Files
cryptsetup/lib/integrity/integrity.c
Milan Broz a0e87c9420 Calculate hash integrity size instead of requiring an explicit tag size.
When integritysetup formats a device with hash or HMAC integrity checksums,
it requires explicitly tag size entry from a user (or default value).

This leads to confusion and shortened tags.

This patch calculates tag size according to real hash output, and
if tag size is specified, it warns if these values differ.

Fixes: #492.
2019-12-31 17:37:33 +01:00

363 lines
10 KiB
C

/*
* Integrity volume handling
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <uuid/uuid.h>
#include "integrity.h"
#include "internal.h"
static int INTEGRITY_read_superblock(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct device *device,
uint64_t offset, struct superblock *sb)
{
int devfd, r;
devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
if(devfd < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
device_alignment(device), sb, sizeof(*sb), offset) != sizeof(*sb) ||
memcmp(sb->magic, SB_MAGIC, sizeof(sb->magic)) ||
sb->version < SB_VERSION_1 || sb->version > SB_VERSION_4) {
log_std(cd, "No integrity superblock detected on %s.\n",
device_path(device));
r = -EINVAL;
} else {
sb->integrity_tag_size = le16toh(sb->integrity_tag_size);
sb->journal_sections = le32toh(sb->journal_sections);
sb->provided_data_sectors = le64toh(sb->provided_data_sectors);
sb->recalc_sector = le64toh(sb->recalc_sector);
sb->flags = le32toh(sb->flags);
r = 0;
}
return r;
}
int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
uint32_t *flags)
{
struct superblock sb;
int r;
r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), 0, &sb);
if (r)
return r;
params->sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block;
params->tag_size = sb.integrity_tag_size;
if (flags)
*flags = sb.flags;
return 0;
}
int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offset)
{
struct superblock sb;
int r;
r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, device, offset, &sb);
if (r)
return r;
log_std(cd, "Info for integrity device %s.\n", device_path(device));
log_std(cd, "superblock_version %d\n", (unsigned)sb.version);
log_std(cd, "log2_interleave_sectors %d\n", sb.log2_interleave_sectors);
log_std(cd, "integrity_tag_size %u\n", sb.integrity_tag_size);
log_std(cd, "journal_sections %u\n", sb.journal_sections);
log_std(cd, "provided_data_sectors %" PRIu64 "\n", sb.provided_data_sectors);
log_std(cd, "sector_size %u\n", SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block);
if (sb.version == SB_VERSION_2 && (sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING))
log_std(cd, "recalc_sector %" PRIu64 "\n", sb.recalc_sector);
log_std(cd, "log2_blocks_per_bitmap %u\n", sb.log2_blocks_per_bitmap_bit);
log_std(cd, "flags %s%s%s%s\n",
sb.flags & SB_FLAG_HAVE_JOURNAL_MAC ? "have_journal_mac " : "",
sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING ? "recalculating " : "",
sb.flags & SB_FLAG_DIRTY_BITMAP ? "dirty_bitmap " : "",
sb.flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING ? "fix_padding " : "");
return 0;
}
int INTEGRITY_data_sectors(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct device *device, uint64_t offset,
uint64_t *data_sectors)
{
struct superblock sb;
int r;
r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, device, offset, &sb);
if (r)
return r;
*data_sectors = sb.provided_data_sectors;
return 0;
}
int INTEGRITY_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *integrity)
{
if (!integrity)
return 0;
//FIXME: use crypto backend hash size
if (!strcmp(integrity, "aead"))
return 0;
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha1)"))
return 20;
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha256)"))
return 32;
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha512)"))
return 64;
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "poly1305"))
return 0;
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "none"))
return 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Return hash or hmac(hash) size, if known */
int INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(const char *integrity)
{
char hash[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
int r;
if (!integrity)
return 0;
if (!strcmp(integrity, "crc32") || !strcmp(integrity, "crc32c"))
return 4;
r = sscanf(integrity, "hmac(%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^)]s", hash);
if (r == 1)
r = crypt_hash_size(hash);
else
r = crypt_hash_size(integrity);
return r < 0 ? 0 : r;
}
int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *integrity,
const char *cipher,
const char *cipher_mode)
{
int iv_tag_size = 0, auth_tag_size = 0;
if (!cipher_mode)
iv_tag_size = 0;
else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "xts-random"))
iv_tag_size = 16;
else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "gcm-random"))
iv_tag_size = 12;
else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "ccm-random"))
iv_tag_size = 8;
