Version 2.5.0-rc1.

So it is always separate section.

.github/workflows/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+set -ex
+
+PACKAGES=(
+	git make autoconf automake autopoint pkg-config libtool libtool-bin
+	gettext libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol1-dev
+	libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev tar libargon2-0-dev libpwquality-dev
+	sharutils dmsetup jq xxd expect keyutils netcat passwd openssh-client sshpass
+	asciidoctor
+)
+
+COMPILER="${COMPILER:?}"
+COMPILER_VERSION="${COMPILER_VERSION:?}"
+RELEASE="$(lsb_release -cs)"
+
+bash -c "echo 'deb-src http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ $RELEASE main restricted universe multiverse' >>/etc/apt/sources.list"
+
+# Latest gcc stack deb packages provided by
+# https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-toolchain-r/+archive/ubuntu/test
+add-apt-repository -y ppa:ubuntu-toolchain-r/test
+PACKAGES+=(gcc-$COMPILER_VERSION)
+
+# scsi_debug, gost crypto
+PACKAGES+=(dkms linux-headers-$(uname -r) linux-modules-extra-$(uname -r) gost-crypto-dkms)
+
+apt-get -y update --fix-missing
+apt-get -y install "${PACKAGES[@]}"
+apt-get -y build-dep cryptsetup

.github/workflows/cibuild.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+PHASES=(${@:-CONFIGURE MAKE CHECK})
+COMPILER="${COMPILER:?}"
+COMPILER_VERSION="${COMPILER_VERSION}"
+CFLAGS=(-O1 -g)
+CXXFLAGS=(-O1 -g)
+
+CC="gcc${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
+CXX="g++${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
+
+set -ex
+
+for phase in "${PHASES[@]}"; do
+	case $phase in
+	CONFIGURE)
+		opts=(
+			--enable-libargon2
+		)
+
+		sudo -E git clean -xdf
+
+		./autogen.sh
+		CC="$CC" CXX="$CXX" CFLAGS="${CFLAGS[@]}" CXXFLAGS="${CXXFLAGS[@]}" ./configure "${opts[@]}"
+		;;
+	MAKE)
+		make -j
+		make -j -C tests check-programs
+		;;
+	CHECK)
+		make check
+		;;
+
+	*)
+		echo >&2 "Unknown phase '$phase'"
+		exit 1
+	esac
+done

.github/workflows/cibuild.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+name: Build test
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - 'main'
+      - 'wip-luks2'
+      - 'v2.3.x'
+      - 'v2.4.x'
+    paths-ignore:
+      - 'docs/**'
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    if: github.repository == 'mbroz/cryptsetup'
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        env:
+          - { COMPILER: "gcc", COMPILER_VERSION: "11",  RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1" }
+    env: ${{ matrix.env }}
+    steps:
+      - name: Repository checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v1
+      - name: Ubuntu setup
+        run: sudo -E .github/workflows/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh
+      - name: Configure & Make
+        run: .github/workflows/cibuild.sh CONFIGURE MAKE
+      - name: Check
+        run: sudo -E .github/workflows/cibuild.sh CHECK

.github/workflows/coverity.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+name: Coverity test
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - 'coverity_scan'
+    paths-ignore:
+      - 'docs/**'
+
+jobs:
+  latest:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    if: github.repository == 'mbroz/cryptsetup'
+    steps:
+      - name: Repository checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v1
+      - name: Ubuntu setup
+        run: sudo -E .github/workflows/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh
+        env:
+          COMPILER: "gcc"
+          COMPILER_VERSION: "11"
+      - name: Install Coverity
+        run: |
+          wget -q https://scan.coverity.com/download/cxx/linux64 --post-data "token=$TOKEN&project=mbroz/cryptsetup" -O cov-analysis-linux64.tar.gz
+          mkdir cov-analysis-linux64
+          tar xzf cov-analysis-linux64.tar.gz --strip 1 -C cov-analysis-linux64
+        env:
+          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.COVERITY_SCAN_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Run autoconf & configure
+        run: |
+          ./autogen.sh
+          ./configure
+      - name: Run cov-build
+        run: |
+          export PATH=`pwd`/cov-analysis-linux64/bin:$PATH
+          cov-build --dir cov-int make
+      - name: Submit to Coverity Scan
+        run: |
+          tar czvf cryptsetup.tgz cov-int
+          curl \
+            --form project=mbroz/cryptsetup \
+            --form token=$TOKEN \
+            --form email=gmazyland@gmail.com \
+            --form file=@cryptsetup.tgz \
+            --form version=trunk \
+            --form description="`./cryptsetup --version`" \
+            https://scan.coverity.com/builds?project=mbroz/cryptsetup
+        env:
+          TOKEN: ${{ secrets.COVERITY_SCAN_TOKEN }}

.gitignore

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Makefile.in.in
 *.lo
 *.la
 *.o
+*.so
+*.8
 **/*.dirstamp
 .deps/
 .libs/
@@ -54,3 +56,5 @@ tests/luks1-images
 tests/tcrypt-images
 tests/unit-utils-io
 tests/vectors-test
+tests/test-symbols-list.h
+tests/all-symbols-test

.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+stages:
+  - test
+
+.dump_kernel_log:
+  after_script:
+    - sudo dmesg > /mnt/artifacts/dmesg.log
+    - sudo journalctl > /mnt/artifacts/journalctl.log
+    - '[ "$(ls -A /var/coredumps)" ] && exit 1 || true'
+
+include:
+  - local: .gitlab/ci/debian.yml
+  - local: .gitlab/ci/fedora.yml
+  - local: .gitlab/ci/rhel.yml
+  - local: .gitlab/ci/centos.yml
+  - local: .gitlab/ci/annocheck.yml
+  - local: .gitlab/ci/csmock.yml
+  - local: .gitlab/ci/gitlab-shared-docker.yml
+  - local: .gitlab/ci/compilation-gcc.gitlab-ci.yml
+  - local: .gitlab/ci/compilation-clang.gitlab-ci.yml
+  - local: .gitlab/ci/alpinelinux.yml

.gitlab/ci/alpinelinux.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+.alpinelinux-dependencies:
+  after_script:
+    - sudo dmesg > /mnt/artifacts/dmesg.log
+    - sudo cp /var/log/messages /mnt/artifacts/
+    - '[ "$(ls -A /var/coredumps)" ] && exit 1 || true'
+  before_script:
+    - >
+      sudo apk add
+      lvm2-dev openssl1.1-compat-dev popt-dev util-linux-dev json-c-dev
+      argon2-dev device-mapper which sharutils gettext gettext-dev automake
+      autoconf libtool build-base keyutils tar jq expect git asciidoctor
+    - ./autogen.sh
+    - ./configure --prefix=/usr --libdir=/lib --sbindir=/sbin --disable-static --enable-libargon2 --with-crypto_backend=openssl --disable-external-tokens --disable-ssh-token --enable-asciidoc
+
+test-main-commit-job-alpinelinux:
+  extends:
+    - .alpinelinux-dependencies
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - alpinelinux
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "0"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check
+
+test-mergerq-job-alpinelinux:
+  extends:
+    - .alpinelinux-dependencies
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - alpinelinux
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "0"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check

.gitlab/ci/annocheck.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+test-main-commit-job-annocheck:
+  extends:
+    - .dump_kernel_log
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - rhel9-annocheck
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  allow_failure: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  script:
+    - /opt/build-rpm-script.sh > /dev/null 2>&1
+    - annocheck /var/lib/mock/rhel-9.0.0-candidate-x86_64/result/*.rpm --profile=el9
+    - annocheck /var/lib/mock/rhel-9.0.0-candidate-x86_64/result/*.rpm --profile=el8

.gitlab/ci/centos.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+.centos-openssl-backend:
+  extends:
+    - .dump_kernel_log
+  before_script:
+    - >
+      sudo dnf -y -q  install
+      autoconf automake device-mapper-devel gcc gettext-devel json-c-devel
+      libblkid-devel libpwquality-devel libselinux-devel libssh-devel libtool
+      libuuid-devel make popt-devel libsepol-devel nc openssh-clients passwd
+      pkgconfig sharutils sshpass tar uuid-devel vim-common device-mapper
+      expect gettext git jq keyutils openssl-devel openssl gem
+    - sudo gem install asciidoctor
+    - sudo -E git clean -xdf
+    - ./autogen.sh
+    - ./configure --enable-fips --enable-pwquality --with-crypto_backend=openssl --enable-asciidoc
+
+# non-FIPS jobs
+
+test-main-commit-centos-stream9:
+  extends:
+    - .centos-openssl-backend
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - centos-stream9
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check
+
+test-mergerq-centos-stream9:
+  extends:
+    - .centos-openssl-backend
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - centos-stream9
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check

.gitlab/ci/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+set -ex
+
+PACKAGES=(
+	git make autoconf automake autopoint pkg-config libtool libtool-bin
+	gettext libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol1-dev
+	libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev tar libargon2-0-dev libpwquality-dev
+	sharutils dmsetup jq xxd expect keyutils netcat passwd openssh-client sshpass
+	asciidoctor
+)
+
+COMPILER="${COMPILER:?}"
+COMPILER_VERSION="${COMPILER_VERSION:?}"
+
+grep -E '^deb' /etc/apt/sources.list > /etc/apt/sources.list~
+sed -Ei 's/^deb /deb-src /' /etc/apt/sources.list~
+cat /etc/apt/sources.list~ >> /etc/apt/sources.list
+
+apt-get -y update --fix-missing
+DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -yq install software-properties-common wget lsb-release
+RELEASE="$(lsb_release -cs)"
+
+if [[ $COMPILER == "gcc" ]]; then
+	# Latest gcc stack deb packages provided by
+	# https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-toolchain-r/+archive/ubuntu/test
+	add-apt-repository -y ppa:ubuntu-toolchain-r/test
+	PACKAGES+=(gcc-$COMPILER_VERSION)
+elif [[ $COMPILER == "clang" ]]; then
+	wget -O - https://apt.llvm.org/llvm-snapshot.gpg.key | apt-key add -
+	add-apt-repository "deb http://apt.llvm.org/${RELEASE}/   llvm-toolchain-${RELEASE}-${COMPILER_VERSION} main"
+
+	# scan-build
+	PACKAGES+=(clang-tools-$COMPILER_VERSION clang-$COMPILER_VERSION lldb-$COMPILER_VERSION lld-$COMPILER_VERSION clangd-$COMPILER_VERSION)
+	PACKAGES+=(perl)
+else
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+apt-get -y update --fix-missing
+DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get -yq install "${PACKAGES[@]}"
+apt-get -y build-dep cryptsetup
+
+echo "====================== VERSIONS ==================="
+if [[ $COMPILER == "clang" ]]; then
+	echo "Using scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
+fi
+
+${COMPILER}-$COMPILER_VERSION -v
+echo "====================== END VERSIONS ==================="

.gitlab/ci/clang-Wall

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# clang -Wall plus other important warnings not included in -Wall
+
+for arg in "$@"
+do
+	case $arg in
+	-O*) Wuninitialized=-Wuninitialized;;  # only makes sense with `-O'
+	esac
+done
+
+CLANG="clang${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
+
+#PEDANTIC="-std=gnu99"
+#PEDANTIC="-pedantic -std=gnu99"
+#PEDANTIC="-pedantic -std=gnu99 -Wno-variadic-macros"
+#CONVERSION="-Wconversion"
+
+EXTRA="\
+ -Wextra \
+ -Wsign-compare \
+ -Wcast-align
+ -Werror-implicit-function-declaration \
+ -Wpointer-arith \
+ -Wwrite-strings \
+ -Wswitch \
+ -Wmissing-format-attribute \
+ -Winit-self \
+ -Wdeclaration-after-statement \
+ -Wold-style-definition \
+ -Wno-missing-field-initializers \
+ -Wno-unused-parameter \
+ -Wno-long-long"
+
+exec $CLANG $PEDANTIC $CONVERSION \
+	-Wall $Wuninitialized \
+	-Wno-switch \
+	-Wdisabled-optimization \
+	-Wwrite-strings \
+	-Wpointer-arith \
+	-Wbad-function-cast \
+	-Wmissing-prototypes \
+	-Wmissing-declarations \
+	-Wstrict-prototypes \
+	-Wnested-externs \
+	-Wcomment \
+	-Winline \
+	-Wcast-qual \
+	-Wredundant-decls $EXTRA \
+	"$@"

.gitlab/ci/compilation-clang.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+test-clang-compilation:
+  extends:
+    - .gitlab-shared-clang
+  script:
+    - export CFLAGS="-Wall -Werror"
+    - ./configure
+    - make -j
+    - make -j check-programs
+
+test-clang-Wall-script:
+  extends:
+    - .gitlab-shared-clang
+  script:
+    - export CFLAGS="-g -O0"
+    - export CC="$CI_PROJECT_DIR/.gitlab/ci/clang-Wall"
+    - ./configure
+    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror"
+    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror" check-programs
+
+test-scan-build:
+  extends:
+    - .gitlab-shared-clang
+  script:
+    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} -V ./configure CFLAGS="-g -O0"
+    - make clean
+    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} --status-bugs -maxloop 10 make -j
+    - scan-build${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION} --status-bugs -maxloop 10 make -j check-programs

.gitlab/ci/compilation-gcc.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+test-gcc-compilation:
+  extends:
+    - .gitlab-shared-gcc
+  script:
+    - export CFLAGS="-Wall -Werror"
+    - ./configure
+    - make -j
+    - make -j check-programs
+
+test-gcc-Wall-script:
+  extends:
+    - .gitlab-shared-gcc
+  script:
+    - export CFLAGS="-g -O0"
+    - export CC="$CI_PROJECT_DIR/.gitlab/ci/gcc-Wall"
+    - ./configure
+    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror"
+    - make -j CFLAGS="-g -O0 -Werror" check-programs
+
+test-gcc-fanalyzer:
+  extends:
+    - .gitlab-shared-gcc
+  script:
+    - export CFLAGS="-Wall -Werror -g -O0 -fanalyzer -fdiagnostics-path-format=separate-events"
+    - ./configure
+    - make -j
+    - make -j check-programs

.gitlab/ci/csmock.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+test-commit-job-csmock:
+  extends:
+    - .dump_kernel_log
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - rhel7-csmock
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  allow_failure: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/ || $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
+  script:
+    - /opt/csmock-run-script.sh

.gitlab/ci/debian.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+.debian-prep:
+  extends:
+    - .dump_kernel_log
+  before_script:
+    - >
+      sudo apt-get -y install -y -qq  git gcc make
+      autoconf automake autopoint pkg-config libtool libtool-bin gettext
+      libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol1-dev
+      libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev tar libargon2-0-dev
+      libpwquality-dev sharutils dmsetup jq xxd expect keyutils
+      netcat passwd openssh-client sshpass asciidoctor
+    - sudo apt-get -y build-dep cryptsetup
+    - sudo -E git clean -xdf
+    - ./autogen.sh
+    - ./configure --enable-libargon2 --enable-asciidoc
+
+test-mergerq-job-debian:
+  extends:
+    - .debian-prep
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - debian10
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check
+
+test-main-commit-job-debian:
+  extends:
+    - .debian-prep
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - debian10
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check

.gitlab/ci/fedora.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+.dnf-openssl-backend:
+  extends:
+    - .dump_kernel_log
+  before_script:
+    - >
+      sudo dnf -y -q  install
+      autoconf automake device-mapper-devel gcc gettext-devel json-c-devel
+      libargon2-devel libblkid-devel libpwquality-devel libselinux-devel
+      libssh-devel libtool libuuid-devel make popt-devel
+      libsepol-devel.x86_64 netcat openssh-clients passwd pkgconfig sharutils
+      sshpass tar uuid-devel vim-common device-mapper expect gettext git jq
+      keyutils openssl-devel openssl asciidoctor
+    - sudo -E git clean -xdf
+    - ./autogen.sh
+    - ./configure --enable-fips --enable-pwquality --enable-libargon2 --with-crypto_backend=openssl --enable-asciidoc
+
+test-main-commit-job-rawhide:
+  extends:
+    - .dnf-openssl-backend
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - fedora-rawhide
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  allow_failure: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check
+
+test-mergerq-job-rawhide:
+  extends:
+    - .dnf-openssl-backend
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - fedora-rawhide
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  allow_failure: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check

.gitlab/ci/gcc-Wall

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# gcc -Wall plus other important warnings not included in -Wall
+
+for arg in "$@"
+do
+	case $arg in
+	-O*) Wuninitialized=-Wuninitialized;;  # only makes sense with `-O'
+	esac
+done
+
+GCC="gcc${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
+
+#PEDANTIC="-std=gnu99"
+#PEDANTIC="-pedantic -std=gnu99"
+#PEDANTIC="-pedantic -std=gnu99 -Wno-variadic-macros"
+#CONVERSION="-Wconversion"
+# -Wpacked \
+
+# This does more than expected for gcc (mixed code with declarations)
+# -Wdeclaration-after-statement \
+
+EXTRA="-Wextra \
+ -Wsign-compare \
+ -Werror-implicit-function-declaration \
+ -Wpointer-arith \
+ -Wwrite-strings \
+ -Wswitch \
+ -Wmissing-format-attribute \
+ -Wstrict-aliasing=3 \
+ -Winit-self \
+ -Wunsafe-loop-optimizations \
+ -Wold-style-definition \
+ -Wno-missing-field-initializers \
+ -Wno-unused-parameter \
+ -Wno-long-long \
+ -Wmaybe-uninitialized \
+ -Wvla \
+ -Wformat-overflow \
+ -Wformat-truncation"
+
+exec $GCC $PEDANTIC $CONVERSION \
+	-Wall $Wuninitialized \
+	-Wno-switch \
+	-Wdisabled-optimization \
+	-Wwrite-strings \
+	-Wpointer-arith \
+	-Wbad-function-cast \
+	-Wmissing-prototypes \
+	-Wmissing-declarations \
+	-Wstrict-prototypes \
+	-Wnested-externs \
+	-Wcomment \
+	-Winline \
+	-Wcast-align=strict \
+	-Wcast-qual \
+	-Wredundant-decls $EXTRA \
+	"$@"

.gitlab/ci/gitlab-shared-docker.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+.gitlab-shared-docker:
+  image: ubuntu:focal
+  tags:
+    - gitlab-org-docker
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event" || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  before_script:
+    - .gitlab/ci/cibuild-setup-ubuntu.sh
+    - export CC="${COMPILER}${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
+    - export CXX="${COMPILER}++${COMPILER_VERSION:+-$COMPILER_VERSION}"
+    - ./autogen.sh
+
+.gitlab-shared-gcc:
+  extends:
+    - .gitlab-shared-docker
+  variables:
+    COMPILER: "gcc"
+    COMPILER_VERSION: "11"
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+
+.gitlab-shared-clang:
+  extends:
+    - .gitlab-shared-docker
+  variables:
+    COMPILER: "clang"
+    COMPILER_VERSION: "13"
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"

.gitlab/ci/rhel.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+.rhel-openssl-backend:
+  extends:
+    - .dump_kernel_log
+  before_script:
+    - >
+      sudo yum -y -q  install
+      autoconf automake device-mapper-devel gcc gettext-devel json-c-devel
+      libblkid-devel libpwquality-devel libselinux-devel libssh-devel libtool
+      libuuid-devel make popt-devel libsepol-devel nc openssh-clients passwd
+      pkgconfig sharutils sshpass tar uuid-devel vim-common device-mapper
+      expect gettext git jq keyutils openssl-devel openssl gem > /dev/null 2>&1
+    - sudo gem install asciidoctor
+    - sudo -E git clean -xdf
+    - ./autogen.sh
+    - ./configure --enable-fips --enable-pwquality --with-crypto_backend=openssl --enable-asciidoc
+
+# non-FIPS jobs
+
+test-main-commit-rhel8:
+  extends:
+    - .rhel-openssl-backend
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - rhel8
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check
+
+test-main-commit-rhel9:
+  extends:
+    - .rhel-openssl-backend
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - rhel9
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check
+
+# FIPS jobs
+
+test-main-commit-rhel8-fips:
+  extends:
+    - .rhel-openssl-backend
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - rhel8-fips
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check
+
+test-main-commit-rhel9-fips:
+  extends:
+    - .rhel-openssl-backend
+  tags:
+    - libvirt
+    - rhel9-fips
+  stage: test
+  interruptible: true
+  allow_failure: true
+  variables:
+    RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST: "1"
+  rules:
+    - if: $CI_PROJECT_PATH != "cryptsetup/cryptsetup"
+      when: never
+    - if: $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == $CI_DEFAULT_BRANCH || $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH =~ /v2\..\.x$/
+  script:
+    - make -j
+    - make -j -C tests check-programs
+    - sudo -E make check

.lgtm.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+queries:
+  - exclude: cpp/fixme-comment
+  - exclude: cpp/empty-block
+# symver attribute detection cannot be used, disable it for lgtm
+extraction:
+  cpp:
+    configure:
+      command:
+      - "./autogen.sh"
+      - "./configure --enable-external-tokens --enable-ssh-token"
+      - "echo \"#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_SYMVER\" >> config.h"

.travis-functions.sh

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# .travis-functions.sh:
-#   - helper functions to be sourced from .travis.yml
-#   - designed to respect travis' environment but testing locally is possible
-#   - modified copy from util-linux project
-#
-
-if [ ! -f "configure.ac" ]; then
-	echo ".travis-functions.sh must be sourced from source dir" >&2
-	return 1 || exit 1
-fi
-
-## some config settings
-# travis docs say we get 1.5 CPUs
-MAKE="make -j2"
-DUMP_CONFIG_LOG="short"
-export TS_OPT_parsable="yes"
-
-export RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST=1
-
-function configure_travis
-{
-	./configure "$@"
-	err=$?
-	if [ "$DUMP_CONFIG_LOG" = "short" ]; then
-		grep -B1 -A10000 "^## Output variables" config.log | grep -v "_FALSE="
-	elif [ "$DUMP_CONFIG_LOG" = "full" ]; then
-		cat config.log
-	fi
-	return $err
-}
-
-function check_nonroot
-{
-	local cfg_opts="$1"
-
-	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
-
-	configure_travis \
-		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
-		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
-		--enable-external-tokens \
-		--enable-ssh-token \
-		"$cfg_opts" \
-		|| return
-
-	$MAKE || return
-
-	make check
-}
-
-function check_root
-{
-	local cfg_opts="$1"
-
-	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
-
-	configure_travis \
-		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
-		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
-		--enable-external-tokens \
-		--enable-ssh-token \
-		"$cfg_opts" \
-		|| return
-
-	$MAKE || return
-
-	# FIXME: we should use -E option here
-	sudo make check
-}
-
-function check_nonroot_compile_only
-{
-	local cfg_opts="$1"
-
-	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
-
-	configure_travis \
-		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
-		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
-		"$cfg_opts" \
-		|| return
-
-	$MAKE
-}
-
-function travis_install_script
-{
-	# install some packages from Ubuntu's default sources
-	sudo apt-get -qq update
-	sudo apt-get install -qq >/dev/null \
-		sharutils \
-		libgcrypt20-dev \
-		libssl-dev \
-		libdevmapper-dev \
-		libpopt-dev \
-		uuid-dev \
-		libsepol1-dev \
-		libtool \
-		dmsetup \
-		autoconf \
-		automake \
-		pkg-config \
-		autopoint \
-		gettext \
-		expect \
-		keyutils \
-		libjson-c-dev \
-		libblkid-dev \
-		dkms \
-		linux-headers-$(uname -r) \
-		linux-modules-extra-$(uname -r) \
-		libssh-dev \
-		sshpass \
-		|| return
-
-	# For VeraCrypt test
-	sudo apt-get install gost-crypto-dkms
-}
-
-function travis_before_script
-{
-	set -o xtrace
-
-	./autogen.sh
-	ret=$?
-
-	set +o xtrace
-	return $ret
-}
-
-function travis_script
-{
-	local ret
-	set -o xtrace
-
-	case "$MAKE_CHECK" in
-	gcrypt)
-		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt" && \
-		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt"
-		;;
-	gcrypt_compile)
-		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt"
-		;;
-	openssl)
-		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=openssl" && \
-		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=openssl"
-		;;
-	openssl_compile)
-		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=openssl"
-		;;
-	kernel)
-		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=kernel" && \
-		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=kernel"
-		;;
-	kernel_compile)
-		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=kernel"
-		;;
-	*)
-		echo "error, check environment (travis.yml)" >&2
-		false
-		;;
-	esac
-
-	ret=$?
-	set +o xtrace
-	return $ret
-}
-
-function travis_after_script
-{
-	return 0
-}

.travis.yml

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-language: c
-
-sudo: required
-os: linux
-dist: focal
-group: edge
-
-compiler:
-  - gcc
-
-env:
-  # MAKE_CHECK="gcrypt"
-  - MAKE_CHECK="openssl"
-  # MAKE_CHECK="kernel"
-
-branches:
-  only:
-    - master
-    - wip-luks2
-    - v2.3.x
-
-before_install:
-  - uname -a
-  - $CC --version
-  - which $CC
-  # workaround clang not system wide, fail on sudo make install
-  - export CC=`which $CC`
-  # workaround travis-ci issue #5301
-  - unset PYTHON_CFLAGS
-
-install:
-  - source ./.travis-functions.sh
-  - travis_install_script
-
-before_script:
-  - travis_before_script
-
-script:
-  - travis_script
-
-after_script:
-  - travis_after_script

Makefile.am

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-EXTRA_DIST = README.md COPYING.LGPL FAQ docs misc
+EXTRA_DIST = README.md COPYING.LGPL FAQ.md docs misc autogen.sh
 SUBDIRS = po tests
 CLEANFILES =
 DISTCLEAN_TARGETS =
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS = \
 AM_CFLAGS = -Wall
 AM_LDFLAGS =
 
-LDADD = $(LTLIBINTL) -lm
+LDADD = $(LTLIBINTL)
 
 tmpfilesddir = @DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR@
 
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ sbin_PROGRAMS =
 man8_MANS =
 tmpfilesd_DATA =
 pkgconfig_DATA =
+dist_noinst_DATA =
 
 include man/Makemodule.am
 
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4
 DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS = 	\
 	--with-tmpfilesdir=$$dc_install_base/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d \
 	--enable-internal-argon2 --enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
-	--enable-external-tokens --enable-ssh-token
+	--enable-external-tokens --enable-ssh-token --enable-asciidoc
 
 distclean-local:
 	-find . -name \*~ -o -name \*.orig -o -name \*.rej | xargs rm -f
@@ -54,3 +55,12 @@ distclean-local:
 
 clean-local:
 	-rm -rf docs/doxygen_api_docs libargon2.la
+
+install-data-local:
+	$(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)/${EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH}
+
+uninstall-local:
+	rmdir $(DESTDIR)/${EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH} 2>/dev/null || :
+
+check-programs: libcryptsetup.la
+	$(MAKE) -C tests $@

README.md

@@ -13,13 +13,14 @@ The project also includes a **veritysetup** utility used to conveniently setup
 and **integritysetup** to setup
 [DMIntegrity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMIntegrity) block integrity kernel module.
 
-
 LUKS Design
 -----------
 **LUKS** is the standard for Linux hard disk encryption. By providing a standard on-disk-format, it does not  
 only facilitate compatibility among distributions, but also provides secure management of multiple user passwords.  
 LUKS stores all necessary setup information in the partition header, enabling to transport or migrate data seamlessly.
 
+### Specifications
+
 Last version of the LUKS2 format specification is
 [available here](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs).
 
@@ -44,22 +45,22 @@ Download
 --------
 All release tarballs and release notes are hosted on [kernel.org](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/).
 
-**The latest release candidate cryptsetup version is 2.4.0-rc0**
-  * [cryptsetup-2.4.0-rc0.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/cryptsetup-2.4.0-rc0.tar.xz)
-  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.4.0-rc0.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/cryptsetup-2.4.0-rc0.tar.sign)
+**The latest stable release candidate cryptsetup version is 2.5.0-rc1**
+  * [cryptsetup-2.5.0-rc1.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.5/cryptsetup-2.5.0-rc1.tar.xz)
+  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.5.0-rc1.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.5/cryptsetup-2.5.0-rc1.tar.sign)
     _(You need to decompress file first to check signature.)_
-  * [Cryptsetup 2.4.0-rc0 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/v2.4.0-rc0-ReleaseNotes).
+  * [Cryptsetup 2.5.0-rc1 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.5/v2.5.0-rc1-ReleaseNotes).
 
-**The latest stable cryptsetup version is 2.3.6**
-  * [cryptsetup-2.3.6.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.6.tar.xz)
-  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.3.6.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.6.tar.sign)
+**The latest stable cryptsetup version is 2.4.3**
+  * [cryptsetup-2.4.3.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/cryptsetup-2.4.3.tar.xz)
+  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.4.3.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/cryptsetup-2.4.3.tar.sign)
     _(You need to decompress file first to check signature.)_
-  * [Cryptsetup 2.3.6 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/v2.3.6-ReleaseNotes).
+  * [Cryptsetup 2.4.3 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/v2.4.3-ReleaseNotes).
 
 Previous versions
- * [Version 2.0.6](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.6.tar.xz) -
-   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.6.tar.sign) -
-   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.6-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 2.3.7](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.7.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.7.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/v2.3.7-ReleaseNotes).
  * [Version 1.7.5](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.5.tar.xz) -
    [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.5.tar.sign) -
    [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes).
@@ -77,22 +78,45 @@ NLS PO files are maintained by [TranslationProject](https://translationproject.o
 
 Required packages
 -----------------
-All distributions provide cryptsetup as distro package. If you need to compile cryptsetup youfself, some packages are required for compilation. Please always prefer distro specific build tools to manually configuring cryptsetup.
-Fo available compile options, check ``configure --help`` for more info. If you are using a git snapshot, you need to generate configure script with ``autogen.sh`` script.
+All distributions provide cryptsetup as distro package. If you need to compile cryptsetup yourself, some packages are required for compilation. Please always prefer distro specific build tools to manually configuring cryptsetup.
 
 Here is the list of packages needed for the compilation of project for particular distributions:
- * For Fedora: `git gcc make autoconf automake gettext-devel pkgconfig openssl-devel popt-devel device-mapper-devel libuuid-devel json-c-devel libblkid-devel findutils libtool libssh-devel tar`. Optionally `libargon2-devel libpwquality-devel`. To run internal testsuite you also need `sharutils device-mapper jq vim-common expect keyutils netcat shadow-utils openssh-clients openssh sshpass`.
+ * For Fedora: `git gcc make autoconf automake gettext-devel pkgconfig openssl-devel popt-devel device-mapper-devel libuuid-devel json-c-devel libblkid-devel findutils libtool libssh-devel tar`. Optionally `libargon2-devel libpwquality-devel`. To run the internal testsuite you also need to install `sharutils device-mapper jq vim-common expect keyutils netcat shadow-utils openssh-clients openssh sshpass`.
 
- * For Debian and Ubuntu: `git gcc make autoconf automake autopoint pkg-config libtool gettext libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol1-dev libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev tar`. Optionally `libargon2-0-dev libpwquality-dev`. To run internal testsuite you also need `sharutils dmsetup jq xxd expect keyutils netcat passwd openssh-client sshpass`
+ * For Debian and Ubuntu: `git gcc make autoconf automake autopoint pkg-config libtool gettext libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol1-dev libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev tar`. Optionally `libargon2-0-dev libpwquality-dev`. To run the internal testsuite you also need to install `sharutils dmsetup jq xxd expect keyutils netcat passwd openssh-client sshpass`
 
-Note that the list could change as distributions evolve.
+Note that the list could change as the distributions evolve.
+
+Compilation
+-----------
+The cryptsetup project uses **automake** and **autoconf** system to generate all needed files for compilation. If you check it from the git snapshot, use ``./autogen.sh && ./configure && make`` to compile the project. If you use downloaded released ``*.tar.xz`` archive, the configure script is already pre-generated (no need to run ``autoconf.sh``).
+See ``./configure --help`` and use ``--disable-*`` and ``--enable-*`` options.
+
+For running the test suite that come with the project, type ``make check``.
+Note that most tests will need root user privileges and run many dangerous storage fail simulations.
+Do **not** run tests with root privilege on production systems! Some tests will need scsi_debug kernel module to be available.
+
+For more details, please refer to [automake](https://www.gnu.org/software/automake/manual/automake.html) and [autoconf](https://www.gnu.org/savannah-checkouts/gnu/autoconf/manual/autoconf.html) manuals.
 
 Help!
 -----
-Please always read [FAQ](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions) first.
-For cryptsetup and LUKS related questions, please use the dm-crypt mailing list, [dm-crypt@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt@saout.de).
 
