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Fix keyslot areas validation.

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This commit fixes two problems:

a) Replace hardcoded 16KiB metadata variant as lower limit
   for keyslot area offset with current value set in config
   section (already validated).

b) Replace segment offset (if not zero) as upper limit for
   keyslot area offset + size with value calculated as
   2 * metadata size + keyslots_size as acquired from
   config section (also already validated)
This commit is contained in:
Ondrej Kozina
2018-11-28 13:47:43 +01:00
committed by Milan Broz
parent 3c0aceb9f7
commit 9ab63c58f2
1 changed files with 22 additions and 18 deletions
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40
lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
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@@ -364,12 +364,13 @@ static json_bool segment_has_digest(const char *segment_name, json_object *jobj_
}
static json_bool validate_intervals(struct crypt_device *cd,
int length, const struct interval *ix, uint64_t *data_offset)
int length, const struct interval *ix,
uint64_t metadata_size, uint64_t keyslots_area_end)
{
int j, i = 0;
while (i < length) {
if (ix[i].offset < 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN) {
if (ix[i].offset < 2 * metadata_size) {
log_dbg(cd, "Illegal area offset: %" PRIu64 ".", ix[i].offset);
return FALSE;
}
@@ -379,10 +380,9 @@ static json_bool validate_intervals(struct crypt_device *cd,
return FALSE;
}
/* first segment at offset 0 means we have detached header. Do not check then. */
if (*data_offset && (ix[i].offset + ix[i].length) > *data_offset) {
log_dbg(cd, "Area [%" PRIu64 ", %" PRIu64 "] intersects with segment starting at offset: %" PRIu64,
ix[i].offset, ix[i].offset + ix[i].length, *data_offset);
if ((ix[i].offset + ix[i].length) > keyslots_area_end) {
log_dbg(cd, "Area [%" PRIu64 ", %" PRIu64 "] overflows binary keyslots area (ends at offset: %" PRIu64 ").",
ix[i].offset, ix[i].offset + ix[i].length, keyslots_area_end);
return FALSE;
}
@@ -633,12 +633,24 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
return 0;
}
static uint64_t LUKS2_metadata_size(json_object *jobj)
{
json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
uint64_t json_size;
json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "config", &jobj1);
json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "json_size", &jobj2);
json_str_to_uint64(jobj2, &json_size);
return json_size + LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
}
static int hdr_validate_areas(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
{
struct interval *intervals;
json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_offset, *jobj_length, *jobj_segments, *jobj_area;
int length, ret, i = 0;
uint64_t first_offset, keyslots_size, keyslots_area_sum = 0;
uint64_t keyslots_size, metadata_size, keyslots_area_sum = 0;
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
return 1;
@@ -649,6 +661,7 @@ static int hdr_validate_areas(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
/* config is already validated */
keyslots_size = LUKS2_keyslots_size(hdr_jobj);
metadata_size = LUKS2_metadata_size(hdr_jobj);
length = json_object_object_length(jobj_keyslots);
@@ -701,9 +714,7 @@ static int hdr_validate_areas(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
return 1;
}
first_offset = get_first_data_offset(jobj_segments, NULL);
ret = validate_intervals(cd, length, intervals, &first_offset) ? 0 : 1;
ret = validate_intervals(cd, length, intervals, metadata_size, LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr_jobj)) ? 0 : 1;
free(intervals);
@@ -954,14 +965,7 @@ uint64_t LUKS2_keyslots_size(json_object *jobj)
uint64_t LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(json_object *jobj)
{
json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
uint64_t json_size;
json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "config", &jobj1);
json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "json_size", &jobj2);
json_str_to_uint64(jobj2, &json_size);
return 2 * (json_size + LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN) + LUKS2_keyslots_size(jobj);
return 2 * LUKS2_metadata_size(jobj) + LUKS2_keyslots_size(jobj);
}
int LUKS2_hdr_backup(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,