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12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Milan Broz
ba57351fc6 Merge branch 'vm-test' into 'main'
Draft: WIP: print info from VMs

See merge request cryptsetup/cryptsetup!864
2025-11-28 23:05:13 +01:00
Kristina Hanicova
f1ba606c28 ci: Add debian unstable (sid) 2025-11-28 20:46:56 +01:00
Ondrej Kozina
5d69c34f59 Reinstate pbkdf serialization flag in device activation.
crypt_activate_by_keyslot_context never respected pbkdf serialation
flag (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF).

In fact it worked only when device was activated via passphrase or via
passphrase file. It was never respected when device was activated
by a token for example.

When the internal code was fully switched to activation via keyslot
context the legacy code for passphrase based activation was dropped
and we lost track of serialization flag completely.

This fixes all of the issues so now the serialization flag will be
respected also with tokens (and all other activation methods unlocking
LUKS2 keyslot with memory hard pbkdf).

Fixes: 58385d68d8 (Allow activation via keyslot context)
Fixes: #968.
2025-11-27 14:51:44 +01:00
Ondrej Kozina
e1cbd4ecba tests: add simple verification test for --serialize-memory-hard-pbkdf 2025-11-27 14:51:32 +01:00
Kfir Kahanov
9ea9af1bcd tests: Add Bitlocker images for clearkey 2025-11-21 22:07:01 +02:00
Kfir Kahanov
4fe1601d9c bitlocker: Open bitlocker devices with clearkey
Always trying to open with clearkey when available
2025-11-21 22:07:01 +02:00
Kfir Kahanov
72173b2777 bitlocker: Handle getting NULL passwords 2025-11-21 22:07:01 +02:00
Kfir Kahanov
f304132b2b bitlocker: Support clearkey
Clearkey does not mean partially encrypted, and may be on fully
encrypted volumes.
2025-11-21 22:07:01 +02:00
Milan Broz
0779c8ceed Explicitly mention units (bytes) for volume key in header. 2025-11-21 16:34:47 +01:00
Milan Broz
153aed3d16 Fix key-size descriptions
For compatibility reasons, cryptsetup uses key size in BITS
while integritysetup in BYTES.

The help is confusing here, this patch fixes it.

Thanks Daniel Tang for notification.
2025-11-21 16:34:47 +01:00
Milan Broz
8a3e16fa25 tests: Avoid verity concurrent test failure on device node check
This regularly crashes on Alpine Linux that use some strange
configuration.
Udev settle seems to help, despite it should be noop on recent systems...
2025-11-21 14:29:38 +01:00
Milan Broz
96c9ea98d0 WIP: print info from VMs 2025-11-19 20:44:16 +01:00
13 changed files with 261 additions and 64 deletions

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,48 @@
- ./configure --enable-libargon2 --enable-asciidoc
test-mergerq-job-debian:
extends:
- .debian-prep
tags:
- libvirt
- cryptsetup-debian-unstable
stage: test
interruptible: true
variables:
DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
rules:
- if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
when: never
- if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
script:
- make -j
- make -j -C tests check-programs
- sudo -E make check
test-main-commit-job-debian:
extends:
- .debian-prep
tags:
- libvirt
- cryptsetup-debian-unstable
stage: test
interruptible: true
variables:
DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
rules:
- if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
when: never
- if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
script:
- make -j
- make -j -C tests check-programs
- sudo -E make check
test-mergerq-job-debian12:
extends:
- .debian-prep
tags:
@@ -37,7 +79,7 @@ test-mergerq-job-debian:
- make -j -C tests check-programs
- sudo -E make check
test-main-commit-job-debian:
test-main-commit-job-debian12:
extends:
- .debian-prep
tags:
@@ -60,6 +102,50 @@ test-main-commit-job-debian:
# meson tests
test-mergerq-job-debian-meson:
extends:
- .debian-prep
tags:
- libvirt
- cryptsetup-debian-unstable
stage: test
interruptible: true
variables:
DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
rules:
- if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
when: never
- if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
script:
- sudo apt-get -y install -y -qq meson ninja-build
- meson setup build
- ninja -C build
- cd build && sudo -E meson test --verbose --print-errorlogs
test-main-commit-job-debian-meson:
extends:
- .debian-prep
tags:
- libvirt
- cryptsetup-debian-unstable
stage: test
interruptible: true
variables:
DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
rules:
- if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
when: never
- if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
script:
- sudo apt-get -y install -y -qq meson ninja-build
- meson setup build
- ninja -C build
- cd build && sudo -E meson test --verbose --print-errorlogs
test-mergerq-job-debian12-meson:
extends:
- .debian-prep
tags:
@@ -81,7 +167,7 @@ test-mergerq-job-debian-meson:
- ninja -C build
- cd build && sudo -E meson test --verbose --print-errorlogs
test-main-commit-job-debian-meson:
test-main-commit-job-debian12-meson:
extends:
- .debian-prep
tags:

