Update po files.

The --keep-key should work when no other parameters are requested.
It was meant to be "apply defaults on original header".

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+po/*gmo
+*~
+Makefile
+Makefile.in
+Makefile.in.in
+*.lo
+*.la
+*.o
+.deps/
+.libs/
+src/cryptsetup
+src/veritysetup
+aclocal.m4
+autom4te.cache/
+compile
+config.guess
+config.h
+config.h.in
+config.log
+config.rpath
+config.status
+config.sub
+configure
+depcomp
+install-sh
+lib/libcryptsetup.pc
+libtool
+ltmain.sh
+m4/
+missing
+po/Makevars.template
+po/POTFILES
+po/Rules-quot
+po/*.pot
+po/*.header
+po/*.sed
+po/*.sin
+po/stamp-po
+stamp-h1
+

.travis-functions.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# .travis-functions.sh:
+#   - helper functions to be sourced from .travis.yml
+#   - designed to respect travis' environment but testing locally is possible
+#   - modified copy from util-linux project
+#
+
+if [ ! -f "configure.ac" ]; then
+	echo ".travis-functions.sh must be sourced from source dir" >&2
+	return 1 || exit 1
+fi
+
+## some config settings
+# travis docs say we get 1.5 CPUs
+MAKE="make -j2"
+DUMP_CONFIG_LOG="short"
+export TS_OPT_parsable="yes"
+
+function configure_travis
+{
+	./configure "$@"
+	err=$?
+	if [ "$DUMP_CONFIG_LOG" = "short" ]; then
+		grep -B1 -A10000 "^## Output variables" config.log | grep -v "_FALSE="
+	elif [ "$DUMP_CONFIG_LOG" = "full" ]; then
+		cat config.log
+	fi
+	return $err
+}
+
+function check_nonroot
+{
+	local cfg_opts="$1"
+
+	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
+
+	configure_travis \
+		--enable-python \
+		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
+		"$cfg_opts" \
+		|| return
+
+	$MAKE || return
+
+	sudo modprobe dm-crypt
+	sudo modprobe dm-verity
+	sudo modprobe dm-integrity
+	uname -a
+	sudo dmsetup version
+	sudo dmsetup targets
+
+	make check
+}
+
+function check_root
+{
+	local cfg_opts="$1"
+
+	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
+
+    configure_travis \
+		--enable-python \
+		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
+		"$cfg_opts" \
+		|| return
+
+	$MAKE || return
+
+	sudo modprobe dm-crypt
+	sudo modprobe dm-verity
+	sudo modprobe dm-integrity
+	uname -a
+	sudo dmsetup version
+	sudo dmsetup targets
+
+	# FIXME: we should use -E option here
+	sudo make check
+}
+
+function check_nonroot_compile_only
+{
+	local cfg_opts="$1"
+
+	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
+
+	configure_travis \
+		--enable-python \
+		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
+		"$cfg_opts" \
+		|| return
+
+	$MAKE
+}
+
+function travis_install_script
+{
+	# install some packages from Ubuntu's default sources
+	sudo apt-get -qq update
+	sudo apt-get install -qq >/dev/null \
+		python-dev \
+		sharutils \
+		libgcrypt20-dev \
+		libssl-dev \
+		libdevmapper-dev \
+		libpopt-dev \
+		uuid-dev \
+		libsepol1-dev \
+		libtool \
+		dmsetup \
+		autoconf \
+		automake \
+		pkg-config \
+		autopoint \
+		gettext \
+		expect \
+		keyutils \
+		libjson-c-dev \
+		|| return
+}
+
+function travis_before_script
+{
+	set -o xtrace
+
+	./autogen.sh
+	ret=$?
+
+	set +o xtrace
+	return $ret
+}
+
+function travis_script
+{
+	local ret
+	set -o xtrace
+
+	case "$MAKE_CHECK" in
+	gcrypt)
+		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt" && \
+		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt"
+		;;
+	gcrypt_compile)
+		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt"
+		;;
+	openssl)
+		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=openssl" && \
+		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=openssl"
+		;;
+	openssl_compile)
+		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=openssl"
+		;;
+	*)
+		echo "error, check environment (travis.yml)" >&2
+		false
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	ret=$?
+	set +o xtrace
+	return $ret
+}
+
+function travis_after_script
+{
+	return 0
+}

.travis.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+language: c
+
+sudo: required
+dist: trusty
+
+compiler:
+  - gcc
+
+env:
+  - MAKE_CHECK="gcrypt"
+  - MAKE_CHECK="openssl"
+
+branches:
+  only:
+    - master
+    - wip-luks2
+
+before_install:
+  - uname -a
+  - $CC --version
+  - which $CC
+  # workaround clang not system wide, fail on sudo make install
+  - export CC=`which $CC`
+  # workaround travis-ci issue #5301
+  - unset PYTHON_CFLAGS
+
+install:
+  - source ./.travis-functions.sh
+  - travis_install_script
+
+before_script:
+  - travis_before_script
+
+script:
+  - travis_script
+
+after_script:
+  - travis_after_script

ChangeLog

@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ Since version 1.6 this file is no longer maintained.
 See docs/*ReleaseNotes for release changes documentation.
 
 See version control history for full commit messages.
-  http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/source/list
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/commits/master

INSTALL

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ The simplest way to compile this package is:
      `sh ./configure' instead to prevent `csh' from trying to execute
      `configure' itself.
 
-     Running `configure' takes awhile.  While running, it prints some
+     Running `configure' takes a while.  While running, it prints some
      messages telling which features it is checking for.
 
   2. Type `make' to compile the package.

Makefile.am

@@ -1,13 +1,52 @@
 EXTRA_DIST = COPYING.LGPL FAQ docs misc
-SUBDIRS = \
-	lib \
-	src \
-	man \
-	python \
-	tests \
-	po
+SUBDIRS = po tests
+TESTS =
+CLEANFILES =
+DISTCLEAN_TARGETS =
+
+AM_CPPFLAGS = \
+	-include config.h \
+	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib \
+        -DDATADIR=\""$(datadir)"\"              \
+        -DLOCALEDIR=\""$(datadir)/locale"\"     \
+        -DLIBDIR=\""$(libdir)"\"                \
+        -DPREFIX=\""$(prefix)"\"                \
+        -DSYSCONFDIR=\""$(sysconfdir)"\"        \
+        -DVERSION=\""$(VERSION)"\"
+AM_CFLAGS = -Wall
+AM_LDFLAGS =
+
+tmpfilesddir = @DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR@
+
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES =
+sbin_PROGRAMS =
+man8_MANS =
+tmpfilesd_DATA =
+
+include man/Makemodule.am
+
+include python/Makemodule.am
+
+include scripts/Makemodule.am
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2
+include lib/crypto_backend/argon2/Makemodule.am
+endif
+include lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am
+include lib/Makemodule.am
+
+include src/Makemodule.am
 
 ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4
 
+DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS = 	\
+	--enable-python		\
+	--with-tmpfilesdir=$$dc_install_base/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d \
+	--enable-internal-argon2
+
+distclean-local:
+	-find . -name \*~ -o -name \*.orig -o -name \*.rej | xargs rm -f
+	rm -rf autom4te.cache
+
 clean-local:
-	-rm -rf docs/doxygen_api_docs
+	-rm -rf docs/doxygen_api_docs libargon2.la

README

@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ setup cryptographic volumes for dm-crypt (including LUKS extension)
 
 WEB PAGE:
 
-      http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/
+      https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/
 
 FAQ:
 
-      http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
+      https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
 
 MAILING LIST:
 
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ DOWNLOAD:
 
 SOURCE CODE:
 
-      URL: http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/source/browse/
-      Checkout: git clone https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/
+      URL: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master
+      Checkout: git clone https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git
 
 NLS (PO TRANSLATIONS):
 

README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+![LUKS logo](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/luks-logo.png)
+
+What the ...?
+=============
+**Cryptsetup** is utility used to conveniently setup disk encryption based
+on [DMCrypt](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt) kernel module.
+
+These include **plain** **dm-crypt** volumes, **LUKS** volumes, **loop-AES**
+and **TrueCrypt** (including **VeraCrypt** extension) format.
+
+Project also includes **veritysetup** utility used to conveniently setup
+[DMVerity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity) block integrity checking kernel module
+and, since version 2.0,  **integritysetup** to setup
+[DMIntegrity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMIntegrity) block integrity kernel module.
+
+
+LUKS Design
+-----------
+**LUKS** is the standard for Linux hard disk encryption. By providing a standard on-disk-format, it does not  
+only facilitate compatibility among distributions, but also provides secure management of multiple user passwords.  
+In contrast to existing solution, LUKS stores all setup necessary setup information in the partition header,  
+enabling the user to transport or migrate his data seamlessly.
+
+Last version of the LUKS format specification is
+[available here](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/LUKS_docs/on-disk-format.pdf).
+
+Why LUKS?
+---------
+ * compatibility via standardization,
+ * secure against low entropy attacks,
+ * support for multiple keys,
+ * effective passphrase revocation,
+ * free.
+
+[Project home page](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/).
+-----------------
+
+[Frequently asked questions (FAQ)](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions)
+--------------------------------
+
+Download
+--------
+All release tarballs and release notes are hosted on [kernel.org](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/).
+
+**The latest cryptsetup version is 2.0.2**
+  * [cryptsetup-2.0.2.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.2.tar.xz)
+  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.0.2.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.2.tar.sign)
+    _(You need to decompress file first to check signature.)_
+  * [Cryptsetup 2.0.2 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.2-ReleaseNotes).
+
+Previous versions
+ * [Version 2.0.1](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.1.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.1.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.1-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 2.0.0](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.0.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.0.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.0-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.5](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.5.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.5.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.4](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.4.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.4.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.3](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.3.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.3.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.2](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.2.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.2.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.2-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.1](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.0](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.0.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.0.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes).
+
+Source and API docs
+-------------------
+For development version code, please refer to [source](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master) page,
+mirror on [kernel.org](https://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git/) or [GitHub](https://github.com/mbroz/cryptsetup).
+
+For libcryptsetup documentation see [libcryptsetup API](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/API/index.html) page.
+
+The libcryptsetup API/ABI changes are tracked in [compatibility report](https://abi-laboratory.pro/tracker/timeline/cryptsetup/).
+
+NLS PO files are maintained by [TranslationProject](http://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html).
+
+Help!
+-----
+Please always read [FAQ](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions) first.
+For cryptsetup and LUKS related questions, please use the dm-crypt mailing list, [dm-crypt@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt@saout.de).
+
+If you want to subscribe just send an empty mail to [dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de).
+
+You can also browse [list archive](http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/) or read it through
+[web interface](https://marc.info/?l=dm-crypt).

TODO

@@ -1,9 +1 @@
-Version 1.7:
-- Export wipe device functions
-- Support K/M suffixes for align payload (new switch?).
-- TRIM for keyslots
-- Do we need crypt_data_path() - path to data device (if differs)?
-- Resync ETA time is not accurate, calculate it better (last minute window?).
-- crypto backend should initialise itself only once (debug log)
-- Extend existing LUKS header to use another KDF? (https://password-hashing.net/)
-- Fix all crazy automake warnings (or switch to Cmake).
+Please see issues tracked at https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues.

autogen.sh

@@ -56,13 +56,6 @@ if test "$DIE" -eq 1; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
-if test -z "$*"; then
-  echo
-  echo "**Warning**: I am going to run 'configure' with no arguments."
-  echo "If you wish to pass any to it, please specify them on the"
-  echo \'$0\'" command line."
-fi
-
 echo
 echo "Generate build-system by:"
 echo "   autopoint:  $(autopoint --version | head -1)"
@@ -81,10 +74,6 @@ autoheader $AH_OPTS
 automake --add-missing --copy --gnu $AM_OPTS
 autoconf $AC_OPTS
 
-if test x$NOCONFIGURE = x; then
-  echo Running $srcdir/configure $conf_flags "$@" ...
-  $srcdir/configure $conf_flags "$@" \
-  && echo Now type \`make\' to compile $PKG_NAME
-else
-  echo Skipping configure process.
-fi
+echo
+echo "Now type '$srcdir/configure' and 'make' to compile."
+echo

configure.ac

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 AC_PREREQ([2.67])
-AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[1.6.5])
+AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[2.0.3])
 
 dnl library version from <major>.<minor>.<release>[-<suffix>]
 LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION=$(echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | cut -f1 -d-)
-LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=10:0:6
-dnl library file name for FIPS selfcheck
-LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_FIPS="libcryptsetup.so.4"
-FIPS_MODULE_FILE="/etc/system-fips"
+LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=15:0:3
 
+AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR(src/cryptsetup.c)
 AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
 
@@ -17,8 +15,8 @@ AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h:config.h.in])
 # http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/automake/2013-01/msg00060.html
 
 # For old automake use this
-#AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(dist-xz)
-AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([dist-xz 1.12 serial-tests])
+#AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(dist-xz subdir-objects)
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([dist-xz 1.12 serial-tests subdir-objects])
 
 if test "x$prefix" = "xNONE"; then
 	sysconfdir=/etc
@@ -36,21 +34,65 @@ AC_ENABLE_STATIC(no)
 LT_INIT
 PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
 
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl define PKG_CHECK_VAR for old pkg-config <= 0.28
+m4_ifndef([AS_VAR_COPY],
+[m4_define([AS_VAR_COPY],
+[AS_LITERAL_IF([$1[]$2], [$1=$$2], [eval $1=\$$2])])
+])
+m4_ifndef([PKG_CHECK_VAR], [
+AC_DEFUN([PKG_CHECK_VAR],
+[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])
+AC_ARG_VAR([$1], [value of $3 for $2, overriding pkg-config])
+
+_PKG_CONFIG([$1], [variable="][$3]["], [$2])
+AS_VAR_COPY([$1], [pkg_cv_][$1])
+
+AS_VAR_IF([$1], [""], [$5], [$4])
+])
+])
+dnl ==========================================================================
+
+AC_C_RESTRICT
+
 AC_HEADER_DIRENT
 AC_HEADER_STDC
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
-	ctype.h unistd.h locale.h byteswap.h endian.h)
+	sys/sysmacros.h sys/statvfs.h ctype.h unistd.h locale.h byteswap.h endian.h stdint.h)
 
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(uuid/uuid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
 AC_CHECK_HEADER(libdevmapper.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the device-mapper library.])])
 
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(keyring, AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-keyring],[disable kernel keyring support and builtin kernel keyring token]),[], [enable_keyring=yes])
+if test "x$enable_keyring" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/keyctl.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with kernel keyring service compiled.])])
+
+	dnl ==========================================================================
+	dnl check whether kernel is compiled with kernel keyring service syscalls
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_add_key,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing add_key syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_keyctl,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing keyctl syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_request_key,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing request_key syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
+
+	dnl ==========================================================================
+	dnl check that key_serial_t hasn't been adopted yet in stdlib
+	AC_CHECK_TYPES([key_serial_t], [], [], [
+	AC_INCLUDES_DEFAULT
+	#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_KEYCTL_H
+	# include <linux/keyctl.h>
+	#endif
+	])
+
+	AC_DEFINE(KERNEL_KEYRING, 1, [Enable kernel keyring service support])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(KERNEL_KEYRING, test x$enable_keyring = xyes)
+
 saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 AC_CHECK_LIB(uuid, uuid_clear, ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
 AC_SUBST(UUID_LIBS, $LIBS)
 LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime],[rt posix4])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign clock_gettime])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign clock_gettime posix_fallocate])
 
 if test "x$enable_largefile" = "xno" ; then
   AC_MSG_ERROR([Building with --disable-largefile is not supported, it can cause data corruption.])
@@ -62,11 +104,12 @@ AC_TYPE_OFF_T
 AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
 AC_FUNC_FSEEKO
 AC_PROG_GCC_TRADITIONAL
+AC_FUNC_STRERROR_R
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 
 AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external],[need-ngettext])
-AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.15])
+AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.18.3])
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 
@@ -77,27 +120,17 @@ AC_SUBST(POPT_LIBS, $LIBS)
 LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
-dnl FIPS extensions
+dnl FIPS extensions (only for RHEL)
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([fips], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fips],[enable FIPS mode restrictions]),
 [with_fips=$enableval],
 [with_fips=no])
 
 if test "x$with_fips" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_FIPS, 1, [Enable FIPS mode restrictions])
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_FIPS, ["$LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_FIPS"],
-		[library file name for FIPS selfcheck])
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FIPS_MODULE_FILE, ["$FIPS_MODULE_FILE"],
-		[file checked to determine if running in FIPS mode])
 
 	if test "x$enable_static" = "xyes" -o "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([Static build is not compatible with FIPS.])
 	fi
-
-	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(fipscheck, FIPSCHECK_verify, ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the fipscheck library.])])
-	AC_SUBST(FIPSCHECK_LIBS, $LIBS)
-	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
-
 fi
 
 AC_DEFUN([NO_FIPS], [
@@ -108,12 +141,14 @@ AC_DEFUN([NO_FIPS], [
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl pwquality library (cryptsetup CLI only)
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([pwquality], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pwquality],[enable password quality checking]),
-[with_pwquality=$enableval],
-[with_pwquality=no])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([pwquality],
+	      AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pwquality],
+			     [enable password quality checking using pwquality library]),
+	      [with_pwquality=$enableval],
+	      [with_pwquality=no])
 
 if test "x$with_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
-	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PWQUALITY, 1, [Enable password quality checking])
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PWQUALITY, 1, [Enable password quality checking using pwquality library])
 	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([PWQUALITY], [pwquality >= 1.0.0],,
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need pwquality library.]))
 
@@ -121,6 +156,31 @@ if test "x$with_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
 	PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS="$PWQUALITY_LIBS -lcrack -lz"
 fi
 
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl passwdqc library (cryptsetup CLI only)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([passwdqc],
+	      AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-passwdqc@<:@=CONFIG_PATH@:>@],
+			     [enable password quality checking using passwdqc library (optionally with CONFIG_PATH)]),
+	      [enable_passwdqc=$enableval],
+	      [enable_passwdqc=no])
+
+case "$enable_passwdqc" in
+	yes|no) use_passwdqc_config="" ;;
+	/*) use_passwdqc_config="$enable_passwdqc"; enable_passwdqc=yes ;;
+	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unrecognized --enable-passwdqc parameter.]) ;;
+esac
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PASSWDQC_CONFIG_FILE], ["$use_passwdqc_config"], [passwdqc library config file])
+
+if test "x$enable_passwdqc" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PASSWDQC, 1, [Enable password quality checking using passwdqc library])
+
+	PASSWDQC_LIBS="-lpasswdqc"
+fi
+
+if test "x$with_pwquality$enable_passwdqc" = "xyesyes"; then
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-pwquality and --enable-passwdqc are mutually incompatible.])
+fi
+
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl Crypto backend functions
 
@@ -140,6 +200,14 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_GCRYPT], [
 		[AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT([1.6.1], [use_internal_pbkdf2=0], [use_internal_pbkdf2=1])])
 	AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT($GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the gcrypt library.])])
 
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if internal cryptsetup PBKDF2 is compiled-in])
+	if test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 0; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		NO_FIPS([])
+	fi
+
 	if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 		saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 		LIBS="$saved_LIBS $LIBGCRYPT_LIBS -static"
@@ -171,7 +239,6 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_OPENSSL], [
 		CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$OPENSSL_STATIC_LIBS
 		PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
 	fi
-	NO_FIPS([])
 ])
 
 AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NSS], [
@@ -225,7 +292,7 @@ saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([static-cryptsetup],
 	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-static-cryptsetup],
-	[enable build of static cryptsetup binary]))
+	[enable build of static version of tools]))
 if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 	if test x$enable_static = xno; then
 		AC_MSG_WARN([Requested static cryptsetup build, enabling static library.])
@@ -234,16 +301,26 @@ if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(STATIC_TOOLS, test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes)
 
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(cryptsetup,
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup],
+	[disable cryptsetup support]),[], [enable_cryptsetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTSETUP, test x$enable_cryptsetup = xyes)
+
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(veritysetup,
 	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-veritysetup],
 	[disable veritysetup support]),[], [enable_veritysetup=yes])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(VERITYSETUP, test x$enable_veritysetup = xyes)
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([cryptsetup-reencrypt],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt],
-	[enable cryptsetup-reencrypt tool]))
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup-reencrypt],
+	[disable cryptsetup-reencrypt tool]),[], [enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt=yes])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(REENCRYPT, test x$enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt = xyes)
 
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(integritysetup,
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-integritysetup],
+	[disable integritysetup support]),[], [enable_integritysetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(INTEGRITYSETUP, test x$enable_integritysetup = xyes)
+
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(selinux,
 	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-selinux],
 	[disable selinux support [default=auto]]),[], [])
@@ -265,6 +342,9 @@ LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 LIBS="$LIBS $DEVMAPPER_LIBS"
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_secure_data], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_retry_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_deferred_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_mounted_fs], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_holders], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG], [have_cookie=yes], [have_cookie=no], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 if test "x$enable_udev" = xyes; then
 	if test "x$have_cookie" = xno; then
@@ -275,6 +355,9 @@ if test "x$enable_udev" = xyes; then
 fi
 LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
+dnl Check for JSON-C used in LUKS2
+PKG_CHECK_MODULES([JSON_C], [json-c])
+
 dnl Crypto backend configuration.
 AC_ARG_WITH([crypto_backend],
 	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-crypto_backend=BACKEND], [crypto backend (gcrypt/openssl/nss/kernel/nettle) [gcrypt]]),
@@ -310,6 +393,28 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE,  test $with_crypto_backend = nettle)
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_PBKDF2, test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 1)
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2, [$use_internal_pbkdf2], [Use internal PBKDF2])
 
+dnl Argon2 implementation
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(internal-argon2, AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-internal-argon2],
+	[disable internal implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]),[], [enable_internal_argon2=yes])
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([libargon2], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-libargon2],
+	[enable external libargon2 (PHC) library (disables internal bundled version) ]),[], [enable_libargon2=no])
+
+if test x$enable_libargon2 = xyes ; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(argon2.h,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need libargon2 development library installed.])])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(Argon2_id,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need more recent Argon2 library with support for Argon2id.])], [#include <argon2.h>])
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBARGON2], [libargon2],,[LIBARGON2_LIBS="-largon2"])
+	enable_internal_argon2=no
+else
+	AC_MSG_WARN([Argon2 bundled (slow) reference implementation will be used, please consider to use system library with --enable-libargon2.])
+fi
+
+if test x$enable_internal_argon2 = xyes ; then
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_INTERNAL_ARGON2, 1, [Use internal Argon2])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2, test x$enable_internal_argon2 = xyes)
+
 dnl Magic for cryptsetup.static build.
 if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 	saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
@@ -342,20 +447,27 @@ if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 	PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
 fi
 
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for systemd tmpfiles config directory])
+PKG_CHECK_VAR([systemd_tmpfilesdir], [systemd], [tmpfilesdir], [], [systemd_tmpfilesdir=no])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$systemd_tmpfilesdir])
+
 AC_SUBST([DEVMAPPER_LIBS])
 AC_SUBST([DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS])
 
 AC_SUBST([PWQUALITY_LIBS])
 AC_SUBST([PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS])
 
+AC_SUBST([PASSWDQC_LIBS])
+
 AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_CFLAGS])
 AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_LIBS])
 AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS])
 
+AC_SUBST([JSON_C_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([LIBARGON2_LIBS])
+
 AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION])
 AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO])
-AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_FIPS])
-AC_SUBST([FIPS_MODULE_FILE])
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([dev-random], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-dev-random],
@@ -380,6 +492,13 @@ AC_DEFUN([CS_NUM_WITH], [AC_ARG_WITH([$1],
 	[CS_DEFINE([$1], [$3], [$2])]
 )])
 
+AC_DEFUN([CS_ABSPATH], [
+	case "$1" in
+		/*) ;;
+		*) AC_MSG_ERROR([$2 argument must be an absolute path.]);;
+	esac
+])
+
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl Python bindings
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([python], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-python],[enable Python bindings]),
@@ -393,14 +512,19 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([python_version],
 if test "x$with_python" = "xyes"; then
 	AM_PATH_PYTHON([$PYTHON_VERSION])
 
-	if ! test -x "$PYTHON-config" ; then
-            AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find python development packages to build bindings])
+	AC_PATH_PROGS([PYTHON_CONFIG], [python${PYTHON_VERSION}-config python-config], [no])
+	if test "${PYTHON_CONFIG}" = "no"; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot find python${PYTHON_VERSION}-config or python-config in PATH])
 	fi
 
-	PYTHON_INCLUDES=$($PYTHON-config --includes)
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for python headers using $PYTHON_CONFIG --includes)
+	PYTHON_INCLUDES=$($PYTHON_CONFIG --includes)
+	AC_MSG_RESULT($PYTHON_INCLUDES)
 	AC_SUBST(PYTHON_INCLUDES)
 
-	PYTHON_LIBS=$($PYTHON-config --libs)
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for python libraries using $PYTHON_CONFIG --libs)
+	PYTHON_LIBS=$($PYTHON_CONFIG --libs)
+	AC_MSG_RESULT($PYTHON_LIBS)
 	AC_SUBST(PYTHON_LIBS)
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL([PYTHON_CRYPTSETUP], [test "x$with_python" = "xyes"])
@@ -411,11 +535,16 @@ CS_STR_WITH([plain-cipher], [cipher for plain mode], [aes])
 CS_STR_WITH([plain-mode],   [cipher mode for plain mode], [cbc-essiv:sha256])
 CS_NUM_WITH([plain-keybits],[key length in bits for plain mode], [256])
 
-CS_STR_WITH([luks1-hash],   [hash function for LUKS1 header], [sha1])
+CS_STR_WITH([luks1-hash],   [hash function for LUKS1 header], [sha256])
 CS_STR_WITH([luks1-cipher], [cipher for LUKS1], [aes])
 CS_STR_WITH([luks1-mode],   [cipher mode for LUKS1], [xts-plain64])
 CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-keybits],[key length in bits for LUKS1], [256])
-CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-iter-time],[PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS1 (in ms)], [1000])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks2-pbkdf],           [Default PBKDF algorithm (pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id) for LUKS2], [argon2i])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-iter-time],       [PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS1 (in ms)], [2000])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-iter-time],       [Argon2 PBKDF iteration time for LUKS2 (in ms)], [2000])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-memory-kb],       [Argon2 PBKDF memory cost for LUKS2 (in kB)], [1048576])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-parallel-threads],[Argon2 PBKDF max parallel cost for LUKS2 (if CPUs available)], [4])
 
 CS_STR_WITH([loopaes-cipher], [cipher for loop-AES mode], [aes])
 CS_NUM_WITH([loopaes-keybits],[key length in bits for loop-AES mode], [256])
@@ -427,21 +556,47 @@ CS_STR_WITH([verity-hash],       [hash function for verity mode], [sha256])
 CS_NUM_WITH([verity-data-block], [data block size for verity mode], [4096])
 CS_NUM_WITH([verity-hash-block], [hash block size for verity mode], [4096])
 CS_NUM_WITH([verity-salt-size],  [salt size for verity mode], [32])
+CS_NUM_WITH([verity-fec-roots],  [parity bytes for verity FEC], [2])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([tmpfilesdir], [override default path to directory with systemd temporary files], [])
+test -z "$with_tmpfilesdir" && with_tmpfilesdir=$systemd_tmpfilesdir
+test "x$with_tmpfilesdir" = "xno" || {
+	CS_ABSPATH([${with_tmpfilesdir}],[with-tmpfilesdir])
+	DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR=$with_tmpfilesdir
+	AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR)
+}
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTSETUP_TMPFILE, test -n "$DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR")
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks2-lock-path], [path to directory for LUKSv2 locks], [/run/cryptsetup])
+test -z "$with_luks2_lock_path" && with_luks2_lock_path=/run/cryptsetup
+CS_ABSPATH([${with_luks2_lock_path}],[with-luks2-lock-path])
+DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH=$with_luks2_lock_path
+AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH)
+
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-lock-dir-perms], [default luks2 locking directory permissions], [0700])
+test -z "$with_luks2_lock_dir_perms" && with_luks2_lock_dir_perms=0700
+DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS=$with_luks2_lock_dir_perms
+AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS)
+
+dnl Override default LUKS format version (for cryptsetup or cryptsetup-reencrypt format actions only).
+AC_ARG_WITH([default_luks_format],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-default-luks-format=FORMAT], [default LUKS format version (LUKS1/LUKS2) [LUKS1]]),
+	[], with_default_luks_format=LUKS1
+)
+
+case $with_default_luks_format in
+	LUKS1) default_luks=CRYPT_LUKS1 ;;
+	LUKS2) default_luks=CRYPT_LUKS2 ;;
+	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown default LUKS format. Use LUKS1 or LUKS2 only.]) ;;
+esac
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([DEFAULT_LUKS_FORMAT], [$default_luks], [default LUKS format version])
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 
 AC_CONFIG_FILES([ Makefile
-lib/Makefile
 lib/libcryptsetup.pc
-lib/crypto_backend/Makefile
-lib/luks1/Makefile
-lib/loopaes/Makefile
-lib/verity/Makefile
-lib/tcrypt/Makefile
-src/Makefile
 po/Makefile.in
-man/Makefile
+scripts/cryptsetup.conf
 tests/Makefile
-python/Makefile
 ])
 AC_OUTPUT

docs/ChangeLog.old

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
 	* Document cryptsetup exit codes.
 
 2011-03-18  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
-	* Respect maximum keyfile size paramater.
+	* Respect maximum keyfile size parameter.
 	* Introduce maximum default keyfile size, add configure option.
 	* Require the whole key read from keyfile in create command (broken in 1.2.0).
 	* Fix offset option for loopaesOpen.
@@ -334,13 +334,13 @@
 	* Version 1.1.0.
 
 2010-01-10  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
-	* Fix initialisation of gcrypt duting luksFormat.
-	* Convert hash name to lower case in header (fix sha1 backward comatible header)
+	* Fix initialisation of gcrypt during luksFormat.
+	* Convert hash name to lower case in header (fix sha1 backward compatible header)
 	* Check for minimum required gcrypt version.
 
 2009-12-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
 	* Fix key slot iteration count calculation (small -i value was the same as default).
-	* The slot and key digest iteration minimun is now 1000.
+	* The slot and key digest iteration minimum is now 1000.
 	* The key digest iteration # is calculated from iteration time (approx 1/8 of that).
 	* Version 1.1.0-rc4.
 
@@ -395,16 +395,16 @@
 	* Require device device-mapper to build and do not use backend wrapper for dm calls.
 	* Move memory locking and dm initialization to command layer.
 	* Increase priority of process if memory is locked.
-	* Add log macros and make logging modre consitent.
+	* Add log macros and make logging more consistent.
 	* Move command successful messages to verbose level.
 	* Introduce --debug parameter.
 	* Move device utils code and provide context parameter (for log).
 	* Keyfile now must be provided by path, only stdin file descriptor is used (api only).
 	* Do not call isatty() on closed keyfile descriptor.
-	* Run performance check for PBKDF2 from LUKS code, do not mix hash algoritms results.
+	* Run performance check for PBKDF2 from LUKS code, do not mix hash algorithms results.
 	* Add ability to provide pre-generated master key and UUID in LUKS header format.
 	* Add LUKS function to verify master key digest.
-	* Move key slot manuipulation function into LUKS specific code.
+	* Move key slot manipulation function into LUKS specific code.
 	* Replace global options struct with separate parameters in helper functions.
 	* Add new libcryptsetup API (documented in libcryptsetup.h).
 	* Implement old API calls using new functions.
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@
 	* Add --master-key-file option for luksFormat and luksAddKey.
 
 2009-08-17  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
-	* Fix PBKDF2 speed calculation for large passhrases.
+	* Fix PBKDF2 speed calculation for large passphrases.
 	* Allow using passphrase provided in options struct for LuksOpen.
 	* Allow restrict keys size in LuksOpen.
 
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@
 	* Switch PBKDF2 from internal SHA1 to libgcrypt, make hash algorithm not hardcoded to SHA1 here.
 	* Add required parameters for changing hash used in LUKS key setup scheme.
 	* Do not export simple XOR helper now used only inside AF functions.
-	* Completely remove internal SHA1 implementanion code, not needed anymore.
+	* Completely remove internal SHA1 implementation code, not needed anymore.
 	* Enable hash algorithm selection for LUKS through -h luksFormat option.
 
 2009-07-28  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@
 
 2005-12-06  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* man/cryptsetup.8: Correct "seconds" to "microseconds" in the explaination for -i.
+	* man/cryptsetup.8: Correct "seconds" to "microseconds" in the explanation for -i.
 
 2005-11-09  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@
 
 2005-09-08  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Fixed another incompatiblity with
+	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Fixed another incompatibility with
 	original cryptsetup.
 
 2005-08-20  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@
 
 	* man/cryptsetup.1: Add man page.
 
-	* lib/setup.c: Remove unneccessary LUKS_write_phdr call, so the
+	* lib/setup.c: Remove unnecessary LUKS_write_phdr call, so the
 	phdr is written after passphrase reading, so the user can change
 	his mind, and not have a partial written LUKS header on it's disk.
 

docs/Keyring.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+Integration with kernel keyring service
+---------------------------------------
+
+We have two different use cases for kernel keyring service:
+
+I) Volume keys
+
+Since upstream kernel 4.10 dm-crypt device mapper target allows loading volume
+key (VK) in kernel keyring service. The key offloaded in kernel keyring service
+is only referenced (by key description) in dm-crypt target and the VK is therefore
+no longer stored directly in dm-crypt target. Starting with cryptsetup 2.0 we
+load VK in kernel keyring by default for LUKSv2 devices (when dm-crypt with the
+feature is available).
+
+Currently cryptsetup loads VK in 'logon' type kernel key so that VK is passed in
+the kernel and can't be read from userspace afterward. Also cryptsetup loads VK in
+thread keyring (before passing the reference to dm-crypt target) so that the key
+lifetime is directly bound to the process that performs the dm-crypt setup. When
+cryptsetup process exits (for whatever reason) the key gets unlinked in kernel
+automatically. In summary, the key description visible in dm-crypt table line is
+a reference to VK that usually no longer exists in kernel keyring service if you
+used cryptsetup to for device activation.
+
+Using this feature dm-crypt no longer maintains a direct key copy (but there's
+always at least one copy in kernel crypto layer).
+
+II) Keyslot passphrase
+The second use case for kernel keyring is to allow cryptsetup reading the keyslot
+passphrase stored in kernel keyring instead. The user may load passphrase in kernel
+keyring and notify cryptsetup to read it from there later. Currently, cryptsetup
+cli supports kernel keyring for passphrase only via LUKS2 internal token
+(luks2-keyring). Library also provides a general method for device activation by
+reading passphrase from keyring: crypt_activate_by_keyring(). The key type
+for use case II) must always be 'user' since we need to read the actual key
+data from userspace unlike with VK in I). Ability to read keyslot passphrase
+from kernel keyring also allows easily auto-activate LUKS2 devices.
+
+Simple example how to use kernel keyring for keyslot passphrase:
+
+1) create LUKS2 keyring token for keyslot 0 (in LUKS2 device/image)
+cryptsetup token add --key-description my:key -S 0 /dev/device
+
+2) Load keyslot passphrase in user keyring
+read -s -p "Keyslot passphrase: "; echo -n $REPLY | keyctl padd user my:key @u
+
+3) Activate device using passphrase stored in kernel keyring
+cryptsetup open /dev/device my_unlocked_device
+
+4a) unlink the key when no longer needed by
+keyctl unlink %user:my:key @u
+
+4b) or revoke it immediately by
+keyctl revoke %user:my:key
+
+If cryptsetup asks for passphrase in step 3) something went wrong with keyring
+activation. See --debug output then.

docs/LUKS2-format.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+LUKS2 on-disk format
+====================
+
+Note: these are temporary documentation notes only.
+The more formal definition will be published later.
+
+Design goals
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The LUKS2 is an on-disk storage format designed to
+provide simple key management, primarily intended for Full Disk
+Encryption based on dm-crypt.
+
+The LUKS2 is highly inspired by LUKS1 format and in some
+specific situations (most of the default installations) can be converted
+in-place (in both ways - to and from LUKS1).
+
+The LUKS2 format is designed to allow future updates of various
+parts without the need to modify binary structures.
+
+On-disk format provides redundancy of metadata, detection
+of metadata corruption and automatic repair from metadata copy.
+
+NOTE: For security reasons, there is no redundancy in keyslots
+binary data (encrypted keys) but format allows updating to redundant
+keyslot encryption in future (add forward error correction codes
+is one possibility).
+
+On-disk structure
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The LUKS2 header contains three parts:
+ - binary header (one 4096 bytes sector)
+ - area for metadata stored in JSON format
+ - keyslot area (per-context binary data).
+
+ The binary header and JSON area are stored twice to increase
+ redundancy. Keyslot area is allocated per-demand, and it is stored only once.
+
+The basic on-disk structure is then
+
+0        4096
+| bin hdr1 | JSON ... | bin hdr2 | JSON ... | Keyslot data | <padding> | (data payload)
+
+Binary header
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The binary header is intended for quick scanning (by blkid and udev) and contains
+magic string to detect the device, basic information (labels), header size information
+and metadata checksum.
+Checksum covers both binary data and following JSON area and is calculated
+with checksum fields zeroed. By default plain SHA256 checksum is used.
+
+The primary binary header is always stored in sector 0 of the device.
+
+The C structure of binary header (see luks2.h) is
+
+#define LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST "LUKS\xba\xbe"
+#define LUKS2_MAGIC_2ND "SKUL\xba\xbe"
+#define LUKS2_MAGIC_L 6
+#define LUKS2_UUID_L 40
+#define LUKS2_LABEL_L 48
+#define LUKS2_SALT_L 64
+#define LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L 32
+#define LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L 64
+
+struct luks2_hdr_disk {
+  char	   magic[LUKS2_MAGIC_L]; /* "LUKS\xba\xbe" (1st) or "SKUL\xba\be" (2nd) */
+  uint16_t version;              /* Version 2 */
+  uint64_t hdr_size;             /* in bytes, including JSON area */
+  uint64_t seqid;                /* sequence ID, increased on every update */
+  char     label[LUKS2_LABEL_L]; /* ASCII label or empty */
+  char     checksum_alg[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L]; /* checksum algorithm, "sha256" */
+  uint8_t  salt[LUKS2_SALT_L];   /* random salt, unique for every header */
+  char	   uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L];   /* UUID of device */
+  char	   subsystem[LUKS2_LABEL_L]; /* owner subsystem label or empty */
+  uint64_t hdr_offset;	         /* header offset from device start in bytes */
+  char	  _padding[184];         /* must be zeroed */
+  uint8_t  csum[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L]; /* header checksum */
+  char	  _padding4096[7*512];   /* must be zeroed */
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+The LUKS1 compatible field (magic, UUID) are placed intentionally on the same offsets.
+The header version must be set to 2.
+The UUID is the same format as in LUKS1.
+
+Magic string differs between the first and second header.
+
+The hdr_offset must match physical header offset on the device.
+If hdr_offset  does not match, the header is misplaced and must not be used.
+(It is a prevention to partition resize or manipulation with device start offset.)
+
+The hdr_size contains the size of the binary header and JSON data area.
+The offset and size of the second (backup) header must match to these data.
+(Prevention to rewrite of a header with different JSON area size.)
+
+There are two labels - label and subsystem. Content of these fields will be visible
+in UDEV/blkid scan and can be used for similar purposes as a filesystem label.
+These fields are by default empty.
+
+The salt field in binary header is generated by an RNG and is different for
+every header, even the backup header must contain a different salt.
+The salt in binary header is not used after the header is read, the main intention
+is to avoid deduplication of the header sector.
+The salt must be regenerated on every header repair (but not on regular update).
+
+The sequential number (seqid) is a counter that is always increased when a new
+update of the header is written. The header with higher seqid is more recent and
+is used for recovery (if there are two headers with different seqid, the
+more recent one is automatically used).
+
+The rest of binary header must be zeroed.
+
+JSON area
+~~~~~~~~~
+The JSON area starts immediately after the binary header. Its size is set
+by binary header hdr_size field (JSON area size  = hdr_size - 4096).
+
+The area contains metadata in JSON format and is fixed. Unused remainder
+of the area must be empty.
+
+The header cannot store larger metadata that this fixed buffer and header
+size must be set properly during format. For now, only areas with 14 kB
+header (4kB binary header + 14kB JSON area) is created during format.
+
+The JSON is structured to be able to describe system in very generic way,
+but LUKS2 intentionally limits options to values that are supportable
+in implemented version.
+
+JSON structure is as follows:
+
+Mandatory sections (must be present but some can be empty):
+ - config
+ - keyslots
+ - digests
+ - segments
+ - tokens
+
+Except for config section, all section contains array of objects that must be named
+as number (unsigned integer) - for example keyslot "0", "1" etc.
+Every object is typed (must contain attribute "type").
+According to type, library decides how to handle (or ignore) such an object.
+
+Binary data inside JSON (for example salt) is stored in Hexa64 encoding.
+
+If a value is needed to be stored as a 64bit integer (usually offset or size),
+it is stored in text format and later converted to the 64bit integer.
+(JSON cannot store 64bit integers directly.)
+
+Config section
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Config contains information about JSON buffer size (cross-checked with binary header),
+keyslot area size and optional object with activation flags.
+
+The "flags" section is array of activation flags that are automatically used
+when LUKS device is activated (for example it can unconditionally allow TRIM/discard
+functionality on the encrypted device).
+
+Segments sections
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The segment is an encrypted area on the disk containing data (in LUKS1 often
+mentioned as a data payload).
+For now, only one data area is available for the user.
+(More segments will be later used for on-line re-encryption functionality.)
+
+Segments contain definition about encryption parameters, sector size and
+start and length of the segments. By default, the segment starts directly
+after the LUKS2 header and is marked as "dynamic" (it automatically detects
+the size of the available device).
+
+Optionally it can contain information about data integrity protection,
+then the data segments is formatted as dm-integrity device and dm-crypt
+encryption is stacked above.
+
+To activate a segment, there must be at least one digest linked to it.
+
+Keyslots section
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Keyslot object contains information stored key - area, where it is stored
+(keyslot data), encryption, anti-forensic function, and Key Derivation Function
+and its parameters (PBKDF type, costs, salt).
+
+For now, only internal "luks2" keyslot type is available, it uses the same logic
+as LUKS1 keyslot, but allows to define per-keyslot algorithms
+(for example different PBKDF).
+
+Digests section
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The digest is used to verify that volume key decrypted from a keyslot is correct.
+A digest is linked to keyslots and segment.
+
+For now, only "pbkdf2" digest (LUKS1 compatible digest that uses PBKDF2)
+is supported.
+
+Tokens section
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+A token is an object that can describe "how to get passphrase or key" to unlock
+particular keyslot or it can be used t store any additional data (even unrelated
+to a keyslot).
+This area can be user configurable, and libcryptsetup provides interface to
+store used data directly in JSON format.
+Some token types are implemented internally, for now, there is only "luks2-keyring".
+type. This token type tries to load unlocking passphrase from kernel keyring
+with stored identification.
+
+There can be external application that uses token objects to store metadata and
+implements bindings to specific hardware (TPM etc.).
+
+LUKS2 JSON Format Example
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+For illustration this is example of a LUKS2 device JSON:
+
+{
+  "keyslots":{
+    "0":{
+      "type":"luks2",
+      "key_size":32,
+      "kdf":{
+        "type":"argon2i",
+        "time":181,
+        "memory":1024,
+        "cpus":4,
+        "salt":"Xfc5ScS8tCLrdbt6jtyWsBjCwAn3Msn\/enOYaAq8PEo="
+      },
+      "af":{
+        "type":"luks1",
+        "hash":"sha256",
+        "stripes":4000
+      },
+      "area":{
+        "type":"raw",
+        "encryption":"aes-xts-plain64",
+        "key_size":32,
+        "offset":"32768",
+        "size":"131072"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "tokens":{
+    "0":{
+      "type":"luks2-keyring",
+      "keyslots":[
+        "0"
+      ],
+      "key_description":"my-token"
+    }
+  },
+  "segments":{
+    "0":{
+      "type":"crypt",
+      "offset":"4194304",
+      "iv_tweak":"0",
+      "size":"dynamic",
+      "encryption":"aes-xts-plain64",
+      "sector_size":512
+    }
+  },
+  "digests":{
+    "0":{
+      "type":"pbkdf2",
+      "keyslots":[
+        "0"
+      ],
+      "segments":[
+        "0"
+      ],
+      "hash":"sha256",
+      "iterations":155298,
+      "salt":"WgMOideLECc5hfnmFVu3bwttJpkfnpf2RayE2WhP8zU=",
+      "digest":"olobPk9pc0GItqofH78aMPmRaOZIbRevlvSlTZ91NLI="
+    }
+  },
+  "config":{
+    "json_size":"12288",
+    "keyslots_size":"4161536",
+    "flags":[
+      "allow-discards"
+    ]
+  }
+}

docs/LUKS2-locking.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+LUKS2 device locking overview
+=============================
+
+Why
+~~~
+
+LUKS2 format keeps two identical copies of metadata stored consecutively
+at the head of metadata device (file or bdev). The metadata
+area (both copies) must be updated in a single atomic operation to avoid
+header corruption during concurrent write.
+
+While with LUKS1 users may have clear knowledge of when a LUKS header is
+being updated (written to) or when it's being read solely the need for
+locking with legacy format was not so obvious as it is with the LUKSv2 format.
+
+With LUKS2 the boundary between read-only and read-write is blurry and what
+used to be the exclusively read-only operation (i.e., cryptsetup open command) may
+easily become read-update operation silently without user's knowledge.
+Major feature of LUKS2 format is resilience against accidental
+corruption of metadata (i.e., partial header overwrite by parted or cfdisk
+while creating partition on mistaken block device).
+Such header corruption is detected early on header read and auto-recovery
+procedure takes place (the corrupted header with checksum mismatch is being
+replaced by the secondary one if that one is intact).
+On current Linux systems header load operation may be triggered without user
+direct intervention for example by udev rule or from systemd service.
+Such clash of header read and auto-recovery procedure could have severe
+consequences with the worst case of having LUKS2 device unaccessible or being
+broken beyond repair.
+
+The whole locking of LUKSv2 device headers split into two categories depending
+what backend the header is stored on:
+
+I) block device
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+We perform flock() on file descriptors of files stored in a private
+directory (by default /run/lock/cryptsetup). The file name is derived
+from major:minor couple of affected block device. Note we recommend
+that access to private locking directory is supposed to be limited
+to superuser only. For this method to work the distribution needs
+to install the locking directory with appropriate access rights.
+
+II) regular files
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+First notable difference between headers stored in a file
+vs. headers stored in a block device is that headers in a file may be
+manipulated by the regular user unlike headers on block devices. Therefore
+we perform flock() protection on file with the luks2 header directly.
+
+Limitations
+~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+a) In general, the locking model provides serialization of I/Os targeting
+the header only. It means the header is always written or read at once
+while locking is enabled.
+We do not suppress any other negative effect that two or more concurrent
+writers of the same header may cause.
+
+b) The locking is not cluster aware in any way.

