The kernel 4.17 will include a new dm-verity flag that
instructs kernel to verify data blocks only once.
This patch adds support for it to libcryptsetup and veritysetup.
This flag can be dangerous; if you can control underlying device
(you can change its content after it was verified) it will no longer
prevent reading tampered data and also it does not prevent to silent
data corrruptions that appears after the block was once read.
Allow symbolic links in the initial part of locking path.
If /run/x/y/crypsetup is locking path, starting with
'run' anything may be symbolic link up to (including) 'y'.
various bugfixes:
- erase flags variable if no flags are stored
- do not print false debug warning
- during activation do not overwrite activation flags
with persistent flags
Move all keyring functions to one place and separate LUKS2 specific
code to generic handling.
Also fix possible mismatch if volume key is in keyring but it is not native
LUKS2 device (libarary cannot process such a device properly).
Kernel could reject HMAC without a key during format, we must set a key here as well.
Because there is no data area (device size is 8 sectors), it is actually never used,
so we can use zeroed key here.
The real HMAC key is used later during device activation with the real size.
The code must not set global table with KDF variants but
it shuld calculate local iterations count.
Also PIM is not used for old Trucrypt modes, do not use it there.
Also fix leak of PIM iteration count to debug log.
Fixes issue #366 and issue #367.
This fixes crypt_keyslot_add_by_key where we were unable to store
keyslot (unbound to segment) with different key_size.
The code used (new) volume key size implicitly which could be wrong
if new size was not compatible with cipher parameter for keyslot area.
For now, crypto API quietly used cipher witout IV if a cipher
algorithm wihtou IV specificaton was used (e.g. aes-xts).
This caused fail later during activation.
This patch allows only two specific backed use without specified IV
(ECB mode and NULL cipher).
Also check cipher string early during parsing of CLI options.
When loading first dm-crypt table (or action that triggers dm-crypt
module load) we do not know dm-crypt version yet. Let's assume all
kernels before 4.15.0 are flawed and reject VK load via kernel keyring
service.
When dm-crypt is already in kernel, check for correct target version
instead (v1.18.1 or later).
Upstream dm-crypt v1.15.0 through v1.18.0 contains
serious bug in kernel key processing that may cause
data corruption for ciphers using essiv, tcw and lmk IVs.
Patch adds patch number processing to DM version checks.
The keyfile interface was designed, well, for keyfiles.
Unfortunately, a keyfile can be placed on a device and the size_t offset
can overflow.
We have to introduce new set of fucntions that allows 64bit offsets even on 32bit systems:
- crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset
- crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset
- crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset
- crypt_keyfile_device_read
The new functions have added _device_ in name.
Old functions are just internall wrappers around these.
Also cryptsetup --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset must now
process 64bit offsets.
For more info see issue 359.
Reduce bloated code in low level keyring utilities code.
Move log messages higher the library code.
Also return -ENOTSUP when code was compiled out by configure
option.
Remove code for handling multiple digests per single keyslot.
Same would apply to segments with the only exception of segment
in-reencryption. We need that exception so that we will not lose
old key digests too early.
