/* * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup * * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. * Copyright (C) 2013-2017, Milan Broz * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 * of the License, or (at your option) any later version. * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "luks.h" #include "af.h" #include "internal.h" /* Get size of struct luks_phdr with all keyslots material space */ static size_t LUKS_device_sectors(size_t keyLen) { size_t keyslot_sectors, sector; int i; keyslot_sectors = AF_split_sectors(keyLen, LUKS_STRIPES); sector = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE; for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) { sector = size_round_up(sector, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE); sector += keyslot_sectors; } return sector; } int LUKS_keyslot_area(const struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, uint64_t *offset, uint64_t *length) { if(keyslot >= LUKS_NUMKEYS || keyslot < 0) return -EINVAL; *offset = (uint64_t)hdr->keyblock[keyslot].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE; *length = AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE; return 0; } static int LUKS_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *ctx, size_t keyLength) { struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx); uint64_t dev_sectors, hdr_sectors; if (!keyLength) return -EINVAL; if(device_size(device, &dev_sectors)) { log_dbg("Cannot get device size for device %s.", device_path(device)); return -EIO; } dev_sectors >>= SECTOR_SHIFT; hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(keyLength); log_dbg("Key length %zu, device size %" PRIu64 " sectors, header size %" PRIu64 " sectors.",keyLength, dev_sectors, hdr_sectors); if (hdr_sectors > dev_sectors) { log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is too small. (LUKS requires at least %" PRIu64 " bytes.)\n"), device_path(device), hdr_sectors * SECTOR_SIZE); return -EINVAL; } return 0; } /* Check keyslot to prevent access outside of header and keyslot area */ static int LUKS_check_keyslot_size(const struct luks_phdr *phdr, unsigned int keyIndex) { uint32_t secs_per_stripes; /* First sectors is the header itself */ if (phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < sizeof(*phdr)) { log_dbg("Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u.", phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset, keyIndex); return 1; } /* Ignore following check for detached header where offset can be zero. */ if (phdr->payloadOffset == 0) return 0; if (phdr->payloadOffset <= phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset) { log_dbg("Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).", phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset, keyIndex, phdr->payloadOffset); return 1; } secs_per_stripes = AF_split_sectors(phdr->keyBytes, phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes); if (phdr->payloadOffset < (phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset + secs_per_stripes)) { log_dbg("Invalid keyslot size %u (offset %u, stripes %u) in " "keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).", secs_per_stripes, phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset, phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes, keyIndex, phdr->payloadOffset); return 1; } return 0; } static const char *dbg_slot_state(crypt_keyslot_info ki) { switch(ki) { case CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE: return "INACTIVE"; case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE: return "ACTIVE"; case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST: return "ACTIVE_LAST"; case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID: default: return "INVALID"; } } int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx) { struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx); struct luks_phdr hdr; int r = 0, devfd = -1; ssize_t hdr_size; ssize_t buffer_size; char *buffer = NULL; r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, 1, 0, ctx); if (r) return r; hdr_size = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr.keyBytes) << SECTOR_SHIFT; buffer_size = size_round_up(hdr_size, crypt_getpagesize()); buffer = crypt_safe_alloc(buffer_size); if (!buffer || hdr_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS || hdr_size > buffer_size) { r = -ENOMEM; goto out; } log_dbg("Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes).", sizeof(hdr), hdr_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS); log_dbg("Output backup file size: %zu bytes.", buffer_size); devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY); if (devfd < 0) { log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"), device_path(device)); r = -EINVAL; goto out; } if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device), buffer, hdr_size) < hdr_size) { r = -EIO; goto out; } close(devfd); /* Wipe unused area, so backup cannot contain old signatures */ if (hdr.keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE == LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) memset(buffer + sizeof(hdr), 0, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS - sizeof(hdr)); devfd = open(backup_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR); if (devfd == -1) { if (errno == EEXIST) log_err(ctx, _("Requested header backup file %s already exists.