-If you want to subscribe just send an empty mail to [dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de).
+### Documentation
 
-You can also browse [list archive](https://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/) or read and search it through
-[web interface on lore.kernel.org](https://lore.kernel.org/dm-crypt/) or alternatively on [marc.info](https://marc.info/?l=dm-crypt).
+Please read the following documentation before posting questions in the mailing list.   You will be able to ask better questions and better understand the answers.  
+
+* [FAQ](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions) 
+* LUKS Specifications
+* manuals (aka man page, man pages, man-page) 
+
+The FAQ is online and in the source code for the project.  The Specifications are referenced above in this document.  The man pages are in source and should be available after installation using standard man commands.  e.g.  man cryptsetup
+
+### Mailing List
+
+For cryptsetup and LUKS related questions, please use the cryptsetup mailing list [cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev](mailto:cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev), hosted at [kernel.org subspace](https://subspace.kernel.org/lists.linux.dev.html).
+To subscribe send an empty mail to [cryptsetup+subscribe@lists.linux.dev](mailto:cryptsetup+subscribe@lists.linux.dev).
+
+You can also browse and/or search the mailing [list archive](https://lore.kernel.org/cryptsetup/).
+News (NNTP), Atom feed and git access to public inbox is available through [lore.kernel.org](https://lore.kernel.org) service.
+
+The former dm-crypt [list archive](https://lore.kernel.org/dm-crypt/) is also available.

SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Reporting a Security Bug in cryptsetup project
+
+If you think you have discovered a security issue, please report it through
+the project issue tracker [New issue](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues)
+as a confidential issue (select confidential checkbox).
+
+An alternative is to send PGP encrypted mail to the cryptsetup maintainer.
+Current maintainer is [Milan Broz](mailto:gmazyland@gmail.com), use PGP key
+with fingerprint 2A29 1824 3FDE 4664 8D06 86F9 D9B0 577B D93E 98FC.
+

autogen.sh

@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ DIE=0
   DIE=1
 }
 
-(grep "^AM_PROG_LIBTOOL" $srcdir/configure.ac >/dev/null) && {
-  (libtool --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+(grep "^LT_INIT" $srcdir/configure.ac >/dev/null) && {
+  (libtoolize --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
     echo
-    echo "**Error**: You must have libtool installed."
+    echo "**Error**: You must have libtoolize installed."
     echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
     DIE=1
   }

configure.ac

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 AC_PREREQ([2.67])
-AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[2.4.0-rc0])
+AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[2.5.0-rc1])
 
 dnl library version from <major>.<minor>.<release>[-<suffix>]
 LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION=$(echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | cut -f1 -d-)
-LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=19:0:7
+LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=20:0:8
 
 AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR(src/cryptsetup.c)
@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ AM_PROG_CC_C_O
 AC_PROG_CPP
 AC_PROG_INSTALL
 AC_PROG_MAKE_SET
+AC_PROG_MKDIR_P
 AC_ENABLE_STATIC(no)
 LT_INIT
 PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
-AM_ICONV
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl define PKG_CHECK_VAR for old pkg-config <= 0.28
@@ -52,13 +52,33 @@ AS_VAR_COPY([$1], [pkg_cv_][$1])
 AS_VAR_IF([$1], [""], [$5], [$4])
 ])
 ])
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl AsciiDoc manual pages
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([asciidoc],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-asciidoc], [do not generate man pages from asciidoc]),
+	[], [enable_asciidoc=yes]
+)
+
+AC_PATH_PROG([ASCIIDOCTOR], [asciidoctor])
+if test "x$enable_asciidoc" = xyes -a "x$ASCIIDOCTOR" = x; then
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([Building man pages requires asciidoctor installed.])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_ASCIIDOC], [test "x$enable_asciidoc" = xyes])
+
+have_manpages=no
+AS_IF([test -f "$srcdir/man/cryptsetup-open.8"], [
+	AC_MSG_NOTICE([re-use already generated man-pages.])
+	have_manpages=yes]
+)
+AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_MANPAGES], [test "x$have_manpages" = xyes])
+
 dnl ==========================================================================
 
 AC_C_RESTRICT
 
 AC_HEADER_DIRENT
-AC_HEADER_STDC
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h uchar.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
 	sys/sysmacros.h sys/statvfs.h ctype.h unistd.h locale.h byteswap.h endian.h stdint.h)
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_CLOEXEC],,[AC_DEFINE([O_CLOEXEC],[0], [Defined to 0 if not provided])],
 [[
@@ -123,6 +143,12 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE([external-tokens],
 	[], [enable_external_tokens=yes])
 if test "x$enable_external_tokens" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_EXTERNAL_TOKENS, 1, [Use external tokens])
+	dnl we need dynamic library loading here
+	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlsym],[dl])
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlvsym])
+	AC_SUBST(DL_LIBS, $LIBS)
+	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 fi
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([ssh-token],
@@ -134,6 +160,14 @@ if test "x$enable_ssh_token" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_external_tokens" = "xno"; the
 	AC_MSG_ERROR([Requested LUKS2 ssh-token build, but external tokens are disabled.])
 fi
 
+dnl LUKS2 online reencryption
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([luks2-reencryption],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-luks2-reencryption], [disable LUKS2 online reencryption extension]),
+	[], [enable_luks2_reencryption=yes])
+if test "x$enable_luks2_reencryption" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION, 1, [Use LUKS2 online reencryption extension])
+fi
+
 dnl ==========================================================================
 
 AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external],[need-ngettext])
@@ -348,11 +382,6 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE([veritysetup],
 	[], [enable_veritysetup=yes])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(VERITYSETUP, test "x$enable_veritysetup" = "xyes")
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([cryptsetup-reencrypt],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup-reencrypt], [disable cryptsetup-reencrypt tool]),
-	[], [enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt=yes])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(REENCRYPT, test "x$enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt" = "xyes")
-
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([integritysetup],
 	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-integritysetup], [disable integritysetup support]),
 	[], [enable_integritysetup=yes])
@@ -399,9 +428,15 @@ PKG_CHECK_MODULES([JSON_C], [json-c])
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([json_object_object_add_ex], [], [], [#include <json-c/json.h>])
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([json_object_deep_copy], [], [], [#include <json-c/json.h>])
 
-dnl Check for libssh for SSH plugin
+dnl Check for libssh and argp for SSH plugin
 if test "x$enable_ssh_token" = "xyes"; then
 	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBSSH], [libssh])
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([ssh_session_is_known_server], [], [], [#include <libssh/libssh.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADER([argp.h], [], AC_MSG_ERROR([You need argp library.]))
+	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([argp_parse],[argp])
+	AC_SUBST(ARGP_LIBS, $LIBS)
+	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 fi
 
 dnl Crypto backend configuration.
@@ -540,6 +575,23 @@ if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
 	PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
 fi
 
+dnl Check compiler support for symver function attribute
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for symver attribute support])
+saved_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
+CFLAGS="-O0 -Werror"
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	void _test_sym(void);
+	__attribute__((__symver__("sym@VERSION_4.2"))) void _test_sym(void) {}
+]],
+[[ _test_sym() ]]
+)],[
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_SYMVER], 1, [Define to 1 to use __attribute__((symver))])
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+], [
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+])
+CFLAGS=$saved_CFLAGS
+
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([for systemd tmpfiles config directory])
 PKG_CHECK_VAR([systemd_tmpfilesdir], [systemd], [tmpfilesdir], [], [systemd_tmpfilesdir=no])
 AC_MSG_RESULT([$systemd_tmpfilesdir])

docs/doxyfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Doxyfile 1.8.8
+# Doxyfile 1.9.1
 
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Project related configuration options
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ OUTPUT_DIRECTORY       = doxygen_api_docs
 CREATE_SUBDIRS         = NO
 ALLOW_UNICODE_NAMES    = NO
 OUTPUT_LANGUAGE        = English
+OUTPUT_TEXT_DIRECTION  = None
 BRIEF_MEMBER_DESC      = YES
 REPEAT_BRIEF           = YES
 ABBREVIATE_BRIEF       =
@@ -22,40 +23,47 @@ STRIP_FROM_PATH        =
 STRIP_FROM_INC_PATH    =
 SHORT_NAMES            = NO
 JAVADOC_AUTOBRIEF      = NO
+JAVADOC_BANNER         = NO
 QT_AUTOBRIEF           = NO
 MULTILINE_CPP_IS_BRIEF = NO
+PYTHON_DOCSTRING       = YES
 INHERIT_DOCS           = YES
 SEPARATE_MEMBER_PAGES  = NO
 TAB_SIZE               = 8
 ALIASES                =
-TCL_SUBST              =
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C  = YES
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_JAVA   = NO
 OPTIMIZE_FOR_FORTRAN   = NO
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_VHDL   = NO
+OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_SLICE  = NO
 EXTENSION_MAPPING      =
 MARKDOWN_SUPPORT       = YES
+TOC_INCLUDE_HEADINGS   = 5
 AUTOLINK_SUPPORT       = YES
 BUILTIN_STL_SUPPORT    = NO
 CPP_CLI_SUPPORT        = NO
 SIP_SUPPORT            = NO
 IDL_PROPERTY_SUPPORT   = YES
 DISTRIBUTE_GROUP_DOC   = NO
+GROUP_NESTED_COMPOUNDS = NO
 SUBGROUPING            = YES
 INLINE_GROUPED_CLASSES = NO
 INLINE_SIMPLE_STRUCTS  = NO
 TYPEDEF_HIDES_STRUCT   = YES
 LOOKUP_CACHE_SIZE      = 0
+NUM_PROC_THREADS       = 1
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Build related configuration options
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 EXTRACT_ALL            = NO
 EXTRACT_PRIVATE        = NO
+EXTRACT_PRIV_VIRTUAL   = NO
 EXTRACT_PACKAGE        = NO
 EXTRACT_STATIC         = NO
 EXTRACT_LOCAL_CLASSES  = YES
 EXTRACT_LOCAL_METHODS  = NO
 EXTRACT_ANON_NSPACES   = NO
+RESOLVE_UNNAMED_PARAMS = YES
 HIDE_UNDOC_MEMBERS     = NO
 HIDE_UNDOC_CLASSES     = NO
 HIDE_FRIEND_COMPOUNDS  = NO
@@ -63,6 +71,7 @@ HIDE_IN_BODY_DOCS      = NO
 INTERNAL_DOCS          = NO
 CASE_SENSE_NAMES       = YES
 HIDE_SCOPE_NAMES       = NO
+HIDE_COMPOUND_REFERENCE= NO
 SHOW_INCLUDE_FILES     = YES
 SHOW_GROUPED_MEMB_INC  = NO
 FORCE_LOCAL_INCLUDES   = NO
@@ -93,13 +102,14 @@ WARNINGS               = YES
 WARN_IF_UNDOCUMENTED   = YES
 WARN_IF_DOC_ERROR      = YES
 WARN_NO_PARAMDOC       = NO
+WARN_AS_ERROR          = NO
 WARN_FORMAT            = "$file:$line: $text"
 WARN_LOGFILE           =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Configuration options related to the input files
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-INPUT                  = "doxygen_index.h" \
-                         "../lib/libcryptsetup.h"
+INPUT                  = doxygen_index.h \
+                         ../lib/libcryptsetup.h
 INPUT_ENCODING         = UTF-8
 FILE_PATTERNS          =
 RECURSIVE              = NO
@@ -107,7 +117,7 @@ EXCLUDE                =
 EXCLUDE_SYMLINKS       = NO
 EXCLUDE_PATTERNS       =
 EXCLUDE_SYMBOLS        =
-EXAMPLE_PATH           = "examples"
+EXAMPLE_PATH           = examples
 EXAMPLE_PATTERNS       =
 EXAMPLE_RECURSIVE      = NO
 IMAGE_PATH             =
@@ -129,12 +139,13 @@ SOURCE_TOOLTIPS        = YES
 USE_HTAGS              = NO
 VERBATIM_HEADERS       = YES
 CLANG_ASSISTED_PARSING = NO
+CLANG_ADD_INC_PATHS    = YES
 CLANG_OPTIONS          =
+CLANG_DATABASE_PATH    =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Configuration options related to the alphabetical class index
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ALPHABETICAL_INDEX     = YES
-COLS_IN_ALPHA_INDEX    = 5
 IGNORE_PREFIX          =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Configuration options related to the HTML output
@@ -151,6 +162,7 @@ HTML_COLORSTYLE_HUE    = 220
 HTML_COLORSTYLE_SAT    = 100
 HTML_COLORSTYLE_GAMMA  = 80
 HTML_TIMESTAMP         = YES
+HTML_DYNAMIC_MENUS     = YES
 HTML_DYNAMIC_SECTIONS  = NO
 HTML_INDEX_NUM_ENTRIES = 100
 GENERATE_DOCSET        = NO
@@ -180,8 +192,10 @@ GENERATE_TREEVIEW      = NO
 ENUM_VALUES_PER_LINE   = 4
 TREEVIEW_WIDTH         = 250
 EXT_LINKS_IN_WINDOW    = NO
+HTML_FORMULA_FORMAT    = png
 FORMULA_FONTSIZE       = 10
 FORMULA_TRANSPARENT    = YES
+FORMULA_MACROFILE      =
 USE_MATHJAX            = NO
 MATHJAX_FORMAT         = HTML-CSS
 MATHJAX_RELPATH        = http://www.mathjax.org/mathjax
@@ -201,11 +215,13 @@ GENERATE_LATEX         = YES
 LATEX_OUTPUT           = latex
 LATEX_CMD_NAME         = latex
 MAKEINDEX_CMD_NAME     = makeindex
+LATEX_MAKEINDEX_CMD    = makeindex
 COMPACT_LATEX          = NO
 PAPER_TYPE             = a4
 EXTRA_PACKAGES         =
 LATEX_HEADER           =
 LATEX_FOOTER           =
+LATEX_EXTRA_STYLESHEET =
 LATEX_EXTRA_FILES      =
 PDF_HYPERLINKS         = YES
 USE_PDFLATEX           = YES
@@ -213,6 +229,8 @@ LATEX_BATCHMODE        = NO
 LATEX_HIDE_INDICES     = NO
 LATEX_SOURCE_CODE      = NO
 LATEX_BIB_STYLE        = plain
+LATEX_TIMESTAMP        = NO
+LATEX_EMOJI_DIRECTORY  =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Configuration options related to the RTF output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -222,6 +240,7 @@ COMPACT_RTF            = NO
 RTF_HYPERLINKS         = NO
 RTF_STYLESHEET_FILE    =
 RTF_EXTENSIONS_FILE    =
+RTF_SOURCE_CODE        = NO
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Configuration options related to the man page output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -236,6 +255,7 @@ MAN_LINKS              = NO
 GENERATE_XML           = NO
 XML_OUTPUT             = xml
 XML_PROGRAMLISTING     = YES
+XML_NS_MEMB_FILE_SCOPE = NO
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Configuration options related to the DOCBOOK output
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -273,12 +293,10 @@ GENERATE_TAGFILE       =
 ALLEXTERNALS           = NO
 EXTERNAL_GROUPS        = YES
 EXTERNAL_PAGES         = YES
-PERL_PATH              =
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Configuration options related to the dot tool
 #---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 CLASS_DIAGRAMS         = YES
-MSCGEN_PATH            =
 DIA_PATH               =
 HIDE_UNDOC_RELATIONS   = YES
 HAVE_DOT               = NO
@@ -291,6 +309,8 @@ COLLABORATION_GRAPH    = YES
 GROUP_GRAPHS           = YES
 UML_LOOK               = NO
 UML_LIMIT_NUM_FIELDS   = 10
+DOT_UML_DETAILS        = NO
+DOT_WRAP_THRESHOLD     = 17
 TEMPLATE_RELATIONS     = NO
 INCLUDE_GRAPH          = YES
 INCLUDED_BY_GRAPH      = YES
@@ -305,6 +325,8 @@ DOTFILE_DIRS           =
 MSCFILE_DIRS           =
 DIAFILE_DIRS           =
 PLANTUML_JAR_PATH      =
+PLANTUML_CFG_FILE      =
+PLANTUML_INCLUDE_PATH  =
 DOT_GRAPH_MAX_NODES    = 50
 MAX_DOT_GRAPH_DEPTH    = 0
 DOT_TRANSPARENT        = NO

docs/examples/crypt_log_usage.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * libcryptsetup API log example
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

docs/examples/crypt_luks_usage.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  *  libcryptsetup API - using LUKS device example
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

docs/v2.0.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Important features
 
   Integritysetup is intended to be used for settings that require
   non-cryptographic data integrity protection with no data encryption.
-  Fo setting integrity protected encrypted devices, see disk authenticated
+  For setting integrity protected encrypted devices, see disk authenticated
   encryption below.
 
   Note that after formatting the checksums need to be initialized;
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
   in kernel (more on this later).
   NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
   in kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
-  randomly generated IVs (the collison probability is not negligible).
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
   For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
 
 * Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for dm-integrity journal.

docs/v2.3.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ Changes since version 2.3.3
 
   If users want to use blake2b/blake2s, the kernel algorithm name includes
   a dash (like "blake2s-256").
-  Theses algorithms can now be used for integritysetup devices.
+  These algorithms can now be used for integritysetup devices.
 
 * Fix crypto backend to properly handle ECB mode.
 

docs/v2.4.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-Cryptsetup 2.4.0-rc0 Release Notes
-==================================
-Stable release candidate with new features and bug fixes.
+Cryptsetup 2.4.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with new features and bug fixes.
 
 This version introduces support for external libraries
 (plugins) for handling LUKS2 token objects.
@@ -18,7 +18,13 @@ Changes since version 2.3.6
   in external libraries (possibly provided by other projects).
 
   A token library allows cryptsetup to understand metadata and provide
-  basic operations (activate, resize, dump metadata, handle keyslots).
+  basic operations. Currently external tokens may be used to unlock
+  keyslots for following CLI actions: open (luksOpen),
+  refresh (open --refresh), resize and dump (prints token specific
+  content).
+
+  LUKS2 devices cannot be resumed (luksResume action) via tokens yet.
+  Support for resume and other actions will be added later.
 
   The library now provides an interface that automatically tries to load
   an external library for a token object in LUKS2 metadata.
@@ -40,8 +46,14 @@ Changes since version 2.3.6
   External projects can use this interface to handle specific hardware
   without introducing additional dependencies to libcryptsetup core.
 
-  Examples of such tokens are already available for the systemd project
-  for TPM2 and FIDO2 interfaces.
+  As of cryptsetup 2.4.0 release systemd project already merged upstream
+  native cryptsetup token handler for its systemd-tpm2 LUKS2 token
+  released originally in systemd-v248. The token can be created using
+  systemd-cryptenroll utility and devices may be manipulated either by
+  systemd-cryptsetup cli or by cryptsetup for actions listed above.
+
+  Other tokens like systemd-fido2 and systemd-pkcs11 are currently
+  in-review.
 
 * Experimental SSH token
 
@@ -98,6 +110,19 @@ Example (how to activate LUKS2 through remote keyfile):
   Please note SSH token is just demonstration of plugin interface API,
   it is an EXPERIMENTAL feature.
 
+* Add cryptsetup --token-type parameter.
+
+  It restricts token type to the parameter value in case no specific
+  token-id is selected.
+
+* Support for token based activation with PIN.
+
+  If specific token requires PIN to unlock keyslot passphrase and
+  --token-only parameter was used cryptsetup asks for additional
+  token PIN.
+
+* Respect keyslot priority with token-based activation.
+
 * Default LUKS2 PBKDF is now Argon2id
 
   Cryptsetup LUKS2 was using Argon2 while there were two versions,
@@ -245,6 +270,10 @@ Example (how to activate LUKS2 through remote keyfile):
   Note that it cannot detect unknown algorithm names and similar where
   we need call API functions.
 
+* veritysetup: add --root-hash-file option
+  Allow passing the root hash via a file, rather than verbatim on
+  the command line, for the open, verify, and format actions.
+
 * libcryptsetup C API extensions (see libcryptsetup.h for details)
 
   - crypt_logf - a printf like log function
@@ -254,10 +283,10 @@ Example (how to activate LUKS2 through remote keyfile):
   - crypt_token_external_path - get path for plugins (or NULL)
   - crypt_token_external_disable - disable runtime support for plugins
   - crypt_activate_by_token_pin - activate by token with additional PIN
-  - crypt_reencrypt - fixed prototype
+  - crypt_reencrypt_run - fixed API for deprecated crypt_reencrypt
 
-  The token plugin library interface cosiste from there versioned
-  exported syblols (for details see header file and SSH token example):
+  The token plugin library interface cosists from these versioned
+  exported symbols (for details see header file and SSH token example):
      cryptsetup_token_open
      cryptsetup_token_open_pin
      cryptsetup_token_buffer_free

docs/v2.4.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.4.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with minor extensions.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.4.0 should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.4.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix compilation for libc implementations without dlvsym().
+
+  Some alternative libc implementations (like musl) do not provide
+  versioned symbols dlvsym function. Code now fallbacks to dlsym
+  operation for dynamic LUKS2 token load.
+  It is up to maintainers to ensure that LUKS2 token plugins are
+  compiled for the supported version.
+
+* Fix compilation and tests on systems with non-standard libraries
+  (standalone argp library, external gettext library, BusyBox
+  implementations of standard tools).
+
+* Try to workaround some issues on systems without udev support.
+  NOTE: non-udev systems cannot provide all functionality for kernel
+  device-mapper, and some operations can fail.
+
+* Fixes for OpenSSL3 crypto backend (including FIPS mode).
+  Because cryptsetup still requires some hash functions implemented
+  in OpenSSL3 legacy provider, crypto backend now uses its library
+  context and tries to load both default and legacy OpenSSL3 providers.
+
+  If FIPS mode is detected, no library context is used, and it is up
+  to the OpenSSL system-wide policy to load proper providers.
+
+  NOTE: We still use some deprecated API in the OpenSSL3 backend,
+  and there are some known problems in OpenSSL 3.0.0.
+
+* Print error message when assigning a token to an inactive keyslot.
+
+* Fix offset bug in LUKS2 encryption code if --offset option was used.
+
+* Do not allow LUKS2 decryption for devices with data offset.
+  Such devices cannot be used after decryption.
+
+* Fix LUKS1 cryptsetup repair command for some specific problems.
+  Repair code can now fix wrongly used initialization vector
+  specification in ECB mode (that is insecure anyway!) and repair
+  the upper-case hash specification in the LUKS1 header.

docs/v2.4.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.4.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.4.1 should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.4.1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix possible large memory allocation if LUKS2 header size is invalid.
+  LUKS2 code read the full header to buffer to verify the checksum.
+  The maximal supported header size now limits the memory allocation.
+
+* Fix memory corruption in debug message printing LUKS2 checksum.
+
+* veritysetup: remove link to the UUID library for the static build.
+
+* Remove link to pwquality library for integritysetup and veritysetup.
+  These tools do not read passphrases.
+
+* OpenSSL3 backend: avoid remaining deprecated calls in API.
+  Crypto backend no longer use API deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0
+
+
+* Check if kernel device-mapper create device failed in an early phase.
+  This happens when a concurrent creation of device-mapper devices
+  meets in the very early state.
+
+* Do not set compiler optimization flag for Argon2 KDF if the memory
+  wipe is implemented in libc.
+
+* Do not attempt to unload LUKS2 tokens if external tokens are disabled.
+  This allows building a static binary with  --disable-external-tokens.
+
+* LUKS convert: also check sysfs for device activity.
+  If udev symlink is missing, code fallbacks to sysfs scan to prevent
+  data corruption for the active device.

docs/v2.4.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.4.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable security bug-fix release that fixes CVE-2021-4122.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.4.x must upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.4.2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
+  reencryption extension crash recovery (CVE-2021-4122).
+
+  An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
+  progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
+  decrypt part of the LUKS device.
+
+  This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but
+  no knowledge of user passphrases.
+
+  The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates
+  the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata.
+  There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened
+  (except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed
+  afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with
+  possible modification of revealed plaintext.
+
+  The size of possible decrypted data depends on configured LUKS2 header
+  size (metadata size is configurable for LUKS2).
+  With the default parameters (16 MiB LUKS2 header) and only one
+  allocated keyslot (512 bit key for AES-XTS), simulated decryption with
+  checksum resilience SHA1 (20 bytes checksum for 4096-byte blocks),
+  the maximal decrypted size can be over 3GiB.
+
+  The attack is not applicable to LUKS1 format, but the attacker can
+  update metadata in place to LUKS2 format as an additional step.
+  For such a converted LUKS2 header, the keyslot area is limited to
+  decrypted size (with SHA1 checksums) over 300 MiB.
+
+  The issue is present in all cryptsetup releases since 2.2.0.
+  Versions 1.x, 2.0.x, and 2.1.x are not affected, as these do not
+  contain LUKS2 reencryption extension.
+
+  The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual
+  reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new
+  encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires
+  calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to
+  initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no
+  encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not
+  protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects
+  visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect
+  against intentional modification but such modification must not cause
+  a violation of data confidentiality.
+
+  The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption
+  metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical
+  reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata
+  digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots.
+  For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0.
+
+  The former reencryption operation (without the additional digest) is no
+  longer supported (reencryption with the digest is not backward
+  compatible). You need to finish in-progress reencryption before
+  updating to new packages. The alternative approach is to perform
+  a repair command from the updated package to recalculate reencryption
+  digest and fix metadata.
+  The reencryption repair operation always require a user passphrase.
+
+  WARNING: Devices with older reencryption in progress can be no longer
+  activated without performing the action mentioned above.
+
+  Encryption in progress can be detected by running the luksDump command
+  (output includes reencrypt keyslot with reencryption parameters). Also,
+  during the active reencryption, no keyslot operations are available
+  (change of passphrases, etc.).
+
+  The issue was found by Milan Broz as cryptsetup maintainer.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Add configure option --disable-luks2-reencryption to completely disable
+  LUKS2 reencryption code.
+
+  When used, the libcryptsetup library can read metadata with
+  reencryption code, but all reencryption API calls and cryptsetup
+  reencrypt commands are disabled.
+
+  Devices with online reencryption in progress cannot be activated.
+  This option can cause some incompatibilities. Please use with care.
+
+* Improve internal metadata validation code for reencryption metadata.
+
+* Add updated documentation for LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification
+  version 1.1.0 (with reencryption extension description and updated
+  metadata description). See docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf or online
+  version in https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs repository.
+
+* Fix support for bitlk (BitLocker compatible) startup key with new
+  metadata entry introduced in Windows 11.
+
+* Fix space restriction for LUKS2 reencryption with data shift.
+  The code required more space than was needed.

docs/v2.5.0-rc1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.5.0-rc1 Release Notes
+==================================
+Stable release candidate with new features and bug fixes.
+
+Changes since version 2.4.3
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Split manual pages into per-action pages and use AsciiDoc format.
+
+  Manual pages are now generated from AsciiDoc format, allowing easy
+  conditional modifications for per-action options.
+
+  Generation of man pages requires the asciidoctor tool installed.
+
+  Pre-generated man pages are also included in the distribution tarball.
+  You can use --disable-asciidoc configure option to skip man page
+  generation completely. In this case, pre-generated man pages will be
+  used for installation.
+
+  For cryptsetup, there is main man page (cryptsetup.8) that references
+  separate man pages for each command (for example, cryptsetup-open.8).
+  You can open such a man page by simply running "man cryptsetup open".
+  Also, man pages for action aliases are available (cryptsetup-luksOpen.8
+  is an alias for cryptsetup-open.8, etc.)
+
+LUKS volume reencryption changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Remove cryptsetup-reencrypt tool from the project and move reencryption
+  to already existing "cryptsetup reencrypt" command.
+
+  Cryptsetup reencrypt now handles both LUKS1 and LUKS2 reencryption,
+  encryption, and decryption.
+
+  If you need to emulate the old cryptsetup-reencrypt binary, use simple
+  wrappers script running "exec cryptsetup reencrypt $@".
+
+  All command line options should be compatible. An exception is the
+  reencryption of LUKS2 volumes with old LUKS1 reencryption code that was
+  replaced by native and more resilient LUKS2 reencryption.
+
+* LUKS2: implement --decryption option that allows LUKS removal. The
+  operation can run online or offline and supports the data shift option.
+
+  During the initialization, the LUKS2 header is exported to a file.
+  The first data segment is moved to the head of the data device in place
+  of the original header.
+
+  The feature internally introduces several new resilience modes
+  (combination of existing modes datashift and "checksum" or "journal").
+  Datashift resilience mode is applied for data moved towards the first
+  segment, and the first segment is then decrypted in place.
+
+  This decryption mode is not backward compatible with prior LUKS2
+  reencryption. Interrupted operations in progress cannot be resumed
+  using older cryptsetup releases.
+
+* Reencryption metadata options that are not compatible with recent code
+  (features implemented in more recent releases) are now only read, but
+  code will not activate or modify such metadata.
+  Reencryption metadata contains a version that is validated when
+  reencryption is resumed.
+  For more info, see the updated LUKS2 on-disk format specification.
+
+  Safe operation of reencryption is to always finish the operation with
+  only one version of the tools.
+
+* Fix decryption operation with --active-name option and restrict
+  it to be used only with LUKS2.
+
+* Do not refresh reencryption digest when not needed.
+  This should speed up the reencryption resume process.
+
+* Store proper resilience data in LUKS2 reencrypt initialization.
+  Resuming reencryption now does not require specification of resilience
+  type parameters if these are the same as during initialization.
+
+* Properly wipe the unused area after reencryption with datashift in
+  the forward direction.
+
+* Check datashift value against larger sector size.
+  For example, it could cause an issue if misaligned 4K sector appears
+  during decryption.
+
+* Do not allow sector size increase reencryption in offline mode.
+  The eventual logical block size increase on the dm-crypt device above
+  may lead to an unusable filesystem. Do not allow offline reencryption
+  when sector size increase is requested.
+
+  You can use --force-offline-reencrypt option to override this check
+  (and potentially destroy the data).
+
+* Do not allow dangerous sector size change during reencryption.
+  By changing the encryption sector size during reencryption, a user
+  may increase the effective logical block size for the dm-crypt active
+  device.
+
+  Do not allow encryption sector size to be increased over the value
+  provided by fs superblock in BLOCK_SIZE property.
+
+* Ask the user for confirmation before resuming reencryption.
+  The prompt is not shown in batch mode or when the user explicitly asks
+  for a reencryption resume via --resume-only.
+
+* Do not resume reencryption with conflicting parameters.
+  For example, if the operation was initialized as --encrypt, do not
+  allow resume with opposing parameter --decrypt and vice versa.
+  Also, the code now checks for conflicting resilience parameters
+  (datashift cannot be changed after initialization).
+
+* Add --force-offline-reencrypt option.
+  It can be used to enforce offline reencryption in batch mode when
+  the device is a regular file; therefore, cryptsetup cannot detect
+  properly active devices using it.
+  Also, it may be useful to override the active device auto-detection
+  for specific storage configurations (dangerous!).
+
+* Do not allow nested encryption in LUKS reencrypt.
+  Avoid accidental nested encryption via cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt.
+
+* Fix --test-passphrase when the device is in reencryption.
+
+* Do not upload keys in keyring during offline reencryption.
+  Reencryption runs in userspace, so the kernel does not need the key.
+
+* Support all options allowed with luksFormat with encrypt action.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Add resize action to integritysetup.
+  This allows resizing of standalone integrity devices.
+
+* Support --device-size option (that allows unit specification) for plain
+  devices (existing --size option requires 512-byte sectors units).
+
+* Fix detection of encryption sector size if a detached header is used.
+
+* Remove obsolete dracut plugin reencryption example.
+
+* Fix possible keyslot area size overflow during conversion to LUKS2.
+  If keyslots are not sorted according to binary area offset, the area
+  size calculation was wrong and could overflow.
+
+* Hardening and fixes to LUKS2 validation functions:
+
+  * Log a visible error if convert fails due to validation check.
+
+  * Check for interval (keyslot and segment area) overflow.
+
+  * Check cipher availability before LUKS conversion to LUKS2.
+    Some historic incompatibilities are ignored for LUKS1 but do not
+    work for LUKS2.
+
+  * Add empty string check to LUKS2 metadata JSON validation.
+    Most of the LUKS2 fields cannot be empty.
+
+  * Fix JSON objects validation to check JSON object type properly.
+
+* TCRYPT: Properly apply retry count and continue if some PBKDF variant
+  is unavailable.
+
+* BITLK: Add a warning when activating a device with the wrong size
+  stored in metadata.
+
+* BITLK: Add BitLocker volume size to dump command.
+
+* BITLK: Fix possible UTF16 buffer overflow in volume key dump.
+
+* BITLK: Skip question if the batch mode is set for volume key dump.
+
+* BITLK: Check dm-zero availability in the kernel.
+  Bitlocker compatible mode uses dm-zero to mask metadata area.
+  The device cannot be activated if dm-zero is not available.
+
+* Fix error message for LUKS2-only cryptsetup commands to explicitly
+  state LUKS2 version is required.
+
+* Fix error message for incompatible dm-integrity metadata.
+  If the integritysetup tool is too old, kernel dm-integrity may use
+  a more recent version of dm-integrity metadata.
+
+* Properly deactivate the integrity device even if the LUKS2 header
+  is no longer available.
+  If LUKS2 is used with integrity protection, there is always
+  a dm-integrity device underneath that must be deactivated.
+
+* Allow use of --header option for cryptsetup close.
+  This can be used to check that the activated device has the same UUID.
+
+* Fix activation of LUKS2 device with integrity and detached header.
+  The kernel-parsed dm-integrity superblock is always located on the
+  data device, the incorrectly used detached header device here.
+
+* Add ZEROOUT IOCTL support for crypt_wipe API call.
+  For block devices, we can use optimized in-kernel BLKZEROOUT ioctl.
+
+* VERITY: set loopback sector size according to dm-verity block sizes.
+  Verity block size has the same limits, so we can optimize the loop
+  device to increase performance.
+
+* Other Documentation and man page improvements:
+
+  * Update LUKS2 on-disk format description.
+
+  * Add per-keyslot LUKS2 options to the man page.
+    Some options were missing for LUKS2 luksAddKey and luksChangeKey.
+
+  * Fix cryptsetup manpage to use PBKDF consistently.
+
+  * Add compile info to README. This information was lost when we removed
+    the default automake INSTALL file.
+
+  * Use volume key consistently in FAQ and man pages.
+
+  * Use markdown version of FAQ directly for installation.
+
+  * Clarify graceful reencryption interruption.
+    Currently, it can be interrupted by both SIGINT and SIGTERM signals.
+
+  * Add new mailing list info.
+
+  * Mention non-cryptographic xxhash64 hash for integrity protection.
+
+* veritysetup: dump device sizes.
+  Calculating device sizes for verity devices is a little bit tricky.
+  Data, hash, and FEC can share devices or be separate devices.
+  Now dump command prints used device sizes, but it requires that
+  the user specifies all values that are not stored in superblock
+  (like FEC device and FEC roots).
+
+* Fix check for argp_usage in configure if argp-standalone lib is used.
+
+* Add constant time memcmp and hexa print implementation and use it for
+  cryptographic keys handling.
+
+* Display progress when wiping the end of the resized device.
+
+* LUKS2 token: prefer token PIN query before passphrase in some cases.
+  When a user provides --token-type or specific --token-id, a token PIN
+  query is preferred to a passphrase query.
+
+* LUKS2 token: allow tokens to be replaced with --token-replace option
+  for cryptsetup token command.
+
+* LUKS2 token: do not continue operation when interrupted in PIN prompt.
+
+* Add --progress-json parameter to utilities.
+  Progress data can now be printed out in JSON format suitable for
+  machine processing.
+
+* Embedded Argon2 PBKDF: optimize and simplify thread exit.
+
+* Avoid using SHA1 in tests and fix new enforcements introduced in FIPS
+  provider for OpenSSL3 (like minimal parameters for PBKDF2).
+
+* Use custom UTF conversion and avoid linking to iconv as a dependency.
+
+* Reimplement BASE64 with simplified code instead of coreutils version.
+
+Libcryptsetup API extensions and changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Properly define uint32_t constants in API.
+  This is not a real change, but it avoids strict compiler warnings.
+
+* crypt_resume_by_token_pin() - Resume crypt device using LUKS2 token.
+
+* crypt_get_label() - Get the label of the LUKS2 device.
+
+* crypt_get_subsystem() - Get the subsystem label of the LUKS2 device.
+
+* Make CRYPT_WIPE_ENCRYPTED_ZERO crypt_wipe() option obsolete.
+  It was never implemented (the idea was to speed up wipe), but with
+  the recent RNG performance changes, it makes no longer sense.
+
+* Add struct crypt_params_reencrypt changes related to decryption.
+
+* Improve crypt_reencrypt_status() return values.
+  Empty or any non-LUKS types now returns CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID status.
+  For LUKS1 devices, it returns CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE.

lib/Makemodule.am

@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ libcryptsetup_la_LIBADD = \
 	@LIBARGON2_LIBS@	\
 	@JSON_C_LIBS@		\
 	@BLKID_LIBS@		\
-	$(LTLIBICONV)		\
+	@DL_LIBS@		\
+	$(LTLIBINTL)		\
 	libcrypto_backend.la	\
 	libutils_io.la
 
@@ -68,8 +69,6 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
 	lib/volumekey.c			\
 	lib/random.c			\
 	lib/crypt_plain.c		\
-	lib/base64.h			\
-	lib/base64.c			\
 	lib/integrity/integrity.h	\
 	lib/integrity/integrity.c	\
 	lib/loopaes/loopaes.h		\
@@ -98,6 +97,7 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
 	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_segment.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_token.c		\

lib/base64.c

@@ -1,605 +0,0 @@
-/* base64.c -- Encode binary data using printable characters.
-   Copyright (C) 1999-2001, 2004-2006, 2009-2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-
-   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
-   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
-   any later version.
-
-   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-   GNU General Public License for more details.
-
-   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-   along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
-
-/* Written by Simon Josefsson.  Partially adapted from GNU MailUtils
- * (mailbox/filter_trans.c, as of 2004-11-28).  Improved by review
- * from Paul Eggert, Bruno Haible, and Stepan Kasal.
- *
- * See also RFC 4648 <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4648.txt>.
- *
- * Be careful with error checking.  Here is how you would typically
- * use these functions:
- *
- * bool ok = base64_decode_alloc (in, inlen, &out, &outlen);
- * if (!ok)
- *   FAIL: input was not valid base64
- * if (out == NULL)
- *   FAIL: memory allocation error
- * OK: data in OUT/OUTLEN
- *
- * size_t outlen = base64_encode_alloc (in, inlen, &out);
- * if (out == NULL && outlen == 0 && inlen != 0)
- *   FAIL: input too long
- * if (out == NULL)
- *   FAIL: memory allocation error
- * OK: data in OUT/OUTLEN.
- *
- */
-
-#include <config.h>
-
-/* Get prototype. */
-#include "base64.h"
-
-/* Get malloc. */
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-/* Get UCHAR_MAX. */
-#include <limits.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-/* C89 compliant way to cast 'char' to 'unsigned char'. */
-static unsigned char
-to_uchar (char ch)
-{
-  return ch;
-}
-
-static const char b64c[64] =
-  "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
-
-/* Base64 encode IN array of size INLEN into OUT array. OUT needs
-   to be of length >= BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), and INLEN needs to be
-   a multiple of 3.  */
-static void
-base64_encode_fast (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen, char *restrict out)
-{
-  while (inlen)
-    {
-      *out++ = b64c[(to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2) & 0x3f];
-      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4) + (to_uchar (in[1]) >> 4)) & 0x3f];
-      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[1]) << 2) + (to_uchar (in[2]) >> 6)) & 0x3f];
-      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[2]) & 0x3f];
-
-      inlen -= 3;
-      in += 3;
-    }
-}
-
-/* Base64 encode IN array of size INLEN into OUT array of size OUTLEN.
-   If OUTLEN is less than BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), write as many bytes as
-   possible.  If OUTLEN is larger than BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), also zero
-   terminate the output buffer. */
-void
-base64_encode (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
-               char *restrict out, size_t outlen)
-{
-  /* Note this outlen constraint can be enforced at compile time.
-     I.E. that the output buffer is exactly large enough to hold
-     the encoded inlen bytes.  The inlen constraints (of corresponding
-     to outlen, and being a multiple of 3) can change at runtime
-     at the end of input.  However the common case when reading
-     large inputs is to have both constraints satisfied, so we depend
-     on both in base_encode_fast().  */
-  if (outlen % 4 == 0 && inlen == outlen / 4 * 3)
-    {
-      base64_encode_fast (in, inlen, out);
-      return;
-    }
-
-  while (inlen && outlen)
-    {
-      *out++ = b64c[(to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2) & 0x3f];
-      if (!--outlen)
-        break;
-      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4)
-                       + (--inlen ? to_uchar (in[1]) >> 4 : 0))
-                      & 0x3f];
-      if (!--outlen)
-        break;
-      *out++ =
-        (inlen
-         ? b64c[((to_uchar (in[1]) << 2)
-                   + (--inlen ? to_uchar (in[2]) >> 6 : 0))
-                  & 0x3f]
-         : '=');
-      if (!--outlen)
-        break;
-      *out++ = inlen ? b64c[to_uchar (in[2]) & 0x3f] : '=';
-      if (!--outlen)
-        break;
-      if (inlen)
-        inlen--;
-      if (inlen)
-        in += 3;
-    }
-
-  if (outlen)
-    *out = '\0';
-}
-
-/* Allocate a buffer and store zero terminated base64 encoded data
-   from array IN of size INLEN, returning BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), i.e.,
-   the length of the encoded data, excluding the terminating zero.  On
-   return, the OUT variable will hold a pointer to newly allocated
-   memory that must be deallocated by the caller.  If output string
-   length would overflow, 0 is returned and OUT is set to NULL.  If
-   memory allocation failed, OUT is set to NULL, and the return value
-   indicates length of the requested memory block, i.e.,
-   BASE64_LENGTH(inlen) + 1. */
-size_t
-base64_encode_alloc (const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out)
-{
-  size_t outlen = 1 + BASE64_LENGTH (inlen);
-
-  /* Check for overflow in outlen computation.
-   *
-   * If there is no overflow, outlen >= inlen.
-   *
-   * If the operation (inlen + 2) overflows then it yields at most +1, so
-   * outlen is 0.
-   *
-   * If the multiplication overflows, we lose at least half of the
-   * correct value, so the result is < ((inlen + 2) / 3) * 2, which is
-   * less than (inlen + 2) * 0.66667, which is less than inlen as soon as
-   * (inlen > 4).
-   */
-  if (inlen > outlen)
-    {
-      *out = NULL;
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-  *out = malloc (outlen);
-  if (!*out)
-    return outlen;
-
-  base64_encode (in, inlen, *out, outlen);
-
-  return outlen - 1;
-}
-
-/* With this approach this file works independent of the charset used
-   (think EBCDIC).  However, it does assume that the characters in the
-   Base64 alphabet (A-Za-z0-9+/) are encoded in 0..255.  POSIX
-   1003.1-2001 require that char and unsigned char are 8-bit
-   quantities, though, taking care of that problem.  But this may be a
-   potential problem on non-POSIX C99 platforms.
-
-   IBM C V6 for AIX mishandles "#define B64(x) ...'x'...", so use "_"
-   as the formal parameter rather than "x".  */
-#define B64(_)                                  \
-  ((_) == 'A' ? 0                               \
-   : (_) == 'B' ? 1                             \
-   : (_) == 'C' ? 2                             \
-   : (_) == 'D' ? 3                             \
-   : (_) == 'E' ? 4                             \
-   : (_) == 'F' ? 5                             \
-   : (_) == 'G' ? 6                             \
-   : (_) == 'H' ? 7                             \
-   : (_) == 'I' ? 8                             \
-   : (_) == 'J' ? 9                             \
-   : (_) == 'K' ? 10                            \
-   : (_) == 'L' ? 11                            \
-   : (_) == 'M' ? 12                            \
-   : (_) == 'N' ? 13                            \
-   : (_) == 'O' ? 14                            \
-   : (_) == 'P' ? 15                            \
-   : (_) == 'Q' ? 16                            \
-   : (_) == 'R' ? 17                            \
-   : (_) == 'S' ? 18                            \
-   : (_) == 'T' ? 19                            \
-   : (_) == 'U' ? 20                            \
-   : (_) == 'V' ? 21                            \
-   : (_) == 'W' ? 22                            \
-   : (_) == 'X' ? 23                            \
-   : (_) == 'Y' ? 24                            \
-   : (_) == 'Z' ? 25                            \
-   : (_) == 'a' ? 26                            \
-   : (_) == 'b' ? 27                            \
-   : (_) == 'c' ? 28                            \
-   : (_) == 'd' ? 29                            \
-   : (_) == 'e' ? 30                            \
-   : (_) == 'f' ? 31                            \
-   : (_) == 'g' ? 32                            \
-   : (_) == 'h' ? 33                            \
-   : (_) == 'i' ? 34                            \
-   : (_) == 'j' ? 35                            \
-   : (_) == 'k' ? 36                            \
-   : (_) == 'l' ? 37                            \
-   : (_) == 'm' ? 38                            \
-   : (_) == 'n' ? 39                            \
-   : (_) == 'o' ? 40                            \
-   : (_) == 'p' ? 41                            \
-   : (_) == 'q' ? 42                            \
-   : (_) == 'r' ? 43                            \
-   : (_) == 's' ? 44                            \
-   : (_) == 't' ? 45                            \
-   : (_) == 'u' ? 46                            \
-   : (_) == 'v' ? 47                            \
-   : (_) == 'w' ? 48                            \
-   : (_) == 'x' ? 49                            \
-   : (_) == 'y' ? 50                            \
-   : (_) == 'z' ? 51                            \
-   : (_) == '0' ? 52                            \
-   : (_) == '1' ? 53                            \
-   : (_) == '2' ? 54                            \
-   : (_) == '3' ? 55                            \
-   : (_) == '4' ? 56                            \
-   : (_) == '5' ? 57                            \
-   : (_) == '6' ? 58                            \
-   : (_) == '7' ? 59                            \
-   : (_) == '8' ? 60                            \
-   : (_) == '9' ? 61                            \
-   : (_) == '+' ? 62                            \
-   : (_) == '/' ? 63                            \
-   : -1)
-
-static const signed char b64[0x100] = {
-  B64 (0), B64 (1), B64 (2), B64 (3),
-  B64 (4), B64 (5), B64 (6), B64 (7),
-  B64 (8), B64 (9), B64 (10), B64 (11),
-  B64 (12), B64 (13), B64 (14), B64 (15),
-  B64 (16), B64 (17), B64 (18), B64 (19),
-  B64 (20), B64 (21), B64 (22), B64 (23),
-  B64 (24), B64 (25), B64 (26), B64 (27),
-  B64 (28), B64 (29), B64 (30), B64 (31),
-  B64 (32), B64 (33), B64 (34), B64 (35),
-  B64 (36), B64 (37), B64 (38), B64 (39),
-  B64 (40), B64 (41), B64 (42), B64 (43),
-  B64 (44), B64 (45), B64 (46), B64 (47),
-  B64 (48), B64 (49), B64 (50), B64 (51),
-  B64 (52), B64 (53), B64 (54), B64 (55),
-  B64 (56), B64 (57), B64 (58), B64 (59),
-  B64 (60), B64 (61), B64 (62), B64 (63),
-  B64 (64), B64 (65), B64 (66), B64 (67),
-  B64 (68), B64 (69), B64 (70), B64 (71),
-  B64 (72), B64 (73), B64 (74), B64 (75),
-  B64 (76), B64 (77), B64 (78), B64 (79),
-  B64 (80), B64 (81), B64 (82), B64 (83),
-  B64 (84), B64 (85), B64 (86), B64 (87),
-  B64 (88), B64 (89), B64 (90), B64 (91),
-  B64 (92), B64 (93), B64 (94), B64 (95),
-  B64 (96), B64 (97), B64 (98), B64 (99),
-  B64 (100), B64 (101), B64 (102), B64 (103),
-  B64 (104), B64 (105), B64 (106), B64 (107),
-  B64 (108), B64 (109), B64 (110), B64 (111),
-  B64 (112), B64 (113), B64 (114), B64 (115),
-  B64 (116), B64 (117), B64 (118), B64 (119),
-  B64 (120), B64 (121), B64 (122), B64 (123),
-  B64 (124), B64 (125), B64 (126), B64 (127),
-  B64 (128), B64 (129), B64 (130), B64 (131),
-  B64 (132), B64 (133), B64 (134), B64 (135),
-  B64 (136), B64 (137), B64 (138), B64 (139),
-  B64 (140), B64 (141), B64 (142), B64 (143),
-  B64 (144), B64 (145), B64 (146), B64 (147),
-  B64 (148), B64 (149), B64 (150), B64 (151),
-  B64 (152), B64 (153), B64 (154), B64 (155),
-  B64 (156), B64 (157), B64 (158), B64 (159),
-  B64 (160), B64 (161), B64 (162), B64 (163),
-  B64 (164), B64 (165), B64 (166), B64 (167),
-  B64 (168), B64 (169), B64 (170), B64 (171),
-  B64 (172), B64 (173), B64 (174), B64 (175),
-  B64 (176), B64 (177), B64 (178), B64 (179),
-  B64 (180), B64 (181), B64 (182), B64 (183),
-  B64 (184), B64 (185), B64 (186), B64 (187),
-  B64 (188), B64 (189), B64 (190), B64 (191),
-  B64 (192), B64 (193), B64 (194), B64 (195),
-  B64 (196), B64 (197), B64 (198), B64 (199),
-  B64 (200), B64 (201), B64 (202), B64 (203),
-  B64 (204), B64 (205), B64 (206), B64 (207),
-  B64 (208), B64 (209), B64 (210), B64 (211),
-  B64 (212), B64 (213), B64 (214), B64 (215),
-  B64 (216), B64 (217), B64 (218), B64 (219),
-  B64 (220), B64 (221), B64 (222), B64 (223),
-  B64 (224), B64 (225), B64 (226), B64 (227),
-  B64 (228), B64 (229), B64 (230), B64 (231),
-  B64 (232), B64 (233), B64 (234), B64 (235),
-  B64 (236), B64 (237), B64 (238), B64 (239),
-  B64 (240), B64 (241), B64 (242), B64 (243),
-  B64 (244), B64 (245), B64 (246), B64 (247),
-  B64 (248), B64 (249), B64 (250), B64 (251),
-  B64 (252), B64 (253), B64 (254), B64 (255)
-};
-
-#if UCHAR_MAX == 255
-# define uchar_in_range(c) true
-#else
-# define uchar_in_range(c) ((c) <= 255)
-#endif
-
-/* Return true if CH is a character from the Base64 alphabet, and
-   false otherwise.  Note that '=' is padding and not considered to be
-   part of the alphabet.  */
-bool
-isbase64 (char ch)
-{
-  return uchar_in_range (to_uchar (ch)) && 0 <= b64[to_uchar (ch)];
-}
-
-/* Initialize decode-context buffer, CTX.  */
-void
-base64_decode_ctx_init (struct base64_decode_context *ctx)
-{
-  ctx->i = 0;
-}
-
-/* If CTX->i is 0 or 4, there are four or more bytes in [*IN..IN_END), and
-   none of those four is a newline, then return *IN.  Otherwise, copy up to
-   4 - CTX->i non-newline bytes from that range into CTX->buf, starting at
-   index CTX->i and setting CTX->i to reflect the number of bytes copied,
-   and return CTX->buf.  In either case, advance *IN to point to the byte
-   after the last one processed, and set *N_NON_NEWLINE to the number of
-   verified non-newline bytes accessible through the returned pointer.  */
-static const char *
-get_4 (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
-       char const *restrict *in, char const *restrict in_end,
-       size_t *n_non_newline)
-{
-  if (ctx->i == 4)
-    ctx->i = 0;
-
-  if (ctx->i == 0)
-    {
-      char const *t = *in;
-      if (4 <= in_end - *in && memchr (t, '\n', 4) == NULL)
-        {
-          /* This is the common case: no newline.  */
-          *in += 4;
-          *n_non_newline = 4;
-          return (const char *) t;
-        }
-    }
-
-  {
-    /* Copy non-newline bytes into BUF.  */
-    char const *p = *in;
-    while (p < in_end)
-      {
-        char c = *p++;
-        if (c != '\n')
-          {
-            ctx->buf[ctx->i++] = c;
-            if (ctx->i == 4)
-              break;
-          }
-      }
-
-    *in = p;
-    *n_non_newline = ctx->i;
-    return ctx->buf;
-  }
-}
-
-#define return_false                            \
-  do                                            \
-    {                                           \
-      *outp = out;                              \
-      return false;                             \
-    }                                           \
-  while (false)
-
-/* Decode up to four bytes of base64-encoded data, IN, of length INLEN
-   into the output buffer, *OUT, of size *OUTLEN bytes.  Return true if
-   decoding is successful, false otherwise.  If *OUTLEN is too small,
-   as many bytes as possible are written to *OUT.  On return, advance
-   *OUT to point to the byte after the last one written, and decrement
-   *OUTLEN to reflect the number of bytes remaining in *OUT.  */
-static bool
-decode_4 (char const *restrict in, size_t inlen,
-          char *restrict *outp, size_t *outleft)
-{
-  char *out = *outp;
-  if (inlen < 2)
-    return false;
-
-  if (!isbase64 (in[0]) || !isbase64 (in[1]))
-    return false;
-
-  if (*outleft)
-    {
-      *out++ = ((b64[to_uchar (in[0])] << 2)
-                | (b64[to_uchar (in[1])] >> 4));
-      --*outleft;
-    }
-
-  if (inlen == 2)
-    return_false;
-
-  if (in[2] == '=')
-    {
-      if (inlen != 4)
-        return_false;
-
-      if (in[3] != '=')
-        return_false;
-    }
-  else
-    {
-      if (!isbase64 (in[2]))
-        return_false;
-
-      if (*outleft)
-        {
-          *out++ = (((b64[to_uchar (in[1])] << 4) & 0xf0)
-                    | (b64[to_uchar (in[2])] >> 2));
-          --*outleft;
-        }
-
-      if (inlen == 3)
-        return_false;
-
-      if (in[3] == '=')
-        {
-          if (inlen != 4)
-            return_false;
-        }
-      else
-        {
-          if (!isbase64 (in[3]))
-            return_false;
-
-          if (*outleft)
-            {
-              *out++ = (((b64[to_uchar (in[2])] << 6) & 0xc0)
-                        | b64[to_uchar (in[3])]);
-              --*outleft;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-  *outp = out;
-  return true;
-}
-
-/* Decode base64-encoded input array IN of length INLEN to output array
-   OUT that can hold *OUTLEN bytes.  The input data may be interspersed
-   with newlines.  Return true if decoding was successful, i.e. if the
-   input was valid base64 data, false otherwise.  If *OUTLEN is too
-   small, as many bytes as possible will be written to OUT.  On return,
-   *OUTLEN holds the length of decoded bytes in OUT.  Note that as soon
-   as any non-alphabet, non-newline character is encountered, decoding
-   is stopped and false is returned.  If INLEN is zero, then process
-   only whatever data is stored in CTX.
-
-   Initially, CTX must have been initialized via base64_decode_ctx_init.
-   Subsequent calls to this function must reuse whatever state is recorded
-   in that buffer.  It is necessary for when a quadruple of base64 input
-   bytes spans two input buffers.
-
-   If CTX is NULL then newlines are treated as garbage and the input
-   buffer is processed as a unit.  */
-
-bool
-base64_decode_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
-                   const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
-                   char *restrict out, size_t *outlen)
-{
-  size_t outleft = *outlen;
-  bool ignore_newlines = ctx != NULL;
-  bool flush_ctx = false;
-  unsigned int ctx_i = 0;
-
-  if (ignore_newlines)
-    {
-      ctx_i = ctx->i;
-      flush_ctx = inlen == 0;
-    }
-
-
-  while (true)
-    {
-      size_t outleft_save = outleft;
-      if (ctx_i == 0 && !flush_ctx)
-        {
-          while (true)
-            {
-              /* Save a copy of outleft, in case we need to re-parse this
-                 block of four bytes.  */
-              outleft_save = outleft;
-              if (!decode_4 (in, inlen, &out, &outleft))
-                break;
-
-              in += 4;
-              inlen -= 4;
-            }
-        }
-
-      if (inlen == 0 && !flush_ctx)
-        break;
-
-      /* Handle the common case of 72-byte wrapped lines.
-         This also handles any other multiple-of-4-byte wrapping.  */
-      if (inlen && *in == '\n' && ignore_newlines)
-        {
-          ++in;
-          --inlen;
-          continue;
-        }
-
-      /* Restore OUT and OUTLEFT.  */
-      out -= outleft_save - outleft;
-      outleft = outleft_save;
-
-      {
-        char const *in_end = in + inlen;
-        char const *non_nl;
-
-        if (ignore_newlines)
-          non_nl = get_4 (ctx, &in, in_end, &inlen);
-        else
-          non_nl = in;  /* Might have nl in this case. */
-
-        /* If the input is empty or consists solely of newlines (0 non-newlines),
-           then we're done.  Likewise if there are fewer than 4 bytes when not
-           flushing context and not treating newlines as garbage.  */
-        if (inlen == 0 || (inlen < 4 && !flush_ctx && ignore_newlines))
-          {
-            inlen = 0;
-            break;
-          }
-        if (!decode_4 (non_nl, inlen, &out, &outleft))
-          break;
-
-        inlen = in_end - in;
-      }
-    }
-
-  *outlen -= outleft;
-
-  return inlen == 0;
-}
-
-/* Allocate an output buffer in *OUT, and decode the base64 encoded
-   data stored in IN of size INLEN to the *OUT buffer.  On return, the
-   size of the decoded data is stored in *OUTLEN.  OUTLEN may be NULL,
-   if the caller is not interested in the decoded length.  *OUT may be
-   NULL to indicate an out of memory error, in which case *OUTLEN
-   contains the size of the memory block needed.  The function returns
-   true on successful decoding and memory allocation errors.  (Use the
-   *OUT and *OUTLEN parameters to differentiate between successful
-   decoding and memory error.)  The function returns false if the
-   input was invalid, in which case *OUT is NULL and *OUTLEN is
-   undefined. */
-bool
-base64_decode_alloc_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
-                         const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out,
-                         size_t *outlen)
-{
-  /* This may allocate a few bytes too many, depending on input,
-     but it's not worth the extra CPU time to compute the exact size.
-     The exact size is 3 * (inlen + (ctx ? ctx->i : 0)) / 4, minus 1 if the
-     input ends with "=" and minus another 1 if the input ends with "==".
-     Dividing before multiplying avoids the possibility of overflow.  */
-  size_t needlen = 3 * (inlen / 4) + 3;
-
-  *out = malloc (needlen);
-  if (!*out)
-    return true;
-
-  if (!base64_decode_ctx (ctx, in, inlen, *out, &needlen))
-    {
-      free (*out);
-      *out = NULL;
-      return false;
-    }
-
-  if (outlen)
-    *outlen = needlen;
-
-  return true;
-}

lib/base64.h

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-/* base64.h -- Encode binary data using printable characters.
-   Copyright (C) 2004-2006, 2009-2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-   Written by Simon Josefsson.
-
-   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
-   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
-   any later version.
-
-   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-   GNU General Public License for more details.
-
-   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-   along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
-
-#ifndef BASE64_H
-# define BASE64_H
-
-/* Get size_t. */
-# include <stddef.h>
-
-/* Get bool. */
-# include <stdbool.h>
-
-# ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-# endif
-
-/* This uses that the expression (n+(k-1))/k means the smallest
-   integer >= n/k, i.e., the ceiling of n/k.  */
-# define BASE64_LENGTH(inlen) ((((inlen) + 2) / 3) * 4)
-
-struct base64_decode_context
-{
-  unsigned int i;
-  char buf[4];
-};
-
-extern bool isbase64 (char ch) __attribute__ ((__const__));
-
-extern void base64_encode (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
-                           char *restrict out, size_t outlen);
-
-extern size_t base64_encode_alloc (const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out);
-
-extern void base64_decode_ctx_init (struct base64_decode_context *ctx);
-
-extern bool base64_decode_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
-                               const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
-                               char *restrict out, size_t *outlen);
-
-extern bool base64_decode_alloc_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
-                                     const char *in, size_t inlen,
-                                     char **out, size_t *outlen);
-
-#define base64_decode(in, inlen, out, outlen) \
-        base64_decode_ctx (NULL, in, inlen, out, outlen)
-
-#define base64_decode_alloc(in, inlen, out, outlen) \
-        base64_decode_alloc_ctx (NULL, in, inlen, out, outlen)
-
-# ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-# endif
-
-#endif /* BASE64_H */

lib/bitlk/bitlk.c

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /*
  * BITLK (BitLocker-compatible) volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Milan Broz
- * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Vojtech Trefny
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2022 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2022 Vojtech Trefny
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <uuid/uuid.h>
 #include <time.h>
-#include <iconv.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 
 #include "bitlk.h"
@@ -234,86 +233,11 @@ static const char* get_bitlk_type_string(BITLKEncryptionType type)
 	}
 }
 
-/* TODO -- move to some utils file */
-static void hexprint(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *d, int n, const char *sep)
-{
-	int i;
-	for(i = 0; i < n; i++)
-		log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", (const char)d[i], sep);
-}
-
 static uint64_t filetime_to_unixtime(uint64_t time)
 {
 	return (time - EPOCH_AS_FILETIME) / HUNDREDS_OF_NANOSECONDS;
 }
 
-static int convert_to_utf8(struct crypt_device *cd, uint8_t *input, size_t inlen, char **out)
-{
-	char *outbuf = NULL;
-	iconv_t ic;
-	size_t ic_inlen = inlen;
-	size_t ic_outlen = inlen;
-	char *ic_outbuf = NULL;
-	size_t r = 0;
-
-	outbuf = malloc(inlen);
-	if (outbuf == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	memset(outbuf, 0, inlen);
-	ic_outbuf = outbuf;
-
-	ic = iconv_open("UTF-8", "UTF-16LE");
-	r = iconv(ic, (char **) &input, &ic_inlen, &ic_outbuf, &ic_outlen);
-	iconv_close(ic);
-
-	if (r == 0)
-		*out = strdup(outbuf);
-	else {
-		*out = NULL;
-		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to convert volume description: %s", strerror(errno));
-		r = 0;
-	}
-
-	free(outbuf);
-	return r;
-}
-
-static int passphrase_to_utf16(struct crypt_device *cd, char *input, size_t inlen, char **out)
-{
-	char *outbuf = NULL;
-	iconv_t ic;
-	size_t ic_inlen = inlen;
-	size_t ic_outlen = inlen * 2;
-	char *ic_outbuf = NULL;
-	size_t r = 0;
-
-	if (inlen == 0)
-		return r;
-
-	outbuf = crypt_safe_alloc(inlen * 2);
-	if (outbuf == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	memset(outbuf, 0, inlen * 2);
-	ic_outbuf = outbuf;
-
-	ic = iconv_open("UTF-16LE", "UTF-8");
-	r = iconv(ic, &input, &ic_inlen, &ic_outbuf, &ic_outlen);
-	iconv_close(ic);
-
-	if (r == 0) {
-		*out = outbuf;
-	} else {
-		*out = NULL;
-		crypt_safe_free(outbuf);
-		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to convert passphrase: %s", strerror(errno));
-		r = -errno;
-	}
-
-	return r;
-}
-
 static int parse_vmk_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint8_t *data, int start, int end, struct bitlk_vmk **vmk)
 {
 	uint16_t key_entry_size = 0;
@@ -324,6 +248,7 @@ static int parse_vmk_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint8_t *data, int start, in
 	const char *key = NULL;
 	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
 	bool supported = false;
+	int r = 0;
 
 	/* only passphrase or recovery passphrase vmks are supported (can be used to activate) */
 	supported = (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE ||
@@ -393,9 +318,14 @@ static int parse_vmk_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint8_t *data, int start, in
 		} else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_RECOVERY_TIME) {
 			;
 		} else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRING) {
-			if (convert_to_utf8(cd, data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN, key_entry_size - BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN, &string) < 0) {
-				log_err(cd, _("Invalid string found when parsing Volume Master Key."));
+			string = malloc((key_entry_size - BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN) * 2 + 1);
+			if (!string)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			r = crypt_utf16_to_utf8(&string, CONST_CAST(char16_t *)(data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN),
+						     key_entry_size - BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN);
+			if (r < 0 || !string) {
 				free(string);
+				log_err(cd, _("Invalid string found when parsing Volume Master Key."));
 				return -EINVAL;
 			} else if ((*vmk)->name != NULL) {
 				if (supported) {
@@ -486,6 +416,7 @@ int BITLK_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct bitlk_metadata *params)
 	int end = 0;
 	size_t key_size = 0;
 	const char *key = NULL;
+	char *description = NULL;
 
 	struct bitlk_vmk *vmk = NULL;
 	struct bitlk_vmk *vmk_p = params->vmks;
@@ -499,8 +430,8 @@ int BITLK_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct bitlk_metadata *params)
 	/* read and check the signature */
 	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 		device_alignment(device), &sig, sizeof(sig), 0) != sizeof(sig)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Failed to read BITLK signature from %s."), device_path(device));
-		r = -EINVAL;
+		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to read BITLK signature from %s.", device_path(device));
+		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -511,7 +442,7 @@ int BITLK_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct bitlk_metadata *params)
 		params->togo = true;
 		fve_offset = BITLK_HEADER_METADATA_OFFSET_TOGO;
 	} else {
-		log_err(cd, _("Invalid or unknown signature for BITLK device."));
+		log_dbg(cd, "Invalid or unknown signature for BITLK device.");
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -581,6 +512,7 @@ int BITLK_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct bitlk_metadata *params)
 			le16_to_cpu(fve.curr_state), le16_to_cpu(fve.next_state));
 	}
 
+	params->volume_size = le64_to_cpu(fve.volume_size);
 	params->metadata_version = le16_to_cpu(fve.fve_version);
 	fve_metadata_size = le32_to_cpu(fve.metadata_size);
 
@@ -738,13 +670,18 @@ int BITLK_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct bitlk_metadata *params)
 			params->volume_header_size = le64_to_cpu(entry_header.size);
 		/* volume description (utf-16 string) */
 		} else if (entry_type == BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_DESCRIPTION) {
-			r = convert_to_utf8(cd, fve_entries + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN,
-					    entry_size - BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN,
-					    &(params->description));
-			if (r < 0) {
+			description = malloc((entry_size - BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN - BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN) * 2 + 1);
+			if (!description)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			r = crypt_utf16_to_utf8(&description, CONST_CAST(char16_t *)(fve_entries + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN),
+					                  entry_size - BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN);
+			if (r < 0 || !description) {
+				free(description);
 				BITLK_bitlk_vmk_free(vmk);
+				log_err(cd, _("Failed to convert BITLK volume description"));
 				goto out;
 			}
+			params->description = description;
 		}
 
 		start += entry_size;
@@ -767,6 +704,7 @@ int BITLK_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, struct bitlk_meta
 	log_std(cd, "Version:      \t%u\n", params->metadata_version);
 	log_std(cd, "GUID:         \t%s\n", params->guid);
 	log_std(cd, "Sector size:  \t%u [bytes]\n", params->sector_size);
+	log_std(cd, "Volume size:  \t%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", params->volume_size);
 	log_std(cd, "Created:      \t%s", ctime((time_t *)&(params->creation_time)));
 	log_std(cd, "Description:  \t%s\n", params->description);
 	log_std(cd, "Cipher name:  \t%s\n", params->cipher);
@@ -785,7 +723,7 @@ int BITLK_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, struct bitlk_meta
 		log_std(cd, "\tGUID:       \t%s\n", vmk_p->guid);
 		log_std(cd, "\tProtection: \t%s\n", get_vmk_protection_string (vmk_p->protection));
 		log_std(cd, "\tSalt:       \t");
-		hexprint(cd, (const char *) vmk_p->salt, 16, "");
+		crypt_log_hex(cd, (const char *) vmk_p->salt, 16, "", 0, NULL);
 		log_std(cd, "\n");
 
 		vk_p = vmk_p->vk;
@@ -869,13 +807,20 @@ static int get_recovery_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int parse_external_key_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *data, int start, int end, struct volume_key **vk)
+static int parse_external_key_entry(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				    const char *data,
+				    int start,
+				    int end,
+				    struct volume_key **vk,
+				    const struct bitlk_metadata *params)
 {
 	uint16_t key_entry_size = 0;
 	uint16_t key_entry_type = 0;
 	uint16_t key_entry_value = 0;
 	size_t key_size = 0;
 	const char *key = NULL;
+	struct bitlk_guid guid;
+	char guid_buf[UUID_STR_LEN] = {0};
 
 	while (end - start > 2) {
 		/* size of this entry */
@@ -892,8 +837,7 @@ static int parse_external_key_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *data, i
 		key_entry_type = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_type);
 		key_entry_value = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_value);
 
-		/* only properties should be in this entry */
-		if (key_entry_type != BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_PROPERTY) {
+		if (key_entry_type != BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_PROPERTY && key_entry_type != BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VOLUME_GUID) {
 			log_err(cd, _("Unexpected metadata entry type '%u' found when parsing external key."), key_entry_type);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -908,7 +852,15 @@ static int parse_external_key_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *data, i
 		/* optional "ExternalKey" string, we can safely ignore it */
 		} else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRING)
 			;
-		else {
+		/* GUID of the BitLocker device we are trying to open with this key */
+		else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_GUID) {
+			memcpy(&guid, data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN, sizeof(struct bitlk_guid));
+			guid_to_string(&guid, guid_buf);
+			if (strcmp(guid_buf, params->guid) != 0) {
+				log_err(cd, _("BEK file GUID '%s' does not match GUID of the volume."), guid_buf);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		} else {
 			log_err(cd, _("Unexpected metadata entry value '%u' found when parsing external key."), key_entry_value);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -925,7 +877,8 @@ static int get_startup_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			   const char *password,
 			   size_t passwordLen,
 			   const struct bitlk_vmk *vmk,
-			   struct volume_key **su_key)
+			   struct volume_key **su_key,
+			   const struct bitlk_metadata *params)
 {
 	struct bitlk_bek_header bek_header = {0};
 	char guid_buf[UUID_STR_LEN] = {0};
@@ -947,12 +900,12 @@ static int get_startup_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (bek_header.metadata_version != 1) {
-		log_err(cd, "Unsupported BEK metadata version %" PRIu32 "", bek_header.metadata_version);
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported BEK metadata version %" PRIu32), bek_header.metadata_version);
 		return -ENOTSUP;
 	}
 
 	if (bek_header.metadata_size != passwordLen) {
-		log_err(cd, "Unexpected BEK metadata size  %" PRIu32 " does not match BEK file length", bek_header.metadata_size);
+		log_err(cd, _("Unexpected BEK metadata size %" PRIu32 " does not match BEK file length"), bek_header.metadata_size);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -975,7 +928,7 @@ static int get_startup_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (key_entry_type == BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_STARTUP_KEY && key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_EXTERNAL_KEY) {
 		return parse_external_key_entry(cd, password,
 						BITLK_BEK_FILE_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_STARTUP_KEY_HEADER_LEN,
-						passwordLen, su_key);
+						passwordLen, su_key, params);
 	} else {
 		log_err(cd, _("Unexpected metadata entry found when parsing startup key."));
 		log_dbg(cd, "Entry type: %u, entry value: %u", key_entry_type, key_entry_value);
@@ -993,7 +946,7 @@ static int bitlk_kdf(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct bitlk_kdf_data kdf = {};
 	struct crypt_hash *hd = NULL;
 	int len = 0;
-	char *utf16Password = NULL;
+	char16_t *utf16Password = NULL;
 	int i = 0;
 	int r = 0;
 
@@ -1010,11 +963,16 @@ static int bitlk_kdf(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	if (!recovery) {
 		/* passphrase: convert to UTF-16 first, then sha256(sha256(pw)) */
-		r = passphrase_to_utf16(cd, CONST_CAST(char*)password, passwordLen, &utf16Password);
+		utf16Password = crypt_safe_alloc(sizeof(char16_t) * (passwordLen + 1));
+		if (!utf16Password) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r = crypt_utf8_to_utf16(&utf16Password, CONST_CAST(char*)password, passwordLen);
 		if (r < 0)
 			goto out;
 
-		crypt_hash_write(hd, utf16Password, passwordLen * 2);
+		crypt_hash_write(hd, (char*)utf16Password, passwordLen * 2);
 		r = crypt_hash_final(hd, kdf.initial_sha256, len);
 		if (r < 0)
 			goto out;
@@ -1142,7 +1100,7 @@ int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			if (r)
 				return r;
 		} else if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY) {
-			r = get_startup_key(cd, password, passwordLen, next_vmk, &vmk_dec_key);
+			r = get_startup_key(cd, password, passwordLen, next_vmk, &vmk_dec_key, params);
 			if (r) {
 				next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
 				continue;
@@ -1243,7 +1201,7 @@ static int _activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint64_t next_start = 0;
 	uint64_t next_end = 0;
 	uint64_t last_segment = 0;
-	uint32_t dmt_flags;
+	uint32_t dmt_flags = 0;
 
 	r = _activate_check(cd, params);
 	if (r)
@@ -1254,6 +1212,11 @@ static int _activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
+	if (dmd.size * SECTOR_SIZE != params->volume_size)
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: BitLocker volume size %" PRIu64 " does not match the underlying device size %" PRIu64 ""),
+			params->volume_size,
+			dmd.size * SECTOR_SIZE);
+
 	/* there will be always 4 dm-zero segments: 3x metadata, 1x FS header */
 	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
 		segments[num_segments].offset = params->metadata_offset[i] / SECTOR_SIZE;
@@ -1384,6 +1347,14 @@ static int _activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			log_err(cd, _("Cannot activate device, kernel dm-crypt is missing support for BITLK Elephant diffuser."));
 			r = -ENOTSUP;
 		}
+		if ((dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS) && !(dmt_flags & DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED)) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot activate device, kernel dm-crypt is missing support for large sector size."));
+			r = -ENOTSUP;
+		}
+		if (dm_flags(cd, DM_ZERO, &dmt_flags) < 0) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot activate device, kernel dm-zero module is missing."));
+			r = -ENOTSUP;
+		}
 	}
 out:
 	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);

lib/bitlk/bitlk.h

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /*
  * BITLK (BitLocker-compatible) header definition
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Milan Broz
- * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Vojtech Trefny
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2022 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2022 Vojtech Trefny
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_STARTUP_KEY = 0x0006,
 	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_DESCRIPTION = 0x0007,
 	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VOLUME_HEADER = 0x000f,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VOLUME_GUID = 0x0019,
 } BITLKFVEEntryType;
 
 typedef enum {
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_EXTERNAL_KEY = 0x0009,
 	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_OFFSET_SIZE = 0x000f,
 	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_RECOVERY_TIME = 0x015,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_GUID = 0x0017,
 } BITLKFVEEntryValue;
 
 struct bitlk_vmk {
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ struct bitlk_fvek {
 
 struct bitlk_metadata {
 	uint16_t sector_size;
+	uint64_t volume_size;
 	bool togo;
 	bool state;
 	BITLKEncryptionType type;

lib/crypt_plain.c

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
  * cryptsetup plain device helper functions
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES = \
 	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c \
 	lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c \
 	lib/crypto_backend/crc32.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/base64.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/utf8.c \
 	lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c \
 	lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c \
 	lib/crypto_backend/cipher_check.c

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c

@@ -120,18 +120,24 @@ void free_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t *memory,
     }
 }
 
-void NOT_OPTIMIZED secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
 #if defined(_MSC_VER) && VC_GE_2005(_MSC_VER)
+void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
     SecureZeroMemory(v, n);
+}
 #elif defined memset_s
+void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
     memset_s(v, n, 0, n);
+}
 #elif defined(HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO)
+void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
     explicit_bzero(v, n);
+}
 #else
+void NOT_OPTIMIZED secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
     static void *(*const volatile memset_sec)(void *, int, size_t) = &memset;
     memset_sec(v, 0, n);
-#endif
 }
+#endif
 
 /* Memory clear flag defaults to true. */
 int FLAG_clear_internal_memory = 1;
@@ -273,7 +279,6 @@ static void *fill_segment_thr(void *thread_data)
 {
     argon2_thread_data *my_data = thread_data;
     fill_segment(my_data->instance_ptr, my_data->pos);
-    argon2_thread_exit();
     return 0;
 }
 

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.c

@@ -46,12 +46,4 @@ int argon2_thread_join(argon2_thread_handle_t handle) {
 #endif
 }
 
-void argon2_thread_exit(void) {
-#if defined(_WIN32)
-    _endthreadex(0);
-#else
-    pthread_exit(NULL);
-#endif
-}
-
 #endif /* ARGON2_NO_THREADS */

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.h

@@ -58,10 +58,5 @@ int argon2_thread_create(argon2_thread_handle_t *handle,
 */
 int argon2_thread_join(argon2_thread_handle_t handle);
 
-/* Terminate the current thread. Must be run inside a thread created by
- * argon2_thread_create.
-*/
-void argon2_thread_exit(void);
-
 #endif /* ARGON2_NO_THREADS */
 #endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Argon2 PBKDF2 library wrapper
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

lib/crypto_backend/base64.c

@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+/*
+ * Base64 "Not encryption" helpers, copied and adapted from systemd project.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Lennart Poettering
+ *
+ * cryptsetup related changes
+ * Copyright (C) 2021-2022 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\n\r"
+
+/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4648#section-4 */
+static char base64char(int x)
+{
+	static const char table[64] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+				      "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+				      "0123456789+/";
+	return table[x & 63];
+}
+
+static int unbase64char(char c)
+{
+	unsigned offset;
+
+	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
+		return c - 'A';
+
+	offset = 'Z' - 'A' + 1;
+
+	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
+		return c - 'a' + offset;
+
+	offset += 'z' - 'a' + 1;
+
+	if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
+		return c - '0' + offset;
+
+	offset += '9' - '0' + 1;
+
+	if (c == '+')
+		return offset;
+
+	offset++;
+
+	if (c == '/')
+		return offset;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_base64_encode(char **out, size_t *out_length, const char *in, size_t in_length)
+{
+	char *r, *z;
+	const uint8_t *x;
+
+	assert(in || in_length == 0);
+	assert(out);
+
+	/* three input bytes makes four output bytes, padding is added so we must round up */
+	z = r = malloc(4 * (in_length + 2) / 3 + 1);
+	if (!r)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (x = (const uint8_t *)in; x < (const uint8_t*)in + (in_length / 3) * 3; x += 3) {
+		/* x[0] == XXXXXXXX; x[1] == YYYYYYYY; x[2] == ZZZZZZZZ */
+		*(z++) = base64char(x[0] >> 2);                    /* 00XXXXXX */
+		*(z++) = base64char((x[0] & 3) << 4 | x[1] >> 4);  /* 00XXYYYY */
+		*(z++) = base64char((x[1] & 15) << 2 | x[2] >> 6); /* 00YYYYZZ */
+		*(z++) = base64char(x[2] & 63);                    /* 00ZZZZZZ */
+	}
+
+	switch (in_length % 3) {
+	case 2:
+		*(z++) = base64char(x[0] >> 2);                   /* 00XXXXXX */
+		*(z++) = base64char((x[0] & 3) << 4 | x[1] >> 4); /* 00XXYYYY */
+		*(z++) = base64char((x[1] & 15) << 2);            /* 00YYYY00 */
+		*(z++) = '=';
+
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		*(z++) = base64char(x[0] >> 2);        /* 00XXXXXX */
+		*(z++) = base64char((x[0] & 3) << 4);  /* 00XX0000 */
+		*(z++) = '=';
+		*(z++) = '=';
+
+		break;
+	}
+
+	*z = 0;
+	*out = r;
+	if (out_length)
+		*out_length = z - r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int unbase64_next(const char **p, size_t *l)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	assert(p);
+	assert(l);
+
+	/* Find the next non-whitespace character, and decode it. If we find padding, we return it as INT_MAX. We
+	 * greedily skip all preceding and all following whitespace. */
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (*l == 0)
+			return -EPIPE;
+
+		if (!strchr(WHITESPACE, **p))
+			break;
+
+		/* Skip leading whitespace */
+		(*p)++, (*l)--;
+	}
+
+	if (**p == '=')
+		ret = INT_MAX; /* return padding as INT_MAX */
+	else {
+		ret = unbase64char(**p);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	for (;;) {
+		(*p)++, (*l)--;
+
+		if (*l == 0)
+			break;
+		if (!strchr(WHITESPACE, **p))
+			break;
+
+		/* Skip following whitespace */
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int crypt_base64_decode(char **out, size_t *out_length, const char *in, size_t in_length)
+{
+	uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+	const char *x;
+	uint8_t *z;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	assert(in || in_length == 0);
+	assert(out);
+	assert(out_length);
+
+	if (in_length == (size_t) -1)
+		in_length = strlen(in);
+
+	/* A group of four input bytes needs three output bytes, in case of padding we need to add two or three extra
+	 * bytes. Note that this calculation is an upper boundary, as we ignore whitespace while decoding */
+	len = (in_length / 4) * 3 + (in_length % 4 != 0 ? (in_length % 4) - 1 : 0);
+
+	buf = malloc(len + 1);
+	if (!buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (x = in, z = buf;;) {
+		int a, b, c, d; /* a == 00XXXXXX; b == 00YYYYYY; c == 00ZZZZZZ; d == 00WWWWWW */
+
+		a = unbase64_next(&x, &in_length);
+		if (a == -EPIPE) /* End of string */
+			break;
+		if (a < 0) {
+			r = a;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		if (a == INT_MAX) { /* Padding is not allowed at the beginning of a 4ch block */
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		b = unbase64_next(&x, &in_length);
+		if (b < 0) {
+			r = b;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		if (b == INT_MAX) { /* Padding is not allowed at the second character of a 4ch block either */
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		c = unbase64_next(&x, &in_length);
+		if (c < 0) {
+			r = c;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		d = unbase64_next(&x, &in_length);
+		if (d < 0) {
+			r = d;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (c == INT_MAX) { /* Padding at the third character */
+
+			if (d != INT_MAX) { /* If the third character is padding, the fourth must be too */
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+			/* b == 00YY0000 */
+			if (b & 15) {
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+			if (in_length > 0) { /* Trailing rubbish? */
+				r = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+			*(z++) = (uint8_t) a << 2 | (uint8_t) (b >> 4); /* XXXXXXYY */
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (d == INT_MAX) {
+			/* c == 00ZZZZ00 */
+			if (c & 3) {
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+			if (in_length > 0) { /* Trailing rubbish? */
+				r = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+			*(z++) = (uint8_t) a << 2 | (uint8_t) b >> 4; /* XXXXXXYY */
+			*(z++) = (uint8_t) b << 4 | (uint8_t) c >> 2; /* YYYYZZZZ */
+			break;
+		}
+
+		*(z++) = (uint8_t) a << 2 | (uint8_t) b >> 4; /* XXXXXXYY */
+		*(z++) = (uint8_t) b << 4 | (uint8_t) c >> 2; /* YYYYZZZZ */
+		*(z++) = (uint8_t) c << 6 | (uint8_t) d;      /* ZZWWWWWW */
+	}
+
+	*z = 0;
+
+	*out_length = (size_t) (z - buf);
+	*out = (char *)buf;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	free(buf);
+
+	/* Ignore other errors in crypt_backend */
+	if (r != -ENOMEM)
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	return r;
+}

lib/crypto_backend/cipher_check.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Cipher performance check
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Linux kernel cipher generic utilities
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -25,13 +25,19 @@
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UCHAR_H
+#include <uchar.h>
+#else
+#define char32_t uint32_t
+#define char16_t uint16_t
+#endif
 
 struct crypt_hash;
 struct crypt_hmac;
 struct crypt_cipher;
 struct crypt_storage;
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void);
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips);
 void crypt_backend_destroy(void);
 
 #define CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL (1 << 0)	/* Crypto uses kernel part, for benchmark */
@@ -83,6 +89,14 @@ int crypt_pbkdf_perf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 /* CRC32 */
 uint32_t crypt_crc32(uint32_t seed, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
 
+/* Base64 */
+int crypt_base64_encode(char **out, size_t *out_length, const char *in, size_t in_length);
+int crypt_base64_decode(char **out, size_t *out_length, const char *in, size_t in_length);
+
+/* UTF8/16 */
+int crypt_utf16_to_utf8(char **out, const char16_t *s, size_t length /* bytes! */);
+int crypt_utf8_to_utf16(char16_t **out, const char *s, size_t length);
+
 /* Block ciphers */
 int crypt_cipher_ivsize(const char *name, const char *mode);
 int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name, const char *mode);
@@ -135,4 +149,7 @@ static inline void crypt_backend_memzero(void *s, size_t n)
 #endif
 }
 
+/* Memcmp helper (memcmp in constant time) */
+int crypt_backend_memeq(const void *m1, const void *m2, size_t n);
+
 #endif /* _CRYPTO_BACKEND_H */

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend_internal.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -58,4 +58,18 @@ int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(const void *key, size_t key_length,
 				   const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
 				   const char *tag, size_t tag_length);
 
+/* Internal implementation for constant time memory comparison */
+static inline int crypt_internal_memeq(const void *m1, const void *m2, size_t n)
+{
+	const unsigned char *_m1 = (const unsigned char *) m1;
+	const unsigned char *_m2 = (const unsigned char *) m2;
+	unsigned char result = 0;
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+		result |= _m1[i] ^ _m2[i];
+
+	return result;
+}
+
 #endif /* _CRYPTO_BACKEND_INTERNAL_H */

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation (skcipher)
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * GCRYPT crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static void crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(void)
 		crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 1;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	int r;
 
@@ -550,3 +550,8 @@ out:
 	return -ENOTSUP;
 #endif
 }
+
+int crypt_backend_memeq(const void *m1, const void *m2, size_t n)
+{
+	return crypt_internal_memeq(m1, m2, n);
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *op
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	struct utsname uts;
 	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
@@ -416,3 +416,8 @@ int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
 	return crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(key, key_length, in, out, length,
 					      iv, iv_length, tag, tag_length);
 }
+
+int crypt_backend_memeq(const void *m1, const void *m2, size_t n)
+{
+	return crypt_internal_memeq(m1, m2, n);
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Nettle crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <nettle/sha3.h>
 #include <nettle/hmac.h>
 #include <nettle/pbkdf2.h>
+#include <nettle/memops.h>
 #include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
 
 #if HAVE_NETTLE_VERSION_H
@@ -213,7 +214,7 @@ static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -446,3 +447,9 @@ int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
 	return crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(key, key_length, in, out, length,
 					      iv, iv_length, tag, tag_length);
 }
+
+int crypt_backend_memeq(const void *m1, const void *m2, size_t n)
+{
+	/* The logic is inverse to memcmp... */
+	return !memeql_sec(m1, m2, n);
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * NSS crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	int r;
 
@@ -395,3 +395,8 @@ int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
 	return crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(key, key_length, in, out, length,
 					      iv, iv_length, tag, tag_length);
 }
+
+int crypt_backend_memeq(const void *m1, const void *m2, size_t n)
+{
+	return NSS_SecureMemcmp(m1, m2, n);
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * OPENSSL crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -28,21 +28,21 @@
  * for all of the code used other than OpenSSL.
  */
 
-/*
- * HMAC will be later rewritten to a new API from OpenSSL 3
- */
-#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
-
 #include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
 #include <openssl/provider.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
 static OSSL_PROVIDER *ossl_legacy = NULL;
 static OSSL_PROVIDER *ossl_default = NULL;
+static OSSL_LIB_CTX  *ossl_ctx = NULL;
+static char backend_version[256] = "OpenSSL";
 #endif
 
 #define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
@@ -56,8 +56,14 @@ struct crypt_hash {
 };
 
 struct crypt_hmac {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	EVP_MAC *mac;
+	EVP_MAC_CTX *md;
+	EVP_MAC_CTX *md_org;
+#else
 	HMAC_CTX *md;
 	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
+#endif
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
@@ -68,6 +74,7 @@ struct crypt_cipher {
 	struct {
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX *hd_enc;
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX *hd_dec;
+		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_type;
 		size_t iv_length;
 	} lib;
 	} u;
@@ -84,9 +91,10 @@ struct hash_alg {
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || \
     (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL)
 
-static void openssl_backend_init(void)
+static int openssl_backend_init(bool fips __attribute__((unused)))
 {
 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void openssl_backend_exit(void)
@@ -130,46 +138,79 @@ static void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *md)
 	free(md);
 }
 #else
-static void openssl_backend_init(void)
+static void openssl_backend_exit(void)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	if (ossl_legacy)
+		OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ossl_legacy);
+	if (ossl_default)
+		OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ossl_default);
+	if (ossl_ctx)
+		OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(ossl_ctx);
+
+	ossl_legacy = NULL;
+	ossl_default = NULL;
+	ossl_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int openssl_backend_init(bool fips)
 {
 /*
  * OpenSSL >= 3.0.0 provides some algorithms in legacy provider
  */
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
-	OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ATEXIT, NULL);
-	ossl_legacy  = OSSL_PROVIDER_try_load(NULL, "legacy", 0);
-	ossl_default = OSSL_PROVIDER_try_load(NULL, "default", 0);
-#endif
-}
+	int r;
 
-static void openssl_backend_exit(void)
-{
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
 	/*
-	 * If Destructor was already called, we must not call it again
+	 * In FIPS mode we keep default OpenSSL context & global config
 	 */
-	if (OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL) != 0) {
-		OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ossl_legacy);
-		OSSL_PROVIDER_unload(ossl_default);
-		OPENSSL_cleanup();
+	if (!fips) {
+		ossl_ctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_new();
+		if (!ossl_ctx)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ossl_default = OSSL_PROVIDER_try_load(ossl_ctx, "default", 0);
+		if (!ossl_default) {
+			OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(ossl_ctx);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		/* Optional */
+		ossl_legacy = OSSL_PROVIDER_try_load(ossl_ctx, "legacy", 0);
+	}
+
+	r = snprintf(backend_version, sizeof(backend_version), "%s %s%s%s",
+		OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION),
+		ossl_default ? "[default]" : "",
+		ossl_legacy  ? "[legacy]" : "",
+		fips  ? "[fips]" : "");
+
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(backend_version)) {
+		openssl_backend_exit();
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	ossl_legacy = NULL;
-	ossl_default = NULL;
 #endif
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static const char *openssl_backend_version(void)
 {
-    return OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	return backend_version;
+#else
+	return OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
+#endif
 }
 #endif
 
-int crypt_backend_init(void)
+int crypt_backend_init(bool fips)
 {
 	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
 		return 0;
 
-	openssl_backend_init();
+	if (openssl_backend_init(fips))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
 	return 0;
@@ -177,7 +218,14 @@ int crypt_backend_init(void)
 
 void crypt_backend_destroy(void)
 {
+	/*
+	 * If Destructor was already called, we must not call it again
+	 */
+	if (!crypto_backend_initialised)
+		return;
+
 	crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
+
 	openssl_backend_exit();
 }
 
@@ -215,16 +263,51 @@ static const char *crypt_hash_compat_name(const char *name)
 	return hash_name;
 }
 
+static const EVP_MD *hash_id_get(const char *name)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	return EVP_MD_fetch(ossl_ctx, crypt_hash_compat_name(name), NULL);
+#else
+	return EVP_get_digestbyname(crypt_hash_compat_name(name));
+#endif
+}
+
+static void hash_id_free(const EVP_MD *hash_id)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	EVP_MD_free(CONST_CAST(EVP_MD*)hash_id);
+#endif
+}
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_type_get(const char *name)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	return EVP_CIPHER_fetch(ossl_ctx, name, NULL);
+#else
+	return EVP_get_cipherbyname(name);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void cipher_type_free(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher_type)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	EVP_CIPHER_free(CONST_CAST(EVP_CIPHER*)cipher_type);
+#endif
+}
+
 /* HASH */
 int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
 {
+	int size;
 	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
 
-	hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(crypt_hash_compat_name(name));
+	hash_id = hash_id_get(name);
 	if (!hash_id)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return EVP_MD_size(hash_id);
+	size = EVP_MD_size(hash_id);
+	hash_id_free(hash_id);
+	return size;
 }
 
 int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
@@ -241,7 +324,7 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(crypt_hash_compat_name(name));
+	h->hash_id = hash_id_get(name);
 	if (!h->hash_id) {
 		EVP_MD_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
@@ -249,6 +332,7 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 	}
 
 	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(h->md, h->hash_id, NULL) != 1) {
+		hash_id_free(h->hash_id);
 		EVP_MD_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -300,6 +384,7 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 
 void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 {
+	hash_id_free(ctx->hash_id);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->md);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
@@ -315,7 +400,39 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 		    const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
 	struct crypt_hmac *h;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+		OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, CONST_CAST(void*)name, 0),
+		OSSL_PARAM_END
+	};
 
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	h->mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ossl_ctx, OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC, NULL);
+	if (!h->mac) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->md = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(h->mac);
+	if (!h->md) {
+		EVP_MAC_free(h->mac);
+		free(h);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (EVP_MAC_init(h->md, key, key_length, params) != 1) {
+		EVP_MAC_CTX_free(h->md);
+		EVP_MAC_free(h->mac);
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->hash_len = EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(h->md);
+	h->md_org = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(h->md);
+#else
 	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
 	if (!h)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -326,7 +443,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(crypt_hash_compat_name(name));
+	h->hash_id = hash_id_get(name);
 	if (!h->hash_id) {
 		HMAC_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
@@ -336,45 +453,75 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 	HMAC_Init_ex(h->md, key, key_length, h->hash_id, NULL);
 
 	h->hash_len = EVP_MD_size(h->hash_id);
+#endif
 	*ctx = h;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void crypt_hmac_restart(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
+static int crypt_hmac_restart(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->md);
+	ctx->md = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx->md_org);
+	if (!ctx->md)
+		return -EINVAL;
+#else
 	HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->md, NULL, 0, ctx->hash_id, NULL);
+#endif
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->md, (const unsigned char *)buffer, length) == 1 ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+#else
 	HMAC_Update(ctx->md, (const unsigned char *)buffer, length);
 	return 0;
+#endif
 }
 
 int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 {
 	unsigned char tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	size_t tmp_len = 0;
+
+	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (EVP_MAC_final(ctx->md, tmp,  &tmp_len, sizeof(tmp)) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+#else
 	unsigned int tmp_len = 0;
 
 	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	HMAC_Final(ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len);
-
+#endif
 	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
 	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 
 	if (tmp_len < length)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	crypt_hmac_restart(ctx);
+	if (crypt_hmac_restart(ctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
 void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->md);
+	EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->md_org);
+	EVP_MAC_free(ctx->mac);
+#else
+	hash_id_free(ctx->hash_id);
 	HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->md);
+#endif
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
 }
@@ -389,48 +536,91 @@ int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int openssl_pbkdf2(const char *password, size_t password_length,
+	const char *salt, size_t salt_length, uint32_t iterations,
+	const char *hash, char *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	int r;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx;
+	EVP_KDF *pbkdf2;
+	OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+		OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD,
+			CONST_CAST(void*)password, password_length),
+		OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
+			CONST_CAST(void*)salt, salt_length),
+		OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER, &iterations),
+		OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
+			CONST_CAST(void*)hash, 0),
+		OSSL_PARAM_END
+	};
+
+	pbkdf2 = EVP_KDF_fetch(ossl_ctx, "pbkdf2", NULL);
+	if (!pbkdf2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(pbkdf2);
+	if (!ctx) {
+		EVP_KDF_free(pbkdf2);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, (unsigned char*)key, key_length, params);
+
+	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
+	EVP_KDF_free(pbkdf2);
+#else
+	const EVP_MD *hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(crypt_hash_compat_name(hash));
+	if (!hash_id)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, (int)password_length, (const unsigned char *)salt,
+		(int)salt_length, iterations, hash_id, (int)key_length, (unsigned char*) key);
+#endif
+	return r == 1 ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int openssl_argon2(const char *type, const char *password, size_t password_length,
+	const char *salt, size_t salt_length, char *key, size_t key_length,
+	uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
+{
+	return argon2(type, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+		      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
+}
+
 /* PBKDF */
 int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		const char *password, size_t password_length,
 		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
 		char *key, size_t key_length,
 		uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel)
-
 {
-	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
-
 	if (!kdf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
-		hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(crypt_hash_compat_name(hash));
-		if (!hash_id)
-			return -EINVAL;
-
-		if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, (int)password_length,
-		    (const unsigned char *)salt, (int)salt_length,
-	            (int)iterations, hash_id, (int)key_length, (unsigned char *)key))
-			return -EINVAL;
-		return 0;
-	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
-		return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
-			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
-	}
-
+	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2"))
+		return openssl_pbkdf2(password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+				      iterations, hash, key, key_length);
+	if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6))
+		return openssl_argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+				      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 /* Block ciphers */
-static void _cipher_destroy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_enc, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_dec)
+static void _cipher_destroy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_enc, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_dec, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher_type)
 {
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(*hd_enc);
 	*hd_enc = NULL;
 
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(*hd_dec);
 	*hd_dec = NULL;
+
+	cipher_type_free(*cipher_type);
+	*cipher_type = NULL;
 }
 
-static int _cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_enc, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_dec, const char *name,
+static int _cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_enc, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_dec, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher_type, const char *name,
 			const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length, size_t *iv_length)
 {
 	char cipher_name[256];
@@ -445,32 +635,38 @@ static int _cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_enc, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_dec, const
 	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(cipher_name))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	type = EVP_get_cipherbyname(cipher_name);
+	type = cipher_type_get(cipher_name);
 	if (!type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_key_length(type) != (int)key_length)
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_key_length(type) != (int)key_length) {
+		cipher_type_free(type);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	*hd_enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 	*hd_dec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 	*iv_length = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(type);
 
-	if (!*hd_enc || !*hd_dec)
+	if (!*hd_enc || !*hd_dec) {
+		cipher_type_free(type);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(*hd_enc, type, NULL, key, NULL) != 1 ||
 	    EVP_DecryptInit_ex(*hd_dec, type, NULL, key, NULL) != 1) {
-		_cipher_destroy(hd_enc, hd_dec);
+		_cipher_destroy(hd_enc, hd_dec, &type);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(*hd_enc, 0) != 1 ||
 	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(*hd_dec, 0) != 1) {
-		_cipher_destroy(hd_enc, hd_dec);
+		_cipher_destroy(hd_enc, hd_dec, &type);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	*cipher_type = type;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -484,7 +680,7 @@ int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
 	if (!h)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (!_cipher_init(&h->u.lib.hd_enc, &h->u.lib.hd_dec, name, mode, key,
+	if (!_cipher_init(&h->u.lib.hd_enc, &h->u.lib.hd_dec, &h->u.lib.cipher_type, name, mode, key,
 			  key_length, &h->u.lib.iv_length)) {
 		h->use_kernel = false;
 		*ctx = h;
@@ -507,7 +703,7 @@ void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
 	if (ctx->use_kernel)
 		crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&ctx->u.kernel);
 	else
-		_cipher_destroy(&ctx->u.lib.hd_enc, &ctx->u.lib.hd_dec);
+		_cipher_destroy(&ctx->u.lib.hd_enc, &ctx->u.lib.hd_dec, &ctx->u.lib.cipher_type);
 	free(ctx);
 }
 
