Workaround for align test for scsi_debug kernel in-use issue.

Bump libcryptsetup version (new defines, all backward compatible).

.codeql-config.yml

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-name: "Cryptsetup CodeQL config"
-
-query-filters:
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/fixme-comment
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/empty-block
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/poorly-documented-function
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/loop-variable-changed
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/empty-if
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/long-switch
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/complex-condition
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/commented-out-code
-
-# These produce many false positives
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/uninitialized-local
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/path-injection
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/missing-check-scanf
-
-# CodeQL should understand coverity [toctou] comments
-- exclude:
-     id: cpp/toctou-race-condition

.github/workflows/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-set -ex
-
-PACKAGES=(
-	git make autoconf automake autopoint pkg-config libtool libtool-bin
-	gettext libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol-dev
-	libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev tar libargon2-dev libpwquality-dev
-	sharutils dmsetup jq xxd expect keyutils netcat-openbsd passwd openssh-client
-	sshpass asciidoctor meson ninja-build
-)
-
-COMPILER="${COMPILER:?}"
-COMPILER_VERSION="${COMPILER_VERSION:?}"
-RELEASE="$(lsb_release -cs)"
-
-bash -c "echo 'deb-src http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ $RELEASE main restricted universe multiverse' >>/etc/apt/sources.list"
-
-# Latest gcc stack deb packages provided by
-# https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-toolchain-r/+archive/ubuntu/test
-add-apt-repository -y ppa:ubuntu-toolchain-r/test
-PACKAGES+=(gcc-$COMPILER_VERSION)
-
-# scsi_debug, gost crypto
-PACKAGES+=(dkms linux-headers-$(uname -r) linux-modules-extra-$(uname -r) gost-crypto-dkms)
-
-apt-get -y update --fix-missing
-apt-get -y install "${PACKAGES[@]}"
-apt-get -y build-dep cryptsetup

.github/workflows/cibuild.sh

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-PHASES=(${@:-CONFIGURE MAKE CHECK})
-COMPILER="${COMPILER:?}"
-COMPILER_VERSION="${COMPILER_VERSION}"
-CFLAGS=(-O1 -g)
-CXXFLAGS=(-O1 -g)
-
-CC="gcc${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-CXX="g++${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-
-set -ex
-
-for phase in "${PHASES[@]}"; do
-	case $phase in
-	CONFIGURE)
-		opts=(
-			--enable-libargon2
-		)
-
-		sudo -E git clean -xdf
-
-		./autogen.sh
-		CC="$CC" CXX="$CXX" CFLAGS="${CFLAGS[@]}" CXXFLAGS="${CXXFLAGS[@]}" ./configure "${opts[@]}"
-		;;
-	MAKE)
-		make -j
-		make -j -C tests check-programs
-		;;
-	CHECK)
-		make check
-		;;
-
-	*)
-		echo >&2 "Unknown phase '$phase'"
-		exit 1
-	esac
-done

.github/workflows/cibuild.yml

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-name: Build test
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - 'main'
-      - 'wip-luks2'
-      - 'v2.*.x'
-    paths-ignore:
-      - 'docs/**'
-
-jobs:
-  build:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    if: github.repository == 'mbroz/cryptsetup'
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        env:
-          - { COMPILER: "gcc", COMPILER_VERSION: "14",  RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1" }
-    env: ${{ matrix.env }}
-    steps:
-      - name: Repository checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - name: Ubuntu setup
-        run: sudo -E .github/workflows/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh
-      - name: Configure & Make
-        run: .github/workflows/cibuild.sh CONFIGURE MAKE
-      - name: Check
-        run: sudo -E .github/workflows/cibuild.sh CHECK

.github/workflows/codeql.yml

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-name: "CodeQL"
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - 'main'
-      - 'wip-luks2'
-      - 'v2.*.x'
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-jobs:
-  analyze:
-    name: Analyze
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    if: github.repository == 'mbroz/cryptsetup'
-    concurrency:
-      group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ matrix.language }}-${{ github.ref }}
-      cancel-in-progress: true
-    permissions:
-      actions: read
-      security-events: write
-
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      matrix:
-        language: [ 'cpp' ]
-
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-      - name: Initialize CodeQL
-        uses: github/codeql-action/init@v3
-        with:
-          languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
-          queries: +security-extended,security-and-quality
-          config-file: .codeql-config.yml
-
-      - name: Install dependencies
-        run: |
-          sudo -E .github/workflows/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh
-          # Force autoconf for now, meson is broken in analysis step
-          rm meson.build
-
-        env: { COMPILER: "gcc", COMPILER_VERSION: "14",  RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1" }
-
-      - name: Autobuild
-        uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v3
-
-      - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
-        uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v3

.github/workflows/coverity.yml

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-name: Coverity test
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - 'coverity_scan'
-    paths-ignore:
-      - 'docs/**'
-
-jobs:
-  latest:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    if: github.repository == 'mbroz/cryptsetup'
-    steps:
-      - name: Repository checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - name: Ubuntu setup
-        run: sudo -E .github/workflows/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh
-        env:
-          COMPILER: "gcc"
-          COMPILER_VERSION: "14"
-      - name: Install Coverity
-        run: |
-          wget -q https://scan.coverity.com/download/cxx/linux64 --post-data "token=$TOKEN&project=mbroz/cryptsetup" -O cov-analysis-linux64.tar.gz
-          mkdir cov-analysis-linux64
-          tar xzf cov-analysis-linux64.tar.gz --strip 1 -C cov-analysis-linux64
-        env:
-          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.COVERITY_SCAN_TOKEN }}
-      - name: Run autoconf & configure
-        run: |
-          ./autogen.sh
-          ./configure
-      - name: Run cov-build
-        run: |
-          export PATH=`pwd`/cov-analysis-linux64/bin:$PATH
-          cov-build --dir cov-int make
-      - name: Submit to Coverity Scan
-        run: |
-          tar czvf cryptsetup.tgz cov-int
-          curl \
-            --form project=mbroz/cryptsetup \
-            --form token=$TOKEN \
-            --form email=gmazyland@gmail.com \
-            --form file=@cryptsetup.tgz \
-            --form version=trunk \
-            --form description="`./cryptsetup --version`" \
-            https://scan.coverity.com/builds?project=mbroz/cryptsetup
-        env:
-          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.COVERITY_SCAN_TOKEN }}

.gitignore

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-po/*gmo
-*~
-Makefile
-Makefile.in
-Makefile.in.in
-*.lo
-*.la
-*.o
-*.so
-*.8
-**/*.dirstamp
-.deps/
-.libs/
-src/cryptsetup
-src/veritysetup
-ABOUT-NLS
-aclocal.m4
-autom4te.cache/
-compile
-compile_commands.json
-config.guess
-config.h
-config.h.in
-config.log
-config.rpath
-config.status
-config.sub
-configure
-cryptsetup
-cryptsetup-reencrypt
-cryptsetup-ssh
-depcomp
-install-sh
-integritysetup
-lib/libcryptsetup.pc
-libtool
-ltmain.sh
-m4/
-missing
-po/Makevars.template
-po/POTFILES
-po/Rules-quot
-po/*.header
-po/*.sed
-po/*.sin
-po/stamp-po
-scripts/cryptsetup.conf
-stamp-h1
-veritysetup
-tests/valglog.*
-*/*.dirstamp
-*-debug-luks2-backup*
-tests/api-test
-tests/api-test-2
-tests/differ
-tests/luks1-images
-tests/tcrypt-images
-tests/unit-utils-io
-tests/vectors-test
-tests/test-symbols-list.h
-tests/all-symbols-test
-tests/fuzz/LUKS2.pb*

.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-stages:
-  - test
-  - test-opal
-
-.fail_if_coredump_generated:
-  after_script:
-    - '[ "$(ls -A /var/coredumps)" ] && exit 1 || true'
-
-include:
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/debian.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/fedora.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/fedora-opal.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/centos.yml
-#  - local: .gitlab/ci/annocheck.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/csmock.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/gitlab-shared-docker.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/compilation-various-disables.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/compilation-gcc.gitlab-ci.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/compilation-clang.gitlab-ci.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/compilation-spellcheck.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/alpinelinux.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/debian-i686.yml
-  - local: .gitlab/ci/cifuzz.yml

.gitlab/ci/alpinelinux.yml

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-.alpinelinux-dependencies:
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-alpine-edge
-  extends:
-    - .fail_if_coredump_generated
-  before_script:
-    - >
-      sudo apk add
-      lvm2-dev openssl-dev popt-dev util-linux-dev json-c-dev
-      argon2-dev device-mapper which sharutils gettext-dev argp-standalone automake
-      autoconf libtool build-base keyutils tar jq expect git asciidoctor
-    # Be sure we have updated basic tools and system
-    - sudo apk upgrade gcc binutils build-base musl
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - ./configure --prefix=/usr --libdir=/lib --sbindir=/sbin --disable-static --enable-libargon2 --with-crypto_backend=openssl --disable-external-tokens --disable-ssh-token --enable-asciidoc
-
-test-main-commit-job-alpinelinux:
-  extends:
-    - .alpinelinux-dependencies
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-alpine-edge
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "0"
-  rules:
-    - if: $RUN_SYSTEMD_PLUGIN_TEST != null
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-mergerq-job-alpinelinux:
-  extends:
-    - .alpinelinux-dependencies
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-alpine-edge
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "0"
-  rules:
-    - if: $RUN_SYSTEMD_PLUGIN_TEST != null
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check

.gitlab/ci/annocheck.yml

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-test-main-commit-job-annocheck:
-  extends:
-    - .fail_if_coredump_generated
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-rhel-9
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  allow_failure: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-rhel-9
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - sudo /opt/run-annocheck.sh

.gitlab/ci/build_srpm

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-set -e
-
-SAVED_PWD=$(pwd)
-GIT_DIR="$SAVED_PWD/upstream_git"
-SPEC="$GIT_DIR/misc/fedora/cryptsetup.spec"
-
-rm -fr $GIT_DIR
-
-git clone -q --depth 1 https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git $GIT_DIR
-cd $GIT_DIR
-
-GIT_COMMIT=$(git rev-parse --short=8 HEAD)
-[ -z "$GIT_COMMIT" ] && exit 1
-
-sed -i "s/^AC_INIT.*/AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[$GIT_COMMIT])/" $GIT_DIR/configure.ac
-sed -i "s/^Version:.*/Version: $GIT_COMMIT/" $SPEC
-sed -i "s/%{version_no_tilde}/$GIT_COMMIT/" $SPEC
-sed -i "2i %global source_date_epoch_from_changelog 0" $SPEC
-sed -i "3i %define _unpackaged_files_terminate_build 0" $SPEC
-
-./autogen.sh
-./configure
-make -j dist
-
-rpmbuild --define "_sourcedir $GIT_DIR" --define "_srcrpmdir $SAVED_PWD" -bs $SPEC
-
-cd $SAVED_PWD
-rm -fr $GIT_DIR
-
-exit 0

.gitlab/ci/centos.yml

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-.centos-openssl-backend:
-  extends:
-    - .fail_if_coredump_generated
-  before_script:
-    - sudo dnf clean all
-    - >
-      sudo dnf -y -q  install
-      autoconf automake device-mapper-devel gcc gettext-devel json-c-devel
-      libblkid-devel libpwquality-devel libselinux-devel libssh-devel libtool
-      libuuid-devel make popt-devel libsepol-devel nc openssh-clients passwd
-      pkgconfig sharutils sshpass tar uuid-devel vim-common device-mapper
-      expect gettext git jq keyutils openssl-devel openssl gem swtpm swtpm-tools
-      tpm2-tools
-    - sudo gem install asciidoctor
-    - sudo -E git clean -xdf
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - ./configure --enable-fips --enable-pwquality --with-crypto_backend=openssl --enable-asciidoc
-
-# non-FIPS jobs
-
-test-main-commit-centos-stream9:
-  extends:
-    - .centos-openssl-backend
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-centos-stream-9
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-centos-stream-9
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $RUN_SYSTEMD_PLUGIN_TEST != null
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-mergerq-centos-stream9:
-  extends:
-    - .centos-openssl-backend
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-centos-stream-9
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-centos-stream-9
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $RUN_SYSTEMD_PLUGIN_TEST != null
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-main-commit-centos-stream10:
-  extends:
-    - .centos-openssl-backend
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-centos-stream-10
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-centos-stream-10
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $RUN_SYSTEMD_PLUGIN_TEST != null
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-mergerq-centos-stream10:
-  extends:
-    - .centos-openssl-backend
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-centos-stream-10
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-centos-stream-10
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $RUN_SYSTEMD_PLUGIN_TEST != null
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check

.gitlab/ci/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-set -ex
-
-PACKAGES=(
-	git make autoconf automake autopoint pkg-config libtool libtool-bin
-	gettext libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol-dev
-	libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev tar libargon2-dev libpwquality-dev
-	sharutils dmsetup jq xxd expect keyutils netcat-openbsd passwd openssh-client
-	sshpass asciidoctor
-)
-
-COMPILER="${COMPILER:?}"
-COMPILER_VERSION="${COMPILER_VERSION:?}"
-
-sed -i 's/^Types: deb$/Types: deb deb-src/' /etc/apt/sources.list.d/ubuntu.sources
-
-# use this on older Ubuntu
-# grep -E '^deb' /etc/apt/sources.list > /etc/apt/sources.list~
-# sed -Ei 's/^deb /deb-src /' /etc/apt/sources.list~
-# cat /etc/apt/sources.list~ >> /etc/apt/sources.list
-
-apt-get -y update --fix-missing
-DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -yq install software-properties-common wget lsb-release
-RELEASE="$(lsb_release -cs)"
-
-if [[ $COMPILER == "gcc" ]]; then
-	# Latest gcc stack deb packages provided by
-	# https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-toolchain-r/+archive/ubuntu/test
-	add-apt-repository -y ppa:ubuntu-toolchain-r/test
-	PACKAGES+=(gcc-$COMPILER_VERSION)
-elif [[ $COMPILER == "clang" ]]; then
-	wget -O - https://apt.llvm.org/llvm-snapshot.gpg.key | apt-key add -
-	add-apt-repository -n "deb http://apt.llvm.org/${RELEASE}/   llvm-toolchain-${RELEASE}-${COMPILER_VERSION} main"
-
-	# scan-build
-	PACKAGES+=(clang-tools-$COMPILER_VERSION clang-$COMPILER_VERSION lldb-$COMPILER_VERSION lld-$COMPILER_VERSION clangd-$COMPILER_VERSION)
-	PACKAGES+=(perl)
-else
-	exit 1
-fi
-
-#apt-get -y update --fix-missing
-(r=3;while ! apt-get -y update --fix-missing ; do ((--r))||exit;sleep 5;echo "Retrying";done)
-
-DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -yq install "${PACKAGES[@]}"
-apt-get -y build-dep cryptsetup

.gitlab/ci/cifuzz.yml

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-cifuzz:
-  variables:
-    OSS_FUZZ_PROJECT_NAME: cryptsetup
-    CFL_PLATFORM: gitlab
-    CIFUZZ_DEBUG: "True"
-    FUZZ_SECONDS: 300 # 5 minutes per fuzzer
-    ARCHITECTURE: "x86_64"
-    DRY_RUN: "False"
-    LOW_DISK_SPACE: "True"
-    BAD_BUILD_CHECK: "True"
-    LANGUAGE: "c"
-    DOCKER_HOST: "tcp://docker:2375"
-    DOCKER_IN_DOCKER: "true"
-    DOCKER_DRIVER: overlay2
-    DOCKER_TLS_CERTDIR: ""
-  image:
-    name: gcr.io/oss-fuzz-base/cifuzz-base
-    entrypoint: [""]
-  services:
-    - docker:dind
-
-  stage: test
-  parallel:
-    matrix:
-      - SANITIZER: [address, undefined, memory]
-  rules:
-    # Default code change.
-    # - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-    #   variables:
-    #     MODE: "code-change"
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $BUILD_AND_RUN_FUZZERS != null
-  before_script:
-    # Get gitlab's container id.
-    - export CFL_CONTAINER_ID=`cut -c9- < /proc/1/cpuset`
-  script:
-    # Will build and run the fuzzers.
-    # We use a hack to override CI_JOB_ID, because otherwise a bad path is used
-    # in GitLab CI environment
-    - CI_JOB_ID="$CI_PROJECT_NAMESPACE/$CI_PROJECT_TITLE" python3 "/opt/oss-fuzz/infra/cifuzz/cifuzz_combined_entrypoint.py"
-  artifacts:
-    # Upload artifacts when a crash makes the job fail.
-    when: always
-    paths:
-      - artifacts/

.gitlab/ci/clang-Wall

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# clang -Wall plus other important warnings not included in -Wall
-
-for arg in "$@"
-do
-	case $arg in
-	-O*) Wuninitialized=-Wuninitialized;;  # only makes sense with `-O'
-	esac
-done
-
-CLANG="clang${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-
-#PEDANTIC="-std=gnu99"
-#PEDANTIC="-pedantic -std=gnu99"
-#PEDANTIC="-pedantic -std=gnu99 -Wno-variadic-macros"
-#CONVERSION="-Wconversion"
-
-EXTRA="\
- -Wextra \
- -Wsign-compare \
- -Wcast-align
- -Werror-implicit-function-declaration \
- -Wpointer-arith \
- -Wwrite-strings \
- -Wswitch \
- -Wmissing-format-attribute \
- -Winit-self \
- -Wold-style-definition \
- -Wno-missing-field-initializers \
- -Wunused-parameter \
- -Wno-long-long"
-
-exec $CLANG $PEDANTIC $CONVERSION \
-	-Wall $Wuninitialized \
-	-Wno-switch \
-	-Wdisabled-optimization \
-	-Wwrite-strings \
-	-Wpointer-arith \
-	-Wbad-function-cast \
-	-Wmissing-prototypes \
-	-Wmissing-declarations \
-	-Wstrict-prototypes \
-	-Wnested-externs \
-	-Wcomment \
-	-Winline \
-	-Wcast-qual \
-	-Wredundant-decls $EXTRA \
-	"$@"

.gitlab/ci/compilation-clang.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-test-clang-compilation:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-clang
-  script:
-    - export CFLAGS="-Wall -Werror"
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - $CC --version
-    - ./configure
-    - make -j
-    - make -j check-programs
-
-test-clang-Wall-script-ubuntu:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-clang
-  script:
-    - export CFLAGS="-g -O0"
-    - export CC="$CI_PROJECT_DIR/.gitlab/ci/clang-Wall"
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - $CC --version
-    - ./configure
-    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror"
-    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror" check-programs
-
-test-clang-Wall-script-alpine:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-clang-alpine
-  allow_failure: true
-  script:
-    - export CFLAGS="-g -O0"
-    - export CC="$CI_PROJECT_DIR/.gitlab/ci/clang-Wall"
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - $CC --version
-    - ./configure
-    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror"
-    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror" check-programs
-
-test-scan-build-ubuntu:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-clang
-  script:
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - echo "scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} -V ./configure CFLAGS="-g -O0"
-    - make clean
-    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} --status-bugs -maxloop 10 make -j
-    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} --status-bugs -maxloop 10 make -j check-programs
-
-test-scan-build-alpine:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-clang-alpine
-  allow_failure: true
-  script:
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - echo "scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} -V ./configure CFLAGS="-g -O0"
-    - make clean
-    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} --status-bugs -maxloop 10 make -j
-    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} --status-bugs -maxloop 10 make -j check-programs
-
-test-scan-build-backends:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-clang
-  parallel:
-    matrix:
-      - BACKENDS: [
-          "openssl",
-          "gcrypt",
-          "nss",
-          "kernel",
-          "nettle",
-          "mbedtls"
-      ]
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event" || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-      changes:
-        - lib/crypto_backend/*
-  script:
-    - DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -yq install libgcrypt20-dev libnss3-dev nettle-dev libmbedtls-dev
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - echo "Configuring with crypto backend $BACKENDS"
-    - echo "scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} -V ./configure CFLAGS="-g -O0" --with-crypto_backend=$BACKENDS
-    - make clean
-    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} --status-bugs -maxloop 10 make -j
-    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} --status-bugs -maxloop 10 make -j check-programs
-    - ./tests/vectors-test

.gitlab/ci/compilation-gcc.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-test-gcc-compilation:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-gcc
-  script:
-    - export CFLAGS="-Wall -Werror"
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - $CC --version
-    - ./configure
-    - make -j
-    - make -j check-programs
-
-test-gcc-Wall-script-ubuntu:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-gcc
-  script:
-    - export CFLAGS="-g -O0"
-    - export CC="$CI_PROJECT_DIR/.gitlab/ci/gcc-Wall"
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - $CC --version
-    - ./configure
-    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror"
-    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror" check-programs
-
-test-gcc-Wall-script-alpine:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-gcc-alpine
-  allow_failure: true
-  script:
-    - export CFLAGS="-g -O0"
-    - export CC="$CI_PROJECT_DIR/.gitlab/ci/gcc-Wall"
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - $CC --version
-    - ./configure
-    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror"
-    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror" check-programs
-
-test-gcc-fanalyzer-ubuntu:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-gcc
-  script:
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - $CC --version
-    - ./configure CFLAGS="-Wall -Werror -g -O0 -fanalyzer -fdiagnostics-path-format=separate-events" --host=x86_64
-    - make -j
-    - make -j check-programs
-
-test-gcc-fanalyzer-alpine:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-gcc-alpine
-  allow_failure: true
-  script:
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - $CC --version
-    - ./configure CFLAGS="-Wall -Werror -g -O0 -fanalyzer -fdiagnostics-path-format=separate-events -Wno-analyzer-fd-leak" --host=x86_64
-    - make -j
-    - make -j check-programs
-
-test-gcc-fanalyzer-backends:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-gcc
-  parallel:
-    matrix:
-      - BACKENDS: [
-          "openssl",
-          "gcrypt",
-          "nss",
-          "kernel",
-          "nettle",
-          "mbedtls"
-      ]
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event" || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-      changes:
-        - lib/crypto_backend/*
-  script:
-    - DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -yq install libgcrypt20-dev libnss3-dev nettle-dev libmbedtls-dev
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - $CC --version
-    - echo "Configuring with crypto backend $BACKENDS"
-    - ./configure CFLAGS="-Wall -Werror -g -O0 -fanalyzer -fdiagnostics-path-format=separate-events" --host=x86_64 --with-crypto_backend=$BACKENDS
-    - make -j
-    - make -j check-programs
-    - ./tests/vectors-test

.gitlab/ci/compilation-spellcheck.yml

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-test-run-spellcheck:
-  image: ubuntu:noble
-  tags:
-    - gitlab-org-docker
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event" || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  artifacts:
-    name: "spellcheck-$CI_COMMIT_REF_NAME"
-    paths:
-      - _spellcheck
-  before_script:
-    - apt-get -y update --fix-missing
-    - apt-get -y install git lintian codespell
-  script:
-    - echo "Running spellcheck"
-    - .gitlab/ci/spellcheck

.gitlab/ci/compilation-various-disables.yml

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-test-gcc-disable-compiles:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-gcc
-  parallel:
-    matrix:
-      - DISABLE_FLAGS: [
-          "keyring",
-          "external-tokens ssh-token",
-          "luks2-reencryption",
-          "cryptsetup veritysetup integritysetup",
-          "kernel_crypto",
-          "udev",
-          "internal-argon2",
-          "blkid",
-          "hw-opal"
-      ]
-  artifacts:
-    name: "meson-build-logs-$CI_COMMIT_REF_NAME"
-    paths:
-      - meson_builddir/meson-logs
-  script:
-    - DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -yq install meson ninja-build
-    - export CFLAGS="-Wall -Werror"
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - echo "Configuring with --disable-$DISABLE_FLAGS"
-    - ./configure $(for i in $DISABLE_FLAGS; do echo "--disable-$i"; done)
-    - make -j
-    - make -j check-programs
-    - git checkout -f && git clean -xdf
-    - meson -v
-    - echo "Configuring with -D$DISABLE_FLAGS=false"
-    - meson setup meson_builddir $(for i in $DISABLE_FLAGS; do [ "$i" == "internal-argon2" ] && echo "-Dargon-implementation=internal" || echo "-D$i=false"; done)
-    - ninja -C meson_builddir

.gitlab/ci/csmock.yml

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-.dnf-csmock:
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-fedora-rawhide
-    DISK_SIZE: 20
-  extends:
-    - .fail_if_coredump_generated
-  before_script:
-    - >
-      sudo dnf -y -q install
-      autoconf automake device-mapper-devel gcc gettext-devel json-c-devel
-      libblkid-devel libpwquality-devel libselinux-devel
-      libssh-devel libtool libuuid-devel make popt-devel
-      libsepol-devel.x86_64 pkgconfig tar uuid-devel git
-      openssl-devel asciidoctor meson ninja-build
-      rpm-build csmock
-
-test-commit-job-csmock:
-  extends:
-    - .dnf-csmock
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-fedora-rawhide
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  allow_failure: true
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/ || $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - .gitlab/ci/build_srpm
-    - .gitlab/ci/run_csmock
-  artifacts:
-    when: always
-    paths:
-      - cryptsetup-csmock-results.tar.xz

.gitlab/ci/debian-i686.yml

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-test-mergerq-job-debian-i686:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-12i686
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-12i686
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $RUN_SYSTEMD_PLUGIN_TEST != null
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-main-commit-job-debian-i686:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-12i686
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-12i686
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $RUN_SYSTEMD_PLUGIN_TEST != null
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check

.gitlab/ci/debian.yml

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
-.debian-prep:
-  extends:
-    - .fail_if_coredump_generated
-  before_script:
-    - sudo apt-get -y update
-    - >
-      sudo apt-get -y install -y -qq git gcc make autoconf automake autopoint
-      pkgconf libtool libtool-bin gettext libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev
-      libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol-dev libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev
-      tar libargon2-dev libpwquality-dev sharutils dmsetup jq xxd expect
-      keyutils netcat-openbsd passwd openssh-client sshpass asciidoctor
-      swtpm meson ninja-build python3-jinja2 gperf libcap-dev libtss2-dev
-      libmount-dev swtpm-tools tpm2-tools
-    - sudo apt-get -y build-dep cryptsetup
-    - sudo -E git clean -xdf
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - ./configure --enable-libargon2 --enable-asciidoc
-
-test-mergerq-job-debian:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-main-commit-job-debian:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-mergerq-job-debian12:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-12
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-12
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-main-commit-job-debian12:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-12
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-12
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-# meson tests
-test-mergerq-job-debian-meson:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - sudo apt-get -y install -y -qq meson ninja-build
-    - meson setup build
-    - ninja -C build
-    - cd build && sudo -E meson test --verbose --print-errorlogs
-
-test-main-commit-job-debian-meson:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-unstable
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - sudo apt-get -y install -y -qq meson ninja-build
-    - meson setup build
-    - ninja -C build
-    - cd build && sudo -E meson test --verbose --print-errorlogs
-
-test-mergerq-job-debian12-meson:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-12
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-12
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - sudo apt-get -y install -y -qq meson ninja-build
-    - meson setup build
-    - ninja -C build
-    - cd build && sudo -E meson test --verbose --print-errorlogs
-
-test-main-commit-job-debian12-meson:
-  extends:
-    - .debian-prep
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-debian-12
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-debian-12
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - sudo apt-get -y install -y -qq meson ninja-build
-    - meson setup build
-    - ninja -C build
-    - cd build && sudo -E meson test --verbose --print-errorlogs

.gitlab/ci/fedora-opal.yml

@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-.opal-template-fedora:
-  extends:
-    - .dnf-openssl-backend
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-fedora-rawhide
-  stage: test-opal
-  interruptible: false
-  variables:
-    OPAL2_DEV: "/dev/nvme0n1"
-    OPAL2_PSID_FILE: "/home/gitlab-runner/psid.txt"
-    VOLATILE: 1
-  script:
-    - sudo dnf install -y -q nvme-cli
-    - sudo nvme list
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check TESTS="00modules-test compat-test-opal"
-
-# Samsung SSD 980 500GB (on tiber machine)
-test-commit-rawhide-samsung980:
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  extends:
-    - .opal-template-fedora
-  tags:
-    - tiber
-  resource_group: samsung980-on-tiber
-  interruptible: false
-  variables:
-    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_VENDOR_ID: "144d"
-    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_DEVICE_ID: "a809"
-
-test-mergerq-rawhide-samsung980:
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  extends:
-    - .opal-template-fedora
-  tags:
-    - tiber
-  resource_group: samsung980-on-tiber
-  interruptible: false
-  variables:
-    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_VENDOR_ID: "144d"
-    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_DEVICE_ID: "a809"
-
-# WD PC SN740 SDDQNQD-512G-1014 (on tiber machine)
-# Disabled on 2025-03-20, seems broken
-#test-commit-rawhide-sn740:
-#  rules:
-#    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-#      when: never
-#    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-#  extends:
-#    - .opal-template-fedora
-#  tags:
-#    - tiber
-#  resource_group: sn740-on-tiber
-#  interruptible: false
-#  variables:
-#    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_VENDOR_ID: "15b7"
-#    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_DEVICE_ID: "5017"
-#
-#test-mergerq-rawhide-sn740:
-#  rules:
-#    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-#      when: never
-#    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-#  extends:
-#    - .opal-template-fedora
-#  tags:
-#    - tiber
-#  resource_group: sn740-on-tiber
-#  interruptible: false
-#  variables:
-#    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_VENDOR_ID: "15b7"
-#    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_DEVICE_ID: "5017"
-
-# Samsung SSD 980 PRO 1TB (on trantor machine)
-test-commit-rawhide-samsung980pro:
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  extends:
-    - .opal-template-fedora
-  tags:
-    - trantor
-  resource_group: samsung980pro-on-trantor
-  interruptible: false
-  variables:
-    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_VENDOR_ID: "144d"
-    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_DEVICE_ID: "a80a"
-
-test-mergerq-rawhide-samsung980pro:
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  extends:
-    - .opal-template-fedora
-  tags:
-    - trantor
-  resource_group: samsung980pro-on-trantor
-  interruptible: false
-  variables:
-    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_VENDOR_ID: "144d"
-    PCI_PASSTHROUGH_DEVICE_ID: "a80a"
-
-# # UMIS RPETJ256MGE2MDQ (on tiber machine)
-# test-commit-rawhide-umis:
-#   rules:
-#     - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-#       when: never
-#     - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-#   extends:
-#     - .opal-template-fedora
-#   tags:
-#     - tiber
-#   resource_group: umis-on-tiber
-#   stage: test
-#   interruptible: false
-#   variables:
-#     PCI_PASSTHROUGH_VENDOR_ID: "1cc4"
-#     PCI_PASSTHROUGH_DEVICE_ID: "6302"
-#
-# test-mergerq-rawhide-umis:
-#   rules:
-#     - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-#       when: never
-#     - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-#   extends:
-#     - .opal-template-fedora
-#   tags:
-#     - tiber
-#   resource_group: umis-on-tiber
-#   stage: test
-#   interruptible: false
-#   variables:
-#     PCI_PASSTHROUGH_VENDOR_ID: "1cc4"
-#     PCI_PASSTHROUGH_DEVICE_ID: "6302"

.gitlab/ci/fedora.yml

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-.dnf-openssl-backend:
-  variables:
-    DISTRO: cryptsetup-fedora-rawhide
-    PKGS: >-
-      autoconf automake device-mapper-devel gcc gettext-devel json-c-devel
-      libargon2-devel libblkid-devel libpwquality-devel libselinux-devel
-      libssh-devel libtool libuuid-devel make popt-devel
-      libsepol-devel.x86_64 netcat openssh-clients passwd pkgconfig sharutils
-      sshpass tar uuid-devel vim-common device-mapper expect gettext git jq
-      keyutils openssl-devel openssl asciidoctor swtpm meson ninja-build
-      python3-jinja2 gperf libcap-devel tpm2-tss-devel libmount-devel swtpm-tools
-  extends:
-    - .fail_if_coredump_generated
-  before_script:
-    - sudo dnf clean all
-    - (r=3;while ! sudo dnf -y -q install $PKGS ; do ((--r))||exit;sleep 5;echo "Retrying";done)
-    - sudo -E git clean -xdf
-    - ./autogen.sh
-    - ./configure --enable-fips --enable-pwquality --enable-libargon2 --with-crypto_backend=openssl --enable-asciidoc
-
-test-main-commit-job-rawhide:
-  extends:
-    - .dnf-openssl-backend
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-fedora-rawhide
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  allow_failure: true
-  variables:
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_SYSTEMD_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check
-
-test-mergerq-job-rawhide:
-  extends:
-    - .dnf-openssl-backend
-  tags:
-    - libvirt
-    - cryptsetup-fedora-rawhide
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  allow_failure: true
-  variables:
-    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_KEYRING_TRUSTED_TEST: "1"
-    RUN_SYSTEMD_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
-  script:
-    - make -j
-    - make -j -C tests check-programs
-    - sudo -E make check

.gitlab/ci/gcc-Wall

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# gcc -Wall plus other important warnings not included in -Wall
-
-for arg in "$@"
-do
-	case $arg in
-	-O*) Wuninitialized=-Wuninitialized;;  # only makes sense with `-O'
-	esac
-done
-
-GCC="gcc${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-
-#PEDANTIC="-std=gnu99"
-#PEDANTIC="-pedantic -std=gnu99"
-#PEDANTIC="-pedantic -std=gnu99 -Wno-variadic-macros"
-#CONVERSION="-Wconversion"
-# -Wpacked \
-
-# This does more than expected for gcc (mixed code with declarations)
-# -Wdeclaration-after-statement \
-
-EXTRA="-Wextra \
- -Wsign-compare \
- -Werror-implicit-function-declaration \
- -Wpointer-arith \
- -Wwrite-strings \
- -Wswitch \
- -Wmissing-format-attribute \
- -Wstrict-aliasing=3 \
- -Winit-self \
- -Wunsafe-loop-optimizations \
- -Wold-style-definition \
- -Wno-missing-field-initializers \
- -Wunused-parameter \
- -Wno-long-long \
- -Wmaybe-uninitialized \
- -Wvla \
- -Wformat-overflow \
- -Wformat-truncation \
- -Wstringop-overread"
-
-exec $GCC $PEDANTIC $CONVERSION \
-	-Wall $Wuninitialized \
-	-Wno-switch \
-	-Wdisabled-optimization \
-	-Wwrite-strings \
-	-Wpointer-arith \
-	-Wbad-function-cast \
-	-Wmissing-prototypes \
-	-Wmissing-declarations \
-	-Wstrict-prototypes \
-	-Wnested-externs \
-	-Wcomment \
-	-Winline \
-	-Wcast-align=strict \
-	-Wcast-qual \
-	-Wredundant-decls $EXTRA \
-	"$@"

