WIP: print info from VMs

.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Build and shortly run fuzzers in proper Docker environment
-# Note that this cannot work with git forks, known CIFuzz limitation
-
-name: CIFuzz
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - 'main'
-    paths-ignore:
-      - 'docs/**'
-
-jobs:
-  Fuzzing:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    if: github.repository == 'mbroz/cryptsetup'
-    steps:
-    - name: Build Fuzzers
-      id: build
-      uses: google/oss-fuzz/infra/cifuzz/actions/build_fuzzers@master
-      with:
-        oss-fuzz-project-name: 'cryptsetup'
-        dry-run: false
-    - name: Run Fuzzers
-      uses: google/oss-fuzz/infra/cifuzz/actions/run_fuzzers@master
-      with:
-        oss-fuzz-project-name: 'cryptsetup'
-        fuzz-seconds: 60
-        dry-run: false
-    - name: Upload Crash
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
-      if: failure() && steps.build.outcome == 'success'
-      with:
-        name: artifacts
-        path: ./out/artifacts

.gitlab/ci/cifuzz.yml

@@ -1,25 +1,46 @@
 cifuzz:
-  image: ubuntu:noble
-  tags:
-    - gitlab-org-docker
+  variables:
+    OSS_FUZZ_PROJECT_NAME: cryptsetup
+    CFL_PLATFORM: gitlab
+    CIFUZZ_DEBUG: "True"
+    FUZZ_SECONDS: 300 # 5 minutes per fuzzer
+    ARCHITECTURE: "x86_64"
+    DRY_RUN: "False"
+    LOW_DISK_SPACE: "True"
+    BAD_BUILD_CHECK: "True"
+    LANGUAGE: "c"
+    DOCKER_HOST: "tcp://docker:2375"
+    DOCKER_IN_DOCKER: "true"
+    DOCKER_DRIVER: overlay2
+    DOCKER_TLS_CERTDIR: ""
+  image:
+    name: gcr.io/oss-fuzz-base/cifuzz-base
+    entrypoint: [""]
+  services:
+    - docker:dind
+
   stage: test
-  interruptible: true
+  parallel:
+    matrix:
+      - SANITIZER: [address, undefined, memory]
   rules:
+    # Default code change.
+    # - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
+    #   variables:
+    #     MODE: "code-change"
     - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
       when: never
     - if: $BUILD_AND_RUN_FUZZERS != null
   before_script:
-    - apt-get -y update
-    - >
-      apt-get -y install -y -qq git clang make autoconf automake autopoint
-      pkgconf libtool libtool-bin gettext libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev
-      libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol-dev libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev
-      flex bison cmake ninja-build
-  parallel:
-    matrix:
-      # memory does not work for now
-      - SANITIZER: [address, undefined]
+    # Get gitlab's container id.
+    - export CFL_CONTAINER_ID=`cut -c9- < /proc/1/cpuset`
   script:
-    - cd tests/fuzz
-    - ./oss-fuzz-build.sh
-    - ls -l out
+    # Will build and run the fuzzers.
+    # We use a hack to override CI_JOB_ID, because otherwise a bad path is used
+    # in GitLab CI environment
+    - CI_JOB_ID="$CI_PROJECT_NAMESPACE/$CI_PROJECT_TITLE" python3 "/opt/oss-fuzz/infra/cifuzz/cifuzz_combined_entrypoint.py"
+  artifacts:
+    # Upload artifacts when a crash makes the job fail.
+    when: always
+    paths:
+      - artifacts/

.gitlab/ci/debian.yml

@@ -17,48 +17,6 @@
     - ./configure --enable-libargon2 --enable-asciidoc
 
 test-mergerq-job-debian:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-main-commit-job-debian:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-mergerq-job-debian12:
   extends:
     - .debian-prep
   tags:
@@ -79,7 +37,7 @@ test-mergerq-job-debian12:
     - make -j -C tests check-programs
     - sudo -E make check
 
-test-main-commit-job-debian12:
+test-main-commit-job-debian:
   extends:
     - .debian-prep
   tags:
@@ -106,11 +64,11 @@ test-mergerq-job-debian-meson:
     - .debian-prep
   tags:
     - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-unstable
+    - cryptsetup-debian-12
   stage: test
   interruptible: true
   variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
+    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-12
     RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
     RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
   rules:
@@ -124,50 +82,6 @@ test-mergerq-job-debian-meson:
     - cd build && sudo -E meson test --verbose --print-errorlogs
 
 test-main-commit-job-debian-meson:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - sudo apt-get -y install -y -qq meson ninja-build
-    - meson setup build
-    - ninja -C build
-    - cd build && sudo -E meson test --verbose --print-errorlogs
-
-test-mergerq-job-debian12-meson:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-12
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-12
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - sudo apt-get -y install -y -qq meson ninja-build
-    - meson setup build
-    - ninja -C build
-    - cd build && sudo -E meson test --verbose --print-errorlogs
-
-test-main-commit-job-debian12-meson:
   extends:
     - .debian-prep
   tags:

lib/bitlk/bitlk.c

@@ -264,11 +264,10 @@ static int parse_vmk_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint8_t *data, int start, in
 	bool supported = false;
 	int r = 0;
 