@@ -594,9 +790,6 @@ int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length __attribute__((un
 	if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_ccm(), NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
 		goto out;
 
-	//EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)
-	//EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)
-
 	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN, iv_length, NULL) != 1)
 		goto out;
 	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG, tag_length, CONST_CAST(void*)tag) != 1)
@@ -614,3 +807,8 @@ out:
 	return -ENOTSUP;
 #endif
 }
+
+int crypt_backend_memeq(const void *m1, const void *m2, size_t n)
+{
+	return CRYPTO_memcmp(m1, m2, n);
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Generic wrapper for storage encryption modes and Initial Vectors
  * (reimplementation of some functions from Linux dm-crypt kernel)
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2014-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2014-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
 
 static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector)
 {
-	uint64_t val;
+	uint64_t val, *u64_iv;
+	uint32_t *u32_iv;
 
 	switch (ctx->type) {
 	case IV_NONE:
@@ -161,19 +162,24 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector
 		break;
 	case IV_PLAIN:
 		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
-		*(uint32_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le32(sector & 0xffffffff);
+		u32_iv = (void *)ctx->iv;
+		*u32_iv = cpu_to_le32(sector & 0xffffffff);
 		break;
 	case IV_PLAIN64:
 		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
-		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
+		u64_iv = (void *)ctx->iv;
+		*u64_iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
 		break;
 	case IV_PLAIN64BE:
 		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
-		*(uint64_t *)&ctx->iv[ctx->iv_size - sizeof(uint64_t)] = cpu_to_be64(sector);
+		/* iv_size is at least of size u64; usually it is 16 bytes */
+		u64_iv = (void *)&ctx->iv[ctx->iv_size - sizeof(uint64_t)];
+		*u64_iv = cpu_to_be64(sector);
 		break;
 	case IV_ESSIV:
 		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
-		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
+		u64_iv = (void *)ctx->iv;
+		*u64_iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
 		return crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->cipher,
 			ctx->iv, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, NULL, 0);
 		break;
@@ -184,7 +190,8 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector
 		break;
 	case IV_EBOIV:
 		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
-		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector << ctx->shift);
+		u64_iv = (void *)ctx->iv;
+		*u64_iv = cpu_to_le64(sector << ctx->shift);
 		return crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->cipher,
 			ctx->iv, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, NULL, 0);
 		break;

lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation
  *
  * cryptsetup related changes
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * PBKDF performance check
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Milan Broz
  * Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Ondrej Mosnacek
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or

lib/crypto_backend/utf8.c

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+/*
+ * UTF8/16 helpers, copied and adapted from systemd project.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Lennart Poettering
+ *
+ * cryptsetup related changes
+ * Copyright (C) 2021-2022 Vojtech Trefny
+
+ * Parts of the original systemd implementation are based on the GLIB utf8
+ * validation functions.
+ * gutf8.c - Operations on UTF-8 strings.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1999 Tom Tromey
+ * Copyright (C) 2000 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Library General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Library General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Library General Public
+ * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA  02110-1301  USA
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <endian.h>
+
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+static inline bool utf16_is_surrogate(char16_t c)
+{
+	return c >= 0xd800U && c <= 0xdfffU;
+}
+
+static inline bool utf16_is_trailing_surrogate(char16_t c)
+{
+	return c >= 0xdc00U && c <= 0xdfffU;
+}
+
+static inline char32_t utf16_surrogate_pair_to_unichar(char16_t lead, char16_t trail)
+{
+	return ((((char32_t) lead - 0xd800U) << 10) + ((char32_t) trail - 0xdc00U) + 0x10000U);
+}
+
+/**
+ * utf8_encode_unichar() - Encode single UCS-4 character as UTF-8
+ * @out_utf8: output buffer of at least 4 bytes or NULL
+ * @g: UCS-4 character to encode
+ *
+ * This encodes a single UCS-4 character as UTF-8 and writes it into @out_utf8.
+ * The length of the character is returned. It is not zero-terminated! If the
+ * output buffer is NULL, only the length is returned.
+ *
+ * Returns: The length in bytes that the UTF-8 representation does or would
+ *          occupy.
+ */
+static size_t utf8_encode_unichar(char *out_utf8, char32_t g)
+{
+	if (g < (1 << 7)) {
+		if (out_utf8)
+			out_utf8[0] = g & 0x7f;
+		return 1;
+	} else if (g < (1 << 11)) {
+		if (out_utf8) {
+			out_utf8[0] = 0xc0 | ((g >> 6) & 0x1f);
+			out_utf8[1] = 0x80 | (g & 0x3f);
+		}
+		return 2;
+	} else if (g < (1 << 16)) {
+		if (out_utf8) {
+			out_utf8[0] = 0xe0 | ((g >> 12) & 0x0f);
+			out_utf8[1] = 0x80 | ((g >> 6) & 0x3f);
+			out_utf8[2] = 0x80 | (g & 0x3f);
+		}
+		return 3;
+	} else if (g < (1 << 21)) {
+		if (out_utf8) {
+			out_utf8[0] = 0xf0 | ((g >> 18) & 0x07);
+			out_utf8[1] = 0x80 | ((g >> 12) & 0x3f);
+			out_utf8[2] = 0x80 | ((g >> 6) & 0x3f);
+			out_utf8[3] = 0x80 | (g & 0x3f);
+		}
+		return 4;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * crypt_utf16_to_utf8()
+ * @out: output buffer, should be 2 * @length + 1 long
+ * @s: string to convert
+ * @length: length of @s in bytes
+ *
+ * Converts a UTF16LE encoded string to a UTF8 encoded string.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success, negative errno otherwise
+ */
+int crypt_utf16_to_utf8(char **out, const char16_t *s, size_t length /* bytes! */)
+{
+	const uint8_t *f;
+	char *t;
+
+	assert(s);
+	assert(out);
+	assert(*out);
+
+	/* Input length is in bytes, i.e. the shortest possible character takes 2 bytes. Each unicode character may
+	 * take up to 4 bytes in UTF-8. Let's also account for a trailing NUL byte. */
+	if (length * 2 < length)
+		return -EOVERFLOW; /* overflow */
+
+	f = (const uint8_t*) s;
+	t = *out;
+
+	while (f + 1 < (const uint8_t*) s + length) {
+		char16_t w1, w2;
+
+		/* see RFC 2781 section 2.2 */
+
+		w1 = f[1] << 8 | f[0];
+		f += 2;
+
+		if (!utf16_is_surrogate(w1)) {
+			t += utf8_encode_unichar(t, w1);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (utf16_is_trailing_surrogate(w1))
+			continue; /* spurious trailing surrogate, ignore */
+
+		if (f + 1 >= (const uint8_t*) s + length)
+			break;
+
+		w2 = f[1] << 8 | f[0];
+		f += 2;
+
+		if (!utf16_is_trailing_surrogate(w2)) {
+			f -= 2;
+			continue; /* surrogate missing its trailing surrogate, ignore */
+		}
+
+		t += utf8_encode_unichar(t, utf16_surrogate_pair_to_unichar(w1, w2));
+	}
+
+	*t = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* count of characters used to encode one unicode char */
+static size_t utf8_encoded_expected_len(uint8_t c)
+{
+	if (c < 0x80)
+		return 1;
+	if ((c & 0xe0) == 0xc0)
+		return 2;
+	if ((c & 0xf0) == 0xe0)
+		return 3;
+	if ((c & 0xf8) == 0xf0)
+		return 4;
+	if ((c & 0xfc) == 0xf8)
+		return 5;
+	if ((c & 0xfe) == 0xfc)
+		return 6;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* decode one unicode char */
+static int utf8_encoded_to_unichar(const char *str, char32_t *ret_unichar)
+{
+	char32_t unichar;
+	size_t len, i;
+
+	assert(str);
+
+	len = utf8_encoded_expected_len(str[0]);
+
+	switch (len) {
+	case 1:
+		*ret_unichar = (char32_t)str[0];
+		return 0;
+	case 2:
+		unichar = str[0] & 0x1f;
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		unichar = (char32_t)str[0] & 0x0f;
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		unichar = (char32_t)str[0] & 0x07;
+		break;
+	case 5:
+		unichar = (char32_t)str[0] & 0x03;
+		break;
+	case 6:
+		unichar = (char32_t)str[0] & 0x01;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 1; i < len; i++) {
+		if (((char32_t)str[i] & 0xc0) != 0x80)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		unichar <<= 6;
+		unichar |= (char32_t)str[i] & 0x3f;
+	}
+
+	*ret_unichar = unichar;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static size_t utf16_encode_unichar(char16_t *out, char32_t c)
+{
+	/* Note that this encodes as little-endian. */
+
+	switch (c) {
+
+	case 0 ... 0xd7ffU:
+	case 0xe000U ... 0xffffU:
+		out[0] = htole16(c);
+		return 1;
+
+	case 0x10000U ... 0x10ffffU:
+		c -= 0x10000U;
+		out[0] = htole16((c >> 10) + 0xd800U);
+		out[1] = htole16((c & 0x3ffU) + 0xdc00U);
+		return 2;
+
+	default: /* A surrogate (invalid) */
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * crypt_utf8_to_utf16()
+ * @out: output buffer, should be @length + 1 long
+ * @s: string to convert
+ * @length: length of @s in bytes
+ *
+ * Converts a UTF8 encoded string to a UTF16LE encoded string.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success, negative errno otherwise
+ */
+int crypt_utf8_to_utf16(char16_t **out, const char *s, size_t length)
+{
+	char16_t *p;
+	size_t i;
+	int r;
+
+	assert(s);
+
+	p = *out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < length;) {
+		char32_t unichar;
+		size_t e;
+
+		e = utf8_encoded_expected_len(s[i]);
+		if (e <= 1) /* Invalid and single byte characters are copied as they are */
+			goto copy;
+
+		if (i + e > length) /* sequence longer than input buffer, then copy as-is */
+			goto copy;
+
+		r = utf8_encoded_to_unichar(s + i, &unichar);
+		if (r < 0) /* sequence invalid, then copy as-is */
+			goto copy;
+
+		p += utf16_encode_unichar(p, unichar);
+		i += e;
+		continue;
+
+	copy:
+		*(p++) = htole16(s[i++]);
+	}
+
+	*p = 0;
+	return 0;
+}

lib/integrity/integrity.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * Integrity volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -27,6 +27,17 @@
 #include "integrity.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
+/* For LUKS2, integrity metadata are on DATA device even for detached header! */
+static struct device *INTEGRITY_metadata_device(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	const char *type = crypt_get_type(cd);
+
+	if (type && !strcmp(type, CRYPT_LUKS2))
+		return crypt_data_device(cd);
+
+	return crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+}
+
 static int INTEGRITY_read_superblock(struct crypt_device *cd,
 				     struct device *device,
 				     uint64_t offset, struct superblock *sb)
@@ -38,11 +49,13 @@ static int INTEGRITY_read_superblock(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
-		device_alignment(device), sb, sizeof(*sb), offset) != sizeof(*sb) ||
-	    memcmp(sb->magic, SB_MAGIC, sizeof(sb->magic)) ||
-	    sb->version < SB_VERSION_1 || sb->version > SB_VERSION_5) {
-		log_std(cd, "No integrity superblock detected on %s.\n",
-			device_path(device));
+	    device_alignment(device), sb, sizeof(*sb), offset) != sizeof(*sb) ||
+	    memcmp(sb->magic, SB_MAGIC, sizeof(sb->magic))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "No kernel dm-integrity metadata detected on %s.", device_path(device));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	} else if (sb->version < SB_VERSION_1 || sb->version > SB_VERSION_5) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Incompatible kernel dm-integrity metadata (version %u) detected on %s."),
+			sb->version, device_path(device));
 		r = -EINVAL;
 	} else {
 		sb->integrity_tag_size = le16toh(sb->integrity_tag_size);
@@ -63,7 +76,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct superblock sb;
 	int r;
 
-	r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), 0, &sb);
+	r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, INTEGRITY_metadata_device(cd), 0, &sb);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
@@ -120,7 +133,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_data_sectors(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int INTEGRITY_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), const char *integrity)
+int INTEGRITY_key_size(const char *integrity)
 {
 	if (!integrity)
 		return 0;
@@ -154,6 +167,9 @@ int INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(const char *integrity)
 	if (!strcmp(integrity, "crc32") || !strcmp(integrity, "crc32c"))
 		return 4;
 
+	if (!strcmp(integrity, "xxhash64"))
+		return 8;
+
 	r = sscanf(integrity, "hmac(%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^)]s", hash);
 	if (r == 1)
 		r = crypt_hash_size(hash);
@@ -163,8 +179,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(const char *integrity)
 	return r < 0 ? 0 : r;
 }
 
-int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)),
-		       const char *integrity,
+int INTEGRITY_tag_size(const char *integrity,
 		       const char *cipher,
 		       const char *cipher_mode)
 {
@@ -228,13 +243,13 @@ int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (sb_flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING)
 		dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
 
-	r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+	r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, INTEGRITY_metadata_device(cd),
 				   crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &dmd->size);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
 	return dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd->segment, 0, dmd->size,
-			crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+			INTEGRITY_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
 			crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
 			crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk, journal_crypt_key,
 			journal_mac_key, params);
@@ -256,18 +271,8 @@ int INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate INTEGRITY device on top of %s, using name %s, tag size %d, provided sectors %" PRIu64".",
 		device_path(tgt->data_device), name, tgt->u.integrity.tag_size, dmd->size);
 
-	r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL,
-				tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmd->flags);
-	if (r)
-		return r;
+	r = create_or_reload_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
 
-	if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
-		r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
-		if (r)
-			return r;
-	}
-
-	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
 	if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-integrity mapping."));
 		return -ENOTSUP;
@@ -299,14 +304,33 @@ int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
 		       uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags)
 {
-	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
-	int r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, params, vk, journal_crypt_key,
-					    journal_mac_key, &dmd, flags, sb_flags);
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdq = {}, dmd = {};
+	int r;
 
-	if (r < 0)
-		return r;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH) {
+		r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+					      DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY |
+					      DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS |
+					      DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY |
+					      DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEY, &dmdq);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
 
-	r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, name, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &dmd, sb_flags);
+		r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, params, vk ?: dmdq.segment.u.integrity.vk,
+						journal_crypt_key ?: dmdq.segment.u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+						journal_mac_key ?: dmdq.segment.u.integrity.journal_integrity_key,
+						&dmd, flags, sb_flags);
+
+		if (!r)
+			dmd.size = dmdq.size;
+	} else
+		r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, params, vk, journal_crypt_key,
+						journal_mac_key, &dmd, flags, sb_flags);
+
+	if (!r)
+		r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, name, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &dmd, sb_flags);
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdq);
 	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -338,7 +362,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (params && params->integrity_key_size)
 		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->integrity_key_size, NULL);
 
-	r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, tgt, 0, dmdi.size, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+	r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, tgt, 0, dmdi.size, INTEGRITY_metadata_device(cd),
 			crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
 			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk,
 			journal_crypt_key, journal_mac_key, params);

lib/integrity/integrity.h

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * Integrity header definition
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -66,9 +66,8 @@ int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offs
 int INTEGRITY_data_sectors(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			   struct device *device, uint64_t offset,
 			   uint64_t *data_sectors);
-int INTEGRITY_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *integrity);
-int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
-		       const char *integrity,
+int INTEGRITY_key_size(const char *integrity);
+int INTEGRITY_tag_size(const char *integrity,
 		       const char *cipher,
 		       const char *cipher_mode);
 int INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(const char *integrity);

lib/internal.h

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

lib/libcryptsetup.h

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -129,9 +129,10 @@ void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd);
  * other values mean accepted.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
- * @param confirm user defined confirm callback reference
+ * @param confirm user defined confirm callback reference; use
+ *        @p msg for message for user to confirm and
+ *        @p usrptr for identification in callback
  * @param usrptr provided identification in callback
- * @param msg Message for user to confirm
  *
  * @note Current version of cryptsetup API requires confirmation for UUID change and
  *	 LUKS header restore only.
@@ -196,10 +197,11 @@ int crypt_set_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t data_offset);
  * Set log function.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle (can be @e NULL to set default log function)
- * @param log user defined log function reference
+ * @param log user defined log function reference; use
+ *        @p level for log level,
+ *        @p msg for message, and
+ *        @p usrptr for identification in callback
  * @param usrptr provided identification in callback
- * @param level log level below (debug messages can uses other levels)
- * @param msg log message
  */
 void crypt_set_log_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr),
@@ -269,9 +271,9 @@ struct crypt_pbkdf_type {
 };
 
 /** Iteration time set by crypt_set_iteration_time(), for compatibility only. */
-#define CRYPT_PBKDF_ITER_TIME_SET   (1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_PBKDF_ITER_TIME_SET   (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
 /** Never run benchmarks, use pre-set value or defaults. */
-#define CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK    (1 << 1)
+#define CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK    (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
 
 /** PBKDF2 according to RFC2898, LUKS1 legacy */
 #define CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2   "pbkdf2"
@@ -511,13 +513,13 @@ struct crypt_params_verity {
 };
 
 /** No on-disk header (only hashes) */
-#define CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER   (1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER   (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
 /** Verity hash in userspace before activation */
-#define CRYPT_VERITY_CHECK_HASH  (1 << 1)
+#define CRYPT_VERITY_CHECK_HASH  (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
 /** Create hash - format hash device */
-#define CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH (1 << 2)
+#define CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH (UINT32_C(1) << 2)
 /** Root hash signature required for activation */
-#define CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE (1 << 3)
+#define CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE (UINT32_C(1) << 3)
 
 /**
  *
@@ -540,18 +542,18 @@ struct crypt_params_tcrypt {
 };
 
 /** Include legacy modes when scanning for header */
-#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES    (1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES    (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
 /** Try to load hidden header (describing hidden device) */
-#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER   (1 << 1)
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER   (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
 /** Try to load backup header */
-#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER   (1 << 2)
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER   (UINT32_C(1) << 2)
 /** Device contains encrypted system (with boot loader) */
-#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER   (1 << 3)
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER   (UINT32_C(1) << 3)
 /** Include VeraCrypt modes when scanning for header,
  *  all other TCRYPT flags applies as well.
  *  VeraCrypt device is reported as TCRYPT type.
  */
-#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES      (1 << 4)
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES      (UINT32_C(1) << 4)
 
 /**
  *
@@ -660,11 +662,11 @@ void crypt_set_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t flags);
 uint32_t crypt_get_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /** dm-integrity device uses less effective (legacy) padding (old kernels) */
-#define CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING (1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
 /** dm-integrity device does not protect superblock with HMAC (old kernels) */
-#define CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC (1 << 1)
+#define CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
 /** dm-integrity allow recalculating of volumes with HMAC keys (old kernels) */
-#define CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC (1 << 2)
+#define CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC (UINT32_C(1) << 2)
 
 /**
  * Convert to new type for already existing device.
@@ -716,6 +718,24 @@ int crypt_set_label(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *label,
 	const char *subsystem);
 
+/**
+ * Get the label of an existing device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return label, or @e NULL otherwise
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_label(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/**
+ * Get the subsystem of an existing device.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return subsystem, or @e NULL otherwise
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_subsystem(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
 /**
  * Enable or disable loading of volume keys via kernel keyring. When set to
  * 'enabled' library loads key in kernel keyring first and pass the key
@@ -747,7 +767,8 @@ int crypt_volume_key_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable);
  * @post In case LUKS header is read successfully but payload device is too small
  * error is returned and device type in context is set to @e NULL
  *
- * @note Note that in current version load works only for LUKS and VERITY device type.
+ * @note Note that load works only for device types with on-disk metadata.
+ * @note Function does not print visible error message if metadata is not present.
  *
  */
 int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -879,6 +900,43 @@ int crypt_resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *name,
 	const char *volume_key,
 	size_t volume_key_size);
+/**
+ * Resume crypt device using LUKS2 token.
+ *
+ * @param cd LUKS2 crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of device to resume
+ * @param type restrict type of token, if @e NULL all types are allowed
+ * @param pin passphrase (or PIN) to unlock token (may be binary data)
+ * @param pin_size size of @e pin
+ * @param usrptr provided identification in callback
+ *
+ * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note EPERM errno means token provided passphrase successfully, but
+ *       passphrase did not unlock any keyslot associated with the token.
+ *
+ * @note ENOENT errno means no token (or subsequently assigned keyslot) was
+ *       eligible to resume LUKS2 device.
+ *
+ * @note ENOANO errno means that token is PIN protected and was either missing
+ *       (NULL) or wrong.
+ *
+ * @note Negative EAGAIN errno means token handler requires additional hardware
+ *       not present in the system to unlock keyslot.
+ *
+ * @note with @param token set to CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN libcryptsetup runs best effort loop
+ *       to resume device using any available token. It may happen that various token handlers
+ *       return different error codes. At the end loop returns error codes in the following
+ *       order (from the most significant to the least) any negative errno except those
+ *       listed below, non negative token id (success), -ENOANO, -EAGAIN, -EPERM, -ENOENT.
+ */
+int crypt_resume_by_token_pin(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *type,
+	int token,
+	const char *pin,
+	size_t pin_size,
+	void *usrptr);
 /** @} */
 
 /**
@@ -1003,13 +1061,13 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t passphrase_size);
 
 /** create keyslot with volume key not associated with current dm-crypt segment */
-#define CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT (1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
 
 /** create keyslot with new volume key and assign it to current dm-crypt segment */
-#define CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET (1 << 1)
+#define CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
 
 /** Assign key to first matching digest before creating new digest */
-#define CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE (1 << 2)
+#define CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE (UINT32_C(1) << 2)
 
 /**
  * Add key slot using provided key.
@@ -1071,59 +1129,59 @@ int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
  */
 
 /** device is read only */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY (1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
 /** only reported for device without uuid */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_UUID  (1 << 1)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_UUID  (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
 /** activate even if cannot grant exclusive access (DANGEROUS) */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED   (1 << 2)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED   (UINT32_C(1) << 2)
 /** enable discards aka TRIM */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS (1 << 3)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS (UINT32_C(1) << 3)
 /** skip global udev rules in activation ("private device"), input only */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE (1 << 4)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE (UINT32_C(1) << 4)
 /** corruption detected (verity), output only */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED (1 << 5)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED (UINT32_C(1) << 5)
 /** use same_cpu_crypt option for dm-crypt */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT (1 << 6)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT (UINT32_C(1) << 6)
 /** use submit_from_crypt_cpus for dm-crypt */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS (1 << 7)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS (UINT32_C(1) << 7)
 /** dm-verity: ignore_corruption flag - ignore corruption, log it only */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION (1 << 8)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION (UINT32_C(1) << 8)
 /** dm-verity: restart_on_corruption flag - restart kernel on corruption */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION (1 << 9)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION (UINT32_C(1) << 9)
 /** dm-verity: ignore_zero_blocks - do not verify zero blocks */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS (1 << 10)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS (UINT32_C(1) << 10)
 /** key loaded in kernel keyring instead directly in dm-crypt */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY (1 << 11)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY (UINT32_C(1) << 11)
 /** dm-integrity: direct writes, do not use journal */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL (1 << 12)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL (UINT32_C(1) << 12)
 /** dm-integrity: recovery mode - no journal, no integrity checks */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY (1 << 13)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY (UINT32_C(1) << 13)
 /** ignore persistently stored flags */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_PERSISTENT (1 << 14)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_PERSISTENT (UINT32_C(1) << 14)
 /** dm-verity: check_at_most_once - check data blocks only the first time */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE (1 << 15)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE (UINT32_C(1) << 15)
 /** allow activation check including unbound keyslots (keyslots without segments) */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY (1 << 16)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY (UINT32_C(1) << 16)
 /** dm-integrity: activate automatic recalculation */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE (1 << 17)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE (UINT32_C(1) << 17)
 /** reactivate existing and update flags, input only */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH	(1 << 18)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH	(UINT32_C(1) << 18)
 /** Use global lock to serialize memory hard KDF on activation (OOM workaround) */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF (1 << 19)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF (UINT32_C(1) << 19)
 /** dm-integrity: direct writes, use bitmap to track dirty sectors */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP (1 << 20)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP (UINT32_C(1) << 20)
 /** device is suspended (key should be wiped from memory), output only */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED (1 << 21)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED (UINT32_C(1) << 21)
 /** use IV sector counted in sector_size instead of default 512 bytes sectors */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS (1 << 22)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS (UINT32_C(1) << 22)
 /** dm-verity: panic_on_corruption flag - panic kernel on corruption */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION (1 << 23)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION (UINT32_C(1) << 23)
 /** dm-crypt: bypass internal workqueue and process read requests synchronously. */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE (1 << 24)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE (UINT32_C(1) << 24)
 /** dm-crypt: bypass internal workqueue and process write requests synchronously. */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE (1 << 25)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE (UINT32_C(1) << 25)
 /** dm-integrity: reset automatic recalculation */
-#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE_RESET (1 << 26)
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE_RESET (UINT32_C(1) << 26)
 
 /**
  * Active device runtime attributes
@@ -1172,11 +1230,11 @@ uint64_t crypt_get_active_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * LUKS2 header requirements
  */
 /** Unfinished offline reencryption */
-#define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT	(1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT	(UINT32_C(1) << 0)
 /** Online reencryption in-progress */
-#define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT	(1 << 1)
+#define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT	(UINT32_C(1) << 1)
 /** unknown requirement in header (output only) */
-#define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_UNKNOWN		(1 << 31)
+#define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_UNKNOWN		(UINT32_C(1) << 31)
 
 /**
  * Persistent flags type
@@ -1306,8 +1364,8 @@ int crypt_activate_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @note For VERITY the volume key means root hash required for activation.
  * 	 Because kernel dm-verity is always read only, you have to provide
  * 	 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY flag always.
- * @note For TCRYPT the volume key should be always NULL and because master
- * 	 key from decrypted header is used instead.
+ * @note For TCRYPT the volume key should be always NULL
+ * 	 the key from decrypted header is used instead.
  */
 int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *name,
@@ -1363,11 +1421,11 @@ int crypt_activate_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint32_t flags);
 
 /** lazy deactivation - remove once last user releases it */
-#define CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED (1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
 /** force deactivation - if the device is busy, it is replaced by error device */
-#define CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE    (1 << 1)
+#define CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE    (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
 /** if set, remove lazy deactivation */
-#define CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL (1 << 2)
+#define CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL (UINT32_C(1) << 2)
 
 /**
  * Deactivate crypt device. This function tries to remove active device-mapper
@@ -1429,6 +1487,10 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param volume_key_size size of @e volume_key
  *
  * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Negative EPERM return value means that passed volume_key
+ * 	 did not pass digest verification routine (not a valid volume
+ * 	 key).
  */
 int crypt_volume_key_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *volume_key,
@@ -1921,7 +1983,7 @@ int crypt_keyfile_read(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint32_t flags);
 
 /** Read key only to the first end of line (\\n). */
-#define CRYPT_KEYFILE_STOP_EOL   (1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_KEYFILE_STOP_EOL   (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
 /** @} */
 
 /**
@@ -1935,7 +1997,7 @@ int crypt_keyfile_read(struct crypt_device *cd,
 typedef enum {
 	CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,           /**< Fill with zeroes */
 	CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM,         /**< Use RNG to fill data */
-	CRYPT_WIPE_ENCRYPTED_ZERO, /**< Add encryption and fill with zeroes as plaintext */
+	CRYPT_WIPE_ENCRYPTED_ZERO, /**< Obsolete, same as CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM */
 	CRYPT_WIPE_SPECIAL,        /**< Compatibility only, do not use (Gutmann method) */
 } crypt_wipe_pattern;
 
@@ -1971,7 +2033,7 @@ int crypt_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
 );
 
 /** Use direct-io */
-#define CRYPT_WIPE_NO_DIRECT_IO (1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_WIPE_NO_DIRECT_IO (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
 /** @} */
 
 /**
@@ -2156,6 +2218,15 @@ int crypt_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param buffer returned allocated buffer with password
  * @param buffer_len length of the buffer
  * @param usrptr user data in @link crypt_activate_by_token @endlink
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success (token passed LUKS2 keyslot passphrase in buffer) or
+ *         negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Negative ENOANO errno means that token is PIN protected and caller should
+ *       use @link crypt_activate_by_token_pin @endlink with PIN provided.
+ *
+ * @note Negative EAGAIN errno means token handler requires additional hardware
+ *       not present in the system.
  */
 typedef int (*crypt_token_open_func) (
 	struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -2177,6 +2248,15 @@ typedef int (*crypt_token_open_func) (
  * @param buffer returned allocated buffer with password
  * @param buffer_len length of the buffer
  * @param usrptr user data in @link crypt_activate_by_token @endlink
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success (token passed LUKS2 keyslot passphrase in buffer) or
+ *         negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Negative ENOANO errno means that token is PIN protected and PIN was
+ *       missing or wrong.
+ *
+ * @note Negative EAGAIN errno means token handler requires additional hardware
+ *       not present in the system.
  */
 typedef int (*crypt_token_open_pin_func) (
 	struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -2267,15 +2347,20 @@ const char *crypt_token_external_path(void);
  */
 void crypt_token_external_disable(void);
 
-/** ABI version for external token in libcryptsetup-token-<name>.so */
+/** ABI version for external token in libcryptsetup-token-[name].so */
 #define CRYPT_TOKEN_ABI_VERSION1    "CRYPTSETUP_TOKEN_1.0"
 
-/** ABI exported symbol for external token */
-#define CRYPT_TOKEN_ABI_OPEN        "cryptsetup_token_open" /* mandatory */
+/** open by token - ABI exported symbol for external token (mandatory) */
+#define CRYPT_TOKEN_ABI_OPEN        "cryptsetup_token_open"
+/** open by token with PIN - ABI exported symbol for external token */
 #define CRYPT_TOKEN_ABI_OPEN_PIN    "cryptsetup_token_open_pin"
+/** deallocate callback - ABI exported symbol for external token */
 #define CRYPT_TOKEN_ABI_BUFFER_FREE "cryptsetup_token_buffer_free"
+/** validate token metadata - ABI exported symbol for external token */
 #define CRYPT_TOKEN_ABI_VALIDATE    "cryptsetup_token_validate"
+/** dump token metadata - ABI exported symbol for external token */
 #define CRYPT_TOKEN_ABI_DUMP        "cryptsetup_token_dump"
+/** token version - ABI exported symbol for external token */
 #define CRYPT_TOKEN_ABI_VERSION     "cryptsetup_token_version"
 
 /**
@@ -2293,10 +2378,19 @@ void crypt_token_external_disable(void);
  *       passphrase did not unlock any keyslot associated with the token.
  *
  * @note ENOENT errno means no token (or subsequently assigned keyslot) was
- * 	 eligible to unlock device.
+ *       eligible to unlock device.
  *
- * @note EAGAIN errno means that token is PIN protected and you should call
+ * @note ENOANO errno means that token is PIN protected and you should call
  *       @link crypt_activate_by_token_pin @endlink with PIN
+ *
+ * @note Negative EAGAIN errno means token handler requires additional hardware
+ *       not present in the system.
+ *
+ * @note with @e token set to CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN libcryptsetup runs best effort loop
+ *       to unlock device using any available token. It may happen that various token handlers
+ *       return different error codes. At the end loop returns error codes in the following
+ *       order (from the most significant to the least) any negative errno except those
+ *       listed below, non negative token id (success), -ENOANO, -EAGAIN, -EPERM, -ENOENT.
  */
 int crypt_activate_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *name,
@@ -2318,12 +2412,23 @@ int crypt_activate_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
  *
  * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
  *
- * @note EPERM errno means pin did not match or token provided passphrase
- *       successfully, but passphrase did not unlock any keyslot associated
- *       with the token.
+ * @note EPERM errno means token provided passphrase successfully, but
+ *       passphrase did not unlock any keyslot associated with the token.
  *
  * @note ENOENT errno means no token (or subsequently assigned keyslot) was
- * 	 eligible to unlock device.
+ *       eligible to unlock device.
+ *
+ * @note ENOANO errno means that token is PIN protected and was either missing
+ *       (NULL) or wrong.
+ *
+ * @note Negative EAGAIN errno means token handler requires additional hardware
+ *       not present in the system.
+ *
+ * @note with @e token set to CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN libcryptsetup runs best effort loop
+ *       to unlock device using any available token. It may happen that various token handlers
+ *       return different error codes. At the end loop returns error codes in the following
+ *       order (from the most significant to the least) any negative errno except those
+ *       listed below, non negative token id (success), -ENOANO, -EAGAIN, -EPERM, -ENOENT.
  */
 int crypt_activate_by_token_pin(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *name,
@@ -2345,13 +2450,16 @@ int crypt_activate_by_token_pin(struct crypt_device *cd,
  */
 