.gitlab/ci/gitlab-shared-docker.yml

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-# Ubuntu
-.gitlab-shared-docker-ubuntu:
-  image: ubuntu:noble
-  tags:
-    - gitlab-org-docker
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event" || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  before_script:
-    - .gitlab/ci/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh
-    - export CC="${COMPILER}${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-    - export CXX="${COMPILER}++${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-
-# Alpine
-.gitlab-shared-docker-alpine:
-  image: alpine:latest
-  tags:
-    - gitlab-org-docker
-  stage: test
-  interruptible: true
-  rules:
-    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
-      when: never
-    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event" || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
-  before_script:
-    - apk add bash build-base clang clang-analyzer argp-standalone lvm2-dev openssl-dev popt-dev util-linux-dev json-c-dev device-mapper gettext-dev libssh-dev automake autoconf libtool tar asciidoctor
-    - export CC="${COMPILER}${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-    - export CXX="${COMPILER}++${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
-
-.gitlab-shared-gcc:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-docker-ubuntu
-  variables:
-    COMPILER: "gcc"
-    COMPILER_VERSION: "14"
-    CC: "gcc-14"
-
-.gitlab-shared-clang:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-docker-ubuntu
-  variables:
-    COMPILER: "clang"
-    COMPILER_VERSION: "20"
-    CC: "clang-20"
-
-.gitlab-shared-gcc-alpine:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-docker-alpine
-  variables:
-    COMPILER: "gcc"
-    CC: "gcc"
-
-.gitlab-shared-clang-alpine:
-  extends:
-    - .gitlab-shared-docker-alpine
-  variables:
-    COMPILER: "clang"
-    CC: "clang"

.gitlab/ci/run_csmock

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-CSMOCK="sudo /usr/bin/csmock"
-CSMOCK_TOOLS="gcc,clang,cppcheck,shellcheck"
-CSMOCK_TXZ="cryptsetup-csmock-results.tar.xz"
-CSMOCK_ERR="cryptsetup-csmock-results/scan-results.err"
-
-$CSMOCK cryptsetup-*.src.rpm \
-       --keep-going --force \
-       --cswrap-timeout 300 \
-       --skip-patches \
-       --tools $CSMOCK_TOOLS \
-       --output $CSMOCK_TXZ \
-       --gcc-analyze \
-       --cppcheck-add-flag=--check-level=exhaustive \
-       || { echo "csmock command failed"; exit 2; }
-
-tar xJf $CSMOCK_TXZ $CSMOCK_ERR --strip-components 1 \
-       && test -s $CSMOCK_ERR \
-       && { echo "csmock discovered important errors"; echo 3; }
-
-exit 0

.gitlab/ci/spellcheck

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-set -e
-DIR="_spellcheck"
-
-[ ! -d $DIR ] && mkdir $DIR
-
-echo "[SPELLINTIAN]"
-git ls-tree -rz --name-only HEAD | grep -Evz -e '\.(pdf|xz)$' -e ^po/ | \
-    xargs -r0 spellintian | \
-    grep -v "(duplicate word)" | \
-    grep -v "docs/" | tee $DIR/spell1.txt
-
-echo "[CODESPELL]"
-git ls-tree -rz --name-only HEAD | grep -Evz -e '\.(pdf|xz)$' -e ^po/ | \
-    xargs -r0 codespell | \
-    grep -v "EXPCT" | \
-    grep -v "params, prams" | \
-    grep -v "pad, padded" | \
-    grep -v "CIPHER, CHIP" | \
-    grep -v "gost" | \
-    grep -v "userA" | \
-    grep -v "re-use" | \
-    grep -v "fo ==" | \
-    grep -v "docs/" | tee $DIR/spell2.txt
-
-
-[ -s $DIR/spell1.txt ] && exit 1
-[ -s $DIR/spell2.txt ] && exit 2
-
-exit 0

.gitlab/issue_templates/Bug.md

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-### Issue description
-<!-- Please, shortly describe the issue here. -->
-
-### Steps for reproducing the issue
-<!-- How it can be reproduced? Include all important steps. -->
-
-### Additional info
-<!-- Please mention what distribution you are using. -->
-
-### Debug log
-<!-- Paste a debug log of the failing command (add --debug option) between the markers below (to keep raw debug format).-->
-<!-- We need a lot of information from the debug log; without it, we cannot process your report. -->
-<!-- Debug log does not contain any private information. Do not paste private data; we'll ask you for more information if needed. -->
-```
-Output with --debug option:
-
-```
-<!-- NOTE: WITHOUT DEBUG LOG, THE BUG REPORT WILL BE CLOSED. ALSO, PLEASE DO NOT TRY TO REMOVE PARTS OF THE DEBUG LOG! -->

.gitlab/issue_templates/Documentation.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-### Documentation issue
-<!-- Please, shortly describe the issue in documentation here. -->
-
-### Additional info
-<!-- Please mention what cryptsetup version you are using. -->

.gitlab/issue_templates/Feature.md

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-### New feature description
-<!-- Please, shortly describe the requested feature here. -->
-
-### Additional info
-<!-- Please mention what distribution and cryptsetup version you are using. -->

AUTHORS

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
-Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-Contributing to cryptsetup
-==========================
-For basic information about the cryptsetup project, please read [README](README.md).
-
-The Cryptsetup project uses free, open-source licenses; details are described in [licensing](README.licensing).
-
-For contribution code or documentation to the cryptsetup project, you must have the necessary rights to the content, and your contribution must be provided under the required license.
-
-We welcome contributions from everyone.
-
-Cryptsetup is an independent project with much volunteer effort, and our resources are limited.
-Following the guidelines specified in this file makes it easier for us to process your issue.
-
-Project maintainers can remove or reject abusive or otherwise unacceptable comments or code.
-
-Git repository
---------------
-The primary repository is located at [gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup).
-The development branch is ``main``; minor stable releases can use their branches with cherry-picked or backported patches.
-
-There are backup mirrors located at [github.com/mbroz/cryptsetup](https://github.com/mbroz/cryptsetup) and [git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git](https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git).
-
-How to make a bug report
-------------------------
-To report an issue or feature request, please use GitLab [cryptsetup issue tracker](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/issues).
-
-Before reporting an issue, please try to search documentation and existing issues. Always try to reproduce the problem on the latest supported release.
-Please *always* collect and attach ``--debug`` log and other information as instructed in the issue template.
-Even if you think the problem is obvious, we need logged information about the environment (like versions of kernel modules, etc.).
-
-Please do not report distribution-specific issues if they are not present in the latest upstream release.
-For such reports, please use downstream distribution-specific trackers.
-If the issue is related to upstream, downstream maintainers will redirect you here, or upstream maintainers will join the discussion.
-
-If you think that you found some security bug, please follow the instructions in the [SECURITY](SECURITY.md) file.
-
-How to contribute changes to cryptsetup
----------------------------------------
-The following notes are a very short introduction to cryptsetup internal processes and an overview of generic rules that should be followed for all changes.
-
-Changes from developers and external contributors should go through the GitLab repository [merge reguests](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/merge_requests).
-Alternatively (for trivial changes), you can send a patch to [cryptsetup mailing list](mailto:cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev).
-
-Please do not write personal emails with questions or patches to maintainers and developers.
-
-### Project structure
-Cryptsetup projects include a libcryptsetup library, tools, token plugins, documentation, and a test suite.
-
-Cryptsetup library (libcryptsetup) exports [versioned symbols](lib/libcryptsetup.sym).
-Tools (cryptsetup, veritysetup, integritysetup) use libcryptsetup shared library.
-Some isolated parts in the lib directory can be reused for tools (the source is recompiled).
-
-The basic directory structure in the repository is
-```
-├── docs - Documentation and release notes.
-├── lib  - libcryptsetup implementation
-│   ├── bitlk           - Bitlocker format
-│   ├── crypto_backend  - Cryptography backend
-│   ├── fvault2         - FileVault2 format
-│   ├── integrity       - Linux dm-integrity interface
-│   ├── loopaes         - Linux LoopAES format
-│   ├── luks1           - LUKS1 format
-│   ├── luks2           - LUKS2 format including OPAL2 SED
-│   ├── tcrypt          - TrueCrypt / VeraCrypt format
-│   └── verity          - Linux dm-verity interface
-├── man - Manual pages (in AsciiDoc format)
-├── misc - Miscellaneous additions
-├── po - Translation files
-├── scripts - Scripts for system configuration
-├── src - Tools implementation
-├── tests - Testsuite (test units, regression tests, fuzzing)
-└── tokens - Token plugins
-```
-### Coordination with other projects
-The cryptsetup tools and library use low-level functions that depend on many other subsystems.
-Currently, the project is supported only for Linux (it will not work on Android or other systems).
-
-Cryptsetup project requires some parts of the Linux kernel, notably the *Device Mapper* (dm-crypt, dm-integrity, dm-verity, dm-zero modules) and kernel *userspace cryptographic interface*.
-Missing kernel interface can significantly limit (or even disallow) cryptsetup functionality.
-
-Integration in operating systems also depends on several other projects, most notably *systemd* (that implements its own tooling using libcryptsetup) and *util-Linux* (*blkid* parsing of supported format metadata). Some changes must be synchronized in all needed places (kernel, blkid, libcryptsetup).
-
-Several other projects implement their own token metadata (either through binary token plugins or through generic libcryptsetup JSON token access functions).
-
-### Used cryptography algorithms
-Cryptsetup avoids implementing cryptographic primitives but uses cryptographic libraries.
-Exceptions were PBKDF internal implementations - PBKDF2 and Argon2 until these were integrated into major cryptographic libraries.
-
-Cryptsetup can be compiled with several cryptographic libraries backend (OpenSSL, libgcrypt, Nettle, NSS, and Linux kernel userspace API).
-OpenSSL is the default and strongly recommended configuration.
-
-If the cryptographic library does not implement some cryptographic primitive (for example, if running in a FIPS-140 environment or just
-because it does not include it at all), functionality could be limited.
-
-### Configuration and versioning
-Cryptsetup can be configured using *Autoconf* or *Meson*. Autoconf support is being deprecated in the long term.
-Currently, all new configuration options must be implemented in both systems.
-
-Cryptsetup intentionally does not use a system configuration file (located in /etc).
-All functionality must be determined dynamically.
-
-All related /etc configuration files (crypttab, fstab and others) are maintained by systemd (in some legacy distributions by cryptsetup downstream).
-
-Cryptsetup uses [semantic versioning](https://semver.org/).
-Major and minor releases are always based on the main git branch; the minor stable (patch) versions can have some specific branch with backported or cherry-picked patches (from the main branch).
-Usually, minor releases happen twice per year and stable patch updates according to reported bugs (in 1-3 month intervals).
-
-### Compilation and debugging
-The library and tools are written in C language; we require C99 and support gcc and Clang compilers.
-Manual pages are generated from AsciiDoc sources and libcryptsetup API documentation by Doxygen (from libcryptsetup.h comments).
-Testsuite is a combination of local C utilities, fuzzing implementation in C++, bash scripts, and uses many other system utilities.
-
-All tools contain compiled-in debug messages that are available through --debug options.
-
-With Autoconf and libtool, you can run the cryptsetup tool in the debugger without installation using this one-line script:
-```
-libtool --mode=execute gdb --args ./cryptsetup --debug $@
-```
-This will ensure that a properly compiled libcryptsetup file is used.
-
-### Coding style
-Cryptsetup uses [Linux kernel coding style](https://cdn.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html) for libcryptsetup and tools (where applicable) with some additional notes:
-- Use tabulators for indentation; the line should not exceed 100 characters with an 8-character tabulator. Otherwise, use a tab of any length. :-).
-- The minimal C standard required is C99.
-- The ``goto`` use is allowed only for error path (``goto out`` for common code path, ``goto err`` for specific error code path).
-- Split patches per change; do not submit huge patches combining several changes.
-- Use an elaborative description in the patch header.
-- No need to use sign-off-by lines.
-- Use name prefixes (``crypt_``, ``LUKS2_`` and similar).
-- Avoid extensive preprocessor use (specifically conditional ``#if`` or ``#ifdef`` sections).
-- To check detected configuration options stored in config.h, always use ``#if SOMETHING`` (do NOT use ``#ifdef``).
-- Use output only through ``log_err, log_std, log_verbose, log_dbg`` macros.
-  The ``log_dbg`` is always in English; the others should be wrapped in the ``_()`` macro for translation.
-- Use ``assert()`` but only for simple invariants and variables (avoid calling functions).
-  Do not use assert for user-defined input (this should be a normal error path).
-- The code style is quite relaxed in testing scripts (code there is not intended for production use).
-
-### General rules and testing
-- Cryptsetup should work on all architectures supported by the Linux kernel.
-Only very few functionalities require specific hardware (notably Opal SED support).
-If you want to introduce some specific hardware support, please discuss it with the maintainers first.
-
-- All code changes should go through merge requests and reviews.
-Code can be merged after review approval (done by someone with the commit right to the development repository), but reviews from external people are very welcome, too.
-
-- All new functionality must come with at least rudimentary coverage in the test suite.
-Always run the test suite before opening the merge request (``make check`` with root privilege).
-
-- We have continuous integration (CI) that runs many tests automatically, but the output is not directly visible for external merge request authors (for security reasons).
-All CI scripts are available in .gitlab and .github folders in the project repository.
-
-  Maintainers will provide you log files if anything fails. Your code must produce no warnings before it is merged.
-
-- We run compilation with many extended [gcc](.gitlab/ci/gcc-Wall) and [Clang](.gitlab/ci/clang-Wall) warnings and include some analyzers, notably
-  - [Coverity](https://scan.coverity.com), GitHub CodeQL, Clang scan-build, and gcc static analyzer, and
-  - fuzzing integrated in [OSS-fuzz project](https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/cryptsetup).
-
-- Testsuite can also partially run under Valgrind dynamic analyzer with ``make valgrind-check``.

ChangeLog

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+Since version 1.6 this file is no longer maintained.
+
+See docs/*ReleaseNotes for release changes documentation.
+
+See version control history for full commit messages.
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/commits/master

INSTALL

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+Copyright 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software
+Foundation, Inc.
+
+   This file is free documentation; the Free Software Foundation gives
+unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
+
+Basic Installation
+==================
+
+   These are generic installation instructions.
+
+   The `configure' shell script attempts to guess correct values for
+various system-dependent variables used during compilation.  It uses
+those values to create a `Makefile' in each directory of the package.
+It may also create one or more `.h' files containing system-dependent
+definitions.  Finally, it creates a shell script `config.status' that
+you can run in the future to recreate the current configuration, and a
+file `config.log' containing compiler output (useful mainly for
+debugging `configure').
+
+   It can also use an optional file (typically called `config.cache'
+and enabled with `--cache-file=config.cache' or simply `-C') that saves
+the results of its tests to speed up reconfiguring.  (Caching is
+disabled by default to prevent problems with accidental use of stale
+cache files.)
+
+   If you need to do unusual things to compile the package, please try
+to figure out how `configure' could check whether to do them, and mail
+diffs or instructions to the address given in the `README' so they can
+be considered for the next release.  If you are using the cache, and at
+some point `config.cache' contains results you don't want to keep, you
+may remove or edit it.
+
+   The file `configure.ac' (or `configure.in') is used to create
+`configure' by a program called `autoconf'.  You only need
+`configure.ac' if you want to change it or regenerate `configure' using
+a newer version of `autoconf'.
+
+The simplest way to compile this package is:
+
+  1. `cd' to the directory containing the package's source code and type
+     `./configure' to configure the package for your system.  If you're
+     using `csh' on an old version of System V, you might need to type
+     `sh ./configure' instead to prevent `csh' from trying to execute
+     `configure' itself.
+
+     Running `configure' takes awhile.  While running, it prints some
+     messages telling which features it is checking for.
+
+  2. Type `make' to compile the package.
+
+  3. Optionally, type `make check' to run any self-tests that come with
+     the package.
+
+  4. Type `make install' to install the programs and any data files and
+     documentation.
+
+  5. You can remove the program binaries and object files from the
+     source code directory by typing `make clean'.  To also remove the
+     files that `configure' created (so you can compile the package for
+     a different kind of computer), type `make distclean'.  There is
+     also a `make maintainer-clean' target, but that is intended mainly
+     for the package's developers.  If you use it, you may have to get
+     all sorts of other programs in order to regenerate files that came
+     with the distribution.
+
+Compilers and Options
+=====================
+
+   Some systems require unusual options for compilation or linking that
+the `configure' script does not know about.  Run `./configure --help'
+for details on some of the pertinent environment variables.
+
+   You can give `configure' initial values for configuration parameters
+by setting variables in the command line or in the environment.  Here
+is an example:
+
+     ./configure CC=c89 CFLAGS=-O2 LIBS=-lposix
+
+   *Note Defining Variables::, for more details.
+
+Compiling For Multiple Architectures
+====================================
+
+   You can compile the package for more than one kind of computer at the
+same time, by placing the object files for each architecture in their
+own directory.  To do this, you must use a version of `make' that
+supports the `VPATH' variable, such as GNU `make'.  `cd' to the
+directory where you want the object files and executables to go and run
+the `configure' script.  `configure' automatically checks for the
+source code in the directory that `configure' is in and in `..'.
+
+   If you have to use a `make' that does not support the `VPATH'
+variable, you have to compile the package for one architecture at a
+time in the source code directory.  After you have installed the
+package for one architecture, use `make distclean' before reconfiguring
+for another architecture.
+
+Installation Names
+==================
+
+   By default, `make install' will install the package's files in
+`/usr/local/bin', `/usr/local/man', etc.  You can specify an
+installation prefix other than `/usr/local' by giving `configure' the
+option `--prefix=PATH'.
+
+   You can specify separate installation prefixes for
+architecture-specific files and architecture-independent files.  If you
+give `configure' the option `--exec-prefix=PATH', the package will use
+PATH as the prefix for installing programs and libraries.
+Documentation and other data files will still use the regular prefix.
+
+   In addition, if you use an unusual directory layout you can give
+options like `--bindir=PATH' to specify different values for particular
+kinds of files.  Run `configure --help' for a list of the directories
+you can set and what kinds of files go in them.
+
+   If the package supports it, you can cause programs to be installed
+with an extra prefix or suffix on their names by giving `configure' the
+option `--program-prefix=PREFIX' or `--program-suffix=SUFFIX'.
+
+Optional Features
+=================
+
+   Some packages pay attention to `--enable-FEATURE' options to
+`configure', where FEATURE indicates an optional part of the package.
+They may also pay attention to `--with-PACKAGE' options, where PACKAGE
+is something like `gnu-as' or `x' (for the X Window System).  The
+`README' should mention any `--enable-' and `--with-' options that the
+package recognizes.
+
+   For packages that use the X Window System, `configure' can usually
+find the X include and library files automatically, but if it doesn't,
+you can use the `configure' options `--x-includes=DIR' and
+`--x-libraries=DIR' to specify their locations.
+
+Specifying the System Type
+==========================
+
+   There may be some features `configure' cannot figure out
+automatically, but needs to determine by the type of machine the package
+will run on.  Usually, assuming the package is built to be run on the
+_same_ architectures, `configure' can figure that out, but if it prints
+a message saying it cannot guess the machine type, give it the
+`--build=TYPE' option.  TYPE can either be a short name for the system
+type, such as `sun4', or a canonical name which has the form:
+
+     CPU-COMPANY-SYSTEM
+
+where SYSTEM can have one of these forms:
+
+     OS KERNEL-OS
+
+   See the file `config.sub' for the possible values of each field.  If
+`config.sub' isn't included in this package, then this package doesn't
+need to know the machine type.
+
+   If you are _building_ compiler tools for cross-compiling, you should
+use the `--target=TYPE' option to select the type of system they will
+produce code for.
+
+   If you want to _use_ a cross compiler, that generates code for a
+platform different from the build platform, you should specify the
+"host" platform (i.e., that on which the generated programs will
+eventually be run) with `--host=TYPE'.
+
+Sharing Defaults
+================
+
+   If you want to set default values for `configure' scripts to share,
+you can create a site shell script called `config.site' that gives
+default values for variables like `CC', `cache_file', and `prefix'.
+`configure' looks for `PREFIX/share/config.site' if it exists, then
+`PREFIX/etc/config.site' if it exists.  Or, you can set the
+`CONFIG_SITE' environment variable to the location of the site script.
+A warning: not all `configure' scripts look for a site script.
+
+Defining Variables
+==================
+
+   Variables not defined in a site shell script can be set in the
+environment passed to `configure'.  However, some packages may run
+configure again during the build, and the customized values of these
+variables may be lost.  In order to avoid this problem, you should set
+them in the `configure' command line, using `VAR=value'.  For example:
+
+     ./configure CC=/usr/local2/bin/gcc
+
+will cause the specified gcc to be used as the C compiler (unless it is
+overridden in the site shell script).
+
+`configure' Invocation
+======================
+
+   `configure' recognizes the following options to control how it
+operates.
+
+`--help'
+`-h'
+     Print a summary of the options to `configure', and exit.
+
+`--version'
+`-V'
+     Print the version of Autoconf used to generate the `configure'
+     script, and exit.
+
+`--cache-file=FILE'
+     Enable the cache: use and save the results of the tests in FILE,
+     traditionally `config.cache'.  FILE defaults to `/dev/null' to
+     disable caching.
+
+`--config-cache'
+`-C'
+     Alias for `--cache-file=config.cache'.
+
+`--quiet'
+`--silent'
+`-q'
+     Do not print messages saying which checks are being made.  To
+     suppress all normal output, redirect it to `/dev/null' (any error
+     messages will still be shown).
+
+`--srcdir=DIR'
+     Look for the package's source code in directory DIR.  Usually
+     `configure' can determine that directory automatically.
+
+`configure' also accepts some other, not widely useful, options.  Run
+`configure --help' for more details.
+

Makefile.am

@@ -1,90 +1,13 @@
-EXTRA_DIST = README.md SECURITY.md README.licensing CONTRIBUTING.md FAQ.md docs misc autogen.sh
-EXTRA_DIST += meson_options.txt \
-	meson.build \
-	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/meson.build \
-	lib/crypto_backend/meson.build \
-	lib/meson.build \
-	man/meson.build \
-	po/meson.build \
-	scripts/meson.build \
-	src/meson.build \
-	tests/meson.build \
-	tests/fuzz/meson.build \
-	tokens/meson.build \
-	tokens/ssh/meson.build
-
-SUBDIRS = po tests tests/fuzz
-CLEANFILES =
-DISTCLEAN_TARGETS =
-
-AM_CPPFLAGS = \
-	-include config.h \
-	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib \
-        -DDATADIR=\""$(datadir)"\"              \
-        -DLOCALEDIR=\""$(datadir)/locale"\"     \
-        -DLIBDIR=\""$(libdir)"\"                \
-        -DPREFIX=\""$(prefix)"\"                \
-        -DSYSCONFDIR=\""$(sysconfdir)"\"        \
-        -DVERSION=\""$(VERSION)"\"
-AM_CFLAGS = -Wall
-AM_CXXFLAGS = -Wall
-AM_LDFLAGS =
-
-if ENABLE_FUZZ_TARGETS
-AM_CFLAGS += -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link
-AM_CXXFLAGS += -fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link
-endif
-
-LDADD = $(LTLIBINTL)
-
-tmpfilesddir = @DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR@
-
-include_HEADERS =
-lib_LTLIBRARIES =
-noinst_LTLIBRARIES =
-sbin_PROGRAMS =
-man8_MANS =
-tmpfilesd_DATA =
-pkgconfig_DATA =
-dist_noinst_DATA =
-
-include man/Makemodule.am
-
-include scripts/Makemodule.am
-
-if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2
-include lib/crypto_backend/argon2/Makemodule.am
-endif
-include lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am
-include lib/Makemodule.am
-
-include src/Makemodule.am
-include tokens/Makemodule.am
+EXTRA_DIST = COPYING.LGPL FAQ docs misc
+SUBDIRS = \
+	lib \
+	src \
+	man \
+	python \
+	tests \
+	po
 
 ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4
 
-DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS = 	\
-	--with-tmpfilesdir=$$dc_install_base/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d \
-	--enable-internal-argon2 --enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
-	--enable-external-tokens --enable-ssh-token --enable-asciidoc
-
-distclean-local:
-	-find . -name \*~ -o -name \*.orig -o -name \*.rej | xargs rm -f
-	rm -rf autom4te.cache
-
 clean-local:
-	-rm -rf docs/doxygen_api_docs libargon2.la
-
-install-data-local:
-	$(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)/${EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH}
-
-uninstall-local:
-	rmdir $(DESTDIR)/${EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH} 2>/dev/null || :
-
-check-programs: libcryptsetup.la
-	$(MAKE) -C tests $@
-
-if ENABLE_FUZZ_TARGETS
-fuzz-targets: libcryptsetup.la libcrypto_backend.la
-	$(MAKE) -C tests/fuzz $@
-endif
+	-rm -rf docs/doxygen_api_docs

NEWS

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+See docs/* directory for Release Notes.

README

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+
+                        cryptsetup
+
+setup cryptographic volumes for dm-crypt (including LUKS extension)
+
+WEB PAGE:
+
+      https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/
+
+FAQ:
+
+      https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
+
+MAILING LIST:
+
+      E-MAIL: dm-crypt@saout.de
+      URL:    http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
+
+DOWNLOAD:
+
+      https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/
+
+SOURCE CODE:
+
+      URL: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master
+      Checkout: git clone https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git
+
+NLS (PO TRANSLATIONS):
+
+      PO files are maintained by:
+          http://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html

README.licensing

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-The cryptsetup project does not use the same license for all of the code and documentation.
-
-There is code and documentation under:
-
-   * GPL-2.0-or-later   - GNU General Public License version 2, or any later version
-
-   * LGPL-2.1-or-later WITH cryptsetup-OpenSSL-exception
-   * LGPL-2.1-or-later  - GNU Lesser General Public License 2.1 or any later version,
-                          (with cryptsetup-OpenSSL-exception where applicable)
-
-   * Apache-2.0         - Apache License 2.0
-
-   * CC-BY-SA-4.0       - Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike 4.0 International
-
-   * Public Domain
-
-Please, check the source code for more details.
-
-The ./COPYING file (GPL-2.0-or-later) is the default license for code without
-an explicitly defined license.

README.md

@@ -2,136 +2,83 @@
 
 What the ...?
 =============
-**Cryptsetup** is an open-source utility used to conveniently set up disk encryption based
-on the [dm-crypt](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt) kernel module.
+**Cryptsetup** is utility used to conveniently setup disk encryption based
+on [DMCrypt](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt) kernel module.
 
-These formats are supported:
-  * **plain** volumes,
-  * **LUKS** volumes,
-  * **loop-AES**,
-  * **TrueCrypt** (including **VeraCrypt** extension),
-  * **BitLocker**, and
-  * **FileVault2**.
+These include **plain** **dm-crypt** volumes, **LUKS** volumes, **loop-AES**
+and **TrueCrypt** (including **VeraCrypt** extension) format.
 
-The project also includes a **veritysetup** utility used to conveniently setup
-[dm-verity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity)
-block integrity checking kernel module and **integritysetup** to setup
-[dm-integrity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMIntegrity)
-block integrity kernel module.
+Project also includes **veritysetup** utility used to conveniently setup
+[DMVerity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity) block integrity checking kernel module.
 
 LUKS Design
 -----------
-**LUKS** is the standard for Linux disk encryption. By providing a standardized on-disk format,
-it not only facilitate compatibility among distributions, but also enables secure management
-of multiple user passwords. LUKS stores all necessary setup information in the partition header,
-which enables users to transport or migrate data seamlessly.
+**LUKS** is the standard for Linux hard disk encryption. By providing a standard on-disk-format, it does not  
+only facilitate compatibility among distributions, but also provides secure management of multiple user passwords.  
+In contrast to existing solution, LUKS stores all setup necessary setup information in the partition header,  
+enabling the user to transport or migrate his data seamlessly.
 
-### Specification and documentation
-  * The latest version of the
-  [LUKS2 format specification](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs).
-  * The latest version of the
-  [LUKS1 format specification](https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/LUKS_docs/on-disk-format.pdf).
-  * [Project home page](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/).
-  * [Frequently asked questions (FAQ)](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions)
+Why LUKS?
+---------
+ * compatiblity via standardization,
+ * secure against low entropy attacks,
+ * support for multiple keys,
+ * effective passphrase revocation,
+ * free.
+
+[Project home page](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/).
+-----------------
+
+[Frequently asked questions (FAQ)](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions)
+--------------------------------
 
 Download
 --------
-Release notes and tarballs are available at
-[kernel.org](https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/).
+All release tarballs and release notes are hosted on [kernel.org](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/).
 
-**The latest stable cryptsetup release version is 2.8.1**
-  * [cryptsetup-2.8.1.tar.xz](https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.8/cryptsetup-2.8.1.tar.xz)
-  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.8.1.tar.sign](https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.8/cryptsetup-2.8.1.tar.sign)
+**The latest cryptsetup version is 1.7.1**
+  * [cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.xz)
+  * Signature [cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.sign)
     _(You need to decompress file first to check signature.)_
-  * [Cryptsetup 2.8.1 Release Notes](https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.8/v2.8.1-ReleaseNotes).
+  * [Cryptsetup 1.7.1 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes).
 
-[Previous versions](https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup)
+Previous versions
+ * [Version 1.7.0](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.0.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.0.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.6.8](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/cryptsetup-1.6.8.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/cryptsetup-1.6.8.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/v1.6.8-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.6.7](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/cryptsetup-1.6.7.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/cryptsetup-1.6.7.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/v1.6.7-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.6.6](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/cryptsetup-1.6.6.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/cryptsetup-1.6.6.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/v1.6.6-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.6.5](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/cryptsetup-1.6.5.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/cryptsetup-1.6.5.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/v1.6.5-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.6.4](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/cryptsetup-1.6.4.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/cryptsetup-1.6.4.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.6/v1.6.4-ReleaseNotes).
 
-Source and API documentation
-----------------------------
-For development version code, please refer to the
-[source](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master) page, with mirrors
-at [kernel.org](https://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git/) and
-[GitHub](https://github.com/mbroz/cryptsetup).
+Source and API docs
+-------------------
+For development version code, please refer to [source](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master) page,
+mirror on [kernel.org](https://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git/) or [GitHub](https://github.com/mbroz/cryptsetup).
 
-For libcryptsetup documentation see
-[libcryptsetup API](https://mbroz.fedorapeople.org/libcryptsetup_API/) page.
+For libcryptsetup documentation see [libcryptsetup API](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/API/index.html) page.
 
-NLS PO files are maintained by
-[TranslationProject](https://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html).
+The libcryptsetup API/ABI changes are tracked in [compatibility report](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/ABI-tracker/timeline/libcryptsetup/index.html).
 
-Required packages
------------------
-All major Linux distributions provide cryptsetup as a bundled package. If you need
-to compile cryptsetup yourself, various additional packages are required.
-Any distribution-specific build tools are preferred when manually configuring cryptsetup.
-
-Below are the packages needed to build for certain Linux distributions:
-
-**For Fedora**:
-```
-git gcc make autoconf automake gettext-devel pkgconfig openssl-devel popt-devel device-mapper-devel libuuid-devel json-c-devel libblkid-devel findutils libtool libssh-devel tar rubygem-asciidoctor
-
-Optionally: libargon2-devel libpwquality-devel
-```
-To run the internal testsuite (make check) you also need to install
-```
-sharutils device-mapper jq vim-common expect keyutils netcat shadow-utils openssh-clients openssh sshpass
-```
-
-**For Debian and Ubuntu**:
-```
-git gcc make autoconf automake autopoint pkg-config libtool gettext libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol-dev libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev tar asciidoctor
-
-Optionally: libargon2-0-dev libpwquality-dev
-```
-To run the internal testsuite (make check) you also need to install
-```
-sharutils dmsetup jq xxd expect keyutils netcat-openbsd passwd openssh-client sshpass
-```
-
-Note that the list may change as Linux distributions evolve.
-
-Compilation
------------
-The cryptsetup project uses **automake** and **autoconf** system to generate all files needed to build.
-When building from a git snapshot,, use **./autogen.sh && ./configure && make**
-to compile the project. When building from a release **tar.xz** tarball, the configure script
-is pre-generated (no need to run **autoconf.sh**).
-See **./configure --help** and use the **--disable-[feature]** and **--enable-[feature]** options.
-
-To run the test suite that come with the project, type **make check**.
-Note that most tests will need root user privileges and will run dangerous storage failure simulations.
-Do **not** run tests with root privilege on production systems! Some tests will need the **scsi_debug**
-kernel module to be installed.
-
-For more details, please refer to the
-[automake](https://www.gnu.org/software/automake/manual/automake.html) and
-[autoconf](https://www.gnu.org/savannah-checkouts/gnu/autoconf/manual/autoconf.html) documentation.
+NLS PO files are maintained by [TranslationProject](http://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html).
 
 Help!
 -----
-### Documentation
-Please read the following before posting questions to the mailing list so that
-you can ask better questions and better understand answers.
+Please always read [FAQ](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions) first.
+For cryptsetup and LUKS related questions, please use the dm-crypt mailing list, [dm-crypt@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt@saout.de).
 
-* [Frequently asked questions (FAQ)](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions),
-* [LUKS Specifications](#specification-and-documentation), and
-* manuals (aka man page, man pages, man-page) 
+If you want to subscribe just send an empty mail to [dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de).
 
-The FAQ is available online and in the source code for the project. The specifications are
-referenced above in this document. The man pages live within the source tree and should be
-available after installation using standard man commands, e.g. **man cryptsetup**.
-
-### Mailing List
-For cryptsetup and LUKS related questions, please use the cryptsetup mailing list
-[cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev](mailto:cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev),
-hosted at [kernel.org subspace](https://subspace.kernel.org/lists.linux.dev.html).
-To subscribe send an empty email message to
-[cryptsetup+subscribe@lists.linux.dev](mailto:cryptsetup+subscribe@lists.linux.dev).
-
-You can also browse and/or search the mailing [list archive](https://lore.kernel.org/cryptsetup/).
-USEnet News (NNTP), Atom feed and git access to the public inbox is available through
-[lore.kernel.org](https://lore.kernel.org) service.
-
-The former **dm-crypt** [list archive](https://lore.kernel.org/dm-crypt/) is also available.
+You can also browse [list archive](http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/) or read it through
+[web interface](http://news.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.device-mapper.dm-crypt).