-	/* only passphrase, recovery passphrase, startup key and clearkey vmks are supported (can be used to activate) */
+	/* only passphrase or recovery passphrase vmks are supported (can be used to activate) */
 	supported = (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE ||
 		    (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_RECOVERY_PASSPHRASE ||
-		    (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY ||
-		    (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY;
+		    (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY;
 
 	while ((end - start) >= (ssize_t)(sizeof(key_entry_size) + sizeof(key_entry_type) + sizeof(key_entry_value))) {
 		/* size of this entry */
@@ -325,13 +324,17 @@ static int parse_vmk_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint8_t *data, int start, in
 			crypt_volume_key_add_next(&((*vmk)->vk), vk);
 		/* clear key for a partially decrypted volume */
 		} else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_KEY) {
-			/* For clearkey protection, we need to store this key */
-			key_size = key_entry_size - (BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4);
-			key = (const char *) data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4;
-			vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, key);
-			if (vk == NULL)
-				return -ENOMEM;
-			crypt_volume_key_add_next(&((*vmk)->vk), vk);
+			/* We currently don't want to support opening a partially decrypted
+			 * device so we don't need to store this key.
+			 *
+			 * key_size = key_entry_size - (BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4);
+			 * key = (const char *) data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4;
+			 * vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, key);
+			 * if (vk == NULL)
+			 * 	return -ENOMEM;
+			 * crypt_volume_key_add_next(&((*vmk)->vk), vk);
+			 */
+			log_dbg(cd, "Skipping clear key metadata entry.");
 		/* unknown timestamps in recovery protected VMK */
 		} else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_RECOVERY_TIME) {
 			;
@@ -1132,9 +1135,6 @@ static int bitlk_kdf(const char *password,
 	int i = 0;
 	int r = 0;
 
-	if (!password)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	memcpy(kdf.salt, salt, 16);
 
 	r = crypt_hash_init(&hd, BITLK_KDF_HASH);
@@ -1249,41 +1249,6 @@ out:
 	return r;
 }
 
-static int get_clear_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const struct bitlk_vmk *vmk, struct volume_key **vmk_dec_key)
-{
-	struct volume_key *nested_key = vmk->vk;
-
-	if (!nested_key) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Clearkey VMK structure incomplete - missing nested key");
-		return -ENOTSUP;
-	}
-
-	struct volume_key *encrypted_vmk = crypt_volume_key_next(nested_key);
-
-	if (!encrypted_vmk) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Clearkey VMK structure incomplete - missing encrypted VMK");
-		return -ENOTSUP;
-	}
-
-	/**
-	 *  For clearkey protection, we need to decrypt the encrypted VMK using the nested key
-	 *  and return the decrypted VMK as vmk_dec_key
-	 */
-	struct volume_key *decrypted_vmk = NULL;
-	int r = decrypt_key(cd, &decrypted_vmk, encrypted_vmk, nested_key,
-			vmk->mac_tag, BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE,
-			vmk->nonce, BITLK_NONCE_SIZE, false);
-
-	if (r == 0 && decrypted_vmk) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Successfully decrypted VMK using nested key");
-		*vmk_dec_key = decrypted_vmk;
-		return 0;
-	} else {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to decrypt VMK using nested key (error: %d)", r);
-		return r;
-	}
-}
-
 int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			 const char *password,
 			 size_t passwordLen,
@@ -1299,7 +1264,6 @@ int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	next_vmk = params->vmks;
 	while (next_vmk) {
-		bool is_decrypted = false;
 		if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE) {
 			r = bitlk_kdf(password, passwordLen, false, next_vmk->salt, &vmk_dec_key);
 			if (r) {
@@ -1334,18 +1298,8 @@ int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 				continue;
 			}
 			log_dbg(cd, "Trying to use external key found in provided password.");
-		} else if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY) {
-			r = get_clear_key(cd, next_vmk, &vmk_dec_key);
-			if (r) {
-				/* something wrong happened, but we still want to check other key slots */
-				next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
-				continue;
-			}
-			is_decrypted = true;
-			open_vmk_key = vmk_dec_key;
-			log_dbg(cd, "Extracted VMK using clearkey.");
 		} else {
-			/* only passphrase, recovery passphrase, startup key and clearkey VMKs supported right now */
+			/* only passphrase, recovery passphrase and startup key VMKs supported right now */
 			log_dbg(cd, "Skipping %s", get_vmk_protection_string(next_vmk->protection));
 			next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
 			if (r == 0)
@@ -1354,21 +1308,19 @@ int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		if (!is_decrypted) {
-			r = decrypt_key(cd, &open_vmk_key, next_vmk->vk, vmk_dec_key,
-					next_vmk->mac_tag, BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE,
-					next_vmk->nonce, BITLK_NONCE_SIZE, false);
-
-			crypt_free_volume_key(vmk_dec_key);
-		}
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to decrypt %s.", get_vmk_protection_string(next_vmk->protection));
+		r = decrypt_key(cd, &open_vmk_key, next_vmk->vk, vmk_dec_key,
+				next_vmk->mac_tag, BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE,
+				next_vmk->nonce, BITLK_NONCE_SIZE, false);
 		if (r < 0) {
 			log_dbg(cd, "Failed to decrypt VMK using provided passphrase.");
-
+			crypt_free_volume_key(vmk_dec_key);
 			if (r == -ENOTSUP)
 				return r;
 			next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
 			continue;
 		}
+		crypt_free_volume_key(vmk_dec_key);
 
 		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to decrypt validation metadata using VMK.");
 		r = crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(crypt_volume_key_get_key(open_vmk_key),
@@ -1427,6 +1379,8 @@ int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 static int _activate_check(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		           const struct bitlk_metadata *params)
 {
+	const struct bitlk_vmk *next_vmk = NULL;
+
 	if (!params->state) {
 		log_err(cd, _("This BITLK device is in an unsupported state and cannot be activated."));
 		return -ENOTSUP;
@@ -1437,6 +1391,15 @@ static int _activate_check(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -ENOTSUP;
 	}
 
+	next_vmk = params->vmks;
+	while (next_vmk) {
+		if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Activation of BITLK device with clear key protection is not supported."));
+			return -ENOTSUP;
+		}
+		next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c

