore-corruption", "\-\-restart-on-corruption", "\-\-panic-on-corruption"
Defines what to do if data integrity problem is detected (data corruption).
Without these options kernel fails the IO operation with I/O error.
With \-\-ignore-corruption option the corruption is only logged.
With \-\-restart-on-corruption or \-\-panic-on-corruption the kernel
is restarted (panicked) immediately.
(You have to provide way how to avoid restart loops.)
\fBWARNING:\fR Use these options only for very specific cases.
These options are available since Linux kernel version 4.1.
.TP
.B "\-\-ignore-zero-blocks"
Instruct kernel to not verify blocks that are expected to contain zeroes
and always directly return zeroes instead.
\fBWARNING:\fR Use this option only in very specific cases.
This option is available since Linux kernel version 4.5.
.TP
.B "\-\-check-at-most-once"
Instruct kernel to verify blocks only the first time they are read
from the data device, rather than every time.
\fBWARNING:\fR It provides a reduced level of security because only
offline tampering of the data device's content will be detected,
not online tampering.
This option is available since Linux kernel version 4.17.
.TP
.B "\-\-hash=hash"
Hash algorithm for dm-verity. For default see \-\-help option.
.TP
.B "\-\-version"
Show the program version.
.TP
.B "\-\-fec-device=fec_device"
Use forward error correction (FEC) to recover from corruption if hash verification fails.
Use encoding data from the specified device.
The fec device argument can be block device or file image.
For format, if fec device path doesn't exist, it will be created as file.
Block sizes for data and hash devices must match.
Also, if the verity data_device is encrypted the fec_device should be too.
FEC calculation covers data, hash area, and optional foreign metadata stored on the same
device with the hash tree (additional space after hash area).
Size of this optional additional area protected by FEC is calculated from image sizes,
so you must be sure that you use the same images for activation.
If the hash device is in a separate image, metadata covers the whole rest of the image after the hash area.
If hash and FEC device is in the image, metadata ends on the FEC area offset.
.TP
.B "\-\-fec-offset=bytes"
This is the offset, in bytes, from the start of the FEC device to the beginning of the encoding data.
.TP
.B "\-\-fec-roots=num"
Number of generator roots. This equals to the number of parity bytes in the encoding data.
In RS(M, N) encoding, the number of roots is M-N. M is 255 and M-N is between 2 and 24 (including).
.TP
.B "\-\-root-hash-file=FILE"
Path to file with stored root hash in hex-encoded text.
.TP
.B "\-\-root-hash-signature=FILE"
Path to roothash signature file used to verify the root hash (in kernel).
This feature requires Linux kernel version 5.4 or more recent.
.TP
.B "\-\-deferred"
Defers device removal in \fIclose\fR command until the last user closes it.
.TP
.B "\-\-cancel\-deferred"
Removes a previously configured deferred device removal in \fIclose\fR command.
.TP
.SH RETURN CODES
Veritysetup returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.
Error codes are:
1 wrong parameters
2 no permission
3 out of memory
4 wrong device specified
5 device already exists or device is busy.
.SH EXAMPLES
.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 format <data_device> <hash_device>"
Calculates and stores verification data on hash_device for the first 256 blocks (of block-size).
If hash_device does not exist, it is created (as file image).
.B "veritysetup format --root-hash-file <path> <data_device> <hash_device>"
Calculates and stores verification data on hash_device for the whole data_device, and store the
root hash as hex-encoded text in <path>.
.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 \-\-hash-offset=1052672 format <device> <device>"
Verification data (hashes) is stored on the same device as data (starting at hash-offset).
Hash-offset must be greater than number of blocks in data-area.
.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 \-\-hash-offset=1052672 create test-device <device> <device> <root_hash>"
Activates the verity device named test-device. Options \-\-data-blocks and \-\-hash-offset are the same
as in the format command. The <root_hash> was calculated in format command.
.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 \-\-hash-offset=1052672 verify <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
Verifies device without activation (in userspace).
.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 \-\-hash-offset=1052672 --root-hash-file <path> verify <data_device> <hash_device>"
Verifies device without activation (in userspace). Root hash passed via a file rather than inline.
.B "veritysetup \-\-fec-device=<fec_device> \-\-fec-roots=10 format <data_device> <hash_device>"
Calculates and stores verification and encoding data for data_device.
.SH REPORTING BUGS
Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on
the cryptsetup mailing list at <cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev>
or in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website.
Please attach the output of the failed command with the
\-\-debug option added.
.SH AUTHORS
The first implementation of veritysetup was written by Chrome OS authors.