SECURITY.md

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# Reporting a Security Bug in cryptsetup project
-
-If you think you have discovered a security issue, please report it through
-the project issue tracker [New issue](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues)
-as a confidential issue (select confidential checkbox).
-
-An alternative is to send PGP encrypted mail to the cryptsetup maintainer.
-Current maintainer is [Milan Broz](mailto:gmazyland@gmail.com), use PGP key
-with fingerprint 2A29 1824 3FDE 4664 8D06 86F9 D9B0 577B D93E 98FC.
-

TODO

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+Version 1.7:
+- Export wipe device functions
+- Support K/M suffixes for align payload (new switch?).
+- TRIM for keyslots
+- Do we need crypt_data_path() - path to data device (if differs)?
+- Resync ETA time is not accurate, calculate it better (last minute window?).
+- Extend existing LUKS header to use another KDF? (https://password-hashing.net/)
+- Fix all crazy automake warnings (or switch to Cmake).

autogen.sh

@@ -9,31 +9,25 @@ DIE=0
 (autopoint --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
   echo "**Error**: You must have autopoint installed."
-  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution,"
+  echo "or see http://www.gnu.org/software/gettext"
   DIE=1
 }
 
-
-(msgfmt --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
-  echo
-  echo "**Warning**: You should have gettext installed."
-  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
-  echo "To disable translation, you can also use --disable-nls"
-  echo "configure option."
-}
-
 (autoconf --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
-  echo "**Error**: You must have autoconf installed."
-  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
+  echo "**Error**: You must have autoconf installed to."
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution,"
+  echo "or get the source tarball at ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
   DIE=1
 }
 
-(grep "^LT_INIT" $srcdir/configure.ac >/dev/null) && {
-  (libtoolize --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+(grep "^AM_PROG_LIBTOOL" $srcdir/configure.ac >/dev/null) && {
+  (libtool --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
     echo
-    echo "**Error**: You must have libtoolize installed."
-    echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
+    echo "**Error**: You must have libtool installed."
+    echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
+    echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
     DIE=1
   }
 }
@@ -41,7 +35,8 @@ DIE=0
 (automake --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
   echo "**Error**: You must have automake installed."
-  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
+  echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
+  echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
   DIE=1
   NO_AUTOMAKE=yes
 }
@@ -52,6 +47,8 @@ test -n "$NO_AUTOMAKE" || (aclocal --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
   echo "**Error**: Missing aclocal.  The version of automake"
   echo "installed doesn't appear recent enough."
+  echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
+  echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
   DIE=1
 }
 
@@ -59,6 +56,13 @@ if test "$DIE" -eq 1; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
+if test -z "$*"; then
+  echo
+  echo "**Warning**: I am going to run 'configure' with no arguments."
+  echo "If you wish to pass any to it, please specify them on the"
+  echo \'$0\'" command line."
+fi
+
 echo
 echo "Generate build-system by:"
 echo "   autopoint:  $(autopoint --version | head -1)"
@@ -74,9 +78,13 @@ autopoint --force $AP_OPTS
 libtoolize --force --copy
 aclocal -I m4 $AL_OPTS
 autoheader $AH_OPTS
-automake --force-missing --add-missing --copy --gnu $AM_OPTS
+automake --add-missing --copy --gnu $AM_OPTS
 autoconf $AC_OPTS
 
-echo
-echo "Now type '$srcdir/configure' and 'make' to compile."
-echo
+if test x$NOCONFIGURE = x; then
+  echo Running $srcdir/configure $conf_flags "$@" ...
+  $srcdir/configure $conf_flags "$@" \
+  && echo Now type \`make\' to compile $PKG_NAME
+else
+  echo Skipping configure process.
+fi

configure.ac

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 AC_PREREQ([2.67])
-AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[2.9.0-git])
+AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[1.7.2])
 
 dnl library version from <major>.<minor>.<release>[-<suffix>]
 LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION=$(echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | cut -f1 -d-)
-LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=23:0:11
+LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=11:0:7
 
 AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR(src/cryptsetup.c)
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h:config.h.in])
 # http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/automake/2013-01/msg00060.html
 
 # For old automake use this
-#AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(dist-xz subdir-objects)
-AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([dist-xz 1.12 serial-tests subdir-objects foreign])
+#AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(dist-xz)
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([dist-xz 1.12 serial-tests])
 
 if test "x$prefix" = "xNONE"; then
 	sysconfdir=/etc
@@ -28,150 +28,44 @@ AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS
 AC_PROG_CC
 AM_PROG_CC_C_O
 AC_PROG_CPP
-AC_PROG_CXX
 AC_PROG_INSTALL
 AC_PROG_MAKE_SET
-AC_PROG_MKDIR_P
 AC_ENABLE_STATIC(no)
 LT_INIT
 PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
 
-dnl ==========================================================================
-dnl define PKG_CHECK_VAR for old pkg-config <= 0.28
-m4_ifndef([AS_VAR_COPY],
-[m4_define([AS_VAR_COPY],
-[AS_LITERAL_IF([$1[]$2], [$1=$$2], [eval $1=\$$2])])
-])
-m4_ifndef([PKG_CHECK_VAR], [
-AC_DEFUN([PKG_CHECK_VAR],
-[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])
-AC_ARG_VAR([$1], [value of $3 for $2, overriding pkg-config])
-
-_PKG_CONFIG([$1], [variable="][$3]["], [$2])
-AS_VAR_COPY([$1], [pkg_cv_][$1])
-
-AS_VAR_IF([$1], [""], [$5], [$4])
-])
-])
-dnl ==========================================================================
-dnl AsciiDoc manual pages
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([asciidoc],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-asciidoc], [do not generate man pages from asciidoc]),
-	[], [enable_asciidoc=yes]
-)
-
-AC_PATH_PROG([ASCIIDOCTOR], [asciidoctor])
-if test "x$enable_asciidoc" = xyes -a "x$ASCIIDOCTOR" = x; then
-	AC_MSG_ERROR([Building man pages requires asciidoctor installed.])
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_ASCIIDOC], [test "x$enable_asciidoc" = xyes])
-
-have_manpages=no
-AS_IF([test -f "$srcdir/man/cryptsetup-open.8"], [
-	AC_MSG_NOTICE([re-use already generated man-pages.])
-	have_manpages=yes]
-)
-AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_MANPAGES], [test "x$have_manpages" = xyes])
-
-dnl ==========================================================================
-
-AC_C_RESTRICT
-
 AC_HEADER_DIRENT
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h uchar.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
-	sys/sysmacros.h sys/statvfs.h ctype.h unistd.h locale.h byteswap.h endian.h stdint.h)
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_CLOEXEC],,[AC_DEFINE([O_CLOEXEC],[0], [Defined to 0 if not provided])],
-[[
-#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
-# include <fcntl.h>
-#endif
-]])
+AC_HEADER_STDC
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
+	sys/sysmacros.h ctype.h unistd.h locale.h byteswap.h endian.h)
 
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(uuid/uuid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
 AC_CHECK_HEADER(libdevmapper.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the device-mapper library.])])
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([keyring],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-keyring], [disable kernel keyring support and builtin kernel keyring token]),
-	[], [enable_keyring=yes])
-if test "x$enable_keyring" = "xyes"; then
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/keyctl.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with kernel keyring service compiled.])])
-
-	dnl ==========================================================================
-	dnl check whether kernel is compiled with kernel keyring service syscalls
-	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_add_key,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing add_key syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
-	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_keyctl,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing keyctl syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
-	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_request_key,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing request_key syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
-
-	dnl ==========================================================================
-	dnl check that key_serial_t hasn't been adopted yet in stdlib
-	AC_CHECK_TYPES([key_serial_t], [], [], [
-	AC_INCLUDES_DEFAULT
-	#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_KEYCTL_H
-	# include <linux/keyctl.h>
-	#endif
-	])
-
-	AC_DEFINE(KERNEL_KEYRING, 1, [Enable kernel keyring service support])
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(KERNEL_KEYRING, test "x$enable_keyring" = "xyes")
-
 saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 AC_CHECK_LIB(uuid, uuid_clear, ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
 AC_SUBST(UUID_LIBS, $LIBS)
 LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime],[rt posix4])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign clock_gettime posix_fallocate explicit_bzero])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign clock_gettime])
 
-if test "x$enable_largefile" = "xno"; then
+if test "x$enable_largefile" = "xno" ; then
   AC_MSG_ERROR([Building with --disable-largefile is not supported, it can cause data corruption.])
 fi
 
+AC_C_CONST
 AC_C_BIGENDIAN
 AC_TYPE_OFF_T
 AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
 AC_FUNC_FSEEKO
+AC_PROG_GCC_TRADITIONAL
 AC_FUNC_STRERROR_R
 
-dnl ==========================================================================
-dnl LUKS2 external tokens
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([external-tokens],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-external-tokens], [disable external LUKS2 tokens]),
-	[], [enable_external_tokens=yes])
-if test "x$enable_external_tokens" = "xyes"; then
-	AC_DEFINE(USE_EXTERNAL_TOKENS, 1, [Use external tokens])
-	dnl we need dynamic library loading here
-	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
-	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlsym],[dl])
-	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlvsym])
-	AC_SUBST(DL_LIBS, $LIBS)
-	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(EXTERNAL_TOKENS, test "x$enable_external_tokens" = "xyes")
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([ssh-token],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-ssh-token], [disable LUKS2 ssh-token]),
-	[], [enable_ssh_token=yes])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(SSHPLUGIN_TOKEN, test "x$enable_ssh_token" = "xyes")
-
-if test "x$enable_ssh_token" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_external_tokens" = "xno"; then
-	AC_MSG_ERROR([Requested LUKS2 ssh-token build, but external tokens are disabled.])
-fi
-
-dnl LUKS2 online reencryption
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([luks2-reencryption],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-luks2-reencryption], [disable LUKS2 online reencryption extension]),
-	[], [enable_luks2_reencryption=yes])
-if test "x$enable_luks2_reencryption" = "xyes"; then
-	AC_DEFINE(USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION, 1, [Use LUKS2 online reencryption extension])
-fi
-
 dnl ==========================================================================
 
 AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external],[need-ngettext])
-AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.18.3])
+AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.15])
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 
@@ -182,10 +76,12 @@ AC_SUBST(POPT_LIBS, $LIBS)
 LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
-dnl FIPS extensions
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([fips],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fips], [enable FIPS mode restrictions]))
-if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
+dnl FIPS extensions (only for RHEL)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([fips], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fips],[enable FIPS mode restrictions]),
+[with_fips=$enableval],
+[with_fips=no])
+
+if test "x$with_fips" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_FIPS, 1, [Enable FIPS mode restrictions])
 
 	if test "x$enable_static" = "xyes" -o "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes" ; then
@@ -194,7 +90,7 @@ if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
 fi
 
 AC_DEFUN([NO_FIPS], [
-	if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
+	if test "x$with_fips" = "xyes"; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([This option is not compatible with FIPS.])
 	fi
 ])
@@ -202,9 +98,12 @@ AC_DEFUN([NO_FIPS], [
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl pwquality library (cryptsetup CLI only)
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([pwquality],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pwquality], [enable password quality checking using pwquality library]))
+	      AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pwquality],
+			     [enable password quality checking using pwquality library]),
+	      [with_pwquality=$enableval],
+	      [with_pwquality=no])
 
-if test "x$enable_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
+if test "x$with_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PWQUALITY, 1, [Enable password quality checking using pwquality library])
 	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([PWQUALITY], [pwquality >= 1.0.0],,
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need pwquality library.]))
@@ -213,25 +112,16 @@ if test "x$enable_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
 	PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS="$PWQUALITY_LIBS -lcrack -lz"
 fi
 
-dnl ==========================================================================
-dnl fuzzers, it requires own static library compilation later
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([fuzz-targets],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fuzz-targets], [enable building fuzz targets]))
-AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_FUZZ_TARGETS, test "x$enable_fuzz_targets" = "xyes")
-
-if test "x$enable_fuzz_targets" = "xyes"; then
-	AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fsanitize=fuzzer-no-link],,
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([Required compiler options not supported; use clang.]), [-Werror])
-fi
-
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl passwdqc library (cryptsetup CLI only)
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([passwdqc],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-passwdqc@<:@=CONFIG_PATH@:>@],
-		       [enable password quality checking using passwdqc library (optionally with CONFIG_PATH)]))
+	      AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-passwdqc@<:@=CONFIG_PATH@:>@],
+			     [enable password quality checking using passwdqc library (optionally with CONFIG_PATH)]),
+	      [enable_passwdqc=$enableval],
+	      [enable_passwdqc=no])
 
 case "$enable_passwdqc" in
-	""|yes|no) use_passwdqc_config="" ;;
+	yes|no) use_passwdqc_config="" ;;
 	/*) use_passwdqc_config="$enable_passwdqc"; enable_passwdqc=yes ;;
 	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unrecognized --enable-passwdqc parameter.]) ;;
 esac
@@ -240,18 +130,10 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PASSWDQC_CONFIG_FILE], ["$use_passwdqc_config"], [passwdqc l
 if test "x$enable_passwdqc" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PASSWDQC, 1, [Enable password quality checking using passwdqc library])
 
-	saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
-	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([passwdqc_check], [passwdqc])
-	case "$ac_cv_search_passwdqc_check" in
-		no) AC_MSG_ERROR([failed to find passwdqc_check]) ;;
-		-l*) PASSWDQC_LIBS="$ac_cv_search_passwdqc_check" ;;
-		*) PASSWDQC_LIBS= ;;
-	esac
-	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([passwdqc_params_free])
-	LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+	PASSWDQC_LIBS="-lpasswdqc"
 fi
 
-if test "x$enable_pwquality$enable_passwdqc" = "xyesyes"; then
+if test "x$with_pwquality$enable_passwdqc" = "xyesyes"; then
 	AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-pwquality and --enable-passwdqc are mutually incompatible.])
 fi
 
@@ -259,29 +141,20 @@ dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl Crypto backend functions
 
 AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_GCRYPT], [
-	if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
+	if test "x$with_fips" = "xyes"; then
 		GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION=1.4.5
 	else
 		GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION=1.1.42
 	fi
-
-	use_internal_pbkdf2=0
-	use_internal_argon2=1
-
-	dnl libgcrypt rejects to use pkgconfig, use AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT from gcrypt-devel here.
-	dnl Do not require gcrypt-devel if other crypto backend is used.
-	m4_ifdef([AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT],[
-	AC_ARG_ENABLE([gcrypt-pbkdf2],
-		dnl Check if we can use gcrypt PBKDF2 (1.6.0 supports empty password)
-		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-gcrypt-pbkdf2], [force enable internal gcrypt PBKDF2]),
+	dnl Check if we can use gcrypt PBKDF2 (1.6.0 supports empty password)
+	AC_ARG_ENABLE([gcrypt-pbkdf2], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-gcrypt-pbkdf2],[force enable internal gcrypt PBKDF2]),
 		if test "x$enableval" = "xyes"; then
 			[use_internal_pbkdf2=0]
 		else
 			[use_internal_pbkdf2=1]
 		fi,
 		[AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT([1.6.1], [use_internal_pbkdf2=0], [use_internal_pbkdf2=1])])
-	AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT($GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the gcrypt library.])])],
-	AC_MSG_ERROR([Missing support for gcrypt: install gcrypt and regenerate configure.]))
+	AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT($GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the gcrypt library.])])
 
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if internal cryptsetup PBKDF2 is compiled-in])
 	if test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 0; then
@@ -291,26 +164,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_GCRYPT], [
 		NO_FIPS([])
 	fi
 
-	m4_ifdef([AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT],[
-	AC_ARG_ENABLE([gcrypt-argon2],
-		dnl Check if we can use gcrypt Argon2 (1.11.0 supports empty password)
-		AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-gcrypt-argon2], [force disable internal gcrypt Argon2]),
-		[],
-		[AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT([1.11.0], [use_internal_argon2=0], [use_internal_argon2=1])])
-	AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT($GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the gcrypt library.])])],
-	AC_MSG_ERROR([Missing support for gcrypt: install gcrypt and regenerate configure.]))
-
-	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if internal cryptsetup Argon2 is compiled-in])
-	if test $use_internal_argon2 = 0; then
-		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-	else
-		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-	fi
-
-	AC_CHECK_DECLS([GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_XTS], [], [], [#include <gcrypt.h>])
-	AC_CHECK_DECLS([GCRY_KDF_ARGON2], [], [], [#include <gcrypt.h>])
-
-	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+	if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 		saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 		LIBS="$saved_LIBS $LIBGCRYPT_LIBS -static"
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(gcrypt, gcry_check_version,,
@@ -328,29 +182,24 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_GCRYPT], [
 ])
 
 AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_OPENSSL], [
-	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBCRYPTO], [libcrypto >= 0.9.8],,
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([OPENSSL], [openssl >= 0.9.8],,
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need openssl library.]))
-	CRYPTO_CFLAGS=$LIBCRYPTO_CFLAGS
-	CRYPTO_LIBS=$LIBCRYPTO_LIBS
+	CRYPTO_CFLAGS=$OPENSSL_CFLAGS
+	CRYPTO_LIBS=$OPENSSL_LIBS
 	use_internal_pbkdf2=0
-	use_internal_argon2=1
 
-	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+	if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 		saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
 		PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --static"
-		PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBCRYPTO_STATIC], [libcrypto])
-		CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$LIBCRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS
+		PKG_CHECK_MODULES([OPENSSL_STATIC], [openssl])
+		CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$OPENSSL_STATIC_LIBS
 		PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
 	fi
-
-	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
-	AC_CHECK_DECLS([OSSL_get_max_threads], [], [], [#include <openssl/thread.h>])
-	AC_CHECK_DECLS([OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ARGON2_VERSION], [use_internal_argon2=0], [], [#include <openssl/core_names.h>])
-	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+	NO_FIPS([])
 ])
 
 AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NSS], [
-	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+	if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([Static build of cryptsetup is not supported with NSS.])
 	fi
 
@@ -367,7 +216,6 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NSS], [
 	CRYPTO_CFLAGS=$NSS_CFLAGS
 	CRYPTO_LIBS=$NSS_LIBS
 	use_internal_pbkdf2=1
-	use_internal_argon2=1
 	NO_FIPS([])
 ])
 
@@ -378,14 +226,12 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_KERNEL], [
 #		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel with userspace crypto interface.])],
 #		[#include <sys/socket.h>])
 	use_internal_pbkdf2=1
-	use_internal_argon2=1
 	NO_FIPS([])
 ])
 
 AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NETTLE], [
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(nettle/sha.h,,
 		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Nettle cryptographic library.])])
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(nettle/version.h)
 
 	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(nettle, nettle_pbkdf2_hmac_sha256,,
@@ -395,24 +241,6 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NETTLE], [
 
 	CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$CRYPTO_LIBS
 	use_internal_pbkdf2=0
-	use_internal_argon2=1
-	NO_FIPS([])
-])
-
-AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_MBEDTLS], [
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(mbedtls/version.h,,
-		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need mbedTLS cryptographic library.])])
-
-	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(mbedcrypto, mbedtls_md_init,,
-		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need mbedTLS cryptographic library.])])
-	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext)
-	CRYPTO_LIBS=$LIBS
-	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
-
-	CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$CRYPTO_LIBS
-	use_internal_pbkdf2=0
-	use_internal_argon2=1
 	NO_FIPS([])
 ])
 
@@ -420,37 +248,33 @@ dnl ==========================================================================
 saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([static-cryptsetup],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-static-cryptsetup], [enable build of static version of tools]))
-if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
-	if test "x$enable_static" = "xno"; then
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-static-cryptsetup],
+	[enable build of static cryptsetup binary]))
+if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
+	if test x$enable_static = xno; then
 		AC_MSG_WARN([Requested static cryptsetup build, enabling static library.])
 		enable_static=yes
 	fi
 fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(STATIC_TOOLS, test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(STATIC_TOOLS, test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes)
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([cryptsetup],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup], [disable cryptsetup support]),
-	[], [enable_cryptsetup=yes])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTSETUP, test "x$enable_cryptsetup" = "xyes")
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(veritysetup,
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-veritysetup],
+	[disable veritysetup support]),[], [enable_veritysetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(VERITYSETUP, test x$enable_veritysetup = xyes)
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([veritysetup],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-veritysetup], [disable veritysetup support]),
-	[], [enable_veritysetup=yes])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(VERITYSETUP, test "x$enable_veritysetup" = "xyes")
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([cryptsetup-reencrypt],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt],
+	[enable cryptsetup-reencrypt tool]))
+AM_CONDITIONAL(REENCRYPT, test x$enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt = xyes)
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([integritysetup],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-integritysetup], [disable integritysetup support]),
-	[], [enable_integritysetup=yes])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(INTEGRITYSETUP, test "x$enable_integritysetup" = "xyes")
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([selinux],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-selinux], [disable selinux support [default=auto]]),
-	[], [enable_selinux=yes])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(selinux,
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-selinux],
+	[disable selinux support [default=auto]]),[], [])
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([udev],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-udev], [disable udev support]),
-	[], [enable_udev=yes])
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-udev],
+	[disable udev support]),[], enable_udev=yes)
 
 dnl Try to use pkg-config for devmapper, but fallback to old detection
 PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEVMAPPER], [devmapper >= 1.02.03],, [
@@ -465,11 +289,6 @@ LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 LIBS="$LIBS $DEVMAPPER_LIBS"
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_secure_data], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_retry_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_deferred_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_mounted_fs], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_holders], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_get_name], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([DM_DEVICE_GET_TARGET_VERSION], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG], [have_cookie=yes], [have_cookie=no], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 if test "x$enable_udev" = xyes; then
 	if test "x$have_cookie" = xno; then
@@ -480,33 +299,19 @@ if test "x$enable_udev" = xyes; then
 fi
 LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
-dnl Check for JSON-C used in LUKS2
-PKG_CHECK_MODULES([JSON_C], [json-c])
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([json_object_object_add_ex], [], [], [#include <json-c/json.h>])
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([json_object_deep_copy], [], [], [#include <json-c/json.h>])
-
-dnl Check for libssh and argp for SSH plugin
-if test "x$enable_ssh_token" = "xyes"; then
-	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBSSH], [libssh])
-	AC_CHECK_DECLS([ssh_session_is_known_server], [], [], [#include <libssh/libssh.h>])
-	AC_CHECK_HEADER([argp.h], [], AC_MSG_ERROR([You need argp library.]))
-	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
-	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([argp_parse],[argp])
-	AC_SUBST(ARGP_LIBS, $LIBS)
-	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
-fi
-
 dnl Crypto backend configuration.
 AC_ARG_WITH([crypto_backend],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-crypto_backend=BACKEND], [crypto backend (gcrypt/openssl/nss/kernel/nettle/mbedtls) [openssl]]),
-	[], [with_crypto_backend=openssl])
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-crypto_backend=BACKEND], [crypto backend (gcrypt/openssl/nss/kernel/nettle) [gcrypt]]),
+	[], with_crypto_backend=gcrypt
+)
 
 dnl Kernel crypto API backend needed for benchmark and tcrypt
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([kernel_crypto],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-kernel_crypto], [disable kernel userspace crypto (no benchmark and tcrypt)]),
-	[], [enable_kernel_crypto=yes])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([kernel_crypto], AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-kernel_crypto],
+	[disable kernel userspace crypto (no benchmark and tcrypt)]),
+	[with_kernel_crypto=$enableval],
+	[with_kernel_crypto=yes])
 
-if test "x$enable_kernel_crypto" = "xyes"; then
+if test "x$with_kernel_crypto" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/if_alg.h,,
 		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with userspace crypto interface. (Or use --disable-kernel_crypto.)])])
 	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_AF_ALG, 1, [Enable using of kernel userspace crypto])
@@ -518,121 +323,19 @@ case $with_crypto_backend in
 	nss)     CONFIGURE_NSS([]) ;;
 	kernel)  CONFIGURE_KERNEL([]) ;;
 	nettle)  CONFIGURE_NETTLE([]) ;;
-	mbedtls) CONFIGURE_MBEDTLS([]) ;;
 	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown crypto backend.]) ;;
 esac
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "gcrypt")
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_OPENSSL, test "$with_crypto_backend" = "openssl")
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NSS,     test "$with_crypto_backend" = "nss")
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_KERNEL,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "kernel")
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "nettle")
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_MBEDTLS, test "$with_crypto_backend" = "mbedtls")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT,  test $with_crypto_backend = gcrypt)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_OPENSSL, test $with_crypto_backend = openssl)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NSS,     test $with_crypto_backend = nss)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_KERNEL,  test $with_crypto_backend = kernel)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE,  test $with_crypto_backend = nettle)
 
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_PBKDF2, test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 1)
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2, [$use_internal_pbkdf2], [Use internal PBKDF2])
 
-dnl Argon2 implementation
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([internal-argon2],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-internal-argon2], [disable internal implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]),
-	[], [enable_internal_argon2=yes])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([libargon2],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-libargon2], [enable external libargon2 (PHC) library (disables internal bundled version)]))
-
-if test $use_internal_argon2 = 0 || ( test "x$enable_internal_argon2" = "xno" && test "x$enable_libargon2" != "xyes" ); then
-	if test "x$enable_internal_argon2" = "xyes" || test "x$enable_libargon2" = "xyes"; then
-		AC_MSG_NOTICE([Argon2 in $with_crypto_backend lib is used; internal Argon2 options are ignored.])
-	fi
-	enable_internal_argon2=no
-	enable_internal_sse_argon2=no
-	enable_libargon2=no
-	use_internal_argon2=0
-elif test "x$enable_libargon2" = "xyes" ; then
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(argon2.h,,
-		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need libargon2 development library installed.])])
-	AC_CHECK_DECL(Argon2_id,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need more recent Argon2 library with support for Argon2id.])], [#include <argon2.h>])
-	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBARGON2], [libargon2],,[LIBARGON2_LIBS="-largon2"])
-	enable_internal_argon2=no
-	use_internal_argon2=0
-else
-	AC_MSG_WARN([Argon2 bundled (slow) reference implementation will be used, please consider to use system library with --enable-libargon2.])
-
-	AC_ARG_ENABLE([internal-sse-argon2],
-		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-internal-sse-argon2], [enable internal SSE implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]))
-
-	if test "x$enable_internal_sse_argon2" = "xyes"; then
-		AC_MSG_CHECKING(if Argon2 SSE optimization can be used)
-		AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-			#include <emmintrin.h>
-			__m128i testfunc(__m128i *a, __m128i *b) {
-			  return _mm_xor_si128(_mm_loadu_si128(a), _mm_loadu_si128(b));
-			}
-		]])],,[enable_internal_sse_argon2=no])
-		AC_MSG_RESULT($enable_internal_sse_argon2)
-	fi
-fi
-
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2, test "x$enable_internal_argon2" = "xyes")
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_SSE_ARGON2, test "x$enable_internal_sse_argon2" = "xyes")
-dnl If libargon is in use, we have defined HAVE_ARGON2_H
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(USE_INTERNAL_ARGON2, [$use_internal_argon2], [Use internal Argon2])
-
-dnl Link with blkid to check for other device types
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([blkid],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-blkid], [disable use of blkid for device signature detection and wiping]),
-	[], [enable_blkid=yes])
-
-if test "x$enable_blkid" = "xyes"; then
-	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([BLKID], [blkid],[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BLKID], 1, [Define to 1 to use blkid for detection of disk signatures.])],[LIBBLKID_LIBS="-lblkid"])
-
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(blkid/blkid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need blkid development library installed.])])
-	AC_CHECK_DECL([blkid_do_wipe],
-		      [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BLKID_WIPE], 1, [Define to 1 to use blkid_do_wipe.])
-			enable_blkid_wipe=yes
-		      ],,
-		      [#include <blkid/blkid.h>])
-	AC_CHECK_DECL([blkid_probe_step_back],
-		      [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BLKID_STEP_BACK], 1, [Define to 1 to use blkid_probe_step_back.])
-			enable_blkid_step_back=yes
-		      ],,
-		      [#include <blkid/blkid.h>])
-	AC_CHECK_DECLS([ blkid_reset_probe,
-			 blkid_probe_set_device,
-			 blkid_probe_filter_superblocks_type,
-			 blkid_do_safeprobe,
-			 blkid_do_probe,
-			 blkid_probe_lookup_value
-		       ],,
-		       [AC_MSG_ERROR([Can not compile with blkid support, disable it by --disable-blkid.])],
-		       [#include <blkid/blkid.h>])
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID, test "x$enable_blkid" = "xyes")
-AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID_WIPE, test "x$enable_blkid_wipe" = "xyes")
-AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID_STEP_BACK, test "x$enable_blkid_step_back" = "xyes")
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([hw-opal],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-hw-opal], [disable use of hardware-backed OPAL for device encryption]),
-	[],
-	[enable_hw_opal=yes])
-
-if test "x$enable_hw_opal" = "xyes"; then
-	have_opal=yes
-	AC_CHECK_DECLS([ OPAL_FL_SUM_SUPPORTED,
-			 IOC_OPAL_GET_LR_STATUS,
-			 IOC_OPAL_GET_GEOMETRY
-		       ],
-		       [],
-		       [have_opal=no],
-		       [#include <linux/sed-opal.h>])
-	if test "x$have_opal" = "xyes"; then
-		AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HW_OPAL], 1, [Define to 1 to enable OPAL support.])
-	else
-		AC_MSG_WARN([Can not compile with OPAL support, kernel headers are too old, requires v6.4.])
-	fi
-fi
-
 dnl Magic for cryptsetup.static build.
-if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 	saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
 	PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --static"
 
@@ -644,7 +347,7 @@ if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
 	LIBS="$saved_LIBS -static"
 	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEVMAPPER_STATIC], [devmapper >= 1.02.27],,[
 		DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS=$DEVMAPPER_LIBS
-		if test "x$enable_selinux" = "xyes"; then
+		if test "x$enable_selinux" != xno; then
 			AC_CHECK_LIB(sepol, sepol_bool_set)
 			AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled)
 			DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS="$DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS $LIBS"
@@ -663,55 +366,6 @@ if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
 	PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
 fi
 
-dnl Check compiler support for symver function attribute
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for symver attribute support])
-saved_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
-CFLAGS="-O0 -Werror"
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-	void _test_sym(void);
-	__attribute__((__symver__("sym@VERSION_4.2"))) void _test_sym(void) {}
-]],
-[[ _test_sym() ]]
-)],[
-	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_SYMVER], 1, [Define to 1 to use __attribute__((symver))])
-	AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-], [
-	AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-])
-CFLAGS=$saved_CFLAGS
-
-dnl Force compiler to use zero_call_used_regs("used") to check for the function attribute support.
-dnl Otherwise the compiler may falsely advertise it with __has_attribute operator, even though
-dnl it does not implement it on some archs.
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for zero_call_used_regs(user)])
-saved_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
-CFLAGS="-O0 -Werror"
-AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-	void _test_function(void);
-	__attribute__((zero_call_used_regs("used"))) void _test_function(void) {
-		volatile int *i; volatile int j = 0; if (j) *i = 0;
-	}
-]],
-[[ _test_function() ]]
-)],[
-	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_ZEROCALLUSEDREGS], 1, [Define to 1 to use __attribute__((zero_call_used_regs("used")))])
-	AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-], [
-	AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-])
-CFLAGS=$saved_CFLAGS
-
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for systemd tmpfiles config directory])
-if test "x$prefix" != "xNONE"; then
-	saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
-	PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --define-variable=prefix='${prefix}'"
-	PKG_CHECK_VAR([systemd_tmpfilesdir], [systemd], [tmpfilesdir], [], [systemd_tmpfilesdir=no])
-	PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
-else
-	PKG_CHECK_VAR([systemd_tmpfilesdir], [systemd], [tmpfilesdir], [], [systemd_tmpfilesdir=no])
-fi
-AC_MSG_RESULT([$systemd_tmpfilesdir])
-
 AC_SUBST([DEVMAPPER_LIBS])
 AC_SUBST([DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS])
 
@@ -724,39 +378,13 @@ AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_CFLAGS])
 AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_LIBS])
 AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS])
 
-AC_SUBST([JSON_C_LIBS])
-AC_SUBST([LIBARGON2_LIBS])
-AC_SUBST([BLKID_LIBS])
-
-AC_SUBST([LIBSSH_LIBS])
-
 AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION])
 AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO])
 
-dnl Set Requires.private for libcryptsetup.pc
-dnl pwquality is used only by tools
-PKGMODULES="uuid devmapper json-c"
-case $with_crypto_backend in
-	gcrypt)  PKGMODULES="$PKGMODULES libgcrypt" ;;
-	openssl) PKGMODULES="$PKGMODULES openssl" ;;
-	nss)     PKGMODULES="$PKGMODULES nss" ;;
-	nettle)  PKGMODULES="$PKGMODULES nettle" ;;
-esac
-if test "x$enable_libargon2" = "xyes"; then
-	PKGMODULES="$PKGMODULES libargon2"
-fi
-if test "x$enable_blkid" = "xyes"; then
-	PKGMODULES="$PKGMODULES blkid"
-fi
-AC_SUBST([PKGMODULES])
 dnl ==========================================================================
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([dev-random],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-dev-random], [use /dev/random by default for key generation (otherwise use /dev/urandom)]))
-if test "x$enable_dev_random" = "xyes"; then
-	default_rng=/dev/random
-else
-	default_rng=/dev/urandom
-fi
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([dev-random], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-dev-random],
+[use blocking /dev/random by default for key generator (otherwise use /dev/urandom)]),
+[default_rng=/dev/random], [default_rng=/dev/urandom])
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEFAULT_RNG, ["$default_rng"], [default RNG type for key generator])
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
@@ -776,115 +404,68 @@ AC_DEFUN([CS_NUM_WITH], [AC_ARG_WITH([$1],
 	[CS_DEFINE([$1], [$3], [$2])]
 )])
 
-AC_DEFUN([CS_ABSPATH], [
-	case "$1" in
-		/*) ;;
-		*) AC_MSG_ERROR([$2 argument must be an absolute path.]);;
-	esac
-])
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl Python bindings
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([python], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-python],[enable Python bindings]),
+[with_python=$enableval],
+[with_python=no])
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([python_version],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-python_version=VERSION], [required Python version [2.6]]),
+	[PYTHON_VERSION=$withval], [PYTHON_VERSION=2.6])
+
+if test "x$with_python" = "xyes"; then
+	AM_PATH_PYTHON([$PYTHON_VERSION])
+
+	if ! test -x "$PYTHON-config" ; then
+            AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find python development packages to build bindings])
+	fi
+
+	PYTHON_INCLUDES=$($PYTHON-config --includes)
+	AC_SUBST(PYTHON_INCLUDES)
+
+	PYTHON_LIBS=$($PYTHON-config --libs)
+	AC_SUBST(PYTHON_LIBS)
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL([PYTHON_CRYPTSETUP], [test "x$with_python" = "xyes"])
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
-CS_STR_WITH([plain-hash],   [password hashing function for plain mode], [sha256])
+CS_STR_WITH([plain-hash],   [password hashing function for plain mode], [ripemd160])
 CS_STR_WITH([plain-cipher], [cipher for plain mode], [aes])
-CS_STR_WITH([plain-mode],   [cipher mode for plain mode], [xts-plain64])
+CS_STR_WITH([plain-mode],   [cipher mode for plain mode], [cbc-essiv:sha256])
 CS_NUM_WITH([plain-keybits],[key length in bits for plain mode], [256])
 
 CS_STR_WITH([luks1-hash],   [hash function for LUKS1 header], [sha256])
 CS_STR_WITH([luks1-cipher], [cipher for LUKS1], [aes])
 CS_STR_WITH([luks1-mode],   [cipher mode for LUKS1], [xts-plain64])
 CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-keybits],[key length in bits for LUKS1], [256])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([luks_adjust_xts_keysize], AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-luks-adjust-xts-keysize],
-	[XTS mode requires two keys, double default LUKS keysize if needed]),
-	[], [enable_luks_adjust_xts_keysize=yes])
-if test "x$enable_luks_adjust_xts_keysize" = "xyes"; then
-	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE, 1, [XTS mode - double default LUKS keysize if needed])
-fi
-
-CS_STR_WITH([luks2-pbkdf],           [Default PBKDF algorithm (pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id) for LUKS2], [argon2id])
-CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-iter-time],       [PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS1 (in ms)], [2000])
-CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-iter-time],       [Argon2 PBKDF iteration time for LUKS2 (in ms)], [2000])
-CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-memory-kb],       [Argon2 PBKDF memory cost for LUKS2 (in kB)], [1048576])
-CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-parallel-threads],[Argon2 PBKDF max parallel cost for LUKS2 (if CPUs available)], [4])
-
-CS_STR_WITH([luks2-keyslot-cipher], [fallback cipher for LUKS2 keyslot (if data encryption is incompatible)], [aes-xts-plain64])
-CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-keyslot-keybits],[fallback key size for LUKS2 keyslot (if data encryption is incompatible)], [512])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-iter-time],[PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS1 (in ms)], [2000])
 
 CS_STR_WITH([loopaes-cipher], [cipher for loop-AES mode], [aes])
 CS_NUM_WITH([loopaes-keybits],[key length in bits for loop-AES mode], [256])
 
 CS_NUM_WITH([keyfile-size-maxkb],[maximum keyfile size (in KiB)], [8192])
-CS_NUM_WITH([integrity-keyfile-size-maxkb],[maximum integritysetup keyfile size (in KiB)], [4])
-CS_NUM_WITH([passphrase-size-max],[maximum passphrase size (in characters)], [512])
+CS_NUM_WITH([passphrase-size-max],[maximum keyfile size (in characters)], [512])
 
 CS_STR_WITH([verity-hash],       [hash function for verity mode], [sha256])
 CS_NUM_WITH([verity-data-block], [data block size for verity mode], [4096])
 CS_NUM_WITH([verity-hash-block], [hash block size for verity mode], [4096])
 CS_NUM_WITH([verity-salt-size],  [salt size for verity mode], [32])
-CS_NUM_WITH([verity-fec-roots],  [parity bytes for verity FEC], [2])
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([tmpfilesdir],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-tmpfilesdir=DIR], [override default path to directory with systemd temporary files]),
-	[], [with_tmpfilesdir=$systemd_tmpfilesdir])
-test "x$with_tmpfilesdir" = "xno" || {
-	CS_ABSPATH([${with_tmpfilesdir}],[with-tmpfilesdir])
-	DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR=$with_tmpfilesdir
-	AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR)
-}
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTSETUP_TMPFILE, test -n "$DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR")
-
-CS_STR_WITH([luks2-lock-path], [path to directory for LUKSv2 locks], [/run/cryptsetup])
-test -z "$with_luks2_lock_path" && with_luks2_lock_path=/run/cryptsetup
-CS_ABSPATH([${with_luks2_lock_path}],[with-luks2-lock-path])
-DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH=$with_luks2_lock_path
-AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH)
-
-CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-lock-dir-perms], [default luks2 locking directory permissions], [0700])
-test -z "$with_luks2_lock_dir_perms" && with_luks2_lock_dir_perms=0700
-DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS=$with_luks2_lock_dir_perms
-AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS)
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([luks2-external-tokens-path],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-luks2-external-tokens-path=DIR], [path to directory with LUKSv2 external token handlers (plugins)]),
-	[], [with_luks2_external_tokens_path=""])
-if test -n "$with_luks2_external_tokens_path"; then
-	CS_ABSPATH([${with_luks2_external_tokens_path}],[with-luks2-external-tokens-path])
-	EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH=$with_luks2_external_tokens_path
-else
-	EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH="\${libdir}/cryptsetup"
-fi
-AC_SUBST(EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH)
-dnl We need to define expanded EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH, but some other code can depend on prefix=NONE.
-dnl Pretend you do not see this hack :-)
-saved_prefix=$prefix
-saved_exec_prefix=$exec_prefix
-test "x$prefix" = "xNONE" && prefix="$ac_default_prefix"
-test "x$exec_prefix" = "xNONE" && exec_prefix="$prefix"
-expanded_EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH=$(eval echo "$EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH")
-expanded_EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH=$(eval echo "$expanded_EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH")
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH], ["$expanded_EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH"], [path to directory with LUKSv2 external token handlers (plugins)])
-prefix=$saved_prefix
-exec_prefix=$saved_exec_prefix
-
-dnl Override default LUKS format version (for cryptsetup or cryptsetup-reencrypt format actions only).
-AC_ARG_WITH([default_luks_format],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-default-luks-format=FORMAT], [default LUKS format version (LUKS1/LUKS2) [LUKS2]]),
-	[], [with_default_luks_format=LUKS2])
-
-case $with_default_luks_format in
-	LUKS1) default_luks=CRYPT_LUKS1 ;;
-	LUKS2) default_luks=CRYPT_LUKS2 ;;
-	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown default LUKS format. Use LUKS1 or LUKS2 only.]) ;;
-esac
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([DEFAULT_LUKS_FORMAT], [$default_luks], [default LUKS format version])
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 
 AC_CONFIG_FILES([ Makefile
+lib/Makefile
 lib/libcryptsetup.pc
+lib/crypto_backend/Makefile
+lib/luks1/Makefile
+lib/loopaes/Makefile
+lib/verity/Makefile
+lib/tcrypt/Makefile
+src/Makefile
 po/Makefile.in
-scripts/cryptsetup.conf
+man/Makefile
 tests/Makefile
-tests/fuzz/Makefile
+python/Makefile
 ])
 AC_OUTPUT

docs/ChangeLog.old

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
 2012-03-16  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
 	* Add --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset parameters to API and CLI.
 	* Add repair command and crypt_repair() for known LUKS metadata problems repair.
-	* Allow one to specify --align-payload only for luksFormat.
+	* Allow to specify --align-payload only for luksFormat.
 