@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <strings.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 
 struct cipher_alg {
@@ -79,21 +77,3 @@ int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name, const char *mode)
 
 	return ca ? (int)ca->wrapped_key : 0;
 }
-
-bool crypt_fips_mode_kernel(void)
-{
-	int fd;
-	char buf = 0;
-
-	fd = open("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", O_RDONLY);
-
-	if (fd < 0)
-		return false;
-
-	if (read(fd, &buf, 1) != 1)
-		buf = '0';
-
-	close(fd);
-
-	return (buf == '1');
-}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct crypt_hmac;
 struct crypt_cipher;
 struct crypt_storage;
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void);
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips);
 void crypt_backend_destroy(void);
 
 #define CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL     (1 << 0) /* Crypto uses kernel part, for benchmark */
@@ -148,9 +148,6 @@ int crypt_backend_memeq(const void *m1, const void *m2, size_t n);
 /* crypto backend running in FIPS mode */
 bool crypt_fips_mode(void);
 
-/* kernel running in FIPS mode */
-bool crypt_fips_mode_kernel(void);
-
 # ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 # endif

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static void crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(void)
 		crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 1;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	int r;
 
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ bool crypt_fips_mode(void)
 	if (fips_checked)
 		return fips_mode;
 
-	if (crypt_backend_init())
+	if (crypt_backend_init(false /* ignored */))
 		return false;
 
 	fips_mode = gcry_fips_mode_active();

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *op
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	struct utsname uts;
 	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
@@ -408,5 +408,5 @@ int crypt_backend_memeq(const void *m1, const void *m2, size_t n)
 
 bool crypt_fips_mode(void)
 {
-	return crypt_fips_mode_kernel();
+	return false;
 }

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_mbedtls.c

@@ -69,13 +69,16 @@ static const mbedtls_md_info_t *crypt_get_hash(const char *name)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips)
 {
 	int ret;
 
 	if (g_initialized)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (fips)
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
 	mbedtls_version_get_string_full(g_backend_version);
 
 	mbedtls_entropy_init(&g_entropy);

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c

@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	return 0;
 }

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	int r;
 

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c

@@ -205,12 +205,12 @@ static const char *openssl_backend_version(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips)
 {
 	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (openssl_backend_init(crypt_fips_mode()))
+	if (openssl_backend_init(fips))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;

lib/libcryptsetup.h

@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param name name of device to resume
  * @param volume_key provided volume key
- * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
  *
  * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
  */
@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param keyslot requested keyslot or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
  * @param volume_key provided volume key or @e NULL if used after crypt_format
- * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
  * @param passphrase passphrase for new keyslot
  * @param passphrase_size size of passphrase
  *
@@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param keyslot requested keyslot or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
  * @param volume_key provided volume key or @e NULL (see note below)
- * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
  * @param passphrase passphrase for new keyslot
  * @param passphrase_size size of passphrase
  * @param flags key flags to set
@@ -1289,7 +1289,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
  *
  * @param volume_key provided volume key or @e NULL if used after crypt_format
  *        or with CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT flag
- * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
  * @param kc returns crypt keyslot context handle type CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEY
  *
  * @return zero on success or negative errno otherwise.
@@ -1305,9 +1305,9 @@ int crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param cd crypt device handle initialized to device context
  *
  * @param volume_key provided volume key
- * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
  * @param signature buffer with signature for the key
- * @param signature_size size of signature buffer
+ * @param signature_size bsize of signature buffer
  * @param kc returns crypt keyslot context handle type CRYPT_KC_TYPE_SIGNED_KEY
  *
  * @return zero on success or negative errno otherwise.
@@ -1753,7 +1753,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param name name of device to create, if @e NULL only check volume key
  * @param volume_key provided volume key (or @e NULL to use internal)
- * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
  * @param flags activation flags
  *
  * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
@@ -1782,9 +1782,9 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param name name of device to create
  * @param volume_key provided volume key
- * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
  * @param signature buffer with signature for the key
- * @param signature_size size of signature buffer
+ * @param signature_size bsize of signature buffer
  * @param flags activation flags
  *
  * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
@@ -1865,7 +1865,7 @@ int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
  * @param keyslot use this keyslot or @e CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
  * @param volume_key buffer for volume key
  * @param volume_key_size on input, size of buffer @e volume_key,
- *        on output size of @e volume_key in bytes
+ *        on output size of @e volume_key
  * @param passphrase passphrase used to unlock volume key
  * @param passphrase_size size of @e passphrase
  *
@@ -1892,7 +1892,7 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param keyslot use this keyslot or @e CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
  * @param volume_key buffer for volume key
  * @param volume_key_size on input, size of buffer @e volume_key,
- *        on output size of @e volume_key in bytes
+ *        on output size of @e volume_key
  * @param kc keyslot context used to unlock volume key
  *
  * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
@@ -1925,7 +1925,7 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param volume_key provided volume key
- * @param volume_key_size size of @e volume_key in bytes
+ * @param volume_key_size size of @e volume_key
  *
  * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
  *
@@ -2117,18 +2117,6 @@ int crypt_header_is_detached(struct crypt_device *cd);
 int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct crypt_params_verity *vp);
 