docs/doxyfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Doxyfile 1.7.4
+# Doxyfile 1.8.8
 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Project related configuration options
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ PROJECT_BRIEF          = "Public cryptsetup API"
 PROJECT_LOGO           =
 OUTPUT_DIRECTORY       = doxygen_api_docs
 CREATE_SUBDIRS         = NO
+ALLOW_UNICODE_NAMES    = NO
 OUTPUT_LANGUAGE        = English
 BRIEF_MEMBER_DESC      = YES
 REPEAT_BRIEF           = YES
@@ -27,11 +28,14 @@ INHERIT_DOCS           = YES
 SEPARATE_MEMBER_PAGES  = NO
 TAB_SIZE               = 8
 ALIASES                =
+TCL_SUBST              =
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C  = YES
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_JAVA   = NO
 OPTIMIZE_FOR_FORTRAN   = NO
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_VHDL   = NO
 EXTENSION_MAPPING      =
+MARKDOWN_SUPPORT       = YES
+AUTOLINK_SUPPORT       = YES
 BUILTIN_STL_SUPPORT    = NO
 CPP_CLI_SUPPORT        = NO
 SIP_SUPPORT            = NO
@@ -39,13 +43,15 @@ IDL_PROPERTY_SUPPORT   = YES
 DISTRIBUTE_GROUP_DOC   = NO
 SUBGROUPING            = YES
 INLINE_GROUPED_CLASSES = NO
+INLINE_SIMPLE_STRUCTS  = NO
 TYPEDEF_HIDES_STRUCT   = YES
-SYMBOL_CACHE_SIZE      = 0
+LOOKUP_CACHE_SIZE      = 0
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Build related configuration options
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 EXTRACT_ALL            = NO
 EXTRACT_PRIVATE        = NO
+EXTRACT_PACKAGE        = NO
 EXTRACT_STATIC         = NO
 EXTRACT_LOCAL_CLASSES  = YES
 EXTRACT_LOCAL_METHODS  = NO
@@ -58,6 +64,7 @@ INTERNAL_DOCS          = NO
 CASE_SENSE_NAMES       = YES
 HIDE_SCOPE_NAMES       = NO
 SHOW_INCLUDE_FILES     = YES
+SHOW_GROUPED_MEMB_INC  = NO
 FORCE_LOCAL_INCLUDES   = NO
 INLINE_INFO            = YES
 SORT_MEMBER_DOCS       = YES
@@ -73,13 +80,13 @@ GENERATE_DEPRECATEDLIST= YES
 ENABLED_SECTIONS       =
 MAX_INITIALIZER_LINES  = 30
 SHOW_USED_FILES        = YES
-SHOW_DIRECTORIES       = NO
 SHOW_FILES             = YES
 SHOW_NAMESPACES        = YES
 FILE_VERSION_FILTER    =
 LAYOUT_FILE            =
+CITE_BIB_FILES         =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options related to warning and progress messages
+# Configuration options related to warning and progress messages
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 QUIET                  = NO
 WARNINGS               = YES
@@ -89,9 +96,10 @@ WARN_NO_PARAMDOC       = NO
 WARN_FORMAT            = "$file:$line: $text"
 WARN_LOGFILE           =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options related to the input files
+# Configuration options related to the input files
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-INPUT                  = "doxygen_index" "../lib/libcryptsetup.h"
+INPUT                  = "doxygen_index.h" \
+                         "../lib/libcryptsetup.h"
 INPUT_ENCODING         = UTF-8
 FILE_PATTERNS          =
 RECURSIVE              = NO
@@ -107,8 +115,9 @@ INPUT_FILTER           =
 FILTER_PATTERNS        =
 FILTER_SOURCE_FILES    = NO
 FILTER_SOURCE_PATTERNS =
+USE_MDFILE_AS_MAINPAGE =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options related to source browsing
+# Configuration options related to source browsing
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 SOURCE_BROWSER         = NO
 INLINE_SOURCES         = NO
@@ -116,16 +125,19 @@ STRIP_CODE_COMMENTS    = YES
 REFERENCED_BY_RELATION = NO
 REFERENCES_RELATION    = NO
 REFERENCES_LINK_SOURCE = YES
+SOURCE_TOOLTIPS        = YES
 USE_HTAGS              = NO
 VERBATIM_HEADERS       = YES
+CLANG_ASSISTED_PARSING = NO
+CLANG_OPTIONS          =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options related to the alphabetical class index
+# Configuration options related to the alphabetical class index
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ALPHABETICAL_INDEX     = YES
 COLS_IN_ALPHA_INDEX    = 5
 IGNORE_PREFIX          =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options related to the HTML output
+# Configuration options related to the HTML output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_HTML          = YES
 HTML_OUTPUT            = html
@@ -133,13 +145,14 @@ HTML_FILE_EXTENSION    = .html
 HTML_HEADER            =
 HTML_FOOTER            =
 HTML_STYLESHEET        =
+HTML_EXTRA_STYLESHEET  =
 HTML_EXTRA_FILES       =
 HTML_COLORSTYLE_HUE    = 220
 HTML_COLORSTYLE_SAT    = 100
 HTML_COLORSTYLE_GAMMA  = 80
 HTML_TIMESTAMP         = YES
-HTML_ALIGN_MEMBERS     = YES
 HTML_DYNAMIC_SECTIONS  = NO
+HTML_INDEX_NUM_ENTRIES = 100
 GENERATE_DOCSET        = NO
 DOCSET_FEEDNAME        = "Doxygen generated docs"
 DOCSET_BUNDLE_ID       = org.doxygen.Project
@@ -163,19 +176,26 @@ QHG_LOCATION           =
 GENERATE_ECLIPSEHELP   = NO
 ECLIPSE_DOC_ID         = org.doxygen.Project
 DISABLE_INDEX          = NO
-ENUM_VALUES_PER_LINE   = 4
 GENERATE_TREEVIEW      = NO
-USE_INLINE_TREES       = NO
+ENUM_VALUES_PER_LINE   = 4
 TREEVIEW_WIDTH         = 250
 EXT_LINKS_IN_WINDOW    = NO
 FORMULA_FONTSIZE       = 10
 FORMULA_TRANSPARENT    = YES
 USE_MATHJAX            = NO
+MATHJAX_FORMAT         = HTML-CSS
 MATHJAX_RELPATH        = http://www.mathjax.org/mathjax
+MATHJAX_EXTENSIONS     =
+MATHJAX_CODEFILE       =
 SEARCHENGINE           = YES
 SERVER_BASED_SEARCH    = NO
+EXTERNAL_SEARCH        = NO
+SEARCHENGINE_URL       =
+SEARCHDATA_FILE        = searchdata.xml
+EXTERNAL_SEARCH_ID     =
+EXTRA_SEARCH_MAPPINGS  =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options related to the LaTeX output
+# Configuration options related to the LaTeX output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_LATEX         = YES
 LATEX_OUTPUT           = latex
@@ -186,13 +206,15 @@ PAPER_TYPE             = a4
 EXTRA_PACKAGES         =
 LATEX_HEADER           =
 LATEX_FOOTER           =
+LATEX_EXTRA_FILES      =
 PDF_HYPERLINKS         = YES
 USE_PDFLATEX           = YES
 LATEX_BATCHMODE        = NO
 LATEX_HIDE_INDICES     = NO
 LATEX_SOURCE_CODE      = NO
+LATEX_BIB_STYLE        = plain
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options related to the RTF output
+# Configuration options related to the RTF output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_RTF           = NO
 RTF_OUTPUT             = rtf
@@ -201,26 +223,31 @@ RTF_HYPERLINKS         = NO
 RTF_STYLESHEET_FILE    =
 RTF_EXTENSIONS_FILE    =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options related to the man page output
+# Configuration options related to the man page output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_MAN           = NO
 MAN_OUTPUT             = man
 MAN_EXTENSION          = .3
+MAN_SUBDIR             =
 MAN_LINKS              = NO
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options related to the XML output
+# Configuration options related to the XML output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_XML           = NO
 XML_OUTPUT             = xml
-XML_SCHEMA             =
-XML_DTD                =
 XML_PROGRAMLISTING     = YES
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options for the AutoGen Definitions output
+# Configuration options related to the DOCBOOK output
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+GENERATE_DOCBOOK       = NO
+DOCBOOK_OUTPUT         = docbook
+DOCBOOK_PROGRAMLISTING = NO
+#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Configuration options for the AutoGen Definitions output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_AUTOGEN_DEF   = NO
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# configuration options related to the Perl module output
+# Configuration options related to the Perl module output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_PERLMOD       = NO
 PERLMOD_LATEX          = NO
@@ -239,18 +266,20 @@ PREDEFINED             =
 EXPAND_AS_DEFINED      =
 SKIP_FUNCTION_MACROS   = YES
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration::additions related to external references
+# Configuration options related to external references
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 TAGFILES               =
 GENERATE_TAGFILE       =
 ALLEXTERNALS           = NO
 EXTERNAL_GROUPS        = YES
+EXTERNAL_PAGES         = YES
 PERL_PATH              =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Configuration options related to the dot tool
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 CLASS_DIAGRAMS         = YES
 MSCGEN_PATH            =
+DIA_PATH               =
 HIDE_UNDOC_RELATIONS   = YES
 HAVE_DOT               = NO
 DOT_NUM_THREADS        = 0
@@ -261,6 +290,7 @@ CLASS_GRAPH            = YES
 COLLABORATION_GRAPH    = YES
 GROUP_GRAPHS           = YES
 UML_LOOK               = NO
+UML_LIMIT_NUM_FIELDS   = 10
 TEMPLATE_RELATIONS     = NO
 INCLUDE_GRAPH          = YES
 INCLUDED_BY_GRAPH      = YES
@@ -269,9 +299,12 @@ CALLER_GRAPH           = NO
 GRAPHICAL_HIERARCHY    = YES
 DIRECTORY_GRAPH        = YES
 DOT_IMAGE_FORMAT       = png
+INTERACTIVE_SVG        = NO
 DOT_PATH               =
 DOTFILE_DIRS           =
 MSCFILE_DIRS           =
+DIAFILE_DIRS           =
+PLANTUML_JAR_PATH      =
 DOT_GRAPH_MAX_NODES    = 50
 MAX_DOT_GRAPH_DEPTH    = 0
 DOT_TRANSPARENT        = NO

docs/doxygen_index.h

@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
-/**
- * @mainpage Cryptsetup API
+/*! \mainpage Cryptsetup API
  *
- * The documentation covers public parts of cryptsetup API. In the following sections you'll find
+ * <b>The</b> documentation covers public parts of cryptsetup API. In the following sections you'll find
  * the examples that describe some features of cryptsetup API.
  * For more info about libcryptsetup API versions see
- * <a href="http://upstream-tracker.org/versions/libcryptsetup.html">Upstream Tracker</a>.
+ * <a href="https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/ABI-tracker/timeline/libcryptsetup/index.html">API Tracker</a>.
  *
  * <OL type="A">
  *	<LI>@ref cexamples "Cryptsetup API examples"</LI>
@@ -32,15 +31,13 @@
  * @section cexamples Cryptsetup API examples
  * 	@section cluks crypt_luks_usage - cryptsetup LUKS device type usage
  *	 	@subsection cinit crypt_init()
- *
- *	  		Every time you need to do something with cryptsetup or dmcrypt device
+ *			Every time you need to do something with cryptsetup or dmcrypt device
  *			you need a valid context. The first step to start your work is
  *			@ref crypt_init call. You can call it either with path
  *			to the block device or path to the regular file. If you don't supply the path,
  *			empty context is initialized.
  *
  *		@subsection cformat crypt_format() - header and payload on mutual device
- *
  *	 		This section covers basic use cases for formatting LUKS devices. Format operation
  *			sets device type in context and in case of LUKS header is written at the beginning
  *			of block device. In the example bellow we use the scenario where LUKS header and data
@@ -51,42 +48,35 @@
  *			overwrites part of the backing block device.
  *
  *		@subsection ckeys Keyslot operations examples
- *
  *			After successful @ref crypt_format of LUKS device, volume key is not stored
  *			in a persistent way on the device. Keyslot area is an array beyond LUKS header, where
  *			volume key is stored in the encrypted form using user input passphrase. For more info about
  *			LUKS keyslots and how it's actually protected, please look at
- *			<A HREF="http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/Specification">LUKS specification</A>.
+ *			<A HREF="https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification">LUKS specification</A>.
  *			There are two basic methods to create a new keyslot:
  *
  *			@subsection ckeyslot_vol crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key()
- *
  *				Creates a new keyslot directly by encrypting volume_key stored in the device
  *				context. Passphrase should be supplied or user is prompted if passphrase param is
  *				NULL.
  *
  *			@subsection ckeyslot_pass crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase()
- *
  *				Creates a new keyslot for the volume key by opening existing active keyslot,
  *				extracting volume key from it and storing it into a new keyslot
  *				protected by a new passphrase
  *
  *		@subsection cload crypt_load()
- *
  *			Function loads header from backing block device into device context.
  *
  *		@subsection cactivate crypt_activate_by_passphrase()
- *
  *			Activates crypt device by user supplied password for keyslot containing the volume_key.
  *			If <I>keyslot</I> parameter is set to <I>CRYPT_ANY_SLOT</I> then all active keyslots
  *			are tried one by one until the volume key is found.
  *
  *	 	@subsection cactive_pars crypt_get_active_device()
- *
  *	 		This call returns structure containing runtime attributes of active device.
  *
  *	 	@subsection cinit_by_name crypt_init_by_name()
- *
  *	 		In case you need to do operations with active device (device which already
  *	 		has its corresponding mapping) and you miss valid device context stored in
  *	 		*crypt_device reference, you should use this call. Function tries to
@@ -94,22 +84,18 @@
  *	 		header.
  *
  *			@subsection cdeactivate crypt_deactivate()
- *
  *			Deactivates crypt device (removes DM mapping and safely erases volume key from kernel).
  *
  *		@subsection cluks_ex crypt_luks_usage.c - Complex example
- *
  *			To compile and run use following commands in examples directory:
  *
  * @code
  * make
  * ./crypt_luks_usage _path_to_[block_device]_file
  * @endcode
- *
  *			Note that you need to have the cryptsetup library compiled. @include crypt_luks_usage.c
  *
  *	@section clog crypt_log_usage - cryptsetup logging API example
- *
  *		Example describes basic use case for cryptsetup logging. To compile and run
  * 		use following commands in examples directory:
  *
@@ -117,7 +103,6 @@
  * make
  * ./crypt_log_usage
  * @endcode
- *
  *		Note that you need to have the cryptsetup library compiled. @include crypt_log_usage.c
  *
  *		@example crypt_luks_usage.c

docs/examples/crypt_log_usage.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * An example of using logging through libcryptsetup API
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

docs/examples/crypt_luks_usage.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * An example of using LUKS device through libcryptsetup API
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

docs/v1.3.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Important changes
    * NSS (because of missing ripemd160 it cannot provide full backward compatibility)
    * kernel userspace API (provided by kernel 2.6.38 and above)
      (Note that kernel userspace backend is very slow for this type of operation.
-      But it can be usefull for embedded systems, because you can avoid userspace
+      But it can be useful for embedded systems, because you can avoid userspace
       crypto library completely.)
 
    Backend is selected during configure time, using --with-crypto_backend option.

docs/v1.4.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ WARNING: This release removes old deprecated API from libcryptsetup
  (It can be used to simulate trivial hidden disk concepts.)
 
 libcryptsetup API changes:
-  * Added options to suport detached metadata device
+  * Added options to support detached metadata device
      crypt_init_by_name_and_header()
      crypt_set_data_device()
   * Add crypt_last_error() API call.

docs/v1.6.6-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.6 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.5
+
+* LUKS: Fix keyslot device access for devices which
+  do not support direct IO operations. (Regression in 1.6.5.)
+
+* LUKS: Fallback to old temporary keyslot device mapping method
+  if hash (for ESSIV) is not supported by userspace crypto
+  library. (Regression in 1.6.5.)
+
+* Properly activate device with discard (TRIM for SSDs)
+  if requested even if dm_crypt module is not yet loaded.
+  Only if discard is not supported by the old kernel then
+  the discard option is ignored.
+
+* Fix some static analysis build warnings (scan-build).
+
+* Report crypto lib version only once (and always add kernel
+  version) in debug output.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function through crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.

docs/v1.6.7-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.7 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.6
+
+* Cryptsetup git and wiki are now hosted on GitLab.
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup
+
+  Repository of stable releases remains on kernel.org site
+  https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/
+
+  For more info please see README file.
+
+* Cryptsetup TCRYPT mode now supports VeraCrypt devices (TrueCrypt extension).
+
+  The VeraCrypt extension only increases iteration count for the key
+  derivation function (on-disk format is the same as TrueCrypt format).
+
+  Note that unlocking of a VeraCrypt device can take very long time if used
+  on slow machines.
+
+  To use this extension, add --veracrypt option, for example
+    cryptsetup open --type tcrypt --veracrypt <container> <name>
+
+  For use through libcryptsetup, just add CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES flag.
+
+* Support keyfile-offset and keyfile-size options even for plain volumes.
+
+* Support keyfile option for luksAddKey if the master key is specified.
+
+* For historic reasons, hashing in the plain mode is not used
+  if keyfile is specified (with exception of --key-file=-).
+  Print a warning if these parameters are ignored.
+
+* Support permanent device decryption for cryptsetup-reencrypt.
+  To remove LUKS encryption from a device, you can now use --decrypt option.
+
+* Allow to use --header option in all LUKS commands.
+  The --header always takes precedence over positional device argument.
+
+* Allow luksSuspend without need to specify a detached header.
+
+* Detect if O_DIRECT is usable on a device allocation.
+  There are some strange storage stack configurations which wrongly allows
+  to open devices with direct-io but fails on all IO operations later.
+
+  Cryptsetup now tries to read the device first sector to ensure it can use
+  direct-io.
+
+*  Add low-level performance options tuning for dmcrypt (for Linux 4.0 and later).
+
+   Linux kernel 4.0 contains rewritten dmcrypt code which tries to better utilize
+   encryption on parallel CPU cores.
+
+   While tests show that this change increases performance on most configurations,
+   dmcrypt now provides some switches to change its new behavior.
+
+   You can use them (per-device) with these cryptsetup switches:
+      --perf-same_cpu_crypt
+      --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus
+
+  Please use these only in the case of serious performance problems.
+  Refer to the cryptsetup man page and dm-crypt documentation
+  (for same_cpu_crypt and submit_from_crypt_cpus options).
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
+
+* Get rid of libfipscheck library.
+  (Note that this option was used only for Red Hat and derived distributions.)
+  With recent FIPS changes we do not need to link to this FIPS monster anymore.
+  Also drop some no longer needed FIPS mode checks.
+
+* Many fixes and clarifications to man pages.
+
+* Prevent compiler to optimize-out zeroing of buffers for on-stack variables.
+
+* Fix a crash if non-GNU strerror_r is used.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function through crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.

docs/v1.6.8-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.8 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.7
+
+* If the null cipher (no encryption) is used, allow only empty password for LUKS.
+  (Previously cryptsetup accepted any password in this case.)
+
+  The null cipher can be used only for testing and it is used temporarily during
+  offline encrypting not yet encrypted device (cryptsetup-reencrypt tool).
+
+  Accepting only empty password prevents situation when someone adds another
+  LUKS device using the same UUID (UUID of existing LUKS device) with faked
+  header containing null cipher.
+  This could force user to use different LUKS device (with no encryption)
+  without noticing.
+  (IOW it prevents situation when attacker intentionally forces
+  user to boot into different system just by LUKS header manipulation.)
+
+  Properly configured systems should have an additional integrity protection
+  in place here (LUKS here provides only confidentiality) but it is better
+  to not allow this situation in the first place.
+
+  (For more info see QubesOS Security Bulletin QSB-019-2015.)
+
+* Properly support stdin "-" handling for luksAddKey for both new and old
+  keyfile parameters.
+
+* If encrypted device is file-backed (it uses underlying loop device),
+  cryptsetup resize will try to resize underlying loop device as well.
+  (It can be used to grow up file-backed device in one step.)
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows to use empty password through stdin pipe.
+  (Intended only for testing in scripts.)
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+
+Direct terminal handling and password calling callback for passphrase
+entry will be removed from libcryptsetup in next major (2.x) version
+(application should handle it itself).
+It means that application have to always provide password in API calls.
+
+Functions returning last error will be removed in next major version (2.x).
+These functions did not work properly for early initialization errors
+and application can implement better function easily using own error callback.
+
+See comments in libcryptsetup.h for more info about deprecated functions.

docs/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+The cryptsetup 1.7 release changes defaults for LUKS,
+there are no API changes.
+
+Changes since version 1.6.8
+
+* Default hash function is now SHA256 (used in key derivation function
+  and anti-forensic splitter).
+
+  Note that replacing SHA1 with SHA256 is not for security reasons.
+  (LUKS does not have problems even if collisions are found for SHA1,
+  for details see FAQ item 5.20).
+
+  Using SHA256 as default is mainly to prevent compatibility problems
+  on hardened systems where SHA1 is already be phased out.
+
+  Note that all checks (kernel crypto API availability check) now uses
+  SHA256 as well.
+
+* Default iteration time for PBKDF2 is now 2 seconds.
+
+  Increasing iteration time is in combination with PBKDF2 benchmark
+  fixes a try to keep PBKDF2 iteration count still high enough and
+  also still acceptable for users.
+
+  N.B. Long term is to replace PBKDF2 algorithm with Password Hashing
+  Competition winner - Argon2.
+
+  Distributions can still change these defaults in compilation time.
+
+  You can change iteration time and used hash function in existing LUKS
+  header with cryptsetup-reencrypt utility even without full reencryption
+  of device (see --keep-key option).
+
+* Fix PBKDF2 iteration benchmark for longer key sizes.
+
+  The previous PBKDF2 benchmark code did not take into account
+  output key length properly.
+
+  For SHA1 (with 160-bits output) and 256-bit keys (and longer)
+  it means that the final iteration value was higher than it should be.
+
+  For other hash algorithms (like SHA256 or SHA512) it caused
+  that iteration count was lower (in comparison to SHA1) than
+  expected for the requested time period.
+
+  The PBKDF2 benchmark code is now fixed to use the key size for
+  the formatted device (or default LUKS key size if running in informational
+  benchmark mode).
+
+  Thanks to A.Visconti, S.Bossi, A.Calo and H.Ragab
+  (http://www.club.di.unimi.it/) for point this out.
+  (Based on "What users should know about Full Disk Encryption
+  based on LUKS" paper to be presented on CANS2015).
+
+* Remove experimental warning for reencrypt tool.
+  The strong request for full backup before using reencryption utility
+  still applies :)
+
+* Add optional libpasswdqc support for new LUKS passwords.
+
+  If password is entered through terminal (no keyfile specified) and
+  cryptsetup is compiled with --enable-passwdqc[=/etc/passwdqc.conf],
+  configured system passwdqc settings are used to check password quality.
+
+* Update FAQ document.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+
+Direct terminal handling and password calling callback for passphrase
+entry will be removed from libcryptsetup in next major (2.x) version
+(application should handle it itself).
+It means that application have to always provide password in API calls.
+
+Functions returning last error will be removed in next major version (2.x).
+These functions did not work properly for early initialization errors
+and application can implement better function easily using own error callback.
+
+See comments in libcryptsetup.h for more info about deprecated functions.

docs/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.0
+
+* Code now uses kernel crypto API backend according to new
+  changes introduced in mainline kernel
+
+  While mainline kernel should contain backward compatible
+  changes, some stable series kernels do not contain fully
+  backported compatibility patches.
+  Without these patches  most of cryptsetup operations
+  (like unlocking device) fail.
+
+  This change in cryptsetup ensures that all operations using
+  kernel crypto API works even on these kernels.
+
+* The cryptsetup-reencrypt utility now properly detects removal
+  of underlying link to block device and does not remove
+  ongoing re-encryption log.
+  This allows proper recovery (resume) of reencrypt operation later.
+
+  NOTE: Never use /dev/disk/by-uuid/ path for reencryption utility,
+  this link disappears once the device metadata is temporarily
+  removed from device.
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows special "-" (standard input) keyfile handling
+  even for TCRYPT (TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt compatible) devices.
+
+* Cryptsetup now fails if there are more keyfiles specified
+  for non-TCRYPT device.
+
+* The luksKillSlot command now does not suppress provided password
+  in batch mode (if password is wrong slot is not destroyed).
+  Note that not providing password in batch mode means that keyslot
+  is destroyed unconditionally.

docs/v1.7.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.1
+
+* Update LUKS documentation format.
+  Clarify fixed sector size and keyslots alignment.
+
+* Support activation options for error handling modes in Linux kernel
+  dm-verity module:
+
+  --ignore-corruption - dm-verity just logs detected corruption
+
+  --restart-on-corruption - dm-verity restarts the kernel if corruption is detected
+
+  If the options above are not specified, default behavior for dm-verity remains.
+  Default is that I/O operation fails with I/O error if corrupted block is detected.
+
+  --ignore-zero-blocks - Instructs dm-verity to not verify blocks that are expected
+  to contain zeroes and always return zeroes directly instead.
+
+  NOTE that these options could have security or functional impacts,
+  do not use them without assessing the risks!
+
+* Fix help text for cipher benchmark specification (mention --cipher option).
+
+* Fix off-by-one error in maximum keyfile size.
+  Allow keyfiles up to compiled-in default and not that value minus one.
+
+* Support resume of interrupted decryption in cryptsetup-reencrypt utility.
+  To resume decryption, LUKS device UUID (--uuid option) option must be used.
+
+* Do not use direct-io for LUKS header with unaligned keyslots.
+  Such headers were used only by the first cryptsetup-luks-1.0.0 release (2005).
+
+* Fix device block size detection to properly work on particular file-based
+  containers over underlying devices with 4k sectors.

docs/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.2
+
+* Fix device access to hash offsets located beyond the 2GB device boundary in veritysetup.
+
+* Set configured (compile-time) default iteration time for devices created directly through
+  libcryptsetup (default was hardcoded 1 second, the configured value applied only
+  for cryptsetup application).
+
+* Fix PBKDF2 benchmark to not double iteration count for specific corner case.
+  If the measurement function returns exactly 500 ms, the iteration calculation loop
+  doubled iteration count but instead of repeating measurement it used this value directly.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: fix memory leak if hash context was repeatedly reused.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: add support for OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+* Fix several minor spelling errors.

docs/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.3
+
+* Allow to specify LUKS1 hash algorithm in Python luksFormat wrapper.
+
+* Use LUKS1 compiled-in defaults also in Python wrapper.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: Fix OpenSSL 1.1.0 support without backward compatible API.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: Fix LibreSSL compatibility.
+
+* Check for data device and hash device area overlap in veritysetup.
+
+* Fix a possible race while allocating a free loop device.
+
+* Fix possible file descriptor leaks if libcryptsetup is run from a forked process.
+
+* Fix missing same_cpu_crypt flag in status command.
+
+* Various updates to FAQ and man pages.

docs/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.4
+
+* Fixes to luksFormat to properly support recent kernel running in FIPS mode.
+
+  Cryptsetup must never use a weak key even if it is just used for testing
+  of algorithm availability. In FIPS mode, weak keys are always rejected.
+
+  A weak key is for example detected if the XTS encryption mode use
+  the same key for the tweak and the encryption part.
+
+* Fixes accesses to unaligned hidden legacy TrueCrypt header.
+
+  On a native 4k-sector device the old hidden TrueCrypt header is not
+  aligned with the hw sector size (this problem was fixed in later TrueCrypt
+  on-disk format versions).
+
+  Cryptsetup now properly aligns the read so it does not fail.
+
+* Fixes to optional dracut ramdisk scripts for offline re-encryption on initial boot.

docs/v2.0.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with experimental features.
+
+This version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+NOTE: This version changes soname of libcryptsetup library and increases
+major version for all public symbols.
+Most of the old functions are fully backward compatible, so only
+recompilation of programs should be needed.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption we need
+better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.0-RC1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Limit KDF requested (for format) memory by available physical memory.
+  On some systems too high requested amount of memory causes OOM killer
+  to kill the process (instead of returning ENOMEM).
+  We never try to use more than half of available physical memory.
+
+* Ignore device alignment if it is not multiple of minimal-io.
+  Some USB enclosures seems to report bogus topology info that
+  prevents to use LUKS detached header.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.0-RC0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Enable to use system libargon2 instead of bundled version.
+  Renames --disable-argon2 to --disable-internal-argon2 option
+  and adds --enable-libargon2 flag to allow system libargon2.
+
+* Changes in build system (Automake)
+  - The build system now uses non-recursive automake (except for tests).
+  (Tools binaries are now located in buildroot directory.)
+  - New --disable-cryptsetup option to disable build of cryptsetup tool.
+  - Enable build of cryptsetup-reencrypt by default.
+
+* Install tmpfiles.d configuration for LUKS2 locking directory.
+  You can overwrite this using --with-tmpfilesdir configure option.
+  If your distro does not support tmpfiles.d directory, you have
+  to create locking directory (/run/lock/cryptsetup) in cryptsetup
+  package (or init scripts).
+
+* Adds limited support for offline reencryption of LUKS2 format.
+
+* Decrease size of testing images (and the whole release archive).
+
+* Fixes for several memory leaks found by Valgrind and Coverity tools.
+
+* Fixes for several typos in man pages and error messages.
+
+* LUKS header file in luksFormat is now automatically created
+  if it does not exist.
+
+* Do not allow resize if device size is not aligned to sector size.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.0.0 RC0 Release Notes
+==================================
+
+Important features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* New command integritysetup: support for the new dm-integrity kernel target.
+
+  The dm-integrity is a new kernel device-mapper target that introduces
+  software emulation of per-sector integrity fields on the disk sector level.
+  It is available since Linux kernel version 4.12.
+
+  The provided per-sector metadata fields can be used for storing a data
+  integrity checksum (for example CRC32).
+  The dm-integrity implements data journal that enforces atomic update
+  of a sector and its integrity metadata.
+
+  Integritysetup is a CLI utility that can setup standalone dm-integrity
+  devices (that internally check integrity of data).
+
+  Integritysetup is intended to be used for settings that require
+  non-cryptographic data integrity protection with no data encryption.
+  Fo setting integrity protected encrypted devices, see disk authenticated
+  encryption below.
+
+  Note that after formatting the checksums need to be initialized;
+  otherwise device reads will fail because of integrity errors.
+  Integritysetup by default tries to wipe the device with zero blocks
+  to avoid this problem. Device wipe can be time-consuming, you can skip
+  this step by specifying --no-wipe option.
+  (But note that not wiping device can cause some operations to fail
+  if a write is not multiple of page size and kernel page cache tries
+  to read sectors with not yet initialized checksums.)
+
+  The default setting is tag size 4 bytes per-sector and CRC32C protection.
+  To format device with these defaults:
+  $ integritysetup format <device>
+  $ integritysetup open <device> <name>
+
+  Note that used algorithm (unlike tag size) is NOT stored in device
+  kernel superblock and if you use different algorithm, you MUST specify
+  it in every open command, for example:
+  $ integritysetup format <device> --tag-size 32 --integrity sha256
+  $ integritysetup open <device> <name> --integrity sha256
+
+  For more info, see integrity man page.
+
+* Veritysetup command can now format and activate dm-verity devices
+  that contain Forward Error Correction (FEC) (Reed-Solomon code is used).
+  This feature is used on most of Android devices already (available since
+  Linux kernel 4.5).
+
+  There are new options --fec-device, --fec-offset to specify data area
+  with correction code and --fec-roots that set Redd-Solomon generator roots.
+  This setting can be used for format command (veritysetup will calculate
+  and store RS codes) or open command (veritysetup configures kernel
+  dm-verity to use RS codes).
+
+  For more info see veritysetup man page.
+
+* Support for larger sector sizes for crypt devices.
+
+  LUKS2 and plain crypt devices can be now configured with larger encryption
+  sector (typically 4096 bytes, sector size must be the power of two,
+  maximal sector size is 4096 bytes for portability).
+  Large sector size can decrease encryption overhead and can also help
+  with some specific crypto hardware accelerators that perform very
+  badly with 512 bytes sectors.
+
+  Note that if you configure such a larger sector of the device that does use
+  smaller physical sector, there is a possibility of a data corruption during
+  power fail (partial sector writes).
+
+  WARNING: If you use different sector size for a plain device after data were
+  stored,  the decryption will produce garbage.
+
+  For LUKS2, the sector size is stored in metadata and cannot be changed later.
+
+LUKS2 format and features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The LUKS2 is an on-disk storage format designed to provide simple key
+management, primarily intended for Full Disk Encryption based on dm-crypt.
+
+The LUKS2 is inspired by LUKS1 format and in some specific situations (most
+of the default configurations) can be converted in-place from LUKS1.
+
+The LUKS2 format is designed to allow future updates of various
+parts without the need to modify binary structures and internally
+uses JSON text format for metadata. Compilation now requires the json-c library
+that is used for JSON data processing.
+
+On-disk format provides redundancy of metadata, detection
+of metadata corruption and automatic repair from metadata copy.
+
+NOTE: For security reasons, there is no redundancy in keyslots binary data
+(encrypted keys) but the format allows adding such a feature in future.
+
+NOTE: to operate correctly, LUKS2 requires locking of metadata.
+Locking is performed by using flock() system call for images in file
+and for block device by using a specific lock file in /run/lock/cryptsetup.
+
+This directory must be created by distribution (do not rely on internal
+fallback). For systemd-based distribution, you can simply install
+scripts/cryptsetup.conf into tmpfiles.d directory.
+
+For more details see LUKS2-format.txt and LUKS2-locking.txt in the docs
+directory. (Please note this is just overview, there will be more formal
+documentation later.)
+
+LUKS2 use
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+LUKS2 allows using all possible configurations as LUKS1.
+
+To format device as LUKS2, you have to add "--type luks2" during format:
+
+ $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device>
+
+All commands issued later will recognize the new format automatically.
+
+The newly added features in LUKS2 include:
+
+* Authenticated disk (sector) encryption (EXPERIMENTAL)
+
+  Legacy Full disk encryption (FDE), for example, LUKS1, is a length-preserving
+  encryption (plaintext is the same size as a ciphertext).
+  Such FDE can provide data confidentiality, but cannot provide sound data
+  integrity protection.
+
+  Full disk authenticated encryption is a way how to provide both
+  confidentiality and data integrity protection. Integrity protection here means
+  not only detection of random data corruption (silent data corruption) but also
+  prevention of an unauthorized intentional change of disk sector content.
+
+  NOTE: Integrity protection of this type cannot prevent a replay attack.
+  An attacker can replace the device or its part of the old content, and it
+  cannot be detected.
+  If you need such protection, better use integrity protection on a higher layer.
+
+  For data integrity protection on the sector level, we need additional
+  per-sector metadata space. In LUKS2 this space is provided by a new
+  device-mapper dm-integrity target (available since kernel 4.12).
+  Here the integrity target provides only reliable per-sector metadata store,
+  and the whole authenticated encryption is performed inside dm-crypt stacked
+  over the dm-integrity device.
+
+  For encryption, Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) is used.
+  Every sector is processed as a encryption request of this format:
+
+   |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --|
+   | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) |              |
+   | sector_LE |  IV |  sector in/out    |  tag in/out  |
+
+  AEAD encrypts the whole sector and also authenticates sector number
+  (to detect sector relocation) and also authenticates Initialization Vector.
+
+  AEAD encryption produces encrypted data and authentication tag.
+  The authenticated tag is then stored in per-sector metadata space provided
+  by dm-integrity.
+
+  Most of the current AEAD algorithms requires IV as a nonce, value that is
+  never reused. Because sector number, as an IV, cannot be used in this
+  environment, we use a new random IV (IV is a random value generated by system
+  RNG on every write). This random IV is then stored in the per-sector metadata
+  as well.
+
+  Because the authentication tag (and IV) requires additional space, the device
+  provided for a user has less capacity. Also, the data journalling means that
+  writes are performed twice, decreasing throughput.
+
+  This integrity protection works better with SSDs. If you want to ignore
+  dm-integrity data journal (because journalling is performed on some higher
+  layer or you just want to trade-off performance to safe recovery), you can
+  switch journal off with --integrity-no-journal option.
+  (This flag can be stored persistently as well.)
+
+  Note that (similar to integritysetup) the device read will fail if
+  authentication tag is not initialized (no previous write).
+  By default cryptsetup run wipe of a device (writing zeroes) to initialize
+  authentication tags. This operation can be very time-consuming.
+  You can skip device wipe using --integrity-no-wipe option.
+
+  To format LUKS2 device with integrity protection, use new --integrity option.
+
+  For now, there are very few AEAD algorithms that can be used, and some
+  of them are known to be problematic. In this release we support only
+  a few of AEAD algorithms (options are for now hard coded), later this
+  extension will be completely algorithm-agnostic.
+
+  For testing of authenticated encryption, these algorithms work for now:
+
+  1) aes-xts-plain64 with hmac-sha256 or hmac-sha512 as the authentication tag.
+     (Common FDE mode + independent authentication tag. Authentication key
+      for HMAC is independently generated. This mode is very slow.)
+     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher aes-xts-plain64 --integrity hmac-sha256
+
+  2) aes-gcm-random (native AEAD mode)
+     DO NOT USE in production! The GCM mode uses only 96-bit nonce,
+     and possible collision means fatal security problem.
+     GCM mode has very good hardware support through AES-NI, so it is useful
+     for performance testing.
+     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher aes-gcm-random --integrity aead
+
+  3) ChaCha20 with Poly1305 authenticator (according to RFC7539)
+     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher chacha20-random --integrity poly1305
+
+  To specify AES128/AES256 just specify proper key size (without possible
+  authentication key). Other symmetric ciphers, like Serpent or Twofish,
+  should work as well. The mode 1) and 2) should be compatible with IEEE 1619.1
+  standard recommendation.
+
+  There will be better suitable authenticated modes available soon
+  For now we are just preparing framework to enable it (and hopefully improve security of FDE).
+
+  FDE authenticated encryption is not a replacement for filesystem layer
+  authenticated encryption. The goal is to provide at least something because
+  data integrity protection is often completely ignored in today systems.
+
+* New memory-hard PBKDF
+
+  LUKS1 introduced Password-Based Key Derivation Function v2 as a tool to
+  increase attacker cost for a dictionary and brute force attacks.
+  The PBKDF2 uses iteration count to increase time of key derivation.
+  Unfortunately, with modern GPUs, the PBKDF2 calculations can be run
+  in parallel and PBKDF2 can no longer provide the best available protection.
+  Increasing iteration count just cannot prevent massive parallel dictionary
+  password attacks in long-term.
+
+  To solve this problem, a new PBKDF, based on so-called memory-hard functions
+  can be used. Key derivation with memory-hard function requires a certain
+  amount of memory to compute its output. The memory requirement is very
+  costly for GPUs and prevents these systems to operate effectively,
+  increasing cost for attackers.
+
+  LUKS2 introduces support for Argon2i and Argon2id as a PBKDF.
+  Argon2 is the winner of Password Hashing Competition and is currently
+  in final RFC draft specification.
+
+  For now, libcryptsetup contains the embedded copy of reference implementation
+  of Argon2 (that is easily portable to all architectures).
+  Later, once this function is available in common crypto libraries, it will
+  switch to external implementation. (This happened for LUKS1 and PBKDF2
+  as well years ago.)
+  With using reference implementation (that is not optimized for speed), there
+  is some performance penalty. However, using memory-hard PBKDF should still
+  significantly complicate GPU-optimized dictionary and brute force attacks.
+
+  The Argon2 uses three costs: memory, time (number of iterations) and parallel
+  (number of threads).
+  Note that time and memory cost highly influences each other (accessing a lot
+  of memory takes more time).
+
+  There is a new benchmark that tries to calculate costs to take similar way as
+  in LUKS1 (where iteration is measured to take 1-2 seconds on user system).
+  Because now there are more cost variables, it prefers time cost (iterations)
+  and tries to find required memory that fits. (IOW required memory cost can be
+  lower if the benchmarks are not able to find required parameters.)
+  The benchmark cannot run too long, so it tries to approximate next step
+  for benchmarking.
+
+  For now, default LUKS2 PBKDF algorithm is Argon2i (data independent variant)
+  with memory cost set to 128MB, time to 800ms and parallel thread according
+  to available CPU cores but no more than 4.
+
+  All default parameters can be set during compile time and also set on
+  the command line by using --pbkdf, --pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel and
+  --iter-time options.
+  (Or without benchmark directly by using --pbkdf-force-iterations, see below.)
+
+  You can still use PBKDF2 even for LUKS2 by specifying --pbkdf pbkdf2 option.
+  (Then only iteration count is applied.)
+
+* Use of kernel keyring
+
+  Kernel keyring is a storage for sensitive material (like cryptographic keys)
+  inside Linux kernel.
+
+  LUKS2 uses keyring for two major functions:
+
+   - To store volume key for dm-crypt where it avoids sending volume key in
+  every device-mapper ioctl structure. Volume key is also no longer directly
+  visible in a dm-crypt mapping table. The key is not available for the user
+  after dm-crypt configuration (obviously except direct memory scan).
+  Use of kernel keyring can be disabled in runtime by --disable-keyring option.
+
+   - As a tool to automatically unlock LUKS device if a passphrase is put into
+  kernel keyring and proper keyring token is configured.
+
+   This allows storing a secret (passphrase) to kernel per-user keyring by
+  some external tool (for example some TPM handler) and LUKS2, if configured,
+  will automatically search in the keyring and unlock the system.
+  For more info see Tokens section below.
+
+* Persistent flags
+  The activation flags (like allow-discards) can be stored in metadata and used
+  automatically by all later activations (even without using crypttab).
+
+  To store activation flags permanently, use activation command with required
+  flags and add --persistent option.
+
+  For example, to mark device to always activate with TRIM enabled,
+  use (for LUKS2 type):
+
+   $ cryptsetup open <device> <name> --allow-discards --persistent
+
+  You can check persistent flags in dump command output:
+
+  $ cryptsetup luksDump <device>
+
+* Tokens and auto-activation
+
+  A LUKS2 token is an object that can be described "how to get passphrase or key"
+  to unlock particular keyslot.
+  (Also it can be used to store any additional metadata, and with
+  the libcryptsetup interface it can be used to define user token types.)
+
+  Cryptsetup internally implements keyring token. Cryptsetup tries to use
+  available tokens before asking for the passphrase. For keyring token,
+  it means that if the passphrase is available under specified identifier
+  inside kernel keyring, the device is automatically activated using this
+  stored passphrase.
+
+  Example of using LUKS2 keyring token:
+
+  # Adding token to metadata with "my_token" identifier (by default it applies to all keyslots).
+  $ cryptsetup token add --key-description "my_token" <device>
+
+  # Storing passphrase to user keyring (this can be done by an external application)
+  $ echo -n <passphrase> | keyctl padd user my_token @u
+
+  # Now cryptsetup activates automatically if it finds correct passphrase
+  $ cryptsetup open <device> <name>
+
+  The main reason to use tokens this way is to separate possible hardware
+  handlers from cryptsetup code.
+
+* Keyslot priorities
+
+  LUKS2 keyslot can have a new priority attribute.
+  The default is "normal". The "prefer" priority tell the keyslot to be tried
+  before other keyslots. Priority "ignore" means that keyslot will never be
+  used if not specified explicitly (it can be used for backup administrator
+  passwords that are used only situations when a user forgets own passphrase).
+
+  The priority of keyslot can be set with new config command, for example
+  $ cryptsetup config <device> --key-slot 1 --priority prefer
+
+  Setting priority to normal will reset slot to normal state.
+
+* LUKS2 label and subsystem
+
+  The header now contains additional fields for label and subsystem (additional
+  label). These fields can be used similar to filesystem label and will be
+  visible in udev rules to possible filtering. (Note that blkid do not yet
+  contain the LUKS scanning code).
+
+  By default both labels are empty. Label and subsystem are always set together
+  (no option  means clear the label) with the config command:
+
+  $ cryptsetup config <device> --label my_device --subsystem ""
+
+* In-place conversion form LUKS1
+
+  To allow easy testing and transition to the new LUKS2 format, there is a new
+  convert command that allows in-place conversion from the LUKS1 format and,
+  if there are no incompatible options, also conversion back from LUKS2
+  to LUKS1 format.
+
+  Note this command can be used only on some LUKS1 devices (some device header
+  sizes are not supported).
+  This command is dangerous, never run it without header backup!
+  If something fails in the middle of conversion (IO error), the header
+  is destroyed. (Note that conversion requires move of keyslot data area to
+  a different offset.)
+
+  To convert header in-place to LUKS2 format, use
+  $ cryptsetup convert <device> --type luks2
+
+  To convert it back to LUKS1 format, use
+  $ cryptsetup convert <device> --type luks1
+
+  You can verify LUKS version with luksDump command.
+  $ cryptsetup luksDump <device>
+
+  Note that some LUKS2 features will make header incompatible with LUKS1 and
+  conversion will be rejected (for example using new Argon2 PBKDF or integrity
+  extensions). Some minor attributes can be lost in conversion.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Explicit KDF iterations count setting
+
+  With new PBKDF interface, there is also the possibility to setup PBKDF costs
+  directly, avoiding benchmarks. This can be useful if device is formatted to be
+  primarily used on a different system.
+
+  The option --pbkdf-force-iterations is available for both LUKS1 and LUKS2
+  format. Using this option can cause device to have either very low or very
+  high PBKDF costs.
+  In the first case it means bad protection to dictionary attacks, in the second
+  case, it can mean extremely high unlocking time or memory requirements.
+  Use only if you are sure what you are doing!
+
+  Not that this setting also affects iteration count for the key digest.
+  For LUKS1 iteration count for digest will be approximately 1/8 of requested
+  value, for LUKS2 and "pbkdf2" digest minimal PBKDF2 iteration count (1000)
+  will be used. You cannot set lower iteration count than the internal minimum
+  (1000 for PBKDF2).
+
+  To format LUKS1 device with forced iteration count (and no benchmarking), use
+  $ cryptsetup luksFormat <device> --pbkdf-force-iterations 22222
+
+  For LUKS2 it is always better to specify full settings (do not rely on default
+  cost values).
+  For example, we can set to use Argon2id with iteration cost 5, memory 128000
+  and parallel set 1:
+  $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> \
+    --pbkdf argon2id --pbkdf-force-iterations 5 --pbkdf-memory 128000 --pbkdf-parallel 1
+
+* VeraCrypt PIM
+
+  Cryptsetup can now also open VeraCrypt device that uses Personal Iteration
+  Multiplier (PIM). PIM is an integer value that user must remember additionally
+  to passphrase and influences PBKDF2 iteration count (without it VeraCrypt uses
+  a fixed number of iterations).
+
+  To open VeraCrypt device with PIM settings, use --veracrypt-pim (to specify
+  PIM on the command line) or --veracrypt-query-pim to query PIM interactively.
+
+* Support for plain64be IV
+
+  The plain64be is big-endian variant of plain64 Initialization Vector. It is
+  used in some images of hardware-based disk encryption systems. Supporting this
+  variant allows using dm-crypt to map such images through cryptsetup.
+
+* Deferral removal
+
+  Cryptsetup now can mark device for deferred removal by using a new option
+  --deferred. This means that close command will not fail if the device is still
+  in use, but will instruct the kernel to remove the device automatically after
+  use count drops to zero (for example, once the filesystem is unmounted).
+
+* A lot of updates to man pages and many minor changes that would make this
+  release notes too long ;-)
+
+Libcryptsetup API changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+These API functions were removed, libcryptsetup no longer handles password
+retries from terminal (application should handle terminal operations itself):
+	crypt_set_password_callback;
+	crypt_set_timeout;
+	crypt_set_password_retry;
+	crypt_set_password_verify;
+
+This call is removed (no need to keep typo backward compatibility,
+the proper function is crypt_set_iteration_time :-)
+	crypt_set_iterarion_time;
+
+These calls were removed because are not safe, use per-context
+error callbacks instead:
+	crypt_last_error;
+	crypt_get_error;
+
+The PBKDF benchmark was replaced by a new function that uses new KDF structure
+	crypt_benchmark_kdf; (removed)
+	crypt_benchmark_pbkdf; (new API call)
+
+These new calls are now exported, for details see libcryptsetup.h:
+	crypt_keyslot_add_by_key;
+	crypt_keyslot_set_priority;
+	crypt_keyslot_get_priority;
+
+	crypt_token_json_get;
+	crypt_token_json_set;
+	crypt_token_status;
+	crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get;
+	crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set;
+	crypt_token_assign_keyslot;
+	crypt_token_unassign_keyslot;
+	crypt_token_register;
+
+	crypt_activate_by_token;
+	crypt_activate_by_keyring;
+	crypt_deactivate_by_name;
+
+	crypt_metadata_locking;
+	crypt_volume_key_keyring;
+	crypt_get_integrity_info;
+	crypt_get_sector_size;
+	crypt_persistent_flags_set;
+	crypt_persistent_flags_get;
+	crypt_set_pbkdf_type;
+	crypt_get_pbkdf_type;
+
+	crypt_convert;
+	crypt_keyfile_read;
+	crypt_wipe;
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples.
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Offline re-encrypt tool LUKS2 support is currently limited.
+  There will be online LUKS2 re-encryption tool in future.
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  (https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html) once these algorithms are available
+  in kernel (more on this later).
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collison probability is not negligible).
+  For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* Some utilities (blkid, systemd-cryptsetup) have already support for LUKS
+  but not yet in released version (support in crypttab etc).
+
+* There are some examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated soon in favor
+  of python bindings to libblockdev library (that can already handle LUKS1 devices).

docs/v2.0.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable and bug-fix release with experimental features.
+
+This version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* To store volume key into kernel keyring, kernel 4.15 with dm-crypt 1.18.1
+  is required. If a volume key is stored in keyring (LUKS2 only),
+  the dm-crypt v1.15.0 through v1.18.0 contains a serious bug that may cause
+  data corruption for ciphers with ESSIV.
+  (The key for ESSIV is zeroed because of code misplacement.)
+  This bug is not present for LUKS1 or any other IVs used in LUKS modes.
+  This change is not visible to the user (except dmsetup output).
+
+* Increase maximum allowed PBKDF memory-cost limit to 4 GiB.
+  The Argon2 PBKDF uses 1GiB by default; this is also limited by the amount
+  of physical memory available (maximum is half of the physical memory).
+
+* Use /run/cryptsetup as default for cryptsetup locking dir.
+  There were problems with sharing /run/lock with lockdev, and in the early
+  boot, the directory was missing.
+  The directory can be changed with --with-luks2-lock-path and
+  --with-luks2-lock-dir-perms configure switches.
+
+* Introduce new 64-bit byte-offset *keyfile_device_offset functions.
+
+  The keyfile interface was designed, well, for keyfiles. Unfortunately,
+  there are user cases where a keyfile can be placed on a device, and
+  size_t offset can overflow on 32-bit systems.
+
+  New set of functions that allow 64-bit offsets even on 32bit systems
+  are now available:
+
+     - crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset
+     - crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset
+     - crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset
+     - crypt_keyfile_device_read
+
+  The new functions have added the _device_ in name.
+  Old functions are just internal wrappers around these.
+
+  Also cryptsetup --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset now allows
+  64-bit offsets as parameters.
+
+* Add error hint for wrongly formatted cipher strings in LUKS1 and
+  properly fail in luksFormat if cipher format is missing required IV.
+  For now, crypto API quietly used cipher without IV if a cipher
+  algorithm without IV specification was used (e.g., aes-xts).
+  This caused fail later during activation.
+
+* Configure check for a recent Argon2 lib to support mandatory Argon2id.
+
+* Fix for the cryptsetup-reencrypt static build if pwquality is enabled.
+
+* Update LUKS1 standard doc (https links in the bibliography).
+
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples.
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Offline re-encrypt tool LUKS2 support is currently limited.
+  There will be online LUKS2 re-encryption tool in future.
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  (https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html) once these algorithms are
+  available in the kernel (more on this later).
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+  For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated soon in favor
+  of python bindings to the libblockdev library (that can already handle LUKS1
+  devices).

docs/v2.0.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable and bug-fix release with experimental features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix a regression in early detection of inactive keyslot for luksKillSlot.
+  It tried to ask for passphrase even for already erased keyslot.
+
+* Fix a regression in loopaesOpen processing for keyfile on standard input.
+  Use of "-" argument was not working properly.
+
+* Add LUKS2 specific options for cryptsetup-reencrypt.
+  Tokens and persistent flags are now transferred during reencryption;
+  change of PBKDF keyslot parameters is now supported and alllows
+  to set precalculated values (no benchmarks).
+
+* Do not allow LUKS2 --persistent and --test-passphrase cryptsetup flags
+  combination. Persistent flags are now stored only if the device was
+  successfully activated with the specified flags.
+
+* Fix integritysetup format after recent Linux kernel changes that
+  requires to setup key for HMAC in all cases.
+  Previously integritysetup allowed HMAC with zero key that behaves
+  like a plain hash.
+
+* Fix VeraCrypt PIM handling that modified internal iteration counts
+  even for subsequent activations. The PIM count is no longer printed
+  in debug log as it is sensitive information.
+  Also, the code now skips legacy TrueCrypt algorithms if a PIM
+  is specified (they cannot be used with PIM anyway).
+
+* PBKDF values cannot be set (even with force parameters) below
+  hardcoded minimums. For PBKDF2 is it 1000 iterations, for Argon2
+  it is 4 iterations and 32 KiB of memory cost.
+
+* Introduce new crypt_token_is_assigned() API function for reporting
+  the binding between token and keyslots.
+
+* Allow crypt_token_json_set() API function to create internal token types.
+  Do not allow unknown fields in internal token objects.
+
+* Print message in cryptsetup that about was aborted if a user did not
+  answer YES in a query.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples.
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS, as CAESAR finalists.
+
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.

docs/v2.0.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with new features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Expose interface to unbound LUKS2 keyslots.
+  Unbound LUKS2 keyslot allows storing a key material that is independent
+  of master volume key (it is not bound to encrypted data segment).
+
+* New API extensions for unbound keyslots (LUKS2 only)
+  crypt_keyslot_get_key_size() and crypt_volume_key_get()
+  These functions allow to get key and key size for unbound keyslots.
+
+* New enum value CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND for keyslot status (LUKS2 only).
+
+* Add --unbound keyslot option to the cryptsetup luksAddKey command.
+
+* Add crypt_get_active_integrity_failures() call to get integrity
+  failure count for dm-integrity devices.
+
+* Add crypt_get_pbkdf_default() function to get per-type PBKDF default
+  setting.
+
+* Add new flag to crypt_keyslot_add_by_key() to force update device
+  volume key. This call is mainly intended for a wrapped key change.
+
+* Allow volume key store in a file with cryptsetup.
+  The --dump-master-key together with --master-key-file allows cryptsetup
+  to store the binary volume key to a file instead of standard output.
+
+* Add support detached header for cryptsetup-reencrypt command.
+
+* Fix VeraCrypt PIM handling - use proper iterations count formula
+  for PBKDF2-SHA512 and PBKDF2-Whirlpool used in system volumes.
+
+* Fix cryptsetup tcryptDump for VeraCrypt PIM (support --veracrypt-pim).
+
+* Add --with-default-luks-format configure time option.
+  (Option to override default LUKS format version.)
+
+* Fix LUKS version conversion for detached (and trimmed) LUKS headers.
+
+* Add luksConvertKey cryptsetup command that converts specific keyslot
+  from one PBKDF to another.
+
+* Do not allow conversion to LUKS2 if LUKSMETA (external tool metadata)
+  header is detected.
+
+* More cleanup and hardening of LUKS2 keyslot specific validation options.
+  Add more checks for cipher validity before writing metadata on-disk.
+
+* Do not allow LUKS1 version downconversion if the header contains tokens.
+
+* Add "paes" family ciphers (AES wrapped key scheme for mainframes)
+  to allowed ciphers.
+  Specific wrapped ley configuration logic must be done by 3rd party tool,
+  LUKS2 stores only keyslot material and allow activation of the device.
+
+* Add support for --check-at-most-once option (kernel 4.17) to veritysetup.
+  This flag can be dangerous; if you can control underlying device
+  (you can change its content after it was verified) it will no longer
+  prevent reading tampered data and also it does not prevent silent
+  data corruptions that appear after the block was once read.
+
+* Fix return code (EPERM instead of EINVAL) and retry count for bad
+  passphrase on non-tty input.
+
+* Enable support for FEC decoding in veritysetup to check dm-verity devices
+  with additional Reed-Solomon code in userspace (verify command).
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples (planned for 2.0.4).
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS, as CAESAR finalists.
+
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases/tag/2.17-1 that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.

