The keyfile interface was designed, well, for keyfiles.
Unfortunately, a keyfile can be placed on a device and the size_t offset
can overflow.
We have to introduce new set of fucntions that allows 64bit offsets even on 32bit systems:
- crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset
- crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset
- crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset
- crypt_keyfile_device_read
The new functions have added _device_ in name.
Old functions are just internall wrappers around these.
Also cryptsetup --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset must now
process 64bit offsets.
For more info see issue 359.
Originally the key description for VK was derived
from segment id. This could lead to ambiguity when
keyslot key is verified and loaded in kernel keyring
using activation functions with CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY
flag raised.
PBKDF2 has nasty behaviour that it generates the same output
for passwords that has several trailing zero bytes.
(IOW null trailing bytes causes collision.)
Unfortunatelly our test plays with password length
and expect wrong length must always fail.
Sometimes the randomly generated key key contains
the null byte in the "wrong" place and PBKDF2 causes test to fail.
For now, fix it by using fixed keyfile without null bytes
(similar to fixed passphrased we already have).
On some systems the requested amount of memory causes OOM killer
to kill the process (instead of returning ENOMEM).
For now, we never try to use more than half of available
physical memory.
This patch duplicates part of the code because following
switch to non-recursive automake is not easily fixable without this change.
(Automake cannot use top_srcdir anymore in this context.)
Code is written by Ondrej Kozina.
This patch adds ability to store volume key in kernel keyring
(feature available in recent kernels) and avoid setting
key through dm-ioctl and avoiding key in table mapping.
Will be used in LUKS2.
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
