Files
cryptsetup/lib/verity/verity.c
Ondrej Kozina ec9b97a731 Fix shared activation for dm-verity devices.
CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED flag was silently ignored
while activating dm-verity devices by libcryptsetup.
This was a bug.

DM verity shared activation is generaly safe (single mapped data device
in multiple DM verity tables) since all verity devices are
read only.

The CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED flag also fixes a race condition
when multiple processes compete for the same DM device name
(all dm-verity) while using same backing data device.

The exclusive open check in-before verity activation could
fail DM table load for a process that otherwise successfully acquired
DM device name (succeed in creating the DM device). This could (in some
cases) result in all processes competening for the DM verity device
to fail and none would activate the DM verity device.
2024-07-24 09:39:21 +00:00

449 lines
13 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
/*
* dm-verity volume handling
*
* Copyright (C) 2012-2024 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <uuid/uuid.h>
#include "libcryptsetup.h"
#include "verity.h"
#include "internal.h"
#define VERITY_SIGNATURE "verity\0\0"
/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity#verity-superblock-format */
struct verity_sb {
uint8_t signature[8]; /* "verity\0\0" */
uint32_t version; /* superblock version */
uint32_t hash_type; /* 0 - Chrome OS, 1 - normal */
uint8_t uuid[16]; /* UUID of hash device */
uint8_t algorithm[32];/* hash algorithm name */
uint32_t data_block_size; /* data block in bytes */
uint32_t hash_block_size; /* hash block in bytes */
uint64_t data_blocks; /* number of data blocks */
uint16_t salt_size; /* salt size */
uint8_t _pad1[6];
uint8_t salt[256]; /* salt */
uint8_t _pad2[168];
} __attribute__((packed));
/* Read verity superblock from disk */
int VERITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
uint64_t sb_offset,
char **uuid_string,
struct crypt_params_verity *params)
{
struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
struct verity_sb sb = {};
ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct verity_sb);
int devfd, sb_version;
log_dbg(cd, "Reading VERITY header of size %zu on device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
sizeof(struct verity_sb), device_path(device), sb_offset);
if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER) {
log_err(cd, _("Verity device %s does not use on-disk header."),
device_path(device));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (MISALIGNED_512(sb_offset)) {
log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash offset."));
return -EINVAL;
}
devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
if (devfd < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
device_alignment(device), &sb, hdr_size,
sb_offset) < hdr_size)
return -EIO;
if (memcmp(sb.signature, VERITY_SIGNATURE, sizeof(sb.signature))) {
log_dbg(cd, "No VERITY signature detected.");
return -EINVAL;
}
sb_version = le32_to_cpu(sb.version);
if (sb_version != 1) {
log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY version %d."), sb_version);
return -EINVAL;
}
params->hash_type = le32_to_cpu(sb.hash_type);
if (params->hash_type > VERITY_MAX_HASH_TYPE) {
log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."), params->hash_type);
return -EINVAL;
}
params->data_block_size = le32_to_cpu(sb.data_block_size);
params->hash_block_size = le32_to_cpu(sb.hash_block_size);
if (VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->data_block_size) ||
VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->hash_block_size)) {
log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY block size."));
return -EINVAL;
}
params->data_size = le64_to_cpu(sb.data_blocks);
/* Update block size to be used for loop devices */
device_set_block_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), params->hash_block_size);
device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), params->data_block_size);
params->hash_name = strndup((const char*)sb.algorithm, sizeof(sb.algorithm));
if (!params->hash_name)
return -ENOMEM;
if (crypt_hash_size(params->hash_name) <= 0) {
log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported."),
params->hash_name);
free(CONST_CAST(char*)params->hash_name);
params->hash_name = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
params->salt_size = le16_to_cpu(sb.salt_size);
if (params->salt_size > sizeof(sb.salt)) {
log_err(cd, _("VERITY header corrupted."));
free(CONST_CAST(char*)params->hash_name);
params->hash_name = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
params->salt = malloc(params->salt_size);
if (!params->salt) {
free(CONST_CAST(char*)params->hash_name);
params->hash_name = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