lib/Makefile.am

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-SUBDIRS = crypto_backend luks1 loopaes verity tcrypt
-
-moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
-
-pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig
-pkgconfig_DATA = libcryptsetup.pc
-
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -include config.h \
-	-I$(top_srcdir)				\
-	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend	\
-	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib/luks1		\
-	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib/loopaes		\
-	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib/verity		\
-	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib/tcrypt		\
-	-DDATADIR=\""$(datadir)"\"		\
-	-DLIBDIR=\""$(libdir)"\"		\
-	-DPREFIX=\""$(prefix)"\"		\
-	-DSYSCONFDIR=\""$(sysconfdir)"\"	\
-	-DVERSION=\""$(VERSION)"\"
-
-lib_LTLIBRARIES = libcryptsetup.la
-
-common_ldadd = \
-	crypto_backend/libcrypto_backend.la	\
-	luks1/libluks1.la			\
-	loopaes/libloopaes.la			\
-	verity/libverity.la			\
-	tcrypt/libtcrypt.la
-
-libcryptsetup_la_DEPENDENCIES = $(common_ldadd) libcryptsetup.sym
-
-libcryptsetup_la_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -no-undefined \
-	-Wl,--version-script=$(top_srcdir)/lib/libcryptsetup.sym \
-	-version-info @LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO@
-
-libcryptsetup_la_CFLAGS = -Wall $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
-
-libcryptsetup_la_LIBADD = \
-	@UUID_LIBS@				\
-	@DEVMAPPER_LIBS@			\
-	@CRYPTO_LIBS@				\
-	@FIPSCHECK_LIBS@			\
-	$(common_ldadd)
-
-
-libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
-	setup.c					\
-	internal.h				\
-	bitops.h				\
-	nls.h					\
-	libcryptsetup.h				\
-	utils.c					\
-	utils_benchmark.c			\
-	utils_crypt.c				\
-	utils_crypt.h				\
-	utils_loop.c				\
-	utils_loop.h				\
-	utils_devpath.c				\
-	utils_wipe.c				\
-	utils_fips.c				\
-	utils_fips.h				\
-	utils_device.c				\
-	libdevmapper.c				\
-	utils_dm.h				\
-	volumekey.c				\
-	random.c				\
-	crypt_plain.c
-
-include_HEADERS = libcryptsetup.h
-
-EXTRA_DIST = libcryptsetup.pc.in libcryptsetup.sym

lib/Makemodule.am

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig
+pkgconfig_DATA = lib/libcryptsetup.pc
+
+lib_LTLIBRARIES = libcryptsetup.la
+
+include_HEADERS = lib/libcryptsetup.h
+
+EXTRA_DIST += lib/libcryptsetup.pc.in lib/libcryptsetup.sym
+
+libcryptsetup_la_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend	\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/luks1		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/luks2		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/loopaes		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/verity		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/tcrypt		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/integrity
+
+libcryptsetup_la_DEPENDENCIES = libcrypto_backend.la lib/libcryptsetup.sym
+
+libcryptsetup_la_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -no-undefined \
+	-Wl,--version-script=$(top_srcdir)/lib/libcryptsetup.sym \
+	-version-info @LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO@
+
+libcryptsetup_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+
+libcryptsetup_la_LIBADD = \
+	@UUID_LIBS@		\
+	@DEVMAPPER_LIBS@	\
+	@CRYPTO_LIBS@		\
+	@LIBARGON2_LIBS@	\
+	@JSON_C_LIBS@		\
+	libcrypto_backend.la
+
+libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/setup.c			\
+	lib/internal.h			\
+	lib/bitops.h			\
+	lib/nls.h			\
+	lib/libcryptsetup.h		\
+	lib/utils.c			\
+	lib/utils_benchmark.c		\
+	lib/utils_crypt.c		\
+	lib/utils_crypt.h		\
+	lib/utils_loop.c		\
+	lib/utils_loop.h		\
+	lib/utils_devpath.c		\
+	lib/utils_wipe.c		\
+	lib/utils_fips.c		\
+	lib/utils_fips.h		\
+	lib/utils_device.c		\
+	lib/utils_keyring.c		\
+	lib/utils_keyring.h		\
+	lib/utils_device_locking.c	\
+	lib/utils_device_locking.h	\
+	lib/utils_pbkdf.c		\
+	lib/utils_io.c			\
+	lib/utils_io.h			\
+	lib/libdevmapper.c		\
+	lib/utils_dm.h			\
+	lib/volumekey.c			\
+	lib/random.c			\
+	lib/crypt_plain.c		\
+	lib/base64.h			\
+	lib/base64.c			\
+	lib/integrity/integrity.h	\
+	lib/integrity/integrity.c       \
+	lib/loopaes/loopaes.h		\
+	lib/loopaes/loopaes.c		\
+	lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h		\
+	lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c		\
+	lib/luks1/af.h			\
+	lib/luks1/af.c			\
+	lib/luks1/keyencryption.c	\
+	lib/luks1/keymanage.c		\
+	lib/luks1/luks.h		\
+	lib/verity/verity_hash.c	\
+	lib/verity/verity_fec.c		\
+	lib/verity/verity.c		\
+	lib/verity/verity.h		\
+	lib/verity/rs_encode_char.c	\
+	lib/verity/rs_decode_char.c	\
+	lib/verity/rs.h                 \
+	lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_digest.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_token.c		\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2.h

lib/base64.c

@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+/* base64.c -- Encode binary data using printable characters.
+   Copyright (C) 1999-2001, 2004-2006, 2009-2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+   any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
+
+/* Written by Simon Josefsson.  Partially adapted from GNU MailUtils
+ * (mailbox/filter_trans.c, as of 2004-11-28).  Improved by review
+ * from Paul Eggert, Bruno Haible, and Stepan Kasal.
+ *
+ * See also RFC 4648 <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4648.txt>.
+ *
+ * Be careful with error checking.  Here is how you would typically
+ * use these functions:
+ *
+ * bool ok = base64_decode_alloc (in, inlen, &out, &outlen);
+ * if (!ok)
+ *   FAIL: input was not valid base64
+ * if (out == NULL)
+ *   FAIL: memory allocation error
+ * OK: data in OUT/OUTLEN
+ *
+ * size_t outlen = base64_encode_alloc (in, inlen, &out);
+ * if (out == NULL && outlen == 0 && inlen != 0)
+ *   FAIL: input too long
+ * if (out == NULL)
+ *   FAIL: memory allocation error
+ * OK: data in OUT/OUTLEN.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+/* Get prototype. */
+#include "base64.h"
+
+/* Get malloc. */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/* Get UCHAR_MAX. */
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* C89 compliant way to cast 'char' to 'unsigned char'. */
+static unsigned char
+to_uchar (char ch)
+{
+  return ch;
+}
+
+static const char b64c[64] =
+  "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+/* Base64 encode IN array of size INLEN into OUT array. OUT needs
+   to be of length >= BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), and INLEN needs to be
+   a multiple of 3.  */
+static void
+base64_encode_fast (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen, char *restrict out)
+{
+  while (inlen)
+    {
+      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2];
+      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4) + (to_uchar (in[1]) >> 4)) & 0x3f];
+      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[1]) << 2) + (to_uchar (in[2]) >> 6)) & 0x3f];
+      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[2]) & 0x3f];
+
+      inlen -= 3;
+      in += 3;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Base64 encode IN array of size INLEN into OUT array of size OUTLEN.
+   If OUTLEN is less than BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), write as many bytes as
+   possible.  If OUTLEN is larger than BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), also zero
+   terminate the output buffer. */
+void
+base64_encode (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+               char *restrict out, size_t outlen)
+{
+  /* Note this outlen constraint can be enforced at compile time.
+     I.E. that the output buffer is exactly large enough to hold
+     the encoded inlen bytes.  The inlen constraints (of corresponding
+     to outlen, and being a multiple of 3) can change at runtime
+     at the end of input.  However the common case when reading
+     large inputs is to have both constraints satisfied, so we depend
+     on both in base_encode_fast().  */
+  if (outlen % 4 == 0 && inlen == outlen / 4 * 3)
+    {
+      base64_encode_fast (in, inlen, out);
+      return;
+    }
+
+  while (inlen && outlen)
+    {
+      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2];
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4)
+                       + (--inlen ? to_uchar (in[1]) >> 4 : 0))
+                      & 0x3f];
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      *out++ =
+        (inlen
+         ? b64c[((to_uchar (in[1]) << 2)
+                   + (--inlen ? to_uchar (in[2]) >> 6 : 0))
+                  & 0x3f]
+         : '=');
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      *out++ = inlen ? b64c[to_uchar (in[2]) & 0x3f] : '=';
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      if (inlen)
+        inlen--;
+      if (inlen)
+        in += 3;
+    }
+
+  if (outlen)
+    *out = '\0';
+}
+
+/* Allocate a buffer and store zero terminated base64 encoded data
+   from array IN of size INLEN, returning BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), i.e.,
+   the length of the encoded data, excluding the terminating zero.  On
+   return, the OUT variable will hold a pointer to newly allocated
+   memory that must be deallocated by the caller.  If output string
+   length would overflow, 0 is returned and OUT is set to NULL.  If
+   memory allocation failed, OUT is set to NULL, and the return value
+   indicates length of the requested memory block, i.e.,
+   BASE64_LENGTH(inlen) + 1. */
+size_t
+base64_encode_alloc (const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out)
+{
+  size_t outlen = 1 + BASE64_LENGTH (inlen);
+
+  /* Check for overflow in outlen computation.
+   *
+   * If there is no overflow, outlen >= inlen.
+   *
+   * If the operation (inlen + 2) overflows then it yields at most +1, so
+   * outlen is 0.
+   *
+   * If the multiplication overflows, we lose at least half of the
+   * correct value, so the result is < ((inlen + 2) / 3) * 2, which is
+   * less than (inlen + 2) * 0.66667, which is less than inlen as soon as
+   * (inlen > 4).
+   */
+  if (inlen > outlen)
+    {
+      *out = NULL;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  *out = malloc (outlen);
+  if (!*out)
+    return outlen;
+
+  base64_encode (in, inlen, *out, outlen);
+
+  return outlen - 1;
+}
+
+/* With this approach this file works independent of the charset used
+   (think EBCDIC).  However, it does assume that the characters in the
+   Base64 alphabet (A-Za-z0-9+/) are encoded in 0..255.  POSIX
+   1003.1-2001 require that char and unsigned char are 8-bit
+   quantities, though, taking care of that problem.  But this may be a
+   potential problem on non-POSIX C99 platforms.
+
+   IBM C V6 for AIX mishandles "#define B64(x) ...'x'...", so use "_"
+   as the formal parameter rather than "x".  */
+#define B64(_)                                  \
+  ((_) == 'A' ? 0                               \
+   : (_) == 'B' ? 1                             \
+   : (_) == 'C' ? 2                             \
+   : (_) == 'D' ? 3                             \
+   : (_) == 'E' ? 4                             \
+   : (_) == 'F' ? 5                             \
+   : (_) == 'G' ? 6                             \
+   : (_) == 'H' ? 7                             \
+   : (_) == 'I' ? 8                             \
+   : (_) == 'J' ? 9                             \
+   : (_) == 'K' ? 10                            \
+   : (_) == 'L' ? 11                            \
+   : (_) == 'M' ? 12                            \
+   : (_) == 'N' ? 13                            \
+   : (_) == 'O' ? 14                            \
+   : (_) == 'P' ? 15                            \
+   : (_) == 'Q' ? 16                            \
+   : (_) == 'R' ? 17                            \
+   : (_) == 'S' ? 18                            \
+   : (_) == 'T' ? 19                            \
+   : (_) == 'U' ? 20                            \
+   : (_) == 'V' ? 21                            \
+   : (_) == 'W' ? 22                            \
+   : (_) == 'X' ? 23                            \
+   : (_) == 'Y' ? 24                            \
+   : (_) == 'Z' ? 25                            \
+   : (_) == 'a' ? 26                            \
+   : (_) == 'b' ? 27                            \
+   : (_) == 'c' ? 28                            \
+   : (_) == 'd' ? 29                            \
+   : (_) == 'e' ? 30                            \
+   : (_) == 'f' ? 31                            \
+   : (_) == 'g' ? 32                            \
+   : (_) == 'h' ? 33                            \
+   : (_) == 'i' ? 34                            \
+   : (_) == 'j' ? 35                            \
+   : (_) == 'k' ? 36                            \
+   : (_) == 'l' ? 37                            \
+   : (_) == 'm' ? 38                            \
+   : (_) == 'n' ? 39                            \
+   : (_) == 'o' ? 40                            \
+   : (_) == 'p' ? 41                            \
+   : (_) == 'q' ? 42                            \
+   : (_) == 'r' ? 43                            \
+   : (_) == 's' ? 44                            \
+   : (_) == 't' ? 45                            \
+   : (_) == 'u' ? 46                            \
+   : (_) == 'v' ? 47                            \
+   : (_) == 'w' ? 48                            \
+   : (_) == 'x' ? 49                            \
+   : (_) == 'y' ? 50                            \
+   : (_) == 'z' ? 51                            \
+   : (_) == '0' ? 52                            \
+   : (_) == '1' ? 53                            \
+   : (_) == '2' ? 54                            \
+   : (_) == '3' ? 55                            \
+   : (_) == '4' ? 56                            \
+   : (_) == '5' ? 57                            \
+   : (_) == '6' ? 58                            \
+   : (_) == '7' ? 59                            \
+   : (_) == '8' ? 60                            \
+   : (_) == '9' ? 61                            \
+   : (_) == '+' ? 62                            \
+   : (_) == '/' ? 63                            \
+   : -1)
+
+static const signed char b64[0x100] = {
+  B64 (0), B64 (1), B64 (2), B64 (3),
+  B64 (4), B64 (5), B64 (6), B64 (7),
+  B64 (8), B64 (9), B64 (10), B64 (11),
+  B64 (12), B64 (13), B64 (14), B64 (15),
+  B64 (16), B64 (17), B64 (18), B64 (19),
+  B64 (20), B64 (21), B64 (22), B64 (23),
+  B64 (24), B64 (25), B64 (26), B64 (27),
+  B64 (28), B64 (29), B64 (30), B64 (31),
+  B64 (32), B64 (33), B64 (34), B64 (35),
+  B64 (36), B64 (37), B64 (38), B64 (39),
+  B64 (40), B64 (41), B64 (42), B64 (43),
+  B64 (44), B64 (45), B64 (46), B64 (47),
+  B64 (48), B64 (49), B64 (50), B64 (51),
+  B64 (52), B64 (53), B64 (54), B64 (55),
+  B64 (56), B64 (57), B64 (58), B64 (59),
+  B64 (60), B64 (61), B64 (62), B64 (63),
+  B64 (64), B64 (65), B64 (66), B64 (67),
+  B64 (68), B64 (69), B64 (70), B64 (71),
+  B64 (72), B64 (73), B64 (74), B64 (75),
+  B64 (76), B64 (77), B64 (78), B64 (79),
+  B64 (80), B64 (81), B64 (82), B64 (83),
+  B64 (84), B64 (85), B64 (86), B64 (87),
+  B64 (88), B64 (89), B64 (90), B64 (91),
+  B64 (92), B64 (93), B64 (94), B64 (95),
+  B64 (96), B64 (97), B64 (98), B64 (99),
+  B64 (100), B64 (101), B64 (102), B64 (103),
+  B64 (104), B64 (105), B64 (106), B64 (107),
+  B64 (108), B64 (109), B64 (110), B64 (111),
+  B64 (112), B64 (113), B64 (114), B64 (115),
+  B64 (116), B64 (117), B64 (118), B64 (119),
+  B64 (120), B64 (121), B64 (122), B64 (123),
+  B64 (124), B64 (125), B64 (126), B64 (127),
+  B64 (128), B64 (129), B64 (130), B64 (131),
+  B64 (132), B64 (133), B64 (134), B64 (135),
+  B64 (136), B64 (137), B64 (138), B64 (139),
+  B64 (140), B64 (141), B64 (142), B64 (143),
+  B64 (144), B64 (145), B64 (146), B64 (147),
+  B64 (148), B64 (149), B64 (150), B64 (151),
+  B64 (152), B64 (153), B64 (154), B64 (155),
+  B64 (156), B64 (157), B64 (158), B64 (159),
+  B64 (160), B64 (161), B64 (162), B64 (163),
+  B64 (164), B64 (165), B64 (166), B64 (167),
+  B64 (168), B64 (169), B64 (170), B64 (171),
+  B64 (172), B64 (173), B64 (174), B64 (175),
+  B64 (176), B64 (177), B64 (178), B64 (179),
+  B64 (180), B64 (181), B64 (182), B64 (183),
+  B64 (184), B64 (185), B64 (186), B64 (187),
+  B64 (188), B64 (189), B64 (190), B64 (191),
+  B64 (192), B64 (193), B64 (194), B64 (195),
+  B64 (196), B64 (197), B64 (198), B64 (199),
+  B64 (200), B64 (201), B64 (202), B64 (203),
+  B64 (204), B64 (205), B64 (206), B64 (207),
+  B64 (208), B64 (209), B64 (210), B64 (211),
+  B64 (212), B64 (213), B64 (214), B64 (215),
+  B64 (216), B64 (217), B64 (218), B64 (219),
+  B64 (220), B64 (221), B64 (222), B64 (223),
+  B64 (224), B64 (225), B64 (226), B64 (227),
+  B64 (228), B64 (229), B64 (230), B64 (231),
+  B64 (232), B64 (233), B64 (234), B64 (235),
+  B64 (236), B64 (237), B64 (238), B64 (239),
+  B64 (240), B64 (241), B64 (242), B64 (243),
+  B64 (244), B64 (245), B64 (246), B64 (247),
+  B64 (248), B64 (249), B64 (250), B64 (251),
+  B64 (252), B64 (253), B64 (254), B64 (255)
+};
+
+#if UCHAR_MAX == 255
+# define uchar_in_range(c) true
+#else
+# define uchar_in_range(c) ((c) <= 255)
+#endif
+
+/* Return true if CH is a character from the Base64 alphabet, and
+   false otherwise.  Note that '=' is padding and not considered to be
+   part of the alphabet.  */
+bool
+isbase64 (char ch)
+{
+  return uchar_in_range (to_uchar (ch)) && 0 <= b64[to_uchar (ch)];
+}
+
+/* Initialize decode-context buffer, CTX.  */
+void
+base64_decode_ctx_init (struct base64_decode_context *ctx)
+{
+  ctx->i = 0;
+}
+
+/* If CTX->i is 0 or 4, there are four or more bytes in [*IN..IN_END), and
+   none of those four is a newline, then return *IN.  Otherwise, copy up to
+   4 - CTX->i non-newline bytes from that range into CTX->buf, starting at
+   index CTX->i and setting CTX->i to reflect the number of bytes copied,
+   and return CTX->buf.  In either case, advance *IN to point to the byte
+   after the last one processed, and set *N_NON_NEWLINE to the number of
+   verified non-newline bytes accessible through the returned pointer.  */
+static const char *
+get_4 (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+       char const *restrict *in, char const *restrict in_end,
+       size_t *n_non_newline)
+{
+  if (ctx->i == 4)
+    ctx->i = 0;
+
+  if (ctx->i == 0)
+    {
+      char const *t = *in;
+      if (4 <= in_end - *in && memchr (t, '\n', 4) == NULL)
+        {
+          /* This is the common case: no newline.  */
+          *in += 4;
+          *n_non_newline = 4;
+          return (const char *) t;
+        }
+    }
+
+  {
+    /* Copy non-newline bytes into BUF.  */
+    char const *p = *in;
+    while (p < in_end)
+      {
+        char c = *p++;
+        if (c != '\n')
+          {
+            ctx->buf[ctx->i++] = c;
+            if (ctx->i == 4)
+              break;
+          }
+      }
+
+    *in = p;
+    *n_non_newline = ctx->i;
+    return ctx->buf;
+  }
+}
+
+#define return_false                            \
+  do                                            \
+    {                                           \
+      *outp = out;                              \
+      return false;                             \
+    }                                           \
+  while (false)
+
+/* Decode up to four bytes of base64-encoded data, IN, of length INLEN
+   into the output buffer, *OUT, of size *OUTLEN bytes.  Return true if
+   decoding is successful, false otherwise.  If *OUTLEN is too small,
+   as many bytes as possible are written to *OUT.  On return, advance
+   *OUT to point to the byte after the last one written, and decrement
+   *OUTLEN to reflect the number of bytes remaining in *OUT.  */
+static bool
+decode_4 (char const *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+          char *restrict *outp, size_t *outleft)
+{
+  char *out = *outp;
+  if (inlen < 2)
+    return false;
+
+  if (!isbase64 (in[0]) || !isbase64 (in[1]))
+    return false;
+
+  if (*outleft)
+    {
+      *out++ = ((b64[to_uchar (in[0])] << 2)
+                | (b64[to_uchar (in[1])] >> 4));
+      --*outleft;
+    }
+
+  if (inlen == 2)
+    return_false;
+
+  if (in[2] == '=')
+    {
+      if (inlen != 4)
+        return_false;
+
+      if (in[3] != '=')
+        return_false;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if (!isbase64 (in[2]))
+        return_false;
+
+      if (*outleft)
+        {
+          *out++ = (((b64[to_uchar (in[1])] << 4) & 0xf0)
+                    | (b64[to_uchar (in[2])] >> 2));
+          --*outleft;
+        }
+
+      if (inlen == 3)
+        return_false;
+
+      if (in[3] == '=')
+        {
+          if (inlen != 4)
+            return_false;
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          if (!isbase64 (in[3]))
+            return_false;
+
+          if (*outleft)
+            {
+              *out++ = (((b64[to_uchar (in[2])] << 6) & 0xc0)
+                        | b64[to_uchar (in[3])]);
+              --*outleft;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  *outp = out;
+  return true;
+}
+
+/* Decode base64-encoded input array IN of length INLEN to output array
+   OUT that can hold *OUTLEN bytes.  The input data may be interspersed
+   with newlines.  Return true if decoding was successful, i.e. if the
+   input was valid base64 data, false otherwise.  If *OUTLEN is too
+   small, as many bytes as possible will be written to OUT.  On return,
+   *OUTLEN holds the length of decoded bytes in OUT.  Note that as soon
+   as any non-alphabet, non-newline character is encountered, decoding
+   is stopped and false is returned.  If INLEN is zero, then process
+   only whatever data is stored in CTX.
+
+   Initially, CTX must have been initialized via base64_decode_ctx_init.
+   Subsequent calls to this function must reuse whatever state is recorded
+   in that buffer.  It is necessary for when a quadruple of base64 input
+   bytes spans two input buffers.
+
+   If CTX is NULL then newlines are treated as garbage and the input
+   buffer is processed as a unit.  */
+
+bool
+base64_decode_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                   const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+                   char *restrict out, size_t *outlen)
+{
+  size_t outleft = *outlen;
+  bool ignore_newlines = ctx != NULL;
+  bool flush_ctx = false;
+  unsigned int ctx_i = 0;
+
+  if (ignore_newlines)
+    {
+      ctx_i = ctx->i;
+      flush_ctx = inlen == 0;
+    }
+
+
+  while (true)
+    {
+      size_t outleft_save = outleft;
+      if (ctx_i == 0 && !flush_ctx)
+        {
+          while (true)
+            {
+              /* Save a copy of outleft, in case we need to re-parse this
+                 block of four bytes.  */
+              outleft_save = outleft;
+              if (!decode_4 (in, inlen, &out, &outleft))
+                break;
+
+              in += 4;
+              inlen -= 4;
+            }
+        }
+
+      if (inlen == 0 && !flush_ctx)
+        break;
+
+      /* Handle the common case of 72-byte wrapped lines.
+         This also handles any other multiple-of-4-byte wrapping.  */
+      if (inlen && *in == '\n' && ignore_newlines)
+        {
+          ++in;
+          --inlen;
+          continue;
+        }
+
+      /* Restore OUT and OUTLEFT.  */
+      out -= outleft_save - outleft;
+      outleft = outleft_save;
+
+      {
+        char const *in_end = in + inlen;
+        char const *non_nl;
+
+        if (ignore_newlines)
+          non_nl = get_4 (ctx, &in, in_end, &inlen);
+        else
+          non_nl = in;  /* Might have nl in this case. */
+
+        /* If the input is empty or consists solely of newlines (0 non-newlines),
+           then we're done.  Likewise if there are fewer than 4 bytes when not
+           flushing context and not treating newlines as garbage.  */
+        if (inlen == 0 || (inlen < 4 && !flush_ctx && ignore_newlines))
+          {
+            inlen = 0;
+            break;
+          }
+        if (!decode_4 (non_nl, inlen, &out, &outleft))
+          break;
+
+        inlen = in_end - in;
+      }
+    }
+
+  *outlen -= outleft;
+
+  return inlen == 0;
+}
+
+/* Allocate an output buffer in *OUT, and decode the base64 encoded
+   data stored in IN of size INLEN to the *OUT buffer.  On return, the
+   size of the decoded data is stored in *OUTLEN.  OUTLEN may be NULL,
+   if the caller is not interested in the decoded length.  *OUT may be
+   NULL to indicate an out of memory error, in which case *OUTLEN
+   contains the size of the memory block needed.  The function returns
+   true on successful decoding and memory allocation errors.  (Use the
+   *OUT and *OUTLEN parameters to differentiate between successful
+   decoding and memory error.)  The function returns false if the
+   input was invalid, in which case *OUT is NULL and *OUTLEN is
+   undefined. */
+bool
+base64_decode_alloc_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                         const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out,
+                         size_t *outlen)
+{
+  /* This may allocate a few bytes too many, depending on input,
+     but it's not worth the extra CPU time to compute the exact size.
+     The exact size is 3 * (inlen + (ctx ? ctx->i : 0)) / 4, minus 1 if the
+     input ends with "=" and minus another 1 if the input ends with "==".
+     Dividing before multiplying avoids the possibility of overflow.  */
+  size_t needlen = 3 * (inlen / 4) + 3;
+
+  *out = malloc (needlen);
+  if (!*out)
+    return true;
+
+  if (!base64_decode_ctx (ctx, in, inlen, *out, &needlen))
+    {
+      free (*out);
+      *out = NULL;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+  if (outlen)
+    *outlen = needlen;
+
+  return true;
+}

lib/base64.h

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/* base64.h -- Encode binary data using printable characters.
+   Copyright (C) 2004-2006, 2009-2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+   Written by Simon Josefsson.
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+   any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
+
+#ifndef BASE64_H
+# define BASE64_H
+
+/* Get size_t. */
+# include <stddef.h>
+
+/* Get bool. */
+# include <stdbool.h>
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+/* This uses that the expression (n+(k-1))/k means the smallest
+   integer >= n/k, i.e., the ceiling of n/k.  */
+# define BASE64_LENGTH(inlen) ((((inlen) + 2) / 3) * 4)
+
+struct base64_decode_context
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+  char buf[4];
+};
+
+extern bool isbase64 (char ch) __attribute__ ((__const__));
+
+extern void base64_encode (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+                           char *restrict out, size_t outlen);
+
+extern size_t base64_encode_alloc (const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out);
+
+extern void base64_decode_ctx_init (struct base64_decode_context *ctx);
+
+extern bool base64_decode_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                               const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+                               char *restrict out, size_t *outlen);
+
+extern bool base64_decode_alloc_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                                     const char *in, size_t inlen,
+                                     char **out, size_t *outlen);
+
+#define base64_decode(in, inlen, out, outlen) \
+        base64_decode_ctx (NULL, in, inlen, out, outlen)
+
+#define base64_decode_alloc(in, inlen, out, outlen) \
+        base64_decode_alloc_ctx (NULL, in, inlen, out, outlen)
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif /* BASE64_H */

lib/crypt_plain.c

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
  * cryptsetup plain device helper functions
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

lib/crypto_backend/Makefile.am

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
-
-noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libcrypto_backend.la
-
-libcrypto_backend_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -Wall @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
-
-libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES = crypto_backend.h \
-	crypto_cipher_kernel.c crypto_storage.c pbkdf_check.c crc32.c
-
-if CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT
-libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += crypto_gcrypt.c
-endif
-if CRYPTO_BACKEND_OPENSSL
-libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += crypto_openssl.c
-endif
-if CRYPTO_BACKEND_NSS
-libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += crypto_nss.c
-endif
-if CRYPTO_BACKEND_KERNEL
-libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += crypto_kernel.c
-endif
-if CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE
-libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += crypto_nettle.c
-endif
-
-if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
-libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += pbkdf2_generic.c
-endif
-
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -include config.h -I$(top_srcdir)/lib

lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libcrypto_backend.la
+
+libcrypto_backend_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crc32.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c
+
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_OPENSSL
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_NSS
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_KERNEL
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c
+endif
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c
+endif
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2
+libcrypto_backend_la_DEPENDENCIES = libargon2.la
+libcrypto_backend_la_LIBADD = libargon2.la
+endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+     CREATIVE COMMONS CORPORATION IS NOT A LAW FIRM AND DOES NOT PROVIDE LEGAL SERVICES. DISTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. CREATIVE COMMONS PROVIDES THIS INFORMATION ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CREATIVE COMMONS MAKES NO WARRANTIES REGARDING THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR THE INFORMATION OR WORKS PROVIDED HEREUNDER, AND DISCLAIMS LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR THE INFORMATION OR WORKS PROVIDED HEREUNDER.
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of authorship and/or a database (each, a "Work").
+
+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the purpose of contributing to a commons of creative, cultural and scientific works ("Commons") that the public can reliably and without fear of later claims of infringement build upon, modify, incorporate in other works, reuse and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever and for any purposes, including without limitation commercial purposes. These owners may contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and efforts of others.
+
+For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any expectation of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright and Related Rights in the Work, voluntarily elects to apply CC0 to the Work and publicly distribute the Work under its terms, with knowledge of his or her Copyright and Related Rights in the Work and the meaning and intended legal effect of CC0 on those rights.
+
+1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be protected by copyright and related or neighboring rights ("Copyright and Related Rights"). Copyright and Related Rights include, but are not limited to, the following:
+
+    the right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, display, communicate, and translate a Work;
+    moral rights retained by the original author(s) and/or performer(s);
+    publicity and privacy rights pertaining to a person's image or likeness depicted in a Work;
+    rights protecting against unfair competition in regards to a Work, subject to the limitations in paragraph 4(a), below;
+    rights protecting the extraction, dissemination, use and reuse of data in a Work;
+    database rights (such as those arising under Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, and under any national implementation thereof, including any amended or successor version of such directive); and
+    other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world based on applicable law or treaty, and any national implementations thereof.
+
+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of, applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently, irrevocably and unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights and associated claims and causes of action, whether now known or unknown (including existing as well as future claims and causes of action), in the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration provided by applicable law or treaty (including future time extensions), (iii) in any current or future medium and for any number of copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever, including without limitation commercial, advertising or promotional purposes (the "Waiver"). Affirmer makes the Waiver for the benefit of each member of the public at large and to the detriment of Affirmer's heirs and successors, fully intending that such Waiver shall not be subject to revocation, rescission, cancellation, termination, or any other legal or equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work by the public as contemplated by Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into account Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the extent the Waiver is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected person a royalty-free, non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive, irrevocable and unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights in the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration provided by applicable law or treaty (including future time extensions), (iii) in any current or future medium and for any number of copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever, including without limitation commercial, advertising or promotional purposes (the "License"). The License shall be deemed effective as of the date CC0 was applied by Affirmer to the Work. Should any part of the License for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, such partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims and causes of action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+    No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned, surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
+    Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or warranties of any kind concerning the Work, express, implied, statutory or otherwise, including without limitation warranties of title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non infringement, or the absence of latent or other defects, accuracy, or the present or absence of errors, whether or not discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
+    Affirmer disclaims responsibility for clearing rights of other persons that may apply to the Work or any use thereof, including without limitation any person's Copyright and Related Rights in the Work. Further, Affirmer disclaims responsibility for obtaining any necessary consents, permissions or other rights required for any use of the Work.
+    Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a party to this document and has no duty or obligation with respect to this CC0 or use of the Work.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/Makemodule.am

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libargon2.la
+
+libargon2_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -std=c89 -pthread -O3
+libargon2_la_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) -I lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2
+
+libargon2_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2b.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2-impl.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-ref.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/ref.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.h
+
+EXTRA_DIST += lib/crypto_backend/argon2/LICENSE
+EXTRA_DIST += lib/crypto_backend/argon2/README

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/README

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+This is bundled Argon2 algorithm library, copied from
+  https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2
+
+For more info see Password Hashing Competition site:
+  https://password-hashing.net/

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.c

@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "argon2.h"
+#include "encoding.h"
+#include "core.h"
+
+/* to silent gcc -Wcast-qual for const cast */
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
+
+const char *argon2_type2string(argon2_type type, int uppercase) {
+    switch (type) {
+        case Argon2_d:
+            return uppercase ? "Argon2d" : "argon2d";
+        case Argon2_i:
+            return uppercase ? "Argon2i" : "argon2i";
+        case Argon2_id:
+            return uppercase ? "Argon2id" : "argon2id";
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int argon2_ctx(argon2_context *context, argon2_type type) {
+    /* 1. Validate all inputs */
+    int result = validate_inputs(context);
+    uint32_t memory_blocks, segment_length;
+    argon2_instance_t instance;
+
+    if (ARGON2_OK != result) {
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    if (Argon2_d != type && Argon2_i != type && Argon2_id != type) {
+        return ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE;
+    }
+
+    /* 2. Align memory size */
+    /* Minimum memory_blocks = 8L blocks, where L is the number of lanes */
+    memory_blocks = context->m_cost;
+
+    if (memory_blocks < 2 * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS * context->lanes) {
+        memory_blocks = 2 * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS * context->lanes;
+    }
+
+    segment_length = memory_blocks / (context->lanes * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS);
+    /* Ensure that all segments have equal length */
+    memory_blocks = segment_length * (context->lanes * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS);
+
+    instance.version = context->version;
+    instance.memory = NULL;
+    instance.passes = context->t_cost;
+    instance.memory_blocks = memory_blocks;
+    instance.segment_length = segment_length;
+    instance.lane_length = segment_length * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS;
+    instance.lanes = context->lanes;
+    instance.threads = context->threads;
+    instance.type = type;
+
+    if (instance.threads > instance.lanes) {
+        instance.threads = instance.lanes;
+    }
+
+    /* 3. Initialization: Hashing inputs, allocating memory, filling first
+     * blocks
+     */
+    result = initialize(&instance, context);
+
+    if (ARGON2_OK != result) {
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    /* 4. Filling memory */
+    result = fill_memory_blocks(&instance);
+
+    if (ARGON2_OK != result) {
+        return result;
+    }
+    /* 5. Finalization */
+    finalize(context, &instance);
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+int argon2_hash(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                void *hash, const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                const size_t encodedlen, argon2_type type,
+                const uint32_t version){
+
+    argon2_context context;
+    int result;
+    uint8_t *out;
+
+    if (pwdlen > ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH) {
+        return ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (saltlen > ARGON2_MAX_SALT_LENGTH) {
+        return ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (hashlen > ARGON2_MAX_OUTLEN) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (hashlen < ARGON2_MIN_OUTLEN) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT;
+    }
+
+    out = malloc(hashlen);
+    if (!out) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    context.out = (uint8_t *)out;
+    context.outlen = (uint32_t)hashlen;
+    context.pwd = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)pwd;
+    context.pwdlen = (uint32_t)pwdlen;
+    context.salt = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)salt;
+    context.saltlen = (uint32_t)saltlen;
+    context.secret = NULL;
+    context.secretlen = 0;
+    context.ad = NULL;
+    context.adlen = 0;
+    context.t_cost = t_cost;
+    context.m_cost = m_cost;
+    context.lanes = parallelism;
+    context.threads = parallelism;
+    context.allocate_cbk = NULL;
+    context.free_cbk = NULL;
+    context.flags = ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+    context.version = version;
+
+    result = argon2_ctx(&context, type);
+
+    if (result != ARGON2_OK) {
+        clear_internal_memory(out, hashlen);
+        free(out);
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    /* if raw hash requested, write it */
+    if (hash) {
+        memcpy(hash, out, hashlen);
+    }
+
+    /* if encoding requested, write it */
+    if (encoded && encodedlen) {
+        if (encode_string(encoded, encodedlen, &context, type) != ARGON2_OK) {
+            clear_internal_memory(out, hashlen); /* wipe buffers if error */
+            clear_internal_memory(encoded, encodedlen);
+            free(out);
+            return ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL;
+        }
+    }
+    clear_internal_memory(out, hashlen);
+    free(out);
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+int argon2i_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                         const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                         const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                         const size_t saltlen, const size_t hashlen,
+                         char *encoded, const size_t encodedlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       NULL, hashlen, encoded, encodedlen, Argon2_i,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2i_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                     const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                     const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                     const size_t saltlen, void *hash, const size_t hashlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, Argon2_i, ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2d_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                         const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                         const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                         const size_t saltlen, const size_t hashlen,
+                         char *encoded, const size_t encodedlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       NULL, hashlen, encoded, encodedlen, Argon2_d,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2d_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                     const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                     const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                     const size_t saltlen, void *hash, const size_t hashlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, Argon2_d, ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2id_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                          const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                          const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                          const size_t saltlen, const size_t hashlen,
+                          char *encoded, const size_t encodedlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       NULL, hashlen, encoded, encodedlen, Argon2_id,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2id_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                      const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                      const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                      const size_t saltlen, void *hash, const size_t hashlen) {
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, Argon2_id,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+static int argon2_compare(const uint8_t *b1, const uint8_t *b2, size_t len) {
+    size_t i;
+    uint8_t d = 0U;
+
+    for (i = 0U; i < len; i++) {
+        d |= b1[i] ^ b2[i];
+    }
+    return (int)((1 & ((d - 1) >> 8)) - 1);
+}
+
+int argon2_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                  argon2_type type) {
+
+    argon2_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *desired_result = NULL;
+
+    int ret = ARGON2_OK;
+
+    size_t encoded_len;
+    uint32_t max_field_len;
+
+    if (pwdlen > ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH) {
+        return ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (encoded == NULL) {
+        return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    encoded_len = strlen(encoded);
+    if (encoded_len > UINT32_MAX) {
+        return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* No field can be longer than the encoded length */
+    max_field_len = (uint32_t)encoded_len;
+
+    ctx.saltlen = max_field_len;
+    ctx.outlen = max_field_len;
+
+    ctx.salt = malloc(ctx.saltlen);
+    ctx.out = malloc(ctx.outlen);
+    if (!ctx.salt || !ctx.out) {
+        ret = ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ctx.pwd = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)pwd;
+    ctx.pwdlen = (uint32_t)pwdlen;
+
+    ret = decode_string(&ctx, encoded, type);
+    if (ret != ARGON2_OK) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    /* Set aside the desired result, and get a new buffer. */
+    desired_result = ctx.out;
+    ctx.out = malloc(ctx.outlen);
+    if (!ctx.out) {
+        ret = ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ret = argon2_verify_ctx(&ctx, (char *)desired_result, type);
+    if (ret != ARGON2_OK) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(ctx.salt);
+    free(ctx.out);
+    free(desired_result);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int argon2i_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen) {
+
+    return argon2_verify(encoded, pwd, pwdlen, Argon2_i);
+}
+
+int argon2d_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen) {
+
+    return argon2_verify(encoded, pwd, pwdlen, Argon2_d);
+}
+
+int argon2id_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen) {
+
+    return argon2_verify(encoded, pwd, pwdlen, Argon2_id);
+}
+
+int argon2d_ctx(argon2_context *context) {
+    return argon2_ctx(context, Argon2_d);
+}
+
+int argon2i_ctx(argon2_context *context) {
+    return argon2_ctx(context, Argon2_i);
+}
+
+int argon2id_ctx(argon2_context *context) {
+    return argon2_ctx(context, Argon2_id);
+}
+
+int argon2_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash,
+                      argon2_type type) {
+    int ret = argon2_ctx(context, type);
+    if (ret != ARGON2_OK) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (argon2_compare(CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)hash, context->out, context->outlen)) {
+        return ARGON2_VERIFY_MISMATCH;
+    }
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+int argon2d_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash) {
+    return argon2_verify_ctx(context, hash, Argon2_d);
+}
+
+int argon2i_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash) {
+    return argon2_verify_ctx(context, hash, Argon2_i);
+}
+
+int argon2id_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash) {
+    return argon2_verify_ctx(context, hash, Argon2_id);
+}
+
+const char *argon2_error_message(int error_code) {
+    switch (error_code) {
+    case ARGON2_OK:
+        return "OK";
+    case ARGON2_OUTPUT_PTR_NULL:
+        return "Output pointer is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Output is too short";
+    case ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Output is too long";
+    case ARGON2_PWD_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Password is too short";
+    case ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Password is too long";
+    case ARGON2_SALT_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Salt is too short";
+    case ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Salt is too long";
+    case ARGON2_AD_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Associated data is too short";
+    case ARGON2_AD_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Associated data is too long";
+    case ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Secret is too short";
+    case ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Secret is too long";
+    case ARGON2_TIME_TOO_SMALL:
+        return "Time cost is too small";
+    case ARGON2_TIME_TOO_LARGE:
+        return "Time cost is too large";
+    case ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_LITTLE:
+        return "Memory cost is too small";
+    case ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_MUCH:
+        return "Memory cost is too large";
+    case ARGON2_LANES_TOO_FEW:
+        return "Too few lanes";
+    case ARGON2_LANES_TOO_MANY:
+        return "Too many lanes";
+    case ARGON2_PWD_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Password pointer is NULL, but password length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_SALT_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Salt pointer is NULL, but salt length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_SECRET_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Secret pointer is NULL, but secret length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_AD_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Associated data pointer is NULL, but ad length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR:
+        return "Memory allocation error";
+    case ARGON2_FREE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL:
+        return "The free memory callback is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_ALLOCATE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL:
+        return "The allocate memory callback is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER:
+        return "Argon2_Context context is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE:
+        return "There is no such version of Argon2";
+    case ARGON2_OUT_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Output pointer mismatch";
+    case ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_FEW:
+        return "Not enough threads";
+    case ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_MANY:
+        return "Too many threads";
+    case ARGON2_MISSING_ARGS:
+        return "Missing arguments";
+    case ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL:
+        return "Encoding failed";
+    case ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL:
+        return "Decoding failed";
+    case ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL:
+        return "Threading failure";
+    case ARGON2_DECODING_LENGTH_FAIL:
+        return "Some of encoded parameters are too long or too short";
+    case ARGON2_VERIFY_MISMATCH:
+        return "The password does not match the supplied hash";
+    default:
+        return "Unknown error code";
+    }
+}
+
+size_t argon2_encodedlen(uint32_t t_cost, uint32_t m_cost, uint32_t parallelism,
+                         uint32_t saltlen, uint32_t hashlen, argon2_type type) {
+  return strlen("$$v=$m=,t=,p=$$") + strlen(argon2_type2string(type, 0)) +
+         numlen(t_cost) + numlen(m_cost) + numlen(parallelism) +
+         b64len(saltlen) + b64len(hashlen) + numlen(ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER) + 1;
+}

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.h

@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ARGON2_H
+#define ARGON2_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Symbols visibility control */
+#ifdef A2_VISCTL
+#define ARGON2_PUBLIC __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+#elif _MSC_VER
+#define ARGON2_PUBLIC __declspec(dllexport)
+#else
+#define ARGON2_PUBLIC
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Argon2 input parameter restrictions
+ */
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of lanes (degree of parallelism) */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_LANES UINT32_C(1)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_LANES UINT32_C(0xFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of threads */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_THREADS UINT32_C(1)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_THREADS UINT32_C(0xFFFFFF)
+
+/* Number of synchronization points between lanes per pass */
+#define ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS UINT32_C(4)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum digest size in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_OUTLEN UINT32_C(4)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_OUTLEN UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of memory blocks (each of BLOCK_SIZE bytes) */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_MEMORY (2 * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS) /* 2 blocks per slice */
+
+#define ARGON2_MIN(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
+/* Max memory size is addressing-space/2, topping at 2^32 blocks (4 TB) */
+#define ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY_BITS                                                 \
+    ARGON2_MIN(UINT32_C(32), (sizeof(void *) * CHAR_BIT - 10 - 1))
+#define ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY                                                      \
+    ARGON2_MIN(UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF), UINT64_C(1) << ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY_BITS)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of passes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_TIME UINT32_C(1)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_TIME UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum password length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_PWD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum associated data length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_AD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_AD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum salt length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_SALT_LENGTH UINT32_C(8)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_SALT_LENGTH UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum key length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_SECRET UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_SECRET UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Flags to determine which fields are securely wiped (default = no wipe). */
+#define ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_PASSWORD (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
+#define ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_SECRET (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
+
+/* Global flag to determine if we are wiping internal memory buffers. This flag
+ * is defined in core.c and deafults to 1 (wipe internal memory). */
+extern int FLAG_clear_internal_memory;
+
+/* Error codes */
+typedef enum Argon2_ErrorCodes {
+    ARGON2_OK = 0,
+
+    ARGON2_OUTPUT_PTR_NULL = -1,
+
+    ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT = -2,
+    ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG = -3,
+
+    ARGON2_PWD_TOO_SHORT = -4,
+    ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG = -5,
+
+    ARGON2_SALT_TOO_SHORT = -6,
+    ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG = -7,
+
+    ARGON2_AD_TOO_SHORT = -8,
+    ARGON2_AD_TOO_LONG = -9,
+
+    ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_SHORT = -10,
+    ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_LONG = -11,
+
+    ARGON2_TIME_TOO_SMALL = -12,
+    ARGON2_TIME_TOO_LARGE = -13,
+
+    ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_LITTLE = -14,
+    ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_MUCH = -15,
+
+    ARGON2_LANES_TOO_FEW = -16,
+    ARGON2_LANES_TOO_MANY = -17,
+
+    ARGON2_PWD_PTR_MISMATCH = -18,    /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+    ARGON2_SALT_PTR_MISMATCH = -19,   /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+    ARGON2_SECRET_PTR_MISMATCH = -20, /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+    ARGON2_AD_PTR_MISMATCH = -21,     /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+
+    ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR = -22,
+
+    ARGON2_FREE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL = -23,
+    ARGON2_ALLOCATE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL = -24,
+
+    ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER = -25,
+    ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE = -26,
+
+    ARGON2_OUT_PTR_MISMATCH = -27,
+
+    ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_FEW = -28,
+    ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_MANY = -29,
+
+    ARGON2_MISSING_ARGS = -30,
+
+    ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL = -31,
+
+    ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL = -32,
+
+    ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL = -33,
+
+    ARGON2_DECODING_LENGTH_FAIL = -34,
+
+    ARGON2_VERIFY_MISMATCH = -35
+} argon2_error_codes;
+
+/* Memory allocator types --- for external allocation */
+typedef int (*allocate_fptr)(uint8_t **memory, size_t bytes_to_allocate);
+typedef void (*deallocate_fptr)(uint8_t *memory, size_t bytes_to_allocate);
+
+/* Argon2 external data structures */
+
+/*
+ *****
+ * Context: structure to hold Argon2 inputs:
+ *  output array and its length,
+ *  password and its length,
+ *  salt and its length,
+ *  secret and its length,
+ *  associated data and its length,
+ *  number of passes, amount of used memory (in KBytes, can be rounded up a bit)
+ *  number of parallel threads that will be run.
+ * All the parameters above affect the output hash value.
+ * Additionally, two function pointers can be provided to allocate and
+ * deallocate the memory (if NULL, memory will be allocated internally).
+ * Also, three flags indicate whether to erase password, secret as soon as they
+ * are pre-hashed (and thus not needed anymore), and the entire memory
+ *****
+ * Simplest situation: you have output array out[8], password is stored in
+ * pwd[32], salt is stored in salt[16], you do not have keys nor associated
+ * data. You need to spend 1 GB of RAM and you run 5 passes of Argon2d with
+ * 4 parallel lanes.
+ * You want to erase the password, but you're OK with last pass not being
+ * erased. You want to use the default memory allocator.
+ * Then you initialize:
+ Argon2_Context(out,8,pwd,32,salt,16,NULL,0,NULL,0,5,1<<20,4,4,NULL,NULL,true,false,false,false)
+ */
+typedef struct Argon2_Context {
+    uint8_t *out;    /* output array */
+    uint32_t outlen; /* digest length */
+
+    uint8_t *pwd;    /* password array */
+    uint32_t pwdlen; /* password length */
+
+    uint8_t *salt;    /* salt array */
+    uint32_t saltlen; /* salt length */
+
+    uint8_t *secret;    /* key array */
+    uint32_t secretlen; /* key length */
+
+    uint8_t *ad;    /* associated data array */
+    uint32_t adlen; /* associated data length */
+
+    uint32_t t_cost;  /* number of passes */
+    uint32_t m_cost;  /* amount of memory requested (KB) */
+    uint32_t lanes;   /* number of lanes */
+    uint32_t threads; /* maximum number of threads */
+
+    uint32_t version; /* version number */
+
+    allocate_fptr allocate_cbk; /* pointer to memory allocator */
+    deallocate_fptr free_cbk;   /* pointer to memory deallocator */
+
+    uint32_t flags; /* array of bool options */
+} argon2_context;
+
+/* Argon2 primitive type */
+typedef enum Argon2_type {
+  Argon2_d = 0,
+  Argon2_i = 1,
+  Argon2_id = 2
+} argon2_type;
+
+/* Version of the algorithm */
+typedef enum Argon2_version {
+    ARGON2_VERSION_10 = 0x10,
+    ARGON2_VERSION_13 = 0x13,
+    ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER = ARGON2_VERSION_13
+} argon2_version;
+
+/*
+ * Function that gives the string representation of an argon2_type.
+ * @param type The argon2_type that we want the string for
+ * @param uppercase Whether the string should have the first letter uppercase
+ * @return NULL if invalid type, otherwise the string representation.
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC const char *argon2_type2string(argon2_type type, int uppercase);
+
+/*
+ * Function that performs memory-hard hashing with certain degree of parallelism
+ * @param  context  Pointer to the Argon2 internal structure
+ * @return Error code if smth is wrong, ARGON2_OK otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_ctx(argon2_context *context, argon2_type type);
+
+/**
+ * Hashes a password with Argon2i, producing an encoded hash
+ * @param t_cost Number of iterations
+ * @param m_cost Sets memory usage to m_cost kibibytes
+ * @param parallelism Number of threads and compute lanes
+ * @param pwd Pointer to password
+ * @param pwdlen Password size in bytes
+ * @param salt Pointer to salt
+ * @param saltlen Salt size in bytes
+ * @param hashlen Desired length of the hash in bytes
+ * @param encoded Buffer where to write the encoded hash
+ * @param encodedlen Size of the buffer (thus max size of the encoded hash)
+ * @pre   Different parallelism levels will give different results
+ * @pre   Returns ARGON2_OK if successful
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t parallelism,
+                                       const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                                       const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                                       const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                                       const size_t encodedlen);
+
+/**
+ * Hashes a password with Argon2i, producing a raw hash at @hash
+ * @param t_cost Number of iterations
+ * @param m_cost Sets memory usage to m_cost kibibytes
+ * @param parallelism Number of threads and compute lanes
+ * @param pwd Pointer to password
+ * @param pwdlen Password size in bytes
+ * @param salt Pointer to salt
+ * @param saltlen Salt size in bytes
+ * @param hash Buffer where to write the raw hash - updated by the function
+ * @param hashlen Desired length of the hash in bytes
+ * @pre   Different parallelism levels will give different results
+ * @pre   Returns ARGON2_OK if successful
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                   const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                                   const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                                   const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                                   const size_t hashlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t parallelism,
+                                       const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                                       const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                                       const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                                       const size_t encodedlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                   const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                                   const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                                   const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                                   const size_t hashlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                        const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                        const uint32_t parallelism,
+                                        const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                                        const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                                        const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                                        const size_t encodedlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                    const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                    const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                                    const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                                    const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                                    const size_t hashlen);
+
+/* generic function underlying the above ones */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_hash(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                              const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                              const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                              const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                              const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                              const size_t encodedlen, argon2_type type,
+                              const uint32_t version);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a password against an encoded string
+ * Encoded string is restricted as in validate_inputs()
+ * @param encoded String encoding parameters, salt, hash
+ * @param pwd Pointer to password
+ * @pre   Returns ARGON2_OK if successful
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                 const size_t pwdlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                 const size_t pwdlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                  const size_t pwdlen);
+
+/* generic function underlying the above ones */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                const size_t pwdlen, argon2_type type);
+
+/**
+ * Argon2d: Version of Argon2 that picks memory blocks depending
+ * on the password and salt. Only for side-channel-free
+ * environment!!
+ *****
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_ctx(argon2_context *context);
+
+/**
+ * Argon2i: Version of Argon2 that picks memory blocks
+ * independent on the password and salt. Good for side-channels,
+ * but worse w.r.t. tradeoff attacks if only one pass is used.
+ *****
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_ctx(argon2_context *context);
+
+/**
+ * Argon2id: Version of Argon2 where the first half-pass over memory is
+ * password-independent, the rest are password-dependent (on the password and
+ * salt). OK against side channels (they reduce to 1/2-pass Argon2i), and
+ * better with w.r.t. tradeoff attacks (similar to Argon2d).
+ *****
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_ctx(argon2_context *context);
+
+/**
+ * Verify if a given password is correct for Argon2d hashing
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @param  hash  The password hash to verify. The length of the hash is
+ * specified by the context outlen member
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash);
+
+/**
+ * Verify if a given password is correct for Argon2i hashing
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @param  hash  The password hash to verify. The length of the hash is
+ * specified by the context outlen member
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash);
+
+/**
+ * Verify if a given password is correct for Argon2id hashing
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @param  hash  The password hash to verify. The length of the hash is
+ * specified by the context outlen member
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context,
+                                      const char *hash);
+
+/* generic function underlying the above ones */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash,
+                                    argon2_type type);
+
+/**
+ * Get the associated error message for given error code
+ * @return  The error message associated with the given error code
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC const char *argon2_error_message(int error_code);
+
+/**
+ * Returns the encoded hash length for the given input parameters
+ * @param t_cost  Number of iterations
+ * @param m_cost  Memory usage in kibibytes
+ * @param parallelism  Number of threads; used to compute lanes
+ * @param saltlen  Salt size in bytes
+ * @param hashlen  Hash size in bytes
+ * @param type The argon2_type that we want the encoded length for
+ * @return  The encoded hash length in bytes
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC size_t argon2_encodedlen(uint32_t t_cost, uint32_t m_cost,
+                                       uint32_t parallelism, uint32_t saltlen,
+                                       uint32_t hashlen, argon2_type type);
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2-impl.h

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PORTABLE_BLAKE2_IMPL_H
+#define PORTABLE_BLAKE2_IMPL_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#define BLAKE2_INLINE __inline
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
+#define BLAKE2_INLINE __inline__
+#else
+#define BLAKE2_INLINE
+#endif
+
+/* Argon2 Team - Begin Code */
+/*
+   Not an exhaustive list, but should cover the majority of modern platforms
+   Additionally, the code will always be correct---this is only a performance
+   tweak.
+*/
+#if (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) &&                                                \
+     (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__)) ||                           \
+    defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) || defined(__ARMEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL__) || \
+    defined(__AARCH64EL__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__) ||       \
+    defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_AMD64) ||                \
+    defined(_M_ARM)
+#define NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#endif
+/* Argon2 Team - End Code */
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint32_t load32(const void *src) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    uint32_t w;
+    memcpy(&w, src, sizeof w);
+    return w;
+#else
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)src;
+    uint32_t w = *p++;
+    w |= (uint32_t)(*p++) << 8;
+    w |= (uint32_t)(*p++) << 16;
+    w |= (uint32_t)(*p++) << 24;
+    return w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t load64(const void *src) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    uint64_t w;
+    memcpy(&w, src, sizeof w);
+    return w;
+#else
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)src;
+    uint64_t w = *p++;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 8;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 16;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 24;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 32;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 40;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 48;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 56;
+    return w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void store32(void *dst, uint32_t w) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    memcpy(dst, &w, sizeof w);
+#else
+    uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void store64(void *dst, uint64_t w) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    memcpy(dst, &w, sizeof w);
+#else
+    uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t load48(const void *src) {
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)src;
+    uint64_t w = *p++;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 8;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 16;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 24;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 32;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 40;
+    return w;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void store48(void *dst, uint64_t w) {
+    uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint32_t rotr32(const uint32_t w, const unsigned c) {
+    return (w >> c) | (w << (32 - c));
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t rotr64(const uint64_t w, const unsigned c) {
+    return (w >> c) | (w << (64 - c));
+}
+
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2.h

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PORTABLE_BLAKE2_H
+#define PORTABLE_BLAKE2_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+enum blake2b_constant {
+    BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES = 128,
+    BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES = 64,
+    BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES = 64,
+    BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES = 16,
+    BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES = 16
+};
+
+#pragma pack(push, 1)
+typedef struct __blake2b_param {
+    uint8_t digest_length;                   /* 1 */
+    uint8_t key_length;                      /* 2 */
+    uint8_t fanout;                          /* 3 */
+    uint8_t depth;                           /* 4 */
+    uint32_t leaf_length;                    /* 8 */
+    uint64_t node_offset;                    /* 16 */
+    uint8_t node_depth;                      /* 17 */
+    uint8_t inner_length;                    /* 18 */
+    uint8_t reserved[14];                    /* 32 */
+    uint8_t salt[BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES];         /* 48 */
+    uint8_t personal[BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES]; /* 64 */
+} blake2b_param;
+#pragma pack(pop)
+
+typedef struct __blake2b_state {
+    uint64_t h[8];
+    uint64_t t[2];
+    uint64_t f[2];
+    uint8_t buf[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES];
+    unsigned buflen;
+    unsigned outlen;
+    uint8_t last_node;
+} blake2b_state;
+
+/* Ensure param structs have not been wrongly padded */
+/* Poor man's static_assert */
+enum {
+    blake2_size_check_0 = 1 / !!(CHAR_BIT == 8),
+    blake2_size_check_2 =
+        1 / !!(sizeof(blake2b_param) == sizeof(uint64_t) * CHAR_BIT)
+};
+
+/* Streaming API */
+int blake2b_init(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen);
+int blake2b_init_key(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key,
+                     size_t keylen);
+int blake2b_init_param(blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P);
+int blake2b_update(blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen);
+int blake2b_final(blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen);
+
+/* Simple API */
+int blake2b(void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen,
+            const void *key, size_t keylen);
+
+/* Argon2 Team - Begin Code */
+int blake2b_long(void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen);
+/* Argon2 Team - End Code */
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2b.c

@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "blake2.h"
+#include "blake2-impl.h"
+
+void clear_internal_memory(void *v, size_t n);
+
+static const uint64_t blake2b_IV[8] = {
+    UINT64_C(0x6a09e667f3bcc908), UINT64_C(0xbb67ae8584caa73b),
+    UINT64_C(0x3c6ef372fe94f82b), UINT64_C(0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1),
+    UINT64_C(0x510e527fade682d1), UINT64_C(0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f),
+    UINT64_C(0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b), UINT64_C(0x5be0cd19137e2179)};
+
+static const unsigned int blake2b_sigma[12][16] = {
+    {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
+    {14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3},
+    {11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4},
+    {7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8},
+    {9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13},
+    {2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9},
+    {12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11},
+    {13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10},
+    {6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5},
+    {10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0},
+    {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
+    {14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3},
+};
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_set_lastnode(blake2b_state *S) {
+    S->f[1] = (uint64_t)-1;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_set_lastblock(blake2b_state *S) {
+    if (S->last_node) {
+        blake2b_set_lastnode(S);
+    }
+    S->f[0] = (uint64_t)-1;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_increment_counter(blake2b_state *S,
+                                                    uint64_t inc) {
+    S->t[0] += inc;
+    S->t[1] += (S->t[0] < inc);
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_invalidate_state(blake2b_state *S) {
+    clear_internal_memory(S, sizeof(*S));      /* wipe */
+    blake2b_set_lastblock(S); /* invalidate for further use */
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_init0(blake2b_state *S) {
+    memset(S, 0, sizeof(*S));
+    memcpy(S->h, blake2b_IV, sizeof(S->h));
+}
+
+int blake2b_init_param(blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P) {
+    const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *)P;
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    if (NULL == P || NULL == S) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    blake2b_init0(S);
+    /* IV XOR Parameter Block */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        S->h[i] ^= load64(&p[i * sizeof(S->h[i])]);
+    }
+    S->outlen = P->digest_length;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Sequential blake2b initialization */
+int blake2b_init(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen) {
+    blake2b_param P;
+
+    if (S == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((outlen == 0) || (outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup Parameter Block for unkeyed BLAKE2 */
+    P.digest_length = (uint8_t)outlen;
+    P.key_length = 0;
+    P.fanout = 1;
+    P.depth = 1;
+    P.leaf_length = 0;
+    P.node_offset = 0;
+    P.node_depth = 0;
+    P.inner_length = 0;
+    memset(P.reserved, 0, sizeof(P.reserved));
+    memset(P.salt, 0, sizeof(P.salt));
+    memset(P.personal, 0, sizeof(P.personal));
+
+    return blake2b_init_param(S, &P);
+}
+
+int blake2b_init_key(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key,
+                     size_t keylen) {
+    blake2b_param P;
+
+    if (S == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((outlen == 0) || (outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((key == 0) || (keylen == 0) || (keylen > BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup Parameter Block for keyed BLAKE2 */
+    P.digest_length = (uint8_t)outlen;
+    P.key_length = (uint8_t)keylen;
+    P.fanout = 1;
+    P.depth = 1;
+    P.leaf_length = 0;
+    P.node_offset = 0;
+    P.node_depth = 0;
+    P.inner_length = 0;
+    memset(P.reserved, 0, sizeof(P.reserved));
+    memset(P.salt, 0, sizeof(P.salt));
+    memset(P.personal, 0, sizeof(P.personal));
+
+    if (blake2b_init_param(S, &P) < 0) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    {
+        uint8_t block[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES];
+        memset(block, 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+        memcpy(block, key, keylen);
+        blake2b_update(S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+        /* Burn the key from stack */
+        clear_internal_memory(block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void blake2b_compress(blake2b_state *S, const uint8_t *block) {
+    uint64_t m[16];
+    uint64_t v[16];
+    unsigned int i, r;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+        m[i] = load64(block + i * sizeof(m[i]));
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        v[i] = S->h[i];
+    }
+
+    v[8] = blake2b_IV[0];
+    v[9] = blake2b_IV[1];
+    v[10] = blake2b_IV[2];
+    v[11] = blake2b_IV[3];
+    v[12] = blake2b_IV[4] ^ S->t[0];
+    v[13] = blake2b_IV[5] ^ S->t[1];
+    v[14] = blake2b_IV[6] ^ S->f[0];
+    v[15] = blake2b_IV[7] ^ S->f[1];
+
+#define G(r, i, a, b, c, d)                                                    \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        a = a + b + m[blake2b_sigma[r][2 * i + 0]];                            \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 32);                                                 \
+        c = c + d;                                                             \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 24);                                                 \
+        a = a + b + m[blake2b_sigma[r][2 * i + 1]];                            \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 16);                                                 \
+        c = c + d;                                                             \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 63);                                                 \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define ROUND(r)                                                               \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        G(r, 0, v[0], v[4], v[8], v[12]);                                      \
+        G(r, 1, v[1], v[5], v[9], v[13]);                                      \
+        G(r, 2, v[2], v[6], v[10], v[14]);                                     \
+        G(r, 3, v[3], v[7], v[11], v[15]);                                     \
+        G(r, 4, v[0], v[5], v[10], v[15]);                                     \
+        G(r, 5, v[1], v[6], v[11], v[12]);                                     \
+        G(r, 6, v[2], v[7], v[8], v[13]);                                      \
+        G(r, 7, v[3], v[4], v[9], v[14]);                                      \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+    for (r = 0; r < 12; ++r) {
+        ROUND(r);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        S->h[i] = S->h[i] ^ v[i] ^ v[i + 8];
+    }
+
+#undef G
+#undef ROUND
+}
+
+int blake2b_update(blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen) {
+    const uint8_t *pin = (const uint8_t *)in;
+
+    if (inlen == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Sanity check */
+    if (S == NULL || in == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Is this a reused state? */
+    if (S->f[0] != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (S->buflen + inlen > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES) {
+        /* Complete current block */
+        size_t left = S->buflen;
+        size_t fill = BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES - left;
+        memcpy(&S->buf[left], pin, fill);
+        blake2b_increment_counter(S, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+        blake2b_compress(S, S->buf);
+        S->buflen = 0;
+        inlen -= fill;
+        pin += fill;
+        /* Avoid buffer copies when possible */
+        while (inlen > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES) {
+            blake2b_increment_counter(S, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+            blake2b_compress(S, pin);
+            inlen -= BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;
+            pin += BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;
+        }
+    }
+    memcpy(&S->buf[S->buflen], pin, inlen);
+    S->buflen += (unsigned int)inlen;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int blake2b_final(blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen) {
+    uint8_t buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES] = {0};
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    /* Sanity checks */
+    if (S == NULL || out == NULL || outlen < S->outlen) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Is this a reused state? */
+    if (S->f[0] != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    blake2b_increment_counter(S, S->buflen);
+    blake2b_set_lastblock(S);
+    memset(&S->buf[S->buflen], 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES - S->buflen); /* Padding */
+    blake2b_compress(S, S->buf);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { /* Output full hash to temp buffer */
+        store64(buffer + sizeof(S->h[i]) * i, S->h[i]);
+    }
+
+    memcpy(out, buffer, S->outlen);
+    clear_internal_memory(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+    clear_internal_memory(S->buf, sizeof(S->buf));
+    clear_internal_memory(S->h, sizeof(S->h));
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int blake2b(void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen,
+            const void *key, size_t keylen) {
+    blake2b_state S;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    /* Verify parameters */
+    if (NULL == in && inlen > 0) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if (NULL == out || outlen == 0 || outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if ((NULL == key && keylen > 0) || keylen > BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if (keylen > 0) {
+        if (blake2b_init_key(&S, outlen, key, keylen) < 0) {
+            goto fail;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (blake2b_init(&S, outlen) < 0) {
+            goto fail;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (blake2b_update(&S, in, inlen) < 0) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ret = blake2b_final(&S, out, outlen);
+
+fail:
+    clear_internal_memory(&S, sizeof(S));
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Argon2 Team - Begin Code */
+int blake2b_long(void *pout, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen) {
+    uint8_t *out = (uint8_t *)pout;
+    blake2b_state blake_state;
+    uint8_t outlen_bytes[sizeof(uint32_t)] = {0};
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    if (outlen > UINT32_MAX) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    /* Ensure little-endian byte order! */
+    store32(outlen_bytes, (uint32_t)outlen);
+
+#define TRY(statement)                                                         \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        ret = statement;                                                       \
+        if (ret < 0) {                                                         \
+            goto fail;                                                         \
+        }                                                                      \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+    if (outlen <= BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {
+        TRY(blake2b_init(&blake_state, outlen));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes)));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen));
+        TRY(blake2b_final(&blake_state, out, outlen));
+    } else {
+        uint32_t toproduce;
+        uint8_t out_buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];
+        uint8_t in_buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];
+        TRY(blake2b_init(&blake_state, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes)));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen));
+        TRY(blake2b_final(&blake_state, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES));
+        memcpy(out, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2);
+        out += BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+        toproduce = (uint32_t)outlen - BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+
+        while (toproduce > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {
+            memcpy(in_buffer, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES);
+            TRY(blake2b(out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in_buffer,
+                        BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL, 0));
+            memcpy(out, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2);
+            out += BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+            toproduce -= BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+        }
+
+        memcpy(in_buffer, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES);
+        TRY(blake2b(out_buffer, toproduce, in_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL,
+                    0));
+        memcpy(out, out_buffer, toproduce);
+    }
+fail:
+    clear_internal_memory(&blake_state, sizeof(blake_state));
+    return ret;
+#undef TRY
+}
+/* Argon2 Team - End Code */

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-ref.h

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_H
+#define BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_H
+
+#include "blake2.h"
+#include "blake2-impl.h"
+
+/*designed by the Lyra PHC team */
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t fBlaMka(uint64_t x, uint64_t y) {
+    const uint64_t m = UINT64_C(0xFFFFFFFF);
+    const uint64_t xy = (x & m) * (y & m);
+    return x + y + 2 * xy;
+}
+
+#define G(a, b, c, d)                                                          \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        a = fBlaMka(a, b);                                                     \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 32);                                                 \
+        c = fBlaMka(c, d);                                                     \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 24);                                                 \
+        a = fBlaMka(a, b);                                                     \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 16);                                                 \
+        c = fBlaMka(c, d);                                                     \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 63);                                                 \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8, v9, v10, v11,   \
+                           v12, v13, v14, v15)                                 \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        G(v0, v4, v8, v12);                                                    \
+        G(v1, v5, v9, v13);                                                    \
+        G(v2, v6, v10, v14);                                                   \
+        G(v3, v7, v11, v15);                                                   \
+        G(v0, v5, v10, v15);                                                   \
+        G(v1, v6, v11, v12);                                                   \
+        G(v2, v7, v8, v13);                                                    \
+        G(v3, v4, v9, v14);                                                    \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c

@@ -0,0 +1,638 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+/*For memory wiping*/
+#ifdef _MSC_VER
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <winbase.h> /* For SecureZeroMemory */
+#endif
+#if defined __STDC_LIB_EXT1__
+#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1
+#endif
+#define VC_GE_2005(version) (version >= 1400)
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "core.h"
+#include "thread.h"
+#include "blake2/blake2.h"
+#include "blake2/blake2-impl.h"
+
+#ifdef GENKAT
+#include "genkat.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__clang__)
+#if __has_attribute(optnone)
+#define NOT_OPTIMIZED __attribute__((optnone))
+#endif
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+#define GCC_VERSION                                                            \
+    (__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__)
+#if GCC_VERSION >= 40400
+#define NOT_OPTIMIZED __attribute__((optimize("O0")))
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifndef NOT_OPTIMIZED
+#define NOT_OPTIMIZED
+#endif
+
+/***************Instance and Position constructors**********/
+void init_block_value(block *b, uint8_t in) { memset(b->v, in, sizeof(b->v)); }
+
+void copy_block(block *dst, const block *src) {
+    memcpy(dst->v, src->v, sizeof(uint64_t) * ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK);
+}
+
+void xor_block(block *dst, const block *src) {
+    int i;
+    for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK; ++i) {
+        dst->v[i] ^= src->v[i];
+    }
+}
+
+static void load_block(block *dst, const void *input) {
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK; ++i) {
+        dst->v[i] = load64((const uint8_t *)input + i * sizeof(dst->v[i]));
+    }
+}
+
+static void store_block(void *output, const block *src) {
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK; ++i) {
+        store64((uint8_t *)output + i * sizeof(src->v[i]), src->v[i]);
+    }
+}
+
+/***************Memory functions*****************/
+
+int allocate_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t **memory,
+                    size_t num, size_t size) {
+    size_t memory_size = num*size;
+    if (memory == NULL) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* 1. Check for multiplication overflow */
+    if (size != 0 && memory_size / size != num) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* 2. Try to allocate with appropriate allocator */
+    if (context->allocate_cbk) {
+        (context->allocate_cbk)(memory, memory_size);
+    } else {
+        *memory = malloc(memory_size);
+    }
+
+    if (*memory == NULL) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+void free_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t *memory,
+                 size_t num, size_t size) {
+    size_t memory_size = num*size;
+    clear_internal_memory(memory, memory_size);
+    if (context->free_cbk) {
+        (context->free_cbk)(memory, memory_size);
+    } else {
+        free(memory);
+    }
+}
+
+void NOT_OPTIMIZED secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && VC_GE_2005(_MSC_VER)
+    SecureZeroMemory(v, n);
+#elif defined memset_s
+    memset_s(v, n, 0, n);
+#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
+    explicit_bzero(v, n);
+#else
+    static void *(*const volatile memset_sec)(void *, int, size_t) = &memset;
+    memset_sec(v, 0, n);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Memory clear flag defaults to true. */
+int FLAG_clear_internal_memory = 1;
+void clear_internal_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
+  if (FLAG_clear_internal_memory && v) {
+    secure_wipe_memory(v, n);
+  }
+}
+
+void finalize(const argon2_context *context, argon2_instance_t *instance) {
+    if (context != NULL && instance != NULL) {
+        block blockhash;
+        uint32_t l;
+
+        copy_block(&blockhash, instance->memory + instance->lane_length - 1);
+
+        /* XOR the last blocks */
+        for (l = 1; l < instance->lanes; ++l) {
+            uint32_t last_block_in_lane =
+                l * instance->lane_length + (instance->lane_length - 1);
+            xor_block(&blockhash, instance->memory + last_block_in_lane);
+        }
+
+        /* Hash the result */
+        {
+            uint8_t blockhash_bytes[ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE];
+            store_block(blockhash_bytes, &blockhash);
+            blake2b_long(context->out, context->outlen, blockhash_bytes,
+                         ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            /* clear blockhash and blockhash_bytes */
+            clear_internal_memory(blockhash.v, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE);
+            clear_internal_memory(blockhash_bytes, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE);
+        }
+
+#ifdef GENKAT
+        print_tag(context->out, context->outlen);
+#endif
+
+        free_memory(context, (uint8_t *)instance->memory,
+                    instance->memory_blocks, sizeof(block));
+    }
+}
+
+uint32_t index_alpha(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
+                     const argon2_position_t *position, uint32_t pseudo_rand,
+                     int same_lane) {
+    /*
+     * Pass 0:
+     *      This lane : all already finished segments plus already constructed
+     * blocks in this segment
+     *      Other lanes : all already finished segments
+     * Pass 1+:
+     *      This lane : (SYNC_POINTS - 1) last segments plus already constructed
+     * blocks in this segment
+     *      Other lanes : (SYNC_POINTS - 1) last segments
+     */
+    uint32_t reference_area_size;
+    uint64_t relative_position;
+    uint32_t start_position, absolute_position;
+
+    if (0 == position->pass) {
+        /* First pass */
+        if (0 == position->slice) {
+            /* First slice */
+            reference_area_size =
+                position->index - 1; /* all but the previous */
+        } else {
+            if (same_lane) {
+                /* The same lane => add current segment */
+                reference_area_size =
+                    position->slice * instance->segment_length +
+                    position->index - 1;
+            } else {
+                reference_area_size =
+                    position->slice * instance->segment_length +
+                    ((position->index == 0) ? (-1) : 0);
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* Second pass */
+        if (same_lane) {
+            reference_area_size = instance->lane_length -
+                                  instance->segment_length + position->index -
+                                  1;
+        } else {
+            reference_area_size = instance->lane_length -
+                                  instance->segment_length +
+                                  ((position->index == 0) ? (-1) : 0);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* 1.2.4. Mapping pseudo_rand to 0..<reference_area_size-1> and produce
+     * relative position */
+    relative_position = pseudo_rand;
+    relative_position = relative_position * relative_position >> 32;
+    relative_position = reference_area_size - 1 -
+                        (reference_area_size * relative_position >> 32);
+
+    /* 1.2.5 Computing starting position */
+    start_position = 0;
+
+    if (0 != position->pass) {
+        start_position = (position->slice == ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS - 1)
+                             ? 0
+                             : (position->slice + 1) * instance->segment_length;
+    }
+
+    /* 1.2.6. Computing absolute position */
+    absolute_position = (start_position + relative_position) %
+                        instance->lane_length; /* absolute position */
+    return absolute_position;
+}
+
+/* Single-threaded version for p=1 case */
+static int fill_memory_blocks_st(argon2_instance_t *instance) {
+    uint32_t r, s, l;
+
+    for (r = 0; r < instance->passes; ++r) {
+        for (s = 0; s < ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS; ++s) {
+            for (l = 0; l < instance->lanes; ++l) {
+                argon2_position_t position = {r, l, (uint8_t)s, 0};
+                fill_segment(instance, position);
+            }
+        }
+#ifdef GENKAT
+        internal_kat(instance, r); /* Print all memory blocks */
+#endif
+    }
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+#if !defined(ARGON2_NO_THREADS)
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+static unsigned __stdcall fill_segment_thr(void *thread_data)
+#else
+static void *fill_segment_thr(void *thread_data)
+#endif
+{
+    argon2_thread_data *my_data = thread_data;
+    fill_segment(my_data->instance_ptr, my_data->pos);
+    argon2_thread_exit();
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Multi-threaded version for p > 1 case */
+static int fill_memory_blocks_mt(argon2_instance_t *instance) {
+    uint32_t r, s;
+    argon2_thread_handle_t *thread = NULL;
+    argon2_thread_data *thr_data = NULL;
+    int rc = ARGON2_OK;
+
+    /* 1. Allocating space for threads */
+    thread = calloc(instance->lanes, sizeof(argon2_thread_handle_t));
+    if (thread == NULL) {
+        rc = ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    thr_data = calloc(instance->lanes, sizeof(argon2_thread_data));
+    if (thr_data == NULL) {
+        rc = ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    for (r = 0; r < instance->passes; ++r) {
+        for (s = 0; s < ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS; ++s) {
+            uint32_t l;
+
+            /* 2. Calling threads */
+            for (l = 0; l < instance->lanes; ++l) {
+                argon2_position_t position;
+
+                /* 2.1 Join a thread if limit is exceeded */
+                if (l >= instance->threads) {
+                    if (argon2_thread_join(thread[l - instance->threads])) {
+                        rc = ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
+                        goto fail;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                /* 2.2 Create thread */
+                position.pass = r;
+                position.lane = l;
+                position.slice = (uint8_t)s;
+                position.index = 0;
+                thr_data[l].instance_ptr =
+                    instance; /* preparing the thread input */
+                memcpy(&(thr_data[l].pos), &position,
+                       sizeof(argon2_position_t));
+                if (argon2_thread_create(&thread[l], &fill_segment_thr,
+                                         (void *)&thr_data[l])) {
+                    rc = ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
+                    goto fail;
+                }
+
+                /* fill_segment(instance, position); */
+                /*Non-thread equivalent of the lines above */
+            }
+
+            /* 3. Joining remaining threads */
+            for (l = instance->lanes - instance->threads; l < instance->lanes;
+                 ++l) {
+                if (argon2_thread_join(thread[l])) {
+                    rc = ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
+                    goto fail;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+#ifdef GENKAT
+        internal_kat(instance, r); /* Print all memory blocks */
+#endif
+    }
+
+fail:
+    if (thread != NULL) {
+        free(thread);
+    }
+    if (thr_data != NULL) {
+        free(thr_data);
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+#endif /* ARGON2_NO_THREADS */
+
+int fill_memory_blocks(argon2_instance_t *instance) {
+	if (instance == NULL || instance->lanes == 0) {
+	    return ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER;
+    }
+#if defined(ARGON2_NO_THREADS)
+    return fill_memory_blocks_st(instance);
+#else
+    return instance->threads == 1 ?
+			fill_memory_blocks_st(instance) : fill_memory_blocks_mt(instance);
+#endif
+}
+
+int validate_inputs(const argon2_context *context) {
+    if (NULL == context) {
+        return ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    if (NULL == context->out) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_PTR_NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate output length */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_OUTLEN > context->outlen) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT;
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_OUTLEN < context->outlen) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate password (required param) */
+    if (NULL == context->pwd) {
+        if (0 != context->pwdlen) {
+            return ARGON2_PWD_PTR_MISMATCH;
+        }
+    }
+#if ARGON2_MIN_PWD_LENGTH > 0 /* cryptsetup: fix gcc warning */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_PWD_LENGTH > context->pwdlen) {
+      return ARGON2_PWD_TOO_SHORT;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH < context->pwdlen) {
+        return ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate salt (required param) */
+    if (NULL == context->salt) {
+        if (0 != context->saltlen) {
+            return ARGON2_SALT_PTR_MISMATCH;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_SALT_LENGTH > context->saltlen) {
+        return ARGON2_SALT_TOO_SHORT;
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_SALT_LENGTH < context->saltlen) {
+        return ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate secret (optional param) */
+    if (NULL == context->secret) {
+        if (0 != context->secretlen) {
+            return ARGON2_SECRET_PTR_MISMATCH;
+        }
+    } else {
+#if ARGON2_MIN_SECRET > 0 /* cryptsetup: fix gcc warning */
+        if (ARGON2_MIN_SECRET > context->secretlen) {
+            return ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_SHORT;
+        }
+#endif
+        if (ARGON2_MAX_SECRET < context->secretlen) {
+            return ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_LONG;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Validate associated data (optional param) */
+    if (NULL == context->ad) {
+        if (0 != context->adlen) {
+            return ARGON2_AD_PTR_MISMATCH;
+        }
+    } else {
+#if ARGON2_MIN_AD_LENGTH > 0 /* cryptsetup: fix gcc warning */
+        if (ARGON2_MIN_AD_LENGTH > context->adlen) {
+            return ARGON2_AD_TOO_SHORT;
+        }
+#endif
+        if (ARGON2_MAX_AD_LENGTH < context->adlen) {
+            return ARGON2_AD_TOO_LONG;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Validate memory cost */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_MEMORY > context->m_cost) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_LITTLE;
+    }
+#if 0 /* UINT32_MAX, cryptsetup: fix gcc warning */
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY < context->m_cost) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_MUCH;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (context->m_cost < 8 * context->lanes) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_LITTLE;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate time cost */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_TIME > context->t_cost) {
+        return ARGON2_TIME_TOO_SMALL;
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_TIME < context->t_cost) {
+        return ARGON2_TIME_TOO_LARGE;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate lanes */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_LANES > context->lanes) {
+        return ARGON2_LANES_TOO_FEW;
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_LANES < context->lanes) {
+        return ARGON2_LANES_TOO_MANY;
+    }
+
+    /* Validate threads */
+    if (ARGON2_MIN_THREADS > context->threads) {
+        return ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_FEW;
+    }
+
+    if (ARGON2_MAX_THREADS < context->threads) {
+        return ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_MANY;
+    }
+
+    if (NULL != context->allocate_cbk && NULL == context->free_cbk) {
+        return ARGON2_FREE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (NULL == context->allocate_cbk && NULL != context->free_cbk) {
+        return ARGON2_ALLOCATE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL;
+    }
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+void fill_first_blocks(uint8_t *blockhash, const argon2_instance_t *instance) {
+    uint32_t l;
+    /* Make the first and second block in each lane as G(H0||0||i) or
+       G(H0||1||i) */
+    uint8_t blockhash_bytes[ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    for (l = 0; l < instance->lanes; ++l) {
+
+        store32(blockhash + ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0);
+        store32(blockhash + ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH + 4, l);
+        blake2b_long(blockhash_bytes, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE, blockhash,
+                     ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH);
+        load_block(&instance->memory[l * instance->lane_length + 0],
+                   blockhash_bytes);
+
+        store32(blockhash + ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1);
+        blake2b_long(blockhash_bytes, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE, blockhash,
+                     ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH);
+        load_block(&instance->memory[l * instance->lane_length + 1],
+                   blockhash_bytes);
+    }
+    clear_internal_memory(blockhash_bytes, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+void initial_hash(uint8_t *blockhash, argon2_context *context,
+                  argon2_type type) {
+    blake2b_state BlakeHash;
+    uint8_t value[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+
+    if (NULL == context || NULL == blockhash) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    blake2b_init(&BlakeHash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+    store32(&value, context->lanes);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, context->outlen);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, context->m_cost);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, context->t_cost);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, context->version);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, (uint32_t)type);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    store32(&value, context->pwdlen);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    if (context->pwd != NULL) {
+        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->pwd,
+                       context->pwdlen);
+
+        if (context->flags & ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_PASSWORD) {
+            secure_wipe_memory(context->pwd, context->pwdlen);
+            context->pwdlen = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    store32(&value, context->saltlen);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    if (context->salt != NULL) {
+        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->salt,
+                       context->saltlen);
+    }
+
+    store32(&value, context->secretlen);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    if (context->secret != NULL) {
+        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->secret,
+                       context->secretlen);
+
+        if (context->flags & ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_SECRET) {
+            secure_wipe_memory(context->secret, context->secretlen);
+            context->secretlen = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    store32(&value, context->adlen);
+    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));
+
+    if (context->ad != NULL) {
+        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->ad,
+                       context->adlen);
+    }
+
+    blake2b_final(&BlakeHash, blockhash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+}
+
+int initialize(argon2_instance_t *instance, argon2_context *context) {
+    uint8_t blockhash[ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH];
+    int result = ARGON2_OK;
+
+    if (instance == NULL || context == NULL)
+        return ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER;
+    instance->context_ptr = context;
+
+    /* 1. Memory allocation */
+    result = allocate_memory(context, (uint8_t **)&(instance->memory),
+                             instance->memory_blocks, sizeof(block));
+    if (result != ARGON2_OK) {
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    /* 2. Initial hashing */
+    /* H_0 + 8 extra bytes to produce the first blocks */
+    /* uint8_t blockhash[ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH]; */
+    /* Hashing all inputs */
+    initial_hash(blockhash, context, instance->type);
+    /* Zeroing 8 extra bytes */
+    clear_internal_memory(blockhash + ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+                          ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH -
+                              ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+#ifdef GENKAT
+    initial_kat(blockhash, context, instance->type);
+#endif
+
+    /* 3. Creating first blocks, we always have at least two blocks in a slice
+     */
+    fill_first_blocks(blockhash, instance);
+    /* Clearing the hash */
+    clear_internal_memory(blockhash, ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH);
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.h

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ARGON2_CORE_H
+#define ARGON2_CORE_H
+
+#include "argon2.h"
+
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
+
+/**********************Argon2 internal constants*******************************/
+
+enum argon2_core_constants {
+    /* Memory block size in bytes */
+    ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE = 1024,
+    ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK = ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE / 8,
+    ARGON2_OWORDS_IN_BLOCK = ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE / 16,
+    ARGON2_HWORDS_IN_BLOCK = ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE / 32,
+    ARGON2_512BIT_WORDS_IN_BLOCK = ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE / 64,
+
+    /* Number of pseudo-random values generated by one call to Blake in Argon2i
+       to
+       generate reference block positions */
+    ARGON2_ADDRESSES_IN_BLOCK = 128,
+
+    /* Pre-hashing digest length and its extension*/
+    ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH = 64,
+    ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH = 72
+};
+
+/*************************Argon2 internal data types***********************/
+
+/*
+ * Structure for the (1KB) memory block implemented as 128 64-bit words.
+ * Memory blocks can be copied, XORed. Internal words can be accessed by [] (no
+ * bounds checking).
+ */
+typedef struct block_ { uint64_t v[ARGON2_QWORDS_IN_BLOCK]; } block;
+
+/*****************Functions that work with the block******************/
+
+/* Initialize each byte of the block with @in */
+void init_block_value(block *b, uint8_t in);
+
+/* Copy block @src to block @dst */
+void copy_block(block *dst, const block *src);
+
+/* XOR @src onto @dst bytewise */
+void xor_block(block *dst, const block *src);
+
+/*
+ * Argon2 instance: memory pointer, number of passes, amount of memory, type,
+ * and derived values.
+ * Used to evaluate the number and location of blocks to construct in each
+ * thread
+ */
+typedef struct Argon2_instance_t {
+    block *memory;          /* Memory pointer */
+    uint32_t version;
+    uint32_t passes;        /* Number of passes */
+    uint32_t memory_blocks; /* Number of blocks in memory */
+    uint32_t segment_length;
+    uint32_t lane_length;
+    uint32_t lanes;
+    uint32_t threads;
+    argon2_type type;
+    int print_internals; /* whether to print the memory blocks */
+    argon2_context *context_ptr; /* points back to original context */
+} argon2_instance_t;
+
+/*
+ * Argon2 position: where we construct the block right now. Used to distribute
+ * work between threads.
+ */
+typedef struct Argon2_position_t {
+    uint32_t pass;
+    uint32_t lane;
+    uint8_t slice;
+    uint32_t index;
+} argon2_position_t;
+
+/*Struct that holds the inputs for thread handling FillSegment*/
+typedef struct Argon2_thread_data {
+    argon2_instance_t *instance_ptr;
+    argon2_position_t pos;
+} argon2_thread_data;
+
+/*************************Argon2 core functions********************************/
+
+/* Allocates memory to the given pointer, uses the appropriate allocator as
+ * specified in the context. Total allocated memory is num*size.
+ * @param context argon2_context which specifies the allocator
+ * @param memory pointer to the pointer to the memory
+ * @param size the size in bytes for each element to be allocated
+ * @param num the number of elements to be allocated
+ * @return ARGON2_OK if @memory is a valid pointer and memory is allocated
+ */
+int allocate_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t **memory,
+                    size_t num, size_t size);
+
+/*
+ * Frees memory at the given pointer, uses the appropriate deallocator as
+ * specified in the context. Also cleans the memory using clear_internal_memory.
+ * @param context argon2_context which specifies the deallocator
+ * @param memory pointer to buffer to be freed
+ * @param size the size in bytes for each element to be deallocated
+ * @param num the number of elements to be deallocated
+ */
+void free_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t *memory,
+                 size_t num, size_t size);
+
+/* Function that securely cleans the memory. This ignores any flags set
+ * regarding clearing memory. Usually one just calls clear_internal_memory.
+ * @param mem Pointer to the memory
+ * @param s Memory size in bytes
+ */
+void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n);
+
+/* Function that securely clears the memory if FLAG_clear_internal_memory is
+ * set. If the flag isn't set, this function does nothing.
+ * @param mem Pointer to the memory
+ * @param s Memory size in bytes
+ */
+void clear_internal_memory(void *v, size_t n);
+
+/*
+ * Computes absolute position of reference block in the lane following a skewed
+ * distribution and using a pseudo-random value as input
+ * @param instance Pointer to the current instance
+ * @param position Pointer to the current position
+ * @param pseudo_rand 32-bit pseudo-random value used to determine the position
+ * @param same_lane Indicates if the block will be taken from the current lane.
+ * If so we can reference the current segment
+ * @pre All pointers must be valid
+ */
+uint32_t index_alpha(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
+                     const argon2_position_t *position, uint32_t pseudo_rand,
+                     int same_lane);
+
+/*
+ * Function that validates all inputs against predefined restrictions and return
+ * an error code
+ * @param context Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return ARGON2_OK if everything is all right, otherwise one of error codes
+ * (all defined in <argon2.h>
+ */
+int validate_inputs(const argon2_context *context);
+
+/*
+ * Hashes all the inputs into @a blockhash[PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH], clears
+ * password and secret if needed
+ * @param  context  Pointer to the Argon2 internal structure containing memory
+ * pointer, and parameters for time and space requirements.
+ * @param  blockhash Buffer for pre-hashing digest
+ * @param  type Argon2 type
+ * @pre    @a blockhash must have at least @a PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes
+ * allocated
+ */
+void initial_hash(uint8_t *blockhash, argon2_context *context,
+                  argon2_type type);
+
+/*
+ * Function creates first 2 blocks per lane
+ * @param instance Pointer to the current instance
+ * @param blockhash Pointer to the pre-hashing digest
+ * @pre blockhash must point to @a PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH allocated values
+ */
+void fill_first_blocks(uint8_t *blockhash, const argon2_instance_t *instance);
+
+/*
+ * Function allocates memory, hashes the inputs with Blake,  and creates first
+ * two blocks. Returns the pointer to the main memory with 2 blocks per lane
+ * initialized
+ * @param  context  Pointer to the Argon2 internal structure containing memory
+ * pointer, and parameters for time and space requirements.
+ * @param  instance Current Argon2 instance
+ * @return Zero if successful, -1 if memory failed to allocate. @context->state
+ * will be modified if successful.
+ */
+int initialize(argon2_instance_t *instance, argon2_context *context);
+
+/*
+ * XORing the last block of each lane, hashing it, making the tag. Deallocates
+ * the memory.
+ * @param context Pointer to current Argon2 context (use only the out parameters
+ * from it)
+ * @param instance Pointer to current instance of Argon2
+ * @pre instance->state must point to necessary amount of memory
+ * @pre context->out must point to outlen bytes of memory
+ * @pre if context->free_cbk is not NULL, it should point to a function that
+ * deallocates memory
+ */
+void finalize(const argon2_context *context, argon2_instance_t *instance);
+
+/*
+ * Function that fills the segment using previous segments also from other
+ * threads
+ * @param context current context
+ * @param instance Pointer to the current instance
+ * @param position Current position
+ * @pre all block pointers must be valid
+ */
+void fill_segment(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
+                  argon2_position_t position);
+
+/*
+ * Function that fills the entire memory t_cost times based on the first two
+ * blocks in each lane
+ * @param instance Pointer to the current instance
+ * @return ARGON2_OK if successful, @context->state
+ */
+int fill_memory_blocks(argon2_instance_t *instance);
+
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.c

@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "encoding.h"
+#include "core.h"
+
+/*
+ * Example code for a decoder and encoder of "hash strings", with Argon2
+ * parameters.
+ *
+ * This code comprises three sections:
+ *
+ *   -- The first section contains generic Base64 encoding and decoding
+ *   functions. It is conceptually applicable to any hash function
+ *   implementation that uses Base64 to encode and decode parameters,
+ *   salts and outputs. It could be made into a library, provided that
+ *   the relevant functions are made public (non-static) and be given
+ *   reasonable names to avoid collisions with other functions.
+ *
+ *   -- The second section is specific to Argon2. It encodes and decodes
+ *   the parameters, salts and outputs. It does not compute the hash
+ *   itself.
+ *
+ * The code was originally written by Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>,
+ * to whom comments and remarks may be sent. It is released under what
+ * should amount to Public Domain or its closest equivalent; the
+ * following mantra is supposed to incarnate that fact with all the
+ * proper legal rituals:
+ *
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * This file is provided under the terms of Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * Public Domain Dedication. To the extent possible under law, the
+ * author (Thomas Pornin) has waived all copyright and related or
+ * neighboring rights to this file. This work is published from: Canada.
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Thomas Pornin
+ */
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * Common code; could be shared between different hash functions.
+ *
+ * Note: the Base64 functions below assume that uppercase letters (resp.
+ * lowercase letters) have consecutive numerical codes, that fit on 8
+ * bits. All modern systems use ASCII-compatible charsets, where these
+ * properties are true. If you are stuck with a dinosaur of a system
+ * that still defaults to EBCDIC then you already have much bigger
+ * interoperability issues to deal with.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Some macros for constant-time comparisons. These work over values in
+ * the 0..255 range. Returned value is 0x00 on "false", 0xFF on "true".
+ */
+#define EQ(x, y) ((((0U - ((unsigned)(x) ^ (unsigned)(y))) >> 8) & 0xFF) ^ 0xFF)
+#define GT(x, y) ((((unsigned)(y) - (unsigned)(x)) >> 8) & 0xFF)
+#define GE(x, y) (GT(y, x) ^ 0xFF)
+#define LT(x, y) GT(y, x)
+#define LE(x, y) GE(y, x)
+
+/*
+ * Convert value x (0..63) to corresponding Base64 character.
+ */
+static int b64_byte_to_char(unsigned x) {
+    return (LT(x, 26) & (x + 'A')) |
+           (GE(x, 26) & LT(x, 52) & (x + ('a' - 26))) |
+           (GE(x, 52) & LT(x, 62) & (x + ('0' - 52))) | (EQ(x, 62) & '+') |
+           (EQ(x, 63) & '/');
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert character c to the corresponding 6-bit value. If character c
+ * is not a Base64 character, then 0xFF (255) is returned.
+ */
+static unsigned b64_char_to_byte(int c) {
+    unsigned x;
+
+    x = (GE(c, 'A') & LE(c, 'Z') & (c - 'A')) |
+        (GE(c, 'a') & LE(c, 'z') & (c - ('a' - 26))) |
+        (GE(c, '0') & LE(c, '9') & (c - ('0' - 52))) | (EQ(c, '+') & 62) |
+        (EQ(c, '/') & 63);
+    return x | (EQ(x, 0) & (EQ(c, 'A') ^ 0xFF));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert some bytes to Base64. 'dst_len' is the length (in characters)
+ * of the output buffer 'dst'; if that buffer is not large enough to
+ * receive the result (including the terminating 0), then (size_t)-1
+ * is returned. Otherwise, the zero-terminated Base64 string is written
+ * in the buffer, and the output length (counted WITHOUT the terminating
+ * zero) is returned.
+ */
+static size_t to_base64(char *dst, size_t dst_len, const void *src,
+                        size_t src_len) {
+    size_t olen;
+    const unsigned char *buf;
+    unsigned acc, acc_len;
+
+    olen = (src_len / 3) << 2;
+    switch (src_len % 3) {
+    case 2:
+        olen++;
+    /* fall through */
+    case 1:
+        olen += 2;
+        break;
+    }
+    if (dst_len <= olen) {
+        return (size_t)-1;
+    }
+    acc = 0;
+    acc_len = 0;
+    buf = (const unsigned char *)src;
+    while (src_len-- > 0) {
+        acc = (acc << 8) + (*buf++);
+        acc_len += 8;
+        while (acc_len >= 6) {
+            acc_len -= 6;
+            *dst++ = (char)b64_byte_to_char((acc >> acc_len) & 0x3F);
+        }
+    }
+    if (acc_len > 0) {
+        *dst++ = (char)b64_byte_to_char((acc << (6 - acc_len)) & 0x3F);
+    }
+    *dst++ = 0;
+    return olen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode Base64 chars into bytes. The '*dst_len' value must initially
+ * contain the length of the output buffer '*dst'; when the decoding
+ * ends, the actual number of decoded bytes is written back in
+ * '*dst_len'.
+ *
+ * Decoding stops when a non-Base64 character is encountered, or when
+ * the output buffer capacity is exceeded. If an error occurred (output
+ * buffer is too small, invalid last characters leading to unprocessed
+ * buffered bits), then NULL is returned; otherwise, the returned value
+ * points to the first non-Base64 character in the source stream, which
+ * may be the terminating zero.
+ */
+static const char *from_base64(void *dst, size_t *dst_len, const char *src) {
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    unsigned acc, acc_len;
+
+    buf = (unsigned char *)dst;
+    len = 0;
+    acc = 0;
+    acc_len = 0;
+    for (;;) {
+        unsigned d;
+
+        d = b64_char_to_byte(*src);
+        if (d == 0xFF) {
+            break;
+        }
+        src++;
+        acc = (acc << 6) + d;
+        acc_len += 6;
+        if (acc_len >= 8) {
+            acc_len -= 8;
+            if ((len++) >= *dst_len) {
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            *buf++ = (acc >> acc_len) & 0xFF;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If the input length is equal to 1 modulo 4 (which is
+     * invalid), then there will remain 6 unprocessed bits;
+     * otherwise, only 0, 2 or 4 bits are buffered. The buffered
+     * bits must also all be zero.
+     */
+    if (acc_len > 4 || (acc & (((unsigned)1 << acc_len) - 1)) != 0) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    *dst_len = len;
+    return src;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode decimal integer from 'str'; the value is written in '*v'.
+ * Returned value is a pointer to the next non-decimal character in the
+ * string. If there is no digit at all, or the value encoding is not
+ * minimal (extra leading zeros), or the value does not fit in an
+ * 'unsigned long', then NULL is returned.
+ */
+static const char *decode_decimal(const char *str, unsigned long *v) {
+    const char *orig;
+    unsigned long acc;
+
+    acc = 0;
+    for (orig = str;; str++) {
+        int c;
+
+        c = *str;
+        if (c < '0' || c > '9') {
+            break;
+        }
+        c -= '0';
+        if (acc > (ULONG_MAX / 10)) {
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        acc *= 10;
+        if ((unsigned long)c > (ULONG_MAX - acc)) {
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        acc += (unsigned long)c;
+    }
+    if (str == orig || (*orig == '0' && str != (orig + 1))) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    *v = acc;
+    return str;
+}
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * Code specific to Argon2.
+ *
+ * The code below applies the following format:
+ *
+ *  $argon2<T>[$v=<num>]$m=<num>,t=<num>,p=<num>$<bin>$<bin>
+ *
+ * where <T> is either 'd', 'id', or 'i', <num> is a decimal integer (positive,
+ * fits in an 'unsigned long'), and <bin> is Base64-encoded data (no '=' padding
+ * characters, no newline or whitespace).
+ *
+ * The last two binary chunks (encoded in Base64) are, in that order,
+ * the salt and the output. Both are required. The binary salt length and the
+ * output length must be in the allowed ranges defined in argon2.h.
+ *
+ * The ctx struct must contain buffers large enough to hold the salt and pwd
+ * when it is fed into decode_string.
+ */
+
+int decode_string(argon2_context *ctx, const char *str, argon2_type type) {
+
+/* check for prefix */
+#define CC(prefix)                                                             \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        size_t cc_len = strlen(prefix);                                        \
+        if (strncmp(str, prefix, cc_len) != 0) {                               \
+            return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        str += cc_len;                                                         \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+/* optional prefix checking with supplied code */
+#define CC_opt(prefix, code)                                                   \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        size_t cc_len = strlen(prefix);                                        \
+        if (strncmp(str, prefix, cc_len) == 0) {                               \
+            str += cc_len;                                                     \
+            { code; }                                                          \
+        }                                                                      \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+/* Decoding prefix into decimal */
+#define DECIMAL(x)                                                             \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        unsigned long dec_x;                                                   \
+        str = decode_decimal(str, &dec_x);                                     \
+        if (str == NULL) {                                                     \
+            return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        (x) = dec_x;                                                           \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+
+/* Decoding prefix into uint32_t decimal */
+#define DECIMAL_U32(x)                                                         \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        unsigned long dec_x;                                                   \
+        str = decode_decimal(str, &dec_x);                                     \
+        if (str == NULL || dec_x > UINT32_MAX) {                               \
+            return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        (x) = (uint32_t)dec_x;                                                 \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+
+/* Decoding base64 into a binary buffer */
+#define BIN(buf, max_len, len)                                                 \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        size_t bin_len = (max_len);                                            \
+        str = from_base64(buf, &bin_len, str);                                 \
+        if (str == NULL || bin_len > UINT32_MAX) {                             \
+            return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        (len) = (uint32_t)bin_len;                                             \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+    size_t maxsaltlen = ctx->saltlen;
+    size_t maxoutlen = ctx->outlen;
+    int validation_result;
+    const char* type_string;
+
+    /* We should start with the argon2_type we are using */
+    type_string = argon2_type2string(type, 0);
+    if (!type_string) {
+        return ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE;
+    }
+
+    CC("$");
+    CC(type_string);
+
+    /* Reading the version number if the default is suppressed */
+    ctx->version = ARGON2_VERSION_10;
+    CC_opt("$v=", DECIMAL_U32(ctx->version));
+
+    CC("$m=");
+    DECIMAL_U32(ctx->m_cost);
+    CC(",t=");
+    DECIMAL_U32(ctx->t_cost);
+    CC(",p=");
+    DECIMAL_U32(ctx->lanes);
+    ctx->threads = ctx->lanes;
+
+    CC("$");
+    BIN(ctx->salt, maxsaltlen, ctx->saltlen);
+    CC("$");
+    BIN(ctx->out, maxoutlen, ctx->outlen);
+
+    /* The rest of the fields get the default values */
+    ctx->secret = NULL;
+    ctx->secretlen = 0;
+    ctx->ad = NULL;
+    ctx->adlen = 0;
+    ctx->allocate_cbk = NULL;
+    ctx->free_cbk = NULL;
+    ctx->flags = ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+
+    /* On return, must have valid context */
+    validation_result = validate_inputs(ctx);
+    if (validation_result != ARGON2_OK) {
+        return validation_result;
+    }
+
+    /* Can't have any additional characters */
+    if (*str == 0) {
+        return ARGON2_OK;
+    } else {
+        return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;
+    }
+#undef CC
+#undef CC_opt
+#undef DECIMAL
+#undef BIN
+}
+
+int encode_string(char *dst, size_t dst_len, argon2_context *ctx,
+                  argon2_type type) {
+#define SS(str)                                                                \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        size_t pp_len = strlen(str);                                           \
+        if (pp_len >= dst_len) {                                               \
+            return ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        memcpy(dst, str, pp_len + 1);                                          \
+        dst += pp_len;                                                         \
+        dst_len -= pp_len;                                                     \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define SX(x)                                                                  \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        char tmp[30];                                                          \
+        sprintf(tmp, "%lu", (unsigned long)(x));                               \
+        SS(tmp);                                                               \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define SB(buf, len)                                                           \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        size_t sb_len = to_base64(dst, dst_len, buf, len);                     \
+        if (sb_len == (size_t)-1) {                                            \
+            return ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL;                                       \
+        }                                                                      \
+        dst += sb_len;                                                         \
+        dst_len -= sb_len;                                                     \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+    const char* type_string = argon2_type2string(type, 0);
+    int validation_result = validate_inputs(ctx);
+
+    if (!type_string) {
+      return ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (validation_result != ARGON2_OK) {
+      return validation_result;
+    }
+
+
+    SS("$");
+    SS(type_string);
+
+    SS("$v=");
+    SX(ctx->version);
+
+    SS("$m=");
+    SX(ctx->m_cost);
+    SS(",t=");
+    SX(ctx->t_cost);
+    SS(",p=");
+    SX(ctx->lanes);
+
+    SS("$");
+    SB(ctx->salt, ctx->saltlen);
+
+    SS("$");
+    SB(ctx->out, ctx->outlen);
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+
+#undef SS
+#undef SX
+#undef SB
+}
+
+size_t b64len(uint32_t len) {
+    size_t olen = ((size_t)len / 3) << 2;
+
+    switch (len % 3) {
+    case 2:
+        olen++;
+    /* fall through */
+    case 1:
+        olen += 2;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return olen;
+}
+
+size_t numlen(uint32_t num) {
+    size_t len = 1;
+    while (num >= 10) {
+        ++len;
+        num = num / 10;
+    }
+    return len;
+}

