Files
cryptsetup/lib/utils_crypt.c
Milan Broz aeea93fa95 Properly fail in luksFormat if cipher format is missing required IV.
For now, crypto API quietly used cipher witout IV if a cipher
algorithm wihtou IV specificaton was used (e.g. aes-xts).

This caused fail later during activation.

This patch allows only two specific backed use without specified IV
(ECB mode and NULL cipher).

Also check cipher string early during parsing of CLI options.
2018-01-18 21:20:25 +01:00

250 lines
5.5 KiB
C

/*
* utils_crypt - cipher utilities for cryptsetup
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
* of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "libcryptsetup.h"
#include "utils_crypt.h"
int crypt_parse_name_and_mode(const char *s, char *cipher, int *key_nums,
char *cipher_mode, int require_iv)
{
if (!s || !cipher || !cipher_mode)
return -EINVAL;
if (sscanf(s, "%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^-]-%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "s",
cipher, cipher_mode) == 2) {
if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "plain"))
strcpy(cipher_mode, "cbc-plain");
if (key_nums) {
char *tmp = strchr(cipher, ':');
*key_nums = tmp ? atoi(++tmp) : 1;
if (!*key_nums)
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Enforce IV */
if (require_iv) {
char *tmp = strchr(cipher_mode, '-');
if (!tmp || tmp[1] == '\0')
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/* Short version for "empty" cipher */
if (!strcmp(s, "null") || !strcmp(s, "cipher_null")) {
strcpy(cipher, "cipher_null");
strcpy(cipher_mode, "ecb");
if (key_nums)
*key_nums = 0;
return 0;
}
if (sscanf(s, "%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^-]", cipher) == 1) {
strcpy(cipher_mode, "cbc-plain");
if (key_nums)
*key_nums = 1;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
int crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(const char *s, char *integrity)
{
char mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], hash[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
int r;
if (!s || !integrity || strchr(s, '(') || strchr(s, ')'))
return -EINVAL;
r = sscanf(s, "%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^-]-%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "s", mode, hash);
if (r == 2)
r = snprintf(integrity, MAX_CIPHER_LEN, "%s(%s)", mode, hash);
else if (r == 1)
r = snprintf(integrity, MAX_CIPHER_LEN, "%s", mode);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (r < 0 || r == MAX_CIPHER_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
int crypt_parse_integrity_mode(const char *s, char *integrity,
int *integrity_key_size)
{
int ks = 0, r = 0;
if (!s || !integrity)
return -EINVAL;
// FIXME: do not hardcode it here
/* AEAD modes */
if (!strcmp(s, "aead") ||
!strcmp(s, "poly1305") ||
!strcmp(s, "none")) {
strncpy(integrity, s, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
ks = 0;
} else if (!strcmp(s, "hmac-sha256")) {
strncpy(integrity, "hmac(sha256)", MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
ks = 32;
} else if (!strcmp(s, "hmac-sha512")) {
ks = 64;
strncpy(integrity, "hmac(sha512)", MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
} else if (!strcmp(s, "cmac-aes")) {
ks = 16;
strncpy(integrity, "cmac(aes)", MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
} else
r = -EINVAL;
if (integrity_key_size)
*integrity_key_size = ks;
return r;
}
int crypt_parse_pbkdf(const char *s, const char **pbkdf)
{
const char *tmp = NULL;
if (!s)
return -EINVAL;
if (!strcasecmp(s, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2))
tmp = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
else if (!strcasecmp(s, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I))
tmp = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I;
else if (!strcasecmp(s, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID))
tmp = CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID;
if (!tmp)
return -EINVAL;
if (pbkdf)
*pbkdf = tmp;
return 0;
}
/*
* Replacement for memset(s, 0, n) on stack that can be optimized out
* Also used in safe allocations for explicit memory wipe.
*/
void crypt_memzero(void *s, size_t n)
{
volatile uint8_t *p = (volatile uint8_t *)s;
while(n--)
*p++ = 0;
}
/* safe allocations */
void *crypt_safe_alloc(size_t size)
{
struct safe_allocation *alloc;
if (!size || size > (SIZE_MAX - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data)))
return NULL;
alloc = malloc(size + offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
if (!alloc)
return NULL;
alloc->size = size;
crypt_memzero(&alloc->data, size);
/* coverity[leaked_storage] */
return &alloc->data;
}
void crypt_safe_free(void *data)
{
struct safe_allocation *alloc;
if (!data)
return;
alloc = (struct safe_allocation *)
((char *)data - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
crypt_memzero(data, alloc->size);
alloc->size = 0x55aa55aa;
free(alloc);
}
void *crypt_safe_realloc(void *data, size_t size)
{
struct safe_allocation *alloc;
void *new_data;
new_data = crypt_safe_alloc(size);
if (new_data && data) {
alloc = (struct safe_allocation *)
((char *)data - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
if (size > alloc->size)
size = alloc->size;
memcpy(new_data, data, size);
}
crypt_safe_free(data);
return new_data;
}
ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *hex, char **result, int safe_alloc)
{
char buf[3] = "xx\0", *endp, *bytes;
size_t i, len;
len = strlen(hex);
if (len % 2)
return -EINVAL;
len /= 2;
bytes = safe_alloc ? crypt_safe_alloc(len) : malloc(len);
if (!bytes)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
memcpy(buf, &hex[i * 2], 2);
bytes[i] = strtoul(buf, &endp, 16);
if (endp != &buf[2]) {
safe_alloc ? crypt_safe_free(bytes) : free(bytes);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
*result = bytes;
return i;
}