\n"), backup_file); else log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file); r = -EINVAL; goto out; } if (write_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) { log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file); r = -EIO; goto out; } r = 0; out: if (devfd >= 0) close(devfd); crypt_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr)); crypt_safe_free(buffer); return r; } int LUKS_hdr_restore( const char *backup_file, struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct crypt_device *ctx) { struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx); int r = 0, devfd = -1, diff_uuid = 0; ssize_t buffer_size = 0; char *buffer = NULL, msg[200]; struct luks_phdr hdr_file; r = LUKS_read_phdr_backup(backup_file, &hdr_file, 0, ctx); if (r == -ENOENT) return r; if (!r) buffer_size = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr_file.keyBytes) << SECTOR_SHIFT; if (r || buffer_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) { log_err(ctx, _("Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header.\n")); r = -EINVAL; goto out; } buffer = crypt_safe_alloc(buffer_size); if (!buffer) { r = -ENOMEM; goto out; } devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY); if (devfd == -1) { log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file); r = -EINVAL; goto out; } if (read_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) { log_err(ctx, _("Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file); r = -EIO; goto out; } close(devfd); devfd = -1; r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 0, 0, ctx); if (r == 0) { log_dbg("Device %s already contains LUKS header, checking UUID and offset.", device_path(device)); if(hdr->payloadOffset != hdr_file.payloadOffset || hdr->keyBytes != hdr_file.keyBytes) { log_err(ctx, _("Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n")); r = -EINVAL; goto out; } if (memcmp(hdr->uuid, hdr_file.uuid, UUID_STRING_L)) diff_uuid = 1; } if (snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Device %s %s%s"), device_path(device), r ? _("does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device.") : _("already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."), diff_uuid ? _("\nWARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!") : "") < 0) { r = -ENOMEM; goto out; } if (!crypt_confirm(ctx, msg)) { r = -EINVAL; goto out; } log_dbg("Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes) to device %s.", sizeof(*hdr), buffer_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS, device_path(device)); devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR); if (devfd < 0) { if (errno == EACCES) log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"), device_path(device)); else log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s.\n"), device_path(device)); r = -EINVAL; goto out; } if (write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device), buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) { r = -EIO; goto out; } close(devfd); devfd = -1; /* Be sure to reload new data */ r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx); out: if (devfd >= 0) close(devfd); crypt_safe_free(buffer); return r; } /* This routine should do some just basic recovery for known problems. */ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx) { struct luks_phdr temp_phdr; const unsigned char *sector = (const unsigned char*)phdr; struct volume_key *vk; uint64_t PBKDF2_per_sec = 1; int i, bad, r, need_write = 0; if (phdr->keyBytes != 16 && phdr->keyBytes != 32 && phdr->keyBytes != 64) { log_err(ctx, _("Non standard key size, manual repair required.\n")); return -EINVAL; } /* cryptsetup 1.0 did not align to 4k, cannot repair this one */ if (phdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset < (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) { log_err(ctx, _("Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required.\n")); return -EINVAL; } vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(phdr->keyBytes, NULL); log_verbose(ctx, _("Repairing keyslots.\n")); log_dbg("Generating second header with the same parameters for check."); /* cipherName, cipherMode, hashSpec, uuid are already null terminated */ /* payloadOffset - cannot check */ r = LUKS_generate_phdr(&temp_phdr, vk, phdr->cipherName, phdr->cipherMode, phdr->hashSpec,phdr->uuid, LUKS_STRIPES, phdr->payloadOffset, 0, 1, &PBKDF2_per_sec, 1, ctx); if (r < 0) { log_err(ctx, _("Repair failed.")); goto out; } for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) { if (phdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) { log_dbg("Skipping repair for active keyslot %i.", i); continue; } bad = 0; if (phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset != temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset) { log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u).\n"), i, (unsigned)phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset, (unsigned)temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset); phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset; bad = 1; } if (phdr->keyblock[i].stripes != temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes) { log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u).\n"), i, (unsigned)phdr->keyblock[i].stripes, (unsigned)temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes); phdr->keyblock[i].stripes = temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes; bad = 1; } /* Known case - MSDOS partition table signature */ if (i == 6 && sector[0x1fe] == 0x55 && sector[0x1ff] == 0xaa) { log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature.\n"), i); bad = 1; } if(bad) { log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: salt wiped.\n"), i); phdr->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED; memset(&phdr->keyblock[i].passwordSalt, 0x00, LUKS_SALTSIZE); phdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = 0; } if (bad) need_write = 1; } if (need_write) { log_verbose(ctx, _("Writing LUKS header to disk.