 2012-03-16  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
 	* Unify password verification option.
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
 	* Document cryptsetup exit codes.
 
 2011-03-18  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
-	* Respect maximum keyfile size parameter.
+	* Respect maximum keyfile size paramater.
 	* Introduce maximum default keyfile size, add configure option.
 	* Require the whole key read from keyfile in create command (broken in 1.2.0).
 	* Fix offset option for loopaesOpen.
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
 
 2011-03-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
 	* Add exception to COPYING for binary distribution linked with OpenSSL library.
-	* Set secure data flag (wipe all ioctl buffers) if devmapper library supports it.
+	* Set secure data flag (wipe all ioclt buffers) if devmapper library supports it.
 
 2011-01-29  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
 	* Fix mapping removal if device disappeared but node still exists.
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@
 	* Fix password callback call.
 	* Fix default plain password entry from terminal in activate_by_passphrase.
 	* Add --dump-master-key option for luksDump to allow volume key dump.
-	* Allow one to activate by internally cached volume key
+	* Allow to activate by internally cached volume key
 	  (format/activate without keyslots active - used for temporary devices).
 	* Initialize volume key from active device in crypt_init_by_name()
 	* Fix cryptsetup binary exitcodes.
@@ -334,13 +334,13 @@
 	* Version 1.1.0.
 
 2010-01-10  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
-	* Fix initialisation of gcrypt during luksFormat.
-	* Convert hash name to lower case in header (fix sha1 backward compatible header)
+	* Fix initialisation of gcrypt duting luksFormat.
+	* Convert hash name to lower case in header (fix sha1 backward comatible header)
 	* Check for minimum required gcrypt version.
 
 2009-12-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
 	* Fix key slot iteration count calculation (small -i value was the same as default).
-	* The slot and key digest iteration minimum is now 1000.
+	* The slot and key digest iteration minimun is now 1000.
 	* The key digest iteration # is calculated from iteration time (approx 1/8 of that).
 	* Version 1.1.0-rc4.
 
@@ -395,16 +395,16 @@
 	* Require device device-mapper to build and do not use backend wrapper for dm calls.
 	* Move memory locking and dm initialization to command layer.
 	* Increase priority of process if memory is locked.
-	* Add log macros and make logging more consistent.
+	* Add log macros and make logging modre consitent.
 	* Move command successful messages to verbose level.
 	* Introduce --debug parameter.
 	* Move device utils code and provide context parameter (for log).
 	* Keyfile now must be provided by path, only stdin file descriptor is used (api only).
 	* Do not call isatty() on closed keyfile descriptor.
-	* Run performance check for PBKDF2 from LUKS code, do not mix hash algorithms results.
+	* Run performance check for PBKDF2 from LUKS code, do not mix hash algoritms results.
 	* Add ability to provide pre-generated master key and UUID in LUKS header format.
 	* Add LUKS function to verify master key digest.
-	* Move key slot manipulation function into LUKS specific code.
+	* Move key slot manuipulation function into LUKS specific code.
 	* Replace global options struct with separate parameters in helper functions.
 	* Add new libcryptsetup API (documented in libcryptsetup.h).
 	* Implement old API calls using new functions.
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@
 	* Add --master-key-file option for luksFormat and luksAddKey.
 
 2009-08-17  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
-	* Fix PBKDF2 speed calculation for large passphrases.
+	* Fix PBKDF2 speed calculation for large passhrases.
 	* Allow using passphrase provided in options struct for LuksOpen.
 	* Allow restrict keys size in LuksOpen.
 
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@
 	* Switch PBKDF2 from internal SHA1 to libgcrypt, make hash algorithm not hardcoded to SHA1 here.
 	* Add required parameters for changing hash used in LUKS key setup scheme.
 	* Do not export simple XOR helper now used only inside AF functions.
-	* Completely remove internal SHA1 implementation code, not needed anymore.
+	* Completely remove internal SHA1 implementanion code, not needed anymore.
 	* Enable hash algorithm selection for LUKS through -h luksFormat option.
 
 2009-07-28  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@
 
 2006-03-15  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* configure.in: 1.0.3-rc3. Most displease release ever. 
+	* configure.in: 1.0.3-rc3. Most unplease release ever. 
 	* lib/setup.c (__crypt_create_device): More verbose error message.
 
 2006-02-26  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@
 
 2005-12-06  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* man/cryptsetup.8: Correct "seconds" to "microseconds" in the explanation for -i.
+	* man/cryptsetup.8: Correct "seconds" to "microseconds" in the explaination for -i.
 
 2005-11-09  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@
 
 2005-09-08  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Fixed another incompatibility with
+	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Fixed another incompatiblity with
 	original cryptsetup.
 
 2005-08-20  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@
 
 	* man/cryptsetup.1: Add man page.
 
-	* lib/setup.c: Remove unnecessary LUKS_write_phdr call, so the
+	* lib/setup.c: Remove unneccessary LUKS_write_phdr call, so the
 	phdr is written after passphrase reading, so the user can change
 	his mind, and not have a partial written LUKS header on it's disk.
 

docs/Keyring.txt

@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-Integration with kernel keyring service
----------------------------------------
-
-We have two different use cases for kernel keyring service:
-
-I) Volume keys
-
-Since upstream kernel 4.10 dm-crypt device mapper target allows loading volume
-key (VK) in kernel keyring service. The key offloaded in kernel keyring service
-is only referenced (by key description) in dm-crypt target and the VK is therefore
-no longer stored directly in dm-crypt target. Starting with cryptsetup 2.0 we
-load VK in kernel keyring by default for LUKSv2 devices (when dm-crypt with the
-feature is available).
-
-Currently, cryptsetup loads VK in 'logon' type kernel key so that VK is passed in
-the kernel and can't be read from userspace afterwards. Also, cryptsetup loads VK in
-the thread keyring (before passing the reference to dm-crypt target) so that the key
-lifetime is directly bound to the process that performs the dm-crypt setup. When
-cryptsetup process exits (for whatever reason) the key gets unlinked in the kernel
-automatically. In summary, the key description visible in dm-crypt table line is
-a reference to VK that usually no longer exists in kernel keyring service if you
-used cryptsetup for device activation.
-
-Using this feature dm-crypt no longer maintains a direct key copy (but there's
-always at least one copy in the kernel crypto layer).
-
-Additionally, libcryptsetup supports the linking of volume keys to
-user-specified kernel keyring with crypt_set_keyring_to_link(). The user may
-specify keyring name, key type ('user' or 'logon') and key description where
-libcryptsetup should link the verified volume key upon subsequent device
-activation (or key verification alone).
-
-The volume key(s) (provided the key type is 'user') linked in the user keyring
-can be later used to activate the device via crypt_activate_by_keyslot_context()
-with CRYPT_KC_TYPE_VK_KEYRING type keyslot context
-(acquired by crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_vk_in_keyring()).
-
-Example of how to use volume key linked in custom user keyring from cryptsetup
-utility:
-
-1) Open the device and store the volume key to the session keyring:
-# cryptsetup open <device> --link-vk-to-keyring "@s::%user:testkey" tst
-
-2) Add a keyslot using the stored volume key in a keyring:
-# cryptsetup luksAddKey <device> --volume-key-keyring "%user:testkey"
-
-3) Activate the device using the volume key cached in a keyring ('user' type key)
-# cryptsetup open <device> <active_name> --volume-key-keyring "testkey"
-
-II) Keyslot passphrase
-The second use case for kernel keyring is to allow cryptsetup reading the keyslot
-passphrase stored in kernel keyring instead. The user may load the passphrase in the kernel
-keyring and notify cryptsetup to read it from there later. Currently, cryptsetup
-cli supports kernel keyring for passphrase only via LUKS2 internal token
-(luks2-keyring). The library also provides a general method for device activation by
-reading the passphrase from the keyring: crypt_activate_by_keyring(). The key type
-for use case II) must always be 'user' since we need to read the actual key
-data from userspace unlike with VK in I). The ability to read keyslot passphrases
-from kernel keyring also allows easy auto-activate LUKS2 devices.
-
-Simple example of how to use kernel keyring for keyslot passphrase:
-
-1) create LUKS2 keyring token for keyslot 0 (in LUKS2 device/image)
-cryptsetup token add --key-description my:key -S 0 /dev/device
-
-2) Load keyslot passphrase in user keyring
-read -s -p "Keyslot passphrase: "; echo -n $REPLY | keyctl padd user my:key @u
-
-3) Activate the device using the passphrase stored in the kernel keyring
-cryptsetup open /dev/device my_unlocked_device
-
-4a) unlink the key when no longer needed by
-keyctl unlink %user:my:key @u
-
-4b) or revoke it immediately by
-keyctl revoke %user:my:key
-
-If cryptsetup asks for a passphrase in step 3) something went wrong with keyring
-activation. See --debug output then.

docs/LUKS2-locking.txt

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-LUKS2 device locking overview
-=============================
-
-Why
-~~~
-
-LUKS2 format keeps two identical copies of metadata stored consecutively
-at the head of the metadata device (file or bdev). The metadata
-area (both copies) must be updated in a single atomic operation to avoid
-header corruption during concurrent write.
-
-While with LUKS1 users may have clear knowledge of when a LUKS header is
-being updated (written to) or when it's being read solely the need for
-locking with legacy format was not so obvious as it is with the LUKSv2 format.
-
-With LUKS2 the boundary between read-only and read-write is blurry and what
-used to be the exclusively read-only operation (i.e., cryptsetup open command) may
-easily become read-update operation silently without the user's knowledge.
-A major feature of the LUKS2 format is resilience against accidental
-corruption of metadata (i.e., partial header overwrite by parted or cfdisk
-while creating a partition on a mistaken block device).
-Such header corruption is detected early on the header read and the auto-recovery
-procedure takes place (the corrupted header with checksum mismatch is being
-replaced by the secondary one if that one is intact).
-On current Linux systems header load operation may be triggered without the user
-direct intervention for example by an udev rule or from a systemd service.
-Such a clash of header read and auto-recovery procedure could have severe
-consequences with the worst case of having a LUKS2 device inaccessible or being
-broken beyond repair.
-
-The whole locking of LUKSv2 device headers split into two categories depending
-what backend the header is stored on:
-
-I) block device
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-We perform flock() on file descriptors of files stored in a private
-directory (by default /run/lock/cryptsetup). The file name is derived
-from major:minor couple of the affected block device. Note we recommend
-that access to the private locking directory is supposed to be limited
-to the superuser only. For this method to work the distribution needs
-to install the locking directory with appropriate access rights.
-
-II) regular files
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-A first notable difference between headers stored in a file
-vs. headers stored in a block device is that headers in a file may be
-manipulated by the regular user, unlike headers on block devices. Therefore
-we perform flock() protection on file with the luks2 header directly.
-
-Limitations
-~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-a) In general, the locking model provides serialization of I/Os targeting
-the header only. It means the header is always written or read at once
-while locking is enabled.
-We do not suppress any other negative effect that two or more concurrent
-writers of the same header may cause.
-
-b) The locking is not cluster-aware in any way.
-
-Additional LUKS2 locks
-======================
-
-LUKS2 reencryption device lock
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-Device in LUKS2 reencryption is protected by an exclusive lock placed in the default
-locking directory. The lock's purpose is to exclude multiple processes from
-performing reencryption on the same device (identified by LUKS uuid). The lock
-is taken no matter the LUKS2 reencryption mode (online or offline).
-
-LUKS2 memory hard global lock
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-An optional global lock that makes libcryptsetup serialize memory hard
-pbkdf function when deriving a key encryption key from passphrase on unlocking
-LUKS2 keyslot. The lock has to be enabled via the CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF
-flag. The lock is placed in the default locking directory.
-
-LUKS2 OPAL lock
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-Exclusive per device lock taken when manipulating LUKS2 device configured for use with
-SED OPAL2 locking range.
-
-Lock ordering
-=============
-
-To avoid a deadlock following rules must apply:
-
-- LUKS2 reencrytpion lock must be taken before LUKS2 OPAL lock.
-
-- LUKS2 OPAL lock must be taken before LUKS2 metadata lock.
-
-- LUKS2 memory hard global lock can not be used with other locks.

docs/doxyfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Doxyfile 1.9.8
+# Doxyfile 1.7.4
 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Project related configuration options
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ PROJECT_BRIEF          = "Public cryptsetup API"
 PROJECT_LOGO           =
 OUTPUT_DIRECTORY       = doxygen_api_docs
 CREATE_SUBDIRS         = NO
-CREATE_SUBDIRS_LEVEL   = 8
-ALLOW_UNICODE_NAMES    = NO
 OUTPUT_LANGUAGE        = English
 BRIEF_MEMBER_DESC      = YES
 REPEAT_BRIEF           = YES
@@ -23,10 +21,8 @@ STRIP_FROM_PATH        =
 STRIP_FROM_INC_PATH    =
 SHORT_NAMES            = NO
 JAVADOC_AUTOBRIEF      = NO
-JAVADOC_BANNER         = NO
 QT_AUTOBRIEF           = NO
 MULTILINE_CPP_IS_BRIEF = NO
-PYTHON_DOCSTRING       = YES
 INHERIT_DOCS           = YES
 SEPARATE_MEMBER_PAGES  = NO
 TAB_SIZE               = 8
@@ -35,37 +31,25 @@ OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C  = YES
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_JAVA   = NO
 OPTIMIZE_FOR_FORTRAN   = NO
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_VHDL   = NO
-OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_SLICE  = NO
 EXTENSION_MAPPING      =
-MARKDOWN_SUPPORT       = YES
-TOC_INCLUDE_HEADINGS   = 5
-MARKDOWN_ID_STYLE      = DOXYGEN
-AUTOLINK_SUPPORT       = YES
 BUILTIN_STL_SUPPORT    = NO
 CPP_CLI_SUPPORT        = NO
 SIP_SUPPORT            = NO
 IDL_PROPERTY_SUPPORT   = YES
 DISTRIBUTE_GROUP_DOC   = NO
-GROUP_NESTED_COMPOUNDS = NO
 SUBGROUPING            = YES
 INLINE_GROUPED_CLASSES = NO
-INLINE_SIMPLE_STRUCTS  = NO
 TYPEDEF_HIDES_STRUCT   = YES
-LOOKUP_CACHE_SIZE      = 0
-NUM_PROC_THREADS       = 1
-TIMESTAMP              = NO
+SYMBOL_CACHE_SIZE      = 0
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Build related configuration options
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 EXTRACT_ALL            = NO
 EXTRACT_PRIVATE        = NO
-EXTRACT_PRIV_VIRTUAL   = NO
-EXTRACT_PACKAGE        = NO
 EXTRACT_STATIC         = NO
 EXTRACT_LOCAL_CLASSES  = YES
 EXTRACT_LOCAL_METHODS  = NO
 EXTRACT_ANON_NSPACES   = NO
-RESOLVE_UNNAMED_PARAMS = YES
 HIDE_UNDOC_MEMBERS     = NO
 HIDE_UNDOC_CLASSES     = NO
 HIDE_FRIEND_COMPOUNDS  = NO
@@ -73,10 +57,7 @@ HIDE_IN_BODY_DOCS      = NO
 INTERNAL_DOCS          = NO
 CASE_SENSE_NAMES       = YES
 HIDE_SCOPE_NAMES       = NO
-HIDE_COMPOUND_REFERENCE= NO
-SHOW_HEADERFILE        = YES
 SHOW_INCLUDE_FILES     = YES
-SHOW_GROUPED_MEMB_INC  = NO
 FORCE_LOCAL_INCLUDES   = NO
 INLINE_INFO            = YES
 SORT_MEMBER_DOCS       = YES
@@ -92,39 +73,33 @@ GENERATE_DEPRECATEDLIST= YES
 ENABLED_SECTIONS       =
 MAX_INITIALIZER_LINES  = 30
 SHOW_USED_FILES        = YES
+SHOW_DIRECTORIES       = NO
 SHOW_FILES             = YES
 SHOW_NAMESPACES        = YES
 FILE_VERSION_FILTER    =
 LAYOUT_FILE            =
-CITE_BIB_FILES         =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to warning and progress messages
+# configuration options related to warning and progress messages
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 QUIET                  = NO
 WARNINGS               = YES
 WARN_IF_UNDOCUMENTED   = YES
 WARN_IF_DOC_ERROR      = YES
-WARN_IF_INCOMPLETE_DOC = YES
 WARN_NO_PARAMDOC       = NO
-WARN_IF_UNDOC_ENUM_VAL = NO
-WARN_AS_ERROR          = NO
 WARN_FORMAT            = "$file:$line: $text"
-WARN_LINE_FORMAT       = "at line $line of file $file"
 WARN_LOGFILE           =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to the input files
+# configuration options related to the input files
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-INPUT                  = doxygen_index.h \
-                         ../lib/libcryptsetup.h
+INPUT                  = "doxygen_index" "../lib/libcryptsetup.h"
 INPUT_ENCODING         = UTF-8
-INPUT_FILE_ENCODING    =
 FILE_PATTERNS          =
 RECURSIVE              = NO
 EXCLUDE                =
 EXCLUDE_SYMLINKS       = NO
 EXCLUDE_PATTERNS       =
 EXCLUDE_SYMBOLS        =
-EXAMPLE_PATH           = examples
+EXAMPLE_PATH           = "examples"
 EXAMPLE_PATTERNS       =
 EXAMPLE_RECURSIVE      = NO
 IMAGE_PATH             =
@@ -132,10 +107,8 @@ INPUT_FILTER           =
 FILTER_PATTERNS        =
 FILTER_SOURCE_FILES    = NO
 FILTER_SOURCE_PATTERNS =
-USE_MDFILE_AS_MAINPAGE =
-FORTRAN_COMMENT_AFTER  = 72
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to source browsing
+# configuration options related to source browsing
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 SOURCE_BROWSER         = NO
 INLINE_SOURCES         = NO
@@ -143,20 +116,16 @@ STRIP_CODE_COMMENTS    = YES
 REFERENCED_BY_RELATION = NO
 REFERENCES_RELATION    = NO
 REFERENCES_LINK_SOURCE = YES
-SOURCE_TOOLTIPS        = YES
 USE_HTAGS              = NO
 VERBATIM_HEADERS       = YES
-CLANG_ASSISTED_PARSING = NO
-CLANG_ADD_INC_PATHS    = YES
-CLANG_OPTIONS          =
-CLANG_DATABASE_PATH    =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to the alphabetical class index
+# configuration options related to the alphabetical class index
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ALPHABETICAL_INDEX     = YES
+COLS_IN_ALPHA_INDEX    = 5
 IGNORE_PREFIX          =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to the HTML output
+# configuration options related to the HTML output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_HTML          = YES
 HTML_OUTPUT            = html
@@ -164,19 +133,15 @@ HTML_FILE_EXTENSION    = .html
 HTML_HEADER            =
 HTML_FOOTER            =
 HTML_STYLESHEET        =
-HTML_EXTRA_STYLESHEET  =
 HTML_EXTRA_FILES       =
-HTML_COLORSTYLE        = AUTO_LIGHT
 HTML_COLORSTYLE_HUE    = 220
 HTML_COLORSTYLE_SAT    = 100
 HTML_COLORSTYLE_GAMMA  = 80
-HTML_DYNAMIC_MENUS     = YES
+HTML_TIMESTAMP         = YES
+HTML_ALIGN_MEMBERS     = YES
 HTML_DYNAMIC_SECTIONS  = NO
-HTML_CODE_FOLDING      = YES
-HTML_INDEX_NUM_ENTRIES = 100
 GENERATE_DOCSET        = NO
 DOCSET_FEEDNAME        = "Doxygen generated docs"
-DOCSET_FEEDURL         =
 DOCSET_BUNDLE_ID       = org.doxygen.Project
 DOCSET_PUBLISHER_ID    = org.doxygen.Publisher
 DOCSET_PUBLISHER_NAME  = Publisher
@@ -187,7 +152,6 @@ GENERATE_CHI           = NO
 CHM_INDEX_ENCODING     =
 BINARY_TOC             = NO
 TOC_EXPAND             = NO
-SITEMAP_URL            =
 GENERATE_QHP           = NO
 QCH_FILE               =
 QHP_NAMESPACE          = org.doxygen.Project
@@ -199,51 +163,36 @@ QHG_LOCATION           =
 GENERATE_ECLIPSEHELP   = NO
 ECLIPSE_DOC_ID         = org.doxygen.Project
 DISABLE_INDEX          = NO
-GENERATE_TREEVIEW      = NO
-FULL_SIDEBAR           = NO
 ENUM_VALUES_PER_LINE   = 4
+GENERATE_TREEVIEW      = NO
+USE_INLINE_TREES       = NO
 TREEVIEW_WIDTH         = 250
 EXT_LINKS_IN_WINDOW    = NO
-OBFUSCATE_EMAILS       = YES
-HTML_FORMULA_FORMAT    = png
 FORMULA_FONTSIZE       = 10
-FORMULA_MACROFILE      =
+FORMULA_TRANSPARENT    = YES
 USE_MATHJAX            = NO
-MATHJAX_VERSION        = MathJax_2
-MATHJAX_FORMAT         = HTML-CSS
 MATHJAX_RELPATH        = http://www.mathjax.org/mathjax
-MATHJAX_EXTENSIONS     =
-MATHJAX_CODEFILE       =
 SEARCHENGINE           = YES
 SERVER_BASED_SEARCH    = NO
-EXTERNAL_SEARCH        = NO
-SEARCHENGINE_URL       =
-SEARCHDATA_FILE        = searchdata.xml
-EXTERNAL_SEARCH_ID     =
-EXTRA_SEARCH_MAPPINGS  =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to the LaTeX output
+# configuration options related to the LaTeX output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_LATEX         = YES
 LATEX_OUTPUT           = latex
 LATEX_CMD_NAME         = latex
 MAKEINDEX_CMD_NAME     = makeindex
-LATEX_MAKEINDEX_CMD    = makeindex
 COMPACT_LATEX          = NO
 PAPER_TYPE             = a4
 EXTRA_PACKAGES         =
 LATEX_HEADER           =
 LATEX_FOOTER           =
-LATEX_EXTRA_STYLESHEET =
-LATEX_EXTRA_FILES      =
 PDF_HYPERLINKS         = YES
 USE_PDFLATEX           = YES
 LATEX_BATCHMODE        = NO
 LATEX_HIDE_INDICES     = NO
-LATEX_BIB_STYLE        = plain
-LATEX_EMOJI_DIRECTORY  =
+LATEX_SOURCE_CODE      = NO
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to the RTF output
+# configuration options related to the RTF output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_RTF           = NO
 RTF_OUTPUT             = rtf
@@ -252,37 +201,26 @@ RTF_HYPERLINKS         = NO
 RTF_STYLESHEET_FILE    =
 RTF_EXTENSIONS_FILE    =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to the man page output
+# configuration options related to the man page output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_MAN           = NO
 MAN_OUTPUT             = man
 MAN_EXTENSION          = .3
-MAN_SUBDIR             =
 MAN_LINKS              = NO
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to the XML output
+# configuration options related to the XML output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_XML           = NO
 XML_OUTPUT             = xml
+XML_SCHEMA             =
+XML_DTD                =
 XML_PROGRAMLISTING     = YES
-XML_NS_MEMB_FILE_SCOPE = NO
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to the DOCBOOK output
-#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-GENERATE_DOCBOOK       = NO
-DOCBOOK_OUTPUT         = docbook
-#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options for the AutoGen Definitions output
+# configuration options for the AutoGen Definitions output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_AUTOGEN_DEF   = NO
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to Sqlite3 output
-#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-GENERATE_SQLITE3       = NO
-SQLITE3_OUTPUT         = sqlite3
-SQLITE3_RECREATE_DB    = YES
-#---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to the Perl module output
+# configuration options related to the Perl module output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GENERATE_PERLMOD       = NO
 PERLMOD_LATEX          = NO
@@ -301,30 +239,28 @@ PREDEFINED             =
 EXPAND_AS_DEFINED      =
 SKIP_FUNCTION_MACROS   = YES
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to external references
+# Configuration::additions related to external references
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 TAGFILES               =
 GENERATE_TAGFILE       =
 ALLEXTERNALS           = NO
 EXTERNAL_GROUPS        = YES
-EXTERNAL_PAGES         = YES
+PERL_PATH              =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Configuration options related to diagram generator tools
+# Configuration options related to the dot tool
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+CLASS_DIAGRAMS         = YES
+MSCGEN_PATH            =
 HIDE_UNDOC_RELATIONS   = YES
 HAVE_DOT               = NO
 DOT_NUM_THREADS        = 0
-DOT_COMMON_ATTR        = "fontname=Helvetica,fontsize=10"
-DOT_EDGE_ATTR          = "labelfontname=Helvetica,labelfontsize=10"
-DOT_NODE_ATTR          = "shape=box,height=0.2,width=0.4"
+DOT_FONTNAME           = Helvetica
+DOT_FONTSIZE           = 10
 DOT_FONTPATH           =
 CLASS_GRAPH            = YES
 COLLABORATION_GRAPH    = YES
 GROUP_GRAPHS           = YES
 UML_LOOK               = NO
-UML_LIMIT_NUM_FIELDS   = 10
-DOT_UML_DETAILS        = NO
-DOT_WRAP_THRESHOLD     = 17
 TEMPLATE_RELATIONS     = NO
 INCLUDE_GRAPH          = YES
 INCLUDED_BY_GRAPH      = YES
@@ -332,20 +268,13 @@ CALL_GRAPH             = NO
 CALLER_GRAPH           = NO
 GRAPHICAL_HIERARCHY    = YES
 DIRECTORY_GRAPH        = YES
-DIR_GRAPH_MAX_DEPTH    = 1
 DOT_IMAGE_FORMAT       = png
-INTERACTIVE_SVG        = NO
 DOT_PATH               =
 DOTFILE_DIRS           =
-DIA_PATH               =
-DIAFILE_DIRS           =
-PLANTUML_JAR_PATH      =
-PLANTUML_CFG_FILE      =
-PLANTUML_INCLUDE_PATH  =
+MSCFILE_DIRS           =
 DOT_GRAPH_MAX_NODES    = 50
 MAX_DOT_GRAPH_DEPTH    = 0
+DOT_TRANSPARENT        = NO
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 GENERATE_LEGEND        = YES
 DOT_CLEANUP            = YES
-MSCGEN_TOOL            =
-MSCFILE_DIRS           =

docs/doxygen_index

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
-/*! \mainpage Cryptsetup API
+/**
+ * @mainpage Cryptsetup API
  *
- * <b>The</b> documentation covers public parts of cryptsetup API. In the following sections you'll find
+ * The documentation covers public parts of cryptsetup API. In the following sections you'll find
  * the examples that describe some features of cryptsetup API.
  * For more info about libcryptsetup API versions see
- * <a href="https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/ABI-tracker/timeline/libcryptsetup/index.html">API Tracker</a>.
+ * <a href="http://upstream-tracker.org/versions/libcryptsetup.html">Upstream Tracker</a>.
  *
  * <OL type="A">
  *	<LI>@ref cexamples "Cryptsetup API examples"</LI>
@@ -31,16 +32,18 @@
  * @section cexamples Cryptsetup API examples
  * 	@section cluks crypt_luks_usage - cryptsetup LUKS device type usage
  *	 	@subsection cinit crypt_init()
- *			Every time you need to do something with cryptsetup or dmcrypt device
+ *
+ *	  		Every time you need to do something with cryptsetup or dmcrypt device
  *			you need a valid context. The first step to start your work is
  *			@ref crypt_init call. You can call it either with path
  *			to the block device or path to the regular file. If you don't supply the path,
  *			empty context is initialized.
  *
  *		@subsection cformat crypt_format() - header and payload on mutual device
+ *
  *	 		This section covers basic use cases for formatting LUKS devices. Format operation
  *			sets device type in context and in case of LUKS header is written at the beginning
- *			of block device. In the example below we use the scenario where LUKS header and data
+ *			of block device. In the example bellow we use the scenario where LUKS header and data
  *			are both stored on the same device. There's also a possibility to store header and
  *			data separately.
  *
@@ -48,6 +51,7 @@
  *			overwrites part of the backing block device.
  *
  *		@subsection ckeys Keyslot operations examples
+ *
  *			After successful @ref crypt_format of LUKS device, volume key is not stored
  *			in a persistent way on the device. Keyslot area is an array beyond LUKS header, where
  *			volume key is stored in the encrypted form using user input passphrase. For more info about
@@ -56,27 +60,33 @@
  *			There are two basic methods to create a new keyslot:
  *
  *			@subsection ckeyslot_vol crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key()
+ *
  *				Creates a new keyslot directly by encrypting volume_key stored in the device
  *				context. Passphrase should be supplied or user is prompted if passphrase param is
  *				NULL.
  *
  *			@subsection ckeyslot_pass crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase()
+ *
  *				Creates a new keyslot for the volume key by opening existing active keyslot,
  *				extracting volume key from it and storing it into a new keyslot
  *				protected by a new passphrase
  *
  *		@subsection cload crypt_load()
+ *
  *			Function loads header from backing block device into device context.
  *
  *		@subsection cactivate crypt_activate_by_passphrase()
+ *
  *			Activates crypt device by user supplied password for keyslot containing the volume_key.
  *			If <I>keyslot</I> parameter is set to <I>CRYPT_ANY_SLOT</I> then all active keyslots
  *			are tried one by one until the volume key is found.
  *
  *	 	@subsection cactive_pars crypt_get_active_device()
+ *
  *	 		This call returns structure containing runtime attributes of active device.
  *
  *	 	@subsection cinit_by_name crypt_init_by_name()
+ *
  *	 		In case you need to do operations with active device (device which already
  *	 		has its corresponding mapping) and you miss valid device context stored in
  *	 		*crypt_device reference, you should use this call. Function tries to
@@ -84,18 +94,22 @@
  *	 		header.
  *
  *			@subsection cdeactivate crypt_deactivate()
+ *
  *			Deactivates crypt device (removes DM mapping and safely erases volume key from kernel).
  *
  *		@subsection cluks_ex crypt_luks_usage.c - Complex example
+ *
  *			To compile and run use following commands in examples directory:
  *
  * @code
  * make
  * ./crypt_luks_usage _path_to_[block_device]_file
  * @endcode
+ *
  *			Note that you need to have the cryptsetup library compiled. @include crypt_luks_usage.c
  *
  *	@section clog crypt_log_usage - cryptsetup logging API example
+ *
  *		Example describes basic use case for cryptsetup logging. To compile and run
  * 		use following commands in examples directory:
  *
@@ -103,6 +117,7 @@
  * make
  * ./crypt_log_usage
  * @endcode
+ *
  *		Note that you need to have the cryptsetup library compiled. @include crypt_log_usage.c
  *
  *		@example crypt_luks_usage.c

docs/examples/crypt_log_usage.c

@@ -1,8 +1,21 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
 /*
- * libcryptsetup API log example
+ * An example of using logging through libcryptsetup API
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2025 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -12,8 +25,10 @@
 #include <libcryptsetup.h>
 
