Files
cryptsetup/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c
Ondrej Kozina 60addcffa6 Fix CVE-2021-4122 - LUKS2 reencryption crash recovery attack
Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
reencryption extension crash recovery.

An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
decrypt part of the LUKS device.

This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but
no knowledge of user passphrases.

The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates
the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata.
There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened
(except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed
afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with
possible modification of revealed plaintext.

The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual
reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new
encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires
calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to
initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no
encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not
protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects
visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect
against intentional modification but such modification must not cause
a violation of data confidentiality.

The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption
metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical
reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata
digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots.
For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0.
2022-01-12 20:49:34 +01:00

382 lines
9.2 KiB
C

/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, reencryption digest helpers
*
* Copyright (C) 2022, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2022, Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2022, Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
* of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
#include "luks2_internal.h"
#include <assert.h>
#define MAX_STR 64
struct jtype {
enum { JNONE = 0, JSTR, JU64, JX64, JU32 } type;
json_object *jobj;
const char *id;
};
static size_t sr(struct jtype *j, uint8_t *ptr)
{
json_object *jobj;
size_t len = 0;
uint64_t u64;
uint32_t u32;
if (!json_object_is_type(j->jobj, json_type_object))
return 0;
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(j->jobj, j->id, &jobj))
return 0;
switch(j->type) {
case JSTR: /* JSON string */
if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
return 0;
len = strlen(json_object_get_string(jobj));
if (len > MAX_STR)
return 0;
if (ptr)
memcpy(ptr, json_object_get_string(jobj), len);
break;
case JU64: /* Unsigned 64bit integer stored as string */
if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
break;
len = sizeof(u64);
if (ptr) {
u64 = cpu_to_be64(crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj));
memcpy(ptr, &u64, len);
}
break;
case JX64: /* Unsigned 64bit segment size (allows "dynamic") */
if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
break;
if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), "dynamic")) {
len = strlen("dynamic");
if (ptr)
memcpy(ptr, json_object_get_string(jobj), len);
} else {
len = sizeof(u64);
u64 = cpu_to_be64(crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj));
if (ptr)
memcpy(ptr, &u64, len);
}
break;
case JU32: /* Unsigned 32bit integer, stored as JSON int */
if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_int))
return 0;
len = sizeof(u32);
if (ptr) {
u32 = cpu_to_be32(crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj));
memcpy(ptr, &u32, len);
}
break;
case JNONE:
return 0;
};
return len;
}
static size_t srs(struct jtype j[], uint8_t *ptr)
{
size_t l, len = 0;
while(j->jobj) {
l = sr(j, ptr);
if (!l)
return 0;
len += l;
if (ptr)
ptr += l;
j++;
}
return len;
}
static size_t segment_linear_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
{
struct jtype j[] = {
{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "type" },
{ JU64, jobj_segment, "offset" },
{ JX64, jobj_segment, "size" },
{}
};
return srs(j, buffer);
}
static size_t segment_crypt_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
{
struct jtype j[] = {
{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "type" },
{ JU64, jobj_segment, "offset" },
{ JX64, jobj_segment, "size" },
{ JU64, jobj_segment, "iv_tweak" },
{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "encryption" },
{ JU32, jobj_segment, "sector_size" },
{}
};
return srs(j, buffer);
}
static size_t segment_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
{
json_object *jobj_type;
const char *segment_type;
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "type", &jobj_type))
return 0;
if (!(segment_type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
return 0;
if (!strcmp(segment_type, "crypt"))
return segment_crypt_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer);
else if (!strcmp(segment_type, "linear"))
return segment_linear_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer);
return 0;
}