\n")); r = LUKS_write_phdr(phdr, ctx); } out: crypt_free_volume_key(vk); crypt_memzero(&temp_phdr, sizeof(temp_phdr)); return r; } static int _check_and_convert_hdr(const char *device, struct luks_phdr *hdr, int require_luks_device, int repair, struct crypt_device *ctx) { int r = 0; unsigned int i; char luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC; if(memcmp(hdr->magic, luksMagic, LUKS_MAGIC_L)) { /* Check magic */ log_dbg("LUKS header not detected."); if (require_luks_device) log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"), device); return -EINVAL; } else if((hdr->version = ntohs(hdr->version)) != 1) { /* Convert every uint16/32_t item from network byte order */ log_err(ctx, _("Unsupported LUKS version %d.\n"), hdr->version); return -EINVAL; } hdr->hashSpec[LUKS_HASHSPEC_L - 1] = '\0'; if (crypt_hmac_size(hdr->hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) { log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"), hdr->hashSpec); return -EINVAL; } /* Header detected */ hdr->payloadOffset = ntohl(hdr->payloadOffset); hdr->keyBytes = ntohl(hdr->keyBytes); hdr->mkDigestIterations = ntohl(hdr->mkDigestIterations); for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) { hdr->keyblock[i].active = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].active); hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations); hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset); hdr->keyblock[i].stripes = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].stripes); if (LUKS_check_keyslot_size(hdr, i)) { log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"), i); r = -EINVAL; } } /* Avoid unterminated strings */ hdr->cipherName[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L - 1] = '\0'; hdr->cipherMode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L - 1] = '\0'; hdr->uuid[UUID_STRING_L - 1] = '\0'; if (repair) { if (r == -EINVAL) r = _keyslot_repair(hdr, ctx); else log_verbose(ctx, _("No known problems detected for LUKS header.\n")); } return r; } static void _to_lower(char *str, unsigned max_len) { for(; *str && max_len; str++, max_len--) if (isupper(*str)) *str = tolower(*str); } static void LUKS_fix_header_compatible(struct luks_phdr *header) { /* Old cryptsetup expects "sha1", gcrypt allows case insensistive names, * so always convert hash to lower case in header */ _to_lower(header->hashSpec, LUKS_HASHSPEC_L); /* ECB mode does not use IV but dmcrypt silently allows it. * Drop any IV here if ECB is used (that is not secure anyway).*/ if (!strncmp(header->cipherMode, "ecb-", 4)) { memset(header->cipherMode, 0, LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L); strcpy(header->cipherMode, "ecb"); } } int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct luks_phdr *hdr, int require_luks_device, struct crypt_device *ctx) { ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr); int devfd = 0, r = 0; log_dbg("Reading LUKS header of size %d from backup file %s", (int)hdr_size, backup_file); devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY); if (devfd == -1) { log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file); return -ENOENT; } if (read_buffer(devfd, hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size) r = -EIO; else { LUKS_fix_header_compatible(hdr); r = _check_and_convert_hdr(backup_file, hdr, require_luks_device, 0, ctx); } close(devfd); return r; } int LUKS_read_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int require_luks_device, int repair, struct crypt_device *ctx) { struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx); ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr); int devfd = 0, r = 0; /* LUKS header starts at offset 0, first keyslot on LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS */ assert(sizeof(struct luks_phdr) <= LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS); /* Stripes count cannot be changed without additional code fixes yet */ assert(LUKS_STRIPES == 4000); if (repair && !require_luks_device) return -EINVAL; log_dbg("Reading LUKS header of size %zu from device %s", hdr_size, device_path(device)); devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY); if (devfd < 0) { log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s.\n"), device_path(device)); return -EINVAL; } if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size) r = -EIO; else r = _check_and_convert_hdr(device_path(device), hdr, require_luks_device, repair, ctx); if (!r) r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr->keyBytes); /* * Cryptsetup 1.0.0 did not align keyslots to 4k (very rare version). * Disable direct-io to avoid possible IO errors if underlying device * has bigger sector size. */ if (!r && hdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) { log_dbg("Old unaligned LUKS keyslot detected, disabling direct-io."); device_disable_direct_io(device); } close(devfd); return r; } int LUKS_write_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct crypt_device *ctx) { struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx); ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr); int devfd = 0; unsigned int i; struct luks_phdr convHdr; int r; log_dbg("Updating LUKS header of size %zu on device %s", sizeof(struct luks_phdr), device_path(device)); r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr->keyBytes); if (r) return r; devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR); if (devfd < 0) { if (errno == EACCES) log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"), device_path(device)); else log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s.