View File

@@ -264,10 +264,11 @@ static int parse_vmk_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint8_t *data, int start, in
bool supported = false;
int r = 0;
/* only passphrase or recovery passphrase vmks are supported (can be used to activate) */
/* only passphrase, recovery passphrase, startup key and clearkey vmks are supported (can be used to activate) */
supported = (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE ||
(*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_RECOVERY_PASSPHRASE ||
(*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY;
(*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY ||
(*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY;
while ((end - start) >= (ssize_t)(sizeof(key_entry_size) + sizeof(key_entry_type) + sizeof(key_entry_value))) {
/* size of this entry */
@@ -324,17 +325,13 @@ static int parse_vmk_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint8_t *data, int start, in
crypt_volume_key_add_next(&((*vmk)->vk), vk);
/* clear key for a partially decrypted volume */
} else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_KEY) {
/* We currently don't want to support opening a partially decrypted
* device so we don't need to store this key.
*
* key_size = key_entry_size - (BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4);
* key = (const char *) data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4;
* vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, key);
* if (vk == NULL)
* return -ENOMEM;
* crypt_volume_key_add_next(&((*vmk)->vk), vk);
*/
log_dbg(cd, "Skipping clear key metadata entry.");
/* For clearkey protection, we need to store this key */
key_size = key_entry_size - (BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4);
key = (const char *) data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4;
vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, key);
if (vk == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
crypt_volume_key_add_next(&((*vmk)->vk), vk);
/* unknown timestamps in recovery protected VMK */
} else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_RECOVERY_TIME) {
;
@@ -1135,6 +1132,9 @@ static int bitlk_kdf(const char *password,
int i = 0;
int r = 0;
if (!password)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(kdf.salt, salt, 16);
r = crypt_hash_init(&hd, BITLK_KDF_HASH);
@@ -1249,6 +1249,41 @@ out:
return r;
}
static int get_clear_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const struct bitlk_vmk *vmk, struct volume_key **vmk_dec_key)
{
struct volume_key *nested_key = vmk->vk;
if (!nested_key) {
log_dbg(cd, "Clearkey VMK structure incomplete - missing nested key");
return -ENOTSUP;
}
struct volume_key *encrypted_vmk = crypt_volume_key_next(nested_key);
if (!encrypted_vmk) {
log_dbg(cd, "Clearkey VMK structure incomplete - missing encrypted VMK");
return -ENOTSUP;
}
/**
* For clearkey protection, we need to decrypt the encrypted VMK using the nested key
* and return the decrypted VMK as vmk_dec_key
*/
struct volume_key *decrypted_vmk = NULL;
int r = decrypt_key(cd, &decrypted_vmk, encrypted_vmk, nested_key,
vmk->mac_tag, BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE,
vmk->nonce, BITLK_NONCE_SIZE, false);
if (r == 0 && decrypted_vmk) {
log_dbg(cd, "Successfully decrypted VMK using nested key");
*vmk_dec_key = decrypted_vmk;
return 0;
} else {
log_dbg(cd, "Failed to decrypt VMK using nested key (error: %d)", r);
return r;
}
}
int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *password,
size_t passwordLen,
@@ -1264,6 +1299,7 @@ int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
next_vmk = params->vmks;
while (next_vmk) {
bool is_decrypted = false;
if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE) {
r = bitlk_kdf(password, passwordLen, false, next_vmk->salt, &vmk_dec_key);
if (r) {
@@ -1298,8 +1334,18 @@ int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
continue;
}
log_dbg(cd, "Trying to use external key found in provided password.");
} else if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY) {
r = get_clear_key(cd, next_vmk, &vmk_dec_key);
if (r) {
/* something wrong happened, but we still want to check other key slots */
next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
continue;
}
is_decrypted = true;
open_vmk_key = vmk_dec_key;
log_dbg(cd, "Extracted VMK using clearkey.");
} else {
/* only passphrase, recovery passphrase and startup key VMKs supported right now */
/* only passphrase, recovery passphrase, startup key and clearkey VMKs supported right now */
log_dbg(cd, "Skipping %s", get_vmk_protection_string(next_vmk->protection));
next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
if (r == 0)
@@ -1308,19 +1354,21 @@ int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
continue;
}
log_dbg(cd, "Trying to decrypt %s.", get_vmk_protection_string(next_vmk->protection));
r = decrypt_key(cd, &open_vmk_key, next_vmk->vk, vmk_dec_key,
next_vmk->mac_tag, BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE,
next_vmk->nonce, BITLK_NONCE_SIZE, false);
if (!is_decrypted) {
r = decrypt_key(cd, &open_vmk_key, next_vmk->vk, vmk_dec_key,
next_vmk->mac_tag, BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE,
next_vmk->nonce, BITLK_NONCE_SIZE, false);
crypt_free_volume_key(vmk_dec_key);
}
if (r < 0) {
log_dbg(cd, "Failed to decrypt VMK using provided passphrase.");
crypt_free_volume_key(vmk_dec_key);
if (r == -ENOTSUP)
return r;
next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
continue;
}
crypt_free_volume_key(vmk_dec_key);
log_dbg(cd, "Trying to decrypt validation metadata using VMK.");
r = crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(crypt_volume_key_get_key(open_vmk_key),