 /*
- * This is an example of crypt_set_log_callback API callback.
+ * This is an example of function that can be registered using crypt_set_log_callback API.
  *
+ * Its prototype is void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr) as defined
+ * in crypt_set_log_callback
  */
 static void simple_syslog_wrapper(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
 {
@@ -56,7 +71,7 @@ int main(void)
 		return 2;
 	}
 
-	/* crypt_set_log_callback() - register a log callback for crypt context */
+	/* crypt_set_log_callback() - register a log function for crypt context */
 	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, &simple_syslog_wrapper, (void *)usrprefix);
 
 	/* send messages ithrough the crypt_log() interface */
@@ -68,7 +83,7 @@ int main(void)
 	/* release crypt context */
 	crypt_free(cd);
 
-	/* Initialize default (global) log callback */
+	/* Initialize default (global) log function */
 	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, &simple_syslog_wrapper, NULL);
 
 	crypt_log(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, "This is normal log message");

docs/examples/crypt_luks_usage.c

@@ -1,8 +1,21 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
 /*
- *  libcryptsetup API - using LUKS device example
+ * An example of using LUKS device through libcryptsetup API
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2025 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -16,18 +29,23 @@
 static int format_and_add_keyslots(const char *path)
 {
 	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_params_luks1 params;
 	int r;
 
 	/*
-	 * The crypt_init() call is used  to initialize crypt_device context,
-	 * The path parameter specifies a device path.
+	 * crypt_init() call precedes most of operations of cryptsetup API. The call is used
+	 * to initialize crypt device context stored in structure referenced by _cd_ in
+	 * the example. Second parameter is used to pass underlaying device path.
 	 *
-	 * For path, you can use either link to a file or block device.
-	 * The loopback device will be detached automatically.
+	 * Note:
+	 * If path refers to a regular file it'll be attached to a first free loop device.
+	 * crypt_init() operation fails in case there's no more loop device available.
+	 * Also, loop device will have the AUTOCLEAR flag set, so the file loopback will
+	 * be detached automatically.
 	 */
 
 	r = crypt_init(&cd, path);
-	if (r < 0) {
+	if (r < 0 ) {
 		printf("crypt_init() failed for %s.\n", path);
 		return r;
 	}
@@ -35,37 +53,73 @@ static int format_and_add_keyslots(const char *path)
 	printf("Context is attached to block device %s.\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
 
 	/*
-	 * So far, no data were written to the device.
+	 * So far no data were written on your device. This will change with call of
+	 * crypt_format() only if you specify CRYPT_LUKS1 as device type.
 	 */
-	printf("Device %s will be formatted as a LUKS device after 5 seconds.\n"
+	printf("Device %s will be formatted to LUKS device after 5 seconds.\n"
 	       "Press CTRL+C now if you want to cancel this operation.\n", path);
 	sleep(5);
 
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare LUKS format parameters
+	 *
+	 * hash parameter defines PBKDF2 hash algorithm used in LUKS header.
+	 * For compatibility reason we use SHA1 here.
+	 */
+	params.hash = "sha1";
+
+	/*
+	 * data_alignment parameter is relevant only in case of the luks header
+	 * and the payload are both stored on same device.
+	 *
+	 * if you set data_alignment = 0, cryptsetup will autodetect
+	 * data_alignment according to underlaying device topology.
+	 */
+	params.data_alignment = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * data_device parameter defines that no external device
+	 * for luks header will be used
+	 */
+	params.data_device = NULL;
+
 	/*
 	 * NULLs for uuid and volume_key means that these attributes will be
-	 * generated during crypt_format().
+	 * generated during crypt_format(). Volume key is generated with respect
+	 * to key size parameter passed to function.
+	 *
+	 * crypt_format() checks device size (LUKS header must fit there).
 	 */
 	r = crypt_format(cd,		/* crypt context */
-			 CRYPT_LUKS2,	/* LUKS2 is a new LUKS format; use CRYPT_LUKS1 for LUKS1 */
+			 CRYPT_LUKS1,	/* LUKS1 is standard LUKS header */
 			 "aes",		/* used cipher */
-			 "xts-plain64",	/* used block mode and IV */
+			 "xts-plain64",	/* used block mode and IV generator*/
 			 NULL,		/* generate UUID */
 			 NULL,		/* generate volume key from RNG */
-			 512 / 8,	/* 512bit key - here AES-256 in XTS mode, size is in bytes */
-			 NULL);		/* default parameters */
+			 256 / 8,	/* 256bit key - here AES-128 in XTS mode, size is in bytes */
+			 &params);	/* parameters above */
 
-	if (r < 0) {
+	if(r < 0) {
 		printf("crypt_format() failed on device %s\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
 		crypt_free(cd);
 		return r;
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * The device now contains a LUKS header, but there is no active keyslot.
+	 * The device now contains LUKS1 header, but there is
+	 * no active keyslot with encrypted volume key yet.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * cryptt_kesylot_add_* call stores volume_key in encrypted form into keyslot.
+	 * Without keyslot you can't manipulate with LUKS device after the context will be freed.
 	 *
-	 * crypt_keyslot_add_* call stores the volume_key in the encrypted form into the keyslot.
+	 * To create a new keyslot you need to supply the existing one (to get the volume key from) or
+	 * you need to supply the volume key.
 	 *
-	 * After format, the volume key is stored internally.
+	 * After format, we have volume key stored internally in context so add new keyslot
+	 * using this internal volume key.
 	 */
 	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd,			/* crypt context */
 					    CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,	/* just use first free slot */
@@ -83,8 +137,8 @@ static int format_and_add_keyslots(const char *path)
 	printf("The first keyslot is initialized.\n");
 
 	/*
-	 * Add another keyslot, now authenticating with the first keyslot.
-	 * It decrypts the volume key from the first keyslot and creates a new one with the specified passphrase.
+	 * Add another keyslot, now using the first keyslot.
+	 * It will decrypt volume key from the first keyslot and creates new one with another passphrase.
 	 */
 	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd,			/* crypt context */
 					    CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,	/* just use first free slot */
@@ -110,18 +164,21 @@ static int activate_and_check_status(const char *path, const char *device_name)
 
 	/*
 	 * LUKS device activation example.
+	 * It's sequence of sub-steps: device initialization, LUKS header load
+	 * and the device activation itself.
 	 */
 	r = crypt_init(&cd, path);
-	if (r < 0) {
+	if (r < 0 ) {
 		printf("crypt_init() failed for %s.\n", path);
 		return r;
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * crypt_load() is used to load existing LUKS header from a block device
+	 * crypt_load() is used to load the LUKS header from block device
+	 * into crypt_device context.
 	 */
 	r = crypt_load(cd,		/* crypt context */
-		       CRYPT_LUKS,	/* requested type - here LUKS of any type */
+		       CRYPT_LUKS1,	/* requested type */
 		       NULL);		/* additional parameters (not used) */
 
 	if (r < 0) {
@@ -131,11 +188,11 @@ static int activate_and_check_status(const char *path, const char *device_name)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Device activation creates a device-mapper device with the specified name.
+	 * Device activation creates device-mapper devie mapping with name device_name.
 	 */
 	r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd,		/* crypt context */
 					 device_name,	/* device name to activate */
-					 CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,/* the keyslot use (try all here) */
+					 CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,/* which slot use (ANY - try all) */
 					 "foo", 3,	/* passphrase */
 					 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY); /* flags */
 	if (r < 0) {
@@ -144,13 +201,13 @@ static int activate_and_check_status(const char *path, const char *device_name)
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	printf("%s device %s/%s is active.\n", crypt_get_type(cd), crypt_get_dir(), device_name);
+	printf("LUKS device %s/%s is active.\n", crypt_get_dir(), device_name);
 	printf("\tcipher used: %s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd));
 	printf("\tcipher mode: %s\n", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
 	printf("\tdevice UUID: %s\n", crypt_get_uuid(cd));
 
 	/*
-	 * Get info about the active device.
+	 * Get info about active device (query DM backend)
 	 */
 	r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, device_name, &cad);
 	if (r < 0) {
@@ -178,7 +235,7 @@ static int handle_active_device(const char *device_name)
 	int r;
 
 	/*
-	 * crypt_init_by_name() initializes context by an active device-mapper name
+	 * crypt_init_by_name() initializes device context and loads LUKS header from backing device
 	 */
 	r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, device_name);
 	if (r < 0) {
@@ -195,7 +252,7 @@ static int handle_active_device(const char *device_name)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * crypt_deactivate() is used to deactivate a device
+	 * crypt_deactivate() is used to deactivate device
 	 */
 	r = crypt_deactivate(cd, device_name);
 	if (r < 0) {

docs/licenses/COPYING.Apache-2.0

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docs/licenses/COPYING.GPL-2.0-or-later-WITH-cryptsetup-OpenSSL-exception

@@ -1,354 +0,0 @@
-                    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
-                       Version 2, June 1991
-
- Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
- 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
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-  The licenses for most software are designed to take away your
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-  To do so, attach the following notices to the program.  It is safest
-to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively
-convey the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least
-the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
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-    <one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
-    Copyright (C) <year>  <name of author>
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-    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-    the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
-    (at your option) any later version.
-
-    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-    GNU General Public License for more details.
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-    with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
-    51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
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-    Gnomovision comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
-    This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
-    under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
-
-The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate
-parts of the General Public License.  Of course, the commands you use may
-be called something other than `show w' and `show c'; they could even be
-mouse-clicks or menu items--whatever suits your program.
-
-You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or your
-school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if
-necessary.  Here is a sample; alter the names:
-
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-  `Gnomovision' (which makes passes at compilers) written by James Hacker.
-
-  <signature of Ty Coon>, 1 April 1989
-  Ty Coon, President of Vice
-
-This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into
-proprietary programs.  If your program is a subroutine library, you may
-consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the
-library.  If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General
-Public License instead of this License.
-
------
-In addition, as a special exception, the copyright holders give
-permission to link the code of portions of this program with the
-OpenSSL library under certain conditions as described in each
-individual source file, and distribute linked combinations
-including the two.
-
-You must obey the GNU General Public License in all respects
-for all of the code used other than OpenSSL.  If you modify
-file(s) with this exception, you may extend this exception to your
-version of the file(s), but you are not obligated to do so.  If you
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-files in the program, then also delete it here.

docs/v1.2.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Libcryptsetup API additions:
 
  * Fix optional password callback handling.
 
- * Allow one to activate by internally cached volume key immediately after
+ * Allow to activate by internally cached volume key immediately after
  crypt_format() without active slot (for temporary devices with
  on-disk metadata)
 

docs/v1.3.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Important changes
    * NSS (because of missing ripemd160 it cannot provide full backward compatibility)
    * kernel userspace API (provided by kernel 2.6.38 and above)
      (Note that kernel userspace backend is very slow for this type of operation.
-      But it can be useful for embedded systems, because you can avoid userspace
+      But it can be usefull for embedded systems, because you can avoid userspace
       crypto library completely.)
 
    Backend is selected during configure time, using --with-crypto_backend option.

docs/v1.4.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ WARNING: This release removes old deprecated API from libcryptsetup
  (It can be used to simulate trivial hidden disk concepts.)
 
 libcryptsetup API changes:
-  * Added options to support detached metadata device
+  * Added options to suport detached metadata device
      crypt_init_by_name_and_header()
      crypt_set_data_device()
   * Add crypt_last_error() API call.

docs/v1.4.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Changes since version 1.4.1
 * Fix header check to support old (cryptsetup 1.0.0) header alignment.
   (Regression in 1.4.0)
 
-* Allow one to specify --align-payload only for luksFormat.
+* Allow to specify --align-payload only for luksFormat.
 
 * Add --master-key-file option to luksOpen (open using volume key).
 

docs/v1.4.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Changes since version 1.4.2
   Device-mapper now retry removal if device is busy.
 
 * Allow "private" activation (skip some udev global rules) flag.
-  Cryptsetup library API now allows one to specify CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE,
+  Cryptsetup library API now allows to specify CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE,
   which means that some udev rules are not processed.
   (Used for temporary devices, like internal keyslot mappings where
   it is not desirable to run any device scans.)

docs/v1.5.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Side effect of reencryption is that final device will contain
 only ciphertext (for all sectors) so even if device was not properly
 wiped by random data, after reencryption you cannot distinguish
 which sectors are used.
-(Reencryption is done always for the whole device.)
+(Reecryption is done always for the whole device.)
 
 There are for sure bugs, please TEST IT IN TEST ENVIRONMENT before
 use for your data.

docs/v1.6.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Cryptsetup 1.6.0 Release Notes
 Changes since version 1.6.0-rc1
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
- * Change LUKS default cipher to use XTS encryption mode,
+ * Change LUKS default cipher to to use XTS encryption mode,
    aes-xts-plain64 (i.e. using AES128-XTS).
 
    XTS mode becomes standard in hard disk encryption.
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ Important changes
 
      WARNING: these tests do not use dmcrypt, only crypto API.
      You have to benchmark the whole device stack and you can get completely
-     different results. But it is usable for basic comparison.
+     different results. But is is usable for basic comparison.
      (Note for example AES-NI decryption optimization effect in example above.)
 
 Features

docs/v1.6.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Changes since version 1.6.1
 * Fix cipher specification string parsing (found by gcc -fsanitize=address option).
 
 * Try to map TCRYPT system encryption through partition
-  (allows one to activate mapping when other partition on the same device is mounted).
+  (allows to activate mapping when other partition on the same device is mounted).
 
 * Print a warning if system encryption is used and device is a partition.
   (TCRYPT system encryption uses whole device argument.)

docs/v1.6.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Changes since version 1.6.3
 
   Please refer to cryptsetup FAQ for detail how to fix this situation.
 
-* Allow one to use --disable-gcrypt-pbkdf2 during configuration
+* Allow to use --disable-gcrypt-pbkdf2 during configuration
   to force use internal PBKDF2 code.
 
 * Require gcrypt 1.6.1 for imported implementation of PBKDF2

docs/v1.6.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Changes since version 1.6.4
   The command "cryptsetup status" will print basic info, even if you
   do not provide detached header argument.
 
-* Allow one to specify ECB mode in cryptsetup benchmark.
+* Allow to specify ECB mode in cryptsetup benchmark.
 
 * Add some LUKS images for regression testing.
   Note that if image with Whirlpool fails, the most probable cause is that

docs/v1.6.7-ReleaseNotes

@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ Changes since version 1.6.6
 * Support permanent device decryption for cryptsetup-reencrypt.
   To remove LUKS encryption from a device, you can now use --decrypt option.
 
-* Allow one to use --header option in all LUKS commands.
+* Allow to use --header option in all LUKS commands.
   The --header always takes precedence over positional device argument.
 
 * Allow luksSuspend without need to specify a detached header.
 
 * Detect if O_DIRECT is usable on a device allocation.
   There are some strange storage stack configurations which wrongly allows
-  one to open devices with direct-io but fails on all IO operations later.
+  to open devices with direct-io but fails on all IO operations later.
 
   Cryptsetup now tries to read the device first sector to ensure it can use
   direct-io.

docs/v1.6.8-ReleaseNotes

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Changes since version 1.6.7
   cryptsetup resize will try to resize underlying loop device as well.
   (It can be used to grow up file-backed device in one step.)
 
-* Cryptsetup now allows one to use empty password through stdin pipe.
+* Cryptsetup now allows to use empty password through stdin pipe.
   (Intended only for testing in scripts.)
 
 Cryptsetup API NOTE:

docs/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 1.7.3 Release Notes
-==============================
-
-Changes since version 1.7.2
-
-* Fix device access to hash offsets located beyond the 2GB device boundary in veritysetup.
-
-* Set configured (compile-time) default iteration time for devices created directly through
-  libcryptsetup (default was hardcoded 1 second, the configured value applied only
-  for cryptsetup application).
-
-* Fix PBKDF2 benchmark to not double iteration count for specific corner case.
-  If the measurement function returns exactly 500 ms, the iteration calculation loop
-  doubled iteration count but instead of repeating measurement it used this value directly.
-
-* OpenSSL backend: fix memory leak if hash context was repeatedly reused.
-
-* OpenSSL backend: add support for OpenSSL 1.1.0.
-
-* Fix several minor spelling errors.

docs/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 1.7.4 Release Notes
-==============================
-
-Changes since version 1.7.3
-
-* Allow one to specify LUKS1 hash algorithm in Python luksFormat wrapper.
-
-* Use LUKS1 compiled-in defaults also in Python wrapper.
-
-* OpenSSL backend: Fix OpenSSL 1.1.0 support without backward compatible API.
-
-* OpenSSL backend: Fix LibreSSL compatibility.
-
-* Check for data device and hash device area overlap in veritysetup.
-
-* Fix a possible race while allocating a free loop device.
-
-* Fix possible file descriptor leaks if libcryptsetup is run from a forked process.
-
-* Fix missing same_cpu_crypt flag in status command.
-
-* Various updates to FAQ and man pages.

docs/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 1.7.5 Release Notes
-==============================
-
-Changes since version 1.7.4
-
-* Fixes to luksFormat to properly support recent kernel running in FIPS mode.
-
-  Cryptsetup must never use a weak key even if it is just used for testing
-  of algorithm availability. In FIPS mode, weak keys are always rejected.
-
-  A weak key is for example detected if the XTS encryption mode use
-  the same key for the tweak and the encryption part.
-
-* Fixes accesses to unaligned hidden legacy TrueCrypt header.
-
-  On a native 4k-sector device the old hidden TrueCrypt header is not
-  aligned with the hw sector size (this problem was fixed in later TrueCrypt
-  on-disk format versions).
-
-  Cryptsetup now properly aligns the read so it does not fail.
-
-* Fixes to optional dracut ramdisk scripts for offline re-encryption on initial boot.

docs/v2.0.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,605 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.0.0 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable release with experimental features.
-
-This version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
-
-The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
-forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
-
-NOTE: This version changes soname of libcryptsetup library and increases
-major version for all public symbols.
-Most of the old functions are fully backward compatible, so only
-recompilation of programs should be needed.
-
-Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
-data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
-Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
-features and can contain some bugs.
-
-To provide all security features of authenticated encryption we need
-better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in kernel (see note below).
-For now, please use authenticated encryption as experimental feature.
-
-Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
-production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
-
-Changes since version 2.0.0-RC1
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* Limit KDF requested (for format) memory by available physical memory.
-  On some systems too high requested amount of memory causes OOM killer
-  to kill the process (instead of returning ENOMEM).
-  We never try to use more than half of available physical memory.
-
-* Ignore device alignment if it is not multiple of minimal-io.
-  Some USB enclosures seems to report bogus topology info that
-  prevents to use LUKS detached header.
-
-Changes since version 2.0.0-RC0
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Enable to use system libargon2 instead of bundled version.
-  Renames --disable-argon2 to --disable-internal-argon2 option
-  and adds --enable-libargon2 flag to allow system libargon2.
-
-* Changes in build system (Automake)
-  - The build system now uses non-recursive automake (except for tests).
-  (Tools binaries are now located in buildroot directory.)
-  - New --disable-cryptsetup option to disable build of cryptsetup tool.
-  - Enable build of cryptsetup-reencrypt by default.
-
-* Install tmpfiles.d configuration for LUKS2 locking directory.
-  You can overwrite this using --with-tmpfilesdir configure option.
-  If your distro does not support tmpfiles.d directory, you have
-  to create locking directory (/run/lock/cryptsetup) in cryptsetup
-  package (or init scripts).
-
-* Adds limited support for offline reencryption of LUKS2 format.
-
-* Decrease size of testing images (and the whole release archive).
-
-* Fixes for several memory leaks found by Valgrind and Coverity tools.
-
-* Fixes for several typos in man pages and error messages.
-
-* LUKS header file in luksFormat is now automatically created
-  if it does not exist.
-
-* Do not allow resize if device size is not aligned to sector size.
-
-Cryptsetup 2.0.0 RC0 Release Notes
-==================================
-
-Important features
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* New command integritysetup: support for the new dm-integrity kernel target.
-
-  The dm-integrity is a new kernel device-mapper target that introduces
-  software emulation of per-sector integrity fields on the disk sector level.
-  It is available since Linux kernel version 4.12.
-
-  The provided per-sector metadata fields can be used for storing a data
-  integrity checksum (for example CRC32).
-  The dm-integrity implements data journal that enforces atomic update
-  of a sector and its integrity metadata.
-
-  Integritysetup is a CLI utility that can setup standalone dm-integrity
-  devices (that internally check integrity of data).
-
-  Integritysetup is intended to be used for settings that require
-  non-cryptographic data integrity protection with no data encryption.
-  For setting integrity protected encrypted devices, see disk authenticated
-  encryption below.
-
-  Note that after formatting the checksums need to be initialized;
-  otherwise device reads will fail because of integrity errors.
-  Integritysetup by default tries to wipe the device with zero blocks
-  to avoid this problem. Device wipe can be time-consuming, you can skip
-  this step by specifying --no-wipe option.
-  (But note that not wiping device can cause some operations to fail
-  if a write is not multiple of page size and kernel page cache tries
-  to read sectors with not yet initialized checksums.)
-
-  The default setting is tag size 4 bytes per-sector and CRC32C protection.
-  To format device with these defaults:
-  $ integritysetup format <device>
-  $ integritysetup open <device> <name>
-
-  Note that used algorithm (unlike tag size) is NOT stored in device
-  kernel superblock and if you use different algorithm, you MUST specify
-  it in every open command, for example:
-  $ integritysetup format <device> --tag-size 32 --integrity sha256
-  $ integritysetup open <device> <name> --integrity sha256
-
-  For more info, see integrity man page.
-
-* Veritysetup command can now format and activate dm-verity devices
-  that contain Forward Error Correction (FEC) (Reed-Solomon code is used).
-  This feature is used on most of Android devices already (available since
-  Linux kernel 4.5).
-
-  There are new options --fec-device, --fec-offset to specify data area
-  with correction code and --fec-roots that set Redd-Solomon generator roots.
-  This setting can be used for format command (veritysetup will calculate
-  and store RS codes) or open command (veritysetup configures kernel
-  dm-verity to use RS codes).
-
-  For more info see veritysetup man page.
-
-* Support for larger sector sizes for crypt devices.
-
-  LUKS2 and plain crypt devices can be now configured with larger encryption
-  sector (typically 4096 bytes, sector size must be the power of two,
-  maximal sector size is 4096 bytes for portability).
-  Large sector size can decrease encryption overhead and can also help
-  with some specific crypto hardware accelerators that perform very
-  badly with 512 bytes sectors.
-
-  Note that if you configure such a larger sector of the device that does use
-  smaller physical sector, there is a possibility of a data corruption during
-  power fail (partial sector writes).
-
-  WARNING: If you use different sector size for a plain device after data were
-  stored,  the decryption will produce garbage.
-
-  For LUKS2, the sector size is stored in metadata and cannot be changed later.
-
-LUKS2 format and features
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-The LUKS2 is an on-disk storage format designed to provide simple key
-management, primarily intended for Full Disk Encryption based on dm-crypt.
-
-The LUKS2 is inspired by LUKS1 format and in some specific situations (most
-of the default configurations) can be converted in-place from LUKS1.
-
-The LUKS2 format is designed to allow future updates of various
-parts without the need to modify binary structures and internally
-uses JSON text format for metadata. Compilation now requires the json-c library
-that is used for JSON data processing.
-
-On-disk format provides redundancy of metadata, detection
-of metadata corruption and automatic repair from metadata copy.
-
-NOTE: For security reasons, there is no redundancy in keyslots binary data
-(encrypted keys) but the format allows adding such a feature in future.
-
-NOTE: to operate correctly, LUKS2 requires locking of metadata.
-Locking is performed by using flock() system call for images in file
-and for block device by using a specific lock file in /run/lock/cryptsetup.
-
-This directory must be created by distribution (do not rely on internal
-fallback). For systemd-based distribution, you can simply install
-scripts/cryptsetup.conf into tmpfiles.d directory.
-
-For more details see LUKS2-format.txt and LUKS2-locking.txt in the docs
-directory. (Please note this is just overview, there will be more formal
-documentation later.)
-
-LUKS2 use
-~~~~~~~~~
-
-LUKS2 allows using all possible configurations as LUKS1.
-
-To format device as LUKS2, you have to add "--type luks2" during format:
-
- $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device>
-
-All commands issued later will recognize the new format automatically.
-
-The newly added features in LUKS2 include:
-
-* Authenticated disk (sector) encryption (EXPERIMENTAL)
-
-  Legacy Full disk encryption (FDE), for example, LUKS1, is a length-preserving
-  encryption (plaintext is the same size as a ciphertext).
-  Such FDE can provide data confidentiality, but cannot provide sound data
-  integrity protection.
-
-  Full disk authenticated encryption is a way how to provide both
-  confidentiality and data integrity protection. Integrity protection here means
-  not only detection of random data corruption (silent data corruption) but also
-  prevention of an unauthorized intentional change of disk sector content.
-
-  NOTE: Integrity protection of this type cannot prevent a replay attack.
-  An attacker can replace the device or its part of the old content, and it
-  cannot be detected.
-  If you need such protection, better use integrity protection on a higher layer.
-
-  For data integrity protection on the sector level, we need additional
-  per-sector metadata space. In LUKS2 this space is provided by a new
-  device-mapper dm-integrity target (available since kernel 4.12).
-  Here the integrity target provides only reliable per-sector metadata store,
-  and the whole authenticated encryption is performed inside dm-crypt stacked
-  over the dm-integrity device.
-
-  For encryption, Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) is used.
-  Every sector is processed as a encryption request of this format:
-
-   |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --|
-   | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) |              |
-   | sector_LE |  IV |  sector in/out    |  tag in/out  |
-
-  AEAD encrypts the whole sector and also authenticates sector number
-  (to detect sector relocation) and also authenticates Initialization Vector.
-
-  AEAD encryption produces encrypted data and authentication tag.
-  The authenticated tag is then stored in per-sector metadata space provided
-  by dm-integrity.
-
-  Most of the current AEAD algorithms requires IV as a nonce, value that is
-  never reused. Because sector number, as an IV, cannot be used in this
-  environment, we use a new random IV (IV is a random value generated by system
-  RNG on every write). This random IV is then stored in the per-sector metadata
-  as well.
-
-  Because the authentication tag (and IV) requires additional space, the device
-  provided for a user has less capacity. Also, the data journalling means that
-  writes are performed twice, decreasing throughput.
-
-  This integrity protection works better with SSDs. If you want to ignore
-  dm-integrity data journal (because journalling is performed on some higher
-  layer or you just want to trade-off performance to safe recovery), you can
-  switch journal off with --integrity-no-journal option.
-  (This flag can be stored persistently as well.)
-
-  Note that (similar to integritysetup) the device read will fail if
-  authentication tag is not initialized (no previous write).
-  By default cryptsetup run wipe of a device (writing zeroes) to initialize
-  authentication tags. This operation can be very time-consuming.
-  You can skip device wipe using --integrity-no-wipe option.
-
-  To format LUKS2 device with integrity protection, use new --integrity option.
-
-  For now, there are very few AEAD algorithms that can be used, and some
-  of them are known to be problematic. In this release we support only
-  a few of AEAD algorithms (options are for now hard coded), later this
-  extension will be completely algorithm-agnostic.
-
-  For testing of authenticated encryption, these algorithms work for now:
-
-  1) aes-xts-plain64 with hmac-sha256 or hmac-sha512 as the authentication tag.
-     (Common FDE mode + independent authentication tag. Authentication key
-      for HMAC is independently generated. This mode is very slow.)
-     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher aes-xts-plain64 --integrity hmac-sha256
-
-  2) aes-gcm-random (native AEAD mode)
-     DO NOT USE in production! The GCM mode uses only 96-bit nonce,
-     and possible collision means fatal security problem.
-     GCM mode has very good hardware support through AES-NI, so it is useful
-     for performance testing.
-     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher aes-gcm-random --integrity aead
-
-  3) ChaCha20 with Poly1305 authenticator (according to RFC7539)
-     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher chacha20-random --integrity poly1305
-
-  To specify AES128/AES256 just specify proper key size (without possible
-  authentication key). Other symmetric ciphers, like Serpent or Twofish,
-  should work as well. The mode 1) and 2) should be compatible with IEEE 1619.1
-  standard recommendation.
-
-  There will be better suitable authenticated modes available soon
-  For now we are just preparing framework to enable it (and hopefully improve security of FDE).
-
-  FDE authenticated encryption is not a replacement for filesystem layer
-  authenticated encryption. The goal is to provide at least something because
-  data integrity protection is often completely ignored in today systems.
-
-* New memory-hard PBKDF
-
-  LUKS1 introduced Password-Based Key Derivation Function v2 as a tool to
-  increase attacker cost for a dictionary and brute force attacks.
-  The PBKDF2 uses iteration count to increase time of key derivation.
-  Unfortunately, with modern GPUs, the PBKDF2 calculations can be run
-  in parallel and PBKDF2 can no longer provide the best available protection.
-  Increasing iteration count just cannot prevent massive parallel dictionary
-  password attacks in long-term.
-
-  To solve this problem, a new PBKDF, based on so-called memory-hard functions
-  can be used. Key derivation with memory-hard function requires a certain
-  amount of memory to compute its output. The memory requirement is very
-  costly for GPUs and prevents these systems to operate effectively,
-  increasing cost for attackers.
-
-  LUKS2 introduces support for Argon2i and Argon2id as a PBKDF.
-  Argon2 is the winner of Password Hashing Competition and is currently
-  in final RFC draft specification.
-
-  For now, libcryptsetup contains the embedded copy of reference implementation
-  of Argon2 (that is easily portable to all architectures).
-  Later, once this function is available in common crypto libraries, it will
-  switch to external implementation. (This happened for LUKS1 and PBKDF2
-  as well years ago.)
-  With using reference implementation (that is not optimized for speed), there
-  is some performance penalty. However, using memory-hard PBKDF should still
-  significantly complicate GPU-optimized dictionary and brute force attacks.
-
-  The Argon2 uses three costs: memory, time (number of iterations) and parallel
-  (number of threads).
-  Note that time and memory cost highly influences each other (accessing a lot
-  of memory takes more time).
-
-  There is a new benchmark that tries to calculate costs to take similar way as
-  in LUKS1 (where iteration is measured to take 1-2 seconds on user system).
-  Because now there are more cost variables, it prefers time cost (iterations)
-  and tries to find required memory that fits. (IOW required memory cost can be
-  lower if the benchmarks are not able to find required parameters.)
-  The benchmark cannot run too long, so it tries to approximate next step
-  for benchmarking.
-
-  For now, default LUKS2 PBKDF algorithm is Argon2i (data independent variant)
-  with memory cost set to 128MB, time to 800ms and parallel thread according
-  to available CPU cores but no more than 4.
-
-  All default parameters can be set during compile time and also set on
-  the command line by using --pbkdf, --pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel and
-  --iter-time options.
-  (Or without benchmark directly by using --pbkdf-force-iterations, see below.)
-
-  You can still use PBKDF2 even for LUKS2 by specifying --pbkdf pbkdf2 option.
-  (Then only iteration count is applied.)
-
-* Use of kernel keyring
-
-  Kernel keyring is a storage for sensitive material (like cryptographic keys)
-  inside Linux kernel.
-
-  LUKS2 uses keyring for two major functions:
-
-   - To store volume key for dm-crypt where it avoids sending volume key in
-  every device-mapper ioctl structure. Volume key is also no longer directly
-  visible in a dm-crypt mapping table. The key is not available for the user
-  after dm-crypt configuration (obviously except direct memory scan).
-  Use of kernel keyring can be disabled in runtime by --disable-keyring option.
-
-   - As a tool to automatically unlock LUKS device if a passphrase is put into
-  kernel keyring and proper keyring token is configured.
-
-   This allows storing a secret (passphrase) to kernel per-user keyring by
-  some external tool (for example some TPM handler) and LUKS2, if configured,
-  will automatically search in the keyring and unlock the system.
-  For more info see Tokens section below.
-
-* Persistent flags
-  The activation flags (like allow-discards) can be stored in metadata and used
-  automatically by all later activations (even without using crypttab).
-
-  To store activation flags permanently, use activation command with required
-  flags and add --persistent option.
-
-  For example, to mark device to always activate with TRIM enabled,
-  use (for LUKS2 type):
-
-   $ cryptsetup open <device> <name> --allow-discards --persistent
-
-  You can check persistent flags in dump command output:
-
-  $ cryptsetup luksDump <device>
-
-* Tokens and auto-activation
-
-  A LUKS2 token is an object that can be described "how to get passphrase or key"
-  to unlock particular keyslot.
-  (Also it can be used to store any additional metadata, and with
-  the libcryptsetup interface it can be used to define user token types.)
-
-  Cryptsetup internally implements keyring token. Cryptsetup tries to use
-  available tokens before asking for the passphrase. For keyring token,
-  it means that if the passphrase is available under specified identifier
-  inside kernel keyring, the device is automatically activated using this
-  stored passphrase.
-
-  Example of using LUKS2 keyring token:
-
-  # Adding token to metadata with "my_token" identifier (by default it applies to all keyslots).
-  $ cryptsetup token add --key-description "my_token" <device>
-
-  # Storing passphrase to user keyring (this can be done by an external application)
-  $ echo -n <passphrase> | keyctl padd user my_token @u
-
-  # Now cryptsetup activates automatically if it finds correct passphrase
-  $ cryptsetup open <device> <name>
-
-  The main reason to use tokens this way is to separate possible hardware
-  handlers from cryptsetup code.
-
-* Keyslot priorities
-
-  LUKS2 keyslot can have a new priority attribute.
-  The default is "normal". The "prefer" priority tell the keyslot to be tried
-  before other keyslots. Priority "ignore" means that keyslot will never be
-  used if not specified explicitly (it can be used for backup administrator
-  passwords that are used only situations when a user forgets own passphrase).
-
-  The priority of keyslot can be set with new config command, for example
-  $ cryptsetup config <device> --key-slot 1 --priority prefer
-
-  Setting priority to normal will reset slot to normal state.
-
-* LUKS2 label and subsystem
-
-  The header now contains additional fields for label and subsystem (additional
-  label). These fields can be used similar to filesystem label and will be
-  visible in udev rules to possible filtering. (Note that blkid do not yet
-  contain the LUKS scanning code).
-
-  By default both labels are empty. Label and subsystem are always set together
-  (no option  means clear the label) with the config command:
-
-  $ cryptsetup config <device> --label my_device --subsystem ""
-
-* In-place conversion form LUKS1
-
-  To allow easy testing and transition to the new LUKS2 format, there is a new
-  convert command that allows in-place conversion from the LUKS1 format and,
-  if there are no incompatible options, also conversion back from LUKS2
-  to LUKS1 format.
-
-  Note this command can be used only on some LUKS1 devices (some device header
-  sizes are not supported).
-  This command is dangerous, never run it without header backup!
-  If something fails in the middle of conversion (IO error), the header
-  is destroyed. (Note that conversion requires move of keyslot data area to
-  a different offset.)
-
-  To convert header in-place to LUKS2 format, use
-  $ cryptsetup convert <device> --type luks2
-
-  To convert it back to LUKS1 format, use
-  $ cryptsetup convert <device> --type luks1
-
-  You can verify LUKS version with luksDump command.
-  $ cryptsetup luksDump <device>
-
-  Note that some LUKS2 features will make header incompatible with LUKS1 and
-  conversion will be rejected (for example using new Argon2 PBKDF or integrity
-  extensions). Some minor attributes can be lost in conversion.
-
-Other changes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Explicit KDF iterations count setting
-
-  With new PBKDF interface, there is also the possibility to setup PBKDF costs
-  directly, avoiding benchmarks. This can be useful if device is formatted to be
-  primarily used on a different system.
-
-  The option --pbkdf-force-iterations is available for both LUKS1 and LUKS2
-  format. Using this option can cause device to have either very low or very
-  high PBKDF costs.
-  In the first case it means bad protection to dictionary attacks, in the second
-  case, it can mean extremely high unlocking time or memory requirements.
-  Use only if you are sure what you are doing!
-
-  Not that this setting also affects iteration count for the key digest.
-  For LUKS1 iteration count for digest will be approximately 1/8 of requested
-  value, for LUKS2 and "pbkdf2" digest minimal PBKDF2 iteration count (1000)
-  will be used. You cannot set lower iteration count than the internal minimum
-  (1000 for PBKDF2).
-
-  To format LUKS1 device with forced iteration count (and no benchmarking), use
-  $ cryptsetup luksFormat <device> --pbkdf-force-iterations 22222
-
-  For LUKS2 it is always better to specify full settings (do not rely on default
-  cost values).
-  For example, we can set to use Argon2id with iteration cost 5, memory 128000
-  and parallel set 1:
-  $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> \
-    --pbkdf argon2id --pbkdf-force-iterations 5 --pbkdf-memory 128000 --pbkdf-parallel 1
-
-* VeraCrypt PIM
-
-  Cryptsetup can now also open VeraCrypt device that uses Personal Iteration
-  Multiplier (PIM). PIM is an integer value that user must remember additionally
-  to passphrase and influences PBKDF2 iteration count (without it VeraCrypt uses
-  a fixed number of iterations).
-
-  To open VeraCrypt device with PIM settings, use --veracrypt-pim (to specify
-  PIM on the command line) or --veracrypt-query-pim to query PIM interactively.
-
-* Support for plain64be IV
-
-  The plain64be is big-endian variant of plain64 Initialization Vector. It is
-  used in some images of hardware-based disk encryption systems. Supporting this
-  variant allows using dm-crypt to map such images through cryptsetup.
-
-* Deferral removal
-
-  Cryptsetup now can mark device for deferred removal by using a new option
-  --deferred. This means that close command will not fail if the device is still
-  in use, but will instruct the kernel to remove the device automatically after
-  use count drops to zero (for example, once the filesystem is unmounted).
-
-* A lot of updates to man pages and many minor changes that would make this
-  release notes too long ;-)
-
-Libcryptsetup API changes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-These API functions were removed, libcryptsetup no longer handles password
-retries from terminal (application should handle terminal operations itself):
-	crypt_set_password_callback;
-	crypt_set_timeout;
-	crypt_set_password_retry;
-	crypt_set_password_verify;
-
-This call is removed (no need to keep typo backward compatibility,
-the proper function is crypt_set_iteration_time :-)
-	crypt_set_iterarion_time;
-
-These calls were removed because are not safe, use per-context
-error callbacks instead:
-	crypt_last_error;
-	crypt_get_error;
-
-The PBKDF benchmark was replaced by a new function that uses new KDF structure
-	crypt_benchmark_kdf; (removed)
-	crypt_benchmark_pbkdf; (new API call)
-
-These new calls are now exported, for details see libcryptsetup.h:
-	crypt_keyslot_add_by_key;
-	crypt_keyslot_set_priority;
-	crypt_keyslot_get_priority;
-
-	crypt_token_json_get;
-	crypt_token_json_set;
-	crypt_token_status;
-	crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get;
-	crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set;
-	crypt_token_assign_keyslot;
-	crypt_token_unassign_keyslot;
-	crypt_token_register;
-
-	crypt_activate_by_token;
-	crypt_activate_by_keyring;
-	crypt_deactivate_by_name;
-
-	crypt_metadata_locking;
-	crypt_volume_key_keyring;
-	crypt_get_integrity_info;
-	crypt_get_sector_size;
-	crypt_persistent_flags_set;
-	crypt_persistent_flags_get;
-	crypt_set_pbkdf_type;
-	crypt_get_pbkdf_type;
-
-	crypt_convert;
-	crypt_keyfile_read;
-	crypt_wipe;
-
-Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* There will be better documentation and examples.
-
-* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
-  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
-  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
-
-* Offline re-encrypt tool LUKS2 support is currently limited.
-  There will be online LUKS2 re-encryption tool in future.
-
-* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
-  (https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html) once these algorithms are available
-  in kernel (more on this later).
-  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
-  in kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
-  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
-  For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
-
-* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for dm-integrity journal.
-
-  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
-  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
-  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
-  detected though.)
-
-* Some utilities (blkid, systemd-cryptsetup) have already support for LUKS
-  but not yet in released version (support in crypttab etc).
-
-* There are some examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
-  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
-  using remote keyfile).
-
-* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
-  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated soon in favor
-  of python bindings to libblockdev library (that can already handle LUKS1 devices).