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.h

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ENCODING_H
+#define ENCODING_H
+#include "argon2.h"
+
+#define ARGON2_MAX_DECODED_LANES UINT32_C(255)
+#define ARGON2_MIN_DECODED_SALT_LEN UINT32_C(8)
+#define ARGON2_MIN_DECODED_OUT_LEN UINT32_C(12)
+
+/*
+* encode an Argon2 hash string into the provided buffer. 'dst_len'
+* contains the size, in characters, of the 'dst' buffer; if 'dst_len'
+* is less than the number of required characters (including the
+* terminating 0), then this function returns ARGON2_ENCODING_ERROR.
+*
+* on success, ARGON2_OK is returned.
+*/
+int encode_string(char *dst, size_t dst_len, argon2_context *ctx,
+                  argon2_type type);
+
+/*
+* Decodes an Argon2 hash string into the provided structure 'ctx'.
+* The only fields that must be set prior to this call are ctx.saltlen and
+* ctx.outlen (which must be the maximal salt and out length values that are
+* allowed), ctx.salt and ctx.out (which must be buffers of the specified
+* length), and ctx.pwd and ctx.pwdlen which must hold a valid password.
+*
+* Invalid input string causes an error. On success, the ctx is valid and all
+* fields have been initialized.
+*
+* Returned value is ARGON2_OK on success, other ARGON2_ codes on error.
+*/
+int decode_string(argon2_context *ctx, const char *str, argon2_type type);
+
+/* Returns the length of the encoded byte stream with length len */
+size_t b64len(uint32_t len);
+
+/* Returns the length of the encoded number num */
+size_t numlen(uint32_t num);
+
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/ref.c

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "argon2.h"
+#include "core.h"
+
+#include "blake2/blamka-round-ref.h"
+#include "blake2/blake2-impl.h"
+#include "blake2/blake2.h"
+
+
+/*
+ * Function fills a new memory block and optionally XORs the old block over the new one.
+ * @next_block must be initialized.
+ * @param prev_block Pointer to the previous block
+ * @param ref_block Pointer to the reference block
+ * @param next_block Pointer to the block to be constructed
+ * @param with_xor Whether to XOR into the new block (1) or just overwrite (0)
+ * @pre all block pointers must be valid
+ */
+static void fill_block(const block *prev_block, const block *ref_block,
+                       block *next_block, int with_xor) {
+    block blockR, block_tmp;
+    unsigned i;
+
+    copy_block(&blockR, ref_block);
+    xor_block(&blockR, prev_block);
+    copy_block(&block_tmp, &blockR);
+    /* Now blockR = ref_block + prev_block and block_tmp = ref_block + prev_block */
+    if (with_xor) {
+        /* Saving the next block contents for XOR over: */
+        xor_block(&block_tmp, next_block);
+        /* Now blockR = ref_block + prev_block and
+           block_tmp = ref_block + prev_block + next_block */
+    }
+
+    /* Apply Blake2 on columns of 64-bit words: (0,1,...,15) , then
+       (16,17,..31)... finally (112,113,...127) */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(
+            blockR.v[16 * i], blockR.v[16 * i + 1], blockR.v[16 * i + 2],
+            blockR.v[16 * i + 3], blockR.v[16 * i + 4], blockR.v[16 * i + 5],
+            blockR.v[16 * i + 6], blockR.v[16 * i + 7], blockR.v[16 * i + 8],
+            blockR.v[16 * i + 9], blockR.v[16 * i + 10], blockR.v[16 * i + 11],
+            blockR.v[16 * i + 12], blockR.v[16 * i + 13], blockR.v[16 * i + 14],
+            blockR.v[16 * i + 15]);
+    }
+
+    /* Apply Blake2 on rows of 64-bit words: (0,1,16,17,...112,113), then
+       (2,3,18,19,...,114,115).. finally (14,15,30,31,...,126,127) */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(
+            blockR.v[2 * i], blockR.v[2 * i + 1], blockR.v[2 * i + 16],
+            blockR.v[2 * i + 17], blockR.v[2 * i + 32], blockR.v[2 * i + 33],
+            blockR.v[2 * i + 48], blockR.v[2 * i + 49], blockR.v[2 * i + 64],
+            blockR.v[2 * i + 65], blockR.v[2 * i + 80], blockR.v[2 * i + 81],
+            blockR.v[2 * i + 96], blockR.v[2 * i + 97], blockR.v[2 * i + 112],
+            blockR.v[2 * i + 113]);
+    }
+
+    copy_block(next_block, &block_tmp);
+    xor_block(next_block, &blockR);
+}
+
+static void next_addresses(block *address_block, block *input_block,
+                           const block *zero_block) {
+    input_block->v[6]++;
+    fill_block(zero_block, input_block, address_block, 0);
+    fill_block(zero_block, address_block, address_block, 0);
+}
+
+void fill_segment(const argon2_instance_t *instance,
+                  argon2_position_t position) {
+    block *ref_block = NULL, *curr_block = NULL;
+    block address_block, input_block, zero_block;
+    uint64_t pseudo_rand, ref_index, ref_lane;
+    uint32_t prev_offset, curr_offset;
+    uint32_t starting_index;
+    uint32_t i;
+    int data_independent_addressing;
+
+    if (instance == NULL) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    data_independent_addressing =
+        (instance->type == Argon2_i) ||
+        (instance->type == Argon2_id && (position.pass == 0) &&
+         (position.slice < ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS / 2));
+
+    if (data_independent_addressing) {
+        init_block_value(&zero_block, 0);
+        init_block_value(&input_block, 0);
+
+        input_block.v[0] = position.pass;
+        input_block.v[1] = position.lane;
+        input_block.v[2] = position.slice;
+        input_block.v[3] = instance->memory_blocks;
+        input_block.v[4] = instance->passes;
+        input_block.v[5] = instance->type;
+    }
+
+    starting_index = 0;
+
+    if ((0 == position.pass) && (0 == position.slice)) {
+        starting_index = 2; /* we have already generated the first two blocks */
+
+        /* Don't forget to generate the first block of addresses: */
+        if (data_independent_addressing) {
+            next_addresses(&address_block, &input_block, &zero_block);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Offset of the current block */
+    curr_offset = position.lane * instance->lane_length +
+                  position.slice * instance->segment_length + starting_index;
+
+    if (0 == curr_offset % instance->lane_length) {
+        /* Last block in this lane */
+        prev_offset = curr_offset + instance->lane_length - 1;
+    } else {
+        /* Previous block */
+        prev_offset = curr_offset - 1;
+    }
+
+    for (i = starting_index; i < instance->segment_length;
+         ++i, ++curr_offset, ++prev_offset) {
+        /*1.1 Rotating prev_offset if needed */
+        if (curr_offset % instance->lane_length == 1) {
+            prev_offset = curr_offset - 1;
+        }
+
+        /* 1.2 Computing the index of the reference block */
+        /* 1.2.1 Taking pseudo-random value from the previous block */
+        if (data_independent_addressing) {
+            if (i % ARGON2_ADDRESSES_IN_BLOCK == 0) {
+                next_addresses(&address_block, &input_block, &zero_block);
+            }
+            pseudo_rand = address_block.v[i % ARGON2_ADDRESSES_IN_BLOCK];
+        } else {
+            pseudo_rand = instance->memory[prev_offset].v[0];
+        }
+
+        /* 1.2.2 Computing the lane of the reference block */
+        ref_lane = ((pseudo_rand >> 32)) % instance->lanes;
+
+        if ((position.pass == 0) && (position.slice == 0)) {
+            /* Can not reference other lanes yet */
+            ref_lane = position.lane;
+        }
+
+        /* 1.2.3 Computing the number of possible reference block within the
+         * lane.
+         */
+        position.index = i;
+        ref_index = index_alpha(instance, &position, pseudo_rand & 0xFFFFFFFF,
+                                ref_lane == position.lane);
+
+        /* 2 Creating a new block */
+        ref_block =
+            instance->memory + instance->lane_length * ref_lane + ref_index;
+        curr_block = instance->memory + curr_offset;
+        if (ARGON2_VERSION_10 == instance->version) {
+            /* version 1.2.1 and earlier: overwrite, not XOR */
+            fill_block(instance->memory + prev_offset, ref_block, curr_block, 0);
+        } else {
+            if(0 == position.pass) {
+                fill_block(instance->memory + prev_offset, ref_block,
+                           curr_block, 0);
+            } else {
+                fill_block(instance->memory + prev_offset, ref_block,
+                           curr_block, 1);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.c

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#if !defined(ARGON2_NO_THREADS)
+
+#include "thread.h"
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+#include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+int argon2_thread_create(argon2_thread_handle_t *handle,
+                         argon2_thread_func_t func, void *args) {
+    if (NULL == handle || func == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+    *handle = _beginthreadex(NULL, 0, func, args, 0, NULL);
+    return *handle != 0 ? 0 : -1;
+#else
+    return pthread_create(handle, NULL, func, args);
+#endif
+}
+
+int argon2_thread_join(argon2_thread_handle_t handle) {
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+    if (WaitForSingleObject((HANDLE)handle, INFINITE) == WAIT_OBJECT_0) {
+        return CloseHandle((HANDLE)handle) != 0 ? 0 : -1;
+    }
+    return -1;
+#else
+    return pthread_join(handle, NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
+void argon2_thread_exit(void) {
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+    _endthreadex(0);
+#else
+    pthread_exit(NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* ARGON2_NO_THREADS */

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.h

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ARGON2_THREAD_H
+#define ARGON2_THREAD_H
+
+#if !defined(ARGON2_NO_THREADS)
+
+/*
+        Here we implement an abstraction layer for the simpĺe requirements
+        of the Argon2 code. We only require 3 primitives---thread creation,
+        joining, and termination---so full emulation of the pthreads API
+        is unwarranted. Currently we wrap pthreads and Win32 threads.
+
+        The API defines 2 types: the function pointer type,
+   argon2_thread_func_t,
+        and the type of the thread handle---argon2_thread_handle_t.
+*/
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+#include <process.h>
+typedef unsigned(__stdcall *argon2_thread_func_t)(void *);
+typedef uintptr_t argon2_thread_handle_t;
+#else
+#include <pthread.h>
+typedef void *(*argon2_thread_func_t)(void *);
+typedef pthread_t argon2_thread_handle_t;
+#endif
+
+/* Creates a thread
+ * @param handle pointer to a thread handle, which is the output of this
+ * function. Must not be NULL.
+ * @param func A function pointer for the thread's entry point. Must not be
+ * NULL.
+ * @param args Pointer that is passed as an argument to @func. May be NULL.
+ * @return 0 if @handle and @func are valid pointers and a thread is successfully
+ * created.
+ */
+int argon2_thread_create(argon2_thread_handle_t *handle,
+                         argon2_thread_func_t func, void *args);
+
+/* Waits for a thread to terminate
+ * @param handle Handle to a thread created with argon2_thread_create.
+ * @return 0 if @handle is a valid handle, and joining completed successfully.
+*/
+int argon2_thread_join(argon2_thread_handle_t handle);
+
+/* Terminate the current thread. Must be run inside a thread created by
+ * argon2_thread_create.
+*/
+void argon2_thread_exit(void);
+
+#endif /* ARGON2_NO_THREADS */
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 PBKDF2 library wrapper
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+#if HAVE_ARGON2_H
+#include <argon2.h>
+#else
+#include "argon2/argon2.h"
+#endif
+
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
+
+int argon2(const char *type, const char *password, size_t password_length,
+	   const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+	   char *key, size_t key_length,
+	   uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
+{
+#if !USE_INTERNAL_ARGON2 && !HAVE_ARGON2_H
+	return -EINVAL;
+#else
+	argon2_type atype;
+	argon2_context context = {
+		.flags = ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS,
+		.version = ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER,
+		.t_cost = (uint32_t)iterations,
+		.m_cost = (uint32_t)memory,
+		.lanes = (uint32_t)parallel,
+		.threads = (uint32_t)parallel,
+		.out = (uint8_t *)key,
+		.outlen = (uint32_t)key_length,
+		.pwd = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)password,
+		.pwdlen = (uint32_t)password_length,
+		.salt = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)salt,
+		.saltlen = (uint32_t)salt_length,
+	};
+	int r;
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, "argon2i"))
+		atype = Argon2_i;
+	else if(!strcmp(type, "argon2id"))
+		atype = Argon2_id;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (argon2_ctx(&context, atype)) {
+	case ARGON2_OK:
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR:
+	case ARGON2_FREE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL:
+	case ARGON2_ALLOCATE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL:
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+#endif
+}
+
+#if 0
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+struct test_vector {
+	argon2_type type;
+	unsigned int memory;
+	unsigned int iterations;
+	unsigned int parallelism;
+	const char *password;
+	unsigned int password_length;
+	const char *salt;
+	unsigned int salt_length;
+	const char *key;
+	unsigned int key_length;
+	const char *ad;
+	unsigned int ad_length;
+	const char *output;
+	unsigned int output_length;
+};
+
+struct test_vector test_vectors[] = {
+	/* Argon2 RFC */
+	{
+		Argon2_i, 32, 3, 4,
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01", 32,
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02"
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02", 16,
+		"\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03", 8,
+		"\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04"
+		"\x04\x04\x04\x04", 12,
+		"\xc8\x14\xd9\xd1\xdc\x7f\x37\xaa"
+		"\x13\xf0\xd7\x7f\x24\x94\xbd\xa1"
+		"\xc8\xde\x6b\x01\x6d\xd3\x88\xd2"
+		"\x99\x52\xa4\xc4\x67\x2b\x6c\xe8", 32
+	},
+	{
+		Argon2_id, 32, 3, 4,
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
+		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01", 32,
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02"
+		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02", 16,
+		"\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03", 8,
+		"\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04"
+		"\x04\x04\x04\x04", 12,
+		"\x0d\x64\x0d\xf5\x8d\x78\x76\x6c"
+		"\x08\xc0\x37\xa3\x4a\x8b\x53\xc9"
+		"\xd0\x1e\xf0\x45\x2d\x75\xb6\x5e"
+		"\xb5\x25\x20\xe9\x6b\x01\xe6\x59", 32
+	}
+};
+
+static void printhex(const char *s, const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	printf("%s: ", s);
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		printf("\\x%02x", (unsigned char)buf[i]);
+	printf("\n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+static int argon2_test_vectors(void)
+{
+	char result[64];
+	int i, r;
+	struct test_vector *vec;
+	argon2_context context;
+
+	printf("Argon2 running test vectors\n");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(test_vectors) / sizeof(*test_vectors)); i++) {
+		vec = &test_vectors[i];
+		memset(result, 0, sizeof(result));
+		memset(&context, 0, sizeof(context));
+
+		context.flags = ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+		context.version = ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER;
+		context.out = (uint8_t *)result;
+		context.outlen = (uint32_t)vec->output_length;
+		context.pwd = (uint8_t *)vec->password;
+		context.pwdlen = (uint32_t)vec->password_length;
+		context.salt = (uint8_t *)vec->salt;
+		context.saltlen = (uint32_t)vec->salt_length;
+		context.secret = (uint8_t *)vec->key;
+		context.secretlen = (uint32_t)vec->key_length;;
+		context.ad = (uint8_t *)vec->ad;
+		context.adlen = (uint32_t)vec->ad_length;
+		context.t_cost = vec->iterations;
+		context.m_cost = vec->memory;
+		context.lanes = vec->parallelism;
+		context.threads = vec->parallelism;
+
+		r = argon2_ctx(&context, vec->type);
+		if (r != ARGON2_OK) {
+			printf("Argon2 failed %i, vector %d\n", r, i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (memcmp(result, vec->output, vec->output_length) != 0) {
+			printf("vector %u\n", i);
+			printhex(" got", result, vec->output_length);
+			printhex("want", vec->output, vec->output_length);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * Linux kernel cipher generic utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018, Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+struct cipher_alg {
+	const char *name;
+	int blocksize;
+	bool wrapped_key;
+};
+
+/* FIXME: Getting block size should be dynamic from cipher backend. */
+static const struct cipher_alg cipher_algs[] = {
+	{ "cipher_null", 16, false },
+	{ "aes",         16, false },
+	{ "serpent",     16, false },
+	{ "twofish",     16, false },
+	{ "anubis",      16, false },
+	{ "blowfish",     8, false },
+	{ "camellia",    16, false },
+	{ "cast5",        8, false },
+	{ "cast6",       16, false },
+	{ "des",          8, false },
+	{ "des3_ede",     8, false },
+	{ "khazad",       8, false },
+	{ "seed",        16, false },
+	{ "tea",          8, false },
+	{ "xtea",         8, false },
+	{ "paes",        16,  true }, /* protected AES, s390 wrapped key scheme */
+	{ NULL,           0, false }
+};
+
+static const struct cipher_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	while (name && cipher_algs[i].name) {
+		if (!strcasecmp(name, cipher_algs[i].name))
+			return &cipher_algs[i];
+		i++;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_blocksize(const char *name)
+{
+	const struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name);
+
+	return ca ? ca->blocksize : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name)
+{
+	const struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name);
+
+	return ca ? (int)ca->wrapped_key : 0;
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #define _CRYPTO_BACKEND_H
 
 #include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
 struct crypt_device;
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ struct crypt_cipher;
 struct crypt_storage;
 
 int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx);
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void);
 
 #define CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL (1 << 0)	/* Crypto uses kernel part, for benchmark */
 
@@ -42,30 +44,40 @@ int crypt_hash_size(const char *name);
 int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name);
 int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length);
 int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length);
-int crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx);
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx);
 
 /* HMAC */
 int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name);
 int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
-		    const void *buffer, size_t length);
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length);
 int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length);
 int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length);
-int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx);
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx);
 
-/* RNG (if fips paramater set, must provide FIPS compliance) */
+/* RNG (if fips parameter set, must provide FIPS compliance) */
 enum { CRYPT_RND_NORMAL = 0, CRYPT_RND_KEY = 1, CRYPT_RND_SALT = 2 };
 int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips);
 
+struct crypt_pbkdf_limits {
+	uint32_t min_iterations, max_iterations;
+	uint32_t min_memory, max_memory;
+	uint32_t min_parallel, max_parallel;
+};
+int crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(const char *kdf, struct crypt_pbkdf_limits *l);
+
 /* PBKDF*/
-int crypt_pbkdf_check(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
-		      const char *password, size_t password_size,
-		      const char *salt, size_t salt_size,
-		      uint64_t *iter_secs);
 int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		const char *password, size_t password_length,
 		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
 		char *key, size_t key_length,
-		unsigned int iterations);
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel);
+int crypt_pbkdf_perf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_size,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_size,
+		size_t volume_key_size, uint32_t time_ms,
+		uint32_t max_memory_kb, uint32_t parallel_threads,
+		uint32_t *iterations_out, uint32_t *memory_out,
+		int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr), void *usrptr);
 
 #if USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
 /* internal PBKDF2 implementation */
@@ -77,14 +89,21 @@ int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
 		 unsigned int hash_block_size);
 #endif
 
+/* Argon2 implementation wrapper */
+int argon2(const char *type, const char *password, size_t password_length,
+	   const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+	   char *key, size_t key_length,
+	   uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel);
+
 /* CRC32 */
 uint32_t crypt_crc32(uint32_t seed, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
 
 /* ciphers */
 int crypt_cipher_blocksize(const char *name);
+int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name);
 int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
-		    const char *mode, const void *buffer, size_t length);
-int crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx);
+		    const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length);
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx);
 int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
 			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length);
@@ -95,11 +114,18 @@ int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 /* storage encryption wrappers */
 int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx, uint64_t sector_start,
 		       const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
-		       char *key, size_t key_length);
-int crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx);
+		       const void *key, size_t key_length);
+void crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx);
 int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t sector,
 			  size_t count, char *buffer);
 int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t sector,
 			  size_t count, char *buffer);
 
+/* Memzero helper (memset on stack can be optimized out) */
+static inline void crypt_backend_memzero(void *s, size_t n)
+{
+	volatile uint8_t *p = (volatile uint8_t *)s;
+	while(n--) *p++ = 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* _CRYPTO_BACKEND_H */

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation (skcipher)
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -44,91 +44,21 @@ struct crypt_cipher {
 	int opfd;
 };
 
-struct cipher_alg {
-	const char *name;
-	int blocksize;
-};
-
-/* FIXME: Getting block size should be dynamic from cipher backend. */
-static struct cipher_alg cipher_algs[] = {
-	{ "cipher_null", 16 },
-	{ "aes",         16 },
-	{ "serpent",     16 },
-	{ "twofish",     16 },
-	{ "anubis",      16 },
-	{ "blowfish",     8 },
-	{ "camellia",    16 },
-	{ "cast5",        8 },
-	{ "cast6",       16 },
-	{ "des",          8 },
-	{ "des3_ede",     8 },
-	{ "khazad",       8 },
-	{ "seed",        16 },
-	{ "tea",          8 },
-	{ "xtea",         8 },
-	{ NULL,           0 }
-};
-
-static struct cipher_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
-{
-	int i = 0;
-
-	while (name && cipher_algs[i].name) {
-		if (!strcasecmp(name, cipher_algs[i].name))
-			return &cipher_algs[i];
-		i++;
-	}
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-int crypt_cipher_blocksize(const char *name)
-{
-	struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name);
-
-	return ca ? ca->blocksize : -EINVAL;
-}
-
-/* Shared with hash kernel backend */
-int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *opfd);
-
-int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *opfd)
-{
-	*tfmfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
-	if (*tfmfd == -1)
-		return -ENOTSUP;
-
-	if (bind(*tfmfd, (struct sockaddr *)sa, sizeof(*sa)) == -1) {
-		close(*tfmfd);
-		*tfmfd = -1;
-		return -ENOENT;
-	}
-
-	*opfd = accept(*tfmfd, NULL, 0);
-	if (*opfd == -1) {
-		close(*tfmfd);
-		*tfmfd = -1;
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /*
- *ciphers
+ * ciphers
  *
  * ENOENT - algorithm not available
  * ENOTSUP - AF_ALG family not available
  * (but cannot check specificaly for skcipher API)
  */
 int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
-		    const char *mode, const void *buffer, size_t length)
+		    const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
 	struct crypt_cipher *h;
 	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
 		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
 		.salg_type = "skcipher",
 	};
-	int r;
 
 	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
 	if (!h)
@@ -137,14 +67,28 @@ int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
 	snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name),
 		 "%s(%s)", mode, name);
 
-	r = crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd);
-	if (r < 0) {
-		free(h);
-		return r;
+	h->opfd = -1;
+	h->tfmfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+	if (h->tfmfd < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+		return -ENOTSUP;
 	}
 
-	if (length && strcmp(name, "cipher_null") &&
-	    setsockopt(h->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buffer, length) == -1) {
+	if (bind(h->tfmfd, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(name, "cipher_null"))
+		key_length = 0;
+
+	if (setsockopt(h->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, key_length) < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->opfd = accept(h->tfmfd, NULL, 0);
+	if (h->opfd < 0) {
 		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -187,6 +131,9 @@ static int crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 
 	/* Set encrypt/decrypt operation */
 	header = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	if (!header)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	header->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
 	header->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_OP;
 	header->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(*type));
@@ -214,7 +161,7 @@ static int crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 	if (len != (ssize_t)length)
 		r = -EIO;
 bad:
-	memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -234,33 +181,26 @@ int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 				  iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_DECRYPT);
 }
 
-int crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
 {
-	if (ctx->tfmfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->tfmfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->tfmfd);
-	if (ctx->opfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->opfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->opfd);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 #else /* ENABLE_AF_ALG */
-
-int crypt_cipher_blocksize(const char *name)
-{
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-
 int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
 		    const char *mode, const void *buffer, size_t length)
 {
 	return -ENOTSUP;
 }
 
-int crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return;
 }
 
 int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * GCRYPT crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -121,6 +121,14 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
+{
+	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
+		gcry_control(GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM);
+
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+}
+
 const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
 {
 	return crypto_backend_initialised ? version : "";
@@ -217,12 +225,11 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 {
 	gcry_md_close(ctx->hd);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* HMAC */
@@ -232,7 +239,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
 }
 
 int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
-		    const void *buffer, size_t length)
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
 	struct crypt_hmac *h;
 	unsigned int flags = GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC;
@@ -254,7 +261,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (gcry_md_setkey(h->hd, buffer, length)) {
+	if (gcry_md_setkey(h->hd, key, key_length)) {
 		gcry_md_close(h->hd);
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -293,12 +300,11 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
 	gcry_md_close(ctx->hd);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* RNG */
@@ -317,38 +323,46 @@ int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* PBKDF */
-int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
-		const char *password, size_t password_length,
-		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
-		char *key, size_t key_length,
-		unsigned int iterations)
+static int pbkdf2(const char *hash,
+		  const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		  const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		  char *key, size_t key_length,
+		  uint32_t iterations)
 {
 	const char *hash_name = crypt_hash_compat_name(hash, NULL);
 
 #if USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
-	if (!kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash_name, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
 			    iterations, key_length, key, 0);
-
 #else /* USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2 */
 	int hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(hash_name);
-	int kdf_id;
 
 	if (!hash_id)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (kdf && !strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
-		kdf_id = GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2;
-	else
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (gcry_kdf_derive(password, password_length, kdf_id, hash_id,
+	if (gcry_kdf_derive(password, password_length, GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2, hash_id,
 	    salt, salt_length, iterations, key_length, key))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
 #endif /* USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2 */
 }
+
+/* PBKDF */
+int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		char *key, size_t key_length,
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
+{
+	if (!kdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2"))
+		return pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations);
+	else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6))
+		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 #endif
 
 static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
-static char version[64];
+static char version[256];
 
 struct hash_alg {
 	const char *name;
@@ -68,8 +68,34 @@ struct crypt_hmac {
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
-/* Defined in crypt_kernel_ciphers.c */
-extern int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *opfd);
+static int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *opfd,
+				    const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	*tfmfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+	if (*tfmfd < 0)
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (bind(*tfmfd, (struct sockaddr *)sa, sizeof(*sa)) < 0) {
+		close(*tfmfd);
+		*tfmfd = -1;
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (key && setsockopt(*tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, key_length) < 0) {
+		close(*tfmfd);
+		*tfmfd = -1;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*opfd = accept(*tfmfd, NULL, 0);
+	if (*opfd < 0) {
+		close(*tfmfd);
+		*tfmfd = -1;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
 
 int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
@@ -77,7 +103,7 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
 		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
 		.salg_type = "hash",
-		.salg_name = "sha1",
+		.salg_name = "sha256",
 	};
 	int tfmfd = -1, opfd = -1;
 
@@ -87,7 +113,7 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	if (uname(&uts) == -1 || strcmp(uts.sysname, "Linux"))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &tfmfd, &opfd) < 0)
+	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &tfmfd, &opfd, NULL, 0) < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	close(tfmfd);
@@ -100,6 +126,11 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
+{
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+}
+
 uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
 {
 	return CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL;
@@ -152,7 +183,7 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 
 	strncpy((char *)sa.salg_name, ha->kernel_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name));
 
-	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd) < 0) {
+	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd, NULL, 0) < 0) {
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -186,15 +217,14 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 {
-	if (ctx->tfmfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->tfmfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->tfmfd);
-	if (ctx->opfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->opfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->opfd);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* HMAC */
@@ -204,7 +234,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
 }
 
 int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
-		    const void *buffer, size_t length)
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
 	struct crypt_hmac *h;
 	struct hash_alg *ha;
@@ -227,16 +257,11 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 	snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name),
 		 "hmac(%s)", ha->kernel_name);
 
-	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd) < 0) {
+	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd, key, key_length) < 0) {
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (setsockopt(h->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buffer, length) == -1) {
-		crypt_hmac_destroy(h);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
 	*ctx = h;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -266,15 +291,14 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
-	if (ctx->tfmfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->tfmfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->tfmfd);
-	if (ctx->opfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->opfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->opfd);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* RNG - N/A */
@@ -288,13 +312,24 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		const char *password, size_t password_length,
 		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
 		char *key, size_t key_length,
-		unsigned int iterations)
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
 {
-	struct hash_alg *ha = _get_alg(hash);
+	struct hash_alg *ha;
 
-	if (!ha || !kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
+	if (!kdf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
-			    iterations, key_length, key, ha->block_length);
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
+		ha = _get_alg(hash);
+		if (!ha)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+				    iterations, key_length, key, ha->block_length);
+	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
+		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
 }

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Nettle crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2018 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@
 static char *version = "Nettle";
 
 typedef void (*init_func) (void *);
-typedef void (*update_func) (void *, unsigned, const uint8_t *);
-typedef void (*digest_func) (void *, unsigned, uint8_t *);
-typedef void (*set_key_func) (void *, unsigned, const uint8_t *);
+typedef void (*update_func) (void *, size_t, const uint8_t *);
+typedef void (*digest_func) (void *, size_t, uint8_t *);
+typedef void (*set_key_func) (void *, size_t, const uint8_t *);
 
 struct hash_alg {
 	const char *name;
@@ -143,6 +143,11 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
 const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
 {
 	return version;
@@ -197,11 +202,10 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 {
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* HMAC */
@@ -211,7 +215,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
 }
 
 int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
-		    const void *buffer, size_t length)
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
 	struct crypt_hmac *h;
 
@@ -225,12 +229,12 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 	if (!h->hash)
 		goto bad;
 
-	h->key = malloc(length);
+	h->key = malloc(key_length);
 	if (!h->key)
 		goto bad;
 
-	memcpy(h->key, buffer, length);
-	h->key_length = length;
+	memcpy(h->key, key, key_length);
+	h->key_length = key_length;
 
 	h->hash->init(&h->nettle_ctx);
 	h->hash->hmac_set_key(&h->nettle_ctx, h->key_length, h->key);
@@ -263,13 +267,12 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
 	memset(ctx->key, 0, ctx->key_length);
 	free(ctx->key);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* RNG - N/A */
@@ -283,23 +286,29 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		const char *password, size_t password_length,
 		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
 		char *key, size_t key_length,
-		unsigned int iterations)
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
 {
 	struct crypt_hmac *h;
 	int r;
 
-	if (!kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
+	if (!kdf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	r = crypt_hmac_init(&h, hash, password, password_length);
-	if (r < 0)
-		return r;
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
+		r = crypt_hmac_init(&h, hash, password, password_length);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
 
-	nettle_pbkdf2(&h->nettle_ctx, h->hash->nettle_hmac_update,
-		      h->hash->nettle_hmac_digest, h->hash->length, iterations,
-		      salt_length, (const uint8_t *)salt, key_length,
-		      (uint8_t *)key);
-	crypt_hmac_destroy(h);
+		nettle_pbkdf2(&h->nettle_ctx, h->hash->nettle_hmac_update,
+			      h->hash->nettle_hmac_digest, h->hash->length, iterations,
+			      salt_length, (const uint8_t *)salt, key_length,
+			      (uint8_t *)key);
+		crypt_hmac_destroy(h);
+		return 0;
+	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
+		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+	}
 
-	return 0;
+	return -EINVAL;
 }

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * NSS crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
+{
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+}
+
 uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -164,7 +169,7 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
-	memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 
 	if (tmp_len < length)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -175,12 +180,11 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 {
 	PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->md, PR_TRUE);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* HMAC */
@@ -190,15 +194,15 @@ int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
 }
 
 int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
-		    const void *buffer, size_t length)
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
 	struct crypt_hmac *h;
 	SECItem keyItem;
 	SECItem noParams;
 
 	keyItem.type = siBuffer;
-	keyItem.data = CONST_CAST(unsigned char *)buffer;
-	keyItem.len = (int)length;
+	keyItem.data = CONST_CAST(unsigned char *)key;
+	keyItem.len = (int)key_length;
 
 	noParams.type = siBuffer;
 	noParams.data = 0;
@@ -266,7 +270,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
-	memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 
 	if (tmp_len < length)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -277,7 +281,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx->key)
 		PK11_FreeSymKey(ctx->key);
@@ -287,7 +291,6 @@ int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 		PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->md, PR_TRUE);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* RNG */
@@ -307,13 +310,24 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		const char *password, size_t password_length,
 		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
 		char *key, size_t key_length,
-		unsigned int iterations)
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
 {
-	struct hash_alg *ha = _get_alg(hash);
+	struct hash_alg *ha;
 
-	if (!ha || !kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
+	if (!kdf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
-			    iterations, key_length, key, ha->block_length);
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
+		ha = _get_alg(hash);
+		if (!ha)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+				    iterations, key_length, key, ha->block_length);
+	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
+		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
 }

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * OPENSSL crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -38,28 +38,89 @@
 static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
 
 struct crypt_hash {
-	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *md;
 	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
 struct crypt_hmac {
-	HMAC_CTX md;
+	HMAC_CTX *md;
 	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Compatible wrappers for OpenSSL < 1.1.0
+ */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+static void openssl_backend_init(void)
+{
+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+}
+
+static const char *openssl_backend_version(void)
+{
+	return SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION);
+}
+
+static EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void)
+{
+	EVP_MD_CTX *md = malloc(sizeof(*md));
+
+	if (md)
+		EVP_MD_CTX_init(md);
+
+	return md;
+}
+
+static void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *md)
+{
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(md);
+	free(md);
+}
+
+static HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void)
+{
+	HMAC_CTX *md = malloc(sizeof(*md));
+
+	if (md)
+		HMAC_CTX_init(md);
+
+	return md;
+}
+
+static void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *md)
+{
+	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(md);
+	free(md);
+}
+#else
+static void openssl_backend_init(void)
+{
+}
+
+static const char *openssl_backend_version(void)
+{
+    return OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
+}
+#endif
+
 int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
 	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
 		return 0;
 
-	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+	openssl_backend_init();
 
 	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
+{
+	crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+}
+
 uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -67,7 +128,7 @@ uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
 
 const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
 {
-	return SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION);
+	return openssl_backend_version();
 }
 
 /* HASH */
@@ -89,13 +150,21 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 	if (!h)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	h->md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+	if (!h->md) {
+		free(h);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
 	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
 	if (!h->hash_id) {
+		EVP_MD_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (EVP_DigestInit(&h->md, h->hash_id) != 1) {
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(h->md, h->hash_id, NULL) != 1) {
+		EVP_MD_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -107,7 +176,7 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 
 static int crypt_hash_restart(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 {
-	if (EVP_DigestInit(&ctx->md, ctx->hash_id) != 1)
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->md, ctx->hash_id, NULL) != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -115,7 +184,7 @@ static int crypt_hash_restart(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 
 int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
 {
-	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md, buffer, length) != 1)
+	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md, buffer, length) != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -129,11 +198,11 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len) != 1)
+	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len) != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
-	memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 
 	if (tmp_len < length)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -144,12 +213,11 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
+void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 {
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->md);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* HMAC */
@@ -159,7 +227,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name)
 }
 
 int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
-		    const void *buffer, size_t length)
+		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
 	struct crypt_hmac *h;
 
@@ -167,14 +235,20 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 	if (!h)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	h->md = HMAC_CTX_new();
+	if (!h->md) {
+		free(h);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
 	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
 	if (!h->hash_id) {
+		HMAC_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&h->md);
-	HMAC_Init_ex(&h->md, buffer, length, h->hash_id, NULL);
+	HMAC_Init_ex(h->md, key, key_length, h->hash_id, NULL);
 
 	h->hash_len = EVP_MD_size(h->hash_id);
 	*ctx = h;
@@ -183,12 +257,12 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 
 static void crypt_hmac_restart(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
-	HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx->md, NULL, 0, ctx->hash_id, NULL);
+	HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->md, NULL, 0, ctx->hash_id, NULL);
 }
 
 int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
 {
-	HMAC_Update(&ctx->md, (const unsigned char *)buffer, length);
+	HMAC_Update(ctx->md, (const unsigned char *)buffer, length);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -200,10 +274,10 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	HMAC_Final(&ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len);
+	HMAC_Final(ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len);
 
 	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
-	memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 
 	if (tmp_len < length)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -213,20 +287,16 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md);
+	HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->md);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* RNG */
 int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips)
 {
-	if (fips)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)buffer, length) != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -238,21 +308,28 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		const char *password, size_t password_length,
 		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
 		char *key, size_t key_length,
-		unsigned int iterations)
+		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
+
 {
 	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
 
-	if (!kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
+	if (!kdf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(hash);
-	if (!hash_id)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
+		hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(hash);
+		if (!hash_id)
+			return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, (int)password_length,
-	    (unsigned char *)salt, (int)salt_length,
-            (int)iterations, hash_id, (int)key_length, (unsigned char *)key))
-		return -EINVAL;
+		if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, (int)password_length,
+		    (unsigned char *)salt, (int)salt_length,
+	            (int)iterations, hash_id, (int)key_length, (unsigned char *)key))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
+		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+	}
 
-	return 0;
+	return -EINVAL;
 }

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Generic wrapper for storage encryption modes and Initial Vectors
  * (reimplementation of some functions from Linux dm-crypt kernel)
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2014-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@
 
 /*
  * Internal IV helper
- * IV documentation: https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMCrypt
+ * IV documentation: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
  */
 struct crypt_sector_iv {
-	enum { IV_NONE, IV_NULL, IV_PLAIN, IV_PLAIN64, IV_ESSIV, IV_BENBI } type;
+	enum { IV_NONE, IV_NULL, IV_PLAIN, IV_PLAIN64, IV_ESSIV, IV_BENBI, IV_PLAIN64BE } type;
 	int iv_size;
 	char *iv;
 	struct crypt_cipher *essiv_cipher;
@@ -55,23 +55,30 @@ static int int_log2(unsigned int x)
 }
 
 static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
-			 const char *cipher_name, const char *iv_name,
-			 char *key, size_t key_length)
+			 const char *cipher_name, const char *mode_name,
+			 const char *iv_name, const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 
 	ctx->iv_size = crypt_cipher_blocksize(cipher_name);
-	if (ctx->iv_size < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (ctx->iv_size < 8)
+		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (!iv_name || !strcmp(cipher_name, "cipher_null")) {
+	if (!strcmp(cipher_name, "cipher_null") ||
+	    !strcmp(mode_name, "ecb")) {
+		if (iv_name)
+			return -EINVAL;
 		ctx->type = IV_NONE;
 		ctx->iv_size = 0;
 		return 0;
+	} else if (!iv_name) {
+		return -EINVAL;
 	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "null")) {
 		ctx->type = IV_NULL;
 	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "plain64")) {
 		ctx->type = IV_PLAIN64;
+	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "plain64be")) {
+		ctx->type = IV_PLAIN64BE;
 	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "plain")) {
 		ctx->type = IV_PLAIN;
 	} else if (!strncasecmp(iv_name, "essiv:", 6)) {
@@ -85,7 +92,10 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		hash_size = crypt_hash_size(++hash_name);
-		if (hash_size < 0 || (unsigned)hash_size > sizeof(tmp))
+		if (hash_size < 0)
+			return -ENOENT;
+
+		if ((unsigned)hash_size > sizeof(tmp))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		if (crypt_hash_init(&h, hash_name))
@@ -100,13 +110,13 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
 		r = crypt_hash_final(h, tmp, hash_size);
 		crypt_hash_destroy(h);
 		if (r) {
-			memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+			crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 			return r;
 		}
 
 		r = crypt_cipher_init(&ctx->essiv_cipher, cipher_name, "ecb",
 				      tmp, hash_size);
-		memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+		crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 		if (r)
 			return r;
 
@@ -146,6 +156,10 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector
 		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
 		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
 		break;
+	case IV_PLAIN64BE:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		*(uint64_t *)&ctx->iv[ctx->iv_size - sizeof(uint64_t)] = cpu_to_be64(sector);
+		break;
 	case IV_ESSIV:
 		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
 		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
@@ -164,7 +178,7 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int crypt_sector_iv_destroy(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx)
+static void crypt_sector_iv_destroy(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx->type == IV_ESSIV)
 		crypt_cipher_destroy(ctx->essiv_cipher);
@@ -175,7 +189,6 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_destroy(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx)
 	}
 
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
-	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Block encryption storage wrappers */
@@ -184,7 +197,7 @@ int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx,
 		       uint64_t sector_start,
 		       const char *cipher,
 		       const char *cipher_mode,
-		       char *key, size_t key_length)
+		       const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
 	struct crypt_storage *s;
 	char mode_name[64];
@@ -211,7 +224,7 @@ int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx,
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	r = crypt_sector_iv_init(&s->cipher_iv, cipher, cipher_iv, key, key_length);
+	r = crypt_sector_iv_init(&s->cipher_iv, cipher, mode_name, cipher_iv, key, key_length);
 	if (r) {
 		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
 		return r;
@@ -271,10 +284,10 @@ int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx,
 	return r;
 }
 
-int crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx)
+void crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx)
 {
 	if (!ctx)
-		return 0;
+		return;
 
 	crypt_sector_iv_destroy(&ctx->cipher_iv);
 
@@ -283,6 +296,4 @@ int crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx)
 
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
-
-	return 0;
 }

lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation
  *
  * cryptsetup related changes
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
 
 		if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P_hash, hLen))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		memset(P_hash, 0, sizeof(P_hash));
+		crypt_backend_memzero(P_hash, sizeof(P_hash));
 	} else {
 		if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P, Plen))
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -224,9 +224,9 @@ int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
 	rc = 0;
 out:
 	crypt_hmac_destroy(hmac);
-	memset(U, 0, sizeof(U));
-	memset(T, 0, sizeof(T));
-	memset(tmp, 0, tmplen);
+	crypt_backend_memzero(U, sizeof(U));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(T, sizeof(T));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, tmplen);
 
 	return rc;
 }

lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * PBKDF performance check
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Ondrej Mosnacek
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -18,11 +19,48 @@
  * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
  */
 
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <time.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #include <sys/resource.h>
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 
+#define BENCH_MIN_MS 250
+#define BENCH_MIN_MS_FAST 10
+#define BENCH_PERCENT_ATLEAST 95
+#define BENCH_PERCENT_ATMOST 110
+#define BENCH_SAMPLES_FAST 3
+#define BENCH_SAMPLES_SLOW 1
+
+/* These PBKDF2 limits must be never violated */
+int crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(const char *kdf, struct crypt_pbkdf_limits *limits)
+{
+	if (!kdf || !limits)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
+		limits->min_iterations = 1000; /* recommendation in NIST SP 800-132 */
+		limits->max_iterations = UINT32_MAX;
+		limits->min_memory     = 0; /* N/A */
+		limits->max_memory     = 0; /* N/A */
+		limits->min_parallel   = 0; /* N/A */
+		limits->max_parallel   = 0; /* N/A */
+		return 0;
+	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
+		limits->min_iterations = 4;
+		limits->max_iterations = UINT32_MAX;
+		limits->min_memory     = 32;
+		limits->max_memory     = 4*1024*1024; /* 4GiB */
+		limits->min_parallel   = 1;
+		limits->max_parallel   = 4;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static long time_ms(struct rusage *start, struct rusage *end)
 {
 	int count_kernel_time = 0;
@@ -50,35 +88,282 @@ static long time_ms(struct rusage *start, struct rusage *end)
 	return ms;
 }
 
+static long timespec_ms(struct timespec *start, struct timespec *end)
+{
+	return (end->tv_sec - start->tv_sec) * 1000 +
+	        (end->tv_nsec - start->tv_nsec) / (1000 * 1000);
+}
+
+static int measure_argon2(const char *kdf, const char *password, size_t password_length,
+			  const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+			  char *key, size_t key_length,
+			  uint32_t t_cost, uint32_t m_cost, uint32_t parallel,
+			  size_t samples, long ms_atleast, long *out_ms)
+{
+	long ms, ms_min = LONG_MAX;
+	int r;
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < samples; i++) {
+		struct timespec tstart, tend;
+
+		/*
+		 * NOTE: We must use clock_gettime here, because Argon2 can run over
+		 * multiple threads, and thus we care about real time, not CPU time!
+		 */
+		if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW, &tstart) < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = crypt_pbkdf(kdf, NULL, password, password_length, salt,
+		                salt_length, key, key_length, t_cost, m_cost, parallel);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+
+		if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW, &tend) < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ms = timespec_ms(&tstart, &tend);
+		if (ms < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (ms < ms_atleast) {
+			/* early exit */
+			ms_min = ms;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (ms < ms_min) {
+			ms_min = ms;
+		}
+	}
+	*out_ms = ms_min;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define CONTINUE 0
+#define FINAL   1
+static int next_argon2_params(uint32_t *t_cost, uint32_t *m_cost,
+			      uint32_t min_t_cost, uint32_t min_m_cost,
+			      uint32_t max_m_cost, long ms, uint32_t target_ms)
+{
+	uint32_t old_t_cost, old_m_cost, new_t_cost, new_m_cost;
+	uint64_t num, denom;
+
+	old_t_cost = *t_cost;
+	old_m_cost = *m_cost;
+
+	if (ms > target_ms) {
+		/* decreasing, first try to lower t_cost, then m_cost */
+		num = (uint64_t)*t_cost * (uint64_t)target_ms;
+		denom = (uint64_t)ms;
+		new_t_cost = (uint32_t)(num / denom);
+		if (new_t_cost < min_t_cost) {
+			num = (uint64_t)*t_cost * (uint64_t)*m_cost *
+			      (uint64_t)target_ms;
+			denom = (uint64_t)min_t_cost * (uint64_t)ms;
+			*t_cost = min_t_cost;
+			*m_cost = (uint32_t)(num / denom);
+			if (*m_cost < min_m_cost) {
+				*m_cost = min_m_cost;
+				return FINAL;
+			}
+		} else {
+			*t_cost = new_t_cost;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* increasing, first try to increase m_cost, then t_cost */
+		num = (uint64_t)*m_cost * (uint64_t)target_ms;
+		denom = (uint64_t)ms;
+		new_m_cost = (uint32_t)(num / denom);
+		if (new_m_cost > max_m_cost) {
+			num = (uint64_t)*t_cost * (uint64_t)*m_cost *
+			      (uint64_t)target_ms;
+			denom = (uint64_t)max_m_cost * (uint64_t)ms;
+			*t_cost = (uint32_t)(num / denom);
+			*m_cost = max_m_cost;
+			if (*t_cost <= min_t_cost) {
+				*t_cost = min_t_cost;
+				return FINAL;
+			}
+		} else if (new_m_cost < min_m_cost) {
+			*m_cost = min_m_cost;
+			return FINAL;
+		} else {
+			*m_cost = new_m_cost;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* do not continue if it is the same as in the previous run */
+	if (old_t_cost == *t_cost && old_m_cost == *m_cost)
+		return FINAL;
+
+	return CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int crypt_argon2_check(const char *kdf, const char *password,
+			      size_t password_length, const char *salt,
+			      size_t salt_length, size_t key_length,
+			      uint32_t min_t_cost, uint32_t max_m_cost,
+			      uint32_t parallel, uint32_t target_ms,
+			      uint32_t *out_t_cost, uint32_t *out_m_cost,
+			      int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr),
+			      void *usrptr)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	char *key = NULL;
+	uint32_t t_cost, m_cost, min_m_cost = 8 * parallel;
+	long ms;
+	long ms_atleast = (long)target_ms * BENCH_PERCENT_ATLEAST / 100;
+	long ms_atmost = (long)target_ms * BENCH_PERCENT_ATMOST / 100;
+
+	if (key_length <= 0 || target_ms <= 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (max_m_cost < min_m_cost)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	key = malloc(key_length);
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	t_cost = min_t_cost;
+	m_cost = min_m_cost;
+
+	/* 1. Find some small parameters, s. t. ms >= BENCH_MIN_MS: */
+	while (1) {
+		r = measure_argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+		                   key, key_length, t_cost, m_cost, parallel,
+		                   BENCH_SAMPLES_FAST, BENCH_MIN_MS, &ms);
+		if (!r) {
+			/* Update parameters to actual measurement */
+			*out_t_cost = t_cost;
+			*out_m_cost = m_cost;
+			if (progress && progress((uint32_t)ms, usrptr))
+				r = -EINTR;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (ms >= BENCH_MIN_MS)
+			break;
+
+		if (m_cost == max_m_cost) {
+			if (ms < BENCH_MIN_MS_FAST)
+				t_cost *= 16;
+			else {
+				uint32_t new = (t_cost * BENCH_MIN_MS) / (uint32_t)ms;
+				if (new == t_cost)
+					break;
+
+				t_cost = new;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (ms < BENCH_MIN_MS_FAST)
+				m_cost *= 16;
+			else {
+				uint32_t new = (m_cost * BENCH_MIN_MS) / (uint32_t)ms;
+				if (new == m_cost)
+					break;
+
+				m_cost = new;
+			}
+			if (m_cost > max_m_cost) {
+				m_cost = max_m_cost;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * 2. Use the params obtained in (1.) to estimate the target params.
+	 * 3. Then repeatedly measure the candidate params and if they fall out of
+	 * the acceptance range (+-5 %), try to improve the estimate:
+	 */
+	do {
+		if (next_argon2_params(&t_cost, &m_cost, min_t_cost, min_m_cost,
+				       max_m_cost, ms, target_ms)) {
+			/* Update parameters to final computation */
+			*out_t_cost = t_cost;
+			*out_m_cost = m_cost;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		r = measure_argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+		                   key, key_length, t_cost, m_cost, parallel,
+		                   BENCH_SAMPLES_SLOW, ms_atleast, &ms);
+
+		if (!r) {
+			/* Update parameters to actual measurement */
+			*out_t_cost = t_cost;
+			*out_m_cost = m_cost;
+			if (progress && progress((uint32_t)ms, usrptr))
+				r = -EINTR;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+
+	} while (ms < ms_atleast || ms > ms_atmost);
+out:
+	if (key) {
+		crypt_backend_memzero(key, key_length);
+		free(key);
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
 /* This code benchmarks PBKDF and returns iterations/second using specified hash */
-int crypt_pbkdf_check(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
-		      const char *password, size_t password_size,
-		      const char *salt, size_t salt_size,
-		      uint64_t *iter_secs)
+static int crypt_pbkdf_check(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		      const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		      const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		      size_t key_length, uint32_t *iter_secs, uint32_t target_ms,
+		      int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr), void *usrptr)
+
 {
 	struct rusage rstart, rend;
 	int r = 0, step = 0;
 	long ms = 0;
-	char buf;
-	unsigned int iterations;
+	char *key = NULL;
+	uint32_t iterations;
+	double PBKDF2_temp;
 
-	if (!kdf || !hash)
+	if (!kdf || !hash || key_length <= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	key = malloc(key_length);
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	*iter_secs = 0;
 	iterations = 1 << 15;
-	while (ms < 500) {
-		if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rstart) < 0)
-			return -EINVAL;
+	while (1) {
+		if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rstart) < 0) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		r = crypt_pbkdf(kdf, hash, password, password_length, salt,
+				salt_length, key, key_length, iterations, 0, 0);
 