@@ -1379,8 +1427,6 @@ int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
static int _activate_check(struct crypt_device *cd,
const struct bitlk_metadata *params)
{
const struct bitlk_vmk *next_vmk = NULL;
if (!params->state) {
log_err(cd, _("This BITLK device is in an unsupported state and cannot be activated."));
return -ENOTSUP;
@@ -1391,15 +1437,6 @@ static int _activate_check(struct crypt_device *cd,
return -ENOTSUP;
}
next_vmk = params->vmks;
while (next_vmk) {
if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY) {
log_err(cd, _("Activation of BITLK device with clear key protection is not supported."));
return -ENOTSUP;
}
next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
}
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
* @param cd crypt device handle
* @param name name of device to resume
* @param volume_key provided volume key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
*
* @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
*/
@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
* @param cd crypt device handle
* @param keyslot requested keyslot or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
* @param volume_key provided volume key or @e NULL if used after crypt_format
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
* @param passphrase passphrase for new keyslot
* @param passphrase_size size of passphrase
*
@@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
* @param cd crypt device handle
* @param keyslot requested keyslot or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
* @param volume_key provided volume key or @e NULL (see note below)
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
* @param passphrase passphrase for new keyslot
* @param passphrase_size size of passphrase
* @param flags key flags to set
@@ -1289,7 +1289,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
*
* @param volume_key provided volume key or @e NULL if used after crypt_format
* or with CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT flag
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
* @param kc returns crypt keyslot context handle type CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEY
*
* @return zero on success or negative errno otherwise.
@@ -1305,9 +1305,9 @@ int crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
* @param cd crypt device handle initialized to device context
*
* @param volume_key provided volume key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
* @param signature buffer with signature for the key
* @param signature_size bsize of signature buffer
* @param signature_size size of signature buffer
* @param kc returns crypt keyslot context handle type CRYPT_KC_TYPE_SIGNED_KEY
*
* @return zero on success or negative errno otherwise.
@@ -1753,7 +1753,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
* @param cd crypt device handle
* @param name name of device to create, if @e NULL only check volume key
* @param volume_key provided volume key (or @e NULL to use internal)
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
* @param flags activation flags
*
* @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
@@ -1782,9 +1782,9 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
* @param cd crypt device handle
* @param name name of device to create
* @param volume_key provided volume key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key in bytes
* @param signature buffer with signature for the key
* @param signature_size bsize of signature buffer
* @param signature_size size of signature buffer
* @param flags activation flags
*
* @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
@@ -1865,7 +1865,7 @@ int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
* @param keyslot use this keyslot or @e CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
* @param volume_key buffer for volume key
* @param volume_key_size on input, size of buffer @e volume_key,
* on output size of @e volume_key
* on output size of @e volume_key in bytes
* @param passphrase passphrase used to unlock volume key
* @param passphrase_size size of @e passphrase
*
@@ -1892,7 +1892,7 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
* @param keyslot use this keyslot or @e CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
* @param volume_key buffer for volume key
* @param volume_key_size on input, size of buffer @e volume_key,
* on output size of @e volume_key
* on output size of @e volume_key in bytes
* @param kc keyslot context used to unlock volume key
*
* @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
@@ -1925,7 +1925,7 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
*
* @param cd crypt device handle
* @param volume_key provided volume key
* @param volume_key_size size of @e volume_key
* @param volume_key_size size of @e volume_key in bytes
*
* @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
*
@@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ int crypt_benchmark(struct crypt_device *cd,
* @param password_size size of password
* @param salt salt for benchmark
* @param salt_size size of salt
* @param volume_key_size output volume key size
* @param volume_key_size output volume key size in bytes
* @param progress callback function
* @param usrptr provided identification in callback
*
@@ -2421,8 +2421,8 @@ void crypt_set_debug_level(int level);
* @param cd crypt device handle
* @param keyfile keyfile to read
* @param key buffer for key
* @param key_size_read size of read key
* @param keyfile_offset key offset in keyfile
* @param key_size_read size of read key in bytes
* @param keyfile_offset key offset in bytes in keyfile
* @param key_size exact key length to read from file or 0
* @param flags keyfile read flags
*