\n"), device_path(device)); return -EINVAL; } memcpy(&convHdr, hdr, hdr_size); memset(&convHdr._padding, 0, sizeof(convHdr._padding)); /* Convert every uint16/32_t item to network byte order */ convHdr.version = htons(hdr->version); convHdr.payloadOffset = htonl(hdr->payloadOffset); convHdr.keyBytes = htonl(hdr->keyBytes); convHdr.mkDigestIterations = htonl(hdr->mkDigestIterations); for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) { convHdr.keyblock[i].active = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].active); convHdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations); convHdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset); convHdr.keyblock[i].stripes = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].stripes); } r = write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device), &convHdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size ? -EIO : 0; if (r) log_err(ctx, _("Error during update of LUKS header on device %s.\n"), device_path(device)); close(devfd); /* Re-read header from disk to be sure that in-memory and on-disk data are the same. */ if (!r) { r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx); if (r) log_err(ctx, _("Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s.\n"), device_path(device)); } return r; } /* Check that kernel supports requested cipher by decryption of one sector */ static int LUKS_check_cipher(struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct crypt_device *ctx) { int r; struct volume_key *empty_key; char buf[SECTOR_SIZE]; log_dbg("Checking if cipher %s-%s is usable.", hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode); empty_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL); if (!empty_key) return -ENOMEM; /* No need to get KEY quality random but it must avoid known weak keys. */ r = crypt_random_get(ctx, empty_key->key, empty_key->keylength, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL); if (!r) r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(buf, sizeof(buf), hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode, empty_key, 0, ctx); crypt_free_volume_key(empty_key); crypt_memzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); return r; } int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header, const struct volume_key *vk, const char *cipherName, const char *cipherMode, const char *hashSpec, const char *uuid, unsigned int stripes, unsigned int alignPayload, unsigned int alignOffset, uint32_t iteration_time_ms, uint64_t *PBKDF2_per_sec, int detached_metadata_device, struct crypt_device *ctx) { unsigned int i = 0, hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(vk->keylength); size_t blocksPerStripeSet, currentSector; int r; uuid_t partitionUuid; char luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC; /* For separate metadata device allow zero alignment */ if (alignPayload == 0 && !detached_metadata_device) alignPayload = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT / SECTOR_SIZE; if (alignPayload && detached_metadata_device && alignPayload < hdr_sectors) { log_err(ctx, _("Data offset for detached LUKS header must be " "either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors).\n"), hdr_sectors); return -EINVAL; } if (crypt_hmac_size(hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) { log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"), hashSpec); return -EINVAL; } if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) { log_err(ctx, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n")); return -EINVAL; } if (!uuid) uuid_generate(partitionUuid); memset(header,0,sizeof(struct luks_phdr)); /* Set Magic */ memcpy(header->magic,luksMagic,LUKS_MAGIC_L); header->version=1; strncpy(header->cipherName,cipherName,LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1); strncpy(header->cipherMode,cipherMode,LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1); strncpy(header->hashSpec,hashSpec,LUKS_HASHSPEC_L-1); header->keyBytes=vk->keylength; LUKS_fix_header_compatible(header); r = LUKS_check_cipher(header, ctx); if (r < 0) return r; log_dbg("Generating LUKS header version %d using hash %s, %s, %s, MK %d bytes", header->version, header->hashSpec ,header->cipherName, header->cipherMode, header->keyBytes); r = crypt_random_get(ctx, header->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT); if(r < 0) { log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed.\n")); return r; } r = crypt_benchmark_kdf(ctx, "pbkdf2", header->hashSpec, "foo", 3, "bar", 3, PBKDF2_per_sec); if (r < 0) { log_err(ctx, _("Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"), header->hashSpec); return r; } /* Compute master key digest */ iteration_time_ms /= 8; header->mkDigestIterations = at_least((uint32_t)(*PBKDF2_per_sec/1024) * iteration_time_ms, LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN); r = crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", header->hashSpec, vk->key,vk->keylength, header->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, header->mkDigest,LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, header->mkDigestIterations); if(r < 0) { log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s).