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This patch adds support for Linux kernel (since version 5.11) dm-integrity fixes that disables integrity recalculation if keyed algorithms (HMAC) is used. Original dm-integrity superblock version <=4 is recalculation offset field not protected by HMAC. An attacker can move this pointer and force the kernel to recalculate the data area, ignoring original HMAC tags. N.B. dm-integrity was not intended to protect against intentional changes. Better use authenticated encryption (AEAD) in combination with dm-crypt. It is designed to protect against random data corruption caused by hardware or storage medium faults. Despite that, we try to keep the system secure if keyed algorithms are used. There are two possible keyed algorithms in dm-integrity - algorithm used to protect journal and superblock (--journal-integrity) and algorithms for protecting data (--integrity). The dm-integrity superblock is guarded by --journal-integrity, so if you want to protect data with HMAC, you should always also use HMAC for --journal-integrity. The keys are independent. If HMAC is used for data but not for the journal, recalculation is disabled by default. For new kernel dm-integrity, the HMAC option also uses salt in superblock to avoid an easy way to distinguish that the HMAC key is the same for two devices (if data are the same). The new HMAC and superblock are enabled automatically if the kernel supports it (you can see superblock version 5 and fix_hmac flag in dump command). If you need to use (insecure) backward compatibility, then two new integritysetup options are introduced: Use --integrity-legacy-recalc (instead of --integrity-recalc) to allow recalculation on legacy devices. Use --integrity-legacy-hmac in format action to force old insecure version format (with HMAC). Libcryptsetup API also introduces flags CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC and CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC to set these through crypt_set_compatibility() call.
377 lines
11 KiB
C
377 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* Integrity volume handling
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Milan Broz
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*
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* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
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* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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* Lesser General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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* License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
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*/
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <uuid/uuid.h>
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#include "integrity.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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static int INTEGRITY_read_superblock(struct crypt_device *cd,
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struct device *device,
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uint64_t offset, struct superblock *sb)
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{
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int devfd, r;
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devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
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if(devfd < 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
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device_alignment(device), sb, sizeof(*sb), offset) != sizeof(*sb) ||
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memcmp(sb->magic, SB_MAGIC, sizeof(sb->magic)) ||
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sb->version < SB_VERSION_1 || sb->version > SB_VERSION_5) {
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log_std(cd, "No integrity superblock detected on %s.\n",
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device_path(device));
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r = -EINVAL;
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} else {
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sb->integrity_tag_size = le16toh(sb->integrity_tag_size);
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sb->journal_sections = le32toh(sb->journal_sections);
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sb->provided_data_sectors = le64toh(sb->provided_data_sectors);
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sb->recalc_sector = le64toh(sb->recalc_sector);
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sb->flags = le32toh(sb->flags);
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r = 0;
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}
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return r;
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}
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int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
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struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
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uint32_t *flags)
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{
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struct superblock sb;
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int r;
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r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), 0, &sb);
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if (r)
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return r;
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params->sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block;
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params->tag_size = sb.integrity_tag_size;
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if (flags)
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*flags = sb.flags;
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return 0;
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}
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int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offset)
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{
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struct superblock sb;
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int r;
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r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, device, offset, &sb);
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if (r)
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return r;
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log_std(cd, "Info for integrity device %s.\n", device_path(device));
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log_std(cd, "superblock_version %d\n", (unsigned)sb.version);
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log_std(cd, "log2_interleave_sectors %d\n", sb.log2_interleave_sectors);
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log_std(cd, "integrity_tag_size %u\n", sb.integrity_tag_size);
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log_std(cd, "journal_sections %u\n", sb.journal_sections);
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log_std(cd, "provided_data_sectors %" PRIu64 "\n", sb.provided_data_sectors);
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log_std(cd, "sector_size %u\n", SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block);
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if (sb.version >= SB_VERSION_2 && (sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING))
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log_std(cd, "recalc_sector %" PRIu64 "\n", sb.recalc_sector);
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log_std(cd, "log2_blocks_per_bitmap %u\n", sb.log2_blocks_per_bitmap_bit);
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log_std(cd, "flags %s%s%s%s%s\n",
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sb.flags & SB_FLAG_HAVE_JOURNAL_MAC ? "have_journal_mac " : "",
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sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING ? "recalculating " : "",
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sb.flags & SB_FLAG_DIRTY_BITMAP ? "dirty_bitmap " : "",
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sb.flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING ? "fix_padding " : "",
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sb.flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_HMAC ? "fix_hmac " : "");
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return 0;
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}
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int INTEGRITY_data_sectors(struct crypt_device *cd,
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struct device *device, uint64_t offset,
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uint64_t *data_sectors)
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{
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struct superblock sb;
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int r;
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r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, device, offset, &sb);
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if (r)
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return r;
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*data_sectors = sb.provided_data_sectors;
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return 0;
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}
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int INTEGRITY_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *integrity)
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{
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if (!integrity)
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return 0;
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//FIXME: use crypto backend hash size
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if (!strcmp(integrity, "aead"))
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return 0;
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha1)"))
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return 20;
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha256)"))
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return 32;
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha512)"))
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return 64;
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "poly1305"))
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return 0;
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "none"))
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return 0;
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/* Return hash or hmac(hash) size, if known */
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int INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(const char *integrity)
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{
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char hash[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
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int r;
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if (!integrity)
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return 0;
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if (!strcmp(integrity, "crc32") || !strcmp(integrity, "crc32c"))
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return 4;
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r = sscanf(integrity, "hmac(%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^)]s", hash);
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if (r == 1)
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r = crypt_hash_size(hash);
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else
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r = crypt_hash_size(integrity);
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return r < 0 ? 0 : r;
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}
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int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
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const char *integrity,
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const char *cipher,
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const char *cipher_mode)
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{
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int iv_tag_size = 0, auth_tag_size = 0;
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if (!cipher_mode)
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iv_tag_size = 0;
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else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "xts-random"))
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iv_tag_size = 16;
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else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "gcm-random"))
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iv_tag_size = 12;
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else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "ccm-random"))
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iv_tag_size = 8;
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else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "ctr-random"))
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iv_tag_size = 16;
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else if (!strcmp(cipher, "aegis256") && !strcmp(cipher_mode, "random"))
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iv_tag_size = 32;
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else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "random"))
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iv_tag_size = 16;
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//FIXME: use crypto backend hash size
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if (!integrity || !strcmp(integrity, "none"))
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auth_tag_size = 0;
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "aead"))