View File

@@ -5450,6 +5450,9 @@ int crypt_activate_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
return _activate_loopaes(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
}
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF)
cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled = true;
/* acquire the volume key(s) */
r = -EINVAL;
if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
@@ -5921,7 +5924,7 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
if (!cd || !volume_key || !volume_key_size ||
(!kc && !isLUKS(cd->type) && !isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type)))
(!kc && !isLUKS(cd->type) && !isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type) && !isBITLK(cd->type)))
return -EINVAL;
if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
@@ -5981,6 +5984,8 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context(struct crypt_device *cd,
} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
if (kc && kc->get_bitlk_volume_key)
r = kc->get_bitlk_volume_key(cd, kc, &cd->u.bitlk.params, &vk);
else if (!kc)
r = BITLK_get_volume_key(cd, NULL, 0, &cd->u.bitlk.params, &vk);
if (r < 0)
log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for BITLK device."));
} else if (isFVAULT2(cd->type)) {

View File

@@ -367,8 +367,9 @@ This option is available since the Linux kernel version 6.11.
endif::[]
ifdef::ACTION_LUKSFORMAT[]
*--integrity-key-size* _bytes_::
*--integrity-key-size* _bits_::
The size of the data integrity key.
The argument has to be a multiple of 8.
Configurable only for HMAC integrity.
The default integrity key size is set to the same as the hash output length.
endif::[]

View File

@@ -509,6 +509,10 @@ static int action_open_bitlk(void)
r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, activated_name,
key, keysize, activate_flags);
} else {
r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, activated_name, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, NULL, 0, activate_flags);
if (r != -EPERM)
goto out;
tries = set_tries_tty(false);
do {
r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
@@ -617,14 +621,19 @@ static int bitlkDump_with_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd)
if (!vk)
return -ENOMEM;
r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), 0, 0, cd);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, &vk_size,
password, passwordLen);
password, passwordLen);
if (r < 0) {
r = tools_get_key(NULL, &password, &passwordLen,
ARG_UINT64(OPT_KEYFILE_OFFSET_ID), ARG_UINT32(OPT_KEYFILE_SIZE_ID), ARG_STR(OPT_KEY_FILE_ID),
ARG_UINT32(OPT_TIMEOUT_ID), 0, 0, cd);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, vk, &vk_size,
password, passwordLen);
}
tools_passphrase_msg(r);
check_signal(&r);
if (r < 0)