This version is based on verification code written by Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
and rewritten for libcryptsetup by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>.
.SH COPYRIGHT
Copyright \(co 2012-2022 Red Hat, Inc.
.br
Copyright \(co 2012-2022 Milan Broz
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
.SH SEE ALSO
The project website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup\fR
The verity on-disk format specification available at
\fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity\fR

307
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= veritysetup(8)
:doctype: manpage
:manmanual: Maintenance Commands
:mansource: veritysetup {release-version}
:man-linkstyle: pass:[blue R < >]
== NAME
veritysetup - manage dm-verity (block level verification) volumes
== SYNOPSIS
*veritysetup <action> [<options>] <action args>*
== DESCRIPTION
Veritysetup is used to configure dm-verity managed device-mapper
mappings.
Device-mapper verity target provides read-only transparent integrity
checking of block devices using kernel crypto API.
The dm-verity devices are always read-only.
== BASIC ACTIONS
Veritysetup supports these operations:
=== FORMAT
*format <data_device> <hash_device>*
Calculates and permanently stores hash verification data for
data_device. Hash area can be located on the same device after data if
specified by --hash-offset option.
Note you need to provide root hash string for device verification or
activation. Root hash must be trusted.
The data or hash device argument can be block device or file image. If
hash device path doesn't exist, it will be created as file.
*<options>* can be [--hash, --no-superblock, --format,
--data-block-size, --hash-block-size, --data-blocks, --hash-offset,
--salt, --uuid, --root-hash-file]
If option --root-hash-file is used, the root hash is stored in
hex-encoded text format in <path>.
=== OPEN
*open <data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>* +
*open <data_device> <name> <hash_device> --root-hash-file <path>* +
create <name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash> (*OBSOLETE syntax*)
Creates a mapping with <name> backed by device <data_device> and using
<hash_device> for in-kernel verification.
The <root_hash> is a hexadecimal string.
*<options>* can be [--hash-offset, --no-superblock, --ignore-corruption
or --restart-on-corruption, --panic-on-corruption, --ignore-zero-blocks,
--check-at-most-once, --root-hash-signature, --root-hash-file]
If option --root-hash-file is used, the root hash is read from <path>
instead of from the command line parameter. Expects hex-encoded text,
without terminating newline.
If option --no-superblock is used, you have to use as the same options
as in initial format operation.
=== VERIFY
*verify <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>* +
*verify <data_device> <hash_device> --root-hash-file <path>*
Verifies data on data_device with use of hash blocks stored on
hash_device.
This command performs userspace verification, no kernel device is
created.
The <root_hash> is a hexadecimal string.
If option --root-hash-file is used, the root hash is read from <path>
instead of from the command line parameter. Expects hex-encoded text,
without terminating newline.
*<options>* can be [--hash-offset, --no-superblock, --root-hash-file]
If option --no-superblock is used, you have to use as the same options
as in initial format operation.
=== CLOSE
*close <name>* +
remove <name> (*OBSOLETE syntax*)
Removes existing mapping <name>.
*<options>* can be [--deferred] or [--cancel-deferred]
=== STATUS
*status <name>*
Reports status for the active verity mapping <name>.
=== DUMP
*dump <hash_device>*
Reports parameters of verity device from on-disk stored superblock.
*<options>* can be [--hash-offset]
== OPTIONS
*--no-superblock*::
Create or use dm-verity without permanent on-disk superblock.
*--format=number*::
Specifies the hash version type. Format type 0 is original Chrome OS
version. Format type 1 is current version.
*--data-block-size=bytes*::
Used block size for the data device. (Note kernel supports only
page-size as maximum here.)
*--hash-block-size=bytes*::
Used block size for the hash device. (Note kernel supports only
page-size as maximum here.)
*--data-blocks=blocks*::
Size of data device used in verification. If not specified, the whole
device is used.
*--hash-offset=bytes*::
Offset of hash area/superblock on hash_device. Value must be aligned
to disk sector offset.
*--salt=hex string*::
Salt used for format or verification. Format is a hexadecimal string.
*--uuid=UUID*::
Use the provided UUID for format command instead of generating new
one.
+
The UUID must be provided in standard UUID format, e.g.
12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc.
*--ignore-corruption , --restart-on-corruption ,
--panic-on-corruption*::
Defines what to do if data integrity problem is detected (data
corruption).
+
Without these options kernel fails the IO operation with I/O error. With
--ignore-corruption option the corruption is only logged. With
--restart-on-corruption or --panic-on-corruption the kernel is restarted
(panicked) immediately. (You have to provide way how to avoid restart
loops.)