memcpy(CONST_CAST(char*)params->salt, sb.salt, params->salt_size);
if ((*uuid_string = malloc(40)))
uuid_unparse(sb.uuid, *uuid_string);
params->hash_area_offset = sb_offset;
return 0;
}
static void _to_lower(char *str)
{
for(; *str; str++)
if (isupper(*str))
*str = tolower(*str);
}
/* Write verity superblock to disk */
int VERITY_write_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
uint64_t sb_offset,
const char *uuid_string,
struct crypt_params_verity *params)
{
struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
struct verity_sb sb = {};
ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct verity_sb);
size_t block_size;
char *algorithm;
uuid_t uuid;
int r, devfd;
log_dbg(cd, "Updating VERITY header of size %zu on device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
sizeof(struct verity_sb), device_path(device), sb_offset);
if (!uuid_string || uuid_parse(uuid_string, uuid) == -1) {
log_err(cd, _("Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s."),
device_path(device));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER) {
log_err(cd, _("Verity device %s does not use on-disk header."),
device_path(device));
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Avoid possible increasing of image size - FEC could fail later because of it */
block_size = device_block_size(cd, device);
if (block_size > params->hash_block_size) {
device_disable_direct_io(device);
block_size = params->hash_block_size;
}
devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDWR);
if (devfd < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(&sb.signature, VERITY_SIGNATURE, sizeof(sb.signature));
sb.version = cpu_to_le32(1);
sb.hash_type = cpu_to_le32(params->hash_type);
sb.data_block_size = cpu_to_le32(params->data_block_size);
sb.hash_block_size = cpu_to_le32(params->hash_block_size);
sb.salt_size = cpu_to_le16(params->salt_size);
sb.data_blocks = cpu_to_le64(params->data_size);
/* Kernel always use lower-case */
algorithm = (char *)sb.algorithm;
strncpy(algorithm, params->hash_name, sizeof(sb.algorithm)-1);
algorithm[sizeof(sb.algorithm)-1] = '\0';
_to_lower(algorithm);
memcpy(sb.salt, params->salt, params->salt_size);
memcpy(sb.uuid, uuid, sizeof(sb.uuid));
r = write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, block_size, device_alignment(device),
(char*)&sb, hdr_size, sb_offset) < hdr_size ? -EIO : 0;
if (r)
log_err(cd, _("Error during update of verity header on device %s."),
device_path(device));
device_sync(cd, device);
return r;
}
/* Calculate hash offset in hash blocks */
uint64_t VERITY_hash_offset_block(struct crypt_params_verity *params)
{
uint64_t hash_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)
return hash_offset / params->hash_block_size;
hash_offset += sizeof(struct verity_sb);
hash_offset += params->hash_block_size - 1;
return hash_offset / params->hash_block_size;
}
int VERITY_UUID_generate(char **uuid_string)
{
uuid_t uuid;
*uuid_string = malloc(40);
if (!*uuid_string)
return -ENOMEM;
uuid_generate(uuid);
uuid_unparse(uuid, *uuid_string);
return 0;
}
int VERITY_verify_params(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct crypt_params_verity *hdr,
bool signed_root_hash,
struct device *fec_device,
struct volume_key *root_hash)
{
bool userspace_verification;
int v, r;
unsigned int fec_errors = 0;
assert(cd);
assert(hdr);
assert(root_hash);
log_dbg(cd, "Verifying VERITY device using hash %s.",
hdr->hash_name);
userspace_verification = hdr->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_CHECK_HASH;
if (userspace_verification && signed_root_hash) {
log_err(cd, _("Root hash signature verification is not supported."));
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((hdr->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE) && !signed_root_hash) {
log_err(cd, _("Root hash signature required."));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!userspace_verification)
return 0;
log_dbg(cd, "Verification of VERITY data in userspace required.");
r = VERITY_verify(cd, hdr, root_hash->key, root_hash->keylength);
if ((r == -EPERM || r == -EFAULT) && fec_device) {
v = r;
log_dbg(cd, "Verification failed, trying to repair with FEC device.");
r = VERITY_FEC_process(cd, hdr, fec_device, 1, &fec_errors);
if (r < 0)
log_err(cd, _("Errors cannot be repaired with FEC device."));
else if (fec_errors) {
log_err(cd, _("Found %u repairable errors with FEC device."),
fec_errors);
/* If root hash failed, we cannot be sure it was properly repaired */
}
if (v == -EFAULT)
r = -EPERM;
}
return r;
}
/* Activate verity device in kernel device-mapper */
int VERITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
struct volume_key *root_hash,
struct volume_key *signature,
struct device *fec_device,
struct crypt_params_verity *verity_hdr,
uint32_t activation_flags)
{
uint32_t dmv_flags;
int r;
key_serial_t kid;