-/**
- * Get FEC repaired block count for VERITY device.
- *
- * @param cd crypt device handle
- * @param name verity device name
- * @param repaired FEC repaired blocks
- *
- * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
- */
-int crypt_get_verity_repaired(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
-			      uint64_t *repaired);
-
 /**
  * Get device parameters for INTEGRITY device.
  *
@@ -2184,7 +2172,7 @@ int crypt_benchmark(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param password_size size of password
  * @param salt salt for benchmark
  * @param salt_size size of salt
- * @param volume_key_size output volume key size in bytes
+ * @param volume_key_size output volume key size
  * @param progress callback function
  * @param usrptr provided identification in callback
  *
@@ -2421,8 +2409,8 @@ void crypt_set_debug_level(int level);
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param keyfile keyfile to read
  * @param key buffer for key
- * @param key_size_read size of read key in bytes
- * @param keyfile_offset key offset in bytes in keyfile
+ * @param key_size_read size of read key
+ * @param keyfile_offset key offset in keyfile
  * @param key_size exact key length to read from file or 0
  * @param flags keyfile read flags
  *

lib/libcryptsetup.sym

@@ -195,8 +195,3 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.8 {
 		crypt_get_old_volume_key_size;
 		crypt_format_inline;
 } CRYPTSETUP_2.7;
-
-CRYPTSETUP_2.9 {
-	global:
-		crypt_get_verity_repaired;
-} CRYPTSETUP_2.8;

lib/libdevmapper.c

@@ -1992,40 +1992,6 @@ int dm_status_verity_ok(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
 	return r;
 }
 
-int dm_status_verity_repaired(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t *repaired)
-{
-	int r;
-	struct dm_info dmi;
-	char *status_line = NULL, *p;
-	uint64_t val64;
-
-	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_VERITY))
-		return -ENOTSUP;
-
-	r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, DM_VERITY_TARGET, &status_line);
-	dm_exit_context();
-	if (r < 0 || !status_line || !*status_line) {
-		free(status_line);
-		return r;
-	}
-	p = status_line + 1;
-	while (*p == ' ')
-		p++;
-
-	if (!*p || *p == '-' || sscanf(p, "%" PRIu64, &val64) != 1) {
-		free(status_line);
-		return -ENOTSUP;
-	}
-
-	log_dbg(cd, "Verity volume %s status is %s.", name, status_line ?: "");
-
-	if (repaired)
-		*repaired = val64;
-
-	free(status_line);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 int dm_status_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t *count)
 {
 	int r;

lib/setup.c

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	r = crypt_backend_init();
+	r = crypt_backend_init(crypt_fips_mode());
 	if (r < 0)
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto backend."));
 
@@ -5450,9 +5450,6 @@ int crypt_activate_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return _activate_loopaes(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
 	}
 
-	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF)
-		cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled = true;
-
 	/* acquire the volume key(s) */
 	r = -EINVAL;
 	if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
@@ -5924,7 +5921,7 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
 
 	if (!cd || !volume_key || !volume_key_size ||
-	    (!kc && !isLUKS(cd->type) && !isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type) && !isBITLK(cd->type)))
+	    (!kc && !isLUKS(cd->type) && !isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
@@ -5984,8 +5981,6 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
 		if (kc && kc->get_bitlk_volume_key)
 			r = kc->get_bitlk_volume_key(cd, kc, &cd->u.bitlk.params, &vk);
-		else if (!kc)
-			r = BITLK_get_volume_key(cd, NULL, 0, &cd->u.bitlk.params, &vk);
 		if (r < 0)
 			log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for BITLK device."));
 	} else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {
@@ -6795,16 +6790,6 @@ int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_get_verity_repaired(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
-			      uint64_t *repaired)
-
-{
-	if (!cd || !isVERITY(cd->type) || !name || !repaired)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return dm_status_verity_repaired(cd, name, repaired);
-}
-
 int crypt_get_integrity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct crypt_params_integrity *ip)
 {

lib/utils_dm.h

@@ -205,7 +205,6 @@ int dm_status_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
 int dm_status_suspended(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
 int dm_status_verity_ok(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
 int dm_status_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t *count);
-int dm_status_verity_repaired(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t *repaired);
 int dm_query_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 		    uint64_t get_flags, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd);
 int dm_device_deps(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *prefix,

man/common_options.adoc

@@ -367,9 +367,8 @@ This option is available since the Linux kernel version 6.11.
 endif::[]
 
 ifdef::ACTION_LUKSFORMAT[]
-*--integrity-key-size* _bits_::
+*--integrity-key-size* _bytes_::
 The size of the data integrity key.
-The argument has to be a multiple of 8.
 Configurable only for HMAC integrity.
 The default integrity key size is set to the same as the hash output length.
 endif::[]

src/cryptsetup.c

@@ -509,10 +509,6 @@ static int action_open_bitlk(void)
 		r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, activated_name,
 						 key, keysize, activate_flags);
 	} else {
-		r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, activated_name, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, NULL, 0, activate_flags);
-		if (r != -EPERM)
-			goto out;
-
 		tries = set_tries_tty(false);
 		do {
 			r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
@@ -621,19 +617,14 @@ static int bitlkDump_with_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	if (!vk)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
+			  ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
+			  ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), 0, 0, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
 	r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, &vk_size,
-					password, passwordLen);
-	if (r < 0) {
-		r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
-					ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
-					ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), 0, 0, cd);
-		if (r < 0)
-			goto out;
-
-		r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, &vk_size,
-						password, passwordLen);
-	}
-
+				 password, passwordLen);
 	tools_passphrase_msg(r);
 	check_signal(&r);
 	if (r < 0)

src/integritysetup_arg_list.h

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_INLINE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use inline integrity mode (HW
 
 ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the integrity key from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
 
-ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the data integrity key"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the data integrity key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
 
 ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_PADDING, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use inefficient legacy padding (old kernels)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
 
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_COMMIT_TIME, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal commit time"), N
 
 ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal integrity algorithm"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
 
-ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the journal integrity key"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the journal integrity key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
 
 ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the journal integrity key from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
 
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal encryption algorithm")
 
 ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the journal encryption key from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING,{}, {})
 
-ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the journal encryption key"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
+ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the journal encryption key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
 
 ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_SIZE, 'j', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal size"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_JOURNAL_SIZE_ACTIONS)
 

src/utils_reencrypt.c

@@ -1914,7 +1914,6 @@ static int reencrypt_luks2_init(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *data_device
 			new_key_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_NEW_KEY_SIZE_ID);
 
 		if (new_key_size || new_cipher)
-			/* This will convert new key size to bytes from bits */
 			new_key_size = get_adjusted_key_size(cipher, mode, new_key_size,
 							 DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, 0);
 		else

src/veritysetup.c

@@ -333,7 +333,6 @@ static int action_status(void)
 	size_t root_hash_size;
 	unsigned path = 0;
 	int r = 0;
-	uint64_t repaired;
 
 	/* perhaps a path, not a dm device name */
 	if (strchr(action_argv[0], '/') && !stat(action_argv[0], &st))
@@ -416,8 +415,6 @@ static int action_status(void)
 			log_std("  FEC offset:  %" PRIu64 " [512-byte units] (%" PRIu64 " [bytes])\n",
 				vp.fec_area_offset * vp.hash_block_size / SECTOR_SIZE, vp.fec_area_offset * vp.hash_block_size);
 			log_std("  FEC roots:   %u\n", vp.fec_roots);
-			if (!crypt_get_verity_repaired(cd, action_argv[0], &repaired))
-				log_std("  FEC repaired: %" PRIu64 " [events]\n", repaired);
 		}
 
 		root_hash_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);

tests/00modules-test

@@ -17,9 +17,6 @@ if [ "$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)" = "1" ] ; then
 	echo "Kernel running in FIPS mode."
 fi
 
-./crypto-check fips_mode && echo "Crypto backend running in FIPS mode."
-./crypto-check fips_mode_kernel && echo "Kernel running in FIPS mode."
-
 if [ -f /etc/os-release ] ; then
 	source /etc/os-release
 	echo "$PRETTY_NAME ($NAME) $VERSION"
@@ -54,4 +51,16 @@ dmsetup version
 echo "Device mapper targets:"
 dmsetup targets
 
+echo "---------------------------"
+pwd
+lsblk
+lsblk -S
+lsblk -N
+lsblk -D
+lsblk -t
+nvme list
+mount
+time $CRYPTSETUP_PATH/cryptsetup benchmark
+echo "---------------------------"
+
 exit 0

tests/align-test

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ PWD1="93R4P4pIqAH8"
 PWD2="mymJeD8ivEhE"
 FAST_PBKDF="--pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
 
+FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+
 if [ -n "$CRYPTSETUP_TESTS_RUN_IN_MESON" ]; then
 	CRYPTSETUP_VALGRIND=$CRYPTSETUP
 else
@@ -20,7 +22,7 @@ fi
 
 fips_mode()
 {
-	./crypto-check fips_mode
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
 }
 
 cleanup() {

tests/api-test.c

@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@
 #define LUKS_PHDR_SIZE_B 1024
 
 static int _fips_mode = 0;
-static int _fips_mode_kernel = 0;
 
 static char *DEVICE_1 = NULL;
 static char *DEVICE_2 = NULL;
@@ -294,9 +293,8 @@ static int _setup(void)
 		return 1;
 
 	_fips_mode = fips_mode();
-	_fips_mode_kernel = fips_mode_kernel();
 	if (_debug)
-		printf("FIPS MODE: LIB %d, KERNEL %d\n", _fips_mode, _fips_mode_kernel);
+		printf("FIPS MODE: %d\n", _fips_mode);
 
 	/* Use default log callback */
 	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, &global_log_callback, NULL);
@@ -1835,7 +1833,7 @@ static void TcryptTest(void)
 	CRYPT_FREE(cd);
 
 	// Following test uses non-FIPS algorithms in the cipher chain
-	if(_fips_mode || _fips_mode_kernel)
+	if(_fips_mode)
 		return;
 
 	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, tcrypt_dev2));

tests/api_test.h

@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ int t_dm_capi_string_supported(void);
 int t_set_readahead(const char *device, unsigned value);
 
 int fips_mode(void);
-int fips_mode_kernel(void);
 
 int create_dmdevice_over_device(const char *dm_name, const char *device, uint64_t size, uint64_t offset);
 

tests/bitlk-compat-test

@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ load_vars()
 	if echo "$1" | grep -q -e "two-recovery"; then
 		# 2 extra variables for image with 2 recovery passphrases
 		num_vars=10
-	elif echo "$1" | grep -q -e "clearkey"; then
-		# 1 extra variable for image with clearkey
-		num_vars=9
 	else
 		num_vars=8
 	fi
@@ -70,7 +67,7 @@ check_dump()
 
 	# volume size
 	dump_size=$(echo "$dump" | grep "Volume size:" | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d "\t\n ")
-	[ "$dump_size" = "104857600[bytes]" -o "$dump_size" = "134217728[bytes]" -o "$dump_size" = "105906176[bytes]" ] || fail " volume size check from dump failed."
+	[ "$dump_size" = "104857600[bytes]" -o "$dump_size" = "134217728[bytes]" -o "$dump_size" = "105906176[bytes]"  ] || fail " volume size check from dump failed."
 