else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "ctr-random"))
iv_tag_size = 16;
else if (!strcmp(cipher, "aegis256") && !strcmp(cipher_mode, "random"))
iv_tag_size = 32;
else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "random"))
iv_tag_size = 16;
//FIXME: use crypto backend hash size
if (!integrity || !strcmp(integrity, "none"))
auth_tag_size = 0;
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "aead"))
auth_tag_size = 16; //FIXME gcm- mode only
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "cmac(aes)"))
auth_tag_size = 16;
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha1)"))
auth_tag_size = 20;
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha256)"))
auth_tag_size = 32;
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha512)"))
auth_tag_size = 64;
else if (!strcmp(integrity, "poly1305")) {
if (iv_tag_size)
iv_tag_size = 12;
auth_tag_size = 16;
}
return iv_tag_size + auth_tag_size;
}
int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
struct volume_key *vk,
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
uint32_t flags)
{
int r;
if (!dmd)
return -EINVAL;
*dmd = (struct crypt_dm_active_device) {
.flags = flags,
};
r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &dmd->size);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd->segment, 0, dmd->size,
crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk, journal_crypt_key,
journal_mac_key, params);
}
int INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *type,
struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
uint32_t sb_flags)
{
int r;
uint32_t dmi_flags;
struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd->segment;
if (!single_segment(dmd) || tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)
return -EINVAL;
log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate INTEGRITY device on top of %s, using name %s, tag size %d, provided sectors %" PRIu64".",
device_path(tgt->data_device), name, tgt->u.integrity.tag_size, dmd->size);
r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL,
tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmd->flags);
if (r)
return r;
if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (r)
return r;
}
r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."));
return -ENOTSUP;
}
if (r < 0 && (sb_flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING) && !dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) &&
!(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED)) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity fixed metadata alignment."));
return -ENOTSUP;
}
return r;
}
int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
struct volume_key *vk,
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags)
{
struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
int r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, params, vk, journal_crypt_key, journal_mac_key, &dmd, flags);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, name, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &dmd, sb_flags);
dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
return r;
}
int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
struct volume_key *journal_mac_key)
{
uint32_t dmi_flags;
char tmp_name[64], tmp_uuid[40];
struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdi = {
.size = 8,
.flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE, /* We always create journal but it can be unused later */
};
struct dm_target *tgt = &dmdi.segment;
int r;
uuid_t tmp_uuid_bin;
struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
uuid_generate(tmp_uuid_bin);
uuid_unparse(tmp_uuid_bin, tmp_uuid);
snprintf(tmp_name, sizeof(tmp_name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%s", tmp_uuid);
/* There is no data area, we can actually use fake zeroed key */
if (params && params->integrity_key_size)
vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->integrity_key_size, NULL);
r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, tgt, 0, dmdi.size, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk,
journal_crypt_key, journal_mac_key, params);
if (r < 0) {
crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
return r;
}
log_dbg(cd, "Trying to format INTEGRITY device on top of %s, tmp name %s, tag size %d.",
device_path(tgt->data_device), tmp_name, tgt->u.integrity.tag_size);
r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL, tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, NULL);
if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."));
r = -ENOTSUP;
}
if (r) {
dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
return r;
}
if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (r) {
dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
return r;
}
}
r = dm_create_device(cd, tmp_name, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &dmdi);
crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
if (r)
return r;
return dm_remove_device(cd, tmp_name, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE);
}