\n"), header->hashSpec); return r; } currentSector = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE; blocksPerStripeSet = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, stripes); for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) { header->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED; header->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = currentSector; header->keyblock[i].stripes = stripes; currentSector = size_round_up(currentSector + blocksPerStripeSet, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE); } if (detached_metadata_device) { /* for separate metadata device use alignPayload directly */ header->payloadOffset = alignPayload; } else { /* alignOffset - offset from natural device alignment provided by topology info */ currentSector = size_round_up(currentSector, alignPayload); header->payloadOffset = currentSector + alignOffset; } uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, header->uuid); log_dbg("Data offset %d, UUID %s, digest iterations %" PRIu32, header->payloadOffset, header->uuid, header->mkDigestIterations); return 0; } int LUKS_hdr_uuid_set( struct luks_phdr *hdr, const char *uuid, struct crypt_device *ctx) { uuid_t partitionUuid; if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) { log_err(ctx, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n")); return -EINVAL; } if (!uuid) uuid_generate(partitionUuid); uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, hdr->uuid); return LUKS_write_phdr(hdr, ctx); } int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex, const char *password, size_t passwordLen, struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, uint32_t iteration_time_ms, uint64_t *PBKDF2_per_sec, struct crypt_device *ctx) { struct volume_key *derived_key; char *AfKey = NULL; size_t AFEKSize; uint64_t PBKDF2_temp; int r; if(hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].active != LUKS_KEY_DISABLED) { log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d active, purge first.\n"), keyIndex); return -EINVAL; } /* LUKS keyslot has always at least 4000 stripes accoding to specification */ if(hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes < 4000) { log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?\n"), keyIndex); return -EINVAL; } log_dbg("Calculating data for key slot %d", keyIndex); r = crypt_benchmark_kdf(ctx, "pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec, "foo", 3, "bar", 3, PBKDF2_per_sec); if (r < 0) { log_err(ctx, _("Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"), hdr->hashSpec); return r; } /* * Avoid floating point operation * Final iteration count is at least LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN */ PBKDF2_temp = *PBKDF2_per_sec * (uint64_t)iteration_time_ms; PBKDF2_temp /= 1024; if (PBKDF2_temp > UINT32_MAX) PBKDF2_temp = UINT32_MAX; hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations = at_least((uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp, LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN); log_dbg("Key slot %d use %" PRIu32 " password iterations.", keyIndex, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations); derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL); if (!derived_key) return -ENOMEM; r = crypt_random_get(ctx, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT); if (r < 0) goto out; r = crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec, password, passwordLen, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, derived_key->key, hdr->keyBytes, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations); if (r < 0) goto out; /* * AF splitting, the masterkey stored in vk->key is split to AfKey */ assert(vk->keylength == hdr->keyBytes); AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes) * SECTOR_SIZE; AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize); if (!AfKey) { r = -ENOMEM; goto out; } log_dbg("Using hash %s for AF in key slot %d, %d stripes", hdr->hashSpec, keyIndex, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes); r = AF_split(vk->key,AfKey,vk->keylength,hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes,hdr->hashSpec); if (r < 0) goto out; log_dbg("Updating key slot %d [0x%04x] area.", keyIndex, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset << 9); /* Encryption via dm */ r = LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(AfKey, AFEKSize, hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode, derived_key, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset, ctx); if (r < 0) goto out; /* Mark the key as active in phdr */ r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, (int)keyIndex, 1); if (r < 0) goto out; r = LUKS_write_phdr(hdr, ctx); if (r < 0) goto out; r = 0; out: crypt_safe_free(AfKey); crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key); return r; } /* Check whether a volume key is invalid. */ int LUKS_verify_volume_key(const struct luks_phdr *hdr, const struct volume_key *vk) { char checkHashBuf[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE]; if (crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec, vk->key, vk->keylength, hdr->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, checkHashBuf, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, hdr->mkDigestIterations) < 0) return -EINVAL; if (memcmp(checkHashBuf, hdr->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE)) return -EPERM; return 0; } /* Try to open a particular key slot */ static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex, const char *password, size_t passwordLen, struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, struct crypt_device *ctx) { crypt_keyslot_info ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(hdr, keyIndex); struct volume_key *derived_key; char *AfKey; size_t AFEKSize; int r; log_dbg("Trying to open key slot %d [%s].", keyIndex, dbg_slot_state(ki)); if (ki < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE) return -ENOENT; derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL); if (!derived_key) return -ENOMEM; assert(vk->keylength == hdr->keyBytes); AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes) * SECTOR_SIZE; AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize); if (!AfKey) { r = -ENOMEM; goto out; } r = crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec, password, passwordLen, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, derived_key->key, hdr->keyBytes, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations); if (r < 0) goto out; log_dbg("Reading key slot %d area.", keyIndex); r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(AfKey, AFEKSize, hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode, derived_key, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset, ctx); if (r < 0) goto out; r = AF_merge(AfKey,vk->key,vk->keylength,hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes,hdr->hashSpec); if (r < 0) goto out; r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(hdr, vk); /* Allow only empty passphrase with null cipher */ if (!r && !strcmp(hdr->cipherName, "cipher_null") && passwordLen) r = -EPERM; if (!r) log_verbose(ctx, _("Key slot %d unlocked.\n"), keyIndex); out: crypt_safe_free(AfKey); crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key); return r; } int LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(int keyIndex, const char *password, size_t passwordLen, struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct volume_key **vk, struct crypt_device *ctx) { unsigned int i; int r; *vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL); if (keyIndex >= 0) { r = LUKS_open_key(keyIndex, password, passwordLen, hdr, *vk, ctx); return (r < 0) ? r : keyIndex; } for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) { r = LUKS_open_key(i, password, passwordLen, hdr, *vk, ctx); if(r == 0) return i; /* Do not retry for errors that are no -EPERM or -ENOENT, former meaning password wrong, latter key slot inactive */ if ((r != -EPERM) && (r != -ENOENT)) return r; } /* Warning, early returns above */ log_err(ctx, _("No key available with this passphrase.\n")); return -EPERM; } int LUKS_del_key(unsigned int keyIndex, struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct crypt_device *ctx) { struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx); unsigned int startOffset, endOffset; int r; r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx); if (r) return r; r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, keyIndex, 0); if (r) { log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"), keyIndex, LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1); return r; } /* secure deletion of key material */ startOffset = hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset; endOffset = startOffset + AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes); r = crypt_wipe_device(ctx, device, CRYPT_WIPE_SPECIAL, startOffset * SECTOR_SIZE, (endOffset - startOffset) * SECTOR_SIZE, (endOffset - startOffset) * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL); if (r) { if (r == -EACCES) { log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"), device_path(device)); r = -EINVAL; } else log_err(ctx, _("Cannot wipe device %s.\n"), device_path(device)); return r; } /* Wipe keyslot info */ memset(&hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, 0, LUKS_SALTSIZE); hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations = 0; r = LUKS_write_phdr(hdr, ctx); return r; } crypt_keyslot_info LUKS_keyslot_info(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot) { int i; if(keyslot >= LUKS_NUMKEYS || keyslot < 0) return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID; if (hdr->keyblock[keyslot].active == LUKS_KEY_DISABLED) return CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE; if (hdr->keyblock[keyslot].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID; for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) if(i != keyslot && hdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE; return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST; } int LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks_phdr *hdr) { int i; for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) if(hdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_DISABLED) break; if (i == LUKS_NUMKEYS) return -EINVAL; return i; } int LUKS_keyslot_active_count(struct luks_phdr *hdr) { int i, num = 0; for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) if(hdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) num++; return num; } int LUKS_keyslot_set(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, int enable) { crypt_keyslot_info ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot); if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID) return -EINVAL; hdr->keyblock[keyslot].active = enable ? LUKS_KEY_ENABLED : LUKS_KEY_DISABLED; log_dbg("Key slot %d was %s in LUKS header.", keyslot, enable ? "enabled" : "disabled"); return 0; } int LUKS1_activate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, struct volume_key *vk, uint32_t flags) { int r; char *dm_cipher = NULL; enum devcheck device_check; struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = { .target = DM_CRYPT, .uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd), .flags = flags, .size = 0, .data_device = crypt_data_device(cd), .u.crypt = { .cipher = NULL, .vk = vk, .offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd), .iv_offset = 0, } }; if (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED) device_check = DEV_SHARED; else device_check = DEV_EXCL; r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmd.data_device, device_check, dmd.u.crypt.offset, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags); if (r) return r; r = asprintf(&dm_cipher, "%s-%s", crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)); if (r < 0) return -ENOMEM; dmd.u.crypt.cipher = dm_cipher; r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_LUKS1, &dmd, 0); free(dm_cipher); return r; }