 	# description
 	dump_desc=$(echo "$dump" | grep Description: | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d "\t\n ")
@@ -98,11 +95,6 @@ check_dump()
 		# second recovery passphrase protected VMK GUID
 		dump_rp2_vmk=$(echo "$dump" | grep "VMK protected with recovery passphrase" -B 1 | tail -2 | head -1 | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d "\t ")
 		[ ! -z "$RP2_VMK_GUID" -a "$dump_rp2_vmk" = "$RP2_VMK_GUID" ] || fail " second recovery passphrase protected VMK GUID check from dump failed."
-	elif echo "$file" | grep -q -e "clearkey"; then
-		# clearkey protected VMK GUID
-		dump_clearkey_guid=$(echo "$dump" | grep "VMK protected with clear key" -B 1 | tail -2 | head -1 | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d "\t ")
-		[ ! -z "$CLEARKEY_VMK_GUID" -a "$dump_clearkey_guid" = "$CLEARKEY_VMK_GUID" ] || fail " clear key protected VMK GUID check from dump failed."
-		return
 	else
 		# password protected VMK GUID
 		dump_pw_vmk=$(echo "$dump" | grep "VMK protected with passphrase" -B 1 | head -1 | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d "\t ")
@@ -165,7 +157,7 @@ for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/bitlk-*) ; do
 		ret=$?
 		[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "aes-cbc" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
 		[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "aes-cbc-elephant" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
-		[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "partially-encrypted" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
+		[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "clearkey" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
 		[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "eow" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
 		[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "-4k.img" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
 		[ $ret -eq 0 ] || fail " failed to open $file ($ret)"
@@ -192,7 +184,7 @@ for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/bitlk-*) ; do
 	ret=$?
 	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "aes-cbc" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
 	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "aes-cbc-elephant" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
-	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "partially-encrypted" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
+	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "clearkey" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
 	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "eow" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
 	[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "-4k.img" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
 	[ $ret -eq 0 ] || fail " failed to open $file using volume key ($ret)"
@@ -244,27 +236,8 @@ for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/bitlk-*) ; do
 		[ "$uuid" = "$UUID" ] || fail " UUID check failed."
 		[ "$sha256sum" = "$SHA256SUM" ] || fail " SHA256 sum check failed."
 		echo " [OK]"
-	fi
 
-	# clear key
-	if echo "$file" | grep -q -e "clearkey"; then
-		echo -n " $file"
-		echo $CRYPTSETUP bitlkOpen -r $file --test-passphrase >/dev/null 2>&1
-		ret=$?
-		[ $ret -eq 1 ] && echo " [N/A]" && continue
-		$CRYPTSETUP bitlkOpen -r $file $MAP >/dev/null 2>&1
-		ret=$?
-		[ $ret -eq 0 ] || fail " failed to open $file ($ret)"
-		$CRYPTSETUP status $MAP >/dev/null || fail
-		$CRYPTSETUP status /dev/mapper/$MAP >/dev/null || fail
-		uuid=$(blkid -p -o value -s UUID /dev/mapper/$MAP)
-		sha256sum=$(sha256sum /dev/mapper/$MAP | cut -d" " -f1)
-		$CRYPTSETUP remove $MAP || fail
-		[ "$uuid" = "$UUID" ] || fail " UUID check failed."
-		[ "$sha256sum" = "$SHA256SUM" ] || fail " SHA256 sum check failed."
-		echo " [OK]"
 	fi
-
 done
 
 remove_mapping

tests/compat-test

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ KEY_MATERIAL5_EXT="S331776-395264"
 TEST_UUID="12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc"
 
 LOOPDEV=$(losetup -f 2>/dev/null)
+FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
 
 remove_mapping()
 {
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ trap _sigchld CHLD
 
 fips_mode()
 {
-	./crypto-check fips_mode
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
 }
 
 can_fail_fips()

tests/compat-test-opal

@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ FAST_PBKDF_OPT="--pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
 
 TEST_UUID="12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc"
 
+FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+
 remove_mapping()
 {
 	[ -b /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME2 ] && dmsetup remove --retry $DEV_NAME2
@@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ trap _sigchld CHLD
 
 fips_mode()
 {
-	./crypto-check fips_mode
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
 }
 
 can_fail_fips()

tests/compat-test2

@@ -45,17 +45,10 @@ KEY_FILE1=test-key-file1
 
 FAST_PBKDF_OPT="--pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
 
-# 32 MiB + 1KiB to bypass minimal memory check (hardocoded)
-FAST_PBKDF_ARGON_OPT="--pbkdf argon2id --pbkdf-force-iterations 4 --pbkdf-memory 32769 --pbkdf-parallel 1"
-
-# TODO: this is configurable
-LUKS2_LOCKING_DIR=/run/cryptsetup
-# hardcoded value
-MEMORY_HARD_LOCK_FILE=LN_memory-hard-access
-
 TEST_UUID="12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc"
 
 LOOPDEV=$(losetup -f 2>/dev/null)
+FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
 
 remove_mapping()
 {
@@ -95,7 +88,7 @@ trap _sigchld CHLD
 
 fips_mode()
 {
-	./crypto-check fips_mode
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
 }
 
 can_fail_fips()
@@ -1706,14 +1699,5 @@ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat -q $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV ||
 echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DM_BAD_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
 echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DM_LONG_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
 
-if ! fips_mode -a -d $LUKS2_LOCKING_DIR; then
-	touch $LUKS2_LOCKING_DIR/$MEMORY_HARD_LOCK_FILE
-	prepare "[52] Test pbkdf serialization flag." wipe
-	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
-	test -f $LUKS2_LOCKING_DIR/$MEMORY_HARD_LOCK_FILE || fail "The locking file disappeared unexpectedly"
-	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open --serialize-memory-hard-pbkdf --test-passphrase $LOOPDEV || fail
-	test -f $LUKS2_LOCKING_DIR/$MEMORY_HARD_LOCK_FILE && fail "The --serialize-memory-hard-pbkdf option did not remove the locking file (did not use the file)."
-fi
-
 remove_mapping
 exit 0

tests/crypto-check.c

@@ -12,6 +12,24 @@
 
 #include "crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h"
 
+static bool fips_mode(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+	char buf = 0;
+
+	fd = open("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", O_RDONLY);
+
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	if (read(fd, &buf, 1) != 1)
+		buf = '0';
+
+	close(fd);
+
+	return (buf == '1');
+}
+
 static int check_cipher(const char *alg, const char *mode, unsigned long key_bits)
 {
 	struct crypt_cipher *cipher;
@@ -49,7 +67,7 @@ static int check_hash(const char *hash)
 
 static void __attribute__((noreturn)) exit_help(bool destroy_backend)
 {
-	printf("Use: crypto_check version | fips_mode | fips_mode_kernel | hash <alg> | cipher <alg> <mode> [key_bits]\n");
+	printf("Use: crypto_check version | hash <alg> | cipher <alg> <mode> [key_bits]\n");
 	if (destroy_backend)
 		crypt_backend_destroy();
 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
@@ -62,21 +80,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	if (argc < 2)
 		exit_help(false);
 
