man: Use *WARNING* only for serious issues.

Use highlighted warning only for possibility of data loss or serious security issues.

No need to scary people everywhere :)
This commit is contained in:
Milan Broz
2025-07-23 15:26:07 +02:00
parent 349912fec2
commit a498757fd4
5 changed files with 6 additions and 7 deletions

View File

@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ ifdef::ACTION_LUKSFORMAT[]
*--integrity-legacy-padding*::
Use inefficient legacy padding.
+
*WARNING*: Do not use this option until you need compatibility with a specific old kernel.
Do not use this option until you need compatibility with a specific old kernel.
endif::[]
ifdef::ACTION_REFRESH[]
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ ifndef::ACTION_REENCRYPT[]
See section _NOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING_ in *cryptsetup*(8) for more information.
endif::[]
ifdef::ACTION_REENCRYPT[]
*WARNING:* --key-file option can be used only if there is only one active keyslot, or alternatively, also if --key-slot option is specified (then all other keyslots will be disabled in the new LUKS device).
The --key-file option can be used only if there is only one active keyslot, or alternatively, also if --key-slot option is specified (then all other keyslots will be disabled in the new LUKS device).
+
If this option is not used, cryptsetup will ask for all active keyslot passphrases.
endif::[]

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The _reencrypt_ action reencrypts data on the LUKS device in-place.
You can regenerate *volume key* (the real key used in on-disk encryption unlocked by passphrase), *cipher*, *cipher mode* or *encryption sector size* (LUKS2 only).
*WARNING:* If you need to use both luksChangeKey and reencrypt (e.g., to recover from a leak), you need to use them in that order to avoid leaking the new volume key.
If you need to use both luksChangeKey and reencrypt (e.g., to recover from a leak), you need to use them in that order to avoid leaking the new volume key.
The reencryption process may be safely interrupted by a user via SIGINT signal (ctrl+c).
The same applies to the SIGTERM signal (i.e., issued by systemd during system shutdown).

View File

@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ Albeit Linux kernel 5.7 added TRIM support for standalone dm-integrity devices,
Some integrity modes require two independent keys (a key for encryption and authentication).
Both these keys are stored in one LUKS keyslot.
*WARNING:* All support for authenticated modes is experimental, and only some modes are available now.
Support for authenticated modes is experimental, and only some modes are available now.
Note that very few authenticated encryption algorithms are suitable for disk encryption.
You also cannot use CRC32 or other non-cryptographic checksums (other than the special integrity mode "none").
If, for some reason, you want to have integrity control without using authentication mode, then you should separately configure dm-integrity independently of LUKS2.

View File

@@ -248,7 +248,6 @@ If this flag is not set, checksums will be calculated for previously stored data
== LEGACY COMPATIBILITY OPTIONS
*WARNING:*::
Do not use these options until you need compatibility with a specific old kernel.
*--integrity-legacy-padding*::

View File

@@ -180,12 +180,12 @@ With --ignore-corruption option, the corruption is only logged.
With --restart-on-corruption or --panic-on-corruption, the kernel is restarted (panicked) immediately.
(You have to provide a way to avoid restart loops.)
+
*WARNING:* Use these options only for very specific cases.
Use these options only for very specific cases.
*--ignore-zero-blocks*::
Instruct the kernel not to verify blocks expected to contain zeroes and always directly return zeroes instead.
+
*WARNING:* Use this option only in very specific cases.
Use this option only in very specific cases.
*--no-superblock*::
Create or use dm-verity without a permanent on-disk superblock.