crypt_deactivate_* fail earlier without noisy dm retries
when other device holders detected. The early detection
works if:
a) other device-mapper device has a hold reference on the
device
- or -
b) mounted fs is detected on the device
Any deactivation flag CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE or
CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED will disable this detection
before this patch any LUKS2 requirement defined in header
would stop a restricted operation from proceeding further.
This patch adds ability to mask requirements (internal only).
This patch adds support for using keyring for volume key
and support for new integrity fields for dm-crypt.
Also helpers for searching disk by id.
To be used later.
Also cache its value in active context, so we run benchmark
only once.
The patch also changes calculated value for LUKS1 key digest
to 125 miliseconds (it means that for full 8 used slots
the additional slow-down is circa 1 second).
Note that there is no need to have too high iteration count
for key digest; if it is too computationally expensive, attacker
will better decrypt of one sector with candidate key anyway.
(Check for a known signature.)
The reason to have some delay for key digest check was
to complicate brute-force search for volume key with LUKS header
only (and if RNG used to generate volumekey was flawed
allowing such a search i reasonable time).
Code is written by Ondrej Kozina.
This patch adds ability to store volume key in kernel keyring
(feature available in recent kernels) and avoid setting
key through dm-ioctl and avoiding key in table mapping.
Will be used in LUKS2.
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Prepare API for PBKDF that can set three costs
- time (similar to iterations in PBKDF2)
- memory (required memory for memory-hard function)
- threads (required number of threads/CPUs).
This patch also removes wrongly designed API call
crypt_benchmark_kdf and replaces it with the new call
crypt_benchmark_pbkdf.
Two functions for PBKDF per context setting
are introduced: crypt_set_pbkdf_type and crypt_get_pbkdf_type.
The patch should be backward compatible when using
crypt_set_iteration_time function (works only for PBKDF2).
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
The dm-integrity target is intended to be used for authenticated
encryption through LUKS and dm-crypt.
It can be used in standalone as well; for this use case there
is a simple configuration utility called integritysetup
(similar to veritysetup to dm-verity).
It is possible to trigger a double free with an invalid verity
partition. All it takes is an unknown hash algorithm, which makes it
a bit more likely than a completely broken partition header. But all
it takes is an error return value of VERITY_read_sb() or strdup().
If crypt_load fails before setting cd->type, crypt_free will handle
the union as if it was of type "none", which means it will call free()
for "active_name", a field which is only properly set up when the
type was actually "none".
In all other cases, "active_name" contains the first 4 or 8 bytes of
the actually used header structure. Fortunately it can be only a
pointer or NULL, so an attacker has no direct control of the value.
Nonetheless it can easily trigger a double free.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
This patch adds the --veracrypt-pim=INT and --veracrypt-query-pim command-
line parameters to support specification of or being queried for a custom
Personal Iteration Multiplier respectively. This affects the number of
iterations for key derivation from the entered password. The manpage is
also updated accordingly.
Fixes Issue #307.