-	if (!strcmp(argv[1], "fips_mode"))
-		return crypt_fips_mode() ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE;
-
-	if (!strcmp(argv[1], "fips_mode_kernel"))
-		return crypt_fips_mode_kernel() ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE;
-
-	if (crypt_backend_init()) {
+        if (crypt_backend_init(fips_mode())) {
 		printf("Crypto backend init error.");
 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
 	}
 
 	if (!strcmp(argv[1], "version")) {
-		printf("%s%s%s\n", crypt_backend_version(),
-		       crypt_fips_mode() ? " (FIPS mode)" : "",
-		       crypt_fips_mode_kernel() ? " (FIPS kernel)" : "");
+		printf("%s%s\n", crypt_backend_version(), fips_mode() ? " (FIPS mode)" : "" );
 	} else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "hash")) {
 		if (argc != 3)
 			exit_help(true);

tests/crypto-vectors.c

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 # define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
 #endif
 
+static bool fips_active = false;
+
 static void printhex(const char *s, const char *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	size_t i;
@@ -29,6 +31,24 @@ static void printhex(const char *s, const char *buf, size_t len)
 	fflush(stdout);
 }
 
+static bool fips_mode(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+	char buf = 0;
+
+	fd = open("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", O_RDONLY);
+
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	if (read(fd, &buf, 1) != 1)
+		buf = '0';
+
+	close(fd);
+
+	return (buf == '1');
+}
+
 /*
  * KDF tests
  */
@@ -1023,7 +1043,7 @@ static int pbkdf_test_vectors(void)
 		    vec->salt, vec->salt_length,
 		    result, vec->output_length,
 		    vec->iterations, vec->memory, vec->parallelism) < 0) {
-			if (vec->can_fail_fips && crypt_fips_mode()) {
+			if (vec->can_fail_fips && fips_mode()) {
 				printf("[API FAILED, IGNORED (FIPS mode)]\n");
 				continue;
 			}
@@ -1532,7 +1552,7 @@ static int kernel_capi_check_test(void)
 		if (!r)
 			printf("[OK]\n");
 		else if (r == -ENOENT || r == -ENOTSUP ||
-			(crypt_fips_mode_kernel() && !capi_test_vectors[i].fips))
+			(fips_active && !capi_test_vectors[i].fips))
 			printf("[N/A]\n");
 		else
 			return EXIT_FAILURE;
@@ -1560,7 +1580,9 @@ int main(__attribute__ ((unused)) int argc, __attribute__ ((unused))char *argv[]
 	}
 #endif
 
-	if (crypt_backend_init())
+	fips_active = fips_mode();
+
+	if (crypt_backend_init(fips_active))
 		exit_test("Crypto backend init error.", EXIT_FAILURE);
 
 	printf("Test vectors using %s crypto backend.\n", crypt_backend_version());
@@ -1593,7 +1615,7 @@ int main(__attribute__ ((unused)) int argc, __attribute__ ((unused))char *argv[]
 		exit_test("Kernel CAPI test failed.", EXIT_FAILURE);
 
 	if (default_alg_test()) {
-		if (crypt_fips_mode())
+		if (fips_mode())
 			printf("\nDefault compiled-in algorithms test ignored (FIPS mode on).\n");
 		else
 			exit_test("\nDefault compiled-in algorithms test failed.", EXIT_FAILURE);

tests/keyring-compat-test

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ else
 	CRYPTSETUP_LIB_VALGRIND=../.libs
 fi
 
+FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+
 remove_mapping()
 {
 	[ -b /dev/mapper/$NAME ] && dmsetup remove --retry $NAME
@@ -113,9 +115,9 @@ test_and_prepare_keyring() {
 	load_key "$HEXKEY_16" user test_key "$TEST_KEYRING" || skip "Kernel keyring service is useless on this system, test skipped."
 }
 
-fips_mode_kernel()
+fips_mode()
 {
-	./crypto-check fips_mode_kernel
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
 }
 
 add_device() {
@@ -203,7 +205,7 @@ diff $CHKS_DMCRYPT $CHKS_KEYRING || fail "Plaintext checksums mismatch (corrupti
 echo "OK"
 
 #test serpent cipher, cbc mode, tcw IV
-fips_mode_kernel || {
+fips_mode || {
 echo -n "Testing $CIPHER_CBC_TCW..."
 dmsetup create $NAME --table "0 $DEVSECTORS crypt $CIPHER_CBC_TCW $HEXKEY_64 0 $DEV 0" || fail
 sha256sum /dev/mapper/$NAME > $CHKS_DMCRYPT || fail

tests/luks2-reencryption-test

@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ HAVE_KEYRING=0
 JSON_MSIZE=16384
 IMG_JSON=luks2-digest-1.json
 
+FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+
 dm_crypt_features()
 {
 	VER_STR=$(dmsetup targets | grep crypt | cut -f2 -dv)
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ skip()
 
 fips_mode()
 {
-	./crypto-check fips_mode || ./crypto-check fips_mode_kernel
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
 }
 
 add_scsi_device() {

tests/reencryption-compat-test

@@ -30,10 +30,11 @@ LUKS1_DECRYPT="LUKS-$LUKS1_DECRYPT_UUID"
 