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auth_tag_size = 16; //FIXME gcm- mode only
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "cmac(aes)"))
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auth_tag_size = 16;
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha1)"))
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auth_tag_size = 20;
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha256)"))
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auth_tag_size = 32;
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha512)"))
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auth_tag_size = 64;
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else if (!strcmp(integrity, "poly1305")) {
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if (iv_tag_size)
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iv_tag_size = 12;
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auth_tag_size = 16;
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}
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return iv_tag_size + auth_tag_size;
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}
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int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
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const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
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struct volume_key *vk,
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struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
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struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
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struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
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uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags)
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{
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int r;
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if (!dmd)
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return -EINVAL;
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*dmd = (struct crypt_dm_active_device) {
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.flags = flags,
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};
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/* Workaround for kernel dm-integrity table bug */
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if (sb_flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING)
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dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
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r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
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crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &dmd->size);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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return dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd->segment, 0, dmd->size,
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crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
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crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
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crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk, journal_crypt_key,
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journal_mac_key, params);
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}
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int INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
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const char *name,
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const char *type,
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struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
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uint32_t sb_flags)
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{
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int r;
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uint32_t dmi_flags;
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struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd->segment;
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if (!single_segment(dmd) || tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)
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return -EINVAL;
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log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate INTEGRITY device on top of %s, using name %s, tag size %d, provided sectors %" PRIu64".",
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device_path(tgt->data_device), name, tgt->u.integrity.tag_size, dmd->size);
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r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL,
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tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmd->flags);
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if (r)
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return r;
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if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
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r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
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if (r)
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return r;
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}
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r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
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if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
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log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-integrity mapping."));
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return -ENOTSUP;
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}
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if (r < 0 && (sb_flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING) && !dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) &&
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!(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED)) {
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log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-integrity fixed metadata alignment."));
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return -ENOTSUP;
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}
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if (r < 0 && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE) &&
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!(crypt_get_compatibility(cd) & CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC) &&
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(sb_flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_HMAC) ?
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(tgt->u.integrity.vk && !tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key) :
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(tgt->u.integrity.vk || tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key)) {
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log_err(cd, _("Kernel refuses to activate insecure recalculate option (see legacy activation options to override)."));
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return -ENOTSUP;
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}
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return r;
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}
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int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
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const char *name,
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const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
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struct volume_key *vk,
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struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
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struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
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uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags)
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{
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struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
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int r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, params, vk, journal_crypt_key,
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journal_mac_key, &dmd, flags, sb_flags);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, name, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &dmd, sb_flags);
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dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
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return r;
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}
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int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
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const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
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struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
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struct volume_key *journal_mac_key)
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{
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uint32_t dmi_flags;
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char tmp_name[64], tmp_uuid[40];
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struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdi = {
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.size = 8,
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.flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE, /* We always create journal but it can be unused later */
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};
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struct dm_target *tgt = &dmdi.segment;
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int r;
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uuid_t tmp_uuid_bin;
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struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
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uuid_generate(tmp_uuid_bin);
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uuid_unparse(tmp_uuid_bin, tmp_uuid);
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snprintf(tmp_name, sizeof(tmp_name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%s", tmp_uuid);
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/* There is no data area, we can actually use fake zeroed key */
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if (params && params->integrity_key_size)
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vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->integrity_key_size, NULL);
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r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, tgt, 0, dmdi.size, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
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crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
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crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk,
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journal_crypt_key, journal_mac_key, params);
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if (r < 0) {
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crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
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return r;
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}
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log_dbg(cd, "Trying to format INTEGRITY device on top of %s, tmp name %s, tag size %d.",
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device_path(tgt->data_device), tmp_name, tgt->u.integrity.tag_size);
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r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL, tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, NULL);
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if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
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log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-integrity mapping."));
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r = -ENOTSUP;
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}
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if (r) {
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dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
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return r;
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}
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if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
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r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
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if (r) {
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dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
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return r;
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}
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}
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r = dm_create_device(cd, tmp_name, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &dmdi);
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crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
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dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
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if (r)
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return r;
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return dm_remove_device(cd, tmp_name, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE);
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}
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