View File

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_INLINE, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use inline integrity mode (HW
ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the integrity key from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the data integrity key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the data integrity key"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
ARG(OPT_INTEGRITY_LEGACY_PADDING, '\0', POPT_ARG_NONE, N_("Use inefficient legacy padding (old kernels)"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_BOOL, {}, {})
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_COMMIT_TIME, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal commit time"), N
ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal integrity algorithm"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the journal integrity key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the journal integrity key"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_INTEGRITY_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the journal integrity key from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING, {}, {})
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal encryption algorithm")
ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_FILE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Read the journal encryption key from a file"), NULL, CRYPT_ARG_STRING,{}, {})
ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the journal encryption key"), N_("BITS"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY_SIZE, '\0', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("The size of the journal encryption key"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT32, {}, {})
ARG(OPT_JOURNAL_SIZE, 'j', POPT_ARG_STRING, N_("Journal size"), N_("bytes"), CRYPT_ARG_UINT64, {}, OPT_JOURNAL_SIZE_ACTIONS)

View File

@@ -1914,6 +1914,7 @@ static int reencrypt_luks2_init(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *data_device
new_key_size = ARG_UINT32(OPT_NEW_KEY_SIZE_ID);
if (new_key_size || new_cipher)
/* This will convert new key size to bytes from bits */
new_key_size = get_adjusted_key_size(cipher, mode, new_key_size,
DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, 0);
else

View File

@@ -54,4 +54,16 @@ dmsetup version
echo "Device mapper targets:"
dmsetup targets
echo "---------------------------"
pwd
lsblk
lsblk -S
lsblk -N
lsblk -D
lsblk -t
nvme list
mount
time $CRYPTSETUP_PATH/cryptsetup benchmark
echo "---------------------------"
exit 0

View File

@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ load_vars()
if echo "$1" | grep -q -e "two-recovery"; then
# 2 extra variables for image with 2 recovery passphrases
num_vars=10
elif echo "$1" | grep -q -e "clearkey"; then
# 1 extra variable for image with clearkey
num_vars=9
else
num_vars=8
fi
@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ check_dump()
# volume size
dump_size=$(echo "$dump" | grep "Volume size:" | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d "\t\n ")
[ "$dump_size" = "104857600[bytes]" -o "$dump_size" = "134217728[bytes]" -o "$dump_size" = "105906176[bytes]" ] || fail " volume size check from dump failed."
[ "$dump_size" = "104857600[bytes]" -o "$dump_size" = "134217728[bytes]" -o "$dump_size" = "105906176[bytes]" ] || fail " volume size check from dump failed."
# description
dump_desc=$(echo "$dump" | grep Description: | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d "\t\n ")
@@ -95,6 +98,11 @@ check_dump()
# second recovery passphrase protected VMK GUID
dump_rp2_vmk=$(echo "$dump" | grep "VMK protected with recovery passphrase" -B 1 | tail -2 | head -1 | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d "\t ")
[ ! -z "$RP2_VMK_GUID" -a "$dump_rp2_vmk" = "$RP2_VMK_GUID" ] || fail " second recovery passphrase protected VMK GUID check from dump failed."
elif echo "$file" | grep -q -e "clearkey"; then
# clearkey protected VMK GUID
dump_clearkey_guid=$(echo "$dump" | grep "VMK protected with clear key" -B 1 | tail -2 | head -1 | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d "\t ")
[ ! -z "$CLEARKEY_VMK_GUID" -a "$dump_clearkey_guid" = "$CLEARKEY_VMK_GUID" ] || fail " clear key protected VMK GUID check from dump failed."
return
else
# password protected VMK GUID
dump_pw_vmk=$(echo "$dump" | grep "VMK protected with passphrase" -B 1 | head -1 | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d "\t ")
@@ -157,7 +165,7 @@ for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/bitlk-*) ; do
ret=$?
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "aes-cbc" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "aes-cbc-elephant" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "clearkey" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "partially-encrypted" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "eow" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "-4k.img" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 0 ] || fail " failed to open $file ($ret)"
@@ -184,7 +192,7 @@ for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/bitlk-*) ; do
ret=$?
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "aes-cbc" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "aes-cbc-elephant" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "clearkey" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "partially-encrypted" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "eow" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && ( echo "$file" | grep -q -e "-4k.img" ) && echo " [N/A]" && continue
[ $ret -eq 0 ] || fail " failed to open $file using volume key ($ret)"
@@ -236,8 +244,27 @@ for file in $(ls $TST_DIR/bitlk-*) ; do
[ "$uuid" = "$UUID" ] || fail " UUID check failed."
[ "$sha256sum" = "$SHA256SUM" ] || fail " SHA256 sum check failed."
echo " [OK]"
fi
# clear key
if echo "$file" | grep -q -e "clearkey"; then
echo -n " $file"
echo $CRYPTSETUP bitlkOpen -r $file --test-passphrase >/dev/null 2>&1
ret=$?
[ $ret -eq 1 ] && echo " [N/A]" && continue
$CRYPTSETUP bitlkOpen -r $file $MAP >/dev/null 2>&1
ret=$?
[ $ret -eq 0 ] || fail " failed to open $file ($ret)"
$CRYPTSETUP status $MAP >/dev/null || fail
$CRYPTSETUP status /dev/mapper/$MAP >/dev/null || fail
uuid=$(blkid -p -o value -s UUID /dev/mapper/$MAP)
sha256sum=$(sha256sum /dev/mapper/$MAP | cut -d" " -f1)
$CRYPTSETUP remove $MAP || fail
[ "$uuid" = "$UUID" ] || fail " UUID check failed."
[ "$sha256sum" = "$SHA256SUM" ] || fail " SHA256 sum check failed."
echo " [OK]"
fi
done
remove_mapping