-		r = crypt_pbkdf(kdf, hash, password, password_size, salt,
-				salt_size, &buf, 1, iterations);
 		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
+			goto out;
 
-		if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rend) < 0)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rend) < 0) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 
 		ms = time_ms(&rstart, &rend);
+		if (ms) {
+			PBKDF2_temp = (double)iterations * target_ms / ms;
+			if (PBKDF2_temp > UINT32_MAX)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			*iter_secs = (uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp;
+		}
+
+		if (progress && progress((uint32_t)ms, usrptr)) {
+			r = -EINTR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		if (ms > 500)
 			break;
 
@@ -91,11 +376,50 @@ int crypt_pbkdf_check(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		else
 			iterations <<= 1;
 
-		if (++step > 10 || !iterations)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (++step > 10 || !iterations) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	if (key) {
+		crypt_backend_memzero(key, key_length);
+		free(key);
 	}
-
-	if (iter_secs)
-		*iter_secs = (iterations * 1000) / ms;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_pbkdf_perf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
+		const char *password, size_t password_size,
+		const char *salt, size_t salt_size,
+		size_t volume_key_size, uint32_t time_ms,
+		uint32_t max_memory_kb, uint32_t parallel_threads,
+		uint32_t *iterations_out, uint32_t *memory_out,
+		int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr), void *usrptr)
+{
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_limits pbkdf_limits;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!kdf || !iterations_out || !memory_out)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(kdf, &pbkdf_limits);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	*memory_out = 0;
+	*iterations_out = 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2"))
+		r = crypt_pbkdf_check(kdf, hash, password, password_size,
+				      salt, salt_size, volume_key_size,
+				      iterations_out, time_ms, progress, usrptr);
+
+	else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6))
+		r = crypt_argon2_check(kdf, password, password_size,
+				       salt, salt_size, volume_key_size,
+				       pbkdf_limits.min_iterations, max_memory_kb,
+				       parallel_threads, time_ms, iterations_out,
+				       memory_out, progress, usrptr);
 	return r;
 }

lib/integrity/integrity.c

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+/*
+ * Integrity volume handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+#include "integrity.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static int INTEGRITY_read_superblock(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				     struct device *device,
+				     uint64_t offset, struct superblock *sb)
+{
+	int devfd, r;
+
+	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
+	if(devfd < 0) {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+		device_alignment(device), sb, sizeof(*sb), offset) != sizeof(*sb) ||
+	    memcmp(sb->magic, SB_MAGIC, sizeof(sb->magic)) ||
+	    sb->version != SB_VERSION) {
+		log_std(cd, "No integrity superblock detected on %s.\n",
+			device_path(device));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		sb->integrity_tag_size = le16toh(sb->integrity_tag_size);
+		sb->journal_sections = le32toh(sb->journal_sections);
+		sb->provided_data_sectors = le64toh(sb->provided_data_sectors);
+		r = 0;
+	}
+
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+	struct superblock sb;
+	int r;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), 0, &sb);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	params->sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block;
+	params->tag_size = sb.integrity_tag_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offset)
+{
+	struct superblock sb;
+	int r;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, device, offset, &sb);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	log_std(cd, "Info for integrity device %s.\n", device_path(device));
+	log_std(cd, "log2_interleave_sectors %d\n", sb.log2_interleave_sectors);
+	log_std(cd, "integrity_tag_size %u\n", sb.integrity_tag_size);
+	log_std(cd, "journal_sections %u\n", sb.journal_sections);
+	log_std(cd, "provided_data_sectors %" PRIu64 "\n", sb.provided_data_sectors);
+	log_std(cd, "sector_size %u\n", SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_data_sectors(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			   struct device *device, uint64_t offset,
+			   uint64_t *data_sectors)
+{
+	struct superblock sb;
+	int r;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, device, offset, &sb);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	*data_sectors = sb.provided_data_sectors;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *integrity)
+{
+	if (!integrity)
+		return 0;
+
+	//FIXME: use crypto backend hash size
+	if (!strcmp(integrity, "aead"))
+		return 0;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha256)"))
+		return 32;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha512)"))
+		return 64;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "poly1305"))
+		return 0;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "none"))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *integrity,
+		       const char *cipher,
+		       const char *cipher_mode)
+{
+	int iv_tag_size = 0, auth_tag_size = 0;
+
+	if (!cipher_mode)
+		iv_tag_size = 0;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "xts-random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 16;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "gcm-random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 12;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "ccm-random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 8;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "ctr-random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 16;
+	else if (!strcmp(cipher_mode, "random"))
+		iv_tag_size = 16;
+
+	//FIXME: use crypto backend hash size
+	if (!integrity || !strcmp(integrity, "none"))
+		auth_tag_size = 0;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "aead"))
+		auth_tag_size = 16; //FIXME gcm- mode only
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "cmac(aes)"))
+		auth_tag_size = 16;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha256)"))
+		auth_tag_size = 32;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "hmac(sha512)"))
+		auth_tag_size = 64;
+	else if (!strcmp(integrity, "poly1305")) {
+		if (iv_tag_size)
+			iv_tag_size = 12;
+		auth_tag_size = 16;
+	}
+
+	return iv_tag_size + auth_tag_size;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *name,
+		       const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		       struct volume_key *vk,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+		       uint32_t flags)
+{
+	uint32_t dmi_flags;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdi = {
+		.target      = DM_INTEGRITY,
+		.data_device = crypt_data_device(cd),
+		.flags = flags,
+		.u.integrity = {
+			.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+			.tag_size = crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+			.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd),
+			.vk = vk,
+			.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key,
+			.journal_integrity_key = journal_mac_key,
+		}
+	};
+	int r;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, dmdi.data_device,
+				   dmdi.u.integrity.offset * SECTOR_SIZE, &dmdi.size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (params) {
+		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_size = params->journal_size;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.interleave_sectors = params->interleave_sectors;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.integrity = params->integrity;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_integrity = params->journal_integrity;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_crypt = params->journal_crypt;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg("Trying to activate INTEGRITY device on top of %s, using name %s, tag size %d, provided sectors %" PRIu64".",
+		device_path(dmdi.data_device), name, dmdi.u.integrity.tag_size, dmdi.size);
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmdi.data_device, DEV_EXCL,
+				dmdi.u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmdi.flags);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, "INTEGRITY", &dmdi, 0);
+	if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		     struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		     struct volume_key *journal_mac_key)
+{
+	uint32_t dmi_flags;
+	char tmp_name[64], tmp_uuid[40];
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdi = {
+		.target      = DM_INTEGRITY,
+		.data_device = crypt_data_device(cd),
+		.size = 8,
+		.flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE, /* We always create journal but it can be unused later */
+		.u.integrity = {
+			.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+			.tag_size = crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+			.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd),
+			.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key,
+			.journal_integrity_key = journal_mac_key,
+		}
+	};
+	int r;
+	uuid_t tmp_uuid_bin;
+
+	if (params) {
+		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_size = params->journal_size;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.interleave_sectors = params->interleave_sectors;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_integrity = params->journal_integrity;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_crypt = params->journal_crypt;
+		dmdi.u.integrity.integrity = params->integrity;
+	}
+
+	uuid_generate(tmp_uuid_bin);
+	uuid_unparse(tmp_uuid_bin, tmp_uuid);
+
+	snprintf(tmp_name, sizeof(tmp_name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%s", tmp_uuid);
+
+	log_dbg("Trying to format INTEGRITY device on top of %s, tmp name %s, tag size %d.",
+		device_path(dmdi.data_device), tmp_name, dmdi.u.integrity.tag_size);
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmdi.data_device, DEV_EXCL, dmdi.u.integrity.offset, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	/* There is no data area, we can actually use fake zeroed key */
+	if (params && params->integrity_key_size)
+		dmdi.u.integrity.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->integrity_key_size, NULL);
+
+	r = dm_create_device(cd, tmp_name, "INTEGRITY", &dmdi, 0);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(dmdi.u.integrity.vk);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	return dm_remove_device(cd, tmp_name, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE);
+}

lib/integrity/integrity.h

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Integrity header defitinion
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_INTEGRITY_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_INTEGRITY_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct device;
+struct crypt_params_integrity;
+struct volume_key;
+
+/* dm-integrity helper */
+#define SB_MAGIC	"integrt"
+#define SB_VERSION	1
+
+struct superblock {
+	uint8_t magic[8];
+	uint8_t version;
+	int8_t log2_interleave_sectors;
+	uint16_t integrity_tag_size;
+	uint32_t journal_sections;
+	uint64_t provided_data_sectors;
+	uint32_t flags;
+	uint8_t log2_sectors_per_block;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_integrity *params);
+
+int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offset);
+
+int INTEGRITY_data_sectors(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			   struct device *device, uint64_t offset,
+			   uint64_t *data_sectors);
+int INTEGRITY_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *integrity);
+int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *integrity,
+		       const char *cipher,
+		       const char *cipher_mode);
+
+int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		     struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		     struct volume_key *journal_mac_key);
+
+int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *name,
+		       const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		       struct volume_key *vk,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+		       uint32_t flags);
+#endif

lib/internal.h

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <inttypes.h>
 
@@ -35,6 +36,8 @@
 #include "utils_loop.h"
 #include "utils_dm.h"
 #include "utils_fips.h"
+#include "utils_keyring.h"
+#include "utils_io.h"
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 
 #include "libcryptsetup.h"
@@ -44,9 +47,10 @@
 
 #define SECTOR_SHIFT		9
 #define SECTOR_SIZE		(1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)
+#define MAX_SECTOR_SIZE		4096 /* min page size among all platforms */
 #define DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT	1048576 /* 1MiB */
 #define DEFAULT_MEM_ALIGNMENT	4096
-#define MAX_ERROR_LENGTH	512
+#define LOG_MAX_LEN		4096
 
 #define at_least(a, b) ({ __typeof__(a) __at_least = (a); (__at_least >= (b))?__at_least:(b); })
 
@@ -54,36 +58,65 @@ struct crypt_device;
 
 struct volume_key {
 	size_t keylength;
+	const char *key_description;
 	char key[];
 };
 
-struct volume_key *crypt_alloc_volume_key(unsigned keylength, const char *key);
-struct volume_key *crypt_generate_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd, unsigned keylength);
+struct volume_key *crypt_alloc_volume_key(size_t keylength, const char *key);
+struct volume_key *crypt_generate_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd, size_t keylength);
 void crypt_free_volume_key(struct volume_key *vk);
+int crypt_volume_key_set_description(struct volume_key *key, const char *key_description);
+
+struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd);
+int init_pbkdf_type(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		    const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf,
+		    const char *dev_type);
+int verify_pbkdf_params(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf);
+int crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				   struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf,
+				   size_t volume_key_size);
 
 /* Device backend */
 struct device;
 int device_alloc(struct device **device, const char *path);
+int device_alloc_no_check(struct device **device, const char *path);
 void device_free(struct device *device);
 const char *device_path(const struct device *device);
+const char *device_dm_name(const struct device *device);
 const char *device_block_path(const struct device *device);
 void device_topology_alignment(struct device *device,
 			    unsigned long *required_alignment, /* bytes */
 			    unsigned long *alignment_offset,   /* bytes */
 			    unsigned long default_alignment);
-int device_block_size(struct device *device);
+size_t device_block_size(struct device *device);
 int device_read_ahead(struct device *device, uint32_t *read_ahead);
 int device_size(struct device *device, uint64_t *size);
 int device_open(struct device *device, int flags);
+void device_disable_direct_io(struct device *device);
+int device_is_identical(struct device *device1, struct device *device2);
+int device_is_rotational(struct device *device);
+size_t device_alignment(struct device *device);
+int device_direct_io(const struct device *device);
+int device_fallocate(struct device *device, uint64_t size);
+
+int device_open_locked(struct device *device, int flags);
+int device_read_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+int device_write_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+void device_read_unlock(struct device *device);
+void device_write_unlock(struct device *device);
 
 enum devcheck { DEV_OK = 0, DEV_EXCL = 1, DEV_SHARED = 2 };
+int device_check_access(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			struct device *device,
+			enum devcheck device_check);
 int device_block_adjust(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			struct device *device,
 			enum devcheck device_check,
 			uint64_t device_offset,
 			uint64_t *size,
 			uint32_t *flags);
-size_t size_round_up(size_t size, unsigned int block);
+size_t size_round_up(size_t size, size_t block);
 
 /* Receive backend devices from context helpers */
 struct device *crypt_metadata_device(struct crypt_device *cd);
@@ -97,12 +130,13 @@ int crypt_dev_is_partition(const char *dev_path);
 char *crypt_get_partition_device(const char *dev_path, uint64_t offset, uint64_t size);
 char *crypt_get_base_device(const char *dev_path);
 uint64_t crypt_dev_partition_offset(const char *dev_path);
+int lookup_by_disk_id(const char *dm_uuid);
+int lookup_by_sysfs_uuid_field(const char *dm_uuid, size_t max_len);
 
-ssize_t write_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *buf, size_t count);
-ssize_t read_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *_buf, size_t count);
-ssize_t write_lseek_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, char *buf, size_t count, off_t offset);
+size_t crypt_getpagesize(void);
+unsigned crypt_cpusonline(void);
+uint64_t crypt_getphysmemory_kb(void);
 
-unsigned crypt_getpagesize(void);
 int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx);
 
 void logger(struct crypt_device *cd, int class, const char *file, int line, const char *format, ...) __attribute__ ((format (printf, 5, 6)));
@@ -116,6 +150,8 @@ int crypt_get_debug_level(void);
 int crypt_memlock_inc(struct crypt_device *ctx);
 int crypt_memlock_dec(struct crypt_device *ctx);
 
+int crypt_metadata_locking_enabled(void);
+
 int crypt_random_init(struct crypt_device *ctx);
 int crypt_random_get(struct crypt_device *ctx, char *buf, size_t len, int quality);
 void crypt_random_exit(void);
@@ -131,23 +167,33 @@ int PLAIN_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     uint64_t size,
 		     uint32_t flags);
 
-/**
- * Different methods used to erase sensitive data concerning
- * either encrypted payload area or master key inside keyslot
- * area
- */
-typedef enum {
-	CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, /**< overwrite area using zero blocks */
-	CRYPT_WIPE_DISK, /**< erase disk (using Gutmann method if it is rotational disk)*/
-	CRYPT_WIPE_SSD, /**< erase solid state disk (random write) */
-	CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM /**< overwrite area using some up to now unspecified
-			    * random algorithm */
-} crypt_wipe_type;
+void *crypt_get_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type);
 
-int crypt_wipe(struct device *device,
-	       uint64_t offset,
-	       uint64_t sectors,
-	       crypt_wipe_type type,
-	       int flags);
+int crypt_wipe_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct device *device,
+	crypt_wipe_pattern pattern,
+	uint64_t offset,
+	uint64_t length,
+	size_t wipe_block_size,
+	int (*progress)(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr);
+
+/* Internal integrity helpers */
+const char *crypt_get_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd);
+int crypt_get_integrity_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd);
+int crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+int crypt_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd);
+void crypt_set_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, unsigned key_in_keyring);
+int crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, struct volume_key *vk);
+int crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(const struct crypt_device *cd);
+void crypt_drop_keyring_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *key_description);
+
+static inline uint64_t version(uint16_t major, uint16_t minor, uint16_t patch, uint16_t release)
+{
+	return (uint64_t)release | ((uint64_t)patch << 16) | ((uint64_t)minor << 32) | ((uint64_t)major << 48);
+}
+
+int kernel_version(uint64_t *kversion);
 
 #endif /* INTERNAL_H */

lib/libcryptsetup.sym

@@ -1,21 +1,20 @@
-CRYPTSETUP_1.0 {
+CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
 	global:
 		crypt_init;
 		crypt_init_by_name;
 		crypt_init_by_name_and_header;
+
 		crypt_set_log_callback;
 		crypt_set_confirm_callback;
-		crypt_set_password_callback;
-		crypt_set_timeout;
-		crypt_set_password_retry;
-		crypt_set_iterarion_time;
 		crypt_set_iteration_time;
-		crypt_set_password_verify;
 		crypt_set_uuid;
+		crypt_set_label;
 		crypt_set_data_device;
 
 		crypt_memory_lock;
+		crypt_metadata_locking;
 		crypt_format;
+		crypt_convert;
 		crypt_load;
 		crypt_repair;
 		crypt_resize;
@@ -23,51 +22,86 @@ CRYPTSETUP_1.0 {
 		crypt_resume_by_passphrase;
 		crypt_resume_by_keyfile;
 		crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset;
+		crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset;
 		crypt_free;
 
 		crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase;
 		crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase;
 		crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile;
 		crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset;
+		crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset;
 		crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key;
+		crypt_keyslot_add_by_key;
+
+		crypt_keyslot_set_priority;
+		crypt_keyslot_get_priority;
+
+		crypt_token_json_get;
+		crypt_token_json_set;
+		crypt_token_status;
+		crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get;
+		crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set;
+		crypt_token_assign_keyslot;
+		crypt_token_unassign_keyslot;
+		crypt_token_is_assigned;
+		crypt_token_register;
+
+		crypt_activate_by_token;
+
 		crypt_keyslot_destroy;
 		crypt_activate_by_passphrase;
 		crypt_activate_by_keyfile;
 		crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset;
+		crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset;
 		crypt_activate_by_volume_key;
+		crypt_activate_by_keyring;
 		crypt_deactivate;
+		crypt_deactivate_by_name;
 		crypt_volume_key_get;
 		crypt_volume_key_verify;
+		crypt_volume_key_keyring;
 		crypt_status;
 		crypt_dump;
 		crypt_benchmark;
-		crypt_benchmark_kdf;
+		crypt_benchmark_pbkdf;
 		crypt_get_cipher;
 		crypt_get_cipher_mode;
+		crypt_get_integrity_info;
 		crypt_get_uuid;
 		crypt_get_data_offset;
 		crypt_get_iv_offset;
 		crypt_get_volume_key_size;
 		crypt_get_device_name;
 		crypt_get_verity_info;
+		crypt_get_sector_size;
 
 		crypt_get_type;
 		crypt_get_active_device;
+		crypt_get_active_integrity_failures;
+		crypt_persistent_flags_set;
+		crypt_persistent_flags_get;
 
 		crypt_set_rng_type;
 		crypt_get_rng_type;
+		crypt_set_pbkdf_type;
+		crypt_get_pbkdf_type;
+		crypt_get_pbkdf_default;
 
 		crypt_keyslot_max;
 		crypt_keyslot_area;
 		crypt_keyslot_status;
-		crypt_last_error;
-		crypt_get_error;
+		crypt_keyslot_get_key_size;
 		crypt_get_dir;
 		crypt_set_debug_level;
 		crypt_log;
 
 		crypt_header_backup;
 		crypt_header_restore;
+
+		crypt_keyfile_read;
+		crypt_keyfile_device_read;
+
+		crypt_wipe;
 	local:
 		*;
 };

lib/loopaes/Makefile.am

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
-
-noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libloopaes.la
-
-libloopaes_la_CFLAGS = -Wall $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
-
-libloopaes_la_SOURCES = \
-	loopaes.c \
-	loopaes.h
-
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -include config.h \
-        -I$(top_srcdir)/lib			\
-        -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend
-

lib/loopaes/loopaes.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * loop-AES compatible volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2013, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -87,12 +87,12 @@ static int hash_keys(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	tweak = get_tweak(keys_count);
 
 	if (!keys_count || !key_len_output || !hash_name || !key_len_input) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Key processing error (using hash %s).\n"),
+		log_err(cd, _("Key processing error (using hash %s)."),
 			hash_name ?: "[none]");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_len_output * keys_count, NULL);
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key((size_t)key_len_output * keys_count, NULL);
 	if (!*vk)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		}
 		if (offset == buffer_len) {
 			log_dbg("Unterminated key #%d in keyfile.", key_index);
-			log_err(cd, _("Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected.\n"));
+			log_err(cd, _("Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."));
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		while (offset < buffer_len && !buffer[offset])
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ int LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	if (offset != buffer_len || key_len == 0 ||
 	   (key_index != 1 && key_index !=64 && key_index != 65)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected.\n"));
+		log_err(cd, _("Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ int LOOPAES_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     uint32_t flags)
 {
 	char *cipher = NULL;
-	uint32_t req_flags;
+	uint32_t req_flags, dmc_flags;
 	int r;
 	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
 		.target = DM_CRYPT,
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ int LOOPAES_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			.vk     = vk,
 			.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
 			.iv_offset = crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
+			.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd),
 		}
 	};
 
@@ -240,8 +241,9 @@ int LOOPAES_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_LOOPAES, &dmd, 0);
 
-	if (r < 0 && !(dm_flags() & req_flags)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping.\n"));
+	if (r < 0 && !dm_flags(DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) &&
+	    (dmc_flags & req_flags) != req_flags) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."));
 		r = -ENOTSUP;
 	}
 

lib/loopaes/loopaes.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * loop-AES compatible volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2013, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

lib/luks1/Makefile.am

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
-
-noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libluks1.la
-
-libluks1_la_CFLAGS = -Wall $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
-
-libluks1_la_SOURCES = \
-	af.c \
-	keymanage.c \
-	keyencryption.c \
-	af.h \
-	luks.h
-
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -include config.h \
-        -I$(top_srcdir)/lib			\
-        -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend
-

lib/luks1/af.c

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
  * therefor supporting secure data destruction.
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static int diffuse(char *src, char *dst, size_t size, const char *hash_name)
  * must be supplied to AF_merge to recover information.
  */
 
-int AF_split(char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize,
+int AF_split(const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize,
 	     unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ out:
 	return r;
 }
 
-int AF_merge(char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize,
+int AF_merge(const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize,
 	     unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash)
 {
 	unsigned int i;

lib/luks1/af.h

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
  * therefor supporting secure data destruction.
@@ -37,8 +37,24 @@
  * On error, both functions return -1, 0 otherwise.
  */
 
-int AF_split(char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
-int AF_merge(char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
+int AF_split(const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
+int AF_merge(const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
 size_t AF_split_sectors(size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers);
 
+int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(
+	char *src, size_t srcLength,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	unsigned int sector,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
+int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(
+	char *dst, size_t dstLength,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	unsigned int sector,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
 #endif

lib/luks1/keyencryption.c

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -21,32 +21,36 @@
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include "luks.h"
+#include "af.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
 static void _error_hint(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *device,
 			const char *cipher, const char *mode, size_t keyLength)
 {
-	char cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN * 3];
+	char *c, cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN * 3];
 
 	if (snprintf(cipher_spec, sizeof(cipher_spec), "%s-%s", cipher, mode) < 0)
 		return;
 
 	log_err(ctx, _("Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
-			"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info).\n"),
+			"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info)."),
 			device, cipher_spec);
 
 	if (!strncmp(mode, "xts", 3) && (keyLength != 256 && keyLength != 512))
-		log_err(ctx, _("Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits.\n"));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Key size in XTS mode must be 256 or 512 bits."));
+	else if (!(c = strchr(mode, '-')) || strlen(c) < 4)
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cipher specification should be in [cipher]-[mode]-[iv] format."));
 }
 
 static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 			       const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
 			       struct volume_key *vk,
 			       unsigned int sector,
-			       ssize_t (*func)(int, int, void *, size_t),
+			       ssize_t (*func)(int, size_t, size_t, void *, size_t),
 			       int mode,
 			       struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
@@ -62,17 +66,24 @@ static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 			.vk     = vk,
 			.offset = sector,
 			.iv_offset = 0,
+			.sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE,
 		}
 	};
-	int r, bsize, devfd = -1;
+	int r, devfd = -1;
+	size_t bsize, keyslot_alignment, alignment;
 
 	log_dbg("Using dmcrypt to access keyslot area.");
 
 	bsize = device_block_size(dmd.data_device);
-	if (bsize <= 0)
+	alignment = device_alignment(dmd.data_device);
+	if (!bsize || !alignment)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	dmd.size = size_round_up(srcLength, bsize) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+	if (bsize > LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS)
+		keyslot_alignment = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+	else
+		keyslot_alignment = bsize;
+	dmd.size = size_round_up(srcLength, keyslot_alignment) / SECTOR_SIZE;
 
 	if (mode == O_RDONLY)
 		dmd.flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
@@ -87,13 +98,13 @@ static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 	r = device_block_adjust(ctx, dmd.data_device, DEV_OK,
 				dmd.u.crypt.offset, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
 	if (r < 0) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s doesn't exist or access denied.\n"),
+		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."),
 			device_path(dmd.data_device));
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
 	if (mode != O_RDONLY && dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"),
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
 			device_path(dmd.data_device));
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -108,21 +119,21 @@ static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 
 	devfd = open(path, mode | O_DIRECT | O_SYNC);
 	if (devfd == -1) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Failed to open temporary keystore device.\n"));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Failed to open temporary keystore device."));
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	r = func(devfd, bsize, src, srcLength);
+	r = func(devfd, bsize, alignment, src, srcLength);
 	if (r < 0) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Failed to access temporary keystore device.\n"));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Failed to access temporary keystore device."));
 		r = -EIO;
 	} else
 		r = 0;
  out:
-	if(devfd != -1)
+	if (devfd != -1)
 		close(devfd);
-	dm_remove_device(ctx, name, 1, dmd.size);
+	dm_remove_device(ctx, name, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE);
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -136,7 +147,7 @@ int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
 	struct crypt_storage *s;
-	int devfd, bsize, r = 0;
+	int devfd = -1, r = 0;
 
 	/* Only whole sector writes supported */
 	if (srcLength % SECTOR_SIZE)
@@ -164,25 +175,30 @@ int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 
 	r = crypt_storage_encrypt(s, 0, srcLength / SECTOR_SIZE, src);
 	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
+	r = -EIO;
+
 	/* Write buffer to device */
-	bsize = device_block_size(device);
-	if (bsize <= 0)
-		return -EIO;
+	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		goto out;
 
-	devfd = open(device_path(device), O_RDWR | O_DIRECT);
-	if (devfd == -1)
-		return -EIO;
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+				  device_alignment(device), src, srcLength,
+				  sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
+		goto out;
 
-	if (lseek(devfd, sector * SECTOR_SIZE, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
-	    write_blockwise(devfd, bsize, src, srcLength) == -1)
-		r = -EIO;
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (devfd >= 0)
+		close(devfd);
+	if (r)
+		log_err(ctx, _("IO error while encrypting keyslot."));
 
-	close(devfd);
 	return r;
-
 }
 
 int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
@@ -194,7 +210,7 @@ int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
 {
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
 	struct crypt_storage *s;
-	int devfd, bsize, r = 0;
+	int devfd = -1, r = 0;
 
 	/* Only whole sector reads supported */
 	if (dstLength % SECTOR_SIZE)
@@ -219,25 +235,17 @@ int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
 
 	log_dbg("Using userspace crypto wrapper to access keyslot area.");
 
+	r = -EIO;
+
 	/* Read buffer from device */
-	bsize = device_block_size(device);
-	if (bsize <= 0) {
-		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
-		return -EIO;
-	}
+	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		goto bad;
 
-	devfd = open(device_path(device), O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
-	if (devfd == -1) {
-		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
-		return -EIO;
-	}
-
-	if (lseek(devfd, sector * SECTOR_SIZE, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
-	    read_blockwise(devfd, bsize, dst, dstLength) == -1) {
-		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
-		close(devfd);
-		return -EIO;
-	}
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+				 device_alignment(device), dst, dstLength,
+				 sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
+		goto bad;
 
 	close(devfd);
 
@@ -245,5 +253,13 @@ int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
 	r = crypt_storage_decrypt(s, 0, dstLength / SECTOR_SIZE, dst);
 	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
 
+	return r;
+bad:
+	if (devfd >= 0)
+		close(devfd);
+
+	log_err(ctx, _("IO error while decrypting keyslot."));
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+
 	return r;
 }

lib/luks1/keymanage.c

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2013-2014, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013-2018, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 /* Get size of struct luks_phdr with all keyslots material space */
-static size_t LUKS_device_sectors(size_t keyLen)
+static size_t LUKS_calculate_device_sectors(size_t keyLen)
 {
 	size_t keyslot_sectors, sector;
 	int i;
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static size_t LUKS_device_sectors(size_t keyLen)
 	return sector;
 }
 
-int LUKS_keyslot_area(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+int LUKS_keyslot_area(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
 	uint64_t *offset,
 	uint64_t *length)
@@ -62,32 +62,70 @@ int LUKS_keyslot_area(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	if(keyslot >= LUKS_NUMKEYS || keyslot < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*offset = hdr->keyblock[keyslot].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	*offset = (uint64_t)hdr->keyblock[keyslot].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
 	*length = AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int LUKS_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *ctx, size_t keyLength)
+/* insertsort: because the array has 8 elements and it's mostly sorted. that's why */
+static void LUKS_sort_keyslots(const struct luks_phdr *hdr, int *array)
+{
+	int i, j, x;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		j = i;
+		while (j > 0 && hdr->keyblock[array[j-1]].keyMaterialOffset > hdr->keyblock[array[j]].keyMaterialOffset) {
+			x = array[j];
+			array[j] = array[j-1];
+			array[j-1] = x;
+			j--;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+size_t LUKS_device_sectors(const struct luks_phdr *hdr)
+{
+	int sorted_areas[LUKS_NUMKEYS] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 };
+
+	LUKS_sort_keyslots(hdr, sorted_areas);
+
+	return hdr->keyblock[sorted_areas[LUKS_NUMKEYS-1]].keyMaterialOffset + AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, LUKS_STRIPES);
+}
+
+size_t LUKS_keyslots_offset(const struct luks_phdr *hdr)
+{
+	int sorted_areas[LUKS_NUMKEYS] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 };
+
+	LUKS_sort_keyslots(hdr, sorted_areas);
+
+	return hdr->keyblock[sorted_areas[0]].keyMaterialOffset;
+}
+
+static int LUKS_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *ctx, const struct luks_phdr *hdr, int falloc)
 {
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
 	uint64_t dev_sectors, hdr_sectors;
 
-	if (!keyLength)
+	if (!hdr->keyBytes)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if(device_size(device, &dev_sectors)) {
+	if (device_size(device, &dev_sectors)) {
 		log_dbg("Cannot get device size for device %s.", device_path(device));
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
 	dev_sectors >>= SECTOR_SHIFT;
-	hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(keyLength);
-	log_dbg("Key length %zu, device size %" PRIu64 " sectors, header size %"
-		PRIu64 " sectors.",keyLength, dev_sectors, hdr_sectors);
+	hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr);
+	log_dbg("Key length %u, device size %" PRIu64 " sectors, header size %"
+		PRIu64 " sectors.", hdr->keyBytes, dev_sectors, hdr_sectors);
 
 	if (hdr_sectors > dev_sectors) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is too small. (LUKS requires at least %" PRIu64 " bytes.)\n"),
+		/* If it is header file, increase its size */
+		if (falloc && !device_fallocate(device, hdr_sectors << SECTOR_SHIFT))
+			return 0;
+
+		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is too small. (LUKS1 requires at least %" PRIu64 " bytes.)"),
 			device_path(device), hdr_sectors * SECTOR_SIZE);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -95,40 +133,67 @@ static int LUKS_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *ctx, size_t keyLength)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Check keyslot to prevent access outside of header and keyslot area */
-static int LUKS_check_keyslot_size(const struct luks_phdr *phdr, unsigned int keyIndex)
+static int LUKS_check_keyslots(struct crypt_device *ctx, const struct luks_phdr *phdr)
 {
-	uint32_t secs_per_stripes;
+	int i, prev, next, sorted_areas[LUKS_NUMKEYS] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 };
+	uint32_t secs_per_stripes = AF_split_sectors(phdr->keyBytes, LUKS_STRIPES);
 
-	/* First sectors is the header itself */
-	if (phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < sizeof(*phdr)) {
-		log_dbg("Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u.",
-			phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset, keyIndex);
-		return 1;
+	LUKS_sort_keyslots(phdr, sorted_areas);
+
+	/* Check keyslot to prevent access outside of header and keyslot area */
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		/* enforce stripes == 4000 */
+		if (phdr->keyblock[i].stripes != LUKS_STRIPES) {
+			log_dbg("Invalid stripes count %u in keyslot %u.",
+				phdr->keyblock[i].stripes, i);
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/* First sectors is the header itself */
+		if (phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < sizeof(*phdr)) {
+			log_dbg("Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u.",
+				phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset, i);
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/* Ignore following check for detached header where offset can be zero. */
+		if (phdr->payloadOffset == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (phdr->payloadOffset <= phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset) {
+			log_dbg("Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
+				phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset, i,
+				phdr->payloadOffset);
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (phdr->payloadOffset < (phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset + secs_per_stripes)) {
+			log_dbg("Invalid keyslot size %u (offset %u, stripes %u) in "
+				"keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
+				secs_per_stripes,
+				phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset,
+				phdr->keyblock[i].stripes,
+				i, phdr->payloadOffset);
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
+			return -1;
+		}
 	}
 
-	/* Ignore following check for detached header where offset can be zero. */
-	if (phdr->payloadOffset == 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (phdr->payloadOffset <= phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset) {
-		log_dbg("Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
-			phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset, keyIndex,
-			phdr->payloadOffset);
-		return 1;
-	}
-
-	secs_per_stripes = AF_split_sectors(phdr->keyBytes, phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes);
-
-	if (phdr->payloadOffset < (phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset + secs_per_stripes)) {
-		log_dbg("Invalid keyslot size %u (offset %u, stripes %u) in "
-			"keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
-			secs_per_stripes,
-			phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset,
-			phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes,
-			keyIndex, phdr->payloadOffset);
-		return 1;
+	/* check no keyslot overlaps with each other */
+	for (i = 1; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		prev = sorted_areas[i-1];
+		next = sorted_areas[i];
+		if (phdr->keyblock[next].keyMaterialOffset <
+		    (phdr->keyblock[prev].keyMaterialOffset + secs_per_stripes)) {
+			log_dbg("Not enough space in LUKS keyslot %d.", prev);
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), prev);
+			return -1;
+		}
 	}
+	/* do not check last keyslot on purpose, it must be tested in device size check */
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -153,15 +218,15 @@ int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
 	struct luks_phdr hdr;
 	int r = 0, devfd = -1;
-	ssize_t hdr_size;
-	ssize_t buffer_size;
+	size_t hdr_size;
+	size_t buffer_size;
 	char *buffer = NULL;
 
 	r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
-	hdr_size = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr.keyBytes) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	hdr_size = LUKS_device_sectors(&hdr) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
 	buffer_size = size_round_up(hdr_size, crypt_getpagesize());
 
 	buffer = crypt_safe_alloc(buffer_size);
@@ -176,13 +241,14 @@ int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	log_dbg("Output backup file size: %zu bytes.", buffer_size);
 
 	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
-	if(devfd == -1) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"), device_path(device));
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), device_path(device));
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), buffer, hdr_size) < hdr_size) {
+	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device),
+			   buffer, hdr_size) < (ssize_t)hdr_size) {
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -195,24 +261,23 @@ int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	devfd = open(backup_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR);
 	if (devfd == -1) {
 		if (errno == EEXIST)
-			log_err(ctx, _("Requested header backup file %s already exists.\n"), backup_file);
+			log_err(ctx, _("Requested header backup file %s already exists."), backup_file);
 		else
-			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create header backup file %s."), backup_file);
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (write(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
+	if (write_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < (ssize_t)buffer_size) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write header backup file %s."), backup_file);
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	close(devfd);
 
 	r = 0;
 out:
-	if (devfd != -1)
+	if (devfd >= 0)
 		close(devfd);
-	memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr));
+	crypt_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
 	crypt_safe_free(buffer);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -233,10 +298,10 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 		return r;
 
 	if (!r)
-		buffer_size = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr_file.keyBytes) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+		buffer_size = LUKS_device_sectors(&hdr_file) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
 
 	if (r || buffer_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header.\n"));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."));
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -249,24 +314,25 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 
 	devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY);
 	if (devfd == -1) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s."), backup_file);
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (read(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
+	if (read_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot read header backup file %s."), backup_file);
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	close(devfd);
+	devfd = -1;
 
 	r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 0, 0, ctx);
 	if (r == 0) {
 		log_dbg("Device %s already contains LUKS header, checking UUID and offset.", device_path(device));
 		if(hdr->payloadOffset != hdr_file.payloadOffset ||
 		   hdr->keyBytes != hdr_file.keyBytes) {
-			log_err(ctx, _("Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"));
+			log_err(ctx, _("Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."));
 			r = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -291,26 +357,28 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 		sizeof(*hdr), buffer_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS, device_path(device));
 
 	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
-	if (devfd == -1) {
+	if (devfd < 0) {
 		if (errno == EACCES)
-			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"),
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
 				device_path(device));
 		else
-			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s.\n"), device_path(device));
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+	if (write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device),
+			    buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	close(devfd);
+	devfd = -1;
 
 	/* Be sure to reload new data */
 	r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
 out:
-	if (devfd != -1)
+	if (devfd >= 0)
 		close(devfd);
 	crypt_safe_free(buffer);
 	return r;
@@ -322,22 +390,25 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	struct luks_phdr temp_phdr;
 	const unsigned char *sector = (const unsigned char*)phdr;
 	struct volume_key *vk;
-	uint64_t PBKDF2_per_sec = 1;
 	int i, bad, r, need_write = 0;
 
 	if (phdr->keyBytes != 16 && phdr->keyBytes != 32 && phdr->keyBytes != 64) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Non standard key size, manual repair required.\n"));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Non standard key size, manual repair required."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	/* cryptsetup 1.0 did not align to 4k, cannot repair this one */
-	if (phdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset < (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required.\n"));
+	if (LUKS_keyslots_offset(phdr) < (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	r = LUKS_check_cipher(ctx, phdr->keyBytes, phdr->cipherName, phdr->cipherMode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(phdr->keyBytes, NULL);
 
-	log_verbose(ctx, _("Repairing keyslots.\n"));
+	log_verbose(ctx, _("Repairing keyslots."));
 
 	log_dbg("Generating second header with the same parameters for check.");
 	/* cipherName, cipherMode, hashSpec, uuid are already null terminated */
@@ -345,12 +416,9 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	r = LUKS_generate_phdr(&temp_phdr, vk, phdr->cipherName, phdr->cipherMode,
 			       phdr->hashSpec,phdr->uuid, LUKS_STRIPES,
 			       phdr->payloadOffset, 0,
-			       1, &PBKDF2_per_sec,
 			       1, ctx);
-	if (r < 0) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Repair failed."));
+	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
-	}
 
 	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) {
 		if (phdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)  {
@@ -360,7 +428,7 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 
 		bad = 0;
 		if (phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset != temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset) {
-			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u).\n"), i,
+			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u)."), i,
 				(unsigned)phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset,
 				(unsigned)temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
 			phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset;
@@ -368,7 +436,7 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 		}
 
 		if (phdr->keyblock[i].stripes != temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes) {
-			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u).\n"), i,
+			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u)."), i,
 				(unsigned)phdr->keyblock[i].stripes,
 				(unsigned)temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes);
 			phdr->keyblock[i].stripes = temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes;
@@ -377,12 +445,12 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 
 		/* Known case - MSDOS partition table signature */
 		if (i == 6 && sector[0x1fe] == 0x55 && sector[0x1ff] == 0xaa) {
-			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature.\n"), i);
+			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature."), i);
 			bad = 1;
 		}
 
 		if(bad) {
-			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: salt wiped.\n"), i);
+			log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: salt wiped."), i);
 			phdr->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
 			memset(&phdr->keyblock[i].passwordSalt, 0x00, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
 			phdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = 0;
@@ -392,13 +460,21 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 			need_write = 1;
 	}
 
-	if (need_write) {
-		log_verbose(ctx, _("Writing LUKS header to disk.\n"));
+	/*
+	 * check repair result before writing because repair can't fix out of order
+	 * keyslot offsets and would corrupt header again
+	 */
+	if (LUKS_check_keyslots(ctx, phdr))
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	else if (need_write) {
+		log_verbose(ctx, _("Writing LUKS header to disk."));
 		r = LUKS_write_phdr(phdr, ctx);
 	}
 out:
+	if (r)
+		log_err(ctx, _("Repair failed."));
 	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
-	memset(&temp_phdr, 0, sizeof(temp_phdr));
+	crypt_memzero(&temp_phdr, sizeof(temp_phdr));
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -415,16 +491,16 @@ static int _check_and_convert_hdr(const char *device,
 	if(memcmp(hdr->magic, luksMagic, LUKS_MAGIC_L)) { /* Check magic */
 		log_dbg("LUKS header not detected.");
 		if (require_luks_device)
-			log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"), device);
+			log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), device);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	} else if((hdr->version = ntohs(hdr->version)) != 1) {	/* Convert every uint16/32_t item from network byte order */
-		log_err(ctx, _("Unsupported LUKS version %d.\n"), hdr->version);
+		log_err(ctx, _("Unsupported LUKS version %d."), hdr->version);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	hdr->hashSpec[LUKS_HASHSPEC_L - 1] = '\0';
 	if (crypt_hmac_size(hdr->hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"), hdr->hashSpec);
+		log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."), hdr->hashSpec);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -438,12 +514,11 @@ static int _check_and_convert_hdr(const char *device,
 		hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
 		hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset  = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
 		hdr->keyblock[i].stripes            = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].stripes);
-		if (LUKS_check_keyslot_size(hdr, i)) {
-			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"), i);
-			r = -EINVAL;
-		}
 	}
 
+	if (LUKS_check_keyslots(ctx, hdr))
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Avoid unterminated strings */
 	hdr->cipherName[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L - 1] = '\0';
 	hdr->cipherMode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L - 1] = '\0';
@@ -453,7 +528,7 @@ static int _check_and_convert_hdr(const char *device,
 		if (r == -EINVAL)
 			r = _keyslot_repair(hdr, ctx);
 		else
-			log_verbose(ctx, _("No known problems detected for LUKS header.\n"));
+			log_verbose(ctx, _("No known problems detected for LUKS header."));
 	}
 
 	return r;
@@ -468,9 +543,16 @@ static void _to_lower(char *str, unsigned max_len)
 
 static void LUKS_fix_header_compatible(struct luks_phdr *header)
 {
-	/* Old cryptsetup expects "sha1", gcrypt allows case insensistive names,
+	/* Old cryptsetup expects "sha1", gcrypt allows case insensitive names,
 	 * so always convert hash to lower case in header */
 	_to_lower(header->hashSpec, LUKS_HASHSPEC_L);
+
+	/* ECB mode does not use IV but dmcrypt silently allows it.
+	 * Drop any IV here if ECB is used (that is not secure anyway).*/
+	if (!strncmp(header->cipherMode, "ecb-", 4)) {
+		memset(header->cipherMode, 0, LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L);
+		strcpy(header->cipherMode, "ecb");
+	}
 }
 
 int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(const char *backup_file,
@@ -485,12 +567,12 @@ int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(const char *backup_file,
 		(int)hdr_size, backup_file);
 
 	devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY);
-	if(-1 == devfd) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s."), backup_file);
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
-	if (read(devfd, hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
+	if (read_buffer(devfd, hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
 		r = -EIO;
 	else {
 		LUKS_fix_header_compatible(hdr);
@@ -524,19 +606,30 @@ int LUKS_read_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 		hdr_size, device_path(device));
 
 	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
-	if (devfd == -1) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s.\n"), device_path(device));
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
+	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device),
+			   hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
 		r = -EIO;
 	else
 		r = _check_and_convert_hdr(device_path(device), hdr, require_luks_device,
 					   repair, ctx);
 
 	if (!r)
-		r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr->keyBytes);
+		r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Cryptsetup 1.0.0 did not align keyslots to 4k (very rare version).
+	 * Disable direct-io to avoid possible IO errors if underlying device
+	 * has bigger sector size.
+	 */
+	if (!r && hdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
+		log_dbg("Old unaligned LUKS keyslot detected, disabling direct-io.");
+		device_disable_direct_io(device);
+	}
 
 	close(devfd);
 	return r;
@@ -555,17 +648,17 @@ int LUKS_write_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	log_dbg("Updating LUKS header of size %zu on device %s",
 		sizeof(struct luks_phdr), device_path(device));
 
-	r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr->keyBytes);
+	r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr, 1);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
 	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
-	if(-1 == devfd) {
+	if (devfd < 0) {
 		if (errno == EACCES)
-			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"),
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
 				device_path(device));
 		else
-			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s.\n"), device_path(device));
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -584,16 +677,17 @@ int LUKS_write_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 		convHdr.keyblock[i].stripes            = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].stripes);
 	}
 
-	r = write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), &convHdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size ? -EIO : 0;
+	r = write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device),
+			    &convHdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size ? -EIO : 0;
 	if (r)
-		log_err(ctx, _("Error during update of LUKS header on device %s.\n"), device_path(device));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."), device_path(device));
 	close(devfd);
 
 	/* Re-read header from disk to be sure that in-memory and on-disk data are the same. */
 	if (!r) {
 		r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
 		if (r)
-			log_err(ctx, _("Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s.\n"),
+			log_err(ctx, _("Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s."),
 				device_path(device));
 	}
 
@@ -601,24 +695,25 @@ int LUKS_write_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 }
 
 /* Check that kernel supports requested cipher by decryption of one sector */
-static int LUKS_check_cipher(struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
+int LUKS_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *ctx, size_t keylength, const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode)
 {
 	int r;
 	struct volume_key *empty_key;
 	char buf[SECTOR_SIZE];
 
-	log_dbg("Checking if cipher %s-%s is usable.", hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode);
+	log_dbg("Checking if cipher %s-%s is usable.", cipher, cipher_mode);
 
-	empty_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
+	empty_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keylength, NULL);
 	if (!empty_key)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(buf, sizeof(buf),
-				      hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode,
-				      empty_key, 0, ctx);
+	/* No need to get KEY quality random but it must avoid known weak keys. */
+	r = crypt_random_get(ctx, empty_key->key, empty_key->keylength, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
+	if (!r)
+		r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(buf, sizeof(buf), cipher, cipher_mode, empty_key, 0, ctx);
 
 	crypt_free_volume_key(empty_key);
-	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	crypt_memzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -628,15 +723,15 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 		       const char *uuid, unsigned int stripes,
 		       unsigned int alignPayload,
 		       unsigned int alignOffset,
-		       uint32_t iteration_time_ms,
-		       uint64_t *PBKDF2_per_sec,
 		       int detached_metadata_device,
 		       struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
-	unsigned int i = 0, hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(vk->keylength);
+	unsigned int i = 0, hdr_sectors = LUKS_calculate_device_sectors(vk->keylength);
 	size_t blocksPerStripeSet, currentSector;
 	int r;
 	uuid_t partitionUuid;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
+	double PBKDF2_temp;
 	char luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
 
 	/* For separate metadata device allow zero alignment */
@@ -645,18 +740,18 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 
 	if (alignPayload && detached_metadata_device && alignPayload < hdr_sectors) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Data offset for detached LUKS header must be "
-			       "either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors).\n"),
+			       "either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors)."),
 			       hdr_sectors);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (crypt_hmac_size(hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"), hashSpec);
+		log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."), hashSpec);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n"));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	if (!uuid)
@@ -667,47 +762,42 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 	/* Set Magic */
 	memcpy(header->magic,luksMagic,LUKS_MAGIC_L);
 	header->version=1;
-	strncpy(header->cipherName,cipherName,LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L);
-	strncpy(header->cipherMode,cipherMode,LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L);
-	strncpy(header->hashSpec,hashSpec,LUKS_HASHSPEC_L);
+	strncpy(header->cipherName,cipherName,LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1);
+	strncpy(header->cipherMode,cipherMode,LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1);
+	strncpy(header->hashSpec,hashSpec,LUKS_HASHSPEC_L-1);
 
 	header->keyBytes=vk->keylength;
 
 	LUKS_fix_header_compatible(header);
 
-	r = LUKS_check_cipher(header, ctx);
-	if (r < 0)
-		return r;
-
 	log_dbg("Generating LUKS header version %d using hash %s, %s, %s, MK %d bytes",
 		header->version, header->hashSpec ,header->cipherName, header->cipherMode,
 		header->keyBytes);
 
 	r = crypt_random_get(ctx, header->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
 	if(r < 0) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed.\n"));
-		return r;
-	}
-
-	r = crypt_benchmark_kdf(ctx, "pbkdf2", header->hashSpec,
-				"foo", 3, "bar", 3, PBKDF2_per_sec);
-	if (r < 0) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"),
-			header->hashSpec);
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed."));
 		return r;
 	}
 
 	/* Compute master key digest */
-	iteration_time_ms /= 8;
-	header->mkDigestIterations = at_least((uint32_t)(*PBKDF2_per_sec/1024) * iteration_time_ms,
-					      LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN);
+	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf(ctx);
+	r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(ctx, pbkdf, vk->keylength);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	assert(pbkdf->iterations);
 
-	r = crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", header->hashSpec, vk->key,vk->keylength,
+	PBKDF2_temp = (double)pbkdf->iterations * LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS / pbkdf->time_ms;
+	if (PBKDF2_temp > (double)UINT32_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	header->mkDigestIterations = at_least((uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp, LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN);
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, header->hashSpec, vk->key,vk->keylength,
 			header->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
 			header->mkDigest,LUKS_DIGESTSIZE,
-			header->mkDigestIterations);
+			header->mkDigestIterations, 0, 0);
 	if(r < 0) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s).\n"),
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."),
 			header->hashSpec);
 		return r;
 	}
@@ -747,7 +837,7 @@ int LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(
 	uuid_t partitionUuid;
 
 	if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n"));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	if (!uuid)
@@ -761,50 +851,40 @@ int LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(
 int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 		 const char *password, size_t passwordLen,
 		 struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk,
-		 uint32_t iteration_time_ms,
-		 uint64_t *PBKDF2_per_sec,
 		 struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
 	struct volume_key *derived_key;
 	char *AfKey = NULL;
 	size_t AFEKSize;
-	uint64_t PBKDF2_temp;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
 	int r;
 
 	if(hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].active != LUKS_KEY_DISABLED) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d active, purge first.\n"), keyIndex);
+		log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d active, purge first."), keyIndex);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* LUKS keyslot has always at least 4000 stripes accoding to specification */
+	/* LUKS keyslot has always at least 4000 stripes according to specification */
 	if(hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes < 4000) {
-	        log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?\n"),
+	        log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?"),
 			keyIndex);
 	         return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	log_dbg("Calculating data for key slot %d", keyIndex);
-
-	r = crypt_benchmark_kdf(ctx, "pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec,
-				"foo", 3, "bar", 3, PBKDF2_per_sec);
-	if (r < 0) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"),
-			hdr->hashSpec);
+	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf(ctx);
+	r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(ctx, pbkdf, vk->keylength);
+	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
-	}
+	assert(pbkdf->iterations);
 
 	/*
-	 * Avoid floating point operation
 	 * Final iteration count is at least LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN
 	 */
-	PBKDF2_temp = (*PBKDF2_per_sec / 2) * (uint64_t)iteration_time_ms;
-	PBKDF2_temp /= 1024;
-	if (PBKDF2_temp > UINT32_MAX)
-		PBKDF2_temp = UINT32_MAX;
-	hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations = at_least((uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp,
-							      LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN);
-
-	log_dbg("Key slot %d use %d password iterations.", keyIndex, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
+	hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations =
+		at_least(pbkdf->iterations, LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN);
+	log_dbg("Key slot %d use %" PRIu32 " password iterations.", keyIndex,
+		hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
 
 	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
 	if (!derived_key)
@@ -815,10 +895,10 @@ int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	r = crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec, password, passwordLen,
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, hdr->hashSpec, password, passwordLen,
 			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
 			derived_key->key, hdr->keyBytes,
-			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
+			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations, 0, 0);
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -873,10 +953,10 @@ int LUKS_verify_volume_key(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 {
 	char checkHashBuf[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE];
 
-	if (crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec, vk->key, vk->keylength,
+	if (crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, hdr->hashSpec, vk->key, vk->keylength,
 			hdr->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
 			checkHashBuf, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE,
-			hdr->mkDigestIterations) < 0)
+			hdr->mkDigestIterations, 0, 0) < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (memcmp(checkHashBuf, hdr->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE))
@@ -917,10 +997,10 @@ static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	r = crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec, password, passwordLen,
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, hdr->hashSpec, password, passwordLen,
 			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
 			derived_key->key, hdr->keyBytes,
-			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
+			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations, 0, 0);
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -939,8 +1019,13 @@ static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 		goto out;
 
 	r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(hdr, vk);
+
+	/* Allow only empty passphrase with null cipher */
+	if (!r && !strcmp(hdr->cipherName, "cipher_null") && passwordLen)
+		r = -EPERM;
+
 	if (!r)
-		log_verbose(ctx, _("Key slot %d unlocked.\n"), keyIndex);
+		log_verbose(ctx, _("Key slot %d unlocked."), keyIndex);
 out:
 	crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
 	crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
@@ -975,7 +1060,6 @@ int LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(int keyIndex,
 			return r;
 	}
 	/* Warning, early returns above */
-	log_err(ctx, _("No key available with this passphrase.\n"));
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
@@ -993,7 +1077,7 @@ int LUKS_del_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 
 	r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, keyIndex, 0);
 	if (r) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"),
+		log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."),
 			keyIndex, LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1);
 		return r;
 	}
@@ -1002,16 +1086,16 @@ int LUKS_del_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 	startOffset = hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset;
 	endOffset = startOffset + AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes);
 
-	r = crypt_wipe(device, startOffset * SECTOR_SIZE,
-		       (endOffset - startOffset) * SECTOR_SIZE,
-		       CRYPT_WIPE_DISK, 0);
+	r = crypt_wipe_device(ctx, device, CRYPT_WIPE_SPECIAL, startOffset * SECTOR_SIZE,
+			      (endOffset - startOffset) * SECTOR_SIZE,
+			      (endOffset - startOffset) * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
 	if (r) {
 		if (r == -EACCES) {
-			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"),
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
 				device_path(device));
 			r = -EINVAL;
 		} else
-			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot wipe device %s.\n"),
+			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot wipe device %s."),
 				device_path(device));
 		return r;
 	}
@@ -1101,6 +1185,7 @@ int LUKS1_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			.vk     = vk,
 			.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
 			.iv_offset = 0,
+			.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd),
 		}
 	};
 

lib/luks1/luks.h

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@
 #define LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN  1000
 #define LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN 1000
 
+// Iteration time for digest in ms
+#define LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS 125
+
 #define LUKS_KEY_DISABLED_OLD 0
 #define LUKS_KEY_ENABLED_OLD 0xCAFE
 
@@ -96,6 +99,11 @@ struct luks_phdr {
 int LUKS_verify_volume_key(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 			   const struct volume_key *vk);
 
+int LUKS_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *ctx,
+		      size_t keylength,
+		      const char *cipher,
+		      const char *cipher_mode);
+
 int LUKS_generate_phdr(
 	struct luks_phdr *header,
 	const struct volume_key *vk,
@@ -106,8 +114,6 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(
 	unsigned int stripes,
 	unsigned int alignPayload,
 	unsigned int alignOffset,
-	uint32_t iteration_time_ms,
-	uint64_t *PBKDF2_per_sec,
 	int detached_metadata_device,
 	struct crypt_device *ctx);
 
@@ -147,8 +153,6 @@ int LUKS_set_key(
 	size_t passwordLen,
 	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	struct volume_key *vk,
-	uint32_t iteration_time_ms,
-	uint64_t *PBKDF2_per_sec,
 	struct crypt_device *ctx);
 
 int LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(
@@ -168,26 +172,12 @@ crypt_keyslot_info LUKS_keyslot_info(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot);
 int LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks_phdr *hdr);
 int LUKS_keyslot_active_count(struct luks_phdr *hdr);
 int LUKS_keyslot_set(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, int enable);
-int LUKS_keyslot_area(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+int LUKS_keyslot_area(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
 	uint64_t *offset,
 	uint64_t *length);
-
-int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(
-	char *src, size_t srcLength,
-	const char *cipher,
-	const char *cipher_mode,
-	struct volume_key *vk,
-	unsigned int sector,
-	struct crypt_device *ctx);
-
-int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(
-	char *dst, size_t dstLength,
-	const char *cipher,
-	const char *cipher_mode,
-	struct volume_key *vk,
-	unsigned int sector,
-	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+size_t LUKS_device_sectors(const struct luks_phdr *hdr);
+size_t LUKS_keyslots_offset(const struct luks_phdr *hdr);
 
 int LUKS1_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		   const char *name,

lib/luks2/luks2.h

@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_ONDISK_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_ONDISK_H
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+
+#define LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST "LUKS\xba\xbe"
+#define LUKS2_MAGIC_2ND "SKUL\xba\xbe"
+#define LUKS2_MAGIC_L 6
+#define LUKS2_UUID_L 40
+#define LUKS2_LABEL_L 48
+#define LUKS2_SALT_L 64
+#define LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L 32
+#define LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L 64
+
+#define LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX       32
+#define LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX         32
+
+#define LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX "luks2-"
+#define LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN 6
+
+#define LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX "keyring"
+
+#define LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX 8
+
+#define CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT -1
+#define CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT 0
+#define CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT_STR "0"
+
+#define CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST -1
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 header on-disk.
+ *
+ * Binary header is followed by JSON area.
+ * JSON area is followed by keyslot area and data area,
+ * these are described in JSON metadata.
+ *
+ * Note: uuid, csum_alg are intentionally on the same offset as LUKS1
+ * (checksum alg replaces hash in LUKS1)
+ *
+ * String (char) should be zero terminated.
+ * Padding should be wiped.
+ * Checksum is calculated with csum zeroed (+ full JSON area).
+ */
+struct luks2_hdr_disk {
+	char		magic[LUKS2_MAGIC_L];
+	uint16_t	version;	/* Version 2 */
+	uint64_t	hdr_size;	/* in bytes, including JSON area */
+	uint64_t	seqid;		/* increased on every update */
+	char		label[LUKS2_LABEL_L];
+	char		checksum_alg[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L];
+	uint8_t		salt[LUKS2_SALT_L]; /* unique for every header/offset */
+	char		uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L];
+	char		subsystem[LUKS2_LABEL_L]; /* owner subsystem label */
+	uint64_t	hdr_offset;	/* offset from device start in bytes */
+	char		_padding[184];
+	uint8_t		csum[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L];
+	char		_padding4096[7*512];
+	/* JSON area starts here */
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 header in-memory.
+ */
+typedef struct json_object json_object;
+struct luks2_hdr {
+	size_t		hdr_size;
+	uint64_t	seqid;
+	unsigned int	version;
+	char		label[LUKS2_LABEL_L];
+	char		subsystem[LUKS2_LABEL_L];
+	char		checksum_alg[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L];
+	uint8_t		salt1[LUKS2_SALT_L];
+	uint8_t		salt2[LUKS2_SALT_L];
+	char		uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L];
+	json_object	*jobj;
+};
+
+struct luks2_keyslot_params {
+	enum { LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AF_LUKS1 = 0 } af_type;
+	enum { LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AREA_RAW = 0 } area_type;
+
+	union {
+	struct {
+		char hash[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L]; // or include luks.h
+		unsigned int stripes;
+	} luks1;
+	} af;
+
+	union {
+	struct {
+		char encryption[65]; // or include utils_crypt.h
+		size_t key_size;
+	} raw;
+	} area;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Supportable header sizes (hdr_disk + JSON area)
+ * Also used as offset for the 2nd header.
+ */
+#define LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN 0x4000
+
+#define LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN sizeof(struct luks2_hdr_disk)
+
+#define LUKS2_HDR_DEFAULT_LEN 0x400000 /* 4 MiB */
+
+#define LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE 0x8000000 /* 128 MiB */
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *backup_file);
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_hdr_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const char *uuid);
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_labels(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const char *label,
+	const char *subsystem,
+	int commit);
+
+void LUKS2_hdr_free(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		     const char *backup_file);
+int LUKS2_hdr_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		      const char *backup_file);
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(json_object *jobj);
+uint64_t LUKS2_keyslots_size(json_object *jobj);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/*
+ * Generic LUKS2 keyslot
+ */
+int LUKS2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	int segment,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int wipe_area_only);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot);
+
+crypt_keyslot_priority LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	crypt_keyslot_priority priority,
+	int commit);
+
+/*
+ * Generic LUKS2 token
+ */
+int LUKS2_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char **json);
+
+int LUKS2_token_assign(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int token,
+	int assign,
+	int commit);
+
+int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int token);
+
+int LUKS2_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *json,
+	int commit);
+
+crypt_token_info LUKS2_token_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char **type);
+
+int LUKS2_builtin_token_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *type,
+	void *params);
+
+int LUKS2_builtin_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *type,
+	const void *params,
+	int commit);
+
+int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		int token,
+		const char *name,
+		uint32_t flags,
+		void *usrptr);
+
+int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate_any(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const char *name,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+int LUKS2_tokens_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+/*
+ * Generic LUKS2 digest
+ */
+int LUKS2_digest_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment,
+	const struct volume_key *vk);
+
+void LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	int keyslot);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int digest);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_assign(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int digest,
+	int assign,
+	int commit);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment,
+	int digest,
+	int assign,
+	int commit);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const struct volume_key *vk);
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 generic
+ */
+int LUKS2_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_luks2_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *cipher,
+	size_t keylength);
+
+int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
+	struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const char *cipherName,
+	const char *cipherMode,
+	const char *integrity,
+	const char *uuid,
+	unsigned int sector_size,
+	unsigned int alignPayload,
+	unsigned int alignOffset,
+	int detached_metadata_device);
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_get_data_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_get_sector_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+const char *LUKS2_get_cipher(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+const char *LUKS2_get_integrity(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	size_t key_size, struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
+int LUKS2_get_keyslot_params(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot,
+	struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
+int LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+int LUKS2_get_keyslot_key_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment);
+crypt_keyslot_info LUKS2_keyslot_info(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length);
+/*
+ * Permanent activation flags stored in header
+ */
+int LUKS2_config_get_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t *flags);
+int LUKS2_config_set_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t flags);
+
+/*
+ * Requirements for device activation or header modification
+ */
+int LUKS2_config_get_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t *reqs);
+int LUKS2_config_set_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs);
+
+int LUKS2_unmet_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs_mask, int quiet);
+
+int LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int segment);
+int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int keyslot);
+
+struct luks_phdr;
+int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			 struct luks_phdr *hdr1,
+			 struct luks2_hdr *hdr2);
+int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			 struct luks2_hdr *hdr2,
+			 struct luks_phdr *hdr1);
+
+#endif

lib/luks2/luks2_digest.c

@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, digest handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+extern const digest_handler PBKDF2_digest;
+
+static const digest_handler *digest_handlers[LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX] = {
+	&PBKDF2_digest,
+	NULL
+};
+
+const digest_handler *LUKS2_digest_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX && digest_handlers[i]; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(digest_handlers[i]->name, type))
+			return digest_handlers[i];
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static const digest_handler *LUKS2_digest_handler(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(jobj1 = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "type", &jobj2))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return LUKS2_digest_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj2));
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_digest_find_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	int digest = 0;
+
+	while (LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest) && digest < LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX)
+		digest++;
+
+	return digest < LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX ? digest : -1;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	int digest;
+	const digest_handler *dh;
+
+	dh = LUKS2_digest_handler_type(cd, type);
+	if (!dh)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_find_free(cd, hdr);
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg("Creating new digest %d (%s).", digest, type);
+
+	return dh->store(cd, digest, vk->key, vk->keylength) ?: digest;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot)
+{
+	char keyslot_name[16];
+	json_object *jobj_digests, *jobj_digest_keyslots;
+
+	if (snprintf(keyslot_name, sizeof(keyslot_name), "%u", keyslot) < 1)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "keyslots", &jobj_digest_keyslots);
+		if (LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_keyslots, keyslot_name))
+			return atoi(key);
+	}
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vk,
+	int keyslot)
+{
+	const digest_handler *h;
+	int digest, r;
+
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, keyslot);
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return digest;
+
+	log_dbg("Verifying key from keyslot %d, digest %d.", keyslot, digest);
+	h = LUKS2_digest_handler(cd, digest);
+	if (!h)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = h->verify(cd, digest, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_dbg("Digest %d (%s) verify failed with %d.", digest, h->name, r);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return digest;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
+{
+	const digest_handler *h;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_digest_handler(cd, digest)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return h->dump(cd, digest);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment,
+	const struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	const digest_handler *h;
+	int digest, r;
+
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(cd, hdr, segment);
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return digest;
+
+	log_dbg("Verifying key digest %d.", digest);
+
+	h = LUKS2_digest_handler(cd, digest);
+	if (!h)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = h->verify(cd, digest, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_dbg("Digest %d (%s) verify failed with %d.", digest, h->name, r);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return digest;
+}
+
+/* FIXME: segment can have more digests */
+int LUKS2_digest_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment)
+{
+	char segment_name[16];
+	json_object *jobj_digests, *jobj_digest_segments;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+
+	if (snprintf(segment_name, sizeof(segment_name), "%u", segment) < 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "segments", &jobj_digest_segments);
+		if (!LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_segments, segment_name))
+			continue;
+
+		return atoi(key);
+	}
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static int assign_one_digest(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			     int keyslot, int digest, int assign)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_digest, *jobj_digest_keyslots;
+	char num[16];
+
+	log_dbg("Keyslot %i %s digest %i.", keyslot, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", digest);
+
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "keyslots", &jobj_digest_keyslots);
+	if (!jobj_digest_keyslots)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
+	if (assign) {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_keyslots, num);
+		if (!jobj1)
+			json_object_array_add(jobj_digest_keyslots, json_object_new_string(num));
+	} else {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_remove(jobj_digest_keyslots, num);
+		if (jobj1)
+			json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "keyslots", jobj1);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			int keyslot, int digest, int assign, int commit)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digests;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (digest == CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			r = assign_one_digest(cd, hdr, keyslot, atoi(key), assign);
+			if (r < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = assign_one_digest(cd, hdr, keyslot, digest, assign);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	// FIXME: do not write header in nothing changed
+	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
+}
+
+static int assign_one_segment(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			     int segment, int digest, int assign)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_digest, *jobj_digest_segments;
+	char num[16];
+
+	log_dbg("Segment %i %s digest %i.", segment, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", digest);
+
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "segments", &jobj_digest_segments);
+	if (!jobj_digest_segments)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", segment);
+	if (assign) {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_segments, num);
+		if (!jobj1)
+			json_object_array_add(jobj_digest_segments, json_object_new_string(num));
+	} else {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_remove(jobj_digest_segments, num);
+		if (jobj1)
+			json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "segments", jobj1);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			int segment, int digest, int assign, int commit)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digests;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (digest == CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			r = assign_one_segment(cd, hdr, segment, atoi(key), assign);
+			if (r < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = assign_one_segment(cd, hdr, segment, digest, assign);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	// FIXME: do not write header in nothing changed
+	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
+}
+
+static int digest_unused(json_object *jobj_digest)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "segments", &jobj);
+	if (!jobj || !json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_array) || json_object_array_length(jobj) > 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "keyslots", &jobj);
+	if (!jobj || !json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_array))
+		return 0;
+
+	return json_object_array_length(jobj) > 0 ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+void LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digests;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+	if (!jobj_digests || !json_object_is_type(jobj_digests, json_type_object))
+		return;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+		if (digest_unused(val)) {
+			log_dbg("Erasing unused digest %d.", atoi(key));
+			json_object_object_del(jobj_digests, key);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* Key description helpers */
+static char *get_key_description_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
+{
+	char *desc, digest_str[3];
+	int r;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (!crypt_get_uuid(cd))
+		return NULL;
+
+	r = snprintf(digest_str, sizeof(digest_str), "d%u", digest);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(digest_str))
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* "cryptsetup:<uuid>-<digest_str>" + \0 */
+	len = strlen(crypt_get_uuid(cd)) + strlen(digest_str) + 13;
+
+	desc = malloc(len);
+	if (!desc)
+	       return NULL;
+
+	r = snprintf(desc, len, "%s:%s-%s", "cryptsetup", crypt_get_uuid(cd), digest_str);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len) {
+	       free(desc);
+	       return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return desc;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int segment)
+{
+	char *desc = get_key_description_by_digest(cd, LUKS2_digest_by_segment(cd, hdr, segment));
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(vk, desc);
+	free(desc);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int keyslot)
+{
+	char *desc = get_key_description_by_digest(cd, LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, keyslot));
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(vk, desc);
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(cd, vk);
+
+	free(desc);
+	return r;
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, PBKDF2 digest handler (LUKS1 compatible)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+#define LUKS_DIGESTSIZE 20 // since SHA1
+#define LUKS_SALTSIZE 32
+#define LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS 125
+
+static int PBKDF2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int digest,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	char checkHashBuf[64];
+	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj1;
+	const char *hashSpec;
+	char *mkDigest = NULL, mkDigestSalt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
+	unsigned int mkDigestIterations;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	/* This can be done only for internally linked digests */
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), digest);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "hash", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	hashSpec = json_object_get_string(jobj1);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "iterations", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	mkDigestIterations = json_object_get_int64(jobj1);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "salt", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	len = sizeof(mkDigestSalt);
+	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), mkDigestSalt, &len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "digest", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	len = 0;
+	if (!base64_decode_alloc(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), &mkDigest, &len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (len < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE ||
+	    len > sizeof(checkHashBuf) ||
+	    (len != LUKS_DIGESTSIZE && len != (size_t)crypt_hash_size(hashSpec))) {
+		free(mkDigest);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = -EPERM;
+	if (crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, hashSpec, volume_key, volume_key_len,
+			mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
+			checkHashBuf, len,
+			mkDigestIterations, 0, 0) < 0) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		if (memcmp(checkHashBuf, mkDigest, len) == 0)
+			r = 0;
+	}
+
+	free(mkDigest);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int PBKDF2_digest_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int digest,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj_digests;
+	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], digest_raw[128], num[16];
+	int r;
+	char *base64_str;
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_limits pbkdf_limits;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
+		.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,
+		.hash = "sha256",
+		.time_ms = LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS,
+	};
+
+	log_dbg("Setting PBKDF2 type key digest %d.", digest);
+
+	r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, &pbkdf_limits);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (crypt_get_pbkdf(cd)->flags & CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK)
+		pbkdf.iterations = pbkdf_limits.min_iterations;
+	else {
+		r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(cd, &pbkdf, volume_key_len);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, pbkdf.hash, volume_key, volume_key_len,
+			salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, digest_raw, crypt_hmac_size(pbkdf.hash),
+			pbkdf.iterations, 0, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), digest);
+	jobj_digests = NULL;
+	if (!jobj_digest) {
+		hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+		jobj_digest = json_object_new_object();
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
+	}
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "type", json_object_new_string("pbkdf2"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "keyslots", json_object_new_array());
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "segments", json_object_new_array());
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "hash", json_object_new_string(pbkdf.hash));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "iterations", json_object_new_int(pbkdf.iterations));
+
+	base64_encode_alloc(salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &base64_str);
+	if (!base64_str) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_digest);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "salt", json_object_new_string(base64_str));
+	free(base64_str);
+
+	base64_encode_alloc(digest_raw, crypt_hmac_size(pbkdf.hash), &base64_str);
+	if (!base64_str) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_digest);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "digest", json_object_new_string(base64_str));
+	free(base64_str);
+
+	if (jobj_digests) {
+		snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", digest);
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_digests, num, jobj_digest);
+	}
+
+	JSON_DBG(jobj_digest, "Digest JSON");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int PBKDF2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj1;
+
+	/* This can be done only for internally linked digests */
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), digest);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "hash", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tHash:       %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "iterations", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tIterations: %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_int64(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "salt", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tSalt:       ");
+	hexprint_base64(cd, jobj1, " ", "            ");
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "digest", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tDigest:     ");
+	hexprint_base64(cd, jobj1, " ", "            ");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const digest_handler PBKDF2_digest = {
+	.name   = "pbkdf2",
+	.verify = PBKDF2_digest_verify,
+	.store  = PBKDF2_digest_store,
+	.dump   = PBKDF2_digest_dump,
+};

lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c

@@ -0,0 +1,723 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Helper functions
+ */
+json_object *parse_json_len(const char *json_area, int length, int *end_offset)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+	struct json_tokener *jtok;
+
+	if (!json_area || length <= 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	jtok = json_tokener_new();
+	if (!jtok) {
+		log_dbg("ERROR: Failed to init json tokener");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	jobj = json_tokener_parse_ex(jtok, json_area, length);
+	if (!jobj)
+		log_dbg("ERROR: Failed to parse json data (%d): %s",
+			json_tokener_get_error(jtok),
+			json_tokener_error_desc(json_tokener_get_error(jtok)));
+	else
+		*end_offset = jtok->char_offset;
+
+	json_tokener_free(jtok);
+
+	return jobj;
+}
+
+static void log_dbg_checksum(const uint8_t *csum, const char *csum_alg, const char *info)
+{
+	char csum_txt[2*LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L+1];
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < crypt_hash_size(csum_alg); i++)
+		snprintf(&csum_txt[i*2], 3, "%02hhx", (const char)csum[i]);
+	csum_txt[i*2+1] = '\0'; /* Just to be safe, sprintf should write \0 there. */
+
+	log_dbg("Checksum:%s (%s)", &csum_txt[0], info);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate hash (checksum) of |LUKS2_bin|LUKS2_JSON_area| from in-memory structs.
+ * LUKS2 on-disk header contains uniques salt both for primary and secondary header.
+ * Checksum is always calculated with zeroed checksum field in binary header.
+ */
+static int hdr_checksum_calculate(const char *alg, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
+				  const char *json_area, size_t json_len)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *hd = NULL;
+	int hash_size, r;
+
+	hash_size = crypt_hash_size(alg);
+	if (hash_size <= 0 || crypt_hash_init(&hd, alg))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Binary header, csum zeroed. */
+	r = crypt_hash_write(hd, (char*)hdr_disk, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+
+	/* JSON area (including unused space) */
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_hash_write(hd, json_area, json_len);
+
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_hash_final(hd, (char*)hdr_disk->csum, (size_t)hash_size);
+
+	crypt_hash_destroy(hd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare hash (checksum) of on-disk and in-memory header.
+ */
+static int hdr_checksum_check(const char *alg, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
+			      const char *json_area, size_t json_len)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr_disk hdr_tmp;
+	int hash_size, r;
+
+	hash_size = crypt_hash_size(alg);
+	if (hash_size <= 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Copy header and zero checksum. */
+	memcpy(&hdr_tmp, hdr_disk, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+	memset(&hdr_tmp.csum, 0, sizeof(hdr_tmp.csum));
+
+	r = hdr_checksum_calculate(alg, &hdr_tmp, json_area, json_len);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	log_dbg_checksum(hdr_disk->csum, alg, "on-disk");
+	log_dbg_checksum(hdr_tmp.csum, alg, "in-memory");
+
+	if (memcmp(hdr_tmp.csum, hdr_disk->csum, (size_t)hash_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert header from on-disk format to in-memory struct
+ */
+static void hdr_from_disk(struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk1,
+			  struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk2,
+			  struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			  int secondary)
+{
+	hdr->version  = be16_to_cpu(hdr_disk1->version);
+	hdr->hdr_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1->hdr_size);
+	hdr->seqid    = be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1->seqid);
+
+	memcpy(hdr->label, hdr_disk1->label, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	hdr->label[LUKS2_LABEL_L - 1] = '\0';
+	memcpy(hdr->subsystem, hdr_disk1->subsystem, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	hdr->subsystem[LUKS2_LABEL_L - 1] = '\0';
+	memcpy(hdr->checksum_alg, hdr_disk1->checksum_alg, LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L);
+	hdr->checksum_alg[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L - 1] = '\0';
+	memcpy(hdr->uuid, hdr_disk1->uuid, LUKS2_UUID_L);
+	hdr->uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L - 1] = '\0';
+
+	if (secondary) {
+		memcpy(hdr->salt1, hdr_disk2->salt, LUKS2_SALT_L);
+		memcpy(hdr->salt2, hdr_disk1->salt, LUKS2_SALT_L);
+	} else {
+		memcpy(hdr->salt1, hdr_disk1->salt, LUKS2_SALT_L);
+		memcpy(hdr->salt2, hdr_disk2->salt, LUKS2_SALT_L);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert header from in-memory struct to on-disk format
+ */
+static void hdr_to_disk(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
+			int secondary, uint64_t offset)
+{
+	assert(((char*)&(hdr_disk->_padding4096) - (char*)&(hdr_disk->magic)) == 512);
+
+	memset(hdr_disk, 0, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+
+	memcpy(&hdr_disk->magic, secondary ? LUKS2_MAGIC_2ND : LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L);
+	hdr_disk->version     = cpu_to_be16(hdr->version);
+	hdr_disk->hdr_size    = cpu_to_be64(hdr->hdr_size);
+	hdr_disk->hdr_offset  = cpu_to_be64(offset);
+	hdr_disk->seqid       = cpu_to_be64(hdr->seqid);
+
+	strncpy(hdr_disk->label, hdr->label, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	hdr_disk->label[LUKS2_LABEL_L - 1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(hdr_disk->subsystem, hdr->subsystem, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	hdr_disk->subsystem[LUKS2_LABEL_L - 1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(hdr_disk->checksum_alg, hdr->checksum_alg, LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L);
+	hdr_disk->checksum_alg[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L - 1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(hdr_disk->uuid, hdr->uuid, LUKS2_UUID_L);
+	hdr_disk->uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L - 1] = '\0';
+
+	memcpy(hdr_disk->salt, secondary ? hdr->salt2 : hdr->salt1, LUKS2_SALT_L);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sanity checks before checksum is validated
+ */
+static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr,
+				     size_t *hdr_json_size, int secondary,
+				     uint64_t offset)
+{
+	if (memcmp(hdr->magic, secondary ? LUKS2_MAGIC_2ND : LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (be16_to_cpu(hdr->version) != 2) {
+		log_dbg("Unsupported LUKS2 header version %u.", be16_to_cpu(hdr->version));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (offset != be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_offset)) {
+		log_dbg("LUKS2 offset 0x%04x on device differs to expected offset 0x%04x.",
+			(unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_offset), (unsigned)offset);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* FIXME: sanity check checksum alg. */
+
+	log_dbg("LUKS2 header version %u of size %u bytes, checksum %s.",
+		(unsigned)be16_to_cpu(hdr->version), (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size),
+		hdr->checksum_alg);
+
+	*hdr_json_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read LUKS2 header from disk at specific offset.
+ */
+static int hdr_read_disk(struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
+			 char **json_area, uint64_t offset, int secondary)
+{
+	size_t hdr_json_size = 0;
+	int devfd = -1, r;
+
+	log_dbg("Trying to read %s LUKS2 header at offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+		secondary ? "secondary" : "primary", offset);
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		return devfd == -1 ? -EIO : devfd;
+
+	/*
+	 * Read binary header and run sanity check before reading
+	 * JSON area and validating checksum.
+	 */
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+				 device_alignment(device), hdr_disk,
+				 LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, offset) != LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	r = hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(hdr_disk, &hdr_json_size, secondary, offset);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate and read JSON area. Always the whole area must be read.
+	 */
+	*json_area = malloc(hdr_json_size);
+	if (!*json_area) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+				 device_alignment(device), *json_area, hdr_json_size,
+				 offset + LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN) != (ssize_t)hdr_json_size) {
+		close(devfd);
+		free(*json_area);
+		*json_area = NULL;
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	close(devfd);
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate and validate checksum and zero it afterwards.
+	 */
+	if (hdr_checksum_check(hdr_disk->checksum_alg, hdr_disk,
+				*json_area, hdr_json_size)) {
+		log_dbg("LUKS2 header checksum error (offset %" PRIu64 ").", offset);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	memset(hdr_disk->csum, 0, LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write LUKS2 header to disk at specific offset.
+ */
+static int hdr_write_disk(struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		   const char *json_area, int secondary)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr_disk hdr_disk;
+	uint64_t offset = secondary ? hdr->hdr_size : 0;
+	size_t hdr_json_len;
+	int devfd = -1, r;
+
+	log_dbg("Trying to write LUKS2 header (%zu bytes) at offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+		hdr->hdr_size, offset);
+
+	/* FIXME: read-only device silent fail? */
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		return devfd == -1 ? -EINVAL : devfd;
+
+	hdr_json_len = hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+
+	hdr_to_disk(hdr, &hdr_disk, secondary, offset);
+
+	/*
+	 * Write header without checksum but with proper seqid.
+	 */
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+				  device_alignment(device), (char *)&hdr_disk,
+				  LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, offset) < (ssize_t)LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Write json area.
+	 */
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+				  device_alignment(device),
+				  CONST_CAST(char*)json_area, hdr_json_len,
+				  LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN + offset) < (ssize_t)hdr_json_len) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate checksum and write header with checksum.
+	 */
+	r = hdr_checksum_calculate(hdr_disk.checksum_alg, &hdr_disk,
+				   json_area, hdr_json_len);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		close(devfd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	log_dbg_checksum(hdr_disk.csum, hdr_disk.checksum_alg, "in-memory");
+
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+				  device_alignment(device), (char *)&hdr_disk,
+				  LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, offset) < (ssize_t)LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN)
+		r = -EIO;
+
+	close(devfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device,
+				   uint64_t hdr_size, int falloc)
+{
+	uint64_t dev_size;
+
+	if (device_size(device, &dev_size)) {
+		log_dbg("Cannot get device size for device %s.", device_path(device));
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg("Device size %" PRIu64 ", header size %"
+		PRIu64 ".", dev_size, hdr_size);
+
+	if (hdr_size > dev_size) {
+		/* If it is header file, increase its size */
+		if (falloc && !device_fallocate(device, hdr_size))
+			return 0;
+
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %" PRIu64 " bytes.)"),
+			device_path(device), hdr_size);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert in-memory LUKS2 header and write it to disk.
+ * This will increase sequence id, write both header copies and calculate checksum.
+ */
+int LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct device *device)
+{
+	char *json_area;
+	const char *json_text;
+	size_t json_area_len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (hdr->version != 2) {
+		log_dbg("Unsupported LUKS2 header version (%u).", hdr->version);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (hdr->hdr_size != LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN) {
+		log_dbg("Unsupported LUKS2 header size (%zu).", hdr->hdr_size);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_check_device_size(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr->jobj), 1);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate and zero JSON area (of proper header size).
+	 */
+	json_area_len = hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+	json_area = malloc(json_area_len);
+	if (!json_area)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(json_area, 0, json_area_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * Generate text space-efficient JSON representation to json area.
+	 */
+	json_text = json_object_to_json_string_ext(hdr->jobj,
+			JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE);
+	if (!json_text || !*json_text) {
+		log_dbg("Cannot parse JSON object to text representation.");
+		free(json_area);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	if (strlen(json_text) > (json_area_len - 1)) {
+		log_dbg("JSON is too large (%zu > %zu).", strlen(json_text), json_area_len);
+		free(json_area);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	strncpy(json_area, json_text, json_area_len);
+
+	/* Increase sequence id before writing it to disk. */
+	hdr->seqid++;
+
+	r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write device lock."));
+		free(json_area);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/* Write primary and secondary header */
+	r = hdr_write_disk(device, hdr, json_area, 0);
+	if (!r)
+		r = hdr_write_disk(device, hdr, json_area, 1);
+
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg("LUKS2 header write failed (%d).", r);
+
+	device_write_unlock(device);
+
+	/* FIXME: try recovery here? */
+
+	free(json_area);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int validate_json_area(const char *json_area, int start, int length)
+{
+	char c;
+
+	/* Enforce there are no needless opening bytes */
+	if (*json_area != '{') {
+		log_dbg("ERROR: Opening character must be left curly bracket: '{'.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (start >= length) {
+		log_dbg("ERROR: Missing trailing null byte beyond parsed json data string.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO:
+	 *	validate there are legal json format characters between
+	 *	'json_area' and 'json_area + start'
+	 */
+
+	do {
+		c = *(json_area + start);
+		if (c != '\0') {
+			log_dbg("ERROR: Forbidden ascii code 0x%02hhx found beyond json data string at offset %d.",
+				c, start);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} while (++start < length);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int validate_luks2_json_object(json_object *jobj_hdr)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	/* we require top level object to be of json_type_object */
+	r = !json_object_is_type(jobj_hdr, json_type_object);
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg("ERROR: Resulting object is not a json object type");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_validate(jobj_hdr);
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg("Repairing JSON metadata.");
+		/* try to correct known glitches */
+		LUKS2_hdr_repair(jobj_hdr);
+
+		/* run validation again */
+		r = LUKS2_hdr_validate(jobj_hdr);
+	}
+
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg("ERROR: LUKS2 validation failed");
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static json_object *parse_and_validate_json(const char *json_area, int length)
+{
+	int offset, r;
+	json_object *jobj = parse_json_len(json_area, length, &offset);
+
+	if (!jobj)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* successful parse_json_len must not return offset <= 0 */
+	assert(offset > 0);
+
+	r = validate_json_area(json_area, offset, length);
+	if (!r)
+		r = validate_luks2_json_object(jobj);
+
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(jobj);
+		jobj = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return jobj;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and convert on-disk LUKS2 header to in-memory representation..
+ * Try to do recovery if on-disk state is not consistent.
+ */
+int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			struct device *device, int do_recovery)
+{
+	enum { HDR_OK, HDR_OBSOLETE, HDR_FAIL, HDR_FAIL_IO } state_hdr1, state_hdr2;
+	struct luks2_hdr_disk hdr_disk1, hdr_disk2;
+	char *json_area1 = NULL, *json_area2 = NULL;
+	json_object *jobj_hdr1 = NULL, *jobj_hdr2 = NULL;
+	int i, r;
+	uint64_t hdr_size;
+
+	if (do_recovery && !crypt_metadata_locking_enabled()) {
+		do_recovery = 0;
+		log_dbg("Disabling header auto-recovery due to locking being disabled.");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Read primary LUKS2 header (offset 0).
+	 */
+	state_hdr1 = HDR_FAIL;
+	r = hdr_read_disk(device, &hdr_disk1, &json_area1, 0, 0);
+	if (r == 0) {
+		jobj_hdr1 = parse_and_validate_json(json_area1, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+		state_hdr1 = jobj_hdr1 ? HDR_OK : HDR_OBSOLETE;
+	} else if (r == -EIO)
+		state_hdr1 = HDR_FAIL_IO;
+
+	/*
+	 * Read secondary LUKS2 header (follows primary).
+	 */
+	state_hdr2 = HDR_FAIL;
+	if (state_hdr1 != HDR_FAIL && state_hdr1 != HDR_FAIL_IO) {
+		r = hdr_read_disk(device, &hdr_disk2, &json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.hdr_size), 1);
+		if (r == 0) {
+			jobj_hdr2 = parse_and_validate_json(json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+			state_hdr2 = jobj_hdr2 ? HDR_OK : HDR_OBSOLETE;
+		} else if (r == -EIO)
+			state_hdr2 = HDR_FAIL_IO;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * No header size, check all known offsets.
+		 */
+		for (r = -EINVAL,i = 2; r < 0 && i <= 1024; i <<= 1)
+			r = hdr_read_disk(device, &hdr_disk2, &json_area2, i * 4096, 1);
+
+		if (r == 0) {
+			jobj_hdr2 = parse_and_validate_json(json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+			state_hdr2 = jobj_hdr2 ? HDR_OK : HDR_OBSOLETE;
+		} else if (r == -EIO)
+			state_hdr2 = HDR_FAIL_IO;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check sequence id if both headers are read correctly.
+	 */
+	if (state_hdr1 == HDR_OK && state_hdr2 == HDR_OK) {
+		if (be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.seqid) > be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.seqid))
+			state_hdr2 = HDR_OBSOLETE;
+		else if (be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.seqid) < be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.seqid))
+			state_hdr1 = HDR_OBSOLETE;
+	}
+
+	/* check header with keyslots to fit the device */
+	if (state_hdr1 == HDR_OK)
+		hdr_size = LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(jobj_hdr1);
+	else if (state_hdr2 == HDR_OK)
+		hdr_size = LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(jobj_hdr2);
+	else {
+		r = (state_hdr1 == HDR_FAIL_IO && state_hdr2 == HDR_FAIL_IO) ? -EIO : -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_check_device_size(cd, device, hdr_size, 0);
+	if (r)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to rewrite (recover) bad header. Always regenerate salt for bad header.
+	 */
+	if (state_hdr1 == HDR_OK && state_hdr2 != HDR_OK) {
+		log_dbg("Secondary LUKS2 header requires recovery.");
+
+		if (do_recovery) {
+			memcpy(&hdr_disk2, &hdr_disk1, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+			r = crypt_random_get(NULL, (char*)hdr_disk2.salt, sizeof(hdr_disk2.salt), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+			if (r)
+				log_dbg("Cannot generate master salt.");
+			else {
+				hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk1, &hdr_disk2, hdr, 0);
+				r = hdr_write_disk(device, hdr, json_area1, 1);
+			}
+			if (r)
+				log_dbg("Secondary LUKS2 header recovery failed.");
+		}
+	} else if (state_hdr1 != HDR_OK && state_hdr2 == HDR_OK) {
+		log_dbg("Primary LUKS2 header requires recovery.");
+
+		if (do_recovery) {
+			memcpy(&hdr_disk1, &hdr_disk2, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+			r = crypt_random_get(NULL, (char*)hdr_disk1.salt, sizeof(hdr_disk1.salt), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+			if (r)
+				log_dbg("Cannot generate master salt.");
+			else {
+				hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk2, &hdr_disk1, hdr, 1);
+				r = hdr_write_disk(device, hdr, json_area2, 0);
+			}
+			if (r)
+				log_dbg("Primary LUKS2 header recovery failed.");
+		}
+	}
+
+	free(json_area1);
+	json_area1 = NULL;
+	free(json_area2);
+	json_area2 = NULL;
+
+	/* wrong lock for write mode during recovery attempt */
+	if (r == -EAGAIN)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Even if status is failed, the second header includes salt.
+	 */
+	if (state_hdr1 == HDR_OK) {
+		hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk1, &hdr_disk2, hdr, 0);
+		hdr->jobj = jobj_hdr1;
+		json_object_put(jobj_hdr2);
+	} else if (state_hdr2 == HDR_OK) {
+		hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk2, &hdr_disk1, hdr, 1);
+		hdr->jobj = jobj_hdr2;
+		json_object_put(jobj_hdr1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: should this fail? At least one header was read correctly.
+	 * r = (state_hdr1 == HDR_FAIL_IO || state_hdr2 == HDR_FAIL_IO) ? -EIO : -EINVAL;
+	 */
+	return 0;
+err:
+	log_dbg("LUKS2 header read failed (%d).", r);
+
+	free(json_area1);
+	free(json_area2);
+	json_object_put(jobj_hdr1);
+	json_object_put(jobj_hdr2);
+	hdr->jobj = NULL;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *backup_file)
+{
+	struct {
+		char magic[LUKS2_MAGIC_L];
+		uint16_t version;
+	}  __attribute__ ((packed)) hdr;
+	struct device *device = NULL;
+	int r = 0, devfd = -1, flags;
+
+	if (!backup_file)
+		device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	else if (device_alloc(&device, backup_file) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!device)
+		return 0;
+
+	flags = O_RDONLY;
+	if (device_direct_io(device))
+		flags |= O_DIRECT;
+
+	devfd = open(device_path(device), flags);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	     device_alignment(device), &hdr, sizeof(hdr), 0) == sizeof(hdr)) &&
+	    !memcmp(hdr.magic, LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L))
+		r = (int)be16_to_cpu(hdr.version);
+err:
+	if (devfd != -1)
+		close(devfd);
+
+	if (backup_file)
+		device_free(device);
+
+	return r;
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_INTERNAL_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <json-c/json.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "luks2.h"
+
+#define UNUSED(x) (void)(x)
+
+/* override useless forward slash escape when supported by json-c */
+#ifndef JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE
+#define JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE 0
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * On-disk access function prototypes
+ */
+int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			struct device *device, int do_recovery);
+int LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			 struct device *device);
+
+/*
+ * JSON struct access helpers
+ */
+json_object *LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
+json_object *LUKS2_get_token_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int token);
+json_object *LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int digest);
+json_object *LUKS2_get_segment_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
+json_object *LUKS2_get_tokens_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+void hexprint_base64(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj,
+		     const char *sep, const char *line_sep);
+
+json_object *parse_json_len(const char *json_area, int length, int *end_offset);
+uint64_t json_object_get_uint64(json_object *jobj);
+uint32_t json_object_get_uint32(json_object *jobj);
+json_object *json_object_new_uint64(uint64_t value);
+
+void JSON_DBG(json_object *jobj, const char *desc);
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 JSON validation
+ */
+
+/* validation helper */
+json_object *json_contains(json_object *jobj, const char *name, const char *section,
+		      const char *key, json_type type);
+
+int LUKS2_hdr_validate(json_object *hdr_jobj);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_validate(json_object *hdr_jobj, json_object *hdr_keyslot, const char *key);
+int LUKS2_check_json_size(const struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_token_validate(json_object *hdr_jobj, json_object *jobj_token, const char *key);
+void LUKS2_token_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int token);
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 JSON repair for known glitches
+ */
+void LUKS2_hdr_repair(json_object *jobj_hdr);
+void LUKS2_keyslots_repair(json_object *jobj_hdr);
+
+/*
+ * JSON array helpers
+ */
+struct json_object *LUKS2_array_jobj(struct json_object *array, const char *num);
+struct json_object *LUKS2_array_remove(struct json_object *array, const char *num);
+
+/*
+ * Plugins API
+ */
+
+/**
+ * LUKS2 keyslots handlers (EXPERIMENTAL)
+ */
+typedef int (*keyslot_alloc_func)(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
+				  size_t volume_key_len,
+				  const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
+typedef int (*keyslot_update_func)(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
+				   const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
+typedef int (*keyslot_open_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
+				  const char *password, size_t password_len,
+				  char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len);
+typedef int (*keyslot_store_func)(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
+				  const char *password, size_t password_len,
+				  const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len);
+typedef int (*keyslot_wipe_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
+typedef int (*keyslot_dump_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
+typedef int (*keyslot_validate_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot);
+typedef void(*keyslot_repair_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot);
+
+/* see LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1 */
+int placeholder_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t area_offset,
+	uint64_t area_length,
+	size_t volume_key_len);
+
+/* validate all keyslot implementations in hdr json */
+int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(json_object *hdr_jobj);
+
+typedef struct  {
+	const char *name;
+	keyslot_alloc_func alloc;
+	keyslot_update_func update;
+	keyslot_open_func  open;
+	keyslot_store_func store;
+	keyslot_wipe_func  wipe;
+	keyslot_dump_func  dump;
+	keyslot_validate_func validate;
+	keyslot_repair_func repair;
+} keyslot_handler;
+
+/**
+ * LUKS2 digest handlers (EXPERIMENTAL)
+ */
+typedef int (*digest_verify_func)(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest,
+				  const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len);
+typedef int (*digest_store_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, int digest,
+				  const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len);
+typedef int (*digest_dump_func)  (struct crypt_device *cd, int digest);
+
+typedef struct  {
+	const char *name;
+	digest_verify_func verify;
+	digest_store_func  store;
+	digest_dump_func   dump;
+} digest_handler;
+
+const digest_handler *LUKS2_digest_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type);
+
+/**
+ * LUKS2 token handlers (internal use only)
+ */
+typedef int (*builtin_token_get_func) (json_object *jobj_token, void *params);
+typedef int (*builtin_token_set_func) (json_object **jobj_token, const void *params);
+
+typedef struct {
+	/* internal only section used by builtin tokens */
+	builtin_token_get_func get;
+	builtin_token_set_func set;
+	/* public token handler */
+	const crypt_token_handler *h;
+} token_handler;
+
+int token_keyring_set(json_object **, const void *);
+int token_keyring_get(json_object *, void *);
+
+int LUKS2_find_area_gap(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			size_t keylength, uint64_t *area_offset, uint64_t *area_length);
+
+#endif

lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS2 header format code
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+
+struct area {
+	uint64_t offset;
+	uint64_t length;
+};
+
+static size_t get_area_size(size_t keylength)
+{
+	//FIXME: calculate this properly, for now it is AF_split_sectors
+	return size_round_up(keylength * 4000, 4096);
+}
+
+static size_t get_min_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	return 2 * hdr->hdr_size;
+}
+
+static size_t get_max_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_find_area_gap(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			size_t keylength, uint64_t *area_offset, uint64_t *area_length)
+{
+	struct area areas[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX], sorted_areas[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX] = {};
+	int i, j, k, area_i;
+	size_t offset, length;
+
+	/* fill area offset + length table */
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		if (!LUKS2_keyslot_area(hdr, i, &areas[i].offset, &areas[i].length))
+			continue;
+		areas[i].length = 0;
+		areas[i].offset = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* sort table */
+	k = 0; /* index in sorted table */
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		offset = get_max_offset(cd) ?: UINT64_MAX;
+		area_i = -1;
+		/* search for the smallest offset in table */
+		for (j = 0; j < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; j++)
+			if (areas[j].offset && areas[j].offset <= offset) {
+				area_i = j;
+				offset = areas[j].offset;
+			}
+
+		if (area_i >= 0) {
+			sorted_areas[k].length = areas[area_i].length;
+			sorted_areas[k].offset = areas[area_i].offset;
+			areas[area_i].length = 0;
+			areas[area_i].offset = 0;
+			k++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* search for the gap we can use */
+	offset = get_min_offset(hdr);
+	length = get_area_size(keylength);
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		/* skip empty */
+		if (sorted_areas[i].offset == 0 || sorted_areas[i].length == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/* enough space before the used area */
+		if ((offset < sorted_areas[i].offset) && ((offset + length) <= sorted_areas[i].offset))
+			break;
+
+		/* both offset and length are already aligned to 4096 bytes */
+		offset = sorted_areas[i].offset + sorted_areas[i].length;
+	}
+
+	if (get_max_offset(cd) && (offset + length) > get_max_offset(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("No space for new keyslot."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg("Found area %zu -> %zu", offset, length + offset);
+/*
+	log_dbg("Area offset min: %zu, max %zu, slots max %u",
+	       get_min_offset(hdr), get_max_offset(cd), LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX);
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++)
+		log_dbg("SLOT[%02i]: %-8" PRIu64 " -> %-8" PRIu64, i,
+			sorted_areas[i].offset,
+			sorted_areas[i].length + sorted_areas[i].offset);
+*/
+	*area_offset = offset;
+	*area_length = length;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
+	struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const char *cipherName,
+	const char *cipherMode,
+	const char *integrity,
+	const char *uuid,
+	unsigned int sector_size,
+	unsigned int alignPayload,
+	unsigned int alignOffset,
+	int detached_metadata_device)
+{
+	struct json_object *jobj_segment, *jobj_integrity, *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_segments, *jobj_config;
+	char num[24], cipher[128];
+	uint64_t offset, json_size, keyslots_size;
+	uuid_t partitionUuid;
+	int digest;
+
+	hdr->hdr_size = LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
+	hdr->seqid = 1;
+	hdr->version = 2;
+	memset(hdr->label, 0, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	strcpy(hdr->checksum_alg, "sha256");
+	crypt_random_get(NULL, (char*)hdr->salt1, LUKS2_SALT_L, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	crypt_random_get(NULL, (char*)hdr->salt2, LUKS2_SALT_L, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+
+	if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!uuid)
+		uuid_generate(partitionUuid);
+
+	uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, hdr->uuid);
+
+	if (*cipherMode != '\0')
+		snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", cipherName, cipherMode);
+	else
+		snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s", cipherName);
+
+	hdr->jobj = json_object_new_object();
+
+	jobj_keyslots = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", jobj_keyslots);
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "tokens", json_object_new_object());
+	jobj_segments = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "segments", jobj_segments);
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "digests", json_object_new_object());
+	jobj_config = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "config", jobj_config);
+
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", hdr, vk);
+	if (digest < 0) {
+		json_object_put(hdr->jobj);
+		hdr->jobj = NULL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, digest, 1, 0) < 0) {
+		json_object_put(hdr->jobj);
+		hdr->jobj = NULL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	jobj_segment = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "type", json_object_new_string("crypt"));
+	if (detached_metadata_device)
+		offset = (uint64_t)alignPayload * sector_size;
+	else {
+		//FIXME
+		//offset = size_round_up(areas[7].offset + areas[7].length, alignPayload * SECTOR_SIZE);
+		offset = size_round_up(LUKS2_HDR_DEFAULT_LEN, (size_t)alignPayload * sector_size);
+		offset += alignOffset;
+	}
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "iv_tweak", json_object_new_string("0"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "size", json_object_new_string("dynamic"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "encryption", json_object_new_string(cipher));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "sector_size", json_object_new_int(sector_size));
+
+	if (integrity) {
+		jobj_integrity = json_object_new_object();
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_integrity, "type", json_object_new_string(integrity));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_integrity, "journal_encryption", json_object_new_string("none"));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_integrity, "journal_integrity", json_object_new_string("none"));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "integrity", jobj_integrity);
+	}
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%u", CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_segments, num, jobj_segment);
+
+	json_size = hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "json_size", json_object_new_uint64(json_size));
+
+	/* for detached metadata device compute reasonable keyslot areas size */
+	// FIXME: this is coupled with FIXME above
+	if (detached_metadata_device)
+		keyslots_size = LUKS2_HDR_DEFAULT_LEN - get_min_offset(hdr);
+	else
+		keyslots_size = offset - get_min_offset(hdr);
+
+	/* keep keyslots_size reasonable for custom data alignments */
+	if (keyslots_size > LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE)
+		keyslots_size = LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE;
+
+	/* keyslots size has to be 4 KiB aligned */
+	keyslots_size -= (keyslots_size % 4096);
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "keyslots_size", json_object_new_uint64(keyslots_size));
+
+	JSON_DBG(hdr->jobj, "Header JSON");
+	return 0;
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c

@@ -0,0 +1,628 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, keyslot handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+/* Internal implementations */
+extern const keyslot_handler luks2_keyslot;
+
+static const keyslot_handler *keyslot_handlers[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX] = {
+	&luks2_keyslot,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const keyslot_handler
+*LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX && keyslot_handlers[i]; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(keyslot_handlers[i]->name, type))
+			return keyslot_handlers[i];
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static const keyslot_handler
+*LUKS2_keyslot_handler(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(jobj1 = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "type", &jobj2))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj2));
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++)
+		if (!LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, i))
+			return i;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* Check if a keyslot is asssigned to specific segment */
+int LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment)
+{
+	int keyslot_digest, segment_digest;
+
+	/* no need to check anything */
+	if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
+		return 0;
+
+	keyslot_digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(NULL, hdr, keyslot);
+	if (keyslot_digest < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	segment_digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(NULL, hdr, segment);
+	if (segment_digest < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return segment_digest == keyslot_digest ? 0 : -ENOENT;
+}
+
+/* Number of keyslots assigned to a segment or all keyslots for CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT */
+int LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment)
+{
+	int num = 0;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots);
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
+		UNUSED(val);
+		if (!LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(hdr, atoi(slot), segment))
+			num++;
+	}
+
+	return num;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	const char *cipher = crypt_get_cipher(cd);
+
+	/* Keyslot is already authenticated; we cannot use integrity tags here */
+	if (crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd) || !cipher)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Wrapped key schemes cannot be used for keyslot encryption */
+	if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	size_t key_size, struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+{
+	int r, integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd);
+
+	if (!hdr || !pbkdf || !params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	params->af_type   = LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AF_LUKS1;
+	params->area_type = LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AREA_RAW;
+
+	/* set keyslot AF parameters */
+	/* currently we use hash for AF from pbkdf settings */
+	r = snprintf(params->af.luks1.hash, sizeof(params->af.luks1.hash),
+		     "%s", pbkdf->hash);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(params->af.luks1.hash))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	params->af.luks1.stripes = 4000;
+
+	/* set keyslot area encryption parameters */
+	/* short circuit authenticated encryption hardcoded defaults */
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd) || key_size == 0) {
+		// FIXME: fixed cipher and key size can be wrong
+		snprintf(params->area.raw.encryption, sizeof(params->area.raw.encryption),
+			 "aes-xts-plain64");
+		params->area.raw.key_size = 32;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	r = snprintf(params->area.raw.encryption, sizeof(params->area.raw.encryption),
+		     "%s", LUKS2_get_cipher(hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT));
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(params->area.raw.encryption))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Slot encryption tries to use the same key size as for the main algorithm */
+	if ((size_t)integrity_key_size > key_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	params->area.raw.key_size = key_size - integrity_key_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_keyslot_unbound(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj_segments;
+	int digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(NULL, hdr, keyslot);
+
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest)))
+		return 0;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "segments", &jobj_segments);
+	if (!jobj_segments || !json_object_is_type(jobj_segments, json_type_array) ||
+	    json_object_array_length(jobj_segments) == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_info LUKS2_keyslot_info(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+{
+	if(keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX || keyslot < 0)
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+
+	if (!LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE;
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_unbound(hdr, keyslot))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND;
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT) == 1 &&
+	    !LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST;
+
+	return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj;
+
+	if(LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*offset = json_object_get_int64(jobj);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "size", &jobj))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*length = json_object_get_int64(jobj);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int segment,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	int key_size, r;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg("Keyslot %d validation failed.", keyslot);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(hdr, keyslot, segment);
+	if (r) {
+		if (r == -ENOENT)
+			log_dbg("Keyslot %d unusable for segment %d.", keyslot, segment);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	key_size = LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(hdr, segment);
+	if (key_size < 0)
+		key_size = LUKS2_get_keyslot_key_size(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (key_size < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
+	if (!*vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = h->open(cd, keyslot, password, password_len, (*vk)->key, (*vk)->keylength);
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_dbg("Keyslot %d (%s) open failed with %d.", keyslot, h->name, r);
+	else
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, *vk, keyslot);
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
+		*vk = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	crypt_keyslot_priority priority,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	int segment,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj;
+	crypt_keyslot_priority slot_priority;
+	int keyslot, r = -ENOENT;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots);
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(val, "priority", &jobj))
+			slot_priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+		else
+			slot_priority = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+
+		keyslot = atoi(slot);
+		if (slot_priority != priority) {
+			log_dbg("Keyslot %d priority %d != %d (required), skipped.",
+				keyslot, slot_priority, priority);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		r = LUKS2_open_and_verify(cd, hdr, keyslot, segment, password, password_len, vk);
+
+		/* Do not retry for errors that are no -EPERM or -ENOENT,
+		   former meaning password wrong, latter key slot unusable for segment */
+		if ((r != -EPERM) && (r != -ENOENT))
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	int segment,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	int r_prio, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		r_prio = LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority(cd, hdr, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_PREFER,
+			password, password_len, segment, vk);
+		if (r_prio >= 0)
+			r = r_prio;
+		else if (r_prio != -EPERM && r_prio != -ENOENT)
+			r = r_prio;
+		else
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority(cd, hdr, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL,
+				password, password_len, segment, vk);
+		/* Prefer password wrong to no entry from priority slot */
+		if (r_prio == -EPERM && r == -ENOENT)
+			r = r_prio;
+	} else
+		r = LUKS2_open_and_verify(cd, hdr, keyslot, segment, password, password_len, vk);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	int r;
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot)) {
+		/* Try to allocate default and empty keyslot type */
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, "luks2");
+		if (!h)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = h->alloc(cd, keyslot, vk->keylength, params);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	} else {
+		if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = h->update(cd, keyslot, params);
+		if (r) {
+			log_dbg("Failed to update keyslot %d json.", keyslot);
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg("Keyslot validation failed.");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return h->store(cd, keyslot, password, password_len,
+			vk->key, vk->keylength);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int wipe_area_only)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	uint64_t area_offset, area_length;
+	char num[16];
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_keyslots;
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+
+	h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (wipe_area_only)
+		log_dbg("Wiping keyslot %d area only.", keyslot);
+
+	/* Just check that nobody uses the metadata now */
+	r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."),
+			device_path(device));
+		return r;
+	}
+	device_write_unlock(device);
+
+	/* secure deletion of possible key material in keyslot area */
+	r = crypt_keyslot_area(cd, keyslot, &area_offset, &area_length);
+	if (r && r != -ENOENT)
+		return r;
+
+	/* We can destroy the binary keyslot area now without lock */
+	if (!r) {
+		r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, device, CRYPT_WIPE_SPECIAL, area_offset,
+			      area_length, area_length, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r) {
+			if (r == -EACCES) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
+					device_path(device));
+				r = -EINVAL;
+			} else
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe device %s."), device_path(device));
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (wipe_area_only)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Slot specific wipe */
+	if (h) {
+		r = h->wipe(cd, keyslot);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	} else
+		log_dbg("Wiping keyslot %d without specific-slot handler loaded.", keyslot);
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
+	json_object_object_del(jobj_keyslots, num);
+
+	return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return h->dump(cd, keyslot);
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_priority LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	  struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_priority;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "priority", &jobj_priority))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+
+	return json_object_get_int(jobj_priority);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			       int keyslot, crypt_keyslot_priority priority, int commit)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (priority == CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL)
+		json_object_object_del(jobj_keyslot, "priority");
+	else
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "priority", json_object_new_int(priority));
+
+	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
+}
+
+int placeholder_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t area_offset,
+	uint64_t area_length,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	char num[16];
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area;
+
+	log_dbg("Allocating placeholder keyslot %d for LUKS1 down conversion.", keyslot);
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "type", json_object_new_string("placeholder"));
+	/*
+	 * key_size = -1 makes placeholder keyslot impossible to pass validation.
+	 * It's a safeguard against accidentaly storing temporary conversion
+	 * LUKS2 header.
+	 */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "key_size", json_object_new_int(-1));
+
+	/* Area object */
+	jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(area_offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", json_object_new_uint64(area_length));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area);
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslots, num, jobj_keyslot);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned LUKS2_get_keyslot_digests_count(json_object *hdr_jobj, int keyslot)
+{
+	char num[16];
+	json_object *jobj_digests, *jobj_keyslots;
+	unsigned count = 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%u", keyslot) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
+		UNUSED(key);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots);
+		if (LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_keyslots, num))
+			count++;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+/* run only on header that passed basic format validation */
+int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(json_object *hdr_jobj)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	int keyslot;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_type;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
+		keyslot = atoi(slot);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "type", &jobj_type);
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(NULL, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+		if (!h)
+			continue;
+		if (h->validate && h->validate(NULL, val)) {
+			log_dbg("Keyslot type %s validation failed on keyslot %d.", h->name, keyslot);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (!strcmp(h->name, "luks2") && LUKS2_get_keyslot_digests_count(hdr_jobj, keyslot) != 1) {
+			log_dbg("Keyslot %d is not assigned to exactly 1 digest.", keyslot);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void LUKS2_keyslots_repair(json_object *jobj_keyslots)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	json_object *jobj_type;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
+		UNUSED(slot);
+		if (!json_object_is_type(val, json_type_object) ||
+		    !json_object_object_get_ex(val, "type", &jobj_type) ||
+		    !json_object_is_type(jobj_type, json_type_string))
+			continue;
+
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(NULL, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+		if (h && h->repair)
+			h->repair(NULL, val);
+	}
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c

@@ -0,0 +1,784 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS2 type keyslot handler
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+/* FIXME: move keyslot encryption to crypto backend */
+#include "../luks1/af.h"
+
+#define LUKS_SALTSIZE 32
+#define LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN 1000
+#define LUKS_STRIPES 4000
+
+static int luks2_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
+	const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
+	struct volume_key *vk, unsigned int sector,
+	struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+#ifndef ENABLE_AF_ALG /* Support for old kernel without Crypto API */
+	int r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return r;
+	}
+	r = LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(src, srcLength, cipher, cipher_mode, vk, sector, cd);
+	device_write_unlock(crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+	return r;
+#else
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	int devfd = -1, r;
+
+	/* Only whole sector writes supported */
+	if (srcLength % SECTOR_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Encrypt buffer */
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg("Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
+			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_storage_encrypt(s, 0, srcLength / SECTOR_SIZE, src);
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."),
+			device_path(device));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd >= 0) {
+		if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+					  device_alignment(device), src,
+					  srcLength, sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
+			r = -EIO;
+		else
+			r = 0;
+		close(devfd);
+	} else
+		r = -EIO;
+
+	device_write_unlock(device);
+
+	if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("IO error while encrypting keyslot."));
+
+	return r;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int luks2_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
+	const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode, struct volume_key *vk,
+	unsigned int sector, struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+#ifndef ENABLE_AF_ALG /* Support for old kernel without Crypto API */
+	int r = device_read_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return r;
+	}
+	r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(dst, dstLength, cipher, cipher_mode, vk, sector, cd);
+	device_read_unlock(crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+	return r;
+#else
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	int devfd = -1, r;
+
+	/* Only whole sector writes supported */
+	if (dstLength % SECTOR_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg("Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
+			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = device_read_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire read lock on device %s."),
+			device_path(device));
+		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd >= 0) {
+		if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+					 device_alignment(device), dst,
+					 dstLength, sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
+			r = -EIO;
+		else
+			r = 0;
+		close(devfd);
+	} else
+		r = -EIO;
+
+	device_read_unlock(device);
+
+	/* Decrypt buffer */
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_storage_decrypt(s, 0, dstLength / SECTOR_SIZE, dst);
+	else
+		log_err(cd, _("IO error while decrypting keyslot."));
+
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+	return r;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+		                struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf, char *salt)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_kdf, *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	size_t salt_len;
+
+	if (!jobj_keyslot || !pbkdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(pbkdf, 0, sizeof(*pbkdf));
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	pbkdf->type = json_object_get_string(jobj1);
+	if (!strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "hash", &jobj2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->hash = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "iterations", &jobj2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->iterations = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+		pbkdf->max_memory_kb = 0;
+		pbkdf->parallel_threads = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "time", &jobj2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->iterations = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "memory", &jobj2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->max_memory_kb = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "cpus", &jobj2))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		pbkdf->parallel_threads = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "salt", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	salt_len = LUKS_SALTSIZE;
+	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj2),
+			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj2),
+			   salt, &salt_len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (salt_len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_set_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+	const char *password, size_t passwordLen,
+	const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	struct volume_key *derived_key;
+	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	char *AfKey = NULL;
+	const char *af_hash = NULL;
+	size_t AFEKSize, keyslot_key_len;
+	json_object *jobj2, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
+	uint64_t area_offset;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* prevent accidental volume key size change after allocation */
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "key_size", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (json_object_get_int(jobj2) != (int)volume_key_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	area_offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj2);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(json_object_get_string(jobj2), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "key_size", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	keyslot_key_len = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "hash", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	af_hash = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
+
+	if (luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(jobj_keyslot, &pbkdf, salt))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate derived key storage.
+	 */
+	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keyslot_key_len, NULL);
+	if (!derived_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/*
+	 * Calculate keyslot content, split and store it to keyslot area.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(pbkdf.type, pbkdf.hash, password, passwordLen,
+			salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
+			derived_key->key, derived_key->keylength,
+			pbkdf.iterations, pbkdf.max_memory_kb,
+			pbkdf.parallel_threads);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	// FIXME: verity key_size to AFEKSize
+	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
+	if (!AfKey) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	r = AF_split(volume_key, AfKey, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
+
+	if (r == 0) {
+		log_dbg("Updating keyslot area [0x%04x].", (unsigned)area_offset);
+		/* FIXME: sector_offset should be size_t, fix LUKS_encrypt... accordingly */
+		r = luks2_encrypt_to_storage(AfKey, AFEKSize, cipher, cipher_mode,
+				    derived_key, (unsigned)(area_offset / SECTOR_SIZE), cd);
+	}
+
+	crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_get_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+	const char *password, size_t passwordLen,
+	char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	struct volume_key *derived_key;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
+	char *AfKey;
+	size_t AFEKSize;
+	const char *af_hash = NULL;
+	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	json_object *jobj2, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
+	uint64_t area_offset;
+	size_t keyslot_key_len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(jobj_keyslot, &pbkdf, salt))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "hash", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	af_hash = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	area_offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj2);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(json_object_get_string(jobj2), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "key_size", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	keyslot_key_len = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate derived key storage space.
+	 */
+	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keyslot_key_len, NULL);
+	if (!derived_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
+	if (!AfKey) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Calculate derived key, decrypt keyslot content and merge it.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_pbkdf(pbkdf.type, pbkdf.hash, password, passwordLen,
+			salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
+			derived_key->key, derived_key->keylength,
+			pbkdf.iterations, pbkdf.max_memory_kb,
+			pbkdf.parallel_threads);
+
+	if (r == 0) {
+		log_dbg("Reading keyslot area [0x%04x].", (unsigned)area_offset);
+		/* FIXME: sector_offset should be size_t, fix LUKS_decrypt... accordingly */
+		r = luks2_decrypt_from_storage(AfKey, AFEKSize, cipher, cipher_mode,
+				      derived_key, (unsigned)(area_offset / SECTOR_SIZE), cd);
+	}
+
+	if (r == 0)
+		r = AF_merge(AfKey, volume_key, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
+	crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * currently we support update of only:
+ *
+ * - af hash function
+ * - kdf params
+ */
+static int luks2_keyslot_update_json(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+{
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
+	json_object *jobj_af, *jobj_area, *jobj_kdf, *jobj1;
+	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], *salt_base64 = NULL;
+	int r, keyslot_key_len;
+
+	/* jobj_keyslot is not yet validated */
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "key_size", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* we do not allow any 'area' object modifications yet */
+	keyslot_key_len = json_object_get_int(jobj1);
+	if (keyslot_key_len < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd);
+	if (!pbkdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(cd, CONST_CAST(struct crypt_pbkdf_type *)pbkdf, keyslot_key_len);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* refresh whole 'kdf' object */
+	jobj_kdf = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!jobj_kdf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "type", json_object_new_string(pbkdf->type));
+	if (!strcmp(pbkdf->type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "hash", json_object_new_string(pbkdf->hash));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "iterations", json_object_new_int(pbkdf->iterations));
+	} else {
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "time", json_object_new_int(pbkdf->iterations));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "memory", json_object_new_int(pbkdf->max_memory_kb));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "cpus", json_object_new_int(pbkdf->parallel_threads));
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", jobj_kdf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Regenerate salt and add it in 'kdf' object
+	 */
+	r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	base64_encode_alloc(salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &salt_base64);
+	if (!salt_base64)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "salt", json_object_new_string(salt_base64));
+	free(salt_base64);
+
+	/* update 'af' hash */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "hash", json_object_new_string(params->af.luks1.hash));
+
+	JSON_DBG(jobj_keyslot, "Keyslot JSON");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	size_t volume_key_len,
+	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	char num[16];
+	uint64_t area_offset, area_length;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg("Trying to allocate LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if (!params || params->area_type != LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AREA_RAW ||
+	    params->af_type != LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AF_LUKS1) {
+		log_dbg("Invalid LUKS2 keyslot parameters.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		keyslot = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(hdr, "luks2");
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot)) {
+		log_dbg("Cannot modify already active keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = LUKS2_find_area_gap(cd, hdr, volume_key_len, &area_offset, &area_length);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "type", json_object_new_string("luks2"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "key_size", json_object_new_int(volume_key_len));
+
+	/* AF object */
+	jobj_af = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "type", json_object_new_string("luks1"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "stripes", json_object_new_int(params->af.luks1.stripes));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "af", jobj_af);
+
+	/* Area object */
+	jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "type", json_object_new_string("raw"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "encryption", json_object_new_string(params->area.raw.encryption));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "key_size", json_object_new_int(params->area.raw.key_size));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(area_offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", json_object_new_uint64(area_length));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area);
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslots, num, jobj_keyslot);
+
+	r = luks2_keyslot_update_json(cd, jobj_keyslot, params);
+
+	if (!r && LUKS2_check_json_size(hdr)) {
+		log_dbg("Not enough space in header json area for new keyslot.");
+		r = -ENOSPC;
+	}
+
+	if (r)
+		json_object_object_del(jobj_keyslots, num);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+
+	log_dbg("Trying to open LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return luks2_keyslot_get_key(cd, jobj_keyslot,
+				     password, password_len,
+				     volume_key, volume_key_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function must not modify json.
+ * It's called after luks2 keyslot validation.
+ */
+static int luks2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg("Calculating attributes for LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = luks2_keyslot_set_key(cd, jobj_keyslot,
+				  password, password_len,
+				  volume_key, volume_key_len);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return keyslot;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Remove any reference of deleted keyslot from digests and tokens */
+	LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
+	LUKS2_token_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, 0, 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj1, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tCipher:     %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tPBKDF:      %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "hash", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\tHash:       %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "iterations", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\tIterations: %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_uint64(jobj1));
+	} else {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "time", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\tTime cost:  %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_int64(jobj1));
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "memory", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\tMemory:     %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_int64(jobj1));
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "cpus", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\tThreads:    %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_int64(jobj1));
+	}
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "salt", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tSalt:       ");
+	hexprint_base64(cd, jobj1, " ", "            ");
+
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "stripes", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tAF stripes: %u\n", json_object_get_int(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tArea offset:%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", json_object_get_uint64(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "size", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tArea length:%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", json_object_get_uint64(jobj1));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af, *jobj_area, *jobj1;
+	const char *type;
+	int count;
+
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	count = json_object_object_length(jobj_kdf);
+
+	jobj1 = json_contains(jobj_kdf, "", "kdf section", "type", json_type_string);
+	if (!jobj1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	type = json_object_get_string(jobj1);
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		if (count != 4 || /* type, salt, hash, iterations only */
+		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "hash", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "iterations", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt", json_type_string))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I) || !strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID)) {
+		if (count != 5 || /* type, salt, time, memory, cpus only */
+		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "time", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "memory", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "cpus", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt", json_type_string))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "type", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), "luks1")) {
+		if (!json_contains(jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "hash", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "stripes", json_type_int))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	// FIXME check numbered
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), "raw")) {
+		if (!json_contains(jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "encryption", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "key_size", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "offset", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "size", json_type_string))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int luks2_keyslot_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg("Updating LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = luks2_keyslot_update_json(cd, jobj_keyslot, params);
+
+	if (!r && LUKS2_check_json_size(hdr)) {
+		log_dbg("Not enough space in header json area for updated keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+		r = -ENOSPC;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void luks2_keyslot_repair(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot)
+{
+	const char *type;
+	json_object *jobj_kdf, *jobj_type;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
+	    !json_object_is_type(jobj_kdf, json_type_object))
+		return;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj_type) ||
+	    !json_object_is_type(jobj_type, json_type_string))
+		return;
+
+	type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type);
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
+		/* type, salt, hash, iterations only */
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_kdf, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			if (!strcmp(key, "type") || !strcmp(key, "salt") ||
+			    !strcmp(key, "hash") || !strcmp(key, "iterations"))
+					continue;
+			json_object_object_del(jobj_kdf, key);
+		}
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I) || !strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID)) {
+		/* type, salt, time, memory, cpus only */
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_kdf, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			if (!strcmp(key, "type") || !strcmp(key, "salt") ||
+			    !strcmp(key, "time") || !strcmp(key, "memory") ||
+			    !strcmp(key, "cpus"))
+					continue;
+			json_object_object_del(jobj_kdf, key);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+const keyslot_handler luks2_keyslot = {
+	.name  = "luks2",
+	.alloc  = luks2_keyslot_alloc,
+	.update = luks2_keyslot_update,
+	.open  = luks2_keyslot_open,
+	.store = luks2_keyslot_store,
+	.wipe  = luks2_keyslot_wipe,
+	.dump  = luks2_keyslot_dump,
+	.validate = luks2_keyslot_validate,
+	.repair = luks2_keyslot_repair
+};

lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c

@@ -0,0 +1,855 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS1 conversion code
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Ondrej Kozina. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+#include "../luks1/luks.h"
+#include "../luks1/af.h"
+
+static int json_luks1_keyslot(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, int keyslot, struct json_object **keyslot_object)
+{
+	char *base64_str, cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L+LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
+	size_t base64_len;
+	struct json_object *keyslot_obj, *field, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
+	uint64_t offset, area_size, offs_a, offs_b, length;
+
+	keyslot_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "type", json_object_new_string("luks2"));
+	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "key_size", json_object_new_int64(hdr_v1->keyBytes));
+
+	/* KDF */
+	jobj_kdf = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "type", json_object_new_string(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "hash", json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->hashSpec));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "iterations", json_object_new_int64(hdr_v1->keyblock[keyslot].passwordIterations));
+	/* salt field */
+	base64_len = base64_encode_alloc(hdr_v1->keyblock[keyslot].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &base64_str);
+	if (!base64_str) {
+		json_object_put(keyslot_obj);
+		json_object_put(jobj_kdf);
+		if (!base64_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	field = json_object_new_string_len(base64_str, base64_len);
+	free(base64_str);
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "salt", field);
+	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "kdf", jobj_kdf);
+
+	/* AF */
+	jobj_af = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "type", json_object_new_string("luks1"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "hash", json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->hashSpec));
+	/* stripes field ignored, fixed to LUKS_STRIPES (4000) */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "stripes", json_object_new_int(4000));
+	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "af", jobj_af);
+
+	/* Area */
+	jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "type", json_object_new_string("raw"));
+
+	/* encryption algorithm field */
+	if (*hdr_v1->cipherMode != '\0') {
+		(void) snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", hdr_v1->cipherName, hdr_v1->cipherMode);
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "encryption", json_object_new_string(cipher));
+	} else
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "encryption", json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->cipherName));
+
+	/* area */
+	if (LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr_v1, 0, &offs_a, &length) ||
+	    LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr_v1, 1, &offs_b, &length) ||
+	    LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr_v1, keyslot, &offset, &length)) {
+		json_object_put(keyslot_obj);
+		json_object_put(jobj_area);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	area_size = offs_b - offs_a;
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "key_size", json_object_new_int(hdr_v1->keyBytes));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", json_object_new_uint64(area_size));
+	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "area", jobj_area);
+
+	*keyslot_object = keyslot_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_keyslots(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **keyslots_object)
+{
+	char keyslot_str[2];
+	int key_slot, r;
+	struct json_object *keyslot_obj, *field;
+
+	keyslot_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!keyslot_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (key_slot = 0; key_slot < LUKS_NUMKEYS; key_slot++) {
+		if (hdr_v1->keyblock[key_slot].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
+			continue;
+		r = json_luks1_keyslot(hdr_v1, key_slot, &field);
+		if (r) {
+			json_object_put(keyslot_obj);
+			return r;
+		}
+		(void) snprintf(keyslot_str, sizeof(keyslot_str), "%d", key_slot);
+		json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, keyslot_str, field);
+	}
+
+	*keyslots_object = keyslot_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_segment(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **segment_object)
+{
+	const char *c;
+	char cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L+LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
+	struct json_object *segment_obj, *field;
+	uint64_t number;
+
+	segment_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!segment_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* type field */
+	field = json_object_new_string("crypt");
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "type", field);
+
+	/* offset field */
+	number = (uint64_t)hdr_v1->payloadOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	field = json_object_new_uint64(number);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "offset", field);
+
+	/* iv_tweak field */
+	field = json_object_new_string("0");
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "iv_tweak", field);
+
+	/* length field */
+	field = json_object_new_string("dynamic");
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "size", field);
+
+	/* cipher field */
+	if (*hdr_v1->cipherMode != '\0') {
+		(void) snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", hdr_v1->cipherName, hdr_v1->cipherMode);
+		c = cipher;
+	} else
+		c = hdr_v1->cipherName;
+
+	field = json_object_new_string(c);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "encryption", field);
+
+	/* block field */
+	field = json_object_new_int(SECTOR_SIZE);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(segment_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(segment_obj, "sector_size", field);
+
+	*segment_object = segment_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_segments(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **segments_object)
+{
+	char num[16];
+	int r;
+	struct json_object *segments_obj, *field;
+
+	segments_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!segments_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = json_luks1_segment(hdr_v1, &field);
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(segments_obj);
+		return r;
+	}
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%u", CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	json_object_object_add(segments_obj, num, field);
+
+	*segments_object = segments_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_digest(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **digest_object)
+{
+	char keyslot_str[2], *base64_str;
+	int ks;
+	size_t base64_len;
+	struct json_object *digest_obj, *array, *field;
+
+	digest_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!digest_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* type field */
+	field = json_object_new_string("pbkdf2");
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "type", field);
+
+	/* keyslots array */
+	array = json_object_new_array();
+	if (!array) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "keyslots", json_object_get(array));
+
+	for (ks = 0; ks < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ks++) {
+		if (hdr_v1->keyblock[ks].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
+			continue;
+		(void) snprintf(keyslot_str, sizeof(keyslot_str), "%d", ks);
+
+		field = json_object_new_string(keyslot_str);
+		if (!field || json_object_array_add(array, field) < 0) {
+			json_object_put(field);
+			json_object_put(array);
+			json_object_put(digest_obj);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	json_object_put(array);
+
+	/* segments array */
+	array = json_object_new_array();
+	if (!array) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "segments", json_object_get(array));
+
+	field = json_object_new_string("0");
+	if (!field || json_object_array_add(array, field) < 0) {
+		json_object_put(field);
+		json_object_put(array);
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	json_object_put(array);
+
+	/* hash field */
+	field = json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->hashSpec);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "hash", field);
+
+	/* salt field */
+	base64_len = base64_encode_alloc(hdr_v1->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &base64_str);
+	if (!base64_str) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		if (!base64_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	field = json_object_new_string_len(base64_str, base64_len);
+	free(base64_str);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "salt", field);
+
+	/* digest field */
+	base64_len = base64_encode_alloc(hdr_v1->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, &base64_str);
+	if (!base64_str) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		if (!base64_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	field = json_object_new_string_len(base64_str, base64_len);
+	free(base64_str);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "digest", field);
+
+	/* iterations field */
+	field = json_object_new_int64(hdr_v1->mkDigestIterations);
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(digest_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "iterations", field);
+
+	*digest_object = digest_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_digests(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **digests_object)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct json_object *digests_obj, *field;
+
+	digests_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!digests_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = json_luks1_digest(hdr_v1, &field);
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(digests_obj);
+		return r;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(digests_obj, "0", field);
+
+	*digests_object = digests_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int json_luks1_object(struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **luks1_object, uint64_t keyslots_size)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct json_object *luks1_obj, *field;
+	uint64_t json_size;
+
+	luks1_obj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!luks1_obj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* keyslots field */
+	r = json_luks1_keyslots(hdr_v1, &field);
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(luks1_obj);
+		return r;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "keyslots", field);
+
+	/* tokens field */
+	field = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(luks1_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "tokens", field);
+
+	/* segments field */
+	r = json_luks1_segments(hdr_v1, &field);
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(luks1_obj);
+		return r;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "segments", field);
+
+	/* digests field */
+	r = json_luks1_digests(hdr_v1, &field);
+	if (r) {
+		json_object_put(luks1_obj);
+		return r;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "digests", field);
+
+	/* config field */
+	/* anything else? */
+	field = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!field) {
+		json_object_put(luks1_obj);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "config", field);
+
+	json_size = LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+	json_object_object_add(field, "json_size", json_object_new_uint64(json_size));
+	json_object_object_add(field, "keyslots_size", json_object_new_uint64(keyslots_size));
+
+	*luks1_object = luks1_obj;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void move_keyslot_offset(json_object *jobj, int offset_add)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2, *jobj_area;
+	uint64_t offset = 0;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "keyslots", &jobj1);
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj1, key, val) {
+		UNUSED(key);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "area", &jobj_area);
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj2);
+		offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj2) + offset_add;
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(offset));
+	}
+}
+
+/* FIXME: return specific error code for partial write error (aka keyslots are gone) */
+static int move_keyslot_areas(struct crypt_device *cd, off_t offset_from,
+			      off_t offset_to, size_t buf_size)
+{
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	void *buf = NULL;
+	int r = -EIO, devfd = -1;
+
+	log_dbg("Moving keyslot areas of size %zu from %jd to %jd.",
+		buf_size, (intmax_t)offset_from, (intmax_t)offset_to);
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buf, crypt_getpagesize(), buf_size))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		free(buf);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/* This can safely fail (for block devices). It only allocates space if it is possible. */
+	if (posix_fallocate(devfd, offset_to, buf_size))
+		log_dbg("Preallocation (fallocate) of new keyslot area not available.");
+
+	/* Try to read *new* area to check that area is there (trimmed backup). */
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+				 device_alignment(device), buf, buf_size,
+				 offset_to)!= (ssize_t)buf_size)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+				 device_alignment(device), buf, buf_size,
+				 offset_from)!= (ssize_t)buf_size)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+				  device_alignment(device), buf, buf_size,
+				  offset_to) != (ssize_t)buf_size)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	close(devfd);
+	crypt_memzero(buf, buf_size);
+	free(buf);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int luks_header_in_use(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = lookup_dm_dev_by_uuid(crypt_get_uuid(cd), crypt_get_type(cd));
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_err(cd, _("Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."), crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Check if there is a luksmeta area (foreign metadata created by the luksmeta package) */
+static int luksmeta_header_present(struct crypt_device *cd, off_t luks1_size)
+{
+	static const uint8_t LM_MAGIC[] = { 'L', 'U', 'K', 'S', 'M', 'E', 'T', 'A' };
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	void *buf = NULL;
+	int devfd, r = 0;
+
+	if (posix_memalign(&buf, crypt_getpagesize(), sizeof(LM_MAGIC)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd == -1) {
+		free(buf);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
+	/* Note: we must not detect failure as problem here, header can be trimmed. */
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device),
+		buf, sizeof(LM_MAGIC), luks1_size) == (ssize_t)sizeof(LM_MAGIC) &&
+		!memcmp(LM_MAGIC, buf, sizeof(LM_MAGIC))) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."));
+			r = -EBUSY;
+	}
+
+	close(devfd);
+	free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Convert LUKS1 -> LUKS2 */
+int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2)
+{
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj = NULL;
+	size_t buf_size, buf_offset, luks1_size, luks1_shift = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+	uint64_t max_size = crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	/* for detached headers max size == device size */
+	if (!max_size && (r = device_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), &max_size)))
+		return r;
+
+	luks1_size = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr1) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	luks1_size = size_round_up(luks1_size, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
+	if (!luks1_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (LUKS_keyslots_offset(hdr1) != (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
+		log_dbg("Unsupported keyslots material offset: %zu.", LUKS_keyslots_offset(hdr1));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (luksmeta_header_present(cd, luks1_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg("Max size: %" PRIu64 ", LUKS1 (full) header size %zu , required shift: %zu",
+		max_size, luks1_size, luks1_shift);
+	if ((max_size - luks1_size) < luks1_shift) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = json_luks1_object(hdr1, &jobj, max_size - 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	move_keyslot_offset(jobj, luks1_shift);
+
+	// fill hdr2
+	memset(hdr2, 0, sizeof(*hdr2));
+	hdr2->hdr_size = LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
+	hdr2->seqid = 1;
+	hdr2->version = 2;
+	strncpy(hdr2->checksum_alg, "sha256", LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L);
+	crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr2->salt1, sizeof(hdr2->salt1), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr2->salt2, sizeof(hdr2->salt2), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	strncpy(hdr2->uuid, crypt_get_uuid(cd), LUKS2_UUID_L-1); /* UUID should be max 36 chars */
+	hdr2->jobj = jobj;
+
+	/*
+	 * It duplicates check in LUKS2_hdr_write() but we don't want to move
+	 * keyslot areas in case it would fail later
+	 */
+	if (max_size < LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr2->jobj)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = luks_header_in_use(cd))) {
+		if (r > 0)
+			r = -EBUSY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	// move keyslots 4k -> 32k offset
+	buf_offset = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
+	buf_size   = luks1_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+	if ((r = move_keyslot_areas(cd, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, buf_offset, buf_size)) < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unable to move keyslot area."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	// Write JSON hdr2
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr2);
+out:
+	LUKS2_hdr_free(hdr2);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, uint32_t key_size)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af;
+	uint64_t l2_offset, l2_length;
+	int ks_key_size;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "type", &jobj) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), "luks2"))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Using PBKDF2, this implies memory and parallel is not used. */
+	jobj = NULL;
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2))
+		return 0;
+
+	jobj = NULL;
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "stripes", &jobj) ||
+	    json_object_get_int(jobj) != LUKS_STRIPES)
+		return 0;
+
+	jobj = NULL;
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "hash", &jobj) ||
+	    crypt_hash_size(json_object_get_string(jobj)) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* FIXME: should this go to validation code instead (aka invalid luks2 header if assigned to segment 0)? */
+	/* FIXME: check all keyslots are assigned to segment id 0, and segments count == 1 */
+	ks_key_size = LUKS2_get_keyslot_key_size(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (ks_key_size < 0 || (int)key_size != LUKS2_get_keyslot_key_size(hdr, keyslot)) {
+		log_dbg("Key length in keyslot %d is different from volume key length", keyslot);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_area(hdr, keyslot, &l2_offset, &l2_length))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (l2_length != (size_round_up(AF_split_sectors(key_size, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE, 4096))) {
+		log_dbg("Area length in LUKS2 keyslot (%d) is not compatible with LUKS1", keyslot);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Convert LUKS2 -> LUKS1 */
+int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct luks_phdr *hdr1)
+{
+	size_t buf_size, buf_offset;
+	char cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L], cipher_mode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
+	char digest[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE], digest_salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
+	size_t len;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_digest, *jobj_segment, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_area, *jobj1, *jobj2;
+	uint32_t key_size;
+	int i, r, last_active = 0;
+	uint64_t offset, area_length;
+	char buf[256], luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
+
+	jobj_digest  = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr2, 0);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_jobj(hdr2, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (!jobj_segment)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr2->jobj, "digests", &jobj1);
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "type", &jobj2) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj2), "pbkdf2") ||
+	    json_object_object_length(jobj1) != 1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(hdr2, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."), cipher);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_tokens_count(hdr2);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (r > 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - LUKS2 header contains %u token(s)."), r);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(hdr2, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	key_size = r;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		if (LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr2, i) == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE)
+			continue;
+
+		if (LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr2, i) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is in invalid state."), i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (i >= LUKS_NUMKEYS) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - slot %u (over maximum slots) is still active."), i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (!keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(hdr2, i, key_size)) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."), i);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	memset(hdr1, 0, sizeof(*hdr1));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].stripes = LUKS_STRIPES;
+
+		jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr2, i);
+
+		if (jobj_keyslot) {
+			if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj1))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj1);
+		} else {
+			if (LUKS2_find_area_gap(cd, hdr2, key_size, &offset, &area_length))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			/*
+			 * We have to create placeholder luks2 keyslots in place of all
+			 * inactive keyslots. Otherwise we would allocate all
+			 * inactive luks1 keyslots over same binary keyslot area.
+			 */
+			if (placeholder_keyslot_alloc(cd, i, offset, area_length, key_size))
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		offset /= SECTOR_SIZE;
+		if (offset > UINT32_MAX)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = offset;
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset -=
+				((2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) / SECTOR_SIZE);
+
+		if (!jobj_keyslot)
+			continue;
+
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_ENABLED;
+		last_active = i;
+
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "iterations", &jobj1))
+			continue;
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = json_object_get_uint32(jobj1);
+
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "salt", &jobj1))
+			continue;
+		len = sizeof(buf);
+		memset(buf, 0, len);
+		if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+				   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), buf, &len))
+			continue;
+		if (len > 0 && len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+			continue;
+		memcpy(hdr1->keyblock[i].passwordSalt, buf, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+	}
+
+	if (!jobj_keyslot) {
+		jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr2, last_active);
+		if (!jobj_keyslot)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(json_object_get_string(jobj1), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	strncpy(hdr1->cipherName, cipher, sizeof(hdr1->cipherName) - 1);
+	strncpy(hdr1->cipherMode, cipher_mode, sizeof(hdr1->cipherMode) - 1);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "hash", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	strncpy(hdr1->hashSpec, json_object_get_string(jobj1), sizeof(hdr1->hashSpec) - 1);
+
+	hdr1->keyBytes = key_size;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "iterations", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	hdr1->mkDigestIterations = json_object_get_uint32(jobj1);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "digest", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	len = sizeof(digest);
+	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), digest, &len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* We can store full digest here, not only sha1 length */
+	if (len < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(hdr1->mkDigest, digest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "salt", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	len = sizeof(digest_salt);
+	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), digest_salt, &len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	memcpy(hdr1->mkDigestSalt, digest_salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "offset", &jobj1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj1) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+	if (offset > UINT32_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* FIXME: LUKS1 requires offset == 0 || offset >= luks1_hdr_size */
+	hdr1->payloadOffset = offset;
+
+	strncpy(hdr1->uuid, hdr2->uuid, UUID_STRING_L - 1); /* max 36 chars */
+
+	memcpy(hdr1->magic, luksMagic, LUKS_MAGIC_L);
+
+	hdr1->version = 1;
+
+	r = luks_header_in_use(cd);
+	if (r)
+		return r > 0 ? -EBUSY : r;
+
+	// move keyslots 32k -> 4k offset
+	buf_offset = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
+	buf_size   = LUKS2_keyslots_size(hdr2->jobj);
+	r = move_keyslot_areas(cd, buf_offset, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, buf_size);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unable to move keyslot area."));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0,
+			  8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+
+	// Write LUKS1 hdr
+	return LUKS_write_phdr(hdr1, cd);
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_token.c

@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, token handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+/* Builtin tokens */
+extern const crypt_token_handler keyring_handler;
+
+static token_handler token_handlers[LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX] = {
+	/* keyring builtin token */
+	{
+	  .get = token_keyring_get,
+	  .set = token_keyring_set,
+	  .h = &keyring_handler
+	},
+};
+
+static int is_builtin_candidate(const char *type)
+{
+	return !strncmp(type, LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX, LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_register(const crypt_token_handler *handler)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (is_builtin_candidate(handler->name)) {
+		log_dbg("'" LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX "' is reserved prefix for builtin tokens.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX && token_handlers[i].h; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(token_handlers[i].h->name, handler->name)) {
+			log_dbg("Keyslot handler %s is already registered.", handler->name);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (i == LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX) {
+		log_dbg("No more space for another token handler.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	token_handlers[i].h = handler;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const token_handler
+*LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX && token_handlers[i].h; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(token_handlers[i].h->name, type))
+			return token_handlers + i;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static const crypt_token_handler
+*LUKS2_token_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	const token_handler *th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, type);
+
+	return th ? th->h : NULL;
+}
+
+static const token_handler
+*LUKS2_token_handler_internal(struct crypt_device *cd, int token)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj2;
+
+	if (token < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!(jobj1 = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "type", &jobj2))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj2));
+}
+
+static const crypt_token_handler
+*LUKS2_token_handler(struct crypt_device *cd, int token)
+{
+	const token_handler *th = LUKS2_token_handler_internal(cd, token);
+
+	return th ? th->h : NULL;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_token_find_free(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX; i++)
+		if (!LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, i))
+			return i;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *json,
+	int commit)
+{
+	const crypt_token_handler *h;
+	const token_handler *th;
+	json_object *jobj_tokens, *jobj_type, *jobj;
+	enum json_tokener_error jerr;
+	char num[16];
+
+	if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+		if (!json)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		token = LUKS2_token_find_free(hdr);
+	}
+
+	if (token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Remove token */
+	if (!json) {
+		snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", token);
+		json_object_object_del(jobj_tokens, num);
+	} else {
+
+		jobj = json_tokener_parse_verbose(json, &jerr);
+		if (!jobj) {
+			log_dbg("Token JSON parse failed.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", token);
+
+		if (LUKS2_token_validate(hdr->jobj, jobj, num)) {
+			json_object_put(jobj);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj, "type", &jobj_type);
+		if (is_builtin_candidate(json_object_get_string(jobj_type))) {
+			th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+			if (!th || !th->set) {
+				log_dbg("%s is builtin token candidate with missing handler", json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+				json_object_put(jobj);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			h = th->h;
+		} else
+			h = LUKS2_token_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+
+		if (h && h->validate && h->validate(cd, json)) {
+			json_object_put(jobj);
+			log_dbg("Token type %s validation failed.", h->name);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_tokens, num, jobj);
+		if (LUKS2_check_json_size(hdr)) {
+			log_dbg("Not enough space in header json area for new token.");
+			json_object_object_del(jobj_tokens, num);
+			return -ENOSPC;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (commit)
+		return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) ?: token;
+
+	return token;
+}
+
+crypt_token_info LUKS2_token_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char **type)
+{
+	const char *tmp;
+	const token_handler *th;
+	json_object *jobj_type, *jobj_token;
+
+	if (token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
+		return CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID;
+
+	if (!(jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token)))
+		return CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "type", &jobj_type);
+	tmp = json_object_get_string(jobj_type);
+
+	if ((th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, tmp))) {
+		if (type)
+			*type = th->h->name;
+		return th->set ? CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL : CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL;
+	}
+
+	if (type)
+		*type = tmp;
+
+	return is_builtin_candidate(tmp) ? CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL_UNKNOWN : CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_builtin_token_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *type,
+	void *params)
+{
+	const token_handler *th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, type);
+
+	// internal error
+	assert(th && th->get);
+
+	return th->get(LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token), params) ?: token;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_builtin_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *type,
+	const void *params,
+	int commit)
+{
+	const token_handler *th;
+	char num[16];
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_tokens;
+
+	th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, type);
+
+	// at this point all builtin handlers must exist and have validate fn defined
+	assert(th && th->set && th->h->validate);
+
+	if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+		if ((token = LUKS2_token_find_free(hdr)) < 0)
+			log_err(cd, _("No free token slot."));
+	}
+	if (token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%u", token);
+
+	r = th->set(&jobj_token, params);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to create builtin token %s."), type);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	// builtin tokens must produce valid json
+	r = LUKS2_token_validate(hdr->jobj, jobj_token, "new");
+	assert(!r);
+	r = th->h->validate(cd, json_object_to_json_string_ext(jobj_token,
+		JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE));
+	assert(!r);
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens);
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_tokens, num, jobj_token);
+	if (LUKS2_check_json_size(hdr)) {
+		log_dbg("Not enough space in header json area for new %s token.", type);
+		json_object_object_del(jobj_tokens, num);
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	}
+
+	if (commit)
+		return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) ?: token;
+
+	return token;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_token_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	char **buffer,
+	size_t *buffer_len,
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	const char *json;
+	const crypt_token_handler *h;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_token_handler(cd, token)))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (h->validate) {
+		if (LUKS2_token_json_get(cd, hdr, token, &json))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (h->validate(cd, json)) {
+			log_dbg("Token %d (%s) validation failed.", token, h->name);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = h->open(cd, token, buffer, buffer_len, usrptr);
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_dbg("Token %d (%s) open failed with %d.", token, h->name, r);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void LUKS2_token_buffer_free(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		int token,
+		void *buffer,
+		size_t buffer_len)
+{
+	const crypt_token_handler *h = LUKS2_token_handler(cd, token);
+
+	if (h->buffer_free)
+		h->buffer_free(buffer, buffer_len);
+	else {
+		crypt_memzero(buffer, buffer_len);
+		free(buffer);
+	}
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	int segment,
+	const char *buffer,
+	size_t buffer_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	const crypt_token_handler *h;
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_token_keyslots, *jobj;
+	const char *num = NULL;
+	int i, r;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_token_handler(cd, token)))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "keyslots", &jobj_token_keyslots);
+	if (!jobj_token_keyslots)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Try to open keyslot referenced in token */
+	r = -EINVAL;
+	for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_token_keyslots) && r < 0; i++) {
+		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_token_keyslots, i);
+		num = json_object_get_string(jobj);
+		log_dbg("Trying to open keyslot %s with token %d (type %s).", num, token, h->name);
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, atoi(num), segment, buffer, buffer_len, vk);
+	}
+
+	if (r >= 0 && num)
+		return atoi(num);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		int token,
+		const char *name,
+		uint32_t flags,
+		void *usrptr)
+{
+	int keyslot, r;
+	char *buffer;
+	size_t buffer_len;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	r = LUKS2_token_open(cd, hdr, token, &buffer, &buffer_len, usrptr);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(cd, hdr, token,
+					(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ?
+					CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+					buffer, buffer_len, &vk);
+
+	LUKS2_token_buffer_free(cd, token, buffer, buffer_len);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	keyslot = r;
+
+	if ((name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot);
+
+	if (r >= 0 && name)
+		r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+
+	if (r < 0 && vk)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk->key_description);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate_any(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const char *name,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *buffer;
+	json_object *tokens_jobj;
+	size_t buffer_len;
+	int keyslot, token, r = -EINVAL;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &tokens_jobj);
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(tokens_jobj, slot, val) {
+		UNUSED(val);
+		token = atoi(slot);
+
+		r = LUKS2_token_open(cd, hdr, token, &buffer, &buffer_len, NULL);
+		if (r < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(cd, hdr, token,
+						(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ?
+						CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+						buffer, buffer_len, &vk);
+		LUKS2_token_buffer_free(cd, token, buffer, buffer_len);
+		if (r >= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	keyslot = r;
+
+	if (r >= 0 && (name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot);
+
+	if (r >= 0 && name)
+		r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+
+	if (r < 0 && vk)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk->key_description);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+void LUKS2_token_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int token)
+{
+	const crypt_token_handler *h;
+	json_object *jobj_token;
+
+	h = LUKS2_token_handler(cd, token);
+	if (h && h->dump) {
+		jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), token);
+		if (jobj_token)
+			h->dump(cd, json_object_to_json_string_ext(jobj_token,
+				JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE));
+	}
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			   int token, const char **json)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_token;
+
+	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*json = json_object_to_json_string_ext(jobj_token,
+		JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int assign_one_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			      int token, int keyslot, int assign)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_token, *jobj_token_keyslots;
+	char num[16];
+
+	log_dbg("Keyslot %i %s token %i.", keyslot, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", token);
+
+	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "keyslots", &jobj_token_keyslots);
+	if (!jobj_token_keyslots)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
+	if (assign) {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_token_keyslots, num);
+		if (!jobj1)
+			json_object_array_add(jobj_token_keyslots, json_object_new_string(num));
+	} else {
+		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_remove(jobj_token_keyslots, num);
+		if (jobj1)
+			json_object_object_add(jobj_token, "keyslots", jobj1);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int assign_one_token(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			    int keyslot, int token, int assign)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (!LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots);
+
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			r = assign_one_keyslot(cd, hdr, token, atoi(key), assign);
+			if (r < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = assign_one_keyslot(cd, hdr, token, keyslot, assign);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			int keyslot, int token, int assign, int commit)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_tokens;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens);
+
+		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_tokens, key, val) {
+			UNUSED(val);
+			r = assign_one_token(cd, hdr, keyslot, atoi(key), assign);
+			if (r < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = assign_one_token(cd, hdr, keyslot, token, assign);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	// FIXME: do not write header in nothing changed
+	if (commit)
+		return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) ?: token;
+
+	return token;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			    int keyslot, int token)
+{
+	int i;
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_token_keyslots, *jobj;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX || token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "keyslots", &jobj_token_keyslots);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_token_keyslots); i++) {
+		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_token_keyslots, i);
+		if (keyslot == atoi(json_object_get_string(jobj)))
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_tokens_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_tokens = LUKS2_get_tokens_jobj(hdr);
+	if (!jobj_tokens)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return json_object_object_length(jobj_tokens);
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, kernel keyring token
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Ondrej Kozina. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+static int keyring_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				int token,
+				char **buffer,
+				size_t *buffer_len,
+				void *usrptr __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_key;
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "key_description", &jobj_key);
+
+	r = keyring_get_passphrase(json_object_get_string(jobj_key), buffer, buffer_len);
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP) {
+		log_dbg("Kernel keyring features disabled.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (r < 0) {
+		log_dbg("keyring_get_passphrase failed (error %d)", r);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int keyring_validate(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)),
+				    const char *json)
+{
+	enum json_tokener_error jerr;
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_key;
+	int r = 1;
+
+	log_dbg("Validating keyring token json");
+
+	jobj_token = json_tokener_parse_verbose(json, &jerr);
+	if (!jobj_token) {
+		log_dbg("Keyring token JSON parse failed.");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (json_object_object_length(jobj_token) != 3) {
+		log_dbg("Keyring token is expected to have exactly 3 fields.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "key_description", &jobj_key)) {
+		log_dbg("missing key_description field.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!json_object_is_type(jobj_key, json_type_string)) {
+		log_dbg("key_description is not a string.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* TODO: perhaps check that key description is in '%s:%s'
+	 * format where both strings are not empty */
+	r = !strlen(json_object_get_string(jobj_key));
+out:
+	json_object_put(jobj_token);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void keyring_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *json)
+{
+	enum json_tokener_error jerr;
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_key;
+
+	jobj_token = json_tokener_parse_verbose(json, &jerr);
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "key_description", &jobj_key)) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_token);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	log_std(cd, "\tKey description: %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj_key));
+
+	json_object_put(jobj_token);
+}
+
+int token_keyring_set(json_object **jobj_builtin_token,
+	const void *params)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj;
+	const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *keyring_params = (const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *) params;
+
+	jobj_token = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!jobj_token)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	jobj = json_object_new_string(LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING);
+	if (!jobj) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_token);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_token, "type", jobj);
+
+	jobj = json_object_new_array();
+	if (!jobj) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_token);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_token, "keyslots", jobj);
+
+	jobj = json_object_new_string(keyring_params->key_description);
+	if (!jobj) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_token);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_token, "key_description", jobj);
+
+	*jobj_builtin_token = jobj_token;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int token_keyring_get(json_object *jobj_token,
+	void *params)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+	struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *keyring_params = (struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *) params;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "type", &jobj);
+	assert(!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "key_description", &jobj);
+
+	keyring_params->key_description = json_object_get_string(jobj);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const crypt_token_handler keyring_handler = {
+	.name = LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING,
+	.open = keyring_open,
+	.validate = keyring_validate,
+	.dump = keyring_dump
+};

lib/random.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * cryptsetup kernel RNG access functions
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@
 #include "libcryptsetup.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
+#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
+#define O_CLOEXEC 0
+#endif
+
 static int random_initialised = 0;
 
 #define URANDOM_DEVICE	"/dev/urandom"
@@ -152,21 +156,24 @@ int crypt_random_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 
 	/* Used for CRYPT_RND_NORMAL */
 	if(urandom_fd == -1)
-		urandom_fd = open(URANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY);
+		urandom_fd = open(URANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if(urandom_fd == -1)
 		goto fail;
 
 	/* Used for CRYPT_RND_KEY */
 	if(random_fd == -1)
-		random_fd = open(RANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
+		random_fd = open(RANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if(random_fd == -1)
 		goto fail;
 
+	if (crypt_fips_mode())
+		log_verbose(ctx, _("Running in FIPS mode."));
+
 	random_initialised = 1;
 	return 0;
 fail:
 	crypt_random_exit();
-	log_err(ctx, _("Fatal error during RNG initialisation.\n"));
+	log_err(ctx, _("Fatal error during RNG initialisation."));
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 
@@ -203,13 +210,12 @@ int crypt_random_get(struct crypt_device *ctx, char *buf, size_t len, int qualit
 		}
 		break;
 	default:
-		log_err(ctx, _("Unknown RNG quality requested.\n"));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Unknown RNG quality requested."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (status)
-		log_err(ctx, _("Error %d reading from RNG: %s\n"),
-			errno, strerror(errno));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Error reading from RNG."));
 
 	return status;
 }
@@ -231,9 +237,11 @@ void crypt_random_exit(void)
 
 int crypt_random_default_key_rng(void)
 {
+	/* coverity[pointless_string_compare] */
 	if (!strcmp(DEFAULT_RNG, RANDOM_DEVICE))
 		return CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM;
 
+	/* coverity[pointless_string_compare] */
 	if (!strcmp(DEFAULT_RNG, URANDOM_DEVICE))
 		return CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM;