Reencryption did not take into account adjusted xts
key size configuration option. This patch fix the
issue by using same logic as in luksFormat with xts
mode selected for data encryption.
By default when reencrypting LUKS2 device we regenerate only
the volume key. But if the device was 'encrypted' by cipher_null
this change did not make sense. The key was always empty.
Change the behaviour so that unless user specifies --cipher
parameter on command line, we change data encryption cipher
to default when old segment cipher was cipher_null.
FEC (Forward Error Correction) data should cover the whole data area,
hashes (Merkle tree) and optionally additional metadata (located after hash area).
Unfortunately, if FEC data is stored in the same file as hash, the calculation
wrongly used the whole file size thus overlaps with FEC area itself.
This produces unusable and too large FEC data.
(There is not a problem if FEC image is a separate image.)
This patch fixes the problem, introducing FEC blocks calculation as:
-If hash device is in a separate image, metadata covers the whole rest of the image after hash area.
(Unchanged behaviour.)
-If hash and FEC device is in the image, metadata ends on the FEC area offset.
This should probably fix several issues reported with FEC wrong calculations.
Fixes: #554
If FEC was enabled, the error for bad root hash was replaced
by error correction (datga were ok, only root hash was wrong).
Do not run recovery test if root hash is incorrect.
This patch adds support for Linux kernel (since version 5.11) dm-integrity
fixes that disables integrity recalculation if keyed algorithms (HMAC) is used.
Original dm-integrity superblock version <=4 is recalculation offset
field not protected by HMAC. An attacker can move this pointer and force
the kernel to recalculate the data area, ignoring original HMAC tags.
N.B. dm-integrity was not intended to protect against intentional changes.
Better use authenticated encryption (AEAD) in combination with dm-crypt.
It is designed to protect against random data corruption caused by hardware
or storage medium faults.
Despite that, we try to keep the system secure if keyed algorithms are used.
There are two possible keyed algorithms in dm-integrity - algorithm used
to protect journal and superblock (--journal-integrity) and algorithms
for protecting data (--integrity).
The dm-integrity superblock is guarded by --journal-integrity, so if you want
to protect data with HMAC, you should always also use HMAC for --journal-integrity.
The keys are independent. If HMAC is used for data but not for the journal,
recalculation is disabled by default.
For new kernel dm-integrity, the HMAC option also uses salt in superblock
to avoid an easy way to distinguish that the HMAC key is the same for two devices
(if data are the same).
The new HMAC and superblock are enabled automatically if the kernel supports it
(you can see superblock version 5 and fix_hmac flag in dump command).
If you need to use (insecure) backward compatibility, then two new integritysetup
options are introduced:
Use --integrity-legacy-recalc (instead of --integrity-recalc) to allow recalculation
on legacy devices.
Use --integrity-legacy-hmac in format action to force old insecure version
format (with HMAC).
Libcryptsetup API also introduces flags
CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC and
CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC
to set these through crypt_set_compatibility() call.
We zero data parts of the test images to make them as small as
possible and for the latest startup key image I deleted bigger
portion of the NTFS header by accident which caused older blkid
on CentOS/RHEL 6 to not identify the NTFS filesystem on the
cleartext device.
These performance options, introduced in kernel 5.9, configures
dm-crypt to bypass read or write workqueues and run encryption
synchronously.
Also support persistent storage of these flags for LUKS2.
If users want to use blake2b/blake2s, the kernel algorithm name
includes dash - like "blake2s-256".
Because we use dash as a separator, this patch adds an exception
for this case.
Fixes: #581.
When creating LUKS2 header with specified --offset much larger
then LUKS2 header size we needlessly also wipe (allocate up to
--offset) much larger file than needed.
The iv_large_sector option is supported in dm-crypt since introduction
of larger sectors encryption.
It counts Initialization Vector (IV) in larger sector size (if set) instead
of 512 bytes sectors.
This option does not have any performance or security impact, but it can be
used for accessing incompatible existing disk images from other systems.
(It is used internally in BitLocker compatibily code).
This patch allows it to be used for plain type device, so users
can manually map foreign disk images.
Only open action with plain device and sector size > 512 bytes is supported.
We need to use the iv_large_sectors flag and correct sector size
for the crypt segments for these devices. Used sector size is
read from the device header. This commit also adds two new test
images with 4k sectors.
Fixes: #557
Adds option to dump content of LUKS2 unbound keyslot
in to a file:
'cryptsetup luksDump --unbound --master-key-file /file -S 12 /dev/luks2'
or to terminal:
'cryptsetup luksDump --unbound -S 12 /dev/luks2'
Parameters -S (specific keyslot) is mandatory with --unbound.
Fixes: #549
Threre asre some situatiuoins when randomized image is nor repairable
by FEC data. Let's use completely deterministic image creation (fixed salt and uuid).
FIXME: The FEC Reed-Solomon code is doing something strange here, this
kind of erasure should be always repairable.
Previous fix for longer passhphrases increased maximal
passphrase length even if it was not needed, for example
if used with SHA256 hash in combination with keyfiles.
This patch tries to fix the problem, so some older volumes
can be opened again.
Also some test images are added for regression testing.
Fixes: #542.
If LUKS1 payload offset (data offset) is not aligned to
4KiB we create unaligned keyslots area in LUKS2 metadata
during upconversion. Unaligned keyslots area is not valid
from LUKS2 perspective. Fix it by properly aligning future
keyslots area and also check if LUKS1 keyslots area fit
in the new one.
Fixes: #534.
With LUKS1 we returned pbkdf values even for inactive keyslot.
Only iterations count was wrong. Remaining values are not
specific keyslot bound with LUKS1.
Fixes: #528.
Other APIs use the root hash in place of keys when using verity
devices, so do the same for crypt_volume_key_get to allow users
to retrieve the root hash of an active verity device.
Use it in veritysetup status to print the root hash.
[Patch slightly modified by Milan Broz]
When integritysetup formats a device with hash or HMAC integrity checksums,
it requires explicitly tag size entry from a user (or default value).
This leads to confusion and shortened tags.
This patch calculates tag size according to real hash output, and
if tag size is specified, it warns if these values differ.
Fixes: #492.