char *description = NULL;
struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = { 0 };
assert(name);
assert(root_hash);
assert(verity_hdr);
dmd.size = verity_hdr->data_size * verity_hdr->data_block_size / 512;
dmd.flags = activation_flags;
dmd.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
log_dbg(cd, "Activating VERITY device %s using hash %s.",
name, verity_hdr->hash_name);
if (signature) {
r = asprintf(&description, "cryptsetup:%s%s%s",
crypt_get_uuid(cd) ?: "", crypt_get_uuid(cd) ? "-" : "", name);
if (r < 0)
return -EINVAL;
log_dbg(cd, "Adding signature %s (type user) into thread keyring.", description);
kid = keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring(USER_KEY, description, signature->key, signature->keylength);
if (kid < 0) {
log_dbg(cd, "keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring failed with errno %d.", errno);
log_err(cd, _("Failed to load key in kernel keyring."));
free(description);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_OK,
0, NULL, NULL);
if (r)
goto out;
r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd),
activation_flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL,
0, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
if (r)
goto out;
if (fec_device) {
r = device_block_adjust(cd, fec_device, DEV_OK,
0, NULL, NULL);
if (r)
goto out;
}
r = dm_verity_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, crypt_data_device(cd),
crypt_metadata_device(cd), fec_device, root_hash->key,
root_hash->keylength, description,
VERITY_hash_offset_block(verity_hdr),
VERITY_FEC_blocks(cd, fec_device, verity_hdr), verity_hdr);
if (r)
goto out;
r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_VERITY, &dmd);
if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_VERITY, &dmv_flags) || !(dmv_flags & DM_VERITY_SUPPORTED))) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-verity mapping."));
r = -ENOTSUP;
}
if (r < 0 && signature && !(dmv_flags & DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SUPPORTED)) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-verity signature option."));
r = -ENOTSUP;
}
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = dm_status_verity_ok(cd, name);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
if (!r)
log_err(cd, _("Verity device detected corruption after activation."));
r = 0;
out:
crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(cd, description, USER_KEY);
free(description);
dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
return r;
}
int VERITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct crypt_params_verity *verity_hdr,
const char *root_hash,
unsigned int root_hash_size,
struct device *fec_device)
{
uint64_t hash_blocks, verity_blocks, fec_blocks = 0, rs_blocks = 0;
bool fec_on_hash_device = false;
hash_blocks = VERITY_hash_blocks(cd, verity_hdr);
verity_blocks = VERITY_hash_offset_block(verity_hdr) + hash_blocks;
if (fec_device && verity_hdr->fec_roots) {
fec_blocks = VERITY_FEC_blocks(cd, fec_device, verity_hdr);
rs_blocks = VERITY_FEC_RS_blocks(fec_blocks, verity_hdr->fec_roots);
fec_on_hash_device = device_is_identical(crypt_metadata_device(cd), fec_device) > 0;
/*
* No way to access fec_area_offset directly.
* Assume FEC area starts directly after hash blocks.
*/
if (fec_on_hash_device)
verity_blocks += rs_blocks;
}
log_std(cd, "VERITY header information for %s\n", device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
log_std(cd, "UUID: \t%s\n", crypt_get_uuid(cd) ?: "");
log_std(cd, "Hash type: \t%u\n", verity_hdr->hash_type);
log_std(cd, "Data blocks: \t%" PRIu64 "\n", verity_hdr->data_size);
log_std(cd, "Data block size: \t%u\n", verity_hdr->data_block_size);
log_std(cd, "Hash blocks: \t%" PRIu64 "\n", hash_blocks);
log_std(cd, "Hash block size: \t%u\n", verity_hdr->hash_block_size);
log_std(cd, "Hash algorithm: \t%s\n", verity_hdr->hash_name);
if (fec_device && fec_blocks) {
log_std(cd, "FEC RS roots: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", verity_hdr->fec_roots);
log_std(cd, "FEC blocks: \t%" PRIu64 "\n", rs_blocks);
}
log_std(cd, "Salt: \t");
if (verity_hdr->salt_size)
crypt_log_hex(cd, verity_hdr->salt, verity_hdr->salt_size, "", 0, NULL);
else
log_std(cd, "-");
log_std(cd, "\n");
if (root_hash) {
log_std(cd, "Root hash: \t");
crypt_log_hex(cd, root_hash, root_hash_size, "", 0, NULL);
log_std(cd, "\n");
}
/* As dump can take only hash device, we have no idea about offsets here. */
if (verity_hdr->hash_area_offset == 0)
log_std(cd, "Hash device size: \t%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", verity_blocks * verity_hdr->hash_block_size);
if (fec_device && verity_hdr->fec_area_offset == 0 && fec_blocks && !fec_on_hash_device)
log_std(cd, "FEC device size: \t%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", rs_blocks * verity_hdr->data_block_size);
return 0;
}