docs/v2.0.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.0.1 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable and bug-fix release with experimental features.
-
-This version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
-
-The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
-forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
-
-Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
-data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
-Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
-features and can contain some bugs.
-
-To provide all security features of authenticated encryption we need
-a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
-For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
-
-Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
-production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
-
-Changes since version 2.0.0
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* To store volume key into kernel keyring, kernel 4.15 with dm-crypt 1.18.1
-  is required. If a volume key is stored in keyring (LUKS2 only),
-  the dm-crypt v1.15.0 through v1.18.0 contains a serious bug that may cause
-  data corruption for ciphers with ESSIV.
-  (The key for ESSIV is zeroed because of code misplacement.)
-  This bug is not present for LUKS1 or any other IVs used in LUKS modes.
-  This change is not visible to the user (except dmsetup output).
-
-* Increase maximum allowed PBKDF memory-cost limit to 4 GiB.
-  The Argon2 PBKDF uses 1GiB by default; this is also limited by the amount
-  of physical memory available (maximum is half of the physical memory).
-
-* Use /run/cryptsetup as default for cryptsetup locking dir.
-  There were problems with sharing /run/lock with lockdev, and in the early
-  boot, the directory was missing.
-  The directory can be changed with --with-luks2-lock-path and
-  --with-luks2-lock-dir-perms configure switches.
-
-* Introduce new 64-bit byte-offset *keyfile_device_offset functions.
-
-  The keyfile interface was designed, well, for keyfiles. Unfortunately,
-  there are user cases where a keyfile can be placed on a device, and
-  size_t offset can overflow on 32-bit systems.
-
-  New set of functions that allow 64-bit offsets even on 32bit systems
-  are now available:
-
-     - crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset
-     - crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset
-     - crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset
-     - crypt_keyfile_device_read
-
-  The new functions have added the _device_ in name.
-  Old functions are just internal wrappers around these.
-
-  Also cryptsetup --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset now allows
-  64-bit offsets as parameters.
-
-* Add error hint for wrongly formatted cipher strings in LUKS1 and
-  properly fail in luksFormat if cipher format is missing required IV.
-  For now, crypto API quietly used cipher without IV if a cipher
-  algorithm without IV specification was used (e.g., aes-xts).
-  This caused fail later during activation.
-
-* Configure check for a recent Argon2 lib to support mandatory Argon2id.
-
-* Fix for the cryptsetup-reencrypt static build if pwquality is enabled.
-
-* Update LUKS1 standard doc (https links in the bibliography).
-
-
-Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* There will be better documentation and examples.
-
-* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
-  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
-  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
-
-* Offline re-encrypt tool LUKS2 support is currently limited.
-  There will be online LUKS2 re-encryption tool in future.
-
-* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
-  (https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html) once these algorithms are
-  available in the kernel (more on this later).
-  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
-  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
-  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
-  For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
-
-* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
-
-  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
-  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
-  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
-  detected though.)
-
-* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
-  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
-  using remote keyfile).
-
-* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
-  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated soon in favor
-  of python bindings to the libblockdev library (that can already handle LUKS1
-  devices).

docs/v2.0.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.0.2 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable and bug-fix release with experimental features.
-
-Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
-
-The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
-forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
-
-Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
-data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
-Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
-features and can contain some bugs.
-
-To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
-a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
-For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
-
-Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
-production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
-
-Changes since version 2.0.1
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Fix a regression in early detection of inactive keyslot for luksKillSlot.
-  It tried to ask for passphrase even for already erased keyslot.
-
-* Fix a regression in loopaesOpen processing for keyfile on standard input.
-  Use of "-" argument was not working properly.
-
-* Add LUKS2 specific options for cryptsetup-reencrypt.
-  Tokens and persistent flags are now transferred during reencryption;
-  change of PBKDF keyslot parameters is now supported and allows one
-  to set precalculated values (no benchmarks).
-
-* Do not allow LUKS2 --persistent and --test-passphrase cryptsetup flags
-  combination. Persistent flags are now stored only if the device was
-  successfully activated with the specified flags.
-
-* Fix integritysetup format after recent Linux kernel changes that
-  requires to setup key for HMAC in all cases.
-  Previously integritysetup allowed HMAC with zero key that behaves
-  like a plain hash.
-
-* Fix VeraCrypt PIM handling that modified internal iteration counts
-  even for subsequent activations. The PIM count is no longer printed
-  in debug log as it is sensitive information.
-  Also, the code now skips legacy TrueCrypt algorithms if a PIM
-  is specified (they cannot be used with PIM anyway).
-
-* PBKDF values cannot be set (even with force parameters) below
-  hardcoded minimums. For PBKDF2 is it 1000 iterations, for Argon2
-  it is 4 iterations and 32 KiB of memory cost.
-
-* Introduce new crypt_token_is_assigned() API function for reporting
-  the binding between token and keyslots.
-
-* Allow crypt_token_json_set() API function to create internal token types.
-  Do not allow unknown fields in internal token objects.
-
-* Print message in cryptsetup that about was aborted if a user did not
-  answer YES in a query.
-
-Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* There will be better documentation and examples.
-
-* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
-  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
-  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
-
-* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
-  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
-  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS, as CAESAR finalists.
-
-  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
-  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
-  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
-
-* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
-
-  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
-  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
-  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
-  detected though.)
-
-* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
-  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
-  using remote keyfile).
-
-* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
-  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated in version 2.1
-  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.

docs/v2.0.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.0.3 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release with new features.
-
-Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
-
-The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
-forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
-
-Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
-data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
-Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
-features and can contain some bugs.
-
-To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
-a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
-For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
-
-Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
-production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
-
-Changes since version 2.0.2
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Expose interface to unbound LUKS2 keyslots.
-  Unbound LUKS2 keyslot allows storing a key material that is independent
-  of master volume key (it is not bound to encrypted data segment).
-
-* New API extensions for unbound keyslots (LUKS2 only)
-  crypt_keyslot_get_key_size() and crypt_volume_key_get()
-  These functions allow one to get key and key size for unbound keyslots.
-
-* New enum value CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND for keyslot status (LUKS2 only).
-
-* Add --unbound keyslot option to the cryptsetup luksAddKey command.
-
-* Add crypt_get_active_integrity_failures() call to get integrity
-  failure count for dm-integrity devices.
-
-* Add crypt_get_pbkdf_default() function to get per-type PBKDF default
-  setting.
-
-* Add new flag to crypt_keyslot_add_by_key() to force update device
-  volume key. This call is mainly intended for a wrapped key change.
-
-* Allow volume key store in a file with cryptsetup.
-  The --dump-master-key together with --master-key-file allows cryptsetup
-  to store the binary volume key to a file instead of standard output.
-
-* Add support detached header for cryptsetup-reencrypt command.
-
-* Fix VeraCrypt PIM handling - use proper iterations count formula
-  for PBKDF2-SHA512 and PBKDF2-Whirlpool used in system volumes.
-
-* Fix cryptsetup tcryptDump for VeraCrypt PIM (support --veracrypt-pim).
-
-* Add --with-default-luks-format configure time option.
-  (Option to override default LUKS format version.)
-
-* Fix LUKS version conversion for detached (and trimmed) LUKS headers.
-
-* Add luksConvertKey cryptsetup command that converts specific keyslot
-  from one PBKDF to another.
-
-* Do not allow conversion to LUKS2 if LUKSMETA (external tool metadata)
-  header is detected.
-
-* More cleanup and hardening of LUKS2 keyslot specific validation options.
-  Add more checks for cipher validity before writing metadata on-disk.
-
-* Do not allow LUKS1 version downconversion if the header contains tokens.
-
-* Add "paes" family ciphers (AES wrapped key scheme for mainframes)
-  to allowed ciphers.
-  Specific wrapped ley configuration logic must be done by 3rd party tool,
-  LUKS2 stores only keyslot material and allow activation of the device.
-
-* Add support for --check-at-most-once option (kernel 4.17) to veritysetup.
-  This flag can be dangerous; if you can control underlying device
-  (you can change its content after it was verified) it will no longer
-  prevent reading tampered data and also it does not prevent silent
-  data corruptions that appear after the block was once read.
-
-* Fix return code (EPERM instead of EINVAL) and retry count for bad
-  passphrase on non-tty input.
-
-* Enable support for FEC decoding in veritysetup to check dm-verity devices
-  with additional Reed-Solomon code in userspace (verify command).
-
-Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* There will be better documentation and examples (planned for 2.0.4).
-
-* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
-  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
-  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
-
-* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
-  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
-  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS, as CAESAR finalists.
-
-  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
-  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
-  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
-
-* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
-
-  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
-  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
-  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
-  detected though.)
-
-* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
-  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
-  using remote keyfile).
-
-* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
-  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
-  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
-  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases/tag/2.17-1 that
-  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.

docs/v2.0.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.0.4 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release with new features.
-
-Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
-
-The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
-forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
-
-Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
-data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
-Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
-features and can contain some bugs.
-
-To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
-a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
-For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
-
-Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
-production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
-
-Changes since version 2.0.3
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Use the libblkid (blockid) library to detect foreign signatures
-  on a device before LUKS format and LUKS2 auto-recovery.
-
-  This change fixes an unexpected recovery using the secondary
-  LUKS2 header after a device was already overwritten with
-  another format (filesystem or LVM physical volume).
-
-  LUKS2 will not recreate a primary header if it detects a valid
-  foreign signature. In this situation, a user must always
-  use cryptsetup repair command for the recovery.
-
-  Note that libcryptsetup and utilities are now linked to libblkid
-  as a new dependence.
-
-  To compile code without blockid support (strongly discouraged),
-  use --disable-blkid configure switch.
-
-* Add prompt for format and repair actions in cryptsetup and
-  integritysetup if foreign signatures are detected on the device
-  through the blockid library.
-
-  After the confirmation, all known signatures are then wiped as
-  part of the format or repair procedure.
-
-* Print consistent verbose message about keyslot and token numbers.
-  For keyslot actions: Key slot <number> unlocked/created/removed.
-  For token actions: Token <number> created/removed.
-
-* Print error, if a non-existent token is tried to be removed.
-
-* Add support for LUKS2 token definition export and import.
-
-  The token command now can export/import customized token JSON file
-  directly from command line. See the man page for more details.
-
-* Add support for new dm-integrity superblock version 2.
-
-* Add an error message when nothing was read from a key file.
-
-* Update cryptsetup man pages, including --type option usage.
-
-* Add a snapshot of LUKS2 format specification to documentation
-  and accordingly fix supported secondary header offsets.
-
-* Add bundled optimized Argon2 SSE (X86_64 platform) code.
-
-  If the bundled Argon2 code is used and the new configure switch
-  --enable-internal-sse-argon2 option is present, and compiler flags
-  support required optimization, the code will try to use optimized
-  and faster variant.
-
-  Always use the shared library (--enable-libargon2) if possible.
-
-  This option was added because an enterprise distribution
-  rejected to support the shared Argon2 library and native support
-  in generic cryptographic libraries is not ready yet.
-
-* Fix compilation with crypto backend for LibreSSL >= 2.7.0.
-  LibreSSL introduced OpenSSL 1.1.x API functions, so compatibility
-  wrapper must be commented out.
-
-* Fix on-disk header size calculation for LUKS2 format if a specific
-  data alignment is requested. Until now, the code used default size
-  that could be wrong for converted devices.
-
-Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
-  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
-  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS (in kernel 4.18), as CAESAR finalists.
-
-  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
-  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
-  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
-
-  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
-  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
-
-* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
-
-  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
-  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
-  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
-  detected though.)
-
-* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
-  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
-  using remote keyfile).
-
-* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
-  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
-  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
-  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
-  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.
-

docs/v2.0.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.0.5 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release with new features.
-
-Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
-
-The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
-forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
-
-Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
-data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
-Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
-features and can contain some bugs.
-
-Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
-production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
-
-Changes since version 2.0.4
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Wipe full header areas (including unused) during LUKS format.
-
-  Since this version, the whole area up to the data offset is zeroed,
-  and subsequently, all keyslots areas are wiped with random data.
-  This ensures that no remaining old data remains in the LUKS header
-  areas, but it could slow down format operation on some devices.
-  Previously only first 4k (or 32k for LUKS2) and the used keyslot
-  was overwritten in the format operation.
-
-* Several fixes to error messages that were unintentionally replaced
-  in previous versions with a silent exit code.
-  More descriptive error messages were added, including error
-  messages if
-   - a device is unusable (not a block device, no access, etc.),
-   - a LUKS device is not detected,
-   - LUKS header load code detects unsupported version,
-   - a keyslot decryption fails (also happens in the cipher check),
-   - converting an inactive keyslot.
-
-* Device activation fails if data area overlaps with LUKS header.
-
-* Code now uses explicit_bzero to wipe memory if available
-  (instead of own implementation).
-
-* Additional VeraCrypt modes are now supported, including Camellia
-  and Kuznyechik symmetric ciphers (and cipher chains) and Streebog
-  hash function. These were introduced in a recent VeraCrypt upstream.
-
-  Note that Kuznyechik requires out-of-tree kernel module and
-  Streebog hash function is available only with the gcrypt cryptographic
-  backend for now.
-
-* Fixes static build for integritysetup if the pwquality library is used.
-
-* Allows passphrase change for unbound keyslots.
-
-* Fixes removed keyslot number in verbose message for luksKillSlot,
-  luksRemoveKey and erase command.
-
-* Adds blkid scan when attempting to open a plain device and warn the user
-  about existing device signatures in a ciphertext device.
-
-* Remove LUKS header signature if luksFormat fails to add the first keyslot.
-
-* Remove O_SYNC from device open and use fsync() to speed up
-  wipe operation considerably.
-
-* Create --master-key-file in luksDump and fail if the file already exists.
-
-* Fixes a bug when LUKS2 authenticated encryption with a detached header
-  wiped the header device instead of dm-integrity data device area (causing
-  unnecessary LUKS2 header auto recovery).
-
-Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* Authenticated encryption should use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
-  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
-  AEGIS and MORUS are already available in kernel 4.18.
-
-  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
-  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
-
-  Please note that authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
-  and can have performance problems for hish-speed devices and device
-  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
-
-* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
-
-  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
-  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
-  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
-  detected though.)
-
-* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
-  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
-  using remote keyfile).
-
-* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
-  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
-  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
-  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
-  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.

docs/v2.0.6-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.0.6 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release.
-All users of cryptsetup 2.0.x should upgrade to this version.
-
-Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
-
-The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
-forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
-
-Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
-data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
-Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
-features and can contain some bugs.
-
-Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
-production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
-
-Changes since version 2.0.5
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Fix support of larger metadata areas in LUKS2 header.
-
-  This release properly supports all specified metadata areas, as documented
-  in LUKS2 format description (see docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf in archive).
-
-  Currently, only default metadata area size is used (in format or convert).
-  Later cryptsetup versions will allow increasing this metadata area size.
-
-* If AEAD (authenticated encryption) is used, cryptsetup now tries to check
-  if the requested AEAD algorithm with specified key size is available
-  in kernel crypto API.
-  This change avoids formatting a device that cannot be later activated.
-
-  For this function, the kernel must be compiled with the
-  CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD option enabled.
-  Note that kernel user crypto API options (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API and
-  CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER) are already mandatory for LUKS2.
-
-* Fix setting of integrity no-journal flag.
-  Now you can store this flag to metadata using --persistent option.
-
-* Fix cryptsetup-reencrypt to not keep temporary reencryption headers
-  if interrupted during initial password prompt.
-
-* Adds early check to plain and LUKS2 formats to disallow device format
-  if device size is not aligned to requested sector size.
-  Previously it was possible, and the device was rejected to activate by
-  kernel later.
-
-* Fix checking of hash algorithms availability for PBKDF early.
-  Previously LUKS2 format allowed non-existent hash algorithm with
-  invalid keyslot preventing the device from activation.
-
-* Allow Adiantum cipher construction (a non-authenticated length-preserving
-  fast encryption scheme), so it can be used both for data encryption and
-  keyslot encryption in LUKS1/2 devices.
-
-  For benchmark, use:
-    # cryptsetup benchmark -c xchacha12,aes-adiantum
-    # cryptsetup benchmark -c xchacha20,aes-adiantum
-
-  For LUKS format:
-    # cryptsetup luksFormat -c xchacha20,aes-adiantum-plain64 -s 256 <device>
-
-  The support for Adiantum will be merged in Linux kernel 4.21.
-  For more info see the paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.
-
-Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* Authenticated encryption should use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
-  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
-  AEGIS and MORUS are already available in kernel 4.18.
-
-  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
-  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
-
-  Please note that authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
-  and can have performance problems for high-speed devices and device
-  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
-
-* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
-
-  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
-  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
-  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
-  detected though.)
-
-* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
-  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
-  using remote keyfile).
-
-* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
-  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
-  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
-  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
-  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.

docs/v2.1.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.1.0 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable release with new features and bug fixes.
-
-Cryptsetup 2.1 version uses a new on-disk LUKS2 format as the default
-LUKS format and increases default LUKS2 header size.
-
-The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported forever
-as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
-
-When upgrading a stable distribution, please use configure option
---with-default-luks-format=LUKS1 to maintain backward compatibility.
-
-This release also switches to OpenSSL as a default cryptographic
-backend for LUKS header processing. Use --with-crypto_backend=gcrypt
-configure option if you need to preserve legacy libgcrypt backend.
-
-Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or
-in production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
-
-Changes since version 2.0.6
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* The default for cryptsetup LUKS format action is now LUKS2.
-  You can use LUKS1 with cryptsetup option --type luks1.
-
-* The default size of the LUKS2 header is increased to 16 MB.
-  It includes metadata and the area used for binary keyslots;
-  it means that LUKS header backup is now 16MB in size.
-
-  Note, that used keyslot area is much smaller, but this increase
-  of reserved space allows implementation of later extensions
-  (like online reencryption).
-  It is fully compatible with older cryptsetup 2.0.x versions.
-  If you require to create LUKS2 header with the same size as
-  in the 2.0.x version, use --offset 8192 option for luksFormat
-  (units are in 512-bytes sectors; see notes below).
-
-* Cryptsetup now doubles LUKS default key size if XTS mode is used
-  (XTS mode uses two internal keys). This does not apply if key size
-  is explicitly specified on the command line and it does not apply
-  for the plain mode.
-  This fixes a confusion with AES and 256bit key in XTS mode where
-  code used AES128 and not AES256 as often expected.
-
-  Also, the default keyslot encryption algorithm (if cannot be derived
-  from data encryption algorithm) is now available as configure
-  options --with-luks2-keyslot-cipher and --with-luks2-keyslot-keybits.
-  The default is aes-xts-plain64 with 2 * 256-bits key.
-
-* Default cryptographic backend used for LUKS header processing is now
-  OpenSSL. For years, OpenSSL provided better performance for PBKDF.
-
-  NOTE: Cryptsetup/libcryptsetup supports several cryptographic
-  library backends. The fully supported are libgcrypt, OpenSSL and
-  kernel crypto API. FIPS mode extensions are maintained only for
-  libgcrypt and OpenSSL. Nettle and NSS are usable only for some
-  subset of algorithms and cannot provide full backward compatibility.
-  You can always switch to other backends by using a configure switch,
-  for libgcrypt (compatibility for older distributions) use:
-  --with-crypto_backend=gcrypt
-
-* The Python bindings are no longer supported and the code was removed
-  from cryptsetup distribution. Please use the libblockdev project
-  that already covers most of the libcryptsetup functionality
-  including LUKS2.
-
-* Cryptsetup now allows using --offset option also for luksFormat.
-  It means that the specified offset value is used for data offset.
-  LUKS2 header areas are automatically adjusted according to this value.
-  (Note units are in 512-byte sectors due to the previous definition
-  of this option in plain mode.)
-  This option can replace --align-payload with absolute alignment value.
-
-* Cryptsetup now supports new refresh action (that is the alias for
-  "open --refresh").
-  It allows changes of parameters for an active device (like root
-  device mapping), for example, it can enable or disable TRIM support
-  on-the-fly.
-  It is supported for LUKS1, LUKS2, plain and loop-AES devices.
-
-* Integritysetup now supports mode with detached data device through
-  new --data-device option.
-  Since kernel 4.18 there is a possibility to specify external data
-  device for dm-integrity that stores all integrity tags.
-
-* Integritysetup now supports automatic integrity recalculation
-  through new --integrity-recalculate option.
-  Linux kernel since version 4.18 supports automatic background
-  recalculation of integrity tags for dm-integrity.
-
-Other changes and fixes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Fix for crypt_wipe call to allocate space if the header is backed
-  by a file. This means that if you use detached header file, it will
-  now have always the full size after luksFormat, even if only
-  a few keyslots are used.
-
-* Fixes to offline cryptsetup-reencrypt to preserve LUKS2 keyslots
-  area sizes after reencryption and fixes for some other issues when
-  creating temporary reencryption headers.
-
-* Added some FIPS mode workarounds. We cannot (yet) use Argon2 in
-  FIPS mode, libcryptsetup now fallbacks to use PBKDF2 in FIPS mode.
-
-* Rejects conversion to LUKS1 if PBKDF2 hash algorithms
-  in keyslots differ.
-
-* The hash setting on command line now applies also to LUKS2 PBKDF2
-  digest. In previous versions, the LUKS2 key digest used PBKDF2-SHA256
-  (except for converted headers).
-
-* Allow LUKS2 keyslots area to increase if data offset allows it.
-  Cryptsetup can fine-tune LUKS2 metadata area sizes through
-  --luks2-metadata-size=BYTES and --luks2-keyslots-size=BYTES.
-  Please DO NOT use these low-level options until you need it for
-  some very specific additional feature.
-  Also, the code now prints these LUKS2 header area sizes in dump
-  command.
-
-* For LUKS2, keyslot can use different encryption that data with
-  new options --keyslot-key-size=BITS and --keyslot-cipher=STRING
-  in all commands that create new LUKS keyslot.
-  Please DO NOT use these low-level options until you need it for
-  some very specific additional feature.
-
-* Code now avoids data flush when reading device status through
-  device-mapper.
-
-* The Nettle crypto backend and the userspace kernel crypto API
-  backend were enhanced to allow more available hash functions
-  (like SHA3 variants).
-
-* Upstream code now does not require libgcrypt-devel
-  for autoconfigure, because OpenSSL is the default.
-  The libgcrypt does not use standard pkgconfig detection and
-  requires specific macro (part of libgcrypt development files)
-  to be always present during autoconfigure.
-  With other crypto backends, like OpenSSL, this makes no sense,
-  so this part of autoconfigure is now optional.
-
-* Cryptsetup now understands new --debug-json option that allows
-  an additional dump of some JSON information. These are no longer
-  present in standard debug output because it could contain some
-  specific LUKS header parameters.
-
-* The luksDump contains the hash algorithm used in Anti-Forensic
-  function.
-
-* All debug messages are now sent through configured log callback
-  functions, so an application can easily use own debug messages
-  handling. In previous versions debug messages were printed directly
-  to standard output.)
-
-Libcryptsetup API additions
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-These new calls are now exported, for details see libcryptsetup.h:
-
- * crypt_init_data_device
- * crypt_get_metadata_device_name
-     functions to init devices with separate metadata and data device
-     before a format function is called.
-
- * crypt_set_data_offset
-     sets the data offset for LUKS to the specified value
-     in 512-byte sectors.
-     It should replace alignment calculation in LUKS param structures.
-
- * crypt_get_metadata_size
- * crypt_set_metadata_size
-     allows one to set/get area sizes in LUKS header
-     (according to specification).
-
- * crypt_get_default_type
-     get default compiled-in LUKS type (version).
-
- * crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params
-     allows one to get compiled-in PBKDF parameters.
-
- * crypt_keyslot_set_encryption
- * crypt_keyslot_get_encryption
-     allows one to set/get per-keyslot encryption algorithm for LUKS2.
-
- * crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf
-     allows one to get PBKDF parameters per-keyslot.
-
- and these new defines:
- * CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON (message type for JSON debug)
- * CRYPT_DEBUG_JSON (log level for JSON debug)
- * CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE (dm-integrity recalculate flag)
- * CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH (new open with refresh flag)
-
-All existing API calls should remain backward compatible.
-
-Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* Optional authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
-  and can have performance problems for high-speed devices and device
-  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
-
-* Authenticated encryption does not use encryption for a dm-integrity
-  journal. While it does not influence data confidentiality or
-  integrity protection, an attacker can get some more information
-  from data journal or cause that system will corrupt sectors after
-  journal replay. (That corruption will be detected though.)
-
-* The LUKS2 metadata area increase is mainly needed for the new online
-  reencryption as the major feature for the next release.

docs/v2.2.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,279 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.2.0 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable release with new experimental features and bug fixes.
-
-Cryptsetup 2.2 version introduces a new LUKS2 online reencryption
-extension that allows reencryption of mounted LUKS2 devices
-(device in use) in the background.
-
-Online reencryption is a complex feature. Please be sure you
-have a full data backup before using this feature.
-
-Changes since version 2.1.0
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-LUKS2 online reencryption
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-The reencryption is intended to provide a reliable way to change
-volume key or an algorithm change while the encrypted device is still
-in use.
-
-It is based on userspace-only approach (no kernel changes needed)
-that uses the device-mapper subsystem to remap active devices on-the-fly
-dynamically. The device is split into several segments (encrypted by old
-key, new key and so-called hotzone, where reencryption is actively running).
-
-The flexible LUKS2 metadata format is used to store intermediate states
-(segment mappings) and both version of keyslots (old and new keys).
-Also, it provides a binary area (in the unused keyslot area space)
-to provide recovery metadata in the case of unexpected failure during
-reencryption. LUKS2 header is during the reencryption marked with
-"online-reencryption" keyword. After the reencryption is finished,
-this keyword is removed, and the device is backward compatible with all
-older cryptsetup tools (that support LUKS2).
-
-The recovery supports three resilience modes:
-
-  - checksum: default mode, where individual checksums of ciphertext hotzone
-    sectors are stored, so the recovery process can detect which sectors were
-    already reencrypted. It requires that the device sector write is atomic.
-
-  - journal: the hotzone is journaled in the binary area
-    (so the data are written twice)
-
-  - none: performance mode; there is no protection
-    (similar to old offline reencryption)
-
-These resilience modes are not available if reencryption uses data shift.
-
-Note: until we have full documentation (both of the process and metadata),
-please refer to Ondrej's slides (some slight details are no longer relevant)
-https://okozina.fedorapeople.org/online-disk-reencryption-with-luks2-compact.pdf
-
-The offline reencryption tool (cryptsetup-reencrypt) is still supported
-for both LUKS1 and LUKS2 format.
-
-Cryptsetup examples for reencryption
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-The reencryption feature is integrated directly into cryptsetup utility
-as the new "reencrypt" action (command).
-
-There are three basic modes - to perform reencryption (change of already
-existing LUKS2 device), to add encryption to plaintext device and to remove
-encryption from a device (decryption).
-
-In all cases, if existing LUKS2 metadata contains information about
-the ongoing reencryption process, following reencrypt command continues
-with the ongoing reencryption process until it is finished.
-
-You can activate a device with ongoing reencryption as the standard LUKS2
-device, but the reencryption process will not continue until the cryptsetup
-reencrypt command is issued.
-
-
-1) Reencryption
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-This mode is intended to change any attribute of the data encryption
-(change of the volume key, algorithm or sector size).
-Note that authenticated encryption is not yet supported.
-
-You can start the reencryption process by specifying a LUKS2 device or with
-a detached LUKS2 header.
-The code should automatically recognize if the device is in use (and if it
-should use online mode of reencryption).
-
-If you do not specify parameters, only volume key is changed
-(a new random key is generated).
-
-# cryptsetup reencrypt <device> [--header <hdr>]
-
-You can also start reencryption using active mapped device name:
-  # cryptsetup reencrypt --active-name <name>
-
-You can also specify the resilience mode (none, checksum, journal) with
---resilience=<mode> option, for checksum mode also the hash algorithm with
---resilience-hash=<alg> (only hash algorithms supported by cryptographic
-backend are available).
-
-The maximal size of reencryption hotzone can be limited by
---hotzone-size=<size> option and applies to all reencryption modes.
-Note that for checksum and journal mode hotzone size is also limited
-by available space in binary keyslot area.
-
-2) Encryption
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-This mode provides a way to encrypt a plaintext device to LUKS2 format.
-This option requires reduction of device size (for LUKS2 header) or new
-detached header.
-
-  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device> --encrypt --reduce-device-size <size>
-
-Or with detached header:
-  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device> --encrypt --header <hdr>
-
-3) Decryption
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-This mode provides the removal of existing LUKS2 encryption and replacing
-a device with plaintext content only.
-For now, we support only decryption with a detached header.
-
-  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device> --decrypt --header <hdr>
-
-For all three modes, you can split the process to metadata initialization
-(prepare keyslots and segments but do not run reencryption yet) and the data
-reencryption step by using --init-only option.
-
-Prepares metadata:
-  # cryptsetup reencrypt --init-only <parameters>
-
-Starts the data processing:
-  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device>
-
-Please note, that due to the Linux kernel limitation, the encryption or
-decryption process cannot be run entirely online - there must be at least
-short offline window where operation adds/removes device-mapper crypt (LUKS2) layer.
-This step should also include modification of /etc/crypttab and fstab UUIDs,
-but it is out of the scope of cryptsetup tools.
-
-Limitations
-~~~~~~~~~~~
-Most of these limitations will be (hopefully) fixed in next versions.
-
-* Only one active keyslot is supported (all old keyslots will be removed
-  after reencryption).
-
-* Only block devices are now supported as parameters. As a workaround
-  for images in a file, please explicitly map a loop device over the image
-  and use the loop device as the parameter.
-
-* Devices with authenticated encryption are not supported. (Later it will
-  be limited by the fixed per-sector metadata, per-sector metadata size
-  cannot be changed without a new device format operation.)
-
-* The reencryption uses userspace crypto library, with fallback to
-  the kernel (if available). There can be some specific configurations
-  where the fallback does not provide optimal performance.
-
-* There are no translations of error messages until the final release
-  (some messages can be rephrased as well).
-
-* The repair command is not finished; the recovery of interrupted
-  reencryption is made automatically on the first device activation.
-
-* Reencryption triggers too many udev scans on metadata updates (on closing
-  write enabled file descriptors). This has a negative performance impact on the whole
-  reencryption and generates excessive I/O load on the system.
-
-New libcryptsetup reencryption API
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-The libcryptsetup contains new API calls that are used to setup and
-run the reencryption.
-
-Note that there can be some changes in API implementation of these functions
-and/or some new function can be introduced in final cryptsetup 2.2 release.
-
-New API symbols (see documentation in libcryptsetup.h)
-* struct crypt_params_reencrypt - reencryption parameters
-
-* crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase
-* crypt_reencrypt_init_by_keyring
-  - function to configure LUKS2 metadata for reencryption;
-    if metadata already exists, it configures the context from this metadata
-
-* crypt_reencrypt
-  - run the reencryption process (processing the data)
-  - the optional callback function can be used to interrupt the reencryption
-    or report the progress.
-
-* crypt_reencrypt_status
-  - function to query LUKS2 metadata about the reencryption state
-
-Other changes and fixes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* Add optional global serialization lock for memory hard PBKDF.
-  (The --serialize-memory-hard-pbkdf option in cryptsetup and
-  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF in activation flag.)
-
-  This is an "ugly" optional workaround for a situation when multiple devices
-  are being activated in parallel (like systemd crypttab activation).
-  The system instead of returning ENOMEM (no memory available) starts
-  out-of-memory (OOM) killer to kill processes randomly.
-
-  Until we find a reliable way how to work with memory-hard function
-  in these situations, cryptsetup provide a way how to serialize memory-hard
-  unlocking among parallel cryptsetup instances to workaround this problem.
-  This flag is intended to be used only in very specific situations,
-  never use it directly :-)
-
-* Abort conversion to LUKS1 with incompatible sector size that is
-  not supported in LUKS1.
-
-* Report error (-ENOENT) if no LUKS keyslots are available. User can now
-  distinguish between a wrong passphrase and no keyslot available.
-
-* Fix a possible segfault in detached header handling (double free).
-
-* Add integritysetup support for bitmap mode introduced in Linux kernel 5.2.
-  Integritysetup now supports --integrity-bitmap-mode option and
-  --bitmap-sector-per-bit and --bitmap-flush-time commandline options.
-
-  In the bitmap operation mode, if a bit in the bitmap is 1, the corresponding
-  region's data and integrity tags are not synchronized - if the machine
-  crashes, the unsynchronized regions will be recalculated.
-  The bitmap mode is faster than the journal mode because we don't have
-  to write the data twice, but it is also less reliable, because if data
-  corruption happens when the machine crashes, it may not be detected.
-  This can be used only for standalone devices, not with dm-crypt.
-
-* The libcryptsetup now keeps all file descriptors to underlying device
-  open during the whole lifetime of crypt device context to avoid excessive
-  scanning in udev (udev run scan on every descriptor close).
-
-* The luksDump command now prints more info for reencryption keyslot
-  (when a device is in-reencryption).
-
-* New --device-size parameter is supported for LUKS2 reencryption.
-  It may be used to encrypt/reencrypt only the initial part of the data
-  device if the user is aware that the rest of the device is empty.
-
-  Note: This change causes API break since the last rc0 release
-  (crypt_params_reencrypt structure contains additional field).
-
-* New --resume-only parameter is supported for LUKS2 reencryption.
-  This flag resumes reencryption process if it exists (not starting
-  new reencryption).
-
-* The repair command now tries LUKS2 reencryption recovery if needed.
-
-* If reencryption device is a file image, an interactive dialog now
-  asks if reencryption should be run safely in offline mode
-  (if autodetection of active devices failed).
-
-* Fix activation through a token where dm-crypt volume key was not
-  set through keyring (but using old device-mapper table parameter mode).
-
-* Online reencryption can now retain all keyslots (if all passphrases
-  are provided). Note that keyslot numbers will change in this case.
-
-* Allow volume key file to be used if no LUKS2 keyslots are present.
-  If all keyslots are removed, LUKS2 has no longer information about
-  the volume key size (there is only key digest present).
-  Please use --key-size option to open the device or add a new keyslot
-  in these cases.
-
-* Print a warning if online reencrypt is called over LUKS1 (not supported).
-
-* Fix TCRYPT KDF failure in FIPS mode.
-  Some crypto backends support plain hash in FIPS mode but not for PBKDF2.
-
-* Remove FIPS mode restriction for crypt_volume_key_get.
-  It is an application responsibility to use this API in the proper context.
-
-* Reduce keyslots area size in luksFormat when the header device is too small.
-  Unless user explicitly asks for keyslots areas size  (either via
-  --luks2-keyslots-size or --offset) reduce keyslots size so that it fits
-  in metadata device.
-
-* Make resize action accept --device-size parameter (supports units suffix).

docs/v2.2.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.2.1 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release.
-
-This version contains a fix for a possible data corruption bug
-on 32-bit platforms.
-All users of cryptsetup 2.1 and 2.2 should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.2.0
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Fix possible data length and IV offset overflow on 32bit architectures.
-  Other 64-bit architectures are not affected.
-
-  The flawed helper function prototypes (introduced in version 2.1.0) used
-  size_t type, that is 32-bit integer on 32-bit systems.
-  This patch fixes the problem to properly use 64-bit types.
-
-  If the offset parameter addresses devices larger than 2TB, the value
-  overflows and stores incorrect information in the metadata.
-  For example, integrity device is smaller than expected size if used
-  over large disk on 32-bit architecture.
-
-  This issue is not present with the standard LUKS1/LUKS2 devices without
-  integrity extensions.
-
-* Fix a regression in TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt system partition activation.
-
-* Reinstate missing backing file hint for loop device.
-
-  If the encrypted device is backed by a file (loopback), cryptsetup now
-  shows the path to the backing file in passphrase query (as in 1.x version).
-
-* LUKS2 reencryption block size is now aligned to reported optimal IO size.
-  This change eliminates possible non-aligned device warnings in kernel log
-  during reencryption.

docs/v2.2.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.2.2 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release.
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.1 and 2.2 should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.2.1
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Print error message if a keyslot open failed for a different reason
-  than wrong passwords (for example there is not enough memory).
-  Only an exit code was present in this case.
-
-* The progress function switches unit sizes (B/s to GiB/s) according
-  to the actual speed. Also, it properly calculates speed in the case
-  of a resumed reencryption operation.
-
-* The --version now supports short -V short option and better handles
-  common option priorities.
-
-* If cryptsetup wipes signatures during format actions through blkid,
-  it also prints signature device offsets.
-
-* Compilation now properly uses LTLIBINTL gettext setting in Makefiles.
-
-* Device-mapper backend now supports new DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION ioctl
-  (available since Linux kernel 5.4).
-  This should help to detect some kernel/userspace incompatibilities
-  earlier later after a failed device activation.
-
-* Fixes LUKS2 reencryption on systems without kernel keyring.
-
-* Fixes unlocking prompt for partitions mapped through loop devices
-  (to properly show the backing device).
-
-* For LUKS2 decryption, a device is now marked for deferred removal
-  to be automatically deactivated.
-
-* Reencryption now limits hotzone size to be maximal 1 GiB or 1/4
-  system memory (if lower).
-
-* Reencryption now retains activation flags during online reencryption.
-
-* Reencryption now allows LUKS2 device to activate device right after
-  LUKS2 encryption is initialized through optional active device name
-  for cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt command.
-  This could help with automated encryption during boot.
-
-  NOTE: It means that part of the device is still not encrypted during
-  activation. Use with care!
-
-* Fixes failure in resize and plain format activation if activated device
-  size was not aligned to underlying logical device size.
-
-* Fixes conversion to LUKS2 format with detached header if a detached
-  header size was smaller than the expected aligned LUKS1 header size.

docs/v2.3.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.3.0 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable release with new experimental features and bug fixes.
-
-Cryptsetup 2.3 version introduces support for BitLocker-compatible
-devices (BITLK format). This format is used in Windows systems,
-and in combination with a filesystem driver, cryptsetup now provides
-native read-write access to BitLocker Full Disk Encryption devices.
-
-The BITLK implementation is based on publicly available information
-and it is an independent and opensource implementation that allows
-one to access this proprietary disk encryption.
-
-Changes since version 2.2.2
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* BITLK (Windows BitLocker compatible) device access
-
-  BITLK userspace implementation is based on the master thesis and code
-  provided by Vojtech Trefny. Also, thanks to other opensource projects
-  like libbde (that provide alternative approach to decode this format)
-  we were able to verify cryptsetup implementation.
-
-  NOTE: Support for the BITLK device is EXPERIMENTAL and will require
-  a lot of testing. If you get some error message (mainly unsupported
-  metadata in the on-disk header), please help us by submitting an issue
-  to cryptsetup project, so we can fix it. Thank you!
-
-  Cryptsetup supports BITLK activation through passphrase or recovery
-  passphrase for existing devices (BitLocker and Bitlocker to Go).
-
-  Activation through TPM, SmartCard, or any other key protector
-  is not supported. And in some situations, mainly for TPM bind to some
-  PCR registers, it could be even impossible on Linux in the future.
-
-  All metadata (key protectors) are handled read-only, cryptsetup cannot
-  create or modify them. Except for old devices (created in old Vista
-  systems), all format variants should be recognized.
-
-  Data devices can be activated read-write (followed by mounting through
-  the proper filesystem driver). To access filesystem on the decrypted device
-  you need properly installed driver (vfat, NTFS or exFAT).
-
-  Foe AES-XTS, activation is supported on all recent Linux kernels.
-
-  For older AES-CBC encryption, Linux Kernel version 5.3 is required
-  (support for special IV variant); for AES-CBC with Elephant diffuser,
-  Linux Kernel 5.6 is required.
-
-  Please note that CBC variants are legacy, and we provide it only
-  for backward compatibility (to be able to access old drives).
-
-  Cryptsetup command now supports the new "bitlk" format and implement dump,
-  open, status, and close actions.
-
-  To activate a BITLK device, use
-
-    # cryptsetup open --type bitlk <device> <name>
-      or with alias
-    # cryptsetup bitlkOpen <device> <name>
-
-  Then with properly installed fs driver (usually NTFS, vfat or exFAT),
-  you can mount the plaintext device /dev/mapper<name> device as a common
-  filesystem.
-
- To print metadata information about BITLK device, use
-   # crypotsetup bitlkDump <device>
-
- To print information about the active device, use
-   # cryptsetup status <name>
-
- Example (activation of disk image):
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-  # Recent blkid recognizes BitLocker device,just to verity
-  # blkid bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img
-    bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img: TYPE="BitLocker"
-
-  # Print visible metadata information (on-disk, form the image)
-  # cryptsetup bitlkDump bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img
-    Info for BITLK device bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img.
-    Version:        2
-    GUID:           ...
-    Created:        Wed Oct 23 17:38:15 2019
-    Description:    DESKTOP-xxxxxxx E: 23.10.2019
-    Cipher name:    aes
-    Cipher mode:    xts-plain64
-    Cipher key:     128 bits
-
-    Keyslots:
-     0: VMK
-            GUID:           ...
-            Protection:     VMK protected with passphrase
-            Salt:           ...
-            Key data size:  44 [bytes]
-     1: VMK
-            GUID:           ...
-            Protection:     VMK protected with recovery passphrase
-            Salt:           ...
-            Key data size:  44 [bytes]
-     2: FVEK
-           Key data size:  44 [bytes]
-
-  # Activation (recovery passphrase works the same as password)
-  # cryptsetup bitlkOpen bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img test -v
-    Enter passphrase for bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img:
-    Command successful.
-
-  # Information about the active device
-  # cryptsetup status test
-    /dev/mapper/test is active.
-    type:    BITLK
-    cipher:  aes-xts-plain64
-    keysize: 128 bits
-    ...
-
-  # Plaintext device should now contain decrypted NTFS filesystem
-  # blkid /dev/mapper/test
-    /dev/mapper/test: UUID="..." TYPE="ntfs"
-
-  # And can be mounted
-  # mount /dev/mapper/test /mnt/tst
-
-  # Deactivation
-  # umount /mnt/tst
-  # cryptsetup close test
-
-* Veritysetup now supports activation with additional PKCS7 signature
-  of root hash through --root-hash-signature option.
-  The signature uses an in-kernel trusted key to validate the signature
-  of the root hash during activation. This option requires Linux kernel
-  5.4 with DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG option.
-
-  Verity devices activated with signature now has a special flag
-  (with signature) active in device status (veritysetup status <name>).
-
-  Usage:
-  # veritysetup open <data_device> name <hash_device> <root_hash> \
-    --root-hash-signature=<roothash_p7_sig_file>
-
-* Integritysetup now calculates hash integrity size according to algorithm
-  instead of requiring an explicit tag size.
-
-  Previously, when integritysetup formats a device with hash or
-  HMAC integrity checksums, it required explicitly tag size entry from
-  a user (or used default value).
-  This led to confusion and unexpected shortened tag sizes.
-
-  Now, libcryptsetup calculates tag size according to real hash output.
-  Tag size can also be specified, then it warns if these values differ.
-
-* Integritysetup now supports fixed padding for dm-integrity devices.
-
-  There was an in-kernel bug that wasted a lot of space when using metadata
-  areas for integrity-protected devices if a larger sector size than
-  512 bytes was used.
-  This problem affects both stand-alone dm-integrity and also LUKS2 with
-  authenticated encryption and larger sector size.
-
-  The new extension to dm-integrity superblock is needed, so devices
-  with the new optimal padding cannot be activated on older systems.
-
-  Integritysetup/Cryptsetup will use new padding automatically if it
-  detects the proper kernel. To create a compatible device with
-  the old padding, use --integrity-legacy-padding option.
-
-* A lot of fixes to online LUKS2 reecryption.
-
-* Add crypt_resume_by_volume_key() function to libcryptsetup.
-  If a user has a volume key available, the LUKS device can be resumed
-  directly using the provided volume key.
-  No keyslot derivation is needed, only the key digest is checked.
-
-* Implement active device suspend info.
-  Add CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED bit to crypt_get_active_device() flags
-  that informs the caller that device is suspended (luksSuspend).
-
-* Allow --test-passphrase for a detached header.
-  Before this fix, we required a data device specified on the command
-  line even though it was not necessary for the passphrase check.
-
-* Allow --key-file option in legacy offline encryption.
-  The option was ignored for LUKS1 encryption initialization.
-
-* Export memory safe functions.
-  To make developing of some extensions simpler, we now export
-  functions to handle memory with proper wipe on deallocation.
-
-* Fail crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf for inactive LUKS1 keyslot.
-
-Libcryptsetup API extensions
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-The libcryptsetup API is backward compatible for existing symbols.
-
-New symbols
- crypt_set_compatibility
- crypt_get_compatibility;
- crypt_resume_by_volume_key;
- crypt_activate_by_signed_key;
- crypt_safe_alloc;
- crypt_safe_realloc;
- crypt_safe_free;
- crypt_safe_memzero;
-
-New defines introduced :
-  CRYPT_BITLK "BITLK" - BITLK (BitLocker-compatible mode
-  CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING - dm-integrity legacy padding
-  CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE - dm-verity root hash signature
-  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED - device suspended info flag

docs/v2.3.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.3.1 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release.
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.3.0
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Support VeraCrypt 128 bytes passwords.
-  VeraCrypt now allows passwords of maximal length 128 bytes
-  (compared to legacy TrueCrypt where it was limited by 64 bytes).
-
-* Strip extra newline from BitLocker recovery keys
-  There might be a trailing newline added by the text editor when
-  the recovery passphrase was passed using the --key-file option.
-
-* Detect separate libiconv library.
-  It should fix compilation issues on distributions with iconv
-  implemented in a separate library.
-
-* Various fixes and workarounds to build on old Linux distributions.
-
-* Split lines with hexadecimal digest printing for large key-sizes.
-
-* Do not wipe the device with no integrity profile.
-  With --integrity none we performed useless full device wipe.
-
-* Workaround for dm-integrity kernel table bug.
-  Some kernels show an invalid dm-integrity mapping table
-  if superblock contains the "recalculate" bit. This causes
-  integritysetup to not recognize the dm-integrity device.
-  Integritysetup now specifies kernel options such a way that
-  even on unpatched kernels mapping table is correct.
-
-* Print error message if LUKS1 keyslot cannot be processed.
-  If the crypto backend is missing support for hash algorithms
-  used in PBKDF2, the error message was not visible.
-
-* Properly align LUKS2 keyslots area on conversion.
-  If the LUKS1 payload offset (data offset) is not aligned
-  to 4 KiB boundary, new LUKS2 keyslots area in now aligned properly.
-
-* Validate LUKS2 earlier on conversion to not corrupt the device
-  if binary keyslots areas metadata are not correct.

docs/v2.3.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.3.2 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release.
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.3.1
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Support compilation with json-c library version 0.14.
-
-* Update FAQ document for some LUKS2 specific information.
-
-* Add option to dump content of LUKS2 unbound keyslot:
-    cryptsetup luksDump --unbound -S <slot> <device>
-  or optionally with --master-key-file option.
-
-  The slot number --key-slot (-S) option is mandatory here.
-
-  An unbound keyslot store a key is that is not assigned to data
-  area on disk (LUKS2 allows one to store arbitrary keys).
-
-* Rephrase some error messages and remove redundant end-of-lines.
-
-* Add support for discards (TRIM) for standalone dm-integrity devices.
-  Linux kernel 5.7 adds support for optional discard/TRIM operation
-  over dm-integrity devices.
-
-  It is now supported through --allow-discards integritysetup option.
-  Note you need to add this flag in all activation calls.
-
-  Note that this option cannot be used for LUKS2 authenticated encryption
-  (that uses dm-integrity for storing additional per-sector metadata).
-
-* Fix cryptsetup-reencrypt to work on devices that do not allow
-  direct-io device access.
-
-* Fix a crash in the BitLocker-compatible code error path.
-
-* Fix Veracrypt compatible support for longer (>64 bytes) passphrases.
-  It allows some older images to be correctly opened again.
-  The issue was introduced in version 2.3.1.

docs/v2.3.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.3.3 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release.
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.3.2
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Fix BitLocker compatible device access that uses native 4kB sectors.
-
-  Devices formatted with storage that natively support 4096-bytes
-  sectors can also use this sector size for encryption units.
-
-* Support large IV count (--iv-large-sectors) cryptsetup option
-  for plain device mapping.
-
-  The large IV count is supported in dm-crypt together with larger
-  sector encryption. It counts the Initialization Vector (IV) in
-  a larger sector size instead of 512-bytes sectors.
-
-  This option does not have any performance or security impact,
-  but it can be used for accessing incompatible existing disk images
-  from other systems.
-
-  Only open action with plain device type and sector size > 512 bytes
-  are supported.
-
-* Fix a memory leak in BitLocker compatible handling.
-
-* Allow EBOIV (Initialization Vector algorithm) use.
-
-  The EBOIV initialization vector is intended to be used internally
-  with BitLocker devices (for CBC mode). It can now be used also
-  outside of the BitLocker compatible code.
-
-* Require both keyslot cipher and key size options.
-
-  If these LUKS2 keyslot parameters were not specified together,
-  cryptsetup silently failed.
-
-* Update to man pages and FAQ.

docs/v2.3.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.3.4 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release with a security fix (32-bit only).
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.2.x and later should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.3.3
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Fix a possible out-of-bounds memory write while validating LUKS2 data
-  segments metadata (CVE-2020-14382).
-
-  This problem can be triggered only on 32-bit builds (64-bit systems
-  are not affected).
-
-  LUKS2 format validation code contains a bug in segments validation code
-  where the code does not check for possible overflow on memory allocation.
-
-  Due to the bug, the libcryptsetup can be tricked to expect such allocation
-  was successful. Later it may read data from image crafted by an attacker and
-  actually write such data beyond allocated memory.
-
-  The bug was introduced in cryptsetup 2.2.0. All later releases until 2.3.4
-  are affected.
-
-  If you only backport the fix for this CVE, these master branch git commits
-  should be backported:
-    52f5cb8cedf22fb3e14c744814ec8af7614146c7
-    46ee71edcd13e1dad50815ad65c28779aa6f7503
-    752c9a52798f11d3b765b673ebaa3058eb25316e
-
-  Thanks to Tobias Stoeckmann for discovering this issue.
-
-* Ignore reported optimal IO size if not aligned to minimal page size.
-
-  Some USB enclosures report bogus block device topology (see lsblk -t) that
-  prevents LUKS2 format with 4k sector size (reported values are not correctly
-  aligned). The code now ignores such values and uses the default alignment.
-
-* Added support for new no_read/write_wrokqueue dm-crypt options (kernel 5.9).
-
-  These performance options, introduced in kernel 5.9, configure dm-crypt
-  to bypass read or write workqueues and run encryption synchronously.
-
-  Use --perf-no_read_workqueue or --perf-no_write_workqueue cryptsetup arguments
-  to use these dm-crypt flags.
-
-  These options are available only for low-level dm-crypt performance tuning,
-  use only if you need a change to default dm-crypt behavior.
-
-  For LUKS2, these flags can be persistently stored in metadata with
-  the --persistent option.
-
-* Added support panic_on_corruption option for dm-verity devices (kernel 5.9).
-
-  Veritysetup now supports --panic-on-corruption argument that configures
-  the dm-verity device to panics kernel if a corruption is detected.
-
-  This option is intended for specific configurations, do not use it in
-  standard configurations.
-
-* Support --master-key-file option for online LUKS2 reencryption
-
-  This can be used for reencryption of devices that uses protected key AES cipher
-  on some mainframes crypto accelerators.
-
-* Always return EEXIST error code if a device already exists.
-
-  Some libcryptsetup functions (activate_by*) now return EEXIST error code,
-  so the caller can distinguish that call fails because some parallel process
-  already activated the device.
-  Previously all fails returned EINVAL (invalid value).
-
-* Fix a problem in integritysetup if a hash algorithm has dash in the name.
-
-  If users want to use blake2b/blake2s, the kernel algorithm name includes
-  a dash (like "blake2s-256").
-  These algorithms can now be used for integritysetup devices.
-
-* Fix crypto backend to properly handle ECB mode.
-
-  Even though it should never be used, it should still work for testing :)
-  This fixes a bug introduced in cryptsetup version 2.3.2.
-
-* TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt compatible mode now supports the activation of devices
-  with a larger sector.
-
-  TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt always uses 512-byte sector for encryption, but for devices
-  with a larger native sector, it stores this value in the header.
-
-  This patch allows activation of such devices, basically ignoring
-  the mentioned sector size.
-
-* LUKS2: Do not create excessively large headers.
-
-  When creating a LUKS2 header with a specified --offset larger than
-  the LUKS2 header size, do not create a larger file than needed.
-
-* Fix unspecified sector size for BitLocker compatible mode.
-
-  Some BitLocker devices can contain zeroed sector size in the header.
-  In this case, the 512-byte sector should be used.
-  The bug was introduced in version 2.3.3.
-
-* Fix reading key data size in metadata for BitLocker compatible mode.
-
-  Such devices with an unexpected entry in metadata can now be activated.
-
-  Thanks to all users reporting these problems, BitLocker metadata documentation
-  is not publicly available, and we depend only on these reports.
-
-* Fix typos in documentation.

docs/v2.3.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.3.5 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release with minor extensions.
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.x and later should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.3.4
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Fix partial reads of passphrase from an interactive terminal.
-  Some stable kernels (5.3.11) started to return buffer from a terminal
-  in parts of maximal size 64 bytes.
-  This breaks the reading of passphrases longer than 64 characters
-  entered through an interactive terminal. The change is already fixed
-  in later kernel releases, but tools now support such partial read from
-  terminal properly.
-
-* Fix maximal length of password entered through a terminal.
-  Now the maximal interactive passphrase length is exactly
-  512 characters (not 511).
-
-* integritysetup: support new dm-integrity HMAC recalculation options.
-
-  In older kernels (since version 4.19), an attacker can force
-  an automatic recalculation of integrity tags by modifying
-  the dm-integrity superblock.
-  This is a problem with a keyed algorithms (HMAC), where it expects
-  nobody can trigger such recalculation without the key.
-  (Automatic recalculation will start after the next activation.)
-
-  Note that dm-integrity in standalone mode was *not* supposed
-  to provide cryptographic data integrity protection.
-  Despite that, we try to keep the system secure if keyed algorithms
-  are used.
-  Thank Daniel Glöckner for the original report of this problem.
-
-  Authenticated encryption that provides data integrity protection (in
-  combination with dm-crypt and LUKS2) is not affected by this problem.
-
-  The fix in the kernel for this problem contains two parts.
-
-  Firstly, the dm-integrity kernel module disables integrity
-  recalculation if keyed algorithms (HMAC) are used.
-  This change is included in long-term stable kernels.
-
-  Secondly, since the kernel version 5.11, dm-integrity introduces
-  modified protection where a journal-integrity algorithm guards
-  superblock; also, journal sections are protected. An attacker cannot
-  copy sectors from one journal section to another, and the superblock
-  also contains salt to prevent header replacement from another device.
-
-  If you want to protect data with HMAC, you should always also use HMAC
-  for --journal-integrity. Keys can be independent.
-  If HMAC is used for data but not for the journal, the recalculation
-  option is disabled.
-
-  If you need to use (insecure) backward compatibility implementation,
-  two new integritysetup options are introduced:
-    - Use --integrity-legacy-recalc (instead of --integrity-recalc)
-      to allow recalculation on legacy devices.
-    - Use --integrity-legacy-hmac in format action to force old insecure
-      HMAC format.
-
-  Libcryptsetup API also introduces flags
-    CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC and
-    CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC
-  to set these through crypt_set_compatibility() call.
-
-* integritysetup: display of recalculating sector in dump command.
-
-* veritysetup: fix verity FEC if stored in the same image with hashes.
-
-  Optional FEC (Forward Error Correction) data should cover the whole
-  data area, hashes (Merkle tree), and optionally additional metadata
-  (located after hash area).
-
-  Unfortunately, if FEC data is stored in the same file as hash,
-  the calculation wrongly used the whole file size, thus overlaps with
-  the FEC area itself. This produced unusable and too large FEC data.
-  There is no problem if the FEC image is a separate image.
-
-  The problem is now fixed, introducing FEC blocks calculation as:
-    - If the hash device is in a separate image, metadata covers the
-      whole rest of the image after the hash area. (Unchanged behavior.)
-    - If hash and FEC device is in the image, metadata ends on the FEC
-      area offset.
-
-  Note: there is also a fix for FEC in the dm-verity kernel (on the way
-  to stable kernels) that fixes error correction with larger RS roots.
-
-* veritysetup: run FEC repair check even if root hash fails.
-
-  Note: The userspace FEC verify command reports are only informational
-  for now. Code does not check verity hash after FEC recovery in
-  userspace. The Reed-Solomon decoder can then report the possibility
-  that it fixed data even if parity is too damaged.
-  This will be fixed in the next major release.
-
-* veritysetup: do not process hash image if hash area is empty.
-
-  Sometimes the device is so small that there is only a root hash
-  needed, and the hash area is not used.
-  Also, the size of the hash image is not increased for hash block
-  alignment in this case.
-
-* veritysetup: store verity hash algorithm in superblock in lowercase.
-
-  Otherwise, the kernel could refuse the activation of the device.
-
-* bitlk: fix a crash if the device disappears during BitLocker scan.
-
-* bitlk: show a better error when trying to open an NTFS device.
-
-  Both BitLocker version 1 and NTFS have the same signature.
-  If a user opens an NTFS device without BitLocker, it now correctly
-  informs that it is not a BITLK device.
-
-* bitlk: add support for startup key protected VMKs.
-
-  The startup key can be provided in --key-file option for open command.
-
-* Fix LUKS1 repair code (regression since version 1.7.x).
-
-  We cannot trust possibly broken keyslots metadata in repair, so the
-  code recalculates them instead.
-  This makes the repair code working again when the master boot record
-  signature overwrites the LUKS header.
-
-* Fix luksKeyChange for LUKS2 with assigned tokens.
-
-  The token references are now correctly assigned to the new keyslot
-  number.
-
-* Fix cryptsetup resize using LUKS2 tokens.
-
-  Code needlessly asked for passphrase even though volume key was
-  already unlocked via LUKS2 token.
-
-* Print a visible error if device resize is not supported.
-
-* Add error message when suspending wrong non-LUKS device.
-
-* Fix default XTS mode key size in reencryption.
-
-  The same luksFormat logic (double key size because XTS uses two keys)
-  is applied in the reencryption code.
-
-* Rephrase missing locking directory warning and move it to debug level.
-
-  The system should later provide a safe transition to tempdir
-  configuration, so creating locking directory inside libcryptsetup
-  call is safe.
-
-* Many fixes for the use of cipher_null (empty debug cipher).
-
-  Support for this empty cipher was intended as a debug feature and for
-  measuring performance overhead. Unfortunately, many systems started to
-  use it as an "empty shell" for LUKS (to enable encryption later).
-
-  This use is very dangerous and it creates a false sense of security.
-
-  Anyway, to not break such systems, we try to support these
-  configurations.
-  Using cipher_null in any production system is strongly discouraged!
-
-  Fixes include:
-   - allow LUKS resume for a device with cipher_null.
-   - do not upload key in keyring when data cipher is null.
-   - switch to default cipher when reencrypting cipher_null device.
-   - replace possible bogus cipher_null keyslots before reencryption.
-   - fix broken detection of null cipher in LUKS2.
-     cipher_null is no longer possible to be used in keyslot encryption
-     in LUKS2, it can be used only for data for debugging purposes.
-
-* Fixes for libpasswdqc 2.0.x (optional passphrase quality check).
-
-* Fixes for problems discovered by various tools for code analysis.
-
-  Fixes include a rework of libpopt command line option string leaks.
-
-* Various fixes to man pages.

docs/v2.3.6-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.3.6 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release with minor extensions.
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.x and later should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.3.5
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* integritysetup: Fix possible dm-integrity mapping table truncation.
-
-  While integritysetup in standalone mode (no encryption) was not
-  designed to provide keyed (and cryptographically strong) data
-  integrity protection, some options can use such algorithms (HMAC).
-
-  If a key is used, it is directly sent to the kernel dm-integrity as
-  a mapping table option (no key derivation is performed).
-  For HMAC, such a key could be quite long (up to 4096 bytes in
-  integritysetup CLI).
-
-  Unfortunately, due to fixed buffers and not correctly checking string
-  truncation, some parameter combinations could cause truncation
-  of the dm-integrity mapping table.
-  In most cases, the table was rejected by the kernel.
-  The worst possible case was key truncation for HMAC options
-  (internal_hash and journal_mac dm-integrity table options).
-
-  This release fixes possible truncation and also adds more sanity
-  checks to reject truncated options.
-  Also, integritysetup now mentions maximal allowed key size
-  in --help output.
-
-  For old standalone dm-integrity devices where the key length was
-  truncated, you have to modify (shorten) --integrity-key-size
-  resp. --journal-integrity-key-size option now.
-
-  This bug is _not_ present for dm-crypt/LUKS, LUKS2 (including
-  integrity protection), or dm-verity devices; it affects only
-  standalone dm-integrity with HMAC integrity protection.
-
-* cryptsetup: Backup header can be used to activate TCRYPT device.
-  Use --header option to specify the header.
-
-* cryptsetup: Avoid LUKS2 decryption without detached header.
-  This feature will be added later and is currently not supported.
-
-* Additional fixes and workarounds for common warnings produced
-  by some static analysis tools (like gcc-11 analyzer) and additional
-  code hardening.
-
-* Fix standalone libintl detection for compiled tests.
-
-* Add Blake2b and Blake2s hash support for crypto backends.
-  Kernel and gcrypt crypto backend support all variants.
-  OpenSSL supports only Blake2b-512 and Blake2s-256.
-  Crypto backend supports kernel notation e.g. "blake2b-512".