Binary file not shown.

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@@ -45,6 +45,14 @@ KEY_FILE1=test-key-file1
FAST_PBKDF_OPT="--pbkdf pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations 1000"
# 32 MiB + 1KiB to bypass minimal memory check (hardocoded)
FAST_PBKDF_ARGON_OPT="--pbkdf argon2id --pbkdf-force-iterations 4 --pbkdf-memory 32769 --pbkdf-parallel 1"
# TODO: this is configurable
LUKS2_LOCKING_DIR=/run/cryptsetup
# hardcoded value
MEMORY_HARD_LOCK_FILE=LN_memory-hard-access
TEST_UUID="12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc"
LOOPDEV=$(losetup -f 2>/dev/null)
@@ -1698,5 +1706,14 @@ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat -q $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV ||
echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DM_BAD_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksOpen $LOOPDEV $DM_LONG_NAME 2>/dev/null && fail
if ! fips_mode -a -d $LUKS2_LOCKING_DIR; then
touch $LUKS2_LOCKING_DIR/$MEMORY_HARD_LOCK_FILE
prepare "[52] Test pbkdf serialization flag." wipe
echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON_OPT --type luks2 $LOOPDEV || fail
test -f $LUKS2_LOCKING_DIR/$MEMORY_HARD_LOCK_FILE || fail "The locking file disappeared unexpectedly"
echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open --serialize-memory-hard-pbkdf --test-passphrase $LOOPDEV || fail
test -f $LUKS2_LOCKING_DIR/$MEMORY_HARD_LOCK_FILE && fail "The --serialize-memory-hard-pbkdf option did not remove the locking file (did not use the file)."
fi
remove_mapping
exit 0

View File

@@ -458,6 +458,8 @@ check_concurrent() # $1 hash
wait
grep -q "Command failed with code .* (wrong or missing parameters)" $DEV_OUT && fail
grep -q "Command failed with code .* (wrong device or file specified)." $DEV_OUT && fail
# Some distros have strange udev rules, settle here seems to be necessary
udevadm settle >/dev/null 2>&1
check_exists
rm $DEV_OUT
$VERITYSETUP close $DEV_NAME >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail