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5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Milan Broz
0fd1c62de9 Add disable-luks2 reencryption configure option.
The option --disable-luks2-reencryption completely disable
LUKS2 reencryption code.

When used, the libcryptsetup library can read metadata with
reencryption code, but all reencryption API calls and cryptsetup
reencrypt commands are disabled.

Devices with online reencryption in progress cannot be activated.

This option can cause some incompatibilities. Please use with care.
2022-01-12 22:54:23 +01:00
Ondrej Kozina
9cc749d9fa Avoid name clash with newer json-c library.
This is partial revert of previous commit and also
fixes wrong decision to name our internal helpers with
json_object prefix.
2022-01-12 21:10:59 +01:00
Ondrej Kozina
46a4c80269 Properly align LUKS2 keyslots area on conversion.
If LUKS1 payload offset (data offset) is not aligned to
4KiB we create unaligned keyslots area in LUKS2 metadata
during upconversion. Unaligned keyslots area is not valid
from LUKS2 perspective. Fix it by properly aligning future
keyslots area and also check if LUKS1 keyslots area fit
in the new one.

Fixes: #534.
2022-01-12 21:10:47 +01:00
Björn Esser
5fec16407b Add support for upcoming json-c 0.14.0.
* TRUE/FALSE are not defined anymore.  1 and 0 are used instead.
  * json_object_get_uint64() and json_object_new_uint64() are part
    of the upstream API now.
2022-01-12 21:04:04 +01:00
Milan Broz
cebc1638e3 Remove obsolete AC_HEADER_STDC macro.
This should be no longer used.
We do not support systems without standard headers anyway.
2022-01-12 21:00:16 +01:00
165 changed files with 13771 additions and 24456 deletions

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@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
### Issue description
<!-- Please, shortly describe the issue here. -->
### Steps for reproducing the issue
<!-- How it can be reproduced? Include all important steps. -->
### Additional info
<!-- Please mention what distribution you are using. -->
### Debug log
<!-- Paste a debug log of the failing command (add --debug option) between the markers below (to keep raw debug format).-->
```
Output with --debug option:
```

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@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
### Documentation issue
<!-- Please, shortly describe the issue in documentation here. -->
### Additional info
<!-- Please mention what cryptsetup version you are using. -->

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@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
### New feature description
<!-- Please, shortly describe the requested feature here. -->
### Additional info
<!-- Please mention what distribution and cryptsetup version you are using. -->

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@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
language: c
sudo: required
os: linux
dist: focal
group: edge
dist: xenial
compiler:
- gcc
@@ -17,7 +15,7 @@ branches:
only:
- master
- wip-luks2
- v2.3.x
- v2_0_x
before_install:
- uname -a

3095
FAQ

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

4
README
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@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ FAQ:
MAILING LIST:
E-MAIL: dm-crypt@saout.de
URL: https://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
URL: http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
DOWNLOAD:
@@ -28,4 +28,4 @@ SOURCE CODE:
NLS (PO TRANSLATIONS):
PO files are maintained by:
https://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html
http://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html

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@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ What the ...?
**Cryptsetup** is a utility used to conveniently set up disk encryption based
on the [DMCrypt](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt) kernel module.
These include **plain** **dm-crypt** volumes, **LUKS** volumes, **loop-AES**,
**TrueCrypt** (including **VeraCrypt** extension) and **BitLocker** formats.
These include **plain** **dm-crypt** volumes, **LUKS** volumes, **loop-AES**
and **TrueCrypt** (including **VeraCrypt** extension) formats.
The project also includes a **veritysetup** utility used to conveniently setup
[DMVerity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity) block integrity checking kernel module
@@ -44,19 +44,16 @@ Download
--------
All release tarballs and release notes are hosted on [kernel.org](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/).
**The latest stable cryptsetup version is 2.3.2**
* [cryptsetup-2.3.2.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.2.tar.xz)
* Signature [cryptsetup-2.3.2.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.2.tar.sign)
**The latest cryptsetup version is 2.2.2**
* [cryptsetup-2.2.2.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.2/cryptsetup-2.2.2.tar.xz)
* Signature [cryptsetup-2.2.2.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.2/cryptsetup-2.2.2.tar.sign)
_(You need to decompress file first to check signature.)_
* [Cryptsetup 2.3.2 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/v2.3.2-ReleaseNotes).
* [Cryptsetup 2.2.2 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.2/v2.2.2-ReleaseNotes).
Previous versions
* [Version 2.3.1](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.1.tar.xz) -
[Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.1.tar.sign) -
[Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/v2.3.1-ReleaseNotes).
* [Version 2.2.2](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.2/cryptsetup-2.2.2.tar.xz) -
[Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.2/cryptsetup-2.2.2.tar.sign) -
[Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.2/v2.2.2-ReleaseNotes).
* [Version 2.2.1](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.2/cryptsetup-2.2.1.tar.xz) -
[Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.2/cryptsetup-2.2.1.tar.sign) -
[Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.2/v2.2.0-ReleaseNotes).
* [Version 2.0.6](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.6.tar.xz) -
[Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.6.tar.sign) -
[Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.6-ReleaseNotes).
@@ -73,7 +70,7 @@ For libcryptsetup documentation see [libcryptsetup API](https://mbroz.fedorapeop
The libcryptsetup API/ABI changes are tracked in [compatibility report](https://abi-laboratory.pro/tracker/timeline/cryptsetup/).
NLS PO files are maintained by [TranslationProject](https://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html).
NLS PO files are maintained by [TranslationProject](http://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html).
Help!
-----
@@ -82,5 +79,5 @@ For cryptsetup and LUKS related questions, please use the dm-crypt mailing list,
If you want to subscribe just send an empty mail to [dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de).
You can also browse [list archive](https://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/) or read it through
You can also browse [list archive](http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/) or read it through
[web interface](https://marc.info/?l=dm-crypt).

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@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
AC_PREREQ([2.67])
AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[2.3.4])
AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[2.2.2])
dnl library version from <major>.<minor>.<release>[-<suffix>]
LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION=$(echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | cut -f1 -d-)
LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=18:0:6
LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=17:0:5
AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR(src/cryptsetup.c)
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ AC_PROG_MAKE_SET
AC_ENABLE_STATIC(no)
LT_INIT
PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
AM_ICONV
dnl ==========================================================================
dnl define PKG_CHECK_VAR for old pkg-config <= 0.28
@@ -57,15 +56,8 @@ dnl ==========================================================================
AC_C_RESTRICT
AC_HEADER_DIRENT
AC_HEADER_STDC
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
sys/sysmacros.h sys/statvfs.h ctype.h unistd.h locale.h byteswap.h endian.h stdint.h)
AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_CLOEXEC],,[AC_DEFINE([O_CLOEXEC],[0], [Defined to 0 if not provided])],
[[
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
]])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(uuid/uuid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER(libdevmapper.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the device-mapper library.])])
@@ -146,6 +138,14 @@ AC_DEFUN([NO_FIPS], [
fi
])
dnl LUKS2 online reencryption
AC_ARG_ENABLE([luks2-reencryption],
AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-luks2-reencryption], [disable LUKS2 online reencryption extension]),
[], [enable_luks2_reencryption=yes])
if test "x$enable_luks2_reencryption" = "xyes"; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION, 1, [Use LUKS2 online reencryption extension])
fi
dnl ==========================================================================
dnl pwquality library (cryptsetup CLI only)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([pwquality],
@@ -355,7 +355,6 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_retry_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_deferred_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_mounted_fs], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_holders], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_get_name], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([DM_DEVICE_GET_TARGET_VERSION], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG], [have_cookie=yes], [have_cookie=no], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
if test "x$enable_udev" = xyes; then

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* libcryptsetup API log example
*
* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* libcryptsetup API - using LUKS device example
*
* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

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@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
Cryptsetup 2.3.0 Release Notes
==============================
Stable release with new experimental features and bug fixes.
Cryptsetup 2.3 version introduces support for BitLocker-compatible
devices (BITLK format). This format is used in Windows systems,
and in combination with a filesystem driver, cryptsetup now provides
native read-write access to BitLocker Full Disk Encryption devices.
The BITLK implementation is based on publicly available information
and it is an independent and opensource implementation that allows
to access this proprietary disk encryption.
Changes since version 2.2.2
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* BITLK (Windows BitLocker compatible) device access
BITLK userspace implementation is based on the master thesis and code
provided by Vojtech Trefny. Also, thanks to other opensource projects
like libbde (that provide alternative approach to decode this format)
we were able to verify cryptsetup implementation.
NOTE: Support for the BITLK device is EXPERIMENTAL and will require
a lot of testing. If you get some error message (mainly unsupported
metadata in the on-disk header), please help us by submitting an issue
to cryptsetup project, so we can fix it. Thank you!
Cryptsetup supports BITLK activation through passphrase or recovery
passphrase for existing devices (BitLocker and Bitlocker to Go).
Activation through TPM, SmartCard, or any other key protector
is not supported. And in some situations, mainly for TPM bind to some
PCR registers, it could be even impossible on Linux in the future.
All metadata (key protectors) are handled read-only, cryptsetup cannot
create or modify them. Except for old devices (created in old Vista
systems), all format variants should be recognized.
Data devices can be activated read-write (followed by mounting through
the proper filesystem driver). To access filesystem on the decrypted device
you need properly installed driver (vfat, NTFS or exFAT).
Foe AES-XTS, activation is supported on all recent Linux kernels.
For older AES-CBC encryption, Linux Kernel version 5.3 is required
(support for special IV variant); for AES-CBC with Elephant diffuser,
Linux Kernel 5.6 is required.
Please note that CBC variants are legacy, and we provide it only
for backward compatibility (to be able to access old drives).
Cryptsetup command now supports the new "bitlk" format and implement dump,
open, status, and close actions.
To activate a BITLK device, use
# cryptsetup open --type bitlk <device> <name>
or with alias
# cryptsetup bitlkOpen <device> <name>
Then with properly installed fs driver (usually NTFS, vfat or exFAT),
you can mount the plaintext device /dev/mapper<name> device as a common
filesystem.
To print metadata information about BITLK device, use
# crypotsetup bitlkDump <device>
To print information about the active device, use
# cryptsetup status <name>
Example (activation of disk image):
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
# Recent blkid recognizes BitLocker device,just to verity
# blkid bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img
bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img: TYPE="BitLocker"
# Print visible metadata information (on-disk, form the image)
# cryptsetup bitlkDump bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img
Info for BITLK device bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img.
Version: 2
GUID: ...
Created: Wed Oct 23 17:38:15 2019
Description: DESKTOP-xxxxxxx E: 23.10.2019
Cipher name: aes
Cipher mode: xts-plain64
Cipher key: 128 bits
Keyslots:
0: VMK
GUID: ...
Protection: VMK protected with passphrase
Salt: ...
Key data size: 44 [bytes]
1: VMK
GUID: ...
Protection: VMK protected with recovery passphrase
Salt: ...
Key data size: 44 [bytes]
2: FVEK
Key data size: 44 [bytes]
# Activation (recovery passphrase works the same as password)
# cryptsetup bitlkOpen bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img test -v
Enter passphrase for bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img:
Command successful.
# Information about the active device
# cryptsetup status test
/dev/mapper/test is active.
type: BITLK
cipher: aes-xts-plain64
keysize: 128 bits
...
# Plaintext device should now contain decrypted NTFS filesystem
# blkid /dev/mapper/test
/dev/mapper/test: UUID="..." TYPE="ntfs"
# And can be mounted
# mount /dev/mapper/test /mnt/tst
# Deactivation
# umount /mnt/tst
# cryptsetup close test
* Veritysetup now supports activation with additional PKCS7 signature
of root hash through --root-hash-signature option.
The signature uses an in-kernel trusted key to validate the signature
of the root hash during activation. This option requires Linux kernel
5.4 with DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG option.
Verity devices activated with signature now has a special flag
(with signature) active in device status (veritysetup status <name>).
Usage:
# veritysetup open <data_device> name <hash_device> <root_hash> \
--root-hash-signature=<roothash_p7_sig_file>
* Integritysetup now calculates hash integrity size according to algorithm
instead of requiring an explicit tag size.
Previously, when integritysetup formats a device with hash or
HMAC integrity checksums, it required explicitly tag size entry from
a user (or used default value).
This led to confusion and unexpected shortened tag sizes.
Now, libcryptsetup calculates tag size according to real hash output.
Tag size can also be specified, then it warns if these values differ.
* Integritysetup now supports fixed padding for dm-integrity devices.
There was an in-kernel bug that wasted a lot of space when using metadata
areas for integrity-protected devices if a larger sector size than
512 bytes was used.
This problem affects both stand-alone dm-integrity and also LUKS2 with
authenticated encryption and larger sector size.
The new extension to dm-integrity superblock is needed, so devices
with the new optimal padding cannot be activated on older systems.
Integritysetup/Cryptsetup will use new padding automatically if it
detects the proper kernel. To create a compatible device with
the old padding, use --integrity-legacy-padding option.
* A lot of fixes to online LUKS2 reecryption.
* Add crypt_resume_by_volume_key() function to libcryptsetup.
If a user has a volume key available, the LUKS device can be resumed
directly using the provided volume key.
No keyslot derivation is needed, only the key digest is checked.
* Implement active device suspend info.
Add CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED bit to crypt_get_active_device() flags
that informs the caller that device is suspended (luksSuspend).
* Allow --test-passphrase for a detached header.
Before this fix, we required a data device specified on the command
line even though it was not necessary for the passphrase check.
* Allow --key-file option in legacy offline encryption.
The option was ignored for LUKS1 encryption initialization.
* Export memory safe functions.
To make developing of some extensions simpler, we now export
functions to handle memory with proper wipe on deallocation.
* Fail crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf for inactive LUKS1 keyslot.
Libcryptsetup API extensions
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The libcryptsetup API is backward compatible for existing symbols.
New symbols
crypt_set_compatibility
crypt_get_compatibility;
crypt_resume_by_volume_key;
crypt_activate_by_signed_key;
crypt_safe_alloc;
crypt_safe_realloc;
crypt_safe_free;
crypt_safe_memzero;
New defines introduced :
CRYPT_BITLK "BITLK" - BITLK (BitLocker-compatible mode
CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING - dm-integrity legacy padding
CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE - dm-verity root hash signature
CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED - device suspended info flag

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@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
Cryptsetup 2.3.1 Release Notes
==============================
Stable bug-fix release.
All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
Changes since version 2.3.0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Support VeraCrypt 128 bytes passwords.
VeraCrypt now allows passwords of maximal length 128 bytes
(compared to legacy TrueCrypt where it was limited by 64 bytes).
* Strip extra newline from BitLocker recovery keys
There might be a trailing newline added by the text editor when
the recovery passphrase was passed using the --key-file option.
* Detect separate libiconv library.
It should fix compilation issues on distributions with iconv
implemented in a separate library.
* Various fixes and workarounds to build on old Linux distributions.
* Split lines with hexadecimal digest printing for large key-sizes.
* Do not wipe the device with no integrity profile.
With --integrity none we performed useless full device wipe.
* Workaround for dm-integrity kernel table bug.
Some kernels show an invalid dm-integrity mapping table
if superblock contains the "recalculate" bit. This causes
integritysetup to not recognize the dm-integrity device.
Integritysetup now specifies kernel options such a way that
even on unpatched kernels mapping table is correct.
* Print error message if LUKS1 keyslot cannot be processed.
If the crypto backend is missing support for hash algorithms
used in PBKDF2, the error message was not visible.
* Properly align LUKS2 keyslots area on conversion.
If the LUKS1 payload offset (data offset) is not aligned
to 4 KiB boundary, new LUKS2 keyslots area in now aligned properly.
* Validate LUKS2 earlier on conversion to not corrupt the device
if binary keyslots areas metadata are not correct.

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@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
Cryptsetup 2.3.2 Release Notes
==============================
Stable bug-fix release.
All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
Changes since version 2.3.1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Support compilation with json-c library version 0.14.
* Update FAQ document for some LUKS2 specific information.
* Add option to dump content of LUKS2 unbound keyslot:
cryptsetup luksDump --unbound -S <slot> <device>
or optionally with --master-key-file option.
The slot number --key-slot (-S) option is mandatory here.
An unbound keyslot store a key is that is not assigned to data
area on disk (LUKS2 allows to store arbitrary keys).
* Rephrase some error messages and remove redundant end-of-lines.
* Add support for discards (TRIM) for standalone dm-integrity devices.
Linux kernel 5.7 adds support for optional discard/TRIM operation
over dm-integrity devices.
It is now supported through --allow-discards integritysetup option.
Note you need to add this flag in all activation calls.
Note that this option cannot be used for LUKS2 authenticated encryption
(that uses dm-integrity for storing additional per-sector metadata).
* Fix cryptsetup-reencrypt to work on devices that do not allow
direct-io device access.
* Fix a crash in the BitLocker-compatible code error path.
* Fix Veracrypt compatible support for longer (>64 bytes) passphrases.
It allows some older images to be correctly opened again.
The issue was introduced in version 2.3.1.

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@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
Cryptsetup 2.3.3 Release Notes
==============================
Stable bug-fix release.
All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
Changes since version 2.3.2
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Fix BitLocker compatible device access that uses native 4kB sectors.
Devices formatted with storage that natively support 4096-bytes
sectors can also use this sector size for encryption units.
* Support large IV count (--iv-large-sectors) cryptsetup option
for plain device mapping.
The large IV count is supported in dm-crypt together with larger
sector encryption. It counts the Initialization Vector (IV) in
a larger sector size instead of 512-bytes sectors.
This option does not have any performance or security impact,
but it can be used for accessing incompatible existing disk images
from other systems.
Only open action with plain device type and sector size > 512 bytes
are supported.
* Fix a memory leak in BitLocker compatible handling.
* Allow EBOIV (Initialization Vector algorithm) use.
The EBOIV initialization vector is intended to be used internally
with BitLocker devices (for CBC mode). It can now be used also
outside of the BitLocker compatible code.
* Require both keyslot cipher and key size options.
If these LUKS2 keyslot parameters were not specified together,
cryptsetup silently failed.
* Update to man pages and FAQ.

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@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
Cryptsetup 2.3.4 Release Notes
==============================
Stable bug-fix release with a security fix (32-bit only).
All users of cryptsetup 2.2.x and later should upgrade to this version.
Changes since version 2.3.3
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Fix a possible out-of-bounds memory write while validating LUKS2 data
segments metadata (CVE-2020-14382).
This problem can be triggered only on 32-bit builds (64-bit systems
are not affected).
LUKS2 format validation code contains a bug in segments validation code
where the code does not check for possible overflow on memory allocation.
Due to the bug, the libcryptsetup can be tricked to expect such allocation
was successful. Later it may read data from image crafted by an attacker and
actually write such data beyond allocated memory.
The bug was introduced in cryptsetup 2.2.0. All later releases until 2.3.4
are affected.
If you only backport the fix for this CVE, these master branch git commits
should be backported:
52f5cb8cedf22fb3e14c744814ec8af7614146c7
46ee71edcd13e1dad50815ad65c28779aa6f7503
752c9a52798f11d3b765b673ebaa3058eb25316e
Thanks to Tobias Stoeckmann for discovering this issue.
* Ignore reported optimal IO size if not aligned to minimal page size.
Some USB enclosures report bogus block device topology (see lsblk -t) that
prevents LUKS2 format with 4k sector size (reported values are not correctly
aligned). The code now ignores such values and uses the default alignment.
* Added support for new no_read/write_wrokqueue dm-crypt options (kernel 5.9).
These performance options, introduced in kernel 5.9, configure dm-crypt
to bypass read or write workqueues and run encryption synchronously.
Use --perf-no_read_workqueue or --perf-no_write_workqueue cryptsetup arguments
to use these dm-crypt flags.
These options are available only for low-level dm-crypt performance tuning,
use only if you need a change to default dm-crypt behavior.
For LUKS2, these flags can be persistently stored in metadata with
the --persistent option.
* Added support panic_on_corruption option for dm-verity devices (kernel 5.9).
Veritysetup now supports --panic-on-corruption argument that configures
the dm-verity device to panics kernel if a corruption is detected.
This option is intended for specific configurations, do not use it in
standard configurations.
* Support --master-key-file option for online LUKS2 reencryption
This can be used for reencryption of devices that uses protected key AES cipher
on some mainframes crypto accelerators.
* Always return EEXIST error code if a device already exists.
Some libcryptsetup functions (activate_by*) now return EEXIST error code,
so the caller can distinguish that call fails because some parallel process
already activated the device.
Previously all fails returned EINVAL (invalid value).
* Fix a problem in integritysetup if a hash algorithm has dash in the name.
If users want to use blake2b/blake2s, the kernel algorithm name includes
a dash (like "blake2s-256").
Theses algorithms can now be used for integritysetup devices.
* Fix crypto backend to properly handle ECB mode.
Even though it should never be used, it should still work for testing :)
This fixes a bug introduced in cryptsetup version 2.3.2.
* TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt compatible mode now supports the activation of devices
with a larger sector.
TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt always uses 512-byte sector for encryption, but for devices
with a larger native sector, it stores this value in the header.
This patch allows activation of such devices, basically ignoring
the mentioned sector size.
* LUKS2: Do not create excessively large headers.
When creating a LUKS2 header with a specified --offset larger than
the LUKS2 header size, do not create a larger file than needed.
* Fix unspecified sector size for BitLocker compatible mode.
Some BitLocker devices can contain zeroed sector size in the header.
In this case, the 512-byte sector should be used.
The bug was introduced in version 2.3.3.
* Fix reading key data size in metadata for BitLocker compatible mode.
Such devices with an unexpected entry in metadata can now be activated.
Thanks to all users reporting these problems, BitLocker metadata documentation
is not publicly available, and we depend only on these reports.
* Fix typos in documentation.

View File

@@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ libcryptsetup_la_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \
-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/loopaes \
-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/verity \
-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/tcrypt \
-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/integrity \
-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/bitlk
-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/integrity
libcryptsetup_la_DEPENDENCIES = libutils_io.la libcrypto_backend.la lib/libcryptsetup.sym
@@ -40,7 +39,6 @@ libcryptsetup_la_LIBADD = \
@LIBARGON2_LIBS@ \
@JSON_C_LIBS@ \
@BLKID_LIBS@ \
$(LTLIBICONV) \
libcrypto_backend.la \
libutils_io.la
@@ -66,7 +64,6 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
lib/utils_device_locking.c \
lib/utils_device_locking.h \
lib/utils_pbkdf.c \
lib/utils_safe_memory.c \
lib/utils_storage_wrappers.c \
lib/utils_storage_wrappers.h \
lib/libdevmapper.c \
@@ -77,7 +74,7 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
lib/base64.h \
lib/base64.c \
lib/integrity/integrity.h \
lib/integrity/integrity.c \
lib/integrity/integrity.c \
lib/loopaes/loopaes.h \
lib/loopaes/loopaes.c \
lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h \
@@ -93,7 +90,7 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
lib/verity/verity.h \
lib/verity/rs_encode_char.c \
lib/verity/rs_decode_char.c \
lib/verity/rs.h \
lib/verity/rs.h \
lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c \
lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c \
lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c \
@@ -110,6 +107,4 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h \
lib/luks2/luks2.h \
lib/utils_blkid.c \
lib/utils_blkid.h \
lib/bitlk/bitlk.h \
lib/bitlk/bitlk.c
lib/utils_blkid.h

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
/*
* BITLK (BitLocker-compatible) header definition
*
* Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Vojtech Trefny
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_BITLK_H
#define _CRYPTSETUP_BITLK_H
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
struct crypt_device;
struct device;
#define BITLK_NONCE_SIZE 12
#define BITLK_SALT_SIZE 16
#define BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE 16
#define BITLK_STATE_NORMAL 0x0004
typedef enum {
BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_NORMAL = 0,
BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_EOW,
BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
} BITLKEncryptionType;
typedef enum {
BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY = 0,
BITLK_PROTECTION_TPM,
BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY,
BITLK_PROTECTION_TPM_PIN,
BITLK_PROTECTION_RECOVERY_PASSPHRASE,
BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE,
BITLK_PROTECTION_SMART_CARD,
BITLK_PROTECTION_UNKNOWN,
} BITLKVMKProtection;
typedef enum {
BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_PROPERTY = 0x0000,
BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VMK = 0x0002,
BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_FVEK = 0x0003,
BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_STARTUP_KEY = 0x0006,
BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_DESCRIPTION = 0x0007,
BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VOLUME_HEADER = 0x000f,
} BITLKFVEEntryType;
typedef enum {
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_ERASED = 0x0000,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_KEY = 0x0001,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRING = 0x0002,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRETCH_KEY = 0x0003,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_USE_KEY = 0x0004,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_ENCRYPTED_KEY = 0x0005,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_TPM_KEY = 0x0006,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_VALIDATION = 0x0007,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_VMK = 0x0008,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_EXTERNAL_KEY = 0x0009,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_OFFSET_SIZE = 0x000f,
BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_RECOVERY_TIME = 0x015,
} BITLKFVEEntryValue;
struct bitlk_vmk {
char *guid;
char *name;
BITLKVMKProtection protection;
uint8_t salt[BITLK_SALT_SIZE];
uint8_t mac_tag[BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE];
uint8_t nonce[BITLK_NONCE_SIZE];
struct volume_key *vk;
struct bitlk_vmk *next;
};
struct bitlk_fvek {
uint8_t mac_tag[BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE];
uint8_t nonce[BITLK_NONCE_SIZE];
struct volume_key *vk;
};
struct bitlk_metadata {
uint16_t sector_size;
bool togo;
bool state;
BITLKEncryptionType type;
const char *cipher;
const char *cipher_mode;
uint16_t key_size;
char *guid;
uint64_t creation_time;
char *description;
uint64_t metadata_offset[3];
uint32_t metadata_version;
uint64_t volume_header_offset;
uint64_t volume_header_size;
struct bitlk_vmk *vmks;
struct bitlk_fvek *fvek;
};
int BITLK_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct bitlk_metadata *params);
int BITLK_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, struct bitlk_metadata *params);
int BITLK_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *password,
size_t passwordLen,
const struct bitlk_metadata *params,
uint32_t flags);
void BITLK_bitlk_fvek_free(struct bitlk_fvek *fvek);
void BITLK_bitlk_vmk_free(struct bitlk_vmk *vmk);
void BITLK_bitlk_metadata_free(struct bitlk_metadata *params);
#endif

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
* cryptsetup plain device helper functions
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
* these licenses can be found at:
*
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
* - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
* - Apache 2.0 : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
* software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* Argon2 PBKDF2 library wrapper
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* Cipher performance check
*
* Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -23,10 +23,6 @@
#include <time.h>
#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
#ifndef CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW
#define CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW CLOCK_MONOTONIC
#endif
/*
* This is not simulating storage, so using disk block causes extreme overhead.
* Let's use some fixed block size where results are more reliable...

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* Linux kernel cipher generic utilities
*
* Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ static const struct cipher_alg cipher_algs[] = {
{ "paes", NULL, 16, true }, /* protected AES, s390 wrapped key scheme */
{ "xchacha12,aes", "adiantum", 32, false },
{ "xchacha20,aes", "adiantum", 32, false },
{ "sm4", NULL, 16, false },
{ NULL, NULL, 0, false }
};
@@ -73,13 +72,7 @@ int crypt_cipher_ivsize(const char *name, const char *mode)
{
const struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name, mode);
if (!ca)
return -EINVAL;
if (mode && !strcasecmp(mode, "ecb"))
return 0;
return ca->blocksize;
return ca ? ca->blocksize : -EINVAL;
}
int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name, const char *mode)

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* crypto backend implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -26,12 +26,13 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
struct crypt_device;
struct crypt_hash;
struct crypt_hmac;
struct crypt_cipher;
struct crypt_storage;
int crypt_backend_init(void);
int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx);
void crypt_backend_destroy(void);
#define CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL (1 << 0) /* Crypto uses kernel part, for benchmark */
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ int crypt_cipher_check_kernel(const char *name, const char *mode,
/* Storage encryption wrappers */
int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx, size_t sector_size,
const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
const void *key, size_t key_length, bool large_iv);
const void *key, size_t key_length);
void crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx);
int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t iv_offset,
uint64_t length, char *buffer);
@@ -118,12 +119,6 @@ int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t iv_offset,
bool crypt_storage_kernel_only(struct crypt_storage *ctx);
/* Temporary Bitlk helper */
int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
const char *tag, size_t tag_length);
/* Memzero helper (memset on stack can be optimized out) */
static inline void crypt_backend_memzero(void *s, size_t n)
{

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* crypto backend implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -55,9 +55,5 @@ int crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length);
void crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx);
int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(const void *key, size_t key_length,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
const char *tag, size_t tag_length);
#endif /* _CRYPTO_BACKEND_INTERNAL_H */

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation (skcipher)
*
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@
#define SOL_ALG 279
#endif
#ifndef ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE
#define ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE 5
#endif
/*
* ciphers
*
@@ -53,7 +49,7 @@
*/
static int _crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
const void *key, size_t key_length,
size_t tag_length, struct sockaddr_alg *sa)
struct sockaddr_alg *sa)
{
if (!ctx)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -75,11 +71,6 @@ static int _crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tag_length && setsockopt(ctx->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE, NULL, tag_length) < 0) {
crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(ctx);
return -EINVAL;
}
ctx->opfd = accept(ctx->tfmfd, NULL, 0);
if (ctx->opfd < 0) {
crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(ctx);
@@ -102,13 +93,12 @@ int crypt_cipher_init_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx, const char *name,
snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name), "%s(%s)", mode, name);
return _crypt_cipher_init(ctx, key, key_length, 0, &sa);
return _crypt_cipher_init(ctx, key, key_length, &sa);
}
/* The in/out should be aligned to page boundary */
static int _crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
const char *in, size_t in_length,
char *out, size_t out_length,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
uint32_t direction)
{
@@ -119,7 +109,7 @@ static int _crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
uint32_t *type;
struct iovec iov = {
.iov_base = (void*)(uintptr_t)in,
.iov_len = in_length,
.iov_len = length,
};
int iv_msg_size = iv ? CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(*alg_iv) + iv_length) : 0;
char buffer[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(*type)) + iv_msg_size];
@@ -130,7 +120,7 @@ static int _crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
.msg_iovlen = 1,
};
if (!in || !out || !in_length)
if (!in || !out || !length)
return -EINVAL;
if ((!iv && iv_length) || (iv && !iv_length))
@@ -161,13 +151,13 @@ static int _crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
}
len = sendmsg(ctx->opfd, &msg, 0);
if (len != (ssize_t)(in_length)) {
if (len != (ssize_t)length) {
r = -EIO;
goto bad;
}
len = read(ctx->opfd, out, out_length);
if (len != (ssize_t)out_length)
len = read(ctx->opfd, out, length);
if (len != (ssize_t)length)
r = -EIO;
bad:
crypt_backend_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
@@ -178,7 +168,7 @@ int crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
{
return _crypt_cipher_crypt(ctx, in, length, out, length,
return _crypt_cipher_crypt(ctx, in, out, length,
iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_ENCRYPT);
}
@@ -186,7 +176,7 @@ int crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
{
return _crypt_cipher_crypt(ctx, in, length, out, length,
return _crypt_cipher_crypt(ctx, in, out, length,
iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_DECRYPT);
}
@@ -253,56 +243,13 @@ int crypt_cipher_check_kernel(const char *name, const char *mode,
memset(key, 0xab, key_length);
*key = 0xef;
r = _crypt_cipher_init(&c, key, key_length, 0, &sa);
r = _crypt_cipher_init(&c, key, key_length, &sa);
crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&c);
free(key);
return r;
}
int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(const void *key, size_t key_length,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
{
struct crypt_cipher_kernel c;
struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
.salg_family = AF_ALG,
.salg_type = "aead",
.salg_name = "ccm(aes)",
};
int r;
char buffer[128], ccm_iv[16];
if (length + tag_length > sizeof(buffer))
return -EINVAL;
if (iv_length > sizeof(ccm_iv) - 2)
return -EINVAL;
r = _crypt_cipher_init(&c, key, key_length, tag_length, &sa);
if (r < 0)
return r;
memcpy(buffer, in, length);
memcpy(buffer + length, tag, tag_length);
/* CCM IV - RFC3610 */
memset(ccm_iv, 0, sizeof(ccm_iv));
ccm_iv[0] = 15 - iv_length - 1;
memcpy(ccm_iv + 1, iv, iv_length);
memset(ccm_iv + 1 + iv_length, 0, ccm_iv[0] + 1);
iv_length = sizeof(ccm_iv);
r = _crypt_cipher_crypt(&c, buffer, length + tag_length, out, length,
ccm_iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_DECRYPT);
crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&c);
crypt_backend_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
return r;
}
#else /* ENABLE_AF_ALG */
int crypt_cipher_init_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx, const char *name,
const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
@@ -333,11 +280,4 @@ int crypt_cipher_check_kernel(const char *name, const char *mode,
/* Cannot check, expect success. */
return 0;
}
int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(const void *key, size_t key_length,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
{
return -ENOTSUP;
}
#endif

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* GCRYPT crypto backend implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct crypt_cipher {
/*
* Test for wrong Whirlpool variant,
* Ref: https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gcrypt-devel/2014-January/002889.html
* Ref: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gcrypt-devel/2014-January/002889.html
*/
static void crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(void)
{
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static void crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(void)
crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 1;
}
int crypt_backend_init(void)
int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
if (crypto_backend_initialised)
return 0;
@@ -479,43 +479,3 @@ bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
{
return ctx->use_kernel;
}
int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
{
#ifdef GCRY_CCM_BLOCK_LEN
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
uint64_t l[3];
int r = -EINVAL;
if (gcry_cipher_open(&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (gcry_cipher_setkey(hd, key, key_length))
goto out;
if (gcry_cipher_setiv(hd, iv, iv_length))
goto out;
l[0] = length;
l[1] = 0;
l[2] = tag_length;
if (gcry_cipher_ctl(hd, GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS, l, sizeof(l)))
goto out;
if (gcry_cipher_decrypt(hd, out, length, in, length))
goto out;
if (gcry_cipher_checktag(hd, tag, tag_length))
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
gcry_cipher_close(hd);
return r;
#else
return -ENOTSUP;
#endif
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *op
return 0;
}
int crypt_backend_init(void)
int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
struct utsname uts;
struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
@@ -392,12 +392,3 @@ bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
{
return true;
}
int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
{
return crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(key, key_length, in, out, length,
iv, iv_length, tag, tag_length);
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* Nettle crypto backend implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
return NULL;
}
int crypt_backend_init(void)
int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -433,12 +433,3 @@ bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
{
return true;
}
int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
{
return crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(key, key_length, in, out, length,
iv, iv_length, tag, tag_length);
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* NSS crypto backend implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
return NULL;
}
int crypt_backend_init(void)
int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
if (crypto_backend_initialised)
return 0;
@@ -381,12 +381,3 @@ bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
{
return true;
}
int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
{
return crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(key, key_length, in, out, length,
iv, iv_length, tag, tag_length);
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* OPENSSL crypto backend implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -35,8 +35,6 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
struct crypt_hash {
@@ -121,7 +119,7 @@ static const char *openssl_backend_version(void)
}
#endif
int crypt_backend_init(void)
int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
if (crypto_backend_initialised)
return 0;
@@ -507,40 +505,3 @@ bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
{
return ctx->use_kernel;
}
int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
{
#ifdef EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
int len = 0, r = -EINVAL;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (!ctx)
return -EINVAL;
if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_ccm(), NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
goto out;
//EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)
//EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN, iv_length, NULL) != 1)
goto out;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG, tag_length, CONST_CAST(void*)tag) != 1)
goto out;
if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, (const unsigned char*)iv) != 1)
goto out;
if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char*)out, &len, (const unsigned char*)in, length) == 1)
r = 0;
out:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return r;
#else
return -ENOTSUP;
#endif
}

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Generic wrapper for storage encryption modes and Initial Vectors
* (reimplementation of some functions from Linux dm-crypt kernel)
*
* Copyright (C) 2014-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2014-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -31,16 +31,16 @@
* IV documentation: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
*/
struct crypt_sector_iv {
enum { IV_NONE, IV_NULL, IV_PLAIN, IV_PLAIN64, IV_ESSIV, IV_BENBI, IV_PLAIN64BE, IV_EBOIV } type;
enum { IV_NONE, IV_NULL, IV_PLAIN, IV_PLAIN64, IV_ESSIV, IV_BENBI, IV_PLAIN64BE } type;
int iv_size;
char *iv;
struct crypt_cipher *cipher;
int shift;
struct crypt_cipher *essiv_cipher;
int benbi_shift;
};
/* Block encryption storage context */
struct crypt_storage {
size_t sector_size;
unsigned sector_shift;
unsigned iv_shift;
struct crypt_cipher *cipher;
struct crypt_sector_iv cipher_iv;
@@ -56,15 +56,12 @@ static int int_log2(unsigned int x)
static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
const char *cipher_name, const char *mode_name,
const char *iv_name, const void *key, size_t key_length,
size_t sector_size)
const char *iv_name, const void *key, size_t key_length)
{
int r;
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->iv_size = crypt_cipher_ivsize(cipher_name, mode_name);
if (ctx->iv_size < 0 || (strcmp(mode_name, "ecb") && ctx->iv_size < 8))
if (ctx->iv_size < 8)
return -ENOENT;
if (!strcmp(cipher_name, "cipher_null") ||
@@ -89,6 +86,7 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
char *hash_name = strchr(iv_name, ':');
int hash_size;
char tmp[256];
int r;
if (!hash_name)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -116,7 +114,7 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
return r;
}
r = crypt_cipher_init(&ctx->cipher, cipher_name, "ecb",
r = crypt_cipher_init(&ctx->essiv_cipher, cipher_name, "ecb",
tmp, hash_size);
crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
if (r)
@@ -129,15 +127,7 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
return -EINVAL;
ctx->type = IV_BENBI;
ctx->shift = SECTOR_SHIFT - log;
} else if (!strncasecmp(iv_name, "eboiv", 5)) {
r = crypt_cipher_init(&ctx->cipher, cipher_name, "ecb",
key, key_length);
if (r)
return r;
ctx->type = IV_EBOIV;
ctx->shift = int_log2(sector_size);
ctx->benbi_shift = SECTOR_SHIFT - log;
} else
return -ENOENT;
@@ -173,20 +163,14 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector
case IV_ESSIV:
memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
return crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->cipher,
return crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->essiv_cipher,
ctx->iv, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, NULL, 0);
break;
case IV_BENBI:
memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
val = cpu_to_be64((sector << ctx->shift) + 1);
val = cpu_to_be64((sector << ctx->benbi_shift) + 1);
memcpy(ctx->iv + ctx->iv_size - sizeof(val), &val, sizeof(val));
break;
case IV_EBOIV:
memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector << ctx->shift);
return crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->cipher,
ctx->iv, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, NULL, 0);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -196,8 +180,8 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector
static void crypt_sector_iv_destroy(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx)
{
if (ctx->type == IV_ESSIV || ctx->type == IV_EBOIV)
crypt_cipher_destroy(ctx->cipher);
if (ctx->type == IV_ESSIV)
crypt_cipher_destroy(ctx->essiv_cipher);
if (ctx->iv) {
memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
@@ -213,8 +197,7 @@ int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx,
size_t sector_size,
const char *cipher,
const char *cipher_mode,
const void *key, size_t key_length,
bool large_iv)
const void *key, size_t key_length)
{
struct crypt_storage *s;
char mode_name[64];
@@ -246,14 +229,14 @@ int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx,
return r;
}
r = crypt_sector_iv_init(&s->cipher_iv, cipher, mode_name, cipher_iv, key, key_length, sector_size);
r = crypt_sector_iv_init(&s->cipher_iv, cipher, mode_name, cipher_iv, key, key_length);
if (r) {
crypt_storage_destroy(s);
return r;
}
s->sector_size = sector_size;
s->iv_shift = large_iv ? int_log2(sector_size) - SECTOR_SHIFT : 0;
s->sector_shift = int_log2(sector_size);
s->iv_shift = s->sector_shift - SECTOR_SHIFT;
*ctx = s;
return 0;
@@ -266,20 +249,19 @@ int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx,
uint64_t i;
int r = 0;
if (length & (ctx->sector_size - 1))
if (length & ((1 << ctx->sector_shift) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (iv_offset & ((ctx->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
length >>= ctx->sector_shift;
for (i = 0; i < length; i += ctx->sector_size) {
r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, (iv_offset + (i >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) >> ctx->iv_shift);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, iv_offset + (uint64_t)(i << ctx->iv_shift));
if (r)
break;
r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(ctx->cipher,
&buffer[i],
&buffer[i],
ctx->sector_size,
&buffer[i << ctx->sector_shift],
&buffer[i << ctx->sector_shift],
1 << ctx->sector_shift,
ctx->cipher_iv.iv,
ctx->cipher_iv.iv_size);
if (r)
@@ -296,20 +278,19 @@ int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx,
uint64_t i;
int r = 0;
if (length & (ctx->sector_size - 1))
if (length & ((1 << ctx->sector_shift) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (iv_offset & ((ctx->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
length >>= ctx->sector_shift;
for (i = 0; i < length; i += ctx->sector_size) {
r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, (iv_offset + (i >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) >> ctx->iv_shift);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, iv_offset + (i << ctx->iv_shift));
if (r)
break;
r = crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->cipher,
&buffer[i],
&buffer[i],
ctx->sector_size,
&buffer[i << ctx->sector_shift],
&buffer[i << ctx->sector_shift],
1 << ctx->sector_shift,
ctx->cipher_iv.iv,
ctx->cipher_iv.iv_size);
if (r)

View File

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
* Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation
*
* cryptsetup related changes
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* PBKDF performance check
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Ondrej Mosnacek
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Mosnacek
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -27,10 +27,6 @@
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include "crypto_backend.h"
#ifndef CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW
#define CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW CLOCK_MONOTONIC
#endif
#define BENCH_MIN_MS 250
#define BENCH_MIN_MS_FAST 10
#define BENCH_PERCENT_ATLEAST 95

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Integrity volume handling
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <uuid/uuid.h>
#include "integrity.h"
@@ -40,7 +41,8 @@ static int INTEGRITY_read_superblock(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
device_alignment(device), sb, sizeof(*sb), offset) != sizeof(*sb) ||
memcmp(sb->magic, SB_MAGIC, sizeof(sb->magic)) ||
sb->version < SB_VERSION_1 || sb->version > SB_VERSION_4) {
(sb->version != SB_VERSION_1 && sb->version != SB_VERSION_2 &&
sb->version != SB_VERSION_3)) {
log_std(cd, "No integrity superblock detected on %s.\n",
device_path(device));
r = -EINVAL;
@@ -56,9 +58,7 @@ static int INTEGRITY_read_superblock(struct crypt_device *cd,
return r;
}
int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
uint32_t *flags)
int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
{
struct superblock sb;
int r;
@@ -70,9 +70,6 @@ int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
params->sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block;
params->tag_size = sb.integrity_tag_size;
if (flags)
*flags = sb.flags;
return 0;
}
@@ -95,11 +92,10 @@ int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offs
if (sb.version == SB_VERSION_2 && (sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING))
log_std(cd, "recalc_sector %" PRIu64 "\n", sb.recalc_sector);
log_std(cd, "log2_blocks_per_bitmap %u\n", sb.log2_blocks_per_bitmap_bit);
log_std(cd, "flags %s%s%s%s\n",
log_std(cd, "flags %s%s%s\n",
sb.flags & SB_FLAG_HAVE_JOURNAL_MAC ? "have_journal_mac " : "",
sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING ? "recalculating " : "",
sb.flags & SB_FLAG_DIRTY_BITMAP ? "dirty_bitmap " : "",
sb.flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING ? "fix_padding " : "");
sb.flags & SB_FLAG_DIRTY_BITMAP ? "dirty_bitmap " : "");
return 0;
}
@@ -141,27 +137,6 @@ int INTEGRITY_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *integrity)
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Return hash or hmac(hash) size, if known */
int INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(const char *integrity)
{
char hash[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
int r;
if (!integrity)
return 0;
if (!strcmp(integrity, "crc32") || !strcmp(integrity, "crc32c"))
return 4;
r = sscanf(integrity, "hmac(%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^)]s", hash);
if (r == 1)
r = crypt_hash_size(hash);
else
r = crypt_hash_size(integrity);
return r < 0 ? 0 : r;
}
int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *integrity,
const char *cipher,
@@ -212,7 +187,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags)
uint32_t flags)
{
int r;
@@ -223,16 +198,12 @@ int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
.flags = flags,
};
/* Workaround for kernel dm-integrity table bug */
if (sb_flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING)
dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &dmd->size);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd->segment, 0, dmd->size,
return dm_integrity_target_set(&dmd->segment, 0, dmd->size,
crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk, journal_crypt_key,
@@ -242,8 +213,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
int INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *type,
struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
uint32_t sb_flags)
struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
{
int r;
uint32_t dmi_flags;
@@ -268,13 +238,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-integrity mapping."));
return -ENOTSUP;
}
if (r < 0 && (sb_flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING) && !dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) &&
!(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED)) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-integrity fixed metadata alignment."));
log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."));
return -ENOTSUP;
}
@@ -287,16 +251,15 @@ int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct volume_key *vk,
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags)
uint32_t flags)
{
struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
int r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, params, vk, journal_crypt_key,
journal_mac_key, &dmd, flags, sb_flags);
int r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, params, vk, journal_crypt_key, journal_mac_key, &dmd, flags);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, name, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &dmd, sb_flags);
r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, name, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &dmd);
dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
return r;
}
@@ -326,7 +289,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (params && params->integrity_key_size)
vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->integrity_key_size, NULL);
r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, tgt, 0, dmdi.size, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
r = dm_integrity_target_set(tgt, 0, dmdi.size, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk,
journal_crypt_key, journal_mac_key, params);
@@ -340,7 +303,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL, tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, NULL);
if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-integrity mapping."));
log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."));
r = -ENOTSUP;
}
if (r) {

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Integrity header definition
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -34,12 +34,10 @@ struct crypt_dm_active_device;
#define SB_VERSION_1 1
#define SB_VERSION_2 2
#define SB_VERSION_3 3
#define SB_VERSION_4 4
#define SB_FLAG_HAVE_JOURNAL_MAC (1 << 0)
#define SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING (1 << 1) /* V2 only */
#define SB_FLAG_DIRTY_BITMAP (1 << 2) /* V3 only */
#define SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING (1 << 3) /* V4 only */
struct superblock {
uint8_t magic[8];
@@ -55,9 +53,7 @@ struct superblock {
uint64_t recalc_sector; /* V2 only */
} __attribute__ ((packed));
int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
uint32_t *flags);
int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_integrity *params);
int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offset);
@@ -70,7 +66,6 @@ int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *integrity,
const char *cipher,
const char *cipher_mode);
int INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(const char *integrity);
int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
@@ -83,7 +78,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct volume_key *vk,
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags);
uint32_t flags);
int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
@@ -91,11 +86,10 @@ int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags);
uint32_t flags);
int INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *type,
struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
uint32_t sb_flags);
struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd);
#endif

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include "nls.h"
#include "bitops.h"
@@ -78,10 +77,6 @@
*_py = NULL; \
} while (0)
#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
#define O_CLOEXEC 0
#endif
struct crypt_device;
struct luks2_reenc_context;

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -414,8 +414,6 @@ int crypt_get_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
#define CRYPT_TCRYPT "TCRYPT"
/** INTEGRITY dm-integrity device */
#define CRYPT_INTEGRITY "INTEGRITY"
/** BITLK (BitLocker-compatible mode) */
#define CRYPT_BITLK "BITLK"
/** LUKS any version */
#define CRYPT_LUKS NULL
@@ -507,8 +505,6 @@ struct crypt_params_verity {
#define CRYPT_VERITY_CHECK_HASH (1 << 1)
/** Create hash - format hash device */
#define CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH (1 << 2)
/** Root hash signature required for activation */
#define CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE (1 << 3)
/**
*
@@ -633,26 +629,6 @@ int crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
size_t volume_key_size,
void *params);
/**
* Set format compatibility flags.
*
* @param cd crypt device handle
* @param flags CRYPT_COMPATIBILITY_* flags
*/
void crypt_set_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t flags);
/**
* Get compatibility flags.
*
* @param cd crypt device handle
*
* @returns compatibility flags
*/
uint32_t crypt_get_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd);
/** dm-integrity device uses less effective (legacy) padding (old kernels) */
#define CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING (1 << 0)
/**
* Convert to new type for already existing device.
*
@@ -852,20 +828,6 @@ int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
int keyslot,
const char *keyfile,
size_t keyfile_size);
/**
* Resume crypt device using provided volume key.
*
* @param cd crypt device handle
* @param name name of device to resume
* @param volume_key provided volume key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
*
* @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
*/
int crypt_resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size);
/** @} */
/**
@@ -1099,16 +1061,6 @@ int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF (1 << 19)
/** dm-integrity: direct writes, use bitmap to track dirty sectors */
#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP (1 << 20)
/** device is suspended (key should be wiped from memory), output only */
#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED (1 << 21)
/** use IV sector counted in sector_size instead of default 512 bytes sectors */
#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS (1 << 22)
/** dm-verity: panic_on_corruption flag - panic kernel on corruption */
#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION (1 << 23)
/** dm-crypt: bypass internal workqueue and process read requests synchronously. */
#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE (1 << 24)
/** dm-crypt: bypass internal workqueue and process write requests synchronously. */
#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE (1 << 25)
/**
* Active device runtime attributes
@@ -1300,31 +1252,6 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
size_t volume_key_size,
uint32_t flags);
/**
* Activate VERITY device using provided key and optional signature).
*
* @param cd crypt device handle
* @param name name of device to create
* @param volume_key provided volume key
* @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
* @param signature buffer with signature for the key
* @param signature_size bsize of signature buffer
* @param flags activation flags
*
* @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
*
* @note For VERITY the volume key means root hash required for activation.
* Because kernel dm-verity is always read only, you have to provide
* CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY flag always.
*/
int crypt_activate_by_signed_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size,
const char *signature,
size_t signature_size,
uint32_t flags);
/**
* Activate device using passphrase stored in kernel keyring.
*
@@ -1395,7 +1322,6 @@ int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
*
* @note For TCRYPT cipher chain is the volume key concatenated
* for all ciphers in chain.
* @note For VERITY the volume key means root hash used for activation.
*/
int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
int keyslot,
@@ -2325,53 +2251,6 @@ crypt_reencrypt_info crypt_reencrypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
/** @} */
/**
* @defgroup crypt-memory Safe memory helpers functions
* @addtogroup crypt-memory
* @{
*/
/**
* Allocate safe memory (content is safely wiped on deallocation).
*
* @param size size of memory in bytes
*
* @return pointer to allocate memory or @e NULL.
*/
void *crypt_safe_alloc(size_t size);
/**
* Release safe memory, content is safely wiped
* The pointer must be allocated with @link crypt_safe_alloc @endlink
*
* @param data pointer to memory to be deallocated
*
* @return pointer to allocate memory or @e NULL.
*/
void crypt_safe_free(void *data);
/**
* Reallocate safe memory (content is copied and safely wiped on deallocation).
*
* @param data pointer to memory to be deallocated
* @param size new size of memory in bytes
*
* @return pointer to allocate memory or @e NULL.
*/
void *crypt_safe_realloc(void *data, size_t size);
/**
* Safe clear memory area (compile should not compile this call out).
*
* @param data pointer to memory to cleared
* @param size new size of memory in bytes
*
* @return pointer to allocate memory or @e NULL.
*/
void crypt_safe_memzero(void *data, size_t size);
/** @} */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View File

@@ -12,9 +12,6 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
crypt_set_label;
crypt_set_data_device;
crypt_set_compatibility;
crypt_get_compatibility;
crypt_memory_lock;
crypt_metadata_locking;
crypt_format;
@@ -27,7 +24,6 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
crypt_resume_by_keyfile;
crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset;
crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset;
crypt_resume_by_volume_key;
crypt_free;
crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase;
@@ -59,7 +55,6 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset;
crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset;
crypt_activate_by_volume_key;
crypt_activate_by_signed_key;
crypt_activate_by_keyring;
crypt_deactivate;
crypt_deactivate_by_name;
@@ -123,11 +118,6 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
crypt_reencrypt_init_by_keyring;
crypt_reencrypt;
crypt_reencrypt_status;
crypt_safe_alloc;
crypt_safe_realloc;
crypt_safe_free;
crypt_safe_memzero;
local:
*;
};

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <libdevmapper.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <uuid/uuid.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -46,7 +47,6 @@
#define DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET "integrity"
#define DM_LINEAR_TARGET "linear"
#define DM_ERROR_TARGET "error"
#define DM_ZERO_TARGET "zero"
#define RETRY_COUNT 5
/* Set if DM target versions were probed */
@@ -168,15 +168,6 @@ static void _dm_set_crypt_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
_dm_flags |= DM_CAPI_STRING_SUPPORTED;
}
if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 19, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
_dm_flags |= DM_BITLK_EBOIV_SUPPORTED;
if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 20, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
_dm_flags |= DM_BITLK_ELEPHANT_SUPPORTED;
if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 22, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
_dm_flags |= DM_CRYPT_NO_WORKQUEUE_SUPPORTED;
_dm_crypt_checked = true;
}
@@ -205,12 +196,6 @@ static void _dm_set_verity_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED;
}
if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 5, 0, verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch))
_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SUPPORTED;
if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 7, 0, verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch))
_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_PANIC_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED;
_dm_verity_checked = true;
}
@@ -233,12 +218,6 @@ static void _dm_set_integrity_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 3, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_SUPPORTED;
if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 4, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED;
if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 6, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED;
_dm_integrity_checked = true;
}
@@ -286,7 +265,7 @@ static int _dm_check_versions(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target_typ
if ((target_type == DM_CRYPT && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
(target_type == DM_VERITY && _dm_verity_checked) ||
(target_type == DM_INTEGRITY && _dm_integrity_checked) ||
(target_type == DM_LINEAR) || (target_type == DM_ZERO) ||
(target_type == DM_LINEAR) ||
(_dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked))
return 1;
@@ -367,7 +346,7 @@ int dm_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target, uint32_t *flags)
if ((target == DM_CRYPT && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
(target == DM_VERITY && _dm_verity_checked) ||
(target == DM_INTEGRITY && _dm_integrity_checked) ||
(target == DM_LINEAR) || (target == DM_ZERO)) /* nothing to check */
(target == DM_LINEAR)) /* nothing to check with linear */
return 0;
return -ENODEV;
@@ -621,12 +600,6 @@ static char *get_dm_crypt_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
num_options++;
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)
num_options++;
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE)
num_options++;
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE)
num_options++;
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS)
num_options++;
if (tgt->u.crypt.integrity)
num_options++;
@@ -637,13 +610,10 @@ static char *get_dm_crypt_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
*sector_feature = '\0';
if (num_options) {
snprintf(features, sizeof(features)-1, " %d%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", num_options,
snprintf(features, sizeof(features)-1, " %d%s%s%s%s%s", num_options,
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) ? " allow_discards" : "",
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT) ? " same_cpu_crypt" : "",
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) ? " submit_from_crypt_cpus" : "",
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE) ? " no_read_workqueue" : "",
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE) ? " no_write_workqueue" : "",
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS) ? " iv_large_sectors" : "",
sector_feature, integrity_dm);
} else
*features = '\0';
@@ -697,7 +667,7 @@ static char *get_dm_verity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
int max_size, r, num_options = 0;
struct crypt_params_verity *vp;
char *params = NULL, *hexroot = NULL, *hexsalt = NULL;
char features[256], fec_features[256], verity_verify_args[512+32];
char features[256], fec_features[256];
if (!tgt || !tgt->u.verity.vp)
return NULL;
@@ -705,19 +675,14 @@ static char *get_dm_verity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
vp = tgt->u.verity.vp;
/* These flags are not compatible */
if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION) &&
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION))
flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION;
if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) &&
(flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION)))
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION))
flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION)
num_options++;
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION)
num_options++;
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION)
num_options++;
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS)
num_options++;
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE)
@@ -732,18 +697,10 @@ static char *get_dm_verity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
} else
*fec_features = '\0';
if (tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc) {
num_options += 2;
snprintf(verity_verify_args, sizeof(verity_verify_args)-1,
" root_hash_sig_key_desc %s", tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc);
} else
*verity_verify_args = '\0';
if (num_options)
snprintf(features, sizeof(features)-1, " %d%s%s%s%s%s", num_options,
snprintf(features, sizeof(features)-1, " %d%s%s%s%s", num_options,
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) ? " ignore_corruption" : "",
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION) ? " restart_on_corruption" : "",
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION) ? " panic_on_corruption" : "",
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS) ? " ignore_zero_blocks" : "",
(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE) ? " check_at_most_once" : "");
else
@@ -765,22 +722,19 @@ static char *get_dm_verity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
max_size = strlen(hexroot) + strlen(hexsalt) +
strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
strlen(device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.hash_device)) +
strlen(vp->hash_name) + strlen(features) + strlen(fec_features) + 128 +
strlen(verity_verify_args);
strlen(vp->hash_name) + strlen(features) + strlen(fec_features) + 128;
params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
if (!params)
goto out;
r = snprintf(params, max_size,
"%u %s %s %u %u %" PRIu64 " %" PRIu64 " %s %s %s%s%s%s",
"%u %s %s %u %u %" PRIu64 " %" PRIu64 " %s %s %s%s%s",
vp->hash_type, device_block_path(tgt->data_device),
device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.hash_device),
vp->data_block_size, vp->hash_block_size,
vp->data_size, tgt->u.verity.hash_offset,
vp->hash_name, hexroot, hexsalt, features, fec_features,
verity_verify_args);
vp->hash_name, hexroot, hexsalt, features, fec_features);
if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
crypt_safe_free(params);
params = NULL;
@@ -912,11 +866,6 @@ static char *get_dm_integrity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags
strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
}
if (tgt->u.integrity.fix_padding) {
num_options++;
snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "fix_padding ");
strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
}
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE) {
num_options++;
@@ -924,12 +873,6 @@ static char *get_dm_integrity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags
strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
}
if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) {
num_options++;
snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "allow_discards ");
strncat(features, feature, sizeof(features) - strlen(features) - 1);
}
if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
num_options++;
snprintf(feature, sizeof(feature), "meta_device:%s ",
@@ -979,16 +922,6 @@ static char *get_dm_linear_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
return params;
}
static char *get_dm_zero_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
{
char *params = crypt_safe_alloc(1);
if (!params)
return NULL;
params[0] = 0;
return params;
}
/* DM helpers */
static int _dm_remove(const char *name, int udev_wait, int deferred)
{
@@ -1262,9 +1195,6 @@ static int _add_dm_targets(struct dm_task *dmt, struct crypt_dm_active_device *d
case DM_LINEAR:
target = DM_LINEAR_TARGET;
break;
case DM_ZERO:
target = DM_ZERO_TARGET;
break;
default:
return -ENOTSUP;
}
@@ -1303,8 +1233,6 @@ static int _create_dm_targets_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
tgt->params = get_dm_integrity_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
else if (tgt->type == DM_LINEAR)
tgt->params = get_dm_linear_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
else if (tgt->type == DM_ZERO)
tgt->params = get_dm_zero_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
else {
r = -ENOTSUP;
goto err;
@@ -1323,12 +1251,6 @@ err:
return r;
}
static bool dm_device_exists(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
{
int r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
return (r >= 0 || r == -EEXIST);
}
static int _dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *type,
const char *uuid, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
{
@@ -1378,11 +1300,8 @@ static int _dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const ch
if (_dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
goto out;
if (!dm_task_run(dmt)) {
if (dm_device_exists(cd, name))
r = -EEXIST;
if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
goto out;
}
if (dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
r = 0;
@@ -1535,13 +1454,10 @@ static void _dm_target_free_query_path(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target
crypt_free_verity_params(tgt->u.verity.vp);
device_free(cd, tgt->u.verity.hash_device);
free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc);
/* fall through */
case DM_LINEAR:
/* fall through */
case DM_ERROR:
/* fall through */
case DM_ZERO:
break;
default:
log_err(cd, _("Unknown dm target type."));
@@ -1606,7 +1522,7 @@ static int check_retry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t *dmd_flags, uint32_t dm
/* If kernel keyring is not supported load key directly in dm-crypt */
if ((*dmd_flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) &&
!(dmt_flags & DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED)) {
log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt does not support kernel keyring");
log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt doesn't support kernel keyring");
*dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
ret = 1;
}
@@ -1614,19 +1530,11 @@ static int check_retry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t *dmd_flags, uint32_t dm
/* Drop performance options if not supported */
if ((*dmd_flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)) &&
!(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED | DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED))) {
log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt does not support performance options");
log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt doesn't support performance options");
*dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~(CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS);
ret = 1;
}
/* Drop no workqueue options if not supported */
if ((*dmd_flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE)) &&
!(dmt_flags & DM_CRYPT_NO_WORKQUEUE_SUPPORTED)) {
log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt does not support performance options");
*dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~(CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE);
ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
@@ -1648,22 +1556,14 @@ int dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
if (r < 0 && dm_flags(cd, dmd->segment.type, &dmt_flags))
goto out;
if (r && (dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT || dmd->segment.type == DM_LINEAR || dmd->segment.type == DM_ZERO) &&
check_retry(cd, &dmd->flags, dmt_flags)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Retrying open without incompatible options.");
if (r && (dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT || dmd->segment.type == DM_LINEAR) && check_retry(cd, &dmd->flags, dmt_flags))
r = _dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd->uuid, dmd);
}
if (r == -EINVAL &&
dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) &&
!(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED|DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED)))
log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
if (r == -EINVAL &&
dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE) &&
!(dmt_flags & DM_CRYPT_NO_WORKQUEUE_SUPPORTED))
log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION|
CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION|
CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS|
@@ -1671,10 +1571,6 @@ int dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
!(dmt_flags & DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED))
log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."));
if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION &&
!(dmt_flags & DM_VERITY_PANIC_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED))
log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."));
if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_VERITY &&
dmd->segment.u.verity.fec_device && !(dmt_flags & DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED))
log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."));
@@ -1690,10 +1586,6 @@ int dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
!(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED))
log_err(cd, _("Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."));
if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
!(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED))
log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP) &&
!(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_SUPPORTED))
log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-integrity bitmap mode is not supported."));
@@ -1721,17 +1613,11 @@ int dm_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
if (r == -EINVAL && (dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT || dmd->segment.type == DM_LINEAR)) {
if ((dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)) &&
!dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED | DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED)))
log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
if ((dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE)) &&
!dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_CRYPT_NO_WORKQUEUE_SUPPORTED))
!dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED|DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED)))
log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
!dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED))
log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
!dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED))
log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
}
if (!r && resume)
@@ -1769,7 +1655,6 @@ static int dm_status_dmi(const char *name, struct dm_info *dmi,
goto out;
}
r = -EEXIST;
dm_get_next_target(dmt, NULL, &start, &length,
&target_type, &params);
@@ -1784,7 +1669,6 @@ static int dm_status_dmi(const char *name, struct dm_info *dmi,
strcmp(target_type, DM_VERITY_TARGET) &&
strcmp(target_type, DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET) &&
strcmp(target_type, DM_LINEAR_TARGET) &&
strcmp(target_type, DM_ZERO_TARGET) &&
strcmp(target_type, DM_ERROR_TARGET)))
goto out;
r = 0;
@@ -1968,12 +1852,6 @@ static int _dm_target_query_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t get_flags,
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "submit_from_crypt_cpus"))
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "no_read_workqueue"))
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE;
else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "no_write_workqueue"))
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE;
else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "iv_large_sectors"))
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS;
else if (sscanf(arg, "integrity:%u:", &val) == 1) {
tgt->u.crypt.tag_size = val;
rintegrity = strchr(arg + strlen("integrity:"), ':');
@@ -2079,7 +1957,6 @@ static int _dm_target_query_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
int r;
struct device *data_device = NULL, *hash_device = NULL, *fec_device = NULL;
char *hash_name = NULL, *root_hash = NULL, *salt = NULL, *fec_dev_str = NULL;
char *root_hash_sig_key_desc = NULL;
if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS) {
vp = crypt_zalloc(sizeof(*vp));
@@ -2222,8 +2099,6 @@ static int _dm_target_query_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "restart_on_corruption"))
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION;
else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "panic_on_corruption"))
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION;
else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "ignore_zero_blocks"))
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS;
else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "check_at_most_once"))
@@ -2265,15 +2140,6 @@ static int _dm_target_query_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (vp)
vp->fec_roots = val32;
i++;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "root_hash_sig_key_desc")) {
str = strsep(&params, " ");
if (!str)
goto err;
if (!root_hash_sig_key_desc)
root_hash_sig_key_desc = strdup(str);
i++;
if (vp)
vp->flags |= CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE;
} else /* unknown option */
goto err;
}
@@ -2299,15 +2165,11 @@ static int _dm_target_query_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
vp->salt = salt;
if (vp && fec_dev_str)
vp->fec_device = fec_dev_str;
if (root_hash_sig_key_desc)
tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc = root_hash_sig_key_desc;
return 0;
err:
device_free(cd, data_device);
device_free(cd, hash_device);
device_free(cd, fec_device);
free(root_hash_sig_key_desc);
free(root_hash);
free(hash_name);
free(salt);
@@ -2472,10 +2334,6 @@ static int _dm_target_query_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
}
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "recalculate")) {
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "fix_padding")) {
tgt->u.integrity.fix_padding = true;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "allow_discards")) {
*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
} else /* unknown option */
goto err;
}
@@ -2558,14 +2416,6 @@ static int _dm_target_query_error(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt
return 0;
}
static int _dm_target_query_zero(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
{
tgt->type = DM_ZERO;
tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
return 0;
}
/*
* on error retval has to be negative
*
@@ -2587,8 +2437,6 @@ static int dm_target_query(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt, const
r = _dm_target_query_linear(cd, tgt, get_flags, params);
else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_ERROR_TARGET))
r = _dm_target_query_error(cd, tgt);
else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_ZERO_TARGET))
r = _dm_target_query_zero(cd, tgt);
if (!r) {
tgt->offset = *start;
@@ -2671,9 +2519,6 @@ static int _dm_query_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
if (dmi.read_only)
dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
if (dmi.suspended)
dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED;
tmp_uuid = dm_task_get_uuid(dmt);
if (!tmp_uuid)
dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_UUID;
@@ -2721,7 +2566,6 @@ int dm_query_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
static int _process_deps(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *prefix, struct dm_deps *deps, char **names, size_t names_offset, size_t names_length)
{
#if HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_GET_NAME
struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
char dmname[PATH_MAX];
unsigned i;
@@ -2760,9 +2604,6 @@ static int _process_deps(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *prefix, struct dm_
}
return count;
#else
return -EINVAL;
#endif
}
int dm_device_deps(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *prefix, char **names, size_t names_length)
@@ -3000,8 +2841,8 @@ err:
int dm_verity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
struct device *data_device, struct device *hash_device, struct device *fec_device,
const char *root_hash, uint32_t root_hash_size, const char *root_hash_sig_key_desc,
uint64_t hash_offset_block, uint64_t hash_blocks, struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
const char *root_hash, uint32_t root_hash_size, uint64_t hash_offset_block,
uint64_t hash_blocks, struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
{
if (!data_device || !hash_device || !vp)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -3016,7 +2857,6 @@ int dm_verity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t se
tgt->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
tgt->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size = root_hash_size;
tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc = root_hash_sig_key_desc;
tgt->u.verity.hash_offset = hash_offset_block;
tgt->u.verity.fec_offset = vp->fec_area_offset / vp->hash_block_size;
tgt->u.verity.hash_blocks = hash_blocks;
@@ -3025,21 +2865,16 @@ int dm_verity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t se
return 0;
}
int dm_integrity_target_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
int dm_integrity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
struct device *meta_device,
struct device *data_device, uint64_t tag_size, uint64_t offset,
uint32_t sector_size, struct volume_key *vk,
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key, struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
const struct crypt_params_integrity *ip)
{
uint32_t dmi_flags;
if (!data_device)
return -EINVAL;
_dm_check_versions(cd, DM_INTEGRITY);
tgt->type = DM_INTEGRITY;
tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
tgt->offset = seg_offset;
@@ -3055,11 +2890,6 @@ int dm_integrity_target_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key = journal_mac_key;
if (!dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) &&
(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED) &&
!(crypt_get_compatibility(cd) & CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING))
tgt->u.integrity.fix_padding = true;
if (ip) {
tgt->u.integrity.journal_size = ip->journal_size;
tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark = ip->journal_watermark;
@@ -3090,13 +2920,3 @@ int dm_linear_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t se
return 0;
}
int dm_zero_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size)
{
tgt->type = DM_ZERO;
tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
tgt->offset = seg_offset;
tgt->size = seg_size;
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* loop-AES compatible volume handling
*
* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static int hash_keys(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *hash_name;
char tweak, *key_ptr;
unsigned int i;
int r = 0;
int r;
hash_name = hash_override ?: get_hash(key_len_output);
tweak = get_tweak(keys_count);
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ int LOOPAES_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (r < 0 && !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) &&
(dmc_flags & req_flags) != req_flags) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support loop-AES compatible mapping."));
log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."));
r = -ENOTSUP;
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* loop-AES compatible volume handling
*
* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
* therefore supporting secure data destruction.

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
* therefore supporting secure data destruction.

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include "luks.h"
@@ -88,7 +89,7 @@ static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
r = device_block_adjust(ctx, crypt_metadata_device(ctx), DEV_OK,
sector, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(ctx, _("Device %s does not exist or access denied."),
log_err(ctx, _("Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."),
device_path(crypt_metadata_device(ctx)));
return -EIO;
}
@@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
return -EINVAL;
/* Encrypt buffer */
r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength, false);
r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
if (r)
log_dbg(ctx, "Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
@@ -218,7 +219,7 @@ int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
if (MISALIGNED_512(dstLength))
return -EINVAL;
r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength, false);
r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
if (r)
log_dbg(ctx, "Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2013-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2013-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -259,7 +260,7 @@ int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
r = 0;
out:
crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
crypt_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
crypt_safe_free(buffer);
return r;
}
@@ -283,7 +284,7 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
buffer_size = LUKS_device_sectors(&hdr_file) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
if (r || buffer_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
log_err(ctx, _("Backup file does not contain valid LUKS header."));
log_err(ctx, _("Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."));
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -452,7 +453,7 @@ out:
if (r)
log_err(ctx, _("Repair failed."));
crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
crypt_safe_memzero(&temp_phdr, sizeof(temp_phdr));
crypt_memzero(&temp_phdr, sizeof(temp_phdr));
return r;
}
@@ -691,7 +692,7 @@ int LUKS_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *ctx, size_t keylength, const char *ci
r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(buf, sizeof(buf), cipher, cipher_mode, empty_key, 0, ctx);
crypt_free_volume_key(empty_key);
crypt_safe_memzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
crypt_memzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return r;
}
@@ -786,15 +787,10 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
return r;
assert(pbkdf->iterations);
if (pbkdf->flags & CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK && pbkdf->time_ms == 0)
PBKDF2_temp = LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN;
else /* iterations per ms * LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS */
PBKDF2_temp = (double)pbkdf->iterations * LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS / pbkdf->time_ms;
PBKDF2_temp = (double)pbkdf->iterations * LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS / pbkdf->time_ms;
if (PBKDF2_temp > (double)UINT32_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
header->mkDigestIterations = at_least((uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp, LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN);
assert(header->mkDigestIterations);
r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, header->hashSpec, vk->key,vk->keylength,
header->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
@@ -986,10 +982,8 @@ static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
derived_key->key, hdr->keyBytes,
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations, 0, 0);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open keyslot (using hash %s)."), hdr->hashSpec);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
}
log_dbg(ctx, "Reading key slot %d area.", keyIndex);
r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(AfKey,
@@ -1230,7 +1224,7 @@ int LUKS_wipe_header_areas(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
int LUKS_keyslot_pbkdf(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
{
if (LUKS_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
if (keyslot >= LUKS_NUMKEYS || keyslot < 0)
return -EINVAL;
pbkdf->type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int LUKS2_check_metadata_area_size(uint64_t metadata_size);
int LUKS2_check_keyslots_area_size(uint64_t keyslots_size);
int LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr, bool detached_header);
struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
uint64_t LUKS2_get_data_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
int LUKS2_get_data_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint64_t *size, bool *dynamic);
@@ -600,8 +600,7 @@ int LUKS2_assembly_multisegment_dmd(struct crypt_device *cd,
crypt_reencrypt_info LUKS2_reencrypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
int crypt_reencrypt_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_lock_handle **reencrypt_lock);
int crypt_reencrypt_lock_by_dm_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *dm_uuid, struct crypt_lock_handle **reencrypt_lock);
int crypt_reencrypt_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid, struct crypt_lock_handle **reencrypt_lock);
void crypt_reencrypt_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock);
int luks2_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint64_t check_size, uint64_t *dev_size, bool activation, bool dynamic);

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, digest handling
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, PBKDF2 digest handler (LUKS1 compatible)
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct crypt_device *cd,
}
if (secondary && (offset != be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size))) {
log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04x in secondary header does not match size 0x%04x.",
log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04x in secondary header doesn't match size 0x%04x.",
(unsigned)offset, (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size));
return -EINVAL;
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#define _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_INTERNAL_H
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <json-c/json.h>

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS2 header format code
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ err:
}
int LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr, bool detached_header)
struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
{
int r;
uint64_t offset, length;
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(struct crypt_device *cd,
return -EINVAL;
/* On detached header wipe at least the first 4k */
if (detached_header) {
if (length == 0) {
length = 4096;
wipe_block = 4096;
}

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Ondrej Kozina
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ void hexprint_base64(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj,
&buf, &buf_len))
return;
for (i = 0; i < buf_len; i++) {
if (i && !(i % 16))
log_std(cd, "\n\t%s", line_sep);
for (i = 0; i < buf_len / 2; i++)
log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", buf[i], sep);
log_std(cd, "\n\t%s", line_sep);
for (i = buf_len / 2; i < buf_len; i++)
log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", buf[i], sep);
}
log_std(cd, "\n");
free(buf);
}
@@ -459,12 +459,12 @@ static int hdr_validate_json_size(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj
json_size = (uint64_t)strlen(json);
if (hdr_json_size != json_area_size) {
log_dbg(cd, "JSON area size does not match value in binary header.");
log_dbg(cd, "JSON area size doesn't match value in binary header.");
return 1;
}
if (json_size > json_area_size) {
log_dbg(cd, "JSON does not fit in the designated area.");
log_dbg(cd, "JSON doesn't fit in the designated area.");
return 1;
}
@@ -594,9 +594,9 @@ static bool validate_segment_intervals(struct crypt_device *cd,
static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
{
json_object *jobj_segments, *jobj_digests, *jobj_offset, *jobj_size, *jobj_type, *jobj_flags, *jobj;
struct interval *intervals;
uint64_t offset, size;
int i, r, count, first_backup = -1;
struct interval *intervals = NULL;
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Missing segments section.");
@@ -676,18 +676,10 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
return 1;
}
/* avoid needlessly large allocation when first backup segment is invalid */
if (first_backup >= count) {
log_dbg(cd, "Gap between last regular segment and backup segment at key %d.", first_backup);
return 1;
}
if (first_backup < 0)
first_backup = count;
if ((size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals))
intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
if (!intervals) {
log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
return 1;
@@ -978,16 +970,13 @@ int LUKS2_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int repair)
return r;
}
static int hdr_cleanup_and_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
{
LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(cd, hdr);
return LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
}
int LUKS2_hdr_write_force(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
{
if (hdr_cleanup_and_validate(cd, hdr))
/* NOTE: is called before LUKS2 validation routines */
/* erase unused digests (no assigned keyslot or segment) */
LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(cd, hdr);
if (LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN))
return -EINVAL;
return LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(cd, hdr, crypt_metadata_device(cd), false);
@@ -995,7 +984,11 @@ int LUKS2_hdr_write_force(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
int LUKS2_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
{
if (hdr_cleanup_and_validate(cd, hdr))
/* NOTE: is called before LUKS2 validation routines */
/* erase unused digests (no assigned keyslot or segment) */
LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(cd, hdr);
if (LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN))
return -EINVAL;
return LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(cd, hdr, crypt_metadata_device(cd), true);
@@ -1166,7 +1159,7 @@ int LUKS2_hdr_restore(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
device_free(cd, backup_device);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("Backup file does not contain valid LUKS header."));
log_err(cd, _("Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."));
goto out;
}
@@ -1277,8 +1270,8 @@ out:
LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, hdr);
LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &hdr_file);
LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &tmp_hdr);
crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr_file, sizeof(hdr_file));
crypt_safe_memzero(&tmp_hdr, sizeof(tmp_hdr));
crypt_memzero(&hdr_file, sizeof(hdr_file));
crypt_memzero(&tmp_hdr, sizeof(tmp_hdr));
crypt_safe_free(buffer);
device_sync(cd, device);
@@ -1297,8 +1290,6 @@ static const struct {
{ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT, "same-cpu-crypt" },
{ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS, "submit-from-crypt-cpus" },
{ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL, "no-journal" },
{ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, "no-read-workqueue" },
{ CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, "no-write-workqueue" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
@@ -2166,12 +2157,7 @@ int LUKS2_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
return -EINVAL;
}
if (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) {
log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
return -EINVAL;
}
r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &dmdi, dmd.flags, 0);
r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &dmdi, dmd.flags);
if (r)
return r;
@@ -2219,21 +2205,26 @@ int LUKS2_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, struct luks2_hdr
struct dm_target *tgt;
crypt_status_info ci;
struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdc;
char **dep, deps_uuid_prefix[40], *deps[MAX_DM_DEPS+1] = { 0 };
char **dep, uuid[37], deps_uuid_prefix[40], *deps[MAX_DM_DEPS+1] = { 0 };
const char *namei = NULL;
struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock = NULL;
if (!dmd || !dmd->uuid || strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, dmd->uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS2)-1))
return -EINVAL;
/* uuid mismatch with metadata (if available) */
if (hdr && crypt_uuid_cmp(dmd->uuid, hdr->uuid))
if (!dmd || !dmd->uuid)
return -EINVAL;
r = snprintf(deps_uuid_prefix, sizeof(deps_uuid_prefix), CRYPT_SUBDEV "-%.32s", dmd->uuid + 6);
if (r < 0 || (size_t)r != (sizeof(deps_uuid_prefix) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
r = snprintf(uuid, sizeof(uuid), "%.8s-%.4s-%.4s-%.4s-%.12s",
dmd->uuid + 6, dmd->uuid + 14, dmd->uuid + 18, dmd->uuid + 22, dmd->uuid + 26);
if (r < 0 || (size_t)r != (sizeof(uuid) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
/* uuid mismatch with metadata (if available) */
if (hdr && strcmp(hdr->uuid, uuid))
return -EINVAL;
tgt = &dmd->segment;
/* TODO: We have LUKS2 dependencies now */
@@ -2245,7 +2236,7 @@ int LUKS2_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, struct luks2_hdr
goto out;
if (contains_reencryption_helper(deps)) {
r = crypt_reencrypt_lock_by_dm_uuid(cd, dmd->uuid, &reencrypt_lock);
r = crypt_reencrypt_lock(cd, uuid, &reencrypt_lock);
if (r) {
if (r == -EBUSY)
log_err(cd, _("Reencryption in-progress. Cannot deactivate device."));
@@ -2354,9 +2345,9 @@ int LUKS2_unmet_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uin
reqs &= ~reqs_mask;
if (reqs_reencrypt(reqs) && !quiet)
log_err(cd, _("Operation incompatible with device marked for legacy reencryption. Aborting."));
log_err(cd, _("Offline reencryption in progress. Aborting."));
if (reqs_reencrypt_online(reqs) && !quiet)
log_err(cd, _("Operation incompatible with device marked for LUKS2 reencryption. Aborting."));
log_err(cd, _("Online reencryption in progress. Aborting."));
/* any remaining unmasked requirement fails the check */
return reqs ? -EINVAL : 0;
@@ -2409,7 +2400,7 @@ int json_object_object_add_by_uint(json_object *jobj, unsigned key, json_object
#endif
}
/* jobj_dst must contain pointer initialized to NULL (see json-c json_object_deep_copy API) */
/* jobj_dst must contain pointer initialised to NULL (see json-c json_object_deep_copy API) */
int json_object_copy(json_object *jobj_src, json_object **jobj_dst)
{
if (!jobj_src || !jobj_dst || *jobj_dst)