+
*WARNING:* Use these options only for very specific cases. These options
are available since Linux kernel version 4.1.
*--ignore-zero-blocks*::
Instruct kernel to not verify blocks that are expected to contain
zeroes and always directly return zeroes instead.
+
*WARNING:* Use this option only in very specific cases. This option is
available since Linux kernel version 4.5.
*--check-at-most-once*::
Instruct kernel to verify blocks only the first time they are read
from the data device, rather than every time.
+
*WARNING:* It provides a reduced level of security because only offline
tampering of the data device's content will be detected, not online
tampering. This option is available since Linux kernel version 4.17.
*--hash=hash*::
Hash algorithm for dm-verity. For default see --help option.
*--fec-device=fec_device*::
Use forward error correction (FEC) to recover from corruption if hash
verification fails. Use encoding data from the specified device.
+
The fec device argument can be block device or file image. For format,
if fec device path doesn't exist, it will be created as file.
+
Block sizes for data and hash devices must match. Also, if the verity
data_device is encrypted the fec_device should be too.
+
FEC calculation covers data, hash area, and optional foreign metadata
stored on the same device with the hash tree (additional space after
hash area). Size of this optional additional area protected by FEC is
calculated from image sizes, so you must be sure that you use the same
images for activation.
+
If the hash device is in a separate image, metadata covers the whole
rest of the image after the hash area.
+
If hash and FEC device is in the image, metadata ends on the FEC area
offset.
*--fec-offset=bytes*::
This is the offset, in bytes, from the start of the FEC device to the
beginning of the encoding data.
*--fec-roots=num*::
Number of generator roots. This equals to the number of parity bytes
in the encoding data. In RS(M, N) encoding, the number of roots is
M-N. M is 255 and M-N is between 2 and 24 (including).
*--root-hash-file=FILE*::
Path to file with stored root hash in hex-encoded text.
*--root-hash-signature=FILE*::
Path to root hash signature file used to verify the root hash (in
kernel). This feature requires Linux kernel version 5.4 or more
recent.
*--deferred*::
Defers device removal in *close* command until the last user closes
it.
*--cancel-deferred*::
Removes a previously configured deferred device removal in *close*
command.
*--verbose, -v*::
Print more information on command execution.
*--debug*::
Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output lines are
always prefixed by *#*.
*--version, -V*::
Show the program version.
*--batch-mode, -q*::
Do not ask for confirmation.
*--usage*::
Show short option help.
*--help, -?*::
Show help text and default parameters.
== RETURN CODES
Veritysetup returns *0* on success and a non-zero value on error.
Error codes are: *1* wrong parameters, *2* no permission, *3* out of memory,
*4* wrong device specified, *5* device already exists or device is busy.
== EXAMPLES
*veritysetup --data-blocks=256 format <data_device> <hash_device>*
Calculates and stores verification data on hash_device for the first 256
blocks (of block-size). If hash_device does not exist, it is created (as
file image).
*veritysetup format --root-hash-file <path> <data_device> <hash_device>*
Calculates and stores verification data on hash_device for the whole
data_device, and store the root hash as hex-encoded text in <path>.
*veritysetup --data-blocks=256 --hash-offset=1052672 format <device>
<device>*
Verification data (hashes) is stored on the same device as data
(starting at hash-offset). Hash-offset must be greater than number of
blocks in data-area.
*veritysetup --data-blocks=256 --hash-offset=1052672 create test-device
<device> <device> <root_hash>*
Activates the verity device named test-device. Options --data-blocks and
--hash-offset are the same as in the format command. The <root_hash> was
calculated in format command.
*veritysetup --data-blocks=256 --hash-offset=1052672 verify
<data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>*
Verifies device without activation (in userspace).
*veritysetup --data-blocks=256 --hash-offset=1052672 --root-hash-file
<path> verify <data_device> <hash_device>*
Verifies device without activation (in userspace). Root hash passed via
a file rather than inline.
*veritysetup --fec-device=<fec_device> --fec-roots=10 format
<data_device> <hash_device>*
Calculates and stores verification and encoding data for data_device.
== DM-VERITY ON-DISK SPECIFICATION
The on-disk format specification is available at
https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity[*DMVerity*] page.
== AUTHORS
The first implementation of veritysetup was written by Chrome OS
authors.
This version is based on verification code written by
mailto:mpatocka@redhat.com[Mikulas Patocka] and rewritten for libcryptsetup
by mailto:gmazyland@gmail.com[Milan Broz].
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