static size_t backup_segments_serialize(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint8_t *buffer)
{
json_object *jobj_segment;
size_t l, len = 0;
jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-previous");
if (!jobj_segment || !(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
return 0;
len += l;
if (buffer)
buffer += l;
jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-final");
if (!jobj_segment || !(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
return 0;
len += l;
if (buffer)
buffer += l;
jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-moved-segment");
if (jobj_segment) {
if (!(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
return 0;
len += l;
}
return len;
}
static size_t reenc_keyslot_serialize(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint8_t *buffer)
{
json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj_type;
const char *area_type;
int keyslot_reencrypt;
keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
return 0;
if (!(jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot_reencrypt)))
return 0;
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
return 0;
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_type))
return 0;
if (!(area_type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
return 0;
struct jtype j[] = {
{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
{ JSTR, jobj_area, "type" },
{ JU64, jobj_area, "offset" },
{ JU64, jobj_area, "size" },
{}
};
struct jtype j_datashift[] = {
{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
{ JSTR, jobj_area, "type" },
{ JU64, jobj_area, "offset" },
{ JU64, jobj_area, "size" },
{ JU64, jobj_area, "shift_size" },
{}
};
struct jtype j_checksum[] = {
{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
{ JSTR, jobj_area, "type" },
{ JU64, jobj_area, "offset" },
{ JU64, jobj_area, "size" },
{ JSTR, jobj_area, "hash" },
{ JU32, jobj_area, "sector_size" },
{}
};
if (!strcmp(area_type, "datashift"))
return srs(j_datashift, buffer);
else if (!strcmp(area_type, "checksum"))
return srs(j_checksum, buffer);
return srs(j, buffer);
}
static size_t blob_serialize(void *blob, size_t length, uint8_t *buffer)
{
if (buffer)
memcpy(buffer, blob, length);
return length;
}
static int reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
struct volume_key *vks,
struct volume_key **verification_data)
{
uint8_t *ptr;
int digest_new, digest_old;
struct volume_key *data = NULL, *vk_old = NULL, *vk_new = NULL;
size_t keyslot_data_len, segments_data_len, data_len = 2;
/* Keys - calculate length */
digest_new = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(hdr);
digest_old = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_old(hdr);
if (digest_old >= 0) {
vk_old = crypt_volume_key_by_id(vks, digest_old);
if (!vk_old)
return -EINVAL;
data_len += blob_serialize(vk_old->key, vk_old->keylength, NULL);
}
if (digest_new >= 0 && digest_old != digest_new) {
vk_new = crypt_volume_key_by_id(vks, digest_new);
if (!vk_new)
return -EINVAL;
data_len += blob_serialize(vk_new->key, vk_new->keylength, NULL);
}
if (data_len == 2)
return -EINVAL;
/* Metadata - calculate length */
if (!(keyslot_data_len = reenc_keyslot_serialize(hdr, NULL)))
return -EINVAL;
data_len += keyslot_data_len;
if (!(segments_data_len = backup_segments_serialize(hdr, NULL)))
return -EINVAL;
data_len += segments_data_len;
/* Alloc and fill serialization data */
data = crypt_alloc_volume_key(data_len, NULL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
ptr = (uint8_t*)data->key;
/* v2 */
*ptr++ = 0x76;
*ptr++ = 0x32;
if (vk_old)
ptr += blob_serialize(vk_old->key, vk_old->keylength, ptr);
if (vk_new)
ptr += blob_serialize(vk_new->key, vk_new->keylength, ptr);
if (!reenc_keyslot_serialize(hdr, ptr))
goto bad;
ptr += keyslot_data_len;
if (!backup_segments_serialize(hdr, ptr))
goto bad;
ptr += segments_data_len;
assert((size_t)(ptr - (uint8_t*)data->key) == data_len);
*verification_data = data;
return 0;
bad:
crypt_free_volume_key(data);
return -EINVAL;
}
int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
struct volume_key *vks)
{
int digest_reencrypt, keyslot_reencrypt, r;
struct volume_key *data;
keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
return keyslot_reencrypt;
r = reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(cd, hdr, vks, &data);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", hdr, data);
crypt_free_volume_key(data);
if (r < 0)
return r;
digest_reencrypt = r;
r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot_reencrypt, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot_reencrypt, digest_reencrypt, 1, 0);
}
int LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
struct volume_key *vks)
{
int r, keyslot_reencrypt;
struct volume_key *data;
keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
return keyslot_reencrypt;
r = reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(cd, hdr, vks, &data);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, data, keyslot_reencrypt);
crypt_free_volume_key(data);
if (r < 0) {
if (r == -ENOENT)
log_dbg(cd, "Reencryption digest is missing.");
log_err(cd, _("Reencryption metadata is invalid."));
} else
log_dbg(cd, "Reencryption metadata verified.");
return r;
}