docs/v2.4.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,302 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.4.0 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable release with new features and bug fixes.
-
-This version introduces support for external libraries
-(plugins) for handling LUKS2 token objects.
-
-Changes since version 2.3.6
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* External LUKS token plugins
-
-  A LUKS2 token is an object that can describe how to get a passphrase
-  to unlock a particular keyslot. The generic metadata format is part
-  of the LUKS2 specification.
-
-  Cryptsetup 2.4 adds the possibility to implement token handlers
-  in external libraries (possibly provided by other projects).
-
-  A token library allows cryptsetup to understand metadata and provide
-  basic operations. Currently external tokens may be used to unlock
-  keyslots for following CLI actions: open (luksOpen),
-  refresh (open --refresh), resize and dump (prints token specific
-  content).
-
-  LUKS2 devices cannot be resumed (luksResume action) via tokens yet.
-  Support for resume and other actions will be added later.
-
-  The library now provides an interface that automatically tries to load
-  an external library for a token object in LUKS2 metadata.
-
-  Token libraries should be installed in the cryptsetup subdirectory
-  (usually /lib*/cryptsetup). This path is configurable through
-  --with-luks2-external-tokens-path configure option.
-
-  The external plugin loading can be compiled entirely out if
-  --disable-external-tokens configure option is used. The external token
-  interface can also be disabled runtime on the command line by
-  --disable-external-tokens cryptsetup switch or by calling
-  crypt_token_external_disable() API function.
-
-  The name of the loaded token library is determined from the JSON LUKS
-  metadata token object type. For example, "ssh" token will load library
-  "libcryptsetup-token-ssh.so".
-
-  External projects can use this interface to handle specific hardware
-  without introducing additional dependencies to libcryptsetup core.
-
-  As of cryptsetup 2.4.0 release systemd project already merged upstream
-  native cryptsetup token handler for its systemd-tpm2 LUKS2 token
-  released originally in systemd-v248. The token can be created using
-  systemd-cryptenroll utility and devices may be manipulated either by
-  systemd-cryptsetup cli or by cryptsetup for actions listed above.
-
-  Other tokens like systemd-fido2 and systemd-pkcs11 are currently
-  in-review.
-
-* Experimental SSH token
-
-  As a demonstration of the external LUKS2 token interface, a new SSH
-  token handler and cryptsetup-ssh utility is now provided and compiled
-  by default.
-
-  Crypsetup SSH token allows using remote keyfile through SSH protocol
-  (it will authenticate through SSH certificates).
-
-  You can disable the build of this token library with
-  --disable-ssh-token configure option.
-
-To configure the token metadata, you need cryptsetup-ssh utility.
-
-Activation of the device is then performed by the cryptsetup utility.
-
-Example (how to activate LUKS2 through remote keyfile):
-
-  - configure existing LUKS2 device with keyslot activated by a keyfile
-   # cryptsetup luksAddKey <device> keyfile --key-slot 2
-
-   - store that keyfile on a remote system accessible through SSH
-
-   - configure SSH to use certificate for authentication
-
-   - add a LUKS2 token with cryptsetup-ssh utility:
-   # cryptsetup-ssh add <device>1 --key-slot 2 \
-      --ssh-server test-vm \
-      --ssh-user test \
-      --ssh-path /home/test/keyfile \
-      --ssh-keypath  /home/test/.ssh/test_rsa_key
-
-  - you should see token metadata now with "cryptsetup luksDump ..."
-   ...
-   Tokens:
-   0: ssh
-        ssh_server: test-vm
-        ssh_user: test
-        ssh_path: /home/test/keyfile
-        ssh_key_path: /home/test/.ssh/test_rsa_key
-        Keyslot:    2
-
-
-  - activation now should be automatic
-  # cryptsetup open <device> test --verbose
-    SSH token initiating ssh session.
-    Key slot 2 unlocked.
-    Command successful.
-
-  - to remove a token, you can use "cryptsetup token remove" command
-  (no plugin library required)
-
-  Please note SSH token is just demonstration of plugin interface API,
-  it is an EXPERIMENTAL feature.
-
-* Add cryptsetup --token-type parameter.
-
-  It restricts token type to the parameter value in case no specific
-  token-id is selected.
-
-* Support for token based activation with PIN.
-
-  If specific token requires PIN to unlock keyslot passphrase and
-  --token-only parameter was used cryptsetup asks for additional
-  token PIN.
-
-* Respect keyslot priority with token-based activation.
-
-* Default LUKS2 PBKDF is now Argon2id
-
-  Cryptsetup LUKS2 was using Argon2 while there were two versions,
-  data-independent (Argon2i) suitable for the KDF use case and
-  Argon2d (data-dependent). Later Argon2id was introduced as a new
-  mandatory algorithm.
-
-  We switched the password-based key derivation algorithms
-  following the latest version of Argon2 RFC draft
-  (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2/) to Argon2id
-  (from Argon2i) as it is the mandatory and primary version
-  of the Argon2 algorithm.
-
-  There is no need to modify older containers; the main reason is that
-  RFC makes Argon2id the primary variant, while Argon2i subvariant is
-  only optional.
-  Argon2id provides better protection to side-channel attacks while
-  still providing protection to time-memory tradeoffs.
-
-  We will switch to OpenSSL implementation once it is available.
-  With a crystal ball as a reference, it could happen early in
-  OpenSSL 3.1 release.
-  Watch https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/4091.
-
-* Increase minimal memory cost for Argon2 benchmark to 64MiB.
-
-  This patch increases the benchmarking value to 64 MiB (as minimal
-  suggested values in Argon2 RFC). For compatibility reasons, we still
-  allow older limits if set by a parameter.
-
-  NOTE: Argon2 RFC draft defines suggested parameters for disk
-  encryption, but the LUKS2 approach is slightly different. We need to
-  provide platform-independent values. The values in the draft expect
-  64bit systems (suggesting using 6 GiB of RAM). In comparison, we need
-  to provide compatibility with all 32bit systems, so allocating more
-  than 4GiB memory is not an option for LUKS2.
-
-  The maximal limit in LUKS2 stays for 4 GiB, and by default LUKS2 PBKDF
-  benchmarking sets maximum to 1 GIB, preferring an increase of CPU cost
-  while running benchmark
-
-* Autodetect optimal encryption sector size on LUKS2 format.
-
-  While the support for larger encryption sectors is supported
-  for several releases, it required an additional parameter.
-
-  Code now uses automatic detection of 4096-bytes native sector devices
-  and automatically enables 4096-bytes encryption size for LUKS2.
-
-  If no setor size option is used, sector size is detected
-  automatically by cryptsetup. For libcryptsetup API, autodetection
-  happens once you specify sector_size to 0.
-
-  NOTE: crypt_format() function runs autodetection ONLY if you
-  recompile your application to the new API symbol version.
-  For backward compatibility, older applications ignore this parameter.
-
-* Use VeraCrypt option by default and add --disable-veracrypt option.
-
-  While TrueCrypt is no longer developed and supported since 2014,
-  VeraCrypt devices (a successor of TrueCrypt) are much more used today.
-
-  Default is now to support VeraCrypt format (in addition to TrueCrypt),
-  making the --veracrypt option obsolete (ignored as it is the default).
-
-  If you need to disable VeraCrypt support, use the new option
-  --disable-veracrypt.
-
-  This option increases the time to recognize wrong passwords because
-  some VeraCrypt modes use a high PBKDF2 iteration count, and the code
-  must try all variants. This could be limited by using --hash and
-  --cipher options mentioned below.
-
-* Support --hash and --cipher to limit opening time for TCRYPT type
-
-  If a user knows which particular PBKDF2 hash or cipher is used for
-  TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt container,  TCRYPT format now supports --hash and
-  --cipher option.
-
-  Note the value means substring (all cipher chains containing
-  the cipher substring are tried).
-
-  For example, you can use
-      # cryptsetup tcryptDump --hash sha512 <container>
-
-  Note: to speed up the scan, the hash option (used for PBKDF)2 matters.
-  Cipher variants are scanned very quickly.
-
-  Use with care.
-  It can reveal some sensitive attributes of the container!
-
-* Fixed default OpenSSL crypt backend support for OpenSSL3.
-
-  For OpenSSL version 3, we need to load legacy provider for older hash
-  and ciphers. For example, RIPEMD160 and Whirlpool hash algorithms are
-  no longer available by default.
-
-  NOTE: the plain format still uses RIPEMD160 for password hashing by
-  default. Changing the default would cause incompatibilities for many
-  old systems. Nevertheless, such a change will be needed very soon.
-
-* integritysetup: add integrity-recalculate-reset flag.
-
-  The new dm-integrity option in kernel 5.13 can restart recalculation
-  from the beginning of the device.
-  It can be used to change the integrity checksum function.
-
-  New integritysetup --integrity-recalculate-reset option is added to
-  integritysetup, and CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE_RESET flag to API.
-
-* cryptsetup: retains keyslot number in luksChangeKey for LUKS2.
-
-    In LUKS1, any change in keyslot means keyslot number change.
-
-    In LUKS2, we can retain the keyslot number.
-    Now luksKeyChange and crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase() API
-    retains keyslot number for LUKS2 by default.
-
-* Fix cryptsetup resize using LUKS2 tokens.
-
-  Fix a bug where cryptsetup needlessly asked for a passphrase even
-  though the volume key was already unlocked via LUKS2 token.
-
-* Add close --deferred and --cancel-deferred options.
-
-  All command-line utilities now understand deferred options for the
-  close command. Deferred close means that the device is removed
-  automagically after the last user closed the device.
-  Cancel deferred means to cancel this operation (so the device remains
-  active even if there a no longer active users).
-
-  CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED and CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL flags
-  are now available for API.
-
-* Rewritten command-line option parsing to avoid libpopt arguments
-  memory leaks.
-
-  Note: some distributions use patched lipopt that still leaks memory
-  inside internal code (see Debian bug 941814).
-
-* Add --test-args option.
-
-  New --test-args option can be used for syntax checking for valid
-  command-line arguments with no actions performed.
-  Note that it cannot detect unknown algorithm names and similar where
-  we need call API functions.
-
-* veritysetup: add --root-hash-file option
-  Allow passing the root hash via a file, rather than verbatim on
-  the command line, for the open, verify, and format actions.
-
-* libcryptsetup C API extensions (see libcryptsetup.h for details)
-
-  - crypt_logf - a printf like log function
-  - crypt_dump_json - dump LUKS2 metadata in JSON format
-  - crypt_header_is_detached - check if context use detached header
-  - crypt_token_max - get maximal tokens number
-  - crypt_token_external_path - get path for plugins (or NULL)
-  - crypt_token_external_disable - disable runtime support for plugins
-  - crypt_activate_by_token_pin - activate by token with additional PIN
-  - crypt_reencrypt_run - fixed API for deprecated crypt_reencrypt
-
-  The token plugin library interface cosists from these versioned
-  exported symbols (for details see header file and SSH token example):
-     cryptsetup_token_open
-     cryptsetup_token_open_pin
-     cryptsetup_token_buffer_free
-     cryptsetup_token_validate
-     cryptsetup_token_dump
-     cryptsetup_token_version
-
- Since version 2.4 libcryptsetup uses exact symbol versioning
- Newly introduced functions have CRYPTSETUP_2.4 namespace (the old
- symbol always used CRYPTSETUP_2.0).
- There is no change in soname (the library is backward compatible).
-
- * Many fixes and additions to documentation and man pages.

docs/v2.4.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.4.1 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release with minor extensions.
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.4.0 should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.4.0
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Fix compilation for libc implementations without dlvsym().
-
-  Some alternative libc implementations (like musl) do not provide
-  versioned symbols dlvsym function. Code now fallbacks to dlsym
-  operation for dynamic LUKS2 token load.
-  It is up to maintainers to ensure that LUKS2 token plugins are
-  compiled for the supported version.
-
-* Fix compilation and tests on systems with non-standard libraries
-  (standalone argp library, external gettext library, BusyBox
-  implementations of standard tools).
-
-* Try to workaround some issues on systems without udev support.
-  NOTE: non-udev systems cannot provide all functionality for kernel
-  device-mapper, and some operations can fail.
-
-* Fixes for OpenSSL3 crypto backend (including FIPS mode).
-  Because cryptsetup still requires some hash functions implemented
-  in OpenSSL3 legacy provider, crypto backend now uses its library
-  context and tries to load both default and legacy OpenSSL3 providers.
-
-  If FIPS mode is detected, no library context is used, and it is up
-  to the OpenSSL system-wide policy to load proper providers.
-
-  NOTE: We still use some deprecated API in the OpenSSL3 backend,
-  and there are some known problems in OpenSSL 3.0.0.
-
-* Print error message when assigning a token to an inactive keyslot.
-
-* Fix offset bug in LUKS2 encryption code if --offset option was used.
-
-* Do not allow LUKS2 decryption for devices with data offset.
-  Such devices cannot be used after decryption.
-
-* Fix LUKS1 cryptsetup repair command for some specific problems.
-  Repair code can now fix wrongly used initialization vector
-  specification in ECB mode (that is insecure anyway!) and repair
-  the upper-case hash specification in the LUKS1 header.

docs/v2.4.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.4.2 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release.
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.4.1 should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.4.1
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Fix possible large memory allocation if LUKS2 header size is invalid.
-  LUKS2 code read the full header to buffer to verify the checksum.
-  The maximal supported header size now limits the memory allocation.
-
-* Fix memory corruption in debug message printing LUKS2 checksum.
-
-* veritysetup: remove link to the UUID library for the static build.
-
-* Remove link to pwquality library for integritysetup and veritysetup.
-  These tools do not read passphrases.
-
-* OpenSSL3 backend: avoid remaining deprecated calls in API.
-  Crypto backend no longer use API deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0
-
-
-* Check if kernel device-mapper create device failed in an early phase.
-  This happens when a concurrent creation of device-mapper devices
-  meets in the very early state.
-
-* Do not set compiler optimization flag for Argon2 KDF if the memory
-  wipe is implemented in libc.
-
-* Do not attempt to unload LUKS2 tokens if external tokens are disabled.
-  This allows building a static binary with  --disable-external-tokens.
-
-* LUKS convert: also check sysfs for device activity.
-  If udev symlink is missing, code fallbacks to sysfs scan to prevent
-  data corruption for the active device.

docs/v2.4.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.4.3 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable security bug-fix release that fixes CVE-2021-4122.
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.4.x must upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.4.2
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
-  reencryption extension crash recovery (CVE-2021-4122).
-
-  An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
-  progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
-  decrypt part of the LUKS device.
-
-  This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but
-  no knowledge of user passphrases.
-
-  The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates
-  the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata.
-  There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened
-  (except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed
-  afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with
-  possible modification of revealed plaintext.
-
-  The size of possible decrypted data depends on configured LUKS2 header
-  size (metadata size is configurable for LUKS2).
-  With the default parameters (16 MiB LUKS2 header) and only one
-  allocated keyslot (512 bit key for AES-XTS), simulated decryption with
-  checksum resilience SHA1 (20 bytes checksum for 4096-byte blocks),
-  the maximal decrypted size can be over 3GiB.
-
-  The attack is not applicable to LUKS1 format, but the attacker can
-  update metadata in place to LUKS2 format as an additional step.
-  For such a converted LUKS2 header, the keyslot area is limited to
-  decrypted size (with SHA1 checksums) over 300 MiB.
-
-  The issue is present in all cryptsetup releases since 2.2.0.
-  Versions 1.x, 2.0.x, and 2.1.x are not affected, as these do not
-  contain LUKS2 reencryption extension.
-
-  The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual
-  reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new
-  encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires
-  calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to
-  initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no
-  encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not
-  protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects
-  visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect
-  against intentional modification but such modification must not cause
-  a violation of data confidentiality.
-
-  The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption
-  metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical
-  reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata
-  digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots.
-  For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0.
-
-  The former reencryption operation (without the additional digest) is no
-  longer supported (reencryption with the digest is not backward
-  compatible). You need to finish in-progress reencryption before
-  updating to new packages. The alternative approach is to perform
-  a repair command from the updated package to recalculate reencryption
-  digest and fix metadata.
-  The reencryption repair operation always require a user passphrase.
-
-  WARNING: Devices with older reencryption in progress can be no longer
-  activated without performing the action mentioned above.
-
-  Encryption in progress can be detected by running the luksDump command
-  (output includes reencrypt keyslot with reencryption parameters). Also,
-  during the active reencryption, no keyslot operations are available
-  (change of passphrases, etc.).
-
-  The issue was found by Milan Broz as cryptsetup maintainer.
-
-Other changes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* Add configure option --disable-luks2-reencryption to completely disable
-  LUKS2 reencryption code.
-
-  When used, the libcryptsetup library can read metadata with
-  reencryption code, but all reencryption API calls and cryptsetup
-  reencrypt commands are disabled.
-
-  Devices with online reencryption in progress cannot be activated.
-  This option can cause some incompatibilities. Please use with care.
-
-* Improve internal metadata validation code for reencryption metadata.
-
-* Add updated documentation for LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification
-  version 1.1.0 (with reencryption extension description and updated
-  metadata description). See docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf or online
-  version in https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs repository.
-
-* Fix support for bitlk (BitLocker compatible) startup key with new
-  metadata entry introduced in Windows 11.
-
-* Fix space restriction for LUKS2 reencryption with data shift.
-  The code required more space than was needed.

docs/v2.5.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,291 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.5.0 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable release with new features and bug fixes.
-
-Changes since version 2.4.3
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Split manual pages into per-action pages and use AsciiDoc format.
-
-  Manual pages are now generated from AsciiDoc format, allowing easy
-  conditional modifications for per-action options.
-
-  Generation of man pages requires the asciidoctor tool installed.
-
-  Pre-generated man pages are also included in the distribution tarball.
-  You can use --disable-asciidoc configure option to skip man page
-  generation completely. In this case, pre-generated man pages will be
-  used for installation.
-
-  For cryptsetup, there is main man page (cryptsetup.8) that references
-  separate man pages for each command (for example, cryptsetup-open.8).
-  You can open such a man page by simply running "man cryptsetup open".
-  Also, man pages for action aliases are available (cryptsetup-luksOpen.8
-  is an alias for cryptsetup-open.8, etc.)
-
-LUKS volume reencryption changes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Remove cryptsetup-reencrypt tool from the project and move reencryption
-  to already existing "cryptsetup reencrypt" command.
-
-  Cryptsetup reencrypt now handles both LUKS1 and LUKS2 reencryption,
-  encryption, and decryption.
-
-  If you need to emulate the old cryptsetup-reencrypt binary, use simple
-  wrappers script running "exec cryptsetup reencrypt $@".
-
-  All command line options should be compatible. An exception is the
-  reencryption of LUKS2 volumes with old LUKS1 reencryption code that was
-  replaced by native and more resilient LUKS2 reencryption.
-
-* LUKS2: implement --decryption option that allows LUKS removal. The
-  operation can run online or offline and supports the data shift option.
-
-  During the initialization, the LUKS2 header is exported to a file.
-  The first data segment is moved to the head of the data device in place
-  of the original header.
-
-  The feature internally introduces several new resilience modes
-  (combination of existing modes datashift and "checksum" or "journal").
-  Datashift resilience mode is applied for data moved towards the first
-  segment, and the first segment is then decrypted in place.
-
-  This decryption mode is not backward compatible with prior LUKS2
-  reencryption. Interrupted operations in progress cannot be resumed
-  using older cryptsetup releases.
-
-* Reencryption metadata options that are not compatible with recent code
-  (features implemented in more recent releases) are now only read, but
-  code will not activate or modify such metadata.
-  Reencryption metadata contains a version that is validated when
-  reencryption is resumed.
-  For more info, see the updated LUKS2 on-disk format specification.
-
-  Safe operation of reencryption is to always finish the operation with
-  only one version of the tools.
-
-* Fix decryption operation with --active-name option and restrict
-  it to be used only with LUKS2.
-
-* Do not refresh reencryption digest when not needed.
-  This should speed up the reencryption resume process.
-
-* Store proper resilience data in LUKS2 reencrypt initialization.
-  Resuming reencryption now does not require specification of resilience
-  type parameters if these are the same as during initialization.
-
-* Properly wipe the unused area after reencryption with datashift in
-  the forward direction.
-
-* Check datashift value against larger sector size.
-  For example, it could cause an issue if misaligned 4K sector appears
-  during decryption.
-
-* Do not allow sector size increase reencryption in offline mode.
-  The eventual logical block size increase on the dm-crypt device above
-  may lead to an unusable filesystem. Do not allow offline reencryption
-  when sector size increase is requested.
-
-  You can use --force-offline-reencrypt option to override this check
-  (and potentially destroy the data).
-
-* Do not allow dangerous sector size change during reencryption.
-  By changing the encryption sector size during reencryption, a user
-  may increase the effective logical block size for the dm-crypt active
-  device.
-
-  Do not allow encryption sector size to be increased over the value
-  provided by fs superblock in BLOCK_SIZE property.
-
-* Ask the user for confirmation before resuming reencryption.
-  The prompt is not shown in batch mode or when the user explicitly asks
-  for a reencryption resume via --resume-only.
-
-* Do not resume reencryption with conflicting parameters.
-  For example, if the operation was initialized as --encrypt, do not
-  allow resume with opposing parameter --decrypt and vice versa.
-  Also, the code now checks for conflicting resilience parameters
-  (datashift cannot be changed after initialization).
-
-* Add --force-offline-reencrypt option.
-  It can be used to enforce offline reencryption in batch mode when
-  the device is a regular file; therefore, cryptsetup cannot detect
-  properly active devices using it.
-  Also, it may be useful to override the active device auto-detection
-  for specific storage configurations (dangerous!).
-
-* Do not allow nested encryption in LUKS reencrypt.
-  Avoid accidental nested encryption via cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt.
-
-* Fix --test-passphrase when the device is in reencryption.
-
-* Do not upload keys in keyring during offline reencryption.
-  Reencryption runs in userspace, so the kernel does not need the key.
-
-* Support all options allowed with luksFormat with encrypt action.
-
-* Add prompt if LUKS2 decryption is run with a detached header.
-
-* Add warning for reencryption of file image and mention
-  the possible use of --force-offline-reencrypt option.
-
-Other changes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Add resize action to integritysetup.
-  This allows resizing of standalone integrity devices.
-
-* Support --device-size option (that allows unit specification) for plain
-  devices (existing --size option requires 512-byte sectors units).
-
-* Fix detection of encryption sector size if a detached header is used.
-
-* Remove obsolete dracut plugin reencryption example.
-
-* Fix possible keyslot area size overflow during conversion to LUKS2.
-  If keyslots are not sorted according to binary area offset, the area
-  size calculation was wrong and could overflow.
-
-* Hardening and fixes to LUKS2 validation functions:
-
-  * Log a visible error if convert fails due to validation check.
-
-  * Check for interval (keyslot and segment area) overflow.
-
-  * Check cipher availability before LUKS conversion to LUKS2.
-    Some historic incompatibilities are ignored for LUKS1 but do not
-    work for LUKS2.
-
-  * Add empty string check to LUKS2 metadata JSON validation.
-    Most of the LUKS2 fields cannot be empty.
-
-  * Fix JSON objects validation to check JSON object type properly.
-
-* TCRYPT: Properly apply retry count and continue if some PBKDF variant
-  is unavailable.
-
-* BITLK: Add a warning when activating a device with the wrong size
-  stored in metadata.
-
-* BITLK: Add BitLocker volume size to dump command.
-
-* BITLK: Fix possible UTF16 buffer overflow in volume key dump.
-
-* BITLK: Skip question if the batch mode is set for volume key dump.
-
-* BITLK: Check dm-zero availability in the kernel.
-  Bitlocker compatible mode uses dm-zero to mask metadata area.
-  The device cannot be activated if dm-zero is not available.
-
-* Fix error message for LUKS2-only cryptsetup commands to explicitly
-  state LUKS2 version is required.
-
-* Fix error message for incompatible dm-integrity metadata.
-  If the integritysetup tool is too old, kernel dm-integrity may use
-  a more recent version of dm-integrity metadata.
-
-* Properly deactivate the integrity device even if the LUKS2 header
-  is no longer available.
-  If LUKS2 is used with integrity protection, there is always
-  a dm-integrity device underneath that must be deactivated.
-
-* Allow use of --header option for cryptsetup close.
-  This can be used to check that the activated device has the same UUID.
-
-* Fix activation of LUKS2 device with integrity and detached header.
-  The kernel-parsed dm-integrity superblock is always located on the
-  data device, the incorrectly used detached header device here.
-
-* Add ZEROOUT IOCTL support for crypt_wipe API call.
-  For block devices, we can use optimized in-kernel BLKZEROOUT ioctl.
-
-* VERITY: set loopback sector size according to dm-verity block sizes.
-  Verity block size has the same limits, so we can optimize the loop
-  device to increase performance.
-
-* Other Documentation and man page improvements:
-
-  * Update LUKS2 on-disk format description.
-
-  * Add per-keyslot LUKS2 options to the man page.
-    Some options were missing for LUKS2 luksAddKey and luksChangeKey.
-
-  * Fix cryptsetup manpage to use PBKDF consistently.
-
-  * Add compile info to README. This information was lost when we removed
-    the default automake INSTALL file.
-
-  * Use volume key consistently in FAQ and man pages.
-
-  * Use markdown version of FAQ directly for installation.
-
-  * Clarify graceful reencryption interruption.
-    Currently, it can be interrupted by both SIGINT and SIGTERM signals.
-
-  * Add new mailing list info.
-
-  * Mention non-cryptographic xxhash64 hash for integrity protection.
-
-* veritysetup: dump device sizes.
-  Calculating device sizes for verity devices is a little bit tricky.
-  Data, hash, and FEC can share devices or be separate devices.
-  Now dump command prints used device sizes, but it requires that
-  the user specifies all values that are not stored in superblock
-  (like FEC device and FEC roots).
-
-* Fix check for argp_usage in configure if argp-standalone lib is used.
-
-* Add constant time memcmp and hexa print implementation and use it for
-  cryptographic keys handling.
-
-* Display progress when wiping the end of the resized device.
-
-* LUKS2 token: prefer token PIN query before passphrase in some cases.
-  When a user provides --token-type or specific --token-id, a token PIN
-  query is preferred to a passphrase query.
-
-* LUKS2 token: allow tokens to be replaced with --token-replace option
-  for cryptsetup token command.
-
-* LUKS2 token: do not continue operation when interrupted in PIN prompt.
-
-* Add --progress-json parameter to utilities.
-  Progress data can now be printed out in JSON format suitable for
-  machine processing.
-
-* Embedded Argon2 PBKDF: optimize and simplify thread exit.
-
-* Avoid using SHA1 in tests and fix new enforcements introduced in FIPS
-  provider for OpenSSL3 (like minimal parameters for PBKDF2).
-
-* Use custom UTF conversion and avoid linking to iconv as a dependency.
-
-* Reimplement BASE64 with simplified code instead of coreutils version.
-
-* Fix regression when warning messages were not displayed
-  if some kernel feature is not supported (2.4.2).
-
-* Add support for --key-slot option in luksResume action.
-
-Libcryptsetup API extensions and changes
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Properly define uint32_t constants in API.
-  This is not a real change, but it avoids strict compiler warnings.
-
-* crypt_resume_by_token_pin() - Resume crypt device using LUKS2 token.
-
-* crypt_get_label() - Get the label of the LUKS2 device.
-
-* crypt_get_subsystem() - Get the subsystem label of the LUKS2 device.
-
-* Make CRYPT_WIPE_ENCRYPTED_ZERO crypt_wipe() option obsolete.
-  It was never implemented (the idea was to speed up wipe), but with
-  the recent RNG performance changes, it makes no longer sense.
-
-* Add struct crypt_params_reencrypt changes related to decryption.
-
-* Improve crypt_reencrypt_status() return values.
-  Empty or any non-LUKS types now returns CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID status.
-  For LUKS1 devices, it returns CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE.

docs/v2.6.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.6.0 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable release with new features and bug fixes.
-
-Changes since version 2.5.0
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* Introduce support for handling macOS FileVault2 devices (FVAULT2).
-
-  Cryptsetup now supports the mapping of FileVault2 full-disk encryption
-  by Apple for the macOS operating system using a native Linux kernel.
-  You can open an existing USB FileVault portable device and (with
-  the hfsplus filesystem driver) access the native data read/write.
-
-  Cryptsetup supports only (legacy) FileVault2 based on Core Storage
-  and HFS+ filesystem (introduced in MacOS X 10.7 Lion).
-  It does NOT support the new version of FileVault based on the APFS
-  filesystem used in recent macOS versions.
-
-  Header formatting and changes are not supported; cryptsetup never
-  changes the metadata on the device.
-
-  FVAULT2 extension requires kernel userspace crypto API and kernel
-  driver for HFS+ (hfsplus) filesystem (available on most systems today).
-
-  Example of using FileVault2 formatted USB device:
-
-  A typical encrypted device contains three partitions; the FileVault
-  encrypted partition is here sda2:
-
-  $ lsblk -o NAME,FSTYPE,LABEL /dev/sda
-    NAME   FSTYPE  LABEL
-    sda
-    |-sda1 vfat    EFI
-    |-sda2
-    `-sda3 hfsplus Boot OS X
-
-  Note: blkid does not recognize FileVault2 format yet.
-
-  To dump metadata information about the device, you can use
-  the fvault2Dump command:
-
-  $ cryptsetup fvault2Dump /dev/sda2
-    Header information for FVAULT2 device /dev/sda2.
-    Physical volume UUID:   6f353c05-daae-4e76-a0ee-6a9569a22d81
-    Family UUID:            f82cceb0-a788-4815-945a-53d57fcd55a8
-    Logical volume offset:  67108864 [bytes]
-    Logical volume size:    3288334336 [bytes]
-    Cipher:                 aes
-    Cipher mode:            xts-plain64
-    PBKDF2 iterations:      97962
-    PBKDF2 salt:            173a4ec7447662ec79ca7a47df6c2a01
-
- To activate the device, use open --type fvault2 option:
-
- $ cryptsetup open --type fvault2 /dev/sda2 test
-   Enter passphrase for /dev/sda2: ...
-
- And check the status of the active device:
-
- $ cryptsetup status test
-   /dev/mapper/test is active.
-   type:    FVAULT2
-   cipher:  aes-xts-plain64
-   keysize: 256 bits
-   key location: dm-crypt
-   device:  /dev/sda2
-   sector size:  512
-   offset:  131072 sectors
-   size:    6422528 sectors
-   mode:    read/write
-
- Now, if the kernel contains hfsplus filesystem driver, you can mount
- decrypted content:
-
- $ mount /dev/mapper/test /mnt/test
-
- For more info about implementation, please refer to the master thesis
- by Pavel Tobias, which was the source for this extension.
- https://is.muni.cz/th/p0aok/?lang=en
-
-* libcryptsetup: no longer use global memory locking through mlockall()
-
-  For many years, libcryptsetup locked all memory (including dependent
-  library address space) to prevent swapping sensitive content outside
-  of RAM.
-
-  This strategy no longer works as the locking of basic libraries exceeds
-  the memory locking limit if running as a non-root user.
-
-  Libcryptsetup now locks only memory ranges containing sensitive
-  material (keys) through crypt_safe_alloc() calls.
-
-  This change solves many reported mysterious problems of unexpected
-  failures. If the initial lock was still under the limit and succeeded,
-  some following memory allocation could fail later as it exceeded
-  the locking limit. If the initial locking fails,  memory locking
-  was quietly ignored completely.
-
-  The whole crypt_memory_lock() API call is deprecated; it no longer
-  calls memlockall().
-
-* libcryptsetup: process priority is increased only for key derivation
-  (PBKDF) calls.
-
-  Increasing priority was tight to memory locking and works only if
-  running under superuser.
-  Only PBKDF calls and benchmarking now increase the process priority.
-
-* Add new LUKS keyslot context handling functions and API.
-
-  In practice, the luksAddKey action does two operations.
-  It unlocks the existing device volume key and stores the unlocked
-  volume key in a new keyslot.
-  Previously the options were limited to key files and passphrases.
-
-  Newly available methods (keyslot contexts) are passphrase, keyfile,
-  key (binary representation), and LUKS2 token.
-
-  To unlock a keyslot user may:
-    - provide existing passphrase via interactive prompt (default method)
-    - use --key-file option to provide a file with a valid passphrase
-    - provide volume key directly via --volume-key-file
-    - unlock keyslot via all available LUKS2 tokens by --token-only
-    - unlock keyslot via specific token with --token-id
-    - unlock keyslot via specific token type by --token-type
-
-  To provide the passphrase for a new keyslot, a user may:
-    - provide existing passphrase via interactive prompt (default method)
-    - use --new-keyfile to read the passphrase from the file
-    - use --new-token-id to select LUKS2 token to get passphrase
-      for new keyslot. The new keyslot is assigned to the selected token
-      id if the operation is successful.
-
-* The volume key may now be extracted using a passphrase, keyfile, or
-  token. For LUKS devices, it also returns the volume key after
-  a successful crypt_format call.
-
-* Fix --disable-luks2-reencryption configuration option.
-
-* cryptsetup: Print a better error message and warning if the format
-  produces an image without space available for data.
-
-  Activation now fails early with a more descriptive message.
-
-* Print error if anti-forensic LUKS2 hash setting is not available.
-  If the specified hash was not available, activation quietly failed.
-
-* Fix internal crypt segment compare routine if the user
-  specified cipher in kernel format (capi: prefix).
-
-* cryptsetup: Add token unassign action.
-
-  This action allows removing token binding on specific keyslot.
-
-* veritysetup: add support for --use-tasklets option.
-
-  This option sets try_verify_in_tasklet kernel dm-verity option
-  (available since Linux kernel 6.0) to allow some performance
-  improvement on specific systems.
-
-* Provide pkgconfig Require.private settings.
-
-  While we do not completely provide static build on udev systems,
-  it helps produce statically linked binaries in certain situations.
-
-* Always update automake library files if autogen.sh is run.
-
-  For several releases, we distributed older automake scripts by mistake.
-
-* reencryption: Fix user defined moved segment size in LUKS2 decryption.
-
-  The --hotzone-size argument was ignored in cases where the actual data
-  size was less than the original LUKS2 data offset.
-
-* Delegate FIPS mode detection to configured crypto backend.
-  System FIPS mode check no longer depends on /etc/system-fips file.
-
-* tests: externally provided systemd plugin is now optionally compiled
-  from systemd git and tested with cryptsetup
-
-* tests: initial integration to OSS-fuzz project with basic crypt_load()
-  test for LUKS2 and JSON mutated fuzzing.
-
-  For more info, see README in tests/fuzz directory.
-
-* Update documentation, including FAQ and man pages.
-
-Libcryptsetup API extensions
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-The libcryptsetup API is backward compatible with existing symbols.
-
-New symbols:
-  crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_passphrase
-  crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_keyfile
-  crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_token
-  crypt_keyslot_context_init_by_volume_key
-  crypt_keyslot_context_get_error
-  crypt_keyslot_context_set_pin
-  crypt_keyslot_context_get_type
-  crypt_keyslot_context_free
-  crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyslot_context
-  crypt_volume_key_get_by_keyslot_context
-
-New defines:
-  CRYPT_FVAULT2 "FVAULT2" (FileVault2 compatible mode)
-
-Keyslot context types:
-  CRYPT_KC_TYPE_PASSPHRASE
-  CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEYFILE
-  CRYPT_KC_TYPE_TOKEN
-  CRYPT_KC_TYPE_KEY
-
-  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_TASKLETS (dm-verity: use tasklets activation flag)
-
-WARNING!
-~~~~~~~~
-The next version of cryptsetup will change the encryption mode and key
-derivation option for the PLAIN format.
-
-This change will cause backward incompatibility.
-For this reason, the user will have to specify the exact parameters
-for cipher, key size, and key derivation parameters for plain format.
-
-The default encryption mode will be AES-XTS with 512bit key (AES-256).
-The CBC mode is no longer considered the best default, as it allows easy
-bit-flipped ciphertext modification attacks and performance problems.
-
-For the passphrase hashing in plain mode, the encryption key is directly
-derived through iterative hashing from a user-provided passphrase
-(except a keyfile that is not hashed).
-
-The default hash is RIPEMD160, which is no longer the best default
-option. The exact change will be yet discussed but should include
-the possibility of using a password-based key derivation function
-instead of iterative hashing.

docs/v2.6.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.6.1 Release Notes
-==============================
-Stable bug-fix release with minor extensions.
-
-All users of cryptsetup 2.6.0 should upgrade to this version.
-
-Changes since version 2.6.0
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-* bitlk: Fixes for BitLocker-compatible on-disk metadata parser
-  (found by new cryptsetup OSS-Fuzz fuzzers).
-  - Fix a possible memory leak if the metadata contains more than
-    one description field.
-  - Harden parsing of metadata entries for key and description entries.
-  - Fix broken metadata parsing that can cause a crash or out of memory.
-
-* Fix possible iteration overflow in OpenSSL2 PBKDF2 crypto backend.
-  OpenSSL2 uses a signed integer for PBKDF2 iteration count.
-  As cryptsetup uses an unsigned value, this can lead to overflow and
-  a decrease in the actual iteration count.
-  This situation can happen only if the user specifies
-  --pbkdf-force-iterations option.
-  OpenSSL3 (and other supported crypto backends) are not affected.
-
-* Fix compilation for new ISO C standards (gcc with -std=c11 and higher).
-
-* fvault2: Fix compilation with very old uuid.h.
-
-* verity: Fix possible hash offset setting overflow.
-
-* bitlk: Fix use of startup BEK key on big-endian platforms.
-
-* Fix compilation with latest musl library.
-  Recent musl no longer implements lseek64() in some configurations.
-  Use lseek() as 64-bit offset is mandatory for cryptsetup.
-
-* Do not initiate encryption (reencryption command) when the header and
-  data devices are the same.
-  If data device reduction is not requsted, this leads to data corruption
-  since LUKS metadata was written over the data device.
-
-* Fix possible memory leak if crypt_load() fails.
-
-* Always use passphrases with a minimal 8 chars length for benchmarking.
-  Some enterprise distributions decided to set an unconditional check
-  for PBKDF2 password length when running in FIPS mode.
-  This questionable change led to unexpected failures during LUKS format
-  and keyslot operations, where short passwords were used for
-  benchmarking PBKDF2 speed.
-  PBKDF2 benchmark calculations should not be affected by this change.