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The Argon2i/id is a password hashing function that won Password Hashing Competiton. It will be (optionally) used in LUKS2 for passworrd-based key derivation. We have to bundle code for now (similar PBKDF2 years ago) because there is yet no usable implementation in common crypto libraries. (Once there is native implementation, cryptsetup will switch to the crypto library version.) For now, we use reference (not optimized but portable) implementation. This patch contains bundled Argon2 algorithm library copied from https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2 For more info see Password Hashing Competition site: https://password-hashing.net/ and draft of RFC document https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2/ Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
365 lines
8.1 KiB
C
365 lines
8.1 KiB
C
/*
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* GCRYPT crypto backend implementation
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Milan Broz
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*
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* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
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* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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* Lesser General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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* License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
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*/
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <gcrypt.h>
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#include "crypto_backend.h"
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static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
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static int crypto_backend_secmem = 1;
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static int crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = -1;
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static char version[64];
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struct crypt_hash {
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gcry_md_hd_t hd;
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int hash_id;
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int hash_len;
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};
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struct crypt_hmac {
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gcry_md_hd_t hd;
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int hash_id;
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int hash_len;
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};
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/*
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* Test for wrong Whirlpool variant,
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* Ref: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gcrypt-devel/2014-January/002889.html
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*/
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static void crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(void)
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{
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struct crypt_hash *h;
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char buf[2] = "\0\0", hash_out1[64], hash_out2[64];
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int r;
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if (crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug >= 0)
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return;
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crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 0;
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if (crypt_hash_init(&h, "whirlpool"))
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return;
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/* One shot */
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if ((r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[0], 2)) ||
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(r = crypt_hash_final(h, hash_out1, 64))) {
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crypt_hash_destroy(h);
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return;
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}
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/* Split buf (crypt_hash_final resets hash state) */
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if ((r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[0], 1)) ||
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(r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[1], 1)) ||
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(r = crypt_hash_final(h, hash_out2, 64))) {
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crypt_hash_destroy(h);
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return;
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}
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crypt_hash_destroy(h);
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if (memcmp(hash_out1, hash_out2, 64))
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crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 1;
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}
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int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
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{
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if (crypto_backend_initialised)
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return 0;
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if (!gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED_P)) {
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if (!gcry_check_version (GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION)) {
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return -ENOSYS;
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}
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/* FIXME: If gcrypt compiled to support POSIX 1003.1e capabilities,
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* it drops all privileges during secure memory initialisation.
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* For now, the only workaround is to disable secure memory in gcrypt.
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* cryptsetup always need at least cap_sys_admin privilege for dm-ioctl
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* and it locks its memory space anyway.
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*/
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#if 0
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gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM);
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crypto_backend_secmem = 0;
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#else
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gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
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gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 16384, 0);
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gcry_control (GCRYCTL_RESUME_SECMEM_WARN);
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#endif
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gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
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}
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crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
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crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug();
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snprintf(version, 64, "gcrypt %s%s%s",
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gcry_check_version(NULL),
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crypto_backend_secmem ? "" : ", secmem disabled",
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crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug > 0 ? ", flawed whirlpool" : ""
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);
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return 0;
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}
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const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
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{
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return crypto_backend_initialised ? version : "";
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}
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uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static const char *crypt_hash_compat_name(const char *name, unsigned int *flags)
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{
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const char *hash_name = name;
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/* "whirlpool_gcryptbug" is out shortcut to flawed whirlpool
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* in libgcrypt < 1.6.0 */
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if (name && !strcasecmp(name, "whirlpool_gcryptbug")) {
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#if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010601
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if (flags)
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*flags |= GCRY_MD_FLAG_BUGEMU1;
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#endif
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hash_name = "whirlpool";
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}
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return hash_name;
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}
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/* HASH */
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int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
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{
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int hash_id;
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assert(crypto_backend_initialised);
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hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, NULL));
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if (!hash_id)
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return -EINVAL;
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return gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(hash_id);
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}
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int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
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{
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struct crypt_hash *h;
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unsigned int flags = 0;
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assert(crypto_backend_initialised);
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h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
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if (!h)
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return -ENOMEM;
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h->hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, &flags));
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if (!h->hash_id) {
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free(h);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (gcry_md_open(&h->hd, h->hash_id, flags)) {
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free(h);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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h->hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(h->hash_id);
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*ctx = h;
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return 0;
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}
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static void crypt_hash_restart(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
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{
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gcry_md_reset(ctx->hd);
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}
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int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
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{
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gcry_md_write(ctx->hd, buffer, length);
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return 0;
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}
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int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
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{
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unsigned char *hash;
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if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
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return -EINVAL;
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hash = gcry_md_read(ctx->hd, ctx->hash_id);
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if (!hash)
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return -EINVAL;
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memcpy(buffer, hash, length);
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crypt_hash_restart(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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int crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
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{
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gcry_md_close(ctx->hd);
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
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free(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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/* HMAC */
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int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
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{
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return crypt_hash_size(name);
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}
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int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
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const void *buffer, size_t length)
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{
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struct crypt_hmac *h;
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unsigned int flags = GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC;
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assert(crypto_backend_initialised);
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h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
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if (!h)
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return -ENOMEM;
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h->hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, &flags));
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if (!h->hash_id) {
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free(h);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (gcry_md_open(&h->hd, h->hash_id, flags)) {
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free(h);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (gcry_md_setkey(h->hd, buffer, length)) {
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gcry_md_close(h->hd);
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free(h);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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h->hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(h->hash_id);
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*ctx = h;
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return 0;
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}
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static void crypt_hmac_restart(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
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{
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gcry_md_reset(ctx->hd);
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}
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int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
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{
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gcry_md_write(ctx->hd, buffer, length);
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return 0;
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}
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int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
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{
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unsigned char *hash;
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if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
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return -EINVAL;
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hash = gcry_md_read(ctx->hd, ctx->hash_id);
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if (!hash)
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return -EINVAL;
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memcpy(buffer, hash, length);
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crypt_hmac_restart(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
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{
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gcry_md_close(ctx->hd);
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
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free(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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/* RNG */
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int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips)
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{
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switch(quality) {
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case CRYPT_RND_NORMAL:
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gcry_randomize(buffer, length, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
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break;
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case CRYPT_RND_SALT:
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case CRYPT_RND_KEY:
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default:
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gcry_randomize(buffer, length, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
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break;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int pbkdf2(const char *hash,
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const char *password, size_t password_length,
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const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
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char *key, size_t key_length,
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uint32_t iterations)
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{
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const char *hash_name = crypt_hash_compat_name(hash, NULL);
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#if USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
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return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash_name, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
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iterations, key_length, key, 0);
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#else /* USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2 */
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int hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(hash_name);
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if (!hash_id)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (gcry_kdf_derive(password, password_length, GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2, hash_id,
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salt, salt_length, iterations, key_length, key))
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return -EINVAL;
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return 0;
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#endif /* USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2 */
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}
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/* PBKDF */
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int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
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const char *password, size_t password_length,
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const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
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char *key, size_t key_length,
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uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
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{
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if (!kdf)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2"))
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return pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
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key, key_length, iterations);
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#if USE_INTERNAL_ARGON2
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else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6))
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return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
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key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
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#endif
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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