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, keyslot handling
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ extern const keyslot_handler reenc_keyslot;
static const keyslot_handler *keyslot_handlers[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX] = {
&luks2_keyslot,
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
&reenc_keyslot,
#endif
NULL
};
@@ -79,18 +81,19 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
/* Check if a keyslot is assigned to specific segment */
static int _keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment)
{
int keyslot_digest, count = 0;
unsigned s;
int keyslot_digest, segment_digest, s, count = 0;
keyslot_digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot);
if (keyslot_digest < 0)
return keyslot_digest;
if (segment >= 0)
return keyslot_digest == LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, segment);
for (s = 0; s < json_segments_count(LUKS2_get_segments_jobj(hdr)); s++) {
if (keyslot_digest == LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, s))
if (segment >= 0) {
segment_digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, segment);
return segment_digest == keyslot_digest;
}
for (s = 0; s < 3; s++) {
segment_digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, s);
if (segment_digest == keyslot_digest)
count++;
}
@@ -309,16 +312,28 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
return 0;
}
static int _open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
static int LUKS2_open_and_verify_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
const keyslot_handler *h,
int keyslot,
int digest,
const char *password,
size_t password_len,
struct volume_key **vk)
{
int r, key_size = LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(hdr, keyslot);
const keyslot_handler *h;
int key_size, r;
if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
return -ENOENT;
r = _keyslot_for_digest(hdr, keyslot, digest);
if (r) {
if (r == -ENOENT)
log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d unusable for digest %d.", keyslot, digest);
return r;
}
key_size = LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(hdr, keyslot);
if (key_size < 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -337,41 +352,9 @@ static int _open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
*vk = NULL;
}
crypt_volume_key_set_id(*vk, r);
return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
}
static int LUKS2_open_and_verify_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
int keyslot,
int digest,
const char *password,
size_t password_len,
struct volume_key **vk)
{
const keyslot_handler *h;
int r;
if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
return -ENOENT;
r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
if (r) {
log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d validation failed.", keyslot);
return r;
}
r = _keyslot_for_digest(hdr, keyslot, digest);
if (r) {
if (r == -ENOENT)
log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d unusable for digest %d.", keyslot, digest);
return r;
}
return _open_and_verify(cd, hdr, h, keyslot, password, password_len, vk);
}
static int LUKS2_open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
int keyslot,
@@ -381,7 +364,7 @@ static int LUKS2_open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct volume_key **vk)
{
const keyslot_handler *h;
int r;
int key_size, r;
if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
return -ENOENT;
@@ -399,7 +382,29 @@ static int LUKS2_open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
return r;
}
return _open_and_verify(cd, hdr, h, keyslot, password, password_len, vk);
key_size = LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(hdr, segment);
if (key_size < 0)
key_size = LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(hdr, keyslot);
if (key_size < 0)
return -EINVAL;
*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
if (!*vk)
return -ENOMEM;
r = h->open(cd, keyslot, password, password_len, (*vk)->key, (*vk)->keylength);
if (r < 0)
log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d (%s) open failed with %d.", keyslot, h->name, r);
else
r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, *vk, keyslot);
if (r < 0) {
crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
*vk = NULL;
} else
crypt_volume_key_set_id(*vk, r);
return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
}
static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -517,7 +522,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_open_all_segments(struct crypt_device *cd,
size_t password_len,
struct volume_key **vks)
{
struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
struct volume_key *vk;
int digest_old, digest_new, r = -EINVAL;
struct luks2_hdr *hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
@@ -527,6 +532,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_open_all_segments(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_digest(cd, hdr, keyslot_old, digest_old, password, password_len, &vk);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
crypt_volume_key_set_id(vk, digest_old);
crypt_volume_key_add_next(vks, vk);
}
@@ -536,6 +542,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_open_all_segments(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_digest(cd, hdr, keyslot_new, digest_new, password, password_len, &vk);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
crypt_volume_key_set_id(vk, digest_new);
crypt_volume_key_add_next(vks, vk);
}
out:

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS2 type keyslot handler
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static int luks2_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
return -EINVAL;
/* Encrypt buffer */
r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength, false);
r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
if (r) {
log_err(cd, _("Cannot use %s-%s cipher for keyslot encryption."), cipher, cipher_mode);
return r;
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static int luks2_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
if (MISALIGNED_512(dstLength))
return -EINVAL;
r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength, false);
r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
if (r) {
log_err(cd, _("Cannot use %s-%s cipher for keyslot encryption."), cipher, cipher_mode);
return r;

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, reencryption keyslot handler
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020, Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Ondrej Kozina
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS1 conversion code
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ static int move_keyslot_areas(struct crypt_device *cd, off_t offset_from,
r = 0;
out:
device_sync(cd, device);
crypt_safe_memzero(buf, buf_size);
crypt_memzero(buf, buf_size);
free(buf);
return r;
@@ -578,12 +578,6 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
goto out;
}
/* check future LUKS2 metadata before moving keyslots area */
if (LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr2->jobj, hdr2->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN)) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = luks_header_in_use(cd))) {
if (r > 0)
r = -EBUSY;
@@ -675,7 +669,7 @@ static int keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *h
int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct luks_phdr *hdr1)
{
size_t buf_size, buf_offset;
char cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L], cipher_mode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
char cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1], cipher_mode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1];
char digest[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE], digest_salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
const char *hash;
size_t len;
@@ -824,10 +818,8 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
if (r < 0)
return r;
strncpy(hdr1->cipherName, cipher, LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L - 1);
hdr1->cipherName[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1] = '\0';
strncpy(hdr1->cipherMode, cipher_mode, LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L - 1);
hdr1->cipherMode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1] = '\0';
strncpy(hdr1->cipherName, cipher, sizeof(hdr1->cipherName) - 1);
strncpy(hdr1->cipherMode, cipher_mode, sizeof(hdr1->cipherMode) - 1);
if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf))
return -EINVAL;

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, reencryption helpers
*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2020, Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019, Ondrej Kozina
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include "luks2_internal.h"
#include "utils_device_locking.h"
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
static json_object *reencrypt_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, unsigned new)
{
return LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, new ? "backup-final" : "backup-previous");
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ static uint64_t reencrypt_get_data_offset_old(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
{
return reencrypt_data_offset(hdr, 0);
}
#endif
static int reencrypt_digest(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, unsigned new)
{
int segment = LUKS2_get_segment_id_by_flag(hdr, new ? "backup-final" : "backup-previous");
@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@ static const char *reencrypt_resilience_hash(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
return json_object_get_string(jobj_hash);
}
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
static uint32_t reencrypt_alignment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
{
json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj_type, *jobj_hash, *jobj_sector_size;
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int reencrypt_make_post_segments(struct crypt_device *cd,
return rh->jobj_segs_post ? 0 : -EINVAL;
}
#endif
static uint64_t reencrypt_data_shift(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
{
json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj_data_shift;
@@ -666,7 +667,7 @@ void LUKS2_reenc_context_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_reenc_contex
crypt_unlock_internal(cd, rh->reenc_lock);
free(rh);
}
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
static size_t reencrypt_get_alignment(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
{
@@ -1401,12 +1402,12 @@ static int reencrypt_recover_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
log_dbg(cd, "Failed to read journaled data.");
r = -EIO;
/* may content plaintext */
crypt_safe_memzero(data_buffer, rh->length);
crypt_memzero(data_buffer, rh->length);
goto out;
}
read = crypt_storage_wrapper_encrypt_write(cw2, 0, data_buffer, rh->length);
/* may content plaintext */
crypt_safe_memzero(data_buffer, rh->length);
crypt_memzero(data_buffer, rh->length);
if (read < 0 || (size_t)read != rh->length) {
log_dbg(cd, "recovery write failed.");
r = -EINVAL;
@@ -1436,13 +1437,13 @@ static int reencrypt_recover_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
log_dbg(cd, "Failed to read data.");
r = -EIO;
/* may content plaintext */
crypt_safe_memzero(data_buffer, rh->length);
crypt_memzero(data_buffer, rh->length);
goto out;
}
read = crypt_storage_wrapper_encrypt_write(cw2, 0, data_buffer, rh->length);
/* may content plaintext */
crypt_safe_memzero(data_buffer, rh->length);
crypt_memzero(data_buffer, rh->length);
if (read < 0 || (size_t)read != rh->length) {
log_dbg(cd, "recovery write failed.");
r = -EINVAL;
@@ -2531,7 +2532,7 @@ static int reencrypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
else if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH)
r = reencrypt_load_crashed(cd, hdr, device_size, &tmp);
else if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
log_err(cd, _("Device not marked for LUKS2 reencryption."));
log_err(cd, _("No LUKS2 reencryption in progress."));
return -EINVAL;
} else
r = -EINVAL;
@@ -2545,11 +2546,22 @@ static int reencrypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
return 0;
}
static int reencrypt_lock_internal(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid, struct crypt_lock_handle **reencrypt_lock)
#endif
/* internal only */
int crypt_reencrypt_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid, struct crypt_lock_handle **reencrypt_lock)
{
int r;
char *lock_resource;
const char *tmp = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
if (!tmp && !uuid)
return -EINVAL;
if (!uuid)
uuid = tmp;
if (!tmp)
tmp = uuid;
if (strcmp(uuid, tmp))
return -EINVAL;
if (!crypt_metadata_locking_enabled()) {
*reencrypt_lock = NULL;
@@ -2571,42 +2583,12 @@ out:
return r;
}
/* internal only */
int crypt_reencrypt_lock_by_dm_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *dm_uuid, struct crypt_lock_handle **reencrypt_lock)
{
int r;
char hdr_uuid[37];
const char *uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
if (!dm_uuid)
return -EINVAL;
if (!uuid) {
r = snprintf(hdr_uuid, sizeof(hdr_uuid), "%.8s-%.4s-%.4s-%.4s-%.12s",
dm_uuid + 6, dm_uuid + 14, dm_uuid + 18, dm_uuid + 22, dm_uuid + 26);
if (r < 0 || (size_t)r != (sizeof(hdr_uuid) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
} else if (crypt_uuid_cmp(dm_uuid, uuid))
return -EINVAL;
return reencrypt_lock_internal(cd, uuid, reencrypt_lock);
}
/* internal only */
int crypt_reencrypt_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_lock_handle **reencrypt_lock)
{
if (!cd || !crypt_get_type(cd) || strcmp(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2))
return -EINVAL;
return reencrypt_lock_internal(cd, crypt_get_uuid(cd), reencrypt_lock);
}
/* internal only */
void crypt_reencrypt_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock)
{
crypt_unlock_internal(cd, reencrypt_lock);
}
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
static int reencrypt_lock_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
struct crypt_lock_handle **reencrypt_lock)
{
@@ -2624,7 +2606,7 @@ static int reencrypt_lock_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *
return -EINVAL;
}
r = crypt_reencrypt_lock(cd, &h);
r = crypt_reencrypt_lock(cd, NULL, &h);
if (r < 0) {
if (r == -EBUSY)
log_err(cd, _("Reencryption process is already running."));
@@ -2828,7 +2810,7 @@ static int reencrypt_recovery_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock;
r = crypt_reencrypt_lock(cd, &reencrypt_lock);
r = crypt_reencrypt_lock(cd, NULL, &reencrypt_lock);
if (r) {
if (r == -EBUSY)
log_err(cd, _("Reencryption in-progress. Cannot perform recovery."));
@@ -2861,7 +2843,7 @@ static int reencrypt_recovery_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
crypt_reencrypt_unlock(cd, reencrypt_lock);
return r;
}
#endif
static int reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *passphrase,
@@ -2872,6 +2854,7 @@ static int reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *cipher_mode,
const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
{
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
int r;
crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
struct volume_key *vks = NULL;
@@ -2882,7 +2865,7 @@ static int reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (flags & CRYPT_REENCRYPT_RECOVERY)
return reencrypt_recovery_by_passphrase(cd, hdr, keyslot_old, keyslot_new, passphrase, passphrase_size);
if (cipher && !crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher, cipher_mode)) {
if (cipher) {
r = crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(cd, keyslot_new);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -2927,6 +2910,10 @@ out:
crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vks);
crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
return r < 0 ? r : LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
#else
log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
return -ENOTSUP;
#endif
}
int crypt_reencrypt_init_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -2955,7 +2942,7 @@ int crypt_reencrypt_init_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, keyslot_old, keyslot_new, cipher, cipher_mode, params);
crypt_safe_memzero(passphrase, passphrase_size);
crypt_memzero(passphrase, passphrase_size);
free(passphrase);
return r;
@@ -2979,6 +2966,7 @@ int crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
return reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, keyslot_old, keyslot_new, cipher, cipher_mode, params);
}
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
static reenc_status_t reencrypt_step(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
struct luks2_reenc_context *rh,
@@ -3219,10 +3207,11 @@ static int reencrypt_teardown(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
return r;
}
#endif
int crypt_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd,
int (*progress)(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr))
{
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
int r;
crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
@@ -3280,8 +3269,12 @@ int crypt_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = reencrypt_teardown(cd, hdr, rh, rs, quit, progress);
return r;
#else
log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
return -ENOTSUP;
#endif
}
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
static int reencrypt_recovery(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
uint64_t device_size,
@@ -3317,7 +3310,7 @@ err:
return r;
}
#endif
/*
* use only for calculation of minimal data device size.
* The real data offset is taken directly from segments!
@@ -3332,7 +3325,7 @@ int LUKS2_reencrypt_data_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, bool blockwise)
return blockwise ? data_offset : data_offset << SECTOR_SHIFT;
}
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
/* internal only */
int luks2_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint64_t check_size, uint64_t *dev_size, bool activation, bool dynamic)
{
@@ -3405,7 +3398,7 @@ int LUKS2_reencrypt_locked_recovery_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk));
if (r < 0)
goto err;
vk = crypt_volume_key_next(vk);
vk = vk->next;
}
if (luks2_check_device_size(cd, hdr, minimal_size, &device_size, true, false))
@@ -3422,7 +3415,7 @@ err:
return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
}
#endif
crypt_reencrypt_info LUKS2_reencrypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
{
crypt_reencrypt_info ri;

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, internal segment handling
*
* Copyright (C) 2018-2020, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2018-2020, Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2018-2019, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2018-2019, Ondrej Kozina
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, token handling
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static void LUKS2_token_buffer_free(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (h->buffer_free)
h->buffer_free(buffer, buffer_len);
else {
crypt_safe_memzero(buffer, buffer_len);
crypt_memzero(buffer, buffer_len);
free(buffer);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, kernel keyring token
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* cryptsetup kernel RNG access functions
*
* Copyright (C) 2010-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2010-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <sys/select.h>
@@ -27,6 +28,10 @@
#include "libcryptsetup.h"
#include "internal.h"
#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
#define O_CLOEXEC 0
#endif
static int random_initialised = 0;
#define URANDOM_DEVICE "/dev/urandom"

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <sys/utsname.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "libcryptsetup.h"
@@ -35,7 +36,6 @@
#include "verity.h"
#include "tcrypt.h"
#include "integrity.h"
#include "bitlk.h"
#include "utils_device_locking.h"
#include "internal.h"
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ struct crypt_device {
struct volume_key *volume_key;
int rng_type;
uint32_t compatibility;
struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
/* global context scope settings */
@@ -96,7 +95,7 @@ struct crypt_device {
} loopaes;
struct { /* used in CRYPT_VERITY */
struct crypt_params_verity hdr;
const char *root_hash;
char *root_hash;
unsigned int root_hash_size;
char *uuid;
struct device *fec_device;
@@ -109,12 +108,7 @@ struct crypt_device {
struct crypt_params_integrity params;
struct volume_key *journal_mac_key;
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key;
uint32_t sb_flags;
} integrity;
struct { /* used in CRYPT_BITLK */
struct bitlk_metadata params;
char *cipher_spec;
} bitlk;
struct { /* used if initialized without header by name */
char *active_name;
/* buffers, must refresh from kernel on every query */
@@ -230,7 +224,7 @@ int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx)
return r;
}
r = crypt_backend_init();
r = crypt_backend_init(ctx);
if (r < 0)
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto backend."));
@@ -321,11 +315,6 @@ static int isINTEGRITY(const char *type)
return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_INTEGRITY, type));
}
static int isBITLK(const char *type)
{
return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_BITLK, type));
}
static int _onlyLUKS(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t cdflags)
{
int r = 0;
@@ -583,9 +572,6 @@ int crypt_init(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *device)
return -EINVAL;
log_dbg(NULL, "Allocating context for crypt device %s.", device ?: "(none)");
#if !HAVE_DECL_O_CLOEXEC
log_dbg(NULL, "Running without O_CLOEXEC.");
#endif
if (!(h = malloc(sizeof(struct crypt_device))))
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -740,6 +726,9 @@ out:
free(type);
LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &hdr2);
}
/* FIXME: why? */
crypt_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
return r;
}
@@ -774,7 +763,7 @@ static int _crypt_load_luks(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *requested_type,
if (isLUKS1(requested_type) || version == 1) {
if (cd->type && isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -814,7 +803,7 @@ static int _crypt_load_luks(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *requested_type,
memcpy(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
} else if (isLUKS2(requested_type) || version == 2 || version == 0) {
if (cd->type && isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -833,7 +822,7 @@ static int _crypt_load_luks(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *requested_type,
r = -EINVAL;
}
out:
crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
crypt_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
return r;
}
@@ -897,7 +886,7 @@ static int _crypt_load_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_verit
free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
crypt_safe_memzero(&cd->u.verity.hdr, sizeof(cd->u.verity.hdr));
crypt_memzero(&cd->u.verity.hdr, sizeof(cd->u.verity.hdr));
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -933,7 +922,7 @@ static int _crypt_load_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = INTEGRITY_read_sb(cd, &cd->u.integrity.params, &cd->u.integrity.sb_flags);
r = INTEGRITY_read_sb(cd, &cd->u.integrity.params);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -976,31 +965,6 @@ static int _crypt_load_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
return 0;
}
static int _crypt_load_bitlk(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct bitlk_metadata *params)
{
int r;
r = init_crypto(cd);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = BITLK_read_sb(cd, &cd->u.bitlk.params);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (asprintf(&cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec, "%s-%s",
cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher, cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher_mode) < 0) {
cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_BITLK)))
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *requested_type,
void *params)
@@ -1023,35 +987,29 @@ int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type) || isLUKS2(requested_type)) {
if (cd->type && !isLUKS1(cd->type) && !isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 0);
} else if (isVERITY(requested_type)) {
if (cd->type && !isVERITY(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
r = _crypt_load_verity(cd, params);
} else if (isTCRYPT(requested_type)) {
if (cd->type && !isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
r = _crypt_load_tcrypt(cd, params);
} else if (isINTEGRITY(requested_type)) {
if (cd->type && !isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
r = _crypt_load_integrity(cd, params);
} else if (isBITLK(requested_type)) {
if (cd->type && !isBITLK(cd->type)) {
log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd, params);
} else
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1128,7 +1086,7 @@ static void crypt_free_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_device);
free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device);
free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash);
free(cd->u.verity.root_hash);
free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
device_free(cd, cd->u.verity.fec_device);
} else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
@@ -1137,9 +1095,6 @@ static void crypt_free_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt);
crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key);
crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key);
} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
free(cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec);
BITLK_bitlk_metadata_free(&cd->u.bitlk.params);
} else if (!cd->type) {
free(cd->u.none.active_name);
cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
@@ -1292,13 +1247,6 @@ static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
} else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type) && single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
r = TCRYPT_init_by_name(cd, name, dmd.uuid, tgt, &cd->device,
&cd->u.tcrypt.params, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr);
} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd, NULL);
if (r < 0) {
log_dbg(cd, "BITLK device header not available.");
crypt_set_null_type(cd);
r = 0;
}
}
out:
dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
@@ -1321,7 +1269,6 @@ static int _init_by_name_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
r = dm_query_device(cd, name,
DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE |
DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_ROOT_HASH |
DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS, &dmd);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -1353,7 +1300,6 @@ static int _init_by_name_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = tgt->u.verity.vp->fec_roots;
MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.fec_device, tgt->u.verity.fec_device);
MOVE_REF(cd->metadata_device, tgt->u.verity.hash_device);
MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.root_hash, tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
}
out:
dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
@@ -1467,8 +1413,6 @@ int crypt_init_by_name_and_header(struct crypt_device **cd,
(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_TCRYPT);
else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_INTEGRITY, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGRITY)-1))
(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY);
else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_BITLK, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_BITLK)-1))
(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_BITLK);
else
log_dbg(NULL, "Unknown UUID set, some parameters are not set.");
} else
@@ -1480,7 +1424,7 @@ int crypt_init_by_name_and_header(struct crypt_device **cd,
goto out;
}
/* Try to initialize basic parameters from active device */
/* Try to initialise basic parameters from active device */
if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT || tgt->type == DM_LINEAR)
r = _init_by_name_crypt(*cd, name);
@@ -1874,7 +1818,7 @@ static int _crypt_format_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
goto out;
}
r = LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, cd->metadata_device != NULL);
r = LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
mdata_device_path(cd));
@@ -2146,7 +2090,6 @@ static int _crypt_format_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
{
int r;
uint32_t integrity_tag_size;
char *integrity = NULL, *journal_integrity = NULL, *journal_crypt = NULL;
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key = NULL, *journal_mac_key = NULL;
@@ -2203,14 +2146,6 @@ static int _crypt_format_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
goto err;
}
integrity_tag_size = INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(integrity);
if (integrity_tag_size > 0 && params->tag_size && integrity_tag_size != params->tag_size)
log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Requested tag size %d bytes differs from %s size output (%d bytes).\n"),
params->tag_size, integrity, integrity_tag_size);
if (params->tag_size)
integrity_tag_size = params->tag_size;
cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key = journal_mac_key;
cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size = params->journal_size;
@@ -2219,7 +2154,7 @@ static int _crypt_format_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors = params->interleave_sectors;
cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size = params->sector_size;
cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size = integrity_tag_size;
cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size = params->tag_size;
cd->u.integrity.params.integrity = integrity;
cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
@@ -2766,7 +2701,7 @@ int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
* explicit size stored in metadata (length != "dynamic")
*/
/* Device context type must be initialized */
/* Device context type must be initialised */
if (!cd || !cd->type || !name)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2967,8 +2902,8 @@ int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
else
r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &hdr2, backup_file);
crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr1, sizeof(hdr1));
crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
crypt_memzero(&hdr1, sizeof(hdr1));
crypt_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS2(requested_type))) {
r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, backup_file);
if (r)
@@ -3003,7 +2938,7 @@ void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd)
free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
/* Some structures can contain keys (TCRYPT), wipe it */
crypt_safe_memzero(cd, sizeof(*cd));
crypt_memzero(cd, sizeof(*cd));
free(cd);
}
@@ -3212,7 +3147,7 @@ int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
}
r = dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(cd, name, vk);
if (r < 0)
if (r)
log_err(cd, _("Error during resuming device %s."), name);
out:
crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
@@ -3243,65 +3178,6 @@ int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset);
}
int crypt_resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size)
{
struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
int r;
if (!name || !volume_key)
return -EINVAL;
log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s by volume key.", name);
if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
return r;
r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (!r) {
log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
return -EINVAL;
}
vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
if (!vk)
return -ENOMEM;
if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
else
r = -EINVAL;
if (r == -EPERM || r == -ENOENT)
log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
if (!r)
r = crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(cd, vk);
}
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(cd, name, vk);
if (r < 0)
log_err(cd, _("Error during resuming device %s."), name);
out:
if (r < 0)
crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
return r;
}
/*
* Keyslot manipulation
*/
@@ -3745,7 +3621,7 @@ static int _create_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, iname, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, dmdi, 0);
r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, iname, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, dmdi);
if (r)
return r;
@@ -3767,27 +3643,6 @@ out:
return r;
}
static int kernel_keyring_support(void)
{
static unsigned _checked = 0;
if (!_checked) {
_kernel_keyring_supported = keyring_check();
_checked = 1;
}
return _kernel_keyring_supported;
}
static int dmcrypt_keyring_bug(void)
{
uint64_t kversion;
if (kernel_version(&kversion))
return 1;
return kversion < version(4,15,0,0);
}
int create_or_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
{
@@ -3853,21 +3708,6 @@ out:
return r;
}
static int load_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vks)
{
int r;
struct volume_key *vk = vks;
while (vk) {
r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk));
if (r < 0)
return r;
vk = crypt_volume_key_next(vk);
}
return 0;
}
/* See fixmes in _open_and_activate_luks2 */
int update_reencryption_flag(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable, bool commit);
@@ -3909,6 +3749,22 @@ out:
return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
}
#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
static int load_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vks)
{
int r;
struct volume_key *vk = vks;
while (vk) {
r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk));
if (r < 0)
return r;
vk = vk->next;
}
return 0;
}
static int _open_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
int keyslot,
@@ -3975,7 +3831,7 @@ static int _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
r = crypt_reencrypt_lock(cd, &reencrypt_lock);
r = crypt_reencrypt_lock(cd, NULL, &reencrypt_lock);
if (r) {
if (r == -EBUSY)
log_err(cd, _("Reencryption in-progress. Cannot activate device."));
@@ -4070,6 +3926,28 @@ static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
return r;
}
#else
static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
int keyslot,
const char *name,
const char *passphrase,
size_t passphrase_size,
uint32_t flags)
{
crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
ri = LUKS2_reenc_status(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
return -EINVAL;
if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
return -ENOTSUP;
}
return _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
}
#endif
static int _activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
@@ -4119,12 +3997,8 @@ static int _activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
r = _open_and_activate_luks2(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
keyslot = r;
} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
r = BITLK_activate(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size,
&cd->u.bitlk.params, flags);
keyslot = 0;
} else {
log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialized."));
log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialised."));
r = -EINVAL;
}
out:
@@ -4161,26 +4035,21 @@ static int _activate_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
static int _activate_check_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, unsigned reload)
{
int r;
crypt_status_info ci;
if (!name)
return 0;
r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
if (r >= 0 && reload)
return 0;
if (r >= 0 || r == -EEXIST) {
ci = crypt_status(cd, name);
if (ci == CRYPT_INVALID) {
log_err(cd, _("Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."), name);
return -EINVAL;
} else if (ci >= CRYPT_ACTIVE && !reload) {
log_err(cd, _("Device %s already exists."), name);
return -EEXIST;
}
if (r == -ENODEV)
return 0;
log_err(cd, _("Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."), name);
return r;
return 0;
}
// activation/deactivation of device mapping
@@ -4268,6 +4137,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
return crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot, keyfile,
keyfile_size, keyfile_offset, flags);
}
int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *volume_key,
@@ -4362,7 +4232,25 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (!r && name)
r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
} else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
r = crypt_activate_by_signed_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, NULL, 0, flags);
/* volume_key == root hash */
if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size) {
log_err(cd, _("Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."));
return -EINVAL;
}
r = VERITY_activate(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, cd->u.verity.fec_device,
&cd->u.verity.hdr, flags|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
if (r == -EPERM) {
free(cd->u.verity.root_hash);
cd->u.verity.root_hash = NULL;
} if (!r) {
cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = volume_key_size;
if (!cd->u.verity.root_hash)
cd->u.verity.root_hash = malloc(volume_key_size);
if (cd->u.verity.root_hash)
memcpy(cd->u.verity.root_hash, volume_key, volume_key_size);
}
} else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
if (!name)
return 0;
@@ -4378,10 +4266,9 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
}
r = INTEGRITY_activate(cd, name, &cd->u.integrity.params, vk,
cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key, flags,
cd->u.integrity.sb_flags);
cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key, flags);
} else {
log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialized."));
log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialised."));
r = -EINVAL;
}
@@ -4392,77 +4279,6 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
return r;
}
int crypt_activate_by_signed_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size,
const char *signature,
size_t signature_size,
uint32_t flags)
{
char description[512];
int r;
if (!cd || !isVERITY(cd->type))
return -EINVAL;
if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size || (!name && signature)) {
log_err(cd, _("Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."));
return -EINVAL;
}
log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s by signed key.", name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "");
if (cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE && !signature) {
log_err(cd, _("Root hash signature required."));
return -EINVAL;
}
r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (signature && !kernel_keyring_support()) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel keyring missing: required for passing signature to kernel."));
return -EINVAL;
}
/* volume_key == root hash */
free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash);
cd->u.verity.root_hash = NULL;
if (signature) {
r = snprintf(description, sizeof(description)-1, "cryptsetup:%s%s%s",
crypt_get_uuid(cd) ?: "", crypt_get_uuid(cd) ? "-" : "", name);
if (r < 0)
return -EINVAL;
log_dbg(cd, "Adding signature into keyring %s", description);
r = keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring(USER_KEY, description, signature, signature_size);
if (r) {
log_err(cd, _("Failed to load key in kernel keyring."));
return r;
}
}
r = VERITY_activate(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size,
signature ? description : NULL,
cd->u.verity.fec_device,
&cd->u.verity.hdr, flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
if (!r) {
cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = volume_key_size;
cd->u.verity.root_hash = malloc(volume_key_size);
if (cd->u.verity.root_hash)
memcpy(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash, volume_key, volume_key_size);
}
if (signature)
crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(cd, description, USER_KEY);
return r;
}
int crypt_deactivate_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
{
struct crypt_device *fake_cd = NULL;
@@ -4502,7 +4318,7 @@ int crypt_deactivate_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t
if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
hdr2 = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
if ((dmd.uuid && !strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS2)-1)) || hdr2)
if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, dmd.uuid ?: "", sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS2)-1) || hdr2)
r = LUKS2_deactivate(cd, name, hdr2, &dmd, flags);
else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
r = TCRYPT_deactivate(cd, name, flags);
@@ -4622,7 +4438,7 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
int key_len, r = -EINVAL;
if (!cd || !volume_key || !volume_key_size || (!isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type) && !passphrase))
if (!cd || !volume_key || !volume_key_size || (!isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !passphrase))
return -EINVAL;
if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
@@ -4652,18 +4468,10 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
} else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
r = TCRYPT_get_volume_key(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params, &vk);
} else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
/* volume_key == root hash */
if (cd->u.verity.root_hash) {
memcpy(volume_key, cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
*volume_key_size = cd->u.verity.root_hash_size;
r = 0;
} else
log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve root hash for verity device."));
} else
log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."), cd->type ?: "(none)");
if (r >= 0 && vk) {
if (r >= 0) {
memcpy(volume_key, vk->key, vk->keylength);
*volume_key_size = vk->keylength;
}
@@ -4690,9 +4498,6 @@ int crypt_volume_key_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
else
r = -EINVAL;
if (r == -EPERM)
log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
@@ -4731,20 +4536,6 @@ int crypt_memory_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, int lock)
return lock ? crypt_memlock_inc(cd) : crypt_memlock_dec(cd);
}
void crypt_set_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t flags)
{
if (cd)
cd->compatibility = flags;
}
uint32_t crypt_get_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
if (cd)
return cd->compatibility;
return 0;
}
/*
* Reporting
*/
@@ -4864,8 +4655,6 @@ int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
return TCRYPT_dump(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
return INTEGRITY_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), 0);
else if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return BITLK_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), &cd->u.bitlk.params);
log_err(cd, _("Dump operation is not supported for this device type."));
return -EINVAL;
@@ -4884,8 +4673,6 @@ const char *crypt_get_cipher_spec(struct crypt_device *cd)
return cd->u.plain.cipher_spec;
else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
return cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec;
else if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec;
else if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
return cd->u.none.cipher_spec;
@@ -4916,9 +4703,6 @@ const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd)
if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
return cd->u.tcrypt.params.cipher;
if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher;
if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
return cd->u.none.cipher;
@@ -4949,9 +4733,6 @@ const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd)
if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
return cd->u.tcrypt.params.mode;
if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher_mode;
if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
return cd->u.none.cipher_mode;
@@ -5026,9 +4807,6 @@ const char *crypt_get_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd)
if (isVERITY(cd->type))
return cd->u.verity.uuid;
if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.params.guid;
return NULL;
}
@@ -5089,9 +4867,6 @@ int crypt_get_volume_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
return cd->u.tcrypt.params.key_size;
if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.params.key_size / 8;
if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
return cd->u.none.key_size;
@@ -5273,9 +5048,6 @@ uint64_t crypt_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
return TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
if (isBITLK(cd->type))
return cd->u.bitlk.params.volume_header_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
return cd->data_offset;
}
@@ -5395,7 +5167,7 @@ int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
vp->data_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size;
vp->hash_area_offset = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset;
vp->hash_type = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type;
vp->flags = cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & (CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER | CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE);
vp->flags = cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER;
return 0;
}
@@ -5847,7 +5619,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &params);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("Failed to initialize default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."));
log_err(cd, _("Failed to initialise default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."));
goto out;
}
@@ -5875,11 +5647,32 @@ out:
* Keyring handling
*/
static int kernel_keyring_support(void)
{
static unsigned _checked = 0;
if (!_checked) {
_kernel_keyring_supported = keyring_check();
_checked = 1;
}
return _kernel_keyring_supported;
}
static int dmcrypt_keyring_bug(void)
{
uint64_t kversion;
if (kernel_version(&kversion))
return 1;
return kversion < version(4,15,0,0);
}
int crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(struct crypt_device *cd)
{
uint32_t dmc_flags;
/* dm backend must be initialized */
/* dm backend must be initialised */
if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
return 0;
@@ -6000,7 +5793,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
crypt_safe_memzero(passphrase, passphrase_size);
crypt_memzero(passphrase, passphrase_size);
free(passphrase);
return r;

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible) and VeraCrypt volume handling
*
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "libcryptsetup.h"
@@ -300,8 +301,8 @@ static int decrypt_blowfish_le_cbc(struct tcrypt_alg *alg,
}
crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher);
crypt_safe_memzero(iv, bs);
crypt_safe_memzero(iv_old, bs);
crypt_memzero(iv, bs);
crypt_memzero(iv_old, bs);
return r;
}
@@ -368,8 +369,8 @@ static int TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr_one(struct tcrypt_alg *alg, const char *mode,
crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher);
}
crypt_safe_memzero(backend_key, sizeof(backend_key));
crypt_safe_memzero(iv, TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN);
crypt_memzero(backend_key, sizeof(backend_key));
crypt_memzero(iv, TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN);
return r;
}
@@ -419,8 +420,8 @@ out:
if (cipher[j])
crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher[j]);
crypt_safe_memzero(iv, bs);
crypt_safe_memzero(iv_old, bs);
crypt_memzero(iv, bs);
crypt_memzero(iv_old, bs);
return r;
}
@@ -473,13 +474,13 @@ static int TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
r = -EPERM;
}
crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
crypt_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
return r;
}
static int TCRYPT_pool_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
unsigned char pool[VCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN],
const char *keyfile, int keyfiles_pool_length)
unsigned char pool[TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN],
const char *keyfile)
{
unsigned char *data;
int i, j, fd, data_size, r = -EIO;
@@ -511,12 +512,12 @@ static int TCRYPT_pool_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc >> 16);
pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc >> 8);
pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc);
j %= keyfiles_pool_length;
j %= TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
}
r = 0;
out:
crypt_safe_memzero(&crc, sizeof(crc));
crypt_safe_memzero(data, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
crypt_memzero(&crc, sizeof(crc));
crypt_memzero(data, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
free(data);
return r;
@@ -526,39 +527,29 @@ static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
{
unsigned char pwd[VCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN] = {};
size_t passphrase_size, max_passphrase_size;
unsigned char pwd[TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN] = {};
size_t passphrase_size;
char *key;
unsigned int i, skipped = 0, iterations;
int r = -EPERM, keyfiles_pool_length;
int r = -EPERM;
if (posix_memalign((void*)&key, crypt_getpagesize(), TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN))
return -ENOMEM;
if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES &&
params->passphrase_size > TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN) {
/* Really. Keyfile pool length depends on passphrase size in Veracrypt. */
max_passphrase_size = VCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
keyfiles_pool_length = VCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
} else {
max_passphrase_size = TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
keyfiles_pool_length = TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
}
if (params->keyfiles_count)
passphrase_size = max_passphrase_size;
passphrase_size = TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
else
passphrase_size = params->passphrase_size;
if (params->passphrase_size > max_passphrase_size) {
log_err(cd, _("Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%zu) exceeded."),
max_passphrase_size);
if (params->passphrase_size > TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN) {
log_err(cd, _("Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded."),
TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN);
goto out;
}
/* Calculate pool content from keyfiles */
for (i = 0; i < params->keyfiles_count; i++) {
r = TCRYPT_pool_keyfile(cd, pwd, params->keyfiles[i], keyfiles_pool_length);
r = TCRYPT_pool_keyfile(cd, pwd, params->keyfiles[i]);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
}
@@ -628,9 +619,9 @@ static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
params->cipher, params->mode, params->key_size);
}
out:
crypt_safe_memzero(pwd, TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN);
crypt_memzero(pwd, TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN);
if (key)
crypt_safe_memzero(key, TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN);
crypt_memzero(key, TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN);
free(key);
return r;
}
@@ -749,14 +740,14 @@ int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
return -ENOTSUP;
}
if (hdr->d.sector_size % SECTOR_SIZE) {
if (hdr->d.sector_size && hdr->d.sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE) {
log_err(cd, _("Activation is not supported for %d sector size."),
hdr->d.sector_size);
return -ENOTSUP;
}
if (strstr(params->mode, "-tcrypt")) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."));
log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."));
return -ENOTSUP;
}
@@ -769,12 +760,15 @@ int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (!algs)
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr->d.sector_size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER)
dmd.size = 0;
else if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER)
dmd.size = hdr->d.hidden_volume_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
dmd.size = hdr->d.hidden_volume_size / hdr->d.sector_size;
else
dmd.size = hdr->d.volume_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
dmd.size = hdr->d.volume_size / hdr->d.sector_size;
if (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED)
device_check = DEV_OK;
@@ -865,7 +859,7 @@ int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (r < 0 &&
(dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) || ((dmc_flags & req_flags) != req_flags))) {
log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support TCRYPT compatible mapping."));
log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping."));
r = -ENOTSUP;
}
@@ -1039,11 +1033,11 @@ uint64_t TCRYPT_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER) {
if (hdr->d.version > 3)
return (hdr->d.mk_offset / SECTOR_SIZE);
return (hdr->d.mk_offset / hdr->d.sector_size);
if (device_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), &size) < 0)
return 0;
return (size - hdr->d.hidden_volume_size +
(TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD)) / SECTOR_SIZE;
(TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD)) / hdr->d.sector_size;
}
goto hdr_offset;
}
@@ -1052,11 +1046,11 @@ uint64_t TCRYPT_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (device_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), &size) < 0)
return 0;
return (size - hdr->d.hidden_volume_size +
(TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD)) / SECTOR_SIZE;
(TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD)) / hdr->d.sector_size;
}
hdr_offset:
return hdr->d.mk_offset / SECTOR_SIZE;
return hdr->d.mk_offset / hdr->d.sector_size;
}
uint64_t TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -1070,7 +1064,7 @@ uint64_t TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
else if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "lrw", 3))
iv_offset = 0;
else
iv_offset = hdr->d.mk_offset / SECTOR_SIZE;
iv_offset = hdr->d.mk_offset / hdr->d.sector_size;
if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER)
iv_offset += crypt_dev_partition_offset(device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible) header definition
*
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
#define TCRYPT_LRW_IKEY_LEN 16
#define TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN 64
#define VCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN 128
#define TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN 1048576
#define TCRYPT_HDR_FLAG_SYSTEM (1 << 0)

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ static int keyfile_seek(int fd, uint64_t bytes)
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
crypt_safe_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
crypt_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
/* read error */
return -1;
}
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ static int keyfile_seek(int fd, uint64_t bytes)
bytes -= bytes_r;
}
crypt_safe_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
crypt_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
return bytes == 0 ? 0 : -1;
}
@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ int crypt_keyfile_device_read(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *keyfile,
key_size = DEFAULT_KEYFILE_SIZE_MAXKB * 1024 + 1;
unlimited_read = 1;
/* use 4k for buffer (page divisor but avoid huge pages) */
buflen = 4096 - sizeof(size_t); // sizeof(struct safe_allocation);
buflen = 4096 - sizeof(struct safe_allocation);
} else
buflen = key_size;

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library, cipher benchmark
*
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -48,12 +48,6 @@ int crypt_benchmark(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (posix_memalign(&buffer, crypt_getpagesize(), buffer_size))
goto out;
r = crypt_cipher_ivsize(cipher, cipher_mode);
if (r >= 0 && iv_size != (size_t)r) {
log_dbg(cd, "IV length for benchmark adjusted to %i bytes (requested %zu).", r, iv_size);
iv_size = r;
}
if (iv_size) {
iv = malloc(iv_size);
if (!iv)
@@ -77,9 +71,9 @@ int crypt_benchmark(struct crypt_device *cd,
if (r == -ERANGE)
log_dbg(cd, "Measured cipher runtime is too low.");
else if (r)
log_dbg(cd, "Cannot initialize cipher %s, mode %s, key size %zu, IV size %zu.",
cipher, cipher_mode, volume_key_size, iv_size);
else if (r == -ENOTSUP || r == -ENOENT)
log_dbg(cd, "Cannot initialise cipher %s, mode %s.", cipher, cipher_mode);
out:
free(buffer);
free(key);

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* blkid probe utilities
*
* Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -310,9 +310,9 @@ int blk_supported(void)
off_t blk_get_offset(struct blkid_handle *h)
{
const char *offset;
off_t offset_value = -1;
#ifdef HAVE_BLKID
const char *offset;
if (blk_is_superblock(h)) {
if (!blkid_probe_lookup_value(h->pr, "SBMAGIC_OFFSET", &offset, NULL))
offset_value = strtoll(offset, NULL, 10);

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* blkid probe utilities
*
* Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
* utils_crypt - cipher utilities for cryptsetup
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "libcryptsetup.h"
@@ -77,10 +76,8 @@ int crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(const char *s, char *integrity)
return -EINVAL;
r = sscanf(s, "%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^-]-%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "s", mode, hash);
if (r == 2 && !isdigit(hash[0]))
if (r == 2)
r = snprintf(integrity, MAX_CIPHER_LEN, "%s(%s)", mode, hash);
else if (r == 2)
r = snprintf(integrity, MAX_CIPHER_LEN, "%s-%s", mode, hash);
else if (r == 1)
r = snprintf(integrity, MAX_CIPHER_LEN, "%s", mode);
else
@@ -152,6 +149,79 @@ int crypt_parse_pbkdf(const char *s, const char **pbkdf)
return 0;
}
/*
* Replacement for memset(s, 0, n) on stack that can be optimized out
* Also used in safe allocations for explicit memory wipe.
*/
void crypt_memzero(void *s, size_t n)
{
#ifdef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
explicit_bzero(s, n);
#else
volatile uint8_t *p = (volatile uint8_t *)s;
while(n--)
*p++ = 0;
#endif
}
/* safe allocations */
void *crypt_safe_alloc(size_t size)
{
struct safe_allocation *alloc;
if (!size || size > (SIZE_MAX - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data)))
return NULL;
alloc = malloc(size + offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
if (!alloc)
return NULL;
alloc->size = size;
crypt_memzero(&alloc->data, size);
/* coverity[leaked_storage] */
return &alloc->data;
}
void crypt_safe_free(void *data)
{
struct safe_allocation *alloc;
if (!data)
return;
alloc = (struct safe_allocation *)
((char *)data - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
crypt_memzero(data, alloc->size);
alloc->size = 0x55aa55aa;
free(alloc);
}
void *crypt_safe_realloc(void *data, size_t size)
{
struct safe_allocation *alloc;
void *new_data;
new_data = crypt_safe_alloc(size);
if (new_data && data) {
alloc = (struct safe_allocation *)
((char *)data - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
if (size > alloc->size)
size = alloc->size;
memcpy(new_data, data, size);
}
crypt_safe_free(data);
return new_data;
}
ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *hex, char **result, int safe_alloc)
{
char buf[3] = "xx\0", *endp, *bytes;

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
* utils_crypt - cipher utilities for cryptsetup
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -29,6 +29,14 @@
#define MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "31"
#define MAX_KEYFILES 32
struct crypt_device;
/* Not to be used directly */
struct safe_allocation {
size_t size;
char data[0];
};
int crypt_parse_name_and_mode(const char *s, char *cipher,
int *key_nums, char *cipher_mode);
int crypt_parse_hash_integrity_mode(const char *s, char *integrity);
@@ -36,6 +44,12 @@ int crypt_parse_integrity_mode(const char *s, char *integrity,
int *integrity_key_size);
int crypt_parse_pbkdf(const char *s, const char **pbkdf);
void *crypt_safe_alloc(size_t size);
void crypt_safe_free(void *data);
void *crypt_safe_realloc(void *data, size_t size);
void crypt_memzero(void *s, size_t n);
ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *hex, char **result, int safe_alloc);
#endif /* _UTILS_CRYPT_H */

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -144,7 +145,7 @@ static int device_read_test(int devfd)
if (read_blockwise(devfd, blocksize, alignment, buffer, minsize) == (ssize_t)minsize)
r = 0;
crypt_safe_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
crypt_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
return r;
}
@@ -184,7 +185,7 @@ static int device_ready(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device)
}
if (devfd < 0) {
log_err(cd, _("Device %s does not exist or access denied."),
log_err(cd, _("Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."),
device_path(device));
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -520,16 +521,10 @@ void device_topology_alignment(struct crypt_device *cd,
temp_alignment = (unsigned long)min_io_size;
/*
* Ignore bogus opt-io that could break alignment.
* Also real opt_io_size should be aligned to minimal page size (4k).
* Some bogus USB enclosures reports wrong data here.
*/
/* Ignore bogus opt-io that could break alignment */
if ((temp_alignment < (unsigned long)opt_io_size) &&
!((unsigned long)opt_io_size % temp_alignment) && !MISALIGNED_4K(opt_io_size))
!((unsigned long)opt_io_size % temp_alignment))
temp_alignment = (unsigned long)opt_io_size;
else if (opt_io_size)
log_err(cd, _("Ignoring bogus optimal-io size for data device (%u bytes)."), opt_io_size);
/* If calculated alignment is multiple of default, keep default */
if (temp_alignment && (default_alignment % temp_alignment))

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* Metadata on-disk locking for processes serialization
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* Metadata on-disk locking for processes serialization
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -64,15 +64,8 @@ static inline uint32_t act2dmflags(uint32_t act_flags)
#define DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED (1 << 16) /* dm-integrity automatic recalculation supported */
#define DM_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_SUPPORTED (1 << 17) /* dm-integrity bitmap mode supported */
#define DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION_SUPPORTED (1 << 18) /* dm DM_GET_TARGET version ioctl supported */
#define DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED (1 << 19) /* supports the parameter fix_padding that fixes a bug that caused excessive padding */
#define DM_BITLK_EBOIV_SUPPORTED (1 << 20) /* EBOIV for BITLK supported */
#define DM_BITLK_ELEPHANT_SUPPORTED (1 << 21) /* Elephant diffuser for BITLK supported */
#define DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SUPPORTED (1 << 22) /* Verity option root_hash_sig_key_desc supported */
#define DM_INTEGRITY_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED (1 << 23) /* dm-integrity discards/TRIM option is supported */
#define DM_VERITY_PANIC_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED (1 << 24) /* dm-verity panic on corruption */
#define DM_CRYPT_NO_WORKQUEUE_SUPPORTED (1 << 25) /* dm-crypt suppot for bypassing workqueues */
typedef enum { DM_CRYPT = 0, DM_VERITY, DM_INTEGRITY, DM_LINEAR, DM_ERROR, DM_ZERO, DM_UNKNOWN } dm_target_type;
typedef enum { DM_CRYPT = 0, DM_VERITY, DM_INTEGRITY, DM_LINEAR, DM_ERROR, DM_UNKNOWN } dm_target_type;
enum tdirection { TARGET_SET = 1, TARGET_QUERY };
int dm_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target, uint32_t *flags);
@@ -117,7 +110,6 @@ struct dm_target {
const char *root_hash;
uint32_t root_hash_size;
const char *root_hash_sig_key_desc;
uint64_t hash_offset; /* hash offset in blocks (not header) */
uint64_t hash_blocks; /* size of hash device (in hash blocks) */
@@ -146,14 +138,10 @@ struct dm_target {
struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key;
struct device *meta_device;
bool fix_padding;
} integrity;
struct {
uint64_t offset;
} linear;
struct {
} zero;
} u;
char *params;
@@ -187,10 +175,9 @@ int dm_crypt_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg
uint32_t tag_size, uint32_t sector_size);
int dm_verity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
struct device *data_device, struct device *hash_device, struct device *fec_device,
const char *root_hash, uint32_t root_hash_size, const char *root_hash_sig_key_desc,
uint64_t hash_offset_block, uint64_t hash_blocks, struct crypt_params_verity *vp);
int dm_integrity_target_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
const char *root_hash, uint32_t root_hash_size, uint64_t hash_offset_block,
uint64_t hash_blocks, struct crypt_params_verity *vp);
int dm_integrity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
struct device *meta_device,
struct device *data_device, uint64_t tag_size, uint64_t offset, uint32_t sector_size,
struct volume_key *vk,
@@ -198,7 +185,6 @@ int dm_integrity_target_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
const struct crypt_params_integrity *ip);
int dm_linear_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
struct device *data_device, uint64_t data_offset);
int dm_zero_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size);
int dm_remove_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags);
int dm_status_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* FIPS mode utilities
*
* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* FIPS mode utilities
*
* Copyright (C) 2011-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* kernel keyring utilities
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -25,14 +25,15 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include "libcryptsetup.h"
#include "utils_keyring.h"
#ifndef HAVE_KEY_SERIAL_T
#define HAVE_KEY_SERIAL_T
#include <stdint.h>
typedef int32_t key_serial_t;
#endif
#include "utils_crypt.h"
#include "utils_keyring.h"
#ifndef ARRAY_SIZE
# define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
#endif
@@ -177,7 +178,7 @@ int keyring_get_passphrase(const char *key_desc,
if (ret < 0) {
err = errno;
if (buf)
crypt_safe_memzero(buf, len);
crypt_memzero(buf, len);
free(buf);
return -err;
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* kernel keyring syscall wrappers
*
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Ondrej Kozina
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2016-2019 Ondrej Kozina
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* loopback block device utilities
*
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* loopback block device utilities
*
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
/*
* utils_pbkdf - PBKDF settings for libcryptsetup
*
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2020 Milan Broz
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2009-2019 Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

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