 MNT_DIR=./mnt_luks
 START_DIR=$(pwd)
+FIPS_MODE=$(cat /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled 2>/dev/null)
 
 fips_mode()
 {
-	./crypto-check fips_mode || ./crypto-check fips_mode_kernel
+	[ -n "$FIPS_MODE" ] && [ "$FIPS_MODE" -gt 0 ]
 }
 
 del_scsi_device()

tests/test_utils.c

@@ -165,12 +165,20 @@ int t_set_readahead(const char *device, unsigned value)
 
 int fips_mode(void)
 {
-	return _system("./crypto-check fips_mode", 1) == 0;
-}
+	int fd;
+	char buf = 0;
 
-int fips_mode_kernel(void)
-{
-	return _system("./crypto-check fips_mode_kernel", 1) == 0;
+	fd = open("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", O_RDONLY);
+
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (read(fd, &buf, 1) != 1)
+		buf = '0';
+
+	close(fd);
+
+	return (buf == '1');
 }
 
 /*

tests/verity-compat-test

@@ -241,7 +241,6 @@ corrupt_device() # $1 device, $2 device_size(in bytes), $3 #{corrupted_bytes}
 # $1 data_device, $2 hash_device, $3 fec_device, $4 data/hash_block_size(in bytes),
 # $5 data_size(in blocks), $6 device_size(in blocks), $7 hash_offset(in bytes),
 # $8 fec_offset(in bytes), $9 fec_roots, ${10} corrupted_bytes, [${11} superblock(y/n), ${12} salt]
-# NOTE: do not use fail() in this function, use RET code
 check_fec()
 {
 	INDEX=25
@@ -293,32 +292,18 @@ check_fec()
 	dd if=/dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME of=$IMG_TMP > /dev/null 2>&1
 	HASH_REPAIRED=$(sha256sum $IMG_TMP | cut -d' ' -f 1)
 
-	# If empty, status not supported
-	REPAIRED=$(dmsetup status $DEV_NAME |sed -e s/.*verity\ \[VC\]\ *//)
-	if [ -n "$REPAIRED" -a "$REPAIRED" != "-" ] ; then
-		echo -n "[EC events: $REPAIRED]"
-	else
-		REPAIRED=""
-	fi
-
 	$VERITYSETUP close $DEV_NAME
 
 	if [ "$HASH_ORIG" != "$HASH_REPAIRED" ]; then
-		RET=1
-		if [ -n "$REPAIRED" ]; then
-			[ "$REPAIRED" -eq 0 ] || { RET=4; echo "FEC repaired events should be 0."; }
-		fi
 		echo -n "[kernel correction failed]"
-		$VERITYSETUP verify $1 $2 $ROOT_HASH --fec-device=$3 $PARAMS >/dev/null 2>&1 &&  { RET=5; echo "Userspace verify should fail"; }
+		$VERITYSETUP verify $1 $2 $ROOT_HASH --fec-device=$3 $PARAMS >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "Userspace verify should fail"
 		echo -n "[userspace verify failed]"
+		RET=1
 	else
-		RET=0
 		echo -n "[repaired in kernel]"
-		if [ -n "$REPAIRED" ]; then
-			[ "$REPAIRED" -gt 0 ] || { RET=4; echo "FEC repaired events should be greater than 0."; }
-		fi
-		$VERITYSETUP verify $1 $2 $ROOT_HASH --fec-device=$3 $PARAMS >/dev/null 2>&1 ||  { RET=5; echo "Userspace verify failed"; }
+		$VERITYSETUP verify $1 $2 $ROOT_HASH --fec-device=$3 $PARAMS >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Userspace verify failed"
 		echo "[userspace verify][OK]"
+		RET=0
 	fi
 	rm $1 $2 $3 $IMG_TMP > /dev/null 2>&1
 	return $RET
@@ -458,8 +443,6 @@ check_concurrent() # $1 hash
 	wait
 	grep -q "Command failed with code .* (wrong or missing parameters)" $DEV_OUT && fail
 	grep -q "Command failed with code .* (wrong device or file specified)." $DEV_OUT && fail
-	# Some distros have strange udev rules, settle here seems to be necessary
-	udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
 	check_exists
 	rm $DEV_OUT
 	$VERITYSETUP close $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail
@@ -548,10 +531,10 @@ if check_version 1 3; then
 	echo "Veritysetup [FEC tests]"
 	for INDEX in  {1..4}; do
 	  # in the first iteration check if we can use FEC (it can be compiled-out)
-	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG $IMG 4096 30 150 163840 409600 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4)))
+	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG $IMG 4096 30 150 163840 409600 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4)) )
 	  RET=$?
-	  [ "$RET" -eq 3 ] && break
-	  [ "$RET" -eq 0 ] || fail "FEC repair failed"
+	  [ "$RET" -eq "3" ] && break
+	  [ "$RET" -eq "0" ] || fail "FEC repair failed"
 
 	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG $IMG 512  500 50000 2457600 4915200 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4)) 'n' $SALT) || fail "FEC repair failed"
 	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG $IMG 512  500 50000 2457600 4915200 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4)) 'y' $SALT) || fail "FEC repair failed"
@@ -563,9 +546,7 @@ if check_version 1 3; then
 	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG_HASH $FEC_DEV 512 2000 2000 0 0 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4))) || fail "FEC repair failed"
 	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG_HASH $FEC_DEV 1024 2000 2000 0 0 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($INDEX * 4))) || fail "FEC repair failed"
 	  # this test should fail
-	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG_HASH $FEC_DEV 4096 30 30 0 0 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($RANDOM % 200 + 200)))
-	  RET=$?
-	  [ "$RET" -eq 1 ] || fail "FEC repair must fail"
+	  (check_fec $IMG $IMG_HASH $FEC_DEV 4096 30 30 0 0 $(($RANDOM % 23 + 2)) $(($RANDOM % 200 + 200))) && fail "FEC repair must fail"
 	  echo "[OK]"
 	done
 fi