 /** Initialize reencryption metadata but do not run reencryption yet. (in) */
-#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INITIALIZE_ONLY    (1 << 0)
-/** Move the first segment, used only with data shift. (in/out) */
-#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_MOVE_FIRST_SEGMENT (1 << 1)
+#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INITIALIZE_ONLY    (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
+/** Move the first segment, used only with datashift resilience mode
+ *  and subvariants. (in/out) */
+#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_MOVE_FIRST_SEGMENT (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
 /** Resume already initialized reencryption only. (in) */
-#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_RESUME_ONLY        (1 << 2)
+#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_RESUME_ONLY        (UINT32_C(1) << 2)
 /** Run reencryption recovery only. (in) */
-#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_RECOVERY           (1 << 3)
+#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_RECOVERY           (UINT32_C(1) << 3)
+/** Reencryption requires metadata protection. (in/out) */
+#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_REPAIR_NEEDED      (UINT32_C(1) << 4)
 
 /**
  * Reencryption direction
@@ -2376,10 +2484,15 @@ typedef enum {
 struct crypt_params_reencrypt {
 	crypt_reencrypt_mode_info mode;           /**< Reencryption mode, immutable after first init. */
 	crypt_reencrypt_direction_info direction; /**< Reencryption direction, immutable after first init. */
-	const char *resilience;                   /**< Resilience mode: "none", "checksum", "journal" or "shift" (only "shift" is immutable after init) */
+	const char *resilience;                   /**< Resilience mode: "none", "checksum", "journal", "datashift",
+						       "datashift-checksum" or "datashift-journal".
+						       "datashift" mode is immutable, "datashift-" subvariant can be only
+						       changed to other "datashift-" subvariant */
 	const char *hash;                         /**< Used hash for "checksum" resilience type, ignored otherwise. */
-	uint64_t data_shift;                      /**< Used in "shift" mode, must be non-zero, immutable after first init. */
-	uint64_t max_hotzone_size;                /**< Exact hotzone size for "none" mode. Maximum hotzone size for "checksum" and "journal" modes. */
+	uint64_t data_shift;                      /**< Used in "datashift" mode (and subvariants), must be non-zero,
+						       immutable after first init. */
+	uint64_t max_hotzone_size;                /**< Maximum hotzone size (may be lowered by library). For "datashift-" subvariants
+						       it is used to set size of moved segment (decryption only). */
 	uint64_t device_size;			  /**< Reencrypt only initial part of the data device. */
 	const struct crypt_params_luks2 *luks2;   /**< LUKS2 parameters for the final reencryption volume.*/
 	uint32_t flags;                           /**< Reencryption flags. */
@@ -2443,6 +2556,21 @@ int crypt_reencrypt_init_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *cipher_mode,
 	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
 
+/**
+ * Legacy data reencryption function.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param progress is a callback function reporting device \b size,
+ * current \b offset of reencryption and provided \b usrptr identification
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @deprecated Use @link crypt_reencrypt_run @endlink instead.
+ */
+int crypt_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		    int (*progress)(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr))
+__attribute__((deprecated));
+
 /**
  * Run data reencryption.
  *
@@ -2453,7 +2581,7 @@ int crypt_reencrypt_init_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
  *
  * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
  */
-int crypt_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd,
+int crypt_reencrypt_run(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		    int (*progress)(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr),
 		    void *usrptr);
 

lib/libcryptsetup.sym

@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
 
 CRYPTSETUP_2.4 {
 	global:
-		crypt_reencrypt;
+		crypt_reencrypt_run;
 		crypt_token_max;
 		crypt_header_is_detached;
 		crypt_logf;
@@ -144,3 +144,10 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.4 {
 		crypt_token_external_disable;
 		crypt_token_external_path;
 } CRYPTSETUP_2.0;
+
+CRYPTSETUP_2.5 {
+	global:
+		crypt_get_label;
+		crypt_get_subsystem;
+		crypt_resume_by_token_pin;
+} CRYPTSETUP_2.4;

lib/libcryptsetup_macros.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
- * Definitions of common constant and generic macros fo libcryptsetup
+ * Definitions of common constant and generic macros of libcryptsetup
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -25,12 +25,17 @@
 /* to silent gcc -Wcast-qual for const cast */
 #define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
 
+/* to silent clang -Wcast-align when working with byte arrays */
+#define VOIDP_CAST(x) (x)(void*)
+
 #define UNUSED(x) (void)(x)
 
 #ifndef ARRAY_SIZE
 # define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
 #endif
 
+#define BITFIELD_SIZE(BF_PTR) (sizeof(*(BF_PTR)) * 8)
+
 #define MOVE_REF(x, y) \
 	do { \
 		__typeof__(x) *_px = &(x), *_py = &(y); \

lib/libcryptsetup_symver.h

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * Helpers for defining versioned symbols
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2021-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
  * It's supposed to be used only with symbols that are exported in at least
  * two versions simultaneously as follows:
  *
- * - the latest version is marked with _NEW variant and oll other compatible
+ * - the latest version is marked with _NEW variant and all other compatible
  *   symbols should be marked with _OLD variant
  *
  * Examples:
@@ -67,11 +67,9 @@
  *   under CRYPT_SYMBOL_EXPORT_OLD(int, crypt_func_X, ...) macro
  */
 
-#ifdef __has_attribute
-#  if __has_attribute(symver)
-#    define _CRYPT_SYMVER(_local_sym, _public_sym, _ver_str, _maj, _min)     \
-       __attribute__((__symver__(#_public_sym _ver_str #_maj "." #_min)))
-#  endif
+#if HAVE_ATTRIBUTE_SYMVER
+#  define _CRYPT_SYMVER(_local_sym, _public_sym, _ver_str, _maj, _min)     \
+     __attribute__((__symver__(#_public_sym _ver_str #_maj "." #_min)))
 #endif
 
 #if !defined(_CRYPT_SYMVER) && defined(__GNUC__)

lib/libdevmapper.c

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static bool _dm_ioctl_checked = false;
 static bool _dm_crypt_checked = false;
 static bool _dm_verity_checked = false;
 static bool _dm_integrity_checked = false;
+static bool _dm_zero_checked = false;
 
 static int _quiet_log = 0;
 static uint32_t _dm_flags = 0;
@@ -241,6 +242,20 @@ static void _dm_set_integrity_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	_dm_integrity_checked = true;
 }
 
+static void _dm_set_zero_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				unsigned zero_maj,
+				unsigned zero_min,
+				unsigned zero_patch)
+{
+	if (_dm_zero_checked || zero_maj == 0)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-zero version %i.%i.%i.",
+		zero_maj, zero_min, zero_patch);
+
+	_dm_zero_checked = true;
+}
+
 /* We use this for loading target module */
 static void _dm_check_target(dm_target_type target_type)
 {
@@ -278,11 +293,12 @@ static int _dm_check_versions(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target_typ
 	unsigned dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch;
 	int r = 0;
 
-	if ((target_type == DM_CRYPT	 && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
+	if ((target_type == DM_CRYPT     && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
 	    (target_type == DM_VERITY    && _dm_verity_checked) ||
 	    (target_type == DM_INTEGRITY && _dm_integrity_checked) ||
-	    (target_type == DM_LINEAR) || (target_type == DM_ZERO) ||
-	    (_dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked))
+	    (target_type == DM_ZERO      && _dm_zero_checked) ||
+	    (target_type == DM_LINEAR) ||
+	    (_dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked && _dm_zero_checked))
 		return 1;
 
 	/* Shut up DM while checking */
@@ -331,8 +347,12 @@ static int _dm_check_versions(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target_typ
 			_dm_set_integrity_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
 						 (unsigned)target->version[1],
 						 (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+		} else if (!strcmp(DM_ZERO_TARGET, target->name)) {
+			_dm_set_zero_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
+					    (unsigned)target->version[1],
+					    (unsigned)target->version[2]);
 		}
-		target = (struct dm_versions *)((char *) target + target->next);
+		target = VOIDP_CAST(struct dm_versions *)((char *) target + target->next);
 	} while (last_target != target);
 
 	r = 1;
@@ -355,13 +375,14 @@ int dm_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target, uint32_t *flags)
 	*flags = _dm_flags;
 
 	if (target == DM_UNKNOWN &&
-	    _dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked)
+	    _dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked && _dm_zero_checked)
 		return 0;
 
-	if ((target == DM_CRYPT	    && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
+	if ((target == DM_CRYPT     && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
 	    (target == DM_VERITY    && _dm_verity_checked) ||
 	    (target == DM_INTEGRITY && _dm_integrity_checked) ||
-	    (target == DM_LINEAR) || (target == DM_ZERO)) /* nothing to check */
+	    (target == DM_ZERO      && _dm_zero_checked) ||
+	    (target == DM_LINEAR)) /* nothing to check */
 		return 0;
 
 	return -ENODEV;
@@ -444,14 +465,6 @@ char *dm_device_name(const char *path)
 	return dm_device_path(NULL, major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev));
 }
 
-static void hex_key(char *hexkey, size_t key_size, const char *key)
-{
-	unsigned i;
-
-	for(i = 0; i < key_size; i++)
-		sprintf(&hexkey[i * 2], "%02x", (unsigned char)key[i]);
-}
-
 static size_t int_log10(uint64_t x)
 {
 	uint64_t r = 0;
@@ -655,24 +668,20 @@ static char *get_dm_crypt_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
 		null_cipher = 1;
 
 	if (null_cipher)
-		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(2);
+		hexkey = crypt_bytes_to_hex(0, NULL);
 	else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
 		keystr_len = strlen(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description) + int_log10(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength) + 10;
 		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(keystr_len);
-	} else
-		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength * 2 + 1);
-
-	if (!hexkey)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (null_cipher)
-		strncpy(hexkey, "-", 2);
-	else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+		if (!hexkey)
+			goto out;
 		r = snprintf(hexkey, keystr_len, ":%zu:logon:%s", tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
 		if (r < 0 || r >= keystr_len)
 			goto out;
 	} else
-		hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key);
+		hexkey = crypt_bytes_to_hex(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key);
+
+	if (!hexkey)
+		goto out;
 
 	max_size = strlen(hexkey) + strlen(cipher_dm) +
 		   strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
@@ -767,18 +776,13 @@ static char *get_dm_verity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
 	} else
 		*features = '\0';
 
-	hexroot = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size * 2 + 1);
+	hexroot = crypt_bytes_to_hex(tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size, tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
 	if (!hexroot)
 		goto out;
-	hex_key(hexroot, tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size, tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
 
-	hexsalt = crypt_safe_alloc(vp->salt_size ? vp->salt_size * 2 + 1 : 2);
+	hexsalt = crypt_bytes_to_hex(vp->salt_size, vp->salt);
 	if (!hexsalt)
 		goto out;
-	if (vp->salt_size)
-		hex_key(hexsalt, vp->salt_size, vp->salt);
-	else
-		strncpy(hexsalt, "-", 2);
 
 	max_size = strlen(hexroot) + strlen(hexsalt) +
 		   strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
@@ -843,10 +847,9 @@ static char *get_dm_integrity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags
 		num_options++;
 
 		if (tgt->u.integrity.vk) {
-			hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength * 2 + 1);
+			hexkey = crypt_bytes_to_hex(tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength, tgt->u.integrity.vk->key);
 			if (!hexkey)
 				goto out;
-			hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength, tgt->u.integrity.vk->key);
 		} else
 			hexkey = NULL;
 
@@ -861,11 +864,10 @@ static char *get_dm_integrity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags
 		num_options++;
 
 		if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key) {
-			hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength * 2 + 1);
+			hexkey = crypt_bytes_to_hex( tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength,
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->key);
 			if (!hexkey)
 				goto out;
-			hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength,
-				tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->key);
 		} else
 			hexkey = NULL;
 
@@ -880,11 +882,10 @@ static char *get_dm_integrity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags
 		num_options++;
 
 		if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key) {
-			hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength * 2 + 1);
+			hexkey = crypt_bytes_to_hex(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength,
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->key);
 			if (!hexkey)
 				goto out;
-			hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength,
-				tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->key);
 		} else
 			hexkey = NULL;
 
@@ -980,7 +981,7 @@ out:
 	return params_out;
 }
 
-static char *get_dm_linear_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags __attribute__((unused)))
+static char *get_dm_linear_params(const struct dm_target *tgt)
 {
 	char *params;
 	int r;
@@ -1001,7 +1002,7 @@ static char *get_dm_linear_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags __
 	return params;
 }
 
-static char *get_dm_zero_params(const struct dm_target *tgt __attribute__((unused)), uint32_t flags __attribute__((unused)))
+static char *get_dm_zero_params(void)
 {
 	char *params = crypt_safe_alloc(1);
 	if (!params)
@@ -1243,7 +1244,7 @@ static int dm_prepare_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char
 
 int lookup_dm_dev_by_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid, const char *type)
 {
-	int r;
+	int r_udev, r;
 	char *c;
 	char dev_uuid[DM_UUID_LEN + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN] = DM_BY_ID_PREFIX;
 
@@ -1257,13 +1258,15 @@ int lookup_dm_dev_by_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid, const char
 	/* cut of dm name */
 	*c = '\0';
 
+	/* Either udev or sysfs can report that device is active. */
 	r = lookup_by_disk_id(dev_uuid);
-	if (r == -ENOENT) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Search by disk id not available. Using sysfs instead.");
-		r = lookup_by_sysfs_uuid_field(dev_uuid + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN);
-	}
+	if (r > 0)
+		return r;
 
-	return r;
+	r_udev = r;
+	r = lookup_by_sysfs_uuid_field(dev_uuid + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN);
+
+	return r == -ENOENT ? r_udev : r;
 }
 
 static int _add_dm_targets(struct dm_task *dmt, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
@@ -1325,9 +1328,9 @@ static int _create_dm_targets_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
 		else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
 			tgt->params = get_dm_integrity_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
 		else if (tgt->type == DM_LINEAR)
-			tgt->params = get_dm_linear_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+			tgt->params = get_dm_linear_params(tgt);
 		else if (tgt->type == DM_ZERO)
-			tgt->params = get_dm_zero_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+			tgt->params = get_dm_zero_params();
 		else {
 			r = -ENOTSUP;
 			goto err;
@@ -1346,12 +1349,6 @@ err:
 	return r;
 }
 
-static bool dm_device_exists(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
-{
-	int r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
-	return (r >= 0 || r == -EEXIST);
-}
-
 static int _dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *type,
 			     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
 {
@@ -1402,8 +1399,11 @@ static int _dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const ch
 		goto out;
 
 	if (!dm_task_run(dmt)) {
-		if (dm_device_exists(cd, name))
+		r = dm_status_device(cd, name);;
+		if (r >= 0)
 			r = -EEXIST;
+		if (r != -EEXIST && r != -ENODEV)
+			r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -1576,6 +1576,9 @@ static void _dm_target_free_query_path(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target
 
 static void _dm_target_erase(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
 {
+	if (tgt->direction == TARGET_EMPTY)
+		return;
+
 	if (tgt->direction == TARGET_QUERY)
 		_dm_target_free_query_path(cd, tgt);
 
@@ -2303,16 +2306,16 @@ static int _dm_target_query_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
 				str = strsep(&params, " ");
 				if (!str)
 					goto err;
-				if (!root_hash_sig_key_desc) {
+				if (vp && !root_hash_sig_key_desc) {
 					root_hash_sig_key_desc = strdup(str);
 					if (!root_hash_sig_key_desc) {
 						r = -ENOMEM;
 						goto err;
 					}
+					/* not stored in params, but cannot be used without vp */
+					vp->flags |= CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE;
 				}
 				i++;
-				if (vp)
-					vp->flags |= CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE;
 			} else /* unknown option */
 				goto err;
 		}
@@ -2370,6 +2373,8 @@ static int _dm_target_query_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct device *data_device = NULL, *meta_device = NULL;
 	char *integrity = NULL, *journal_crypt = NULL, *journal_integrity = NULL;
 	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	struct volume_key *journal_integrity_key = NULL;
+	struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key = NULL;
 
 	tgt->type = DM_INTEGRITY;
 	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
@@ -2499,6 +2504,28 @@ static int _dm_target_query_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
 						goto err;
 					}
 				}
+
+				if (str) {
+					len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 1);
+					if (len < 0) {
+						r = len;
+						goto err;
+					}
+
+					r = 0;
+					if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY) {
+						journal_crypt_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, str2);
+						if (!journal_crypt_key)
+							r = -ENOMEM;
+					} else if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEYSIZE) {
+						journal_crypt_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, NULL);
+						if (!journal_crypt_key)
+							r = -ENOMEM;
+					}
+					crypt_safe_free(str2);
+					if (r < 0)
+						goto err;
+				}
 			} else if (!strncmp(arg, "journal_mac:", 12) && !journal_integrity) {
 				str = &arg[12];
 				arg = strsep(&str, ":");
@@ -2509,6 +2536,28 @@ static int _dm_target_query_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
 						goto err;
 					}
 				}
+
+				if (str) {
+					len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 1);
+					if (len < 0) {
+						r = len;
+						goto err;
+					}
+
+					r = 0;
+					if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEY) {
+						journal_integrity_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, str2);
+						if (!journal_integrity_key)
+							r = -ENOMEM;
+					} else if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEYSIZE) {
+						journal_integrity_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, NULL);
+						if (!journal_integrity_key)
+							r = -ENOMEM;
+					}
+					crypt_safe_free(str2);
+					if (r < 0)
+						goto err;
+				}
 			} else if (!strcmp(arg, "recalculate")) {
 				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
 			} else if (!strcmp(arg, "reset_recalculate")) {
@@ -2544,6 +2593,10 @@ static int _dm_target_query_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
 	if (vk)
 		tgt->u.integrity.vk = vk;
+	if (journal_integrity_key)
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key = journal_integrity_key;
+	if (journal_crypt_key)
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
 	return 0;
 err:
 	device_free(cd, data_device);
@@ -2552,6 +2605,8 @@ err:
 	free(journal_crypt);
 	free(journal_integrity);
 	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(journal_integrity_key);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(journal_crypt_key);
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -2595,7 +2650,7 @@ err:
 	return r;
 }
 
-static int _dm_target_query_error(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), struct dm_target *tgt)
+static int _dm_target_query_error(struct dm_target *tgt)
 {
 	tgt->type = DM_ERROR;
 	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
@@ -2603,7 +2658,7 @@ static int _dm_target_query_error(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int _dm_target_query_zero(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), struct dm_target *tgt)
+static int _dm_target_query_zero(struct dm_target *tgt)
 {
 	tgt->type = DM_ZERO;
 	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
@@ -2631,9 +2686,9 @@ static int dm_target_query(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt, const
 	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_LINEAR_TARGET))
 		r = _dm_target_query_linear(cd, tgt, get_flags, params);
 	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_ERROR_TARGET))
-		r = _dm_target_query_error(cd, tgt);
+		r = _dm_target_query_error(tgt);
 	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_ZERO_TARGET))
-		r = _dm_target_query_zero(cd, tgt);
+		r = _dm_target_query_zero(tgt);
 
 	if (!r) {
 		tgt->offset = *start;
@@ -2948,7 +3003,7 @@ int dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 {
 	uint32_t dmt_flags;
 	int msg_size;
-	char *msg = NULL;
+	char *msg = NULL, *key = NULL;
 	int r = -ENOTSUP;
 
 	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_CRYPT) || dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags))
@@ -2970,14 +3025,21 @@ int dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	strcpy(msg, "key set ");
-	if (!vk->keylength)
-		snprintf(msg + 8, msg_size - 8, "-");
-	else if (vk->key_description)
-		snprintf(msg + 8, msg_size - 8, ":%zu:logon:%s", vk->keylength, vk->key_description);
-	else
-		hex_key(&msg[8], vk->keylength, vk->key);
+	if (vk->key_description) {
+		r = snprintf(msg, msg_size, "key set :%zu:logon:%s", vk->keylength, vk->key_description);
+	} else  {
+		key = crypt_bytes_to_hex(vk->keylength, vk->key);
+		if (!key) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
 
+		r = snprintf(msg, msg_size, "key set %s", key);
+	}
+	if (r < 0 || r >= msg_size) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	if (!_dm_message(name, msg) ||
 	    _dm_resume_device(name, 0)) {
 		r = -EINVAL;
@@ -2986,6 +3048,7 @@ int dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 	r = 0;
 out:
 	crypt_safe_free(msg);
+	crypt_safe_free(key);
 	dm_exit_context();
 	return r;
 }

lib/loopaes/loopaes.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * loop-AES compatible volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

lib/loopaes/loopaes.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * loop-AES compatible volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

lib/luks1/af.c

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
  * therefore supporting secure data destruction.
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ out:
 	return r;
 }
 
-int AF_merge(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)), const char *src, char *dst,
+int AF_merge(const char *src, char *dst,
 	     size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ int AF_merge(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)), const char *src,
 	if (!bufblock)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	for(i = 0; i < blocknumbers - 1; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < blocknumbers - 1; i++) {
 		XORblock(src + blocksize * i, bufblock, bufblock, blocksize);
 		r = diffuse(bufblock, bufblock, blocksize, hash);
 		if (r < 0)

lib/luks1/af.h

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
  * therefore supporting secure data destruction.
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct volume_key;
 
 int AF_split(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *src, char *dst,
 	     size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
-int AF_merge(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize,
+int AF_merge(const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize,
 	     unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
 size_t AF_split_sectors(size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers);
 

lib/luks1/keyencryption.c

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

lib/luks1/keymanage.c

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2013-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -65,6 +65,27 @@ static void LUKS_sort_keyslots(const struct luks_phdr *hdr, int *array)
 	}
 }
 
+static int _is_not_lower(char *str, unsigned max_len)
+{
+	for(; *str && max_len; str++, max_len--)
+		if (isupper(*str))
+			return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _to_lower(char *str, unsigned max_len)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	for(; *str && max_len; str++, max_len--)
+		if (isupper(*str)) {
+			*str = tolower(*str);
+			r = 1;
+		}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
 size_t LUKS_device_sectors(const struct luks_phdr *hdr)
 {
 	int sorted_areas[LUKS_NUMKEYS] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 };
@@ -378,13 +399,37 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	/*
 	 * cryptsetup 1.0 did not align keyslots to 4k, cannot repair this one
 	 * Also we cannot trust possibly broken keyslots metadata here through LUKS_keyslots_offset().
-	 * Expect first keyslot is aligned, if not, then manual repair is neccessary.
+	 * Expect first keyslot is aligned, if not, then manual repair is necessary.
 	 */
 	if (phdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset < (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * ECB mode does not use IV but legacy dmcrypt silently allows it.
+	 * Today device cannot be activated anyway, so we need to fix it here.
+	 */
+	if (!strncmp(phdr->cipherMode, "ecb-", 4)) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cipher mode repaired (%s -> %s)."), phdr->cipherMode, "ecb");
+		memset(phdr->cipherMode, 0, LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L);
+		strcpy(phdr->cipherMode, "ecb");
+		need_write = 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Old cryptsetup expects "sha1", gcrypt allows case insensitive names,
+	 * so always convert hash to lower case in header
+	 */
+	if (_to_lower(phdr->hashSpec, LUKS_HASHSPEC_L)) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cipher hash repaired to lowercase (%s)."), phdr->hashSpec);
+		if (crypt_hmac_size(phdr->hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) {
+			log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."), phdr->hashSpec);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		need_write = 1;
+	}
+
 	r = LUKS_check_cipher(ctx, phdr->keyBytes, phdr->cipherName, phdr->cipherMode);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -486,7 +531,7 @@ static int _check_and_convert_hdr(const char *device,
 	hdr->hashSpec[LUKS_HASHSPEC_L - 1] = '\0';
 	if (crypt_hmac_size(hdr->hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported."), hdr->hashSpec);
-		return -EINVAL;
+		r = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	/* Header detected */
@@ -510,6 +555,16 @@ static int _check_and_convert_hdr(const char *device,
 	hdr->uuid[UUID_STRING_L - 1] = '\0';
 
 	if (repair) {
+		if (!strncmp(hdr->cipherMode, "ecb-", 4)) {
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS cipher mode %s is invalid."), hdr->cipherMode);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (_is_not_lower(hdr->hashSpec, LUKS_HASHSPEC_L)) {
+			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS hash %s is invalid."), hdr->hashSpec);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		if (r == -EINVAL)
 			r = _keyslot_repair(hdr, ctx);
 		else
@@ -519,27 +574,6 @@ static int _check_and_convert_hdr(const char *device,
 	return r;
 }
 
-static void _to_lower(char *str, unsigned max_len)
-{
-	for(; *str && max_len; str++, max_len--)
-		if (isupper(*str))
-			*str = tolower(*str);
-}
-
-static void LUKS_fix_header_compatible(struct luks_phdr *header)
-{
-	/* Old cryptsetup expects "sha1", gcrypt allows case insensitive names,
-	 * so always convert hash to lower case in header */
-	_to_lower(header->hashSpec, LUKS_HASHSPEC_L);
-
-	/* ECB mode does not use IV but dmcrypt silently allows it.
-	 * Drop any IV here if ECB is used (that is not secure anyway).*/
-	if (!strncmp(header->cipherMode, "ecb-", 4)) {
-		memset(header->cipherMode, 0, LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L);
-		strcpy(header->cipherMode, "ecb");
-	}
-}
-
 int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(const char *backup_file,
 			  struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 			  int require_luks_device,
@@ -559,11 +593,9 @@ int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(const char *backup_file,
 
 	if (read_buffer(devfd, hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
 		r = -EIO;
-	else {
-		LUKS_fix_header_compatible(hdr);
+	else
 		r = _check_and_convert_hdr(backup_file, hdr,
 					   require_luks_device, 0, ctx);
-	}
 
 	close(devfd);
 	return r;
@@ -771,11 +803,10 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 	strncpy(header->cipherName,cipherName,LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1);
 	strncpy(header->cipherMode,cipherMode,LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1);
 	strncpy(header->hashSpec,hashSpec,LUKS_HASHSPEC_L-1);
+	_to_lower(header->hashSpec, LUKS_HASHSPEC_L);
 
 	header->keyBytes=vk->keylength;
 
-	LUKS_fix_header_compatible(header);
-
 	log_dbg(ctx, "Generating LUKS header version %d using hash %s, %s, %s, MK %d bytes",
 		header->version, header->hashSpec ,header->cipherName, header->cipherMode,
 		header->keyBytes);
@@ -786,7 +817,7 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	/* Compute master key digest */
+	/* Compute volume key digest */
 	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf(ctx);
 	r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(ctx, pbkdf, vk->keylength);
 	if (r < 0)
@@ -895,7 +926,7 @@ int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 		goto out;
 
 	/*
-	 * AF splitting, the masterkey stored in vk->key is split to AfKey
+	 * AF splitting, the volume key stored in vk->key is split to AfKey
 	 */
 	assert(vk->keylength == hdr->keyBytes);
 	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes) * SECTOR_SIZE;
@@ -951,7 +982,7 @@ int LUKS_verify_volume_key(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 			hdr->mkDigestIterations, 0, 0) < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (memcmp(checkHashBuf, hdr->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE))
+	if (crypt_backend_memeq(checkHashBuf, hdr->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1013,7 +1044,7 @@ static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	r = AF_merge(ctx, AfKey, (*vk)->key, (*vk)->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes, hdr->hashSpec);
+	r = AF_merge(AfKey, (*vk)->key, (*vk)->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes, hdr->hashSpec);
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
 

lib/luks1/luks.h

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License

lib/luks2/luks2.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -62,8 +62,16 @@
 /* 1 GiB */
 #define LUKS2_REENCRYPT_MAX_HOTZONE_LENGTH 0x40000000
 
+/* supported reencryption requirement versions */
+#define LUKS2_REENCRYPT_REQ_VERSION         UINT8_C(2)
+#define LUKS2_DECRYPT_DATASHIFT_REQ_VERSION UINT8_C(3)
+
+/* see reencrypt_assembly_verification_data() in luks2_reencrypt_digest.c */
+/*	LUKS2_REENCRYPT_MAX_VERSION         UINT8_C(207) */
+
 struct device;
 struct luks2_reencrypt;
+struct reenc_protection;
 struct crypt_lock_handle;
 struct crypt_dm_active_device;
 struct luks_phdr; /* LUKS1 for conversion */
@@ -217,9 +225,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
 	int wipe_area_only);
 
-crypt_keyslot_priority LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	int keyslot);
+crypt_keyslot_priority LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
 
 int LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
@@ -235,8 +241,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_swap(struct crypt_device *cd,
 /*
  * Generic LUKS2 token
  */
-int LUKS2_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+int LUKS2_token_json_get(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int token,
 	const char **json);
 
@@ -247,8 +252,7 @@ int LUKS2_token_assign(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int assign,
 	int commit);
 
-int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
 	int token);
 
@@ -279,8 +283,17 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint32_t flags,
 	void *usrptr);
 
-int LUKS2_token_keyring_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+int LUKS2_token_unlock_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *type,
+	const char *pin,
+	size_t pin_size,
+	uint32_t flags,
+	void *usrptr,
+	struct volume_key **vk);
+
+int LUKS2_token_keyring_get(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int token,
 	struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *keyring_params);
 
@@ -372,7 +385,7 @@ int LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 uint64_t LUKS2_get_data_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
 int LUKS2_get_data_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint64_t *size, bool *dynamic);
-int LUKS2_get_sector_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+uint32_t LUKS2_get_sector_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
 const char *LUKS2_get_cipher(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
 const char *LUKS2_get_integrity(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
 int LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
@@ -400,6 +413,11 @@ int LUKS2_config_set_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint3
  */
 int LUKS2_config_get_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t *reqs);
 int LUKS2_config_set_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs, bool commit);
+int LUKS2_config_set_requirement_version(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t req_id, uint8_t req_version, bool commit);
+
+int LUKS2_config_get_reencrypt_version(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint8_t *version);
+
+bool LUKS2_reencrypt_requirement_candidate(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
 
 int LUKS2_unmet_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs_mask, int quiet);
 
@@ -408,7 +426,7 @@ int LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
 int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int keyslot);
 int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
-		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int digest);
+		struct volume_key *vk, int digest);
 
 int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			 struct luks_phdr *hdr1,
@@ -425,7 +443,6 @@ int LUKS2_reencrypt_locked_recovery_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot_new,
 	const char *passphrase,
 	size_t passphrase_size,
-	uint32_t flags,
 	struct volume_key **vks);
 
 void LUKS2_reencrypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -453,4 +470,16 @@ int LUKS2_reencrypt_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	bool activation,
 	bool dynamic);
 
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vks);
+
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_max_hotzone_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const struct reenc_protection *rp,
+	int reencrypt_keyslot,
+	uint64_t *r_length);
+
+void LUKS2_reencrypt_protection_erase(struct reenc_protection *rp);
+
 #endif

lib/luks2/luks2_digest.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, digest handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ int LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
 }
 
 int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr __attribute__((unused)),
 	int digest,
 	const struct volume_key *vk)
 {
@@ -144,7 +143,7 @@ int LUKS2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	log_dbg(cd, "Verifying key from keyslot %d, digest %d.", keyslot, digest);
 
-	return LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, digest, vk);
+	return LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, digest, vk);
 }
 
 int LUKS2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
@@ -164,7 +163,7 @@ int LUKS2_digest_any_matching(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int digest;
 
 	for (digest = 0; digest < LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX; digest++)
-		if (LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, digest, vk) == digest)
+		if (LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, digest, vk) == digest)
 			return digest;
 
 	return -ENOENT;
@@ -175,7 +174,7 @@ int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int segment,
 	const struct volume_key *vk)
 {
-	return LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, segment), vk);
+	return LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, segment), vk);
 }
 
 /* FIXME: segment can have more digests */
@@ -259,8 +258,7 @@ int LUKS2_digest_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
 }
 
-static int assign_all_segments(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)),
-			       struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int digest, int assign)
+static int assign_all_segments(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int digest, int assign)
 {
 	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_digest, *jobj_digest_segments;
 
@@ -336,7 +334,7 @@ int LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
 			UNUSED(val);
 			if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
-				r = assign_all_segments(cd, hdr, atoi(key), assign);
+				r = assign_all_segments(hdr, atoi(key), assign);
 			else
 				r = assign_one_segment(cd, hdr, segment, atoi(key), assign);
 			if (r < 0)
@@ -344,7 +342,7 @@ int LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 		}
 	} else {
 		if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
-			r = assign_all_segments(cd, hdr, digest, assign);
+			r = assign_all_segments(hdr, digest, assign);
 		else
 			r = assign_one_segment(cd, hdr, segment, digest, assign);
 	}
@@ -443,7 +441,7 @@ int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
 }
 
 int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
-		struct luks2_hdr *hdr __attribute__((unused)), struct volume_key *vk, int digest)
+		struct volume_key *vk, int digest)
 {
 	char *desc = get_key_description_by_digest(cd, digest);
 	int r;

lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, PBKDF2 digest handler (LUKS1 compatible)
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ static int PBKDF2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	char checkHashBuf[64];
 	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj1;
 	const char *hashSpec;
-	char *mkDigest = NULL, mkDigestSalt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
+	char *mkDigest = NULL, *mkDigestSalt = NULL;
 	unsigned int mkDigestIterations;
 	size_t len;
-	int r;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
 
 	/* This can be done only for internally linked digests */
 	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), digest);
@@ -53,25 +53,23 @@ static int PBKDF2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "salt", &jobj1))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	len = sizeof(mkDigestSalt);
-	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
-			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), mkDigestSalt, &len))
-		return -EINVAL;
+	r = crypt_base64_decode(&mkDigestSalt, &len, json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+				json_object_get_string_len(jobj1));
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
 	if (len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
-		return -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "digest", &jobj1))
-		return -EINVAL;
-	len = 0;
-	if (!base64_decode_alloc(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
-			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), &mkDigest, &len))
-		return -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	r = crypt_base64_decode(&mkDigest, &len, json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+				json_object_get_string_len(jobj1));
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
 	if (len < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE ||
 	    len > sizeof(checkHashBuf) ||
-	    (len != LUKS_DIGESTSIZE && len != (size_t)crypt_hash_size(hashSpec))) {
-		free(mkDigest);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	    (len != LUKS_DIGESTSIZE && len != (size_t)crypt_hash_size(hashSpec)))
+		goto out;
 
 	r = -EPERM;
 	if (crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, hashSpec, volume_key, volume_key_len,
@@ -80,11 +78,12 @@ static int PBKDF2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			mkDigestIterations, 0, 0) < 0) {
 		r = -EINVAL;
 	} else {
-		if (memcmp(checkHashBuf, mkDigest, len) == 0)
+		if (crypt_backend_memeq(checkHashBuf, mkDigest, len) == 0)
 			r = 0;
 	}
-
+out:
 	free(mkDigest);
+	free(mkDigestSalt);
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -154,18 +153,18 @@ static int PBKDF2_digest_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "hash", json_object_new_string(pbkdf.hash));
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "iterations", json_object_new_int(pbkdf.iterations));
 
-	base64_encode_alloc(salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &base64_str);
-	if (!base64_str) {
+	r = crypt_base64_encode(&base64_str, NULL, salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+	if (r < 0) {
 		json_object_put(jobj_digest);
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		return r;
 	}
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "salt", json_object_new_string(base64_str));
 	free(base64_str);
 
-	base64_encode_alloc(digest_raw, hmac_size, &base64_str);
-	if (!base64_str) {
+	r = crypt_base64_encode(&base64_str, NULL, digest_raw, hmac_size);
+	if (r < 0) {
 		json_object_put(jobj_digest);
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		return r;
 	}
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "digest", json_object_new_string(base64_str));
 	free(base64_str);

lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ static void log_dbg_checksum(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < crypt_hash_size(csum_alg); i++)
-		snprintf(&csum_txt[i*2], 3, "%02hhx", (const char)csum[i]);
-	csum_txt[i*2+1] = '\0'; /* Just to be safe, sprintf should write \0 there. */
+		if (snprintf(&csum_txt[i*2], 3, "%02hhx", (const char)csum[i]) != 2)
+			return;
 
 	log_dbg(cd, "Checksum:%s (%s)", &csum_txt[0], info);
 }
@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct crypt_device *cd,
 				     size_t *hdr_json_size, int secondary,
 				     uint64_t offset)
 {
+	uint64_t hdr_size;
+
 	if (memcmp(hdr->magic, secondary ? LUKS2_MAGIC_2ND : LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -204,24 +206,31 @@ static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	}
 
 	if (offset != be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_offset)) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04x on device differs to expected offset 0x%04x.",
-			(unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_offset), (unsigned)offset);
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04" PRIx64 " on device differs to expected offset 0x%04" PRIx64 ".",
+			be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_offset), offset);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (secondary && (offset != be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size))) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04x in secondary header does not match size 0x%04x.",
-			(unsigned)offset, (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size));
+	hdr_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size);
+
+	if (hdr_size < LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN || hdr_size > LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header has bogus size 0x%04" PRIx64 ".", hdr_size);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (secondary && (offset != hdr_size)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04" PRIx64 " in secondary header does not match size 0x%04" PRIx64 ".",
+			offset, hdr_size);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	/* FIXME: sanity check checksum alg. */
 
-	log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header version %u of size %u bytes, checksum %s.",
-		(unsigned)be16_to_cpu(hdr->version), (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size),
+	log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header version %u of size %" PRIu64 " bytes, checksum %s.",
+		be16_to_cpu(hdr->version), hdr_size,
 		hdr->checksum_alg);
 
-	*hdr_json_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+	*hdr_json_size = hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -252,18 +261,19 @@ static int hdr_read_disk(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * hdr_json_size is validated if this call succeeds
+	 */
 	r = hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(cd, hdr_disk, &hdr_json_size, secondary, offset);
-	if (r < 0) {
+	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Allocate and read JSON area. Always the whole area must be read.
 	 */
 	*json_area = malloc(hdr_json_size);
-	if (!*json_area) {
+	if (!*json_area)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
 
 	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 				 device_alignment(device), *json_area, hdr_json_size,
@@ -279,6 +289,8 @@ static int hdr_read_disk(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (hdr_checksum_check(cd, hdr_disk->checksum_alg, hdr_disk,
 				*json_area, hdr_json_size)) {
 		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header checksum error (offset %" PRIu64 ").", offset);
+		free(*json_area);
+		*json_area = NULL;
 		r = -EINVAL;
 	}
 	memset(hdr_disk->csum, 0, LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L);
@@ -695,7 +707,7 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 			memcpy(&hdr_disk2, &hdr_disk1, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
 			r = crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr_disk2.salt, sizeof(hdr_disk2.salt), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
 			if (r)
-				log_dbg(cd, "Cannot generate master salt.");
+				log_dbg(cd, "Cannot generate header salt.");
 			else {
 				hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk1, &hdr_disk2, hdr, 0);
 				r = hdr_write_disk(cd, device, hdr, json_area1, 1);
@@ -716,7 +728,7 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 			memcpy(&hdr_disk1, &hdr_disk2, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
 			r = crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr_disk1.salt, sizeof(hdr_disk1.salt), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
 			if (r)
-				log_dbg(cd, "Cannot generate master salt.");
+				log_dbg(cd, "Cannot generate header salt.");
 			else {
 				hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk2, &hdr_disk1, hdr, 1);
 				r = hdr_write_disk(cd, device, hdr, json_area2, 0);

lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include <json-c/json.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
-#include "base64.h"
 #include "luks2.h"
 
 /* override useless forward slash escape when supported by json-c */
@@ -73,9 +72,11 @@ void JSON_DBG(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj, const char *desc);
  */
 
 /* validation helper */
-json_bool validate_json_uint32(json_object *jobj);
+bool validate_json_uint32(json_object *jobj);
 json_object *json_contains(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj, const char *name,
 			   const char *section, const char *key, json_type type);
+json_object *json_contains_string(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj,
+				  const char *name, const char *section, const char *key);
 
 int LUKS2_hdr_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj, uint64_t json_size);
 int LUKS2_check_json_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
@@ -116,14 +117,13 @@ typedef int (*keyslot_store_func)(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot,
 typedef int (*keyslot_wipe_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
 typedef int (*keyslot_dump_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
 typedef int (*keyslot_validate_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot);
-typedef void(*keyslot_repair_func) (struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot);
+typedef void(*keyslot_repair_func) (json_object *jobj_keyslot);
 
 /* see LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1 */
 int placeholder_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
 	uint64_t area_offset,
-	uint64_t area_length,
-	size_t volume_key_len);
+	uint64_t area_length);
 
 /* validate all keyslot implementations in hdr json */
 int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj);
@@ -140,11 +140,28 @@ typedef struct  {
 	keyslot_repair_func repair;
 } keyslot_handler;
 
-/* can not fit prototype alloc function */
-int reenc_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	int keyslot,
-	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
+struct reenc_protection {
+	enum { REENC_PROTECTION_NOT_SET = 0,
+	       REENC_PROTECTION_NONE,
+	       REENC_PROTECTION_CHECKSUM,
+	       REENC_PROTECTION_JOURNAL,
+	       REENC_PROTECTION_DATASHIFT } type;
+
+	union {
+	struct {
+		char hash[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L];
+		struct crypt_hash *ch;
+		size_t hash_size;
+		/* buffer for checksums */
+		void *checksums;
+		size_t checksums_len;
+		size_t block_size;
+	} csum;
+	struct {
+		uint64_t data_shift;
+	} ds;
+	} p;
+};
 
 /**
  * LUKS2 digest handlers (EXPERIMENTAL)
@@ -234,21 +251,48 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const void *buffer,
 	size_t buffer_length);
 
-int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_allocate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
-	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+	size_t alignment);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_update_needed(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+	size_t alignment);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+	size_t alignment,
+	struct volume_key *vks);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	struct reenc_protection *rp,
+	bool primary);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	uint8_t version,
+	struct volume_key *vks);
 
 int LUKS2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot);
 
+int LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(json_object *jobj_keyslot, uint64_t *offset, uint64_t *length);
+
 /* JSON helpers */
 uint64_t json_segment_get_offset(json_object *jobj_segment, unsigned blockwise);
 const char *json_segment_type(json_object *jobj_segment);
 uint64_t json_segment_get_iv_offset(json_object *jobj_segment);
 uint64_t json_segment_get_size(json_object *jobj_segment, unsigned blockwise);
 const char *json_segment_get_cipher(json_object *jobj_segment);
-int json_segment_get_sector_size(json_object *jobj_segment);
+uint32_t json_segment_get_sector_size(json_object *jobj_segment);
 bool json_segment_is_backup(json_object *jobj_segment);
 json_object *json_segments_get_segment(json_object *jobj_segments, int segment);
 unsigned json_segments_count(json_object *jobj_segments);
@@ -257,6 +301,8 @@ uint64_t json_segments_get_minimal_offset(json_object *jobj_segments, unsigned b
 json_object *json_segment_create_linear(uint64_t offset, const uint64_t *length, unsigned reencryption);
 json_object *json_segment_create_crypt(uint64_t offset, uint64_t iv_offset, const uint64_t *length, const char *cipher, uint32_t sector_size, unsigned reencryption);
 int json_segments_segment_in_reencrypt(json_object *jobj_segments);
+bool json_segment_cmp(json_object *jobj_segment_1, json_object *jobj_segment_2);
+bool json_segment_contains_flag(json_object *jobj_segment, const char *flag_str, size_t len);
 
 int LUKS2_assembly_multisegment_dmd(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
@@ -310,7 +356,6 @@ int LUKS2_reencrypt_data_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, bool blockwise);
  * Generic LUKS2 digest
  */
 int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int digest,
 	const struct volume_key *vk);
 
@@ -336,8 +381,6 @@ int LUKS2_reload(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 int LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment);
 int LUKS2_find_keyslot(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type);
-int LUKS2_set_keyslots_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	uint64_t data_offset);
+int LUKS2_set_keyslots_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint64_t data_offset);
 
 #endif

lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS2 header format code
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -383,9 +383,7 @@ int LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(struct crypt_device *cd,
 				 offset, length, wipe_block, NULL, NULL);
 }
 
-int LUKS2_set_keyslots_size(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)),
-		struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-		uint64_t data_offset)
+int LUKS2_set_keyslots_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint64_t data_offset)
 {
 	json_object *jobj_config;
 	uint64_t keyslots_size;

lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, keyslot handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -27,12 +27,14 @@ extern const keyslot_handler reenc_keyslot;
 
 static const keyslot_handler *keyslot_handlers[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX] = {
 	&luks2_keyslot,
+#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
 	&reenc_keyslot,
+#endif
 	NULL
 };
 
 static const keyslot_handler
-*LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), const char *type)
+*LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(const char *type)
 {
 	int i;
 
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ static const keyslot_handler
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj1, "type", &jobj2))
 		return NULL;
 
-	return LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj2));
+	return LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(json_object_get_string(jobj2));
 }
 
 int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, size_t keylength)
@@ -288,19 +290,9 @@ crypt_keyslot_info LUKS2_keyslot_info(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
 	return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE;
 }
 
-int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	int keyslot,
-	uint64_t *offset,
-	uint64_t *length)
+int LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(json_object *jobj_keyslot, uint64_t *offset, uint64_t *length)
 {
-	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj;
-
-	if(LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
-	if (!jobj_keyslot)
-		return -ENOENT;
+	json_object *jobj_area, *jobj;
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -316,6 +308,23 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	return LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(jobj_keyslot, offset, length);
+}
+
 static int _open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	const keyslot_handler *h,
@@ -552,7 +561,7 @@ out:
 
 		if (r == -ENOMEM)
 			log_err(cd, _("Not enough available memory to open a keyslot."));
-		else if (r != -EPERM)
+		else if (r != -EPERM && r != -ENOENT)
 			log_err(cd, _("Keyslot open failed."));
 	}
 	return r;
@@ -589,48 +598,13 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (r < 0) {
 		if (r == -ENOMEM)
 			log_err(cd, _("Not enough available memory to open a keyslot."));
-		else if (r != -EPERM)
+		else if (r != -EPERM && r != -ENOENT)
 			log_err(cd, _("Keyslot open failed."));
 	}
 
 	return r;
 }
 
-int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	int keyslot,
-	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
-{
-	const keyslot_handler *h;
-	int r;
-
-	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, "reencrypt");
-	if (!h)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	r = reenc_keyslot_alloc(cd, hdr, keyslot, params);
-	if (r < 0)
-		return r;
-
-	r = LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(cd, hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_IGNORE, 0);
-	if (r < 0)
-		return r;
-
-	r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
-	if (r) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot validation failed.");
-		return r;
-	}
-
-	if (LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
@@ -669,7 +643,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	if (!LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot)) {
 		/* Try to allocate default and empty keyslot type */
-		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, "luks2");
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type("luks2");
 		if (!h)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -775,8 +749,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
 	return h->dump(cd, keyslot);
 }
 
-crypt_keyslot_priority LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)),
-	  struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
+crypt_keyslot_priority LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
 {
 	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_priority;
 
@@ -810,8 +783,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 int placeholder_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
 	uint64_t area_offset,
-	uint64_t area_length,
-	size_t volume_key_len __attribute__((unused)))
+	uint64_t area_length)
 {
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
 	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area;
@@ -878,14 +850,21 @@ int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
 	const keyslot_handler *h;
 	int keyslot;
 	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_type;
+	uint32_t reqs, reencrypt_count = 0;
+	struct luks2_hdr dummy = {
+		.jobj = hdr_jobj
+	};
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (LUKS2_config_get_requirements(cd, &dummy, &reqs))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
 		keyslot = atoi(slot);
 		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "type", &jobj_type);
-		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
 		if (!h)
 			continue;
 		if (h->validate && h->validate(cd, val)) {
@@ -897,6 +876,24 @@ int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
 			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d is not assigned to exactly 1 digest.", keyslot);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
+
+		if (!strcmp(h->name, "reencrypt"))
+			reencrypt_count++;
+	}
+
+	if ((reqs & CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT) && reencrypt_count == 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing reencryption keyslot.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (reencrypt_count && !LUKS2_reencrypt_requirement_candidate(&dummy)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing reencryption requirement flag.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (reencrypt_count > 1) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Too many reencryption keyslots.");
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -914,9 +911,9 @@ void LUKS2_keyslots_repair(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslots)
 		    !json_object_is_type(jobj_type, json_type_string))
 			continue;
 
-		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
 		if (h && h->repair)
-			h->repair(cd, val);
+			h->repair(val);
 	}
 }
 

lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS2 type keyslot handler
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -142,10 +142,11 @@ static int luks2_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
 }
 
 static int luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(json_object *jobj_keyslot,
-		                struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf, char *salt)
+		                struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf, char **salt)
 {
 	json_object *jobj_kdf, *jobj1, *jobj2;
 	size_t salt_len;
+	int r;
 
 	if (!jobj_keyslot || !pbkdf)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -181,13 +182,16 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(json_object *jobj_keyslot,
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "salt", &jobj2))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	salt_len = LUKS_SALTSIZE;
-	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj2),
-			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj2),
-			   salt, &salt_len))
-		return -EINVAL;
-	if (salt_len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+
+	r = crypt_base64_decode(salt, &salt_len, json_object_get_string(jobj2),
+				json_object_get_string_len(jobj2));
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (salt_len != LUKS_SALTSIZE) {
+		free(*salt);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -198,7 +202,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_set_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len)
 {
 	struct volume_key *derived_key;
-	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	char *salt = NULL, cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
 	char *AfKey = NULL;
 	const char *af_hash = NULL;
 	size_t AFEKSize, keyslot_key_len;
@@ -236,23 +240,28 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_set_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	af_hash = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
 
-	if (luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(jobj_keyslot, &pbkdf, salt))
-		return -EINVAL;
+	r = luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(jobj_keyslot, &pbkdf, &salt);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
 	/*
 	 * Allocate derived key storage.
 	 */
 	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keyslot_key_len, NULL);
-	if (!derived_key)
+	if (!derived_key) {
+		free(salt);
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Calculate keyslot content, split and store it to keyslot area.
 	 */
+	log_dbg(cd, "Running keyslot key derivation.");
 	r = crypt_pbkdf(pbkdf.type, pbkdf.hash, password, passwordLen,
 			salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
 			derived_key->key, derived_key->keylength,
 			pbkdf.iterations, pbkdf.max_memory_kb,
 			pbkdf.parallel_threads);
+	free(salt);
 	if (r < 0) {
 		crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
 		return r;
@@ -269,7 +278,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_set_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	r = AF_split(cd, volume_key, AfKey, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
 
 	if (r == 0) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Updating keyslot area [0x%04x].", (unsigned)area_offset);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Updating keyslot area [0x%04" PRIx64 "].", area_offset);
 		/* FIXME: sector_offset should be size_t, fix LUKS_encrypt... accordingly */
 		r = luks2_encrypt_to_storage(AfKey, AFEKSize, cipher, cipher_mode,
 				    derived_key, (unsigned)(area_offset / SECTOR_SIZE), cd);
@@ -288,12 +297,12 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_get_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *password, size_t passwordLen,
 	char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_len)
 {
-	struct volume_key *derived_key;
+	struct volume_key *derived_key = NULL;
 	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
-	char *AfKey;
+	char *AfKey = NULL;
 	size_t AFEKSize;
 	const char *af_hash = NULL;
-	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	char *salt = NULL, cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
 	json_object *jobj2, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
 	uint64_t area_offset;
 	size_t keyslot_key_len;
@@ -304,9 +313,6 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_get_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(jobj_keyslot, &pbkdf, salt))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "hash", &jobj2))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	af_hash = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
@@ -325,29 +331,38 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_get_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	keyslot_key_len = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
 
+	r = luks2_keyslot_get_pbkdf_params(jobj_keyslot, &pbkdf, &salt);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate derived key storage space.
+	 */
+	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keyslot_key_len, NULL);
+	if (!derived_key) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
+	if (!AfKey) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * If requested, serialize unlocking for memory-hard KDF. Usually NOOP.
 	 */
 	if (pbkdf.max_memory_kb > MIN_MEMORY_FOR_SERIALIZE_LOCK_KB)
 		try_serialize_lock = true;
-	if (try_serialize_lock && crypt_serialize_lock(cd))
-		return -EINVAL;
-	/*
-	 * Allocate derived key storage space.
-	 */
-	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keyslot_key_len, NULL);
-	if (!derived_key)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (try_serialize_lock && (r = crypt_serialize_lock(cd)))
+		goto out;
 
-	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE;
-	AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
-	if (!AfKey) {
-		crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
 	/*
 	 * Calculate derived key, decrypt keyslot content and merge it.
 	 */
+	log_dbg(cd, "Running keyslot key derivation.");
 	r = crypt_pbkdf(pbkdf.type, pbkdf.hash, password, passwordLen,
 			salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
 			derived_key->key, derived_key->keylength,
@@ -358,15 +373,16 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_get_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		crypt_serialize_unlock(cd);
 
 	if (r == 0) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Reading keyslot area [0x%04x].", (unsigned)area_offset);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Reading keyslot area [0x%04" PRIx64 "].", area_offset);
 		/* FIXME: sector_offset should be size_t, fix LUKS_decrypt... accordingly */
 		r = luks2_decrypt_from_storage(AfKey, AFEKSize, cipher, cipher_mode,
 				      derived_key, (unsigned)(area_offset / SECTOR_SIZE), cd);
 	}
 
 	if (r == 0)
-		r = AF_merge(cd, AfKey, volume_key, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
-
+		r = AF_merge(AfKey, volume_key, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
+out:
+	free(salt);
 	crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
 	crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
 
@@ -427,9 +443,9 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_update_json(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
-	base64_encode_alloc(salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &salt_base64);
-	if (!salt_base64)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	r = crypt_base64_encode(&salt_base64, NULL, salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "salt", json_object_new_string(salt_base64));
 	free(salt_base64);
 
@@ -657,50 +673,56 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_key
 	if (!jobj_keyslot)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
-	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
-	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+	if (!(jobj_kdf = json_contains(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "keyslot", "kdf", json_type_object)) ||
+	    !(jobj_af = json_contains(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "keyslot", "af", json_type_object)) ||
+	    !(jobj_area = json_contains(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "keyslot", "area", json_type_object)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	count = json_object_object_length(jobj_kdf);
 
-	jobj1 = json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "", "kdf section", "type", json_type_string);
+	jobj1 = json_contains_string(cd, jobj_kdf, "", "kdf section", "type");
 	if (!jobj1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	type = json_object_get_string(jobj1);
 
 	if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
 		if (count != 4 || /* type, salt, hash, iterations only */
-		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "hash", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains_string(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "hash") ||
 		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "iterations", json_type_int) ||
-		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt", json_type_string))
+		    !json_contains_string(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt"))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I) || !strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID)) {
 		if (count != 5 || /* type, salt, time, memory, cpus only */
 		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "time", json_type_int) ||
 		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "memory", json_type_int) ||
 		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "cpus", json_type_int) ||
-		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt", json_type_string))
+		    !json_contains_string(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt"))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "type", &jobj1))
+	jobj1 = json_contains_string(cd, jobj_af, "", "af section", "type");
+	if (!jobj1)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), "luks1")) {
-		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "hash", json_type_string) ||
+	type = json_object_get_string(jobj1);
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, "luks1")) {
+		if (!json_contains_string(cd, jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "hash") ||
 		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "stripes", json_type_int))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	// FIXME check numbered
-	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj1))
+	jobj1 = json_contains_string(cd, jobj_area, "", "area section", "type");
+	if (!jobj1)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), "raw")) {
-		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "encryption", json_type_string) ||
+	type = json_object_get_string(jobj1);
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, "raw")) {
+		if (!json_contains_string(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "encryption") ||
 		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "key_size", json_type_int) ||
-		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "offset", json_type_string) ||
-		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "size", json_type_string))
+		    !json_contains_string(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "offset") ||
+		    !json_contains_string(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "size"))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -735,7 +757,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	return r;
 }
 
-static void luks2_keyslot_repair(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), json_object *jobj_keyslot)
+static void luks2_keyslot_repair(json_object *jobj_keyslot)
 {
 	const char *type;
 	json_object *jobj_kdf, *jobj_type;

lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, reencryption keyslot handler
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2021, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2021, Ondrej Kozina
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Ondrej Kozina
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -31,10 +31,77 @@ static int reenc_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)),
 	return -ENOENT;
 }
 
-int reenc_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
+static json_object *reencrypt_keyslot_area_jobj(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+		size_t alignment,
+		uint64_t area_offset,
+		uint64_t area_length)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
+
+	if (!jobj_area || !params || !params->resilience)
+		return NULL;
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_length));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "type", json_object_new_string(params->resilience));
+
+	if (!strcmp(params->resilience, "checksum")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Setting reencrypt keyslot for checksum protection.");
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "hash", json_object_new_string(params->hash));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "sector_size", json_object_new_int64(alignment));
+	} else if (!strcmp(params->resilience, "journal")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Setting reencrypt keyslot for journal protection.");
+	} else if (!strcmp(params->resilience, "none")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Setting reencrypt keyslot for none protection.");
+	} else if (!strcmp(params->resilience, "datashift")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Setting reencrypt keyslot for datashift protection.");
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "shift_size",
+				       crypt_jobj_new_uint64(params->data_shift << SECTOR_SHIFT));
+	} else if (!strcmp(params->resilience, "datashift-checksum")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Setting reencrypt keyslot for datashift and checksum protection.");
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "hash", json_object_new_string(params->hash));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "sector_size", json_object_new_int64(alignment));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "shift_size",
+				       crypt_jobj_new_uint64(params->data_shift << SECTOR_SHIFT));
+	} else if (!strcmp(params->resilience, "datashift-journal")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Setting reencrypt keyslot for datashift and journal protection.");
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "shift_size",
+				       crypt_jobj_new_uint64(params->data_shift << SECTOR_SHIFT));
+	} else {
+		json_object_put(jobj_area);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return jobj_area;
+}
+
+static json_object *reencrypt_keyslot_area_jobj_update_block_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		json_object *jobj_area, size_t alignment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_type, *jobj_area_new = NULL;
+
+	if (!jobj_area ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_type) ||
+	    (strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_type), "checksum") &&
+	     strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_type), "datashift-checksum")))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (json_object_copy(jobj_area, &jobj_area_new))
+		return NULL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Updating reencrypt resilience checksum block size.");
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area_new, "sector_size", json_object_new_int64(alignment));
+
+	return jobj_area_new;
+}
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
-	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+	size_t alignment)
 {
 	int r;
 	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area;
@@ -42,50 +109,41 @@ int reenc_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	log_dbg(cd, "Allocating reencrypt keyslot %d.", keyslot);
 
+	if (!params || !params->resilience || params->direction > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_BACKWARD)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/* encryption doesn't require area (we shift data and backup will be available) */
-	if (!params->data_shift) {
-		r = LUKS2_find_area_max_gap(cd, hdr, &area_offset, &area_length);
-		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
-	} else { /* we can't have keyslot w/o area...bug? */
+	/* only plain datashift resilience mode does not require additional storage */
+	if (!strcmp(params->resilience, "datashift"))
 		r = LUKS2_find_area_gap(cd, hdr, 1, &area_offset, &area_length);
-		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
-	}
+	else
+		r = LUKS2_find_area_max_gap(cd, hdr, &area_offset, &area_length);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	jobj_area = reencrypt_keyslot_area_jobj(cd, params, alignment, area_offset, area_length);
+	if (!jobj_area)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	jobj_keyslot = json_object_new_object();
-	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+	if (!jobj_keyslot) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_area);
 		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
-
-	if (params->data_shift) {
-		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "type", json_object_new_string("datashift"));
-		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "shift_size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(params->data_shift << SECTOR_SHIFT));
-	} else
-		/* except data shift protection, initial setting is irrelevant. Type can be changed during reencryption */
-		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "type", json_object_new_string("none"));
-
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_offset));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_length));
+	}
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area);
 
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "type", json_object_new_string("reencrypt"));
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "key_size", json_object_new_int(1)); /* useless but mandatory */
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "mode", json_object_new_string(crypt_reencrypt_mode_to_str(params->mode)));
 	if (params->direction == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_FORWARD)
 		json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "direction", json_object_new_string("forward"));
-	else if (params->direction == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_BACKWARD)
-		json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "direction", json_object_new_string("backward"));
 	else
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area);
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "direction", json_object_new_string("backward"));
 
 	json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot, jobj_keyslot);
 	if (LUKS2_check_json_size(cd, hdr)) {
@@ -176,9 +234,17 @@ static int reenc_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
 }
 
-static int reenc_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)),
-	int keyslot __attribute__((unused)))
+static int reenc_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot)
 {
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* remove reencryption verification data */
+	LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -222,7 +288,8 @@ static int reenc_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
 
 static int reenc_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot)
 {
-	json_object *jobj_mode, *jobj_area, *jobj_type, *jobj_shift_size, *jobj_hash, *jobj_sector_size, *jobj_direction;
+	json_object *jobj_mode, *jobj_area, *jobj_type, *jobj_shift_size, *jobj_hash,
+		    *jobj_sector_size, *jobj_direction, *jobj_key_size;
 	const char *mode, *type, *direction;
 	uint32_t sector_size;
 	uint64_t shift_size;
@@ -230,10 +297,10 @@ static int reenc_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_key
 	/* mode (string: encrypt,reencrypt,decrypt)
 	 * direction (string:)
 	 * area {
-	 *   type: (string: datashift, journal, checksum, none)
-	 *   	hash: (string: checksum only)
-	 *   	sector_size (uint32: checksum only)
-	 *   	shift_size (uint64: datashift only)
+	 *   type: (string: datashift, journal, checksum, none, datashift-journal, datashift-checksum)
+	 *   	hash: (string: checksum and datashift-checksum types)
+	 *   	sector_size (uint32:  checksum and datashift-checksum types)
+	 *   	shift_size (uint64: all datashift based types)
 	 * }
 	 */
 
@@ -242,12 +309,18 @@ static int reenc_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_key
 	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_type))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	jobj_mode = json_contains(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "reencrypt keyslot", "mode", json_type_string);
-	jobj_direction = json_contains(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "reencrypt keyslot", "direction", json_type_string);
+	jobj_key_size = json_contains(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "reencrypt keyslot", "key_size", json_type_int);
+	jobj_mode = json_contains_string(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "reencrypt keyslot", "mode");
+	jobj_direction = json_contains_string(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "reencrypt keyslot", "direction");
 
-	if (!jobj_mode || !jobj_direction)
+	if (!jobj_mode || !jobj_direction || !jobj_key_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!validate_json_uint32(jobj_key_size) || crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj_key_size) != 1) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Illegal reencrypt key size.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	mode = json_object_get_string(jobj_mode);
 	type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type);
 	direction = json_object_get_string(jobj_direction);
@@ -263,20 +336,26 @@ static int reenc_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_key
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (!strcmp(type, "checksum")) {
-		jobj_hash = json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "type:checksum", "Keyslot area", "hash", json_type_string);
-		jobj_sector_size = json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "type:checksum", "Keyslot area", "sector_size", json_type_int);
+	if (!strcmp(type, "checksum") || !strcmp(type, "datashift-checksum")) {
+		jobj_hash = json_contains_string(cd, jobj_area, "type:checksum",
+					  "Keyslot area", "hash");
+		jobj_sector_size = json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "type:checksum",
+						 "Keyslot area", "sector_size", json_type_int);
 		if (!jobj_hash || !jobj_sector_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		if (!validate_json_uint32(jobj_sector_size))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		sector_size = crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj_sector_size);
 		if (sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE || NOTPOW2(sector_size)) {
-			log_dbg(cd, "Invalid sector_size (%" PRIu32 ") for checksum resilience mode.", sector_size);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Invalid sector_size (%" PRIu32 ") for checksum resilience mode.",
+				sector_size);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-	} else if (!strcmp(type, "datashift")) {
-		if (!(jobj_shift_size = json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "type:datashift", "Keyslot area", "shift_size", json_type_string)))
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, "datashift") ||
+		   !strcmp(type, "datashift-checksum") ||
+		   !strcmp(type, "datashift-journal")) {
+		if (!(jobj_shift_size = json_contains_string(cd, jobj_area, "type:datashift",
+						      "Keyslot area", "shift_size")))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		shift_size = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj_shift_size);
@@ -284,7 +363,7 @@ static int reenc_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_key
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		if (MISALIGNED_512(shift_size)) {
-			log_dbg(cd, "Shift size field has to be aligned to sector size: %" PRIu32, SECTOR_SIZE);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Shift size field has to be aligned to 512 bytes.");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
@@ -292,6 +371,377 @@ static int reenc_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_key
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int reenc_keyslot_update_needed(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+	size_t alignment)
+{
+	const char *type;
+	json_object *jobj_area, *jobj_type, *jobj;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_type) ||
+	    !(type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * If no resilience mode change is requested and effective
+	 * resilience mode is 'checksum' then check alignment matches
+	 * stored checksum block size.
+	 */
+	if (!params || !params->resilience) {
+		if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_type), "checksum") ||
+		    !strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_type), "datashift-checksum"))
+			return (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "sector_size", &jobj) ||
+				alignment != crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(params->resilience, type))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, "checksum") ||
+	    !strcmp(type, "datashift-checksum")) {
+		if (!params->hash)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "hash", &jobj) ||
+			strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), params->hash) ||
+			!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "sector_size", &jobj) ||
+			crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj) != alignment)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (!strncmp(type, "datashift", 9)) {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "shift_size", &jobj))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if ((params->data_shift << SECTOR_SHIFT) != crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* nothing to compare with 'none' and 'journal' */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int load_checksum_protection(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_area,
+	uint64_t area_length,
+	struct reenc_protection *rp)
+{
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj_hash, *jobj_block_size;
+
+	if (!jobj_area || !rp ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "hash", &jobj_hash) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "sector_size", &jobj_block_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = snprintf(rp->p.csum.hash, sizeof(rp->p.csum.hash), "%s", json_object_get_string(jobj_hash));
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(rp->p.csum.hash))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (crypt_hash_init(&rp->p.csum.ch, rp->p.csum.hash)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s is not available."), rp->p.csum.hash);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_hash_size(rp->p.csum.hash);
+	if (r <= 0) {
+		crypt_hash_destroy(rp->p.csum.ch);
+		rp->p.csum.ch = NULL;
+		log_dbg(cd, "Invalid hash size");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	rp->p.csum.hash_size = r;
+	rp->p.csum.block_size = crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj_block_size);
+	rp->p.csum.checksums_len = area_length;
+
+	rp->type = REENC_PROTECTION_CHECKSUM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_load_resilience_primary(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type,
+	json_object *jobj_area,
+	uint64_t area_length,
+	struct reenc_protection *rp)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, "checksum")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Initializing checksum resilience mode.");
+		return load_checksum_protection(cd, jobj_area, area_length, rp);
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, "journal")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Initializing journal resilience mode.");
+		rp->type = REENC_PROTECTION_JOURNAL;
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, "none")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Initializing none resilience mode.");
+		rp->type = REENC_PROTECTION_NONE;
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, "datashift") ||
+		   !strcmp(type, "datashift-checksum") ||
+		   !strcmp(type, "datashift-journal")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Initializing datashift resilience mode.");
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "shift_size", &jobj))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		rp->type = REENC_PROTECTION_DATASHIFT;
+		rp->p.ds.data_shift = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj);
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_load_resilience_secondary(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type,
+	json_object *jobj_area,
+	uint64_t area_length,
+	struct reenc_protection *rp)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(type, "datashift-checksum")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Initializing checksum resilience mode.");
+		return load_checksum_protection(cd, jobj_area, area_length, rp);
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, "datashift-journal")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Initializing journal resilience mode.");
+		rp->type = REENC_PROTECTION_JOURNAL;
+	} else
+		rp->type = REENC_PROTECTION_NOT_SET;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_load_resilience(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+	struct reenc_protection *rp,
+	bool primary)
+{
+	const char *type;
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj_area, *jobj_type;
+	uint64_t dummy, area_length;
+
+	if (!rp || !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(jobj_keyslot, &dummy, &area_length);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type);
+	if (!type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (primary)
+		return reenc_keyslot_load_resilience_primary(cd, type, jobj_area, area_length, rp);
+	else
+		return reenc_keyslot_load_resilience_secondary(cd, type, jobj_area, area_length, rp);
+}
+
+static bool reenc_keyslot_update_is_valid(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_area,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
+{
+	const char *type;
+	json_object *jobj_type, *jobj;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_type) ||
+	    !(type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
+		return false;
+
+	/* do not allow switch to/away from datashift resilience type */
+	if ((strcmp(params->resilience, "datashift") && !strcmp(type, "datashift")) ||
+	    (!strcmp(params->resilience, "datashift") && strcmp(type, "datashift")))
+		return false;
+
+	/* do not allow switch to/away from datashift- resilience subvariants */
+	if ((strncmp(params->resilience, "datashift-", 10) &&
+	     !strncmp(type, "datashift-", 10)) ||
+	    (!strncmp(params->resilience, "datashift-", 10) &&
+	     strncmp(type, "datashift-", 10)))
+		return false;
+
+	/* datashift value is also immutable */
+	if (!strncmp(type, "datashift", 9)) {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "shift_size", &jobj))
+			return false;
+		return (params->data_shift << SECTOR_SHIFT) == crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj);
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+	size_t alignment)
+{
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj_area, *jobj_area_new;
+	uint64_t area_offset, area_length;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(jobj_keyslot, &area_offset, &area_length);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!params || !params->resilience)
+		jobj_area_new = reencrypt_keyslot_area_jobj_update_block_size(cd, jobj_area, alignment);
+	else {
+		if (!reenc_keyslot_update_is_valid(cd, jobj_area, params)) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Invalid reencryption resilience mode change requested."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		jobj_area_new = reencrypt_keyslot_area_jobj(cd, params, alignment,
+							    area_offset, area_length);
+	}
+
+	if (!jobj_area_new)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* increase refcount for validation purposes */
+	json_object_get(jobj_area);
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area_new);
+
+	r = reenc_keyslot_validate(cd, jobj_keyslot);
+	if (r) {
+		/* replace invalid object with previous valid one */
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* previous area object is no longer needed */
+	json_object_put(jobj_area);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_allocate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+	size_t alignment)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = reenc_keyslot_alloc(cd, hdr, keyslot, params, alignment);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(cd, hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_IGNORE, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = reenc_keyslot_validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot validation failed.");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_update_needed(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+	size_t alignment)
+{
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj_type, *jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+
+	if (!jobj_keyslot ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "type", &jobj_type) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_type), "reencrypt"))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = reenc_keyslot_update_needed(cd, jobj_keyslot, params, alignment);
+	if (!r)
+		log_dbg(cd, "No update of reencrypt keyslot needed.");
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params,
+	size_t alignment,
+	struct volume_key *vks)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint8_t version;
+	uint64_t max_size, moved_segment_size;
+	json_object *jobj_type, *jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	struct reenc_protection check_rp = {};
+
+	if (!jobj_keyslot ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "type", &jobj_type) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_type), "reencrypt"))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (LUKS2_config_get_reencrypt_version(hdr, &version))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* verify existing reencryption metadata before updating */
+	r = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = reenc_keyslot_update(cd, jobj_keyslot, params, alignment);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = reenc_keyslot_load_resilience(cd, jobj_keyslot, &check_rp, false);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (check_rp.type != REENC_PROTECTION_NOT_SET) {
+		r = LUKS2_reencrypt_max_hotzone_size(cd, hdr, &check_rp, keyslot, &max_size);
+		LUKS2_reencrypt_protection_erase(&check_rp);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		moved_segment_size = json_segment_get_size(LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-moved-segment"), 0);
+		if (!moved_segment_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (moved_segment_size > max_size) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Can not update resilience type. "
+				      "New type only provides %" PRIu64 " bytes, "
+				      "required space is: %" PRIu64 " bytes."),
+				max_size, moved_segment_size);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(cd, hdr, version, vks);
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to refresh reencryption verification digest."));
+
+	return r ?: LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	struct reenc_protection *rp,
+	bool primary)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_type, *jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+
+	if (!jobj_keyslot ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "type", &jobj_type) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_type), "reencrypt"))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return reenc_keyslot_load_resilience(cd, jobj_keyslot, rp, primary);
+}
+
 const keyslot_handler reenc_keyslot = {
 	.name  = "reencrypt",
 	.open  = reenc_keyslot_open,

lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS1 conversion code
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Ondrej Kozina
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Ondrej Kozina
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -24,12 +24,38 @@
 #include "../luks1/luks.h"
 #include "../luks1/af.h"
 
+/* This differs from LUKS_check_cipher() that it does not check dm-crypt fallback. */
 int LUKS2_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		      size_t keylength,
 		      const char *cipher,
 		      const char *cipher_mode)
 {
-	return LUKS_check_cipher(cd, keylength, cipher, cipher_mode);
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	char buf[SECTOR_SIZE], *empty_key;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Checking if cipher %s-%s is usable (storage wrapper).", cipher, cipher_mode);
+
+	empty_key = crypt_safe_alloc(keylength);
+	if (!empty_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No need to get KEY quality random but it must avoid known weak keys. */
+	r = crypt_random_get(cd, empty_key, keylength, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, empty_key, keylength, false);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	r = crypt_storage_decrypt(s, 0, sizeof(buf), buf);
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(empty_key);
+	crypt_safe_memzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	return r;
 }
 
 static int json_luks1_keyslot(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, int keyslot, struct json_object **keyslot_object)
@@ -37,7 +63,8 @@ static int json_luks1_keyslot(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, int keyslot, struc
 	char *base64_str, cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L+LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
 	size_t base64_len;
 	struct json_object *keyslot_obj, *field, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
-	uint64_t offset, area_size, offs_a, offs_b, length;
+	uint64_t offset, area_size, length;
+	int r;
 
 	keyslot_obj = json_object_new_object();
 	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "type", json_object_new_string("luks2"));
@@ -49,13 +76,11 @@ static int json_luks1_keyslot(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, int keyslot, struc
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "hash", json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->hashSpec));
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_kdf, "iterations", json_object_new_int64(hdr_v1->keyblock[keyslot].passwordIterations));
 	/* salt field */
-	base64_len = base64_encode_alloc(hdr_v1->keyblock[keyslot].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &base64_str);
-	if (!base64_str) {
+	r = crypt_base64_encode(&base64_str, &base64_len, hdr_v1->keyblock[keyslot].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+	if (r < 0) {
 		json_object_put(keyslot_obj);
 		json_object_put(jobj_kdf);
-		if (!base64_len)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		return r;
 	}
 	field = json_object_new_string_len(base64_str, base64_len);
 	free(base64_str);
@@ -67,7 +92,7 @@ static int json_luks1_keyslot(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, int keyslot, struc
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "type", json_object_new_string("luks1"));
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "hash", json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->hashSpec));
 	/* stripes field ignored, fixed to LUKS_STRIPES (4000) */
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "stripes", json_object_new_int(4000));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "stripes", json_object_new_int(LUKS_STRIPES));
 	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "af", jobj_af);
 
 	/* Area */
@@ -76,20 +101,22 @@ static int json_luks1_keyslot(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, int keyslot, struc
 
 	/* encryption algorithm field */
 	if (*hdr_v1->cipherMode != '\0') {
-		(void) snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", hdr_v1->cipherName, hdr_v1->cipherMode);
+		if (snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", hdr_v1->cipherName, hdr_v1->cipherMode) < 0) {
+			json_object_put(keyslot_obj);
+			json_object_put(jobj_area);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "encryption", json_object_new_string(cipher));
 	} else
 		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "encryption", json_object_new_string(hdr_v1->cipherName));
 
 	/* area */
-	if (LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr_v1, 0, &offs_a, &length) ||
-	    LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr_v1, 1, &offs_b, &length) ||
-	    LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr_v1, keyslot, &offset, &length)) {
+	if (LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr_v1, keyslot, &offset, &length)) {
 		json_object_put(keyslot_obj);
 		json_object_put(jobj_area);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	area_size = offs_b - offs_a;
+	area_size = size_round_up(length, 4096);
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "key_size", json_object_new_int(hdr_v1->keyBytes));
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(offset));
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_size));
@@ -170,7 +197,10 @@ static int json_luks1_segment(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object
 
 	/* cipher field */
 	if (*hdr_v1->cipherMode != '\0') {
-		(void) snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", hdr_v1->cipherName, hdr_v1->cipherMode);
+		if (snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", hdr_v1->cipherName, hdr_v1->cipherMode) < 0) {
+			json_object_put(segment_obj);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		c = cipher;
 	} else
 		c = hdr_v1->cipherName;
@@ -216,8 +246,8 @@ static int json_luks1_segments(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_objec
 
 static int json_luks1_digest(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **digest_object)
 {
-	char keyslot_str[2], *base64_str;
-	int ks;
+	char keyslot_str[16], *base64_str;
+	int r, ks;
 	size_t base64_len;
 	struct json_object *digest_obj, *array, *field;
 
@@ -244,7 +274,12 @@ static int json_luks1_digest(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object
 	for (ks = 0; ks < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ks++) {
 		if (hdr_v1->keyblock[ks].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
 			continue;
-		(void) snprintf(keyslot_str, sizeof(keyslot_str), "%d", ks);
+		if (snprintf(keyslot_str, sizeof(keyslot_str), "%d", ks) < 0) {
+			json_object_put(field);
+			json_object_put(array);
+			json_object_put(digest_obj);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 
 		field = json_object_new_string(keyslot_str);
 		if (!field || json_object_array_add(array, field) < 0) {
@@ -284,12 +319,10 @@ static int json_luks1_digest(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object
 	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "hash", field);
 
 	/* salt field */
-	base64_len = base64_encode_alloc(hdr_v1->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, &base64_str);
-	if (!base64_str) {
+	r = crypt_base64_encode(&base64_str, &base64_len, hdr_v1->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+	if (r < 0) {
 		json_object_put(digest_obj);
-		if (!base64_len)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		return r;
 	}
 
 	field = json_object_new_string_len(base64_str, base64_len);
@@ -301,12 +334,10 @@ static int json_luks1_digest(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object
 	json_object_object_add(digest_obj, "salt", field);
 
 	/* digest field */
-	base64_len = base64_encode_alloc(hdr_v1->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, &base64_str);
-	if (!base64_str) {
+	r = crypt_base64_encode(&base64_str, &base64_len, hdr_v1->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE);
+	if (r < 0) {
 		json_object_put(digest_obj);
-		if (!base64_len)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		return r;
 	}
 
 	field = json_object_new_string_len(base64_str, base64_len);
@@ -424,7 +455,6 @@ static void move_keyslot_offset(json_object *jobj, int offset_add)
 	}
 }
 
-/* FIXME: return specific error code for partial write error (aka keyslots are gone) */
 static int move_keyslot_areas(struct crypt_device *cd, off_t offset_from,
 			      off_t offset_to, size_t buf_size)
 {
@@ -535,6 +565,12 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (LUKS2_check_cipher(cd, hdr1->keyBytes, hdr1->cipherName, hdr1->cipherMode)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unable to use cipher specification %s-%s for LUKS2."),
+			hdr1->cipherName, hdr1->cipherMode);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (luksmeta_header_present(cd, luks1_size))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -558,7 +594,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
 
 	move_keyslot_offset(jobj, luks1_shift);
 
-	// fill hdr2
+	/* Create and fill LUKS2 hdr */
 	memset(hdr2, 0, sizeof(*hdr2));
 	hdr2->hdr_size = LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
 	hdr2->seqid = 1;
@@ -580,6 +616,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
 
 	/* check future LUKS2 metadata before moving keyslots area */
 	if (LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr2->jobj, hdr2->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS2 format - invalid metadata."));
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -590,7 +627,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	// move keyslots 4k -> 32k offset
+	/* move keyslots 4k -> 32k offset */
 	buf_offset = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
 	buf_size   = luks1_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
 
@@ -606,7 +643,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	// Write JSON hdr2
+	/* Write new LUKS2 JSON */
 	r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr2);
 out:
 	LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, hdr2);
@@ -651,8 +688,6 @@ static int keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *h
 	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), hash))
 		return 0;
 
-	/* FIXME: should this go to validation code instead (aka invalid luks2 header if assigned to segment 0)? */
-	/* FIXME: check all keyslots are assigned to segment id 0, and segments count == 1 */
 	ks_cipher = LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(hdr, keyslot, &ks_key_size);
 	data_cipher = LUKS2_get_cipher(hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
 	if (!ks_cipher || !data_cipher || key_size != ks_key_size || strcmp(ks_cipher, data_cipher)) {
@@ -676,14 +711,14 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 {
 	size_t buf_size, buf_offset;
 	char cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L], cipher_mode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
-	char digest[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE], digest_salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
+	char *digest, *digest_salt;
 	const char *hash;
 	size_t len;
 	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_digest, *jobj_segment, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_area, *jobj1, *jobj2;
 	uint32_t key_size;
 	int i, r, last_active = 0;
 	uint64_t offset, area_length;
-	char buf[256], luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
+	char *buf, luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
 
 	jobj_digest  = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr2, 0);
 	if (!jobj_digest)
@@ -718,6 +753,11 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (json_segments_count(LUKS2_get_segments_jobj(hdr2)) != 1) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses more segments."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	r = LUKS2_tokens_count(hdr2);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
@@ -773,7 +813,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 			 * inactive keyslots. Otherwise we would allocate all
 			 * inactive luks1 keyslots over same binary keyslot area.
 			 */
-			if (placeholder_keyslot_alloc(cd, i, offset, area_length, key_size))
+			if (placeholder_keyslot_alloc(cd, i, offset, area_length))
 				return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
@@ -800,14 +840,16 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 
 		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "salt", &jobj1))
 			continue;
-		len = sizeof(buf);
-		memset(buf, 0, len);
-		if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
-				   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), buf, &len))
+
+		if (crypt_base64_decode(&buf, &len, json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+					json_object_get_string_len(jobj1)))
 			continue;
-		if (len > 0 && len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+		if (len > 0 && len != LUKS_SALTSIZE) {
+			free(buf);
 			continue;
+		}
 		memcpy(hdr1->keyblock[i].passwordSalt, buf, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+		free(buf);
 	}
 
 	if (!jobj_keyslot) {
@@ -843,31 +885,36 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "digest", &jobj1))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	len = sizeof(digest);
-	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
-			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), digest, &len))
-		return -EINVAL;
+	r = crypt_base64_decode(&digest, &len, json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+				json_object_get_string_len(jobj1));
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 	/* We can store full digest here, not only sha1 length */
-	if (len < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE)
+	if (len < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) {
+		free(digest);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	memcpy(hdr1->mkDigest, digest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE);
+	free(digest);
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "salt", &jobj1))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	len = sizeof(digest_salt);
-	if (!base64_decode(json_object_get_string(jobj1),
-			   json_object_get_string_len(jobj1), digest_salt, &len))
-		return -EINVAL;
-	if (len != LUKS_SALTSIZE)
+	r = crypt_base64_decode(&digest_salt, &len, json_object_get_string(jobj1),
+				json_object_get_string_len(jobj1));
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (len != LUKS_SALTSIZE) {
+		free(digest_salt);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	memcpy(hdr1->mkDigestSalt, digest_salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
+	free(digest_salt);
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "offset", &jobj1))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	offset = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj1) / SECTOR_SIZE;
 	if (offset > UINT32_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	/* FIXME: LUKS1 requires offset == 0 || offset >= luks1_hdr_size */
 	hdr1->payloadOffset = offset;
 
 	strncpy(hdr1->uuid, hdr2->uuid, UUID_STRING_L); /* max 36 chars */
@@ -881,7 +928,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 	if (r)
 		return r > 0 ? -EBUSY : r;
 
-	// move keyslots 32k -> 4k offset
+	/* move keyslots 32k -> 4k offset */
 	buf_offset = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
 	buf_size   = LUKS2_keyslots_size(hdr2);
 	r = move_keyslot_areas(cd, buf_offset, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, buf_size);
@@ -893,6 +940,6 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 	crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0,
 			  8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
 
-	// Write LUKS1 hdr
+	/* Write new LUKS1 hdr */
 	return LUKS_write_phdr(hdr1, cd);
 }

lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c

@@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, reencryption digest helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Ondrej Kozina
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#define MAX_STR 64
+
+struct jtype {
+	enum { JNONE = 0, JSTR, JU64, JX64, JU32 } type;
+	json_object *jobj;
+	const char *id;
+};
+
+static size_t sr(struct jtype *j, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+	size_t len = 0;
+	uint64_t u64;
+	uint32_t u32;
+
+	if (!json_object_is_type(j->jobj, json_type_object))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(j->jobj, j->id, &jobj))
+		return 0;
+
+	switch(j->type) {
+	case JSTR: /* JSON string */
+		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
+			return 0;
+		len = strlen(json_object_get_string(jobj));
+		if (len > MAX_STR)
+			return 0;
+		if (ptr)
+			memcpy(ptr, json_object_get_string(jobj), len);
+		break;
+	case JU64: /* Unsigned 64bit integer stored as string */
+		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
+			break;
+		len = sizeof(u64);
+		if (ptr) {
+			u64 = cpu_to_be64(crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj));
+			memcpy(ptr, &u64, len);
+		}
+		break;
+	case JX64: /* Unsigned 64bit segment size (allows "dynamic") */
+		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
+			break;
+		if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), "dynamic")) {
+			len = strlen("dynamic");
+			if (ptr)
+				memcpy(ptr, json_object_get_string(jobj), len);
+		} else {
+			len = sizeof(u64);
+			u64 = cpu_to_be64(crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj));
+			if (ptr)
+				memcpy(ptr, &u64, len);
+		}
+		break;
+	case JU32: /* Unsigned 32bit integer, stored as JSON int */
+		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_int))
+			return 0;
+		len =  sizeof(u32);
+		if (ptr) {
+			u32 = cpu_to_be32(crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj));
+			memcpy(ptr, &u32, len);
+		}
+		break;
+	case JNONE:
+		return 0;
+	};
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+static size_t srs(struct jtype j[], uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+	size_t l, len = 0;
+
+	while(j->jobj) {
+		l = sr(j, ptr);
+		if (!l)
+			return 0;
+		len += l;
+		if (ptr)
+			ptr += l;
+		j++;
+	}
+	return len;
+}
+
+static size_t segment_linear_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	struct jtype j[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_segment, "offset" },
+		{ JX64, jobj_segment, "size" },
+		{}
+	};
+	return srs(j, buffer);
+}
+
+static size_t segment_crypt_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	struct jtype j[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_segment, "offset" },
+		{ JX64, jobj_segment, "size" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_segment, "iv_tweak" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "encryption" },
+		{ JU32, jobj_segment, "sector_size" },
+		{}
+	};
+	return srs(j, buffer);
+}
+
+static size_t segment_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_type;
+	const char *segment_type;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "type", &jobj_type))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(segment_type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(segment_type, "crypt"))
+		return segment_crypt_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer);
+	else if (!strcmp(segment_type, "linear"))
+		return segment_linear_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static size_t backup_segments_serialize(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_segment;
+	size_t l, len = 0;
+
+	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-previous");
+	if (!jobj_segment || !(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
+		return 0;
+	len += l;
+	if (buffer)
+		buffer += l;
+
+	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-final");
+	if (!jobj_segment || !(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
+		return 0;
+	len += l;
+	if (buffer)
+		buffer += l;
+
+	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-moved-segment");
+	if (jobj_segment) {
+		if (!(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
+			return 0;
+		len += l;
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+static size_t reenc_keyslot_serialize(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj_type;
+	const char *area_type;
+	int keyslot_reencrypt;
+
+	keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
+	if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot_reencrypt)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_type))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(area_type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
+		return 0;
+
+	struct jtype j[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "offset" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "size" },
+		{}
+	};
+	struct jtype j_datashift[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "offset" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "size" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "shift_size" },
+		{}
+	};
+	struct jtype j_checksum[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "offset" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "size" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "hash" },
+		{ JU32, jobj_area,    "sector_size" },
+		{}
+	};
+	struct jtype j_datashift_checksum[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "offset" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "size" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "hash" },
+		{ JU32, jobj_area,    "sector_size" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "shift_size" },
+		{}
+	};
+
+	if (!strcmp(area_type, "datashift-checksum"))
+		return srs(j_datashift_checksum, buffer);
+	else if (!strcmp(area_type, "datashift") ||
+		 !strcmp(area_type, "datashift-journal"))
+		return srs(j_datashift, buffer);
+	else if (!strcmp(area_type, "checksum"))
+		return srs(j_checksum, buffer);
+
+	return srs(j, buffer);
+}
+
+static size_t blob_serialize(void *blob, size_t length, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	if (buffer)
+		memcpy(buffer, blob, length);
+
+	return length;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vks,
+	uint8_t version,
+	struct volume_key **verification_data)
+{
+	uint8_t *ptr;
+	int digest_new, digest_old;
+	struct volume_key *data = NULL, *vk_old = NULL, *vk_new = NULL;
+	size_t keyslot_data_len, segments_data_len, data_len = 2;
+
+	/*
+	 * This works up to (including) version v207.
+	 */
+	assert(version < (UINT8_MAX - 0x2F));
+
+	/* Keys - calculate length */
+	digest_new = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(hdr);
+	digest_old = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_old(hdr);
+
+	if (digest_old >= 0) {
+		vk_old = crypt_volume_key_by_id(vks, digest_old);
+		if (!vk_old) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Key (digest id %d) required but not unlocked.", digest_old);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		data_len += blob_serialize(vk_old->key, vk_old->keylength, NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (digest_new >= 0 && digest_old != digest_new) {
+		vk_new = crypt_volume_key_by_id(vks, digest_new);
+		if (!vk_new) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Key (digest id %d) required but not unlocked.", digest_new);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		data_len += blob_serialize(vk_new->key, vk_new->keylength, NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (data_len == 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Metadata - calculate length */
+	if (!(keyslot_data_len = reenc_keyslot_serialize(hdr, NULL)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	data_len += keyslot_data_len;
+
+	if (!(segments_data_len = backup_segments_serialize(hdr, NULL)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	data_len += segments_data_len;
+
+	/* Alloc and fill serialization data */
+	data = crypt_alloc_volume_key(data_len, NULL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ptr = (uint8_t*)data->key;
+
+	*ptr++ = 0x76;
+	*ptr++ = 0x30 + version;
+
+	if (vk_old)
+		ptr += blob_serialize(vk_old->key, vk_old->keylength, ptr);
+
+	if (vk_new)
+		ptr += blob_serialize(vk_new->key, vk_new->keylength, ptr);
+
+	if (!reenc_keyslot_serialize(hdr, ptr))
+		goto bad;
+	ptr += keyslot_data_len;
+
+	if (!backup_segments_serialize(hdr, ptr))
+		goto bad;
+	ptr += segments_data_len;
+
+	assert((size_t)(ptr - (uint8_t*)data->key) == data_len);
+
+	*verification_data = data;
+
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(data);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	uint8_t version,
+	struct volume_key *vks)
+{
+	int digest_reencrypt, keyslot_reencrypt, r;
+	struct volume_key *data;
+
+	keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
+	if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
+		return keyslot_reencrypt;
+
+	r = reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(cd, hdr, vks, version, &data);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", hdr, data);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(data);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	digest_reencrypt = r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot_reencrypt, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot_reencrypt, digest_reencrypt, 1, 0);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vks)
+{
+	int r, keyslot_reencrypt;
+	struct volume_key *data;
+	uint8_t version;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Verifying reencryption metadata.");
+
+	keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
+	if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
+		return keyslot_reencrypt;
+
+	if (LUKS2_config_get_reencrypt_version(hdr, &version))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(cd, hdr, vks, version, &data);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, data, keyslot_reencrypt);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(data);
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		if (r == -ENOENT)
+			log_dbg(cd, "Reencryption digest is missing.");
+		log_err(cd, _("Reencryption metadata is invalid."));
+	} else
+		log_dbg(cd, "Reencryption metadata verified.");
+
+	return r;
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_segment.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, internal segment handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2018-2021, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2018-2021, Ondrej Kozina
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2022 Ondrej Kozina
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -103,15 +103,17 @@ const char *json_segment_get_cipher(json_object *jobj_segment)
 	return json_object_get_string(jobj);
 }
 
-int json_segment_get_sector_size(json_object *jobj_segment)
+uint32_t json_segment_get_sector_size(json_object *jobj_segment)
 {
 	json_object *jobj;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!jobj_segment ||
             !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "sector_size", &jobj))
-		return -1;
+		return SECTOR_SIZE;
 
-	return json_object_get_int(jobj);
+	i = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+	return i < 0 ? SECTOR_SIZE : i;
 }
 
 static json_object *json_segment_get_flags(json_object *jobj_segment)
@@ -123,7 +125,7 @@ static json_object *json_segment_get_flags(json_object *jobj_segment)
 	return jobj;
 }
 
-static bool json_segment_contains_flag(json_object *jobj_segment, const char *flag_str, size_t len)
+bool json_segment_contains_flag(json_object *jobj_segment, const char *flag_str, size_t len)
 {
 	int r, i;
 	json_object *jobj, *jobj_flags = json_segment_get_flags(jobj_segment);
@@ -344,19 +346,11 @@ int LUKS2_segment_by_type(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type)
 int LUKS2_segment_first_unused_id(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
 {
 	json_object *jobj_segments;
-	int id, last_id = -1;
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_segments, slot, val) {
-		UNUSED(val);
-		id = atoi(slot);
-		if (id > last_id)
-			last_id = id;
-	}
-
-	return last_id + 1;
+	return json_object_object_length(jobj_segments);
 }
 
 int LUKS2_segment_set_flag(json_object *jobj_segment, const char *flag)
@@ -410,3 +404,23 @@ json_object *LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *flag)
 
 	return jobj_segment;
 }
+
+/* compares key characteristics of both segments */
+bool json_segment_cmp(json_object *jobj_segment_1, json_object *jobj_segment_2)
+{
+	const char *type = json_segment_type(jobj_segment_1);
+	const char *type2 = json_segment_type(jobj_segment_2);
+
+	if (!type || !type2)
+		return false;
+
+	if (strcmp(type, type2))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, "crypt"))
+		return (json_segment_get_sector_size(jobj_segment_1) == json_segment_get_sector_size(jobj_segment_2) &&
+			!strcmp(json_segment_get_cipher(jobj_segment_1),
+			        json_segment_get_cipher(jobj_segment_2)));
+
+	return true;
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_token.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, token handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -63,13 +63,17 @@ static void *token_dlvsym(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	char *error;
 	void *sym;
 
+#ifdef HAVE_DLVSYM
 	log_dbg(cd, "Loading symbol %s@%s.", symbol, version);
-
 	sym = dlvsym(handle, symbol, version);
+#else
+	log_dbg(cd, "Loading default version of symbol %s.", symbol);
+	sym = dlsym(handle, symbol);
+#endif
 	error = dlerror();
 
 	if (error)
-		log_dbg(cd, "Error: %s.", error);
+		log_dbg(cd, "%s", error);
 
 	return sym;
 }
@@ -81,12 +85,12 @@ static bool token_validate_v1(struct crypt_device *cd, const crypt_token_handler
 		return false;
 
 	if (!h->name) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Token handler does not provide name attribute.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Error: token handler does not provide name attribute.");
 		return false;
 	}
 
 	if (!h->open) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Token handler does not provide open function.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Error: token handler does not provide open function.");
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -103,7 +107,7 @@ static bool token_validate_v2(struct crypt_device *cd, const struct crypt_token_
 		return false;
 
 	if (!h->u.v2.version) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Token handler does not provide " CRYPT_TOKEN_ABI_VERSION " function.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Error: token handler does not provide " CRYPT_TOKEN_ABI_VERSION " function.");
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -157,7 +161,7 @@ crypt_token_load_external(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, struct cryp
 
 	h = dlopen(buf, RTLD_LAZY);
 	if (!h) {
-		log_dbg(NULL, "%s", dlerror());
+		log_dbg(cd, "%s", dlerror());
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	dlerror();
@@ -182,7 +186,7 @@ crypt_token_load_external(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, struct cryp
 	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
 		*buf = '\0';
 
-	log_dbg(cd, "Token handler %s-%s loaded sucessfuly.", token->name, buf);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Token handler %s-%s loaded successfully.", token->name, buf);
 
 	token->dlhandle = h;
 	ret->version = 2;
@@ -241,6 +245,7 @@ int crypt_token_register(const crypt_token_handler *handler)
 
 void crypt_token_unload_external_all(struct crypt_device *cd)
 {
+#if USE_EXTERNAL_TOKENS
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
@@ -254,6 +259,7 @@ void crypt_token_unload_external_all(struct crypt_device *cd)
 		if (dlclose(CONST_CAST(void *)token_handlers[i].u.v2.dlhandle))
 			log_dbg(cd, "%s", dlerror());
 	}
+#endif
 }
 
 static const void
@@ -417,10 +423,11 @@ static const char *token_json_to_string(json_object *jobj_token)
 		JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE);
 }
 
-static int token_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, json_object *jobj_token, int segment)
+static int token_is_usable(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, json_object *jobj_token, int segment, crypt_keyslot_priority minimal_priority)
 {
+	crypt_keyslot_priority keyslot_priority;
 	json_object *jobj_array;
-	int i, len, r = -ENOENT;
+	int i, keyslot, len, r = -ENOENT;
 
 	if (!jobj_token)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -436,14 +443,17 @@ static int token_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, json_object *jobj_token, int
 	if (len <= 0)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	/* no need to check anything */
-	if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
-		return 0;
-
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-		r = LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(hdr,
-				atoi(json_object_get_string(json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_array, i))),
-				segment);
+		keyslot = atoi(json_object_get_string(json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_array, i)));
+
+		keyslot_priority = LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(hdr, keyslot);
+		if (keyslot_priority == CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (keyslot_priority < minimal_priority)
+			continue;
+
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(hdr, keyslot, segment);
 		if (r != -ENOENT)
 			return r;
 	}
@@ -453,9 +463,9 @@ static int token_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, json_object *jobj_token, int
 
 static int translate_errno(struct crypt_device *cd, int ret_val, const char *type)
 {
-	if ((ret_val > 0 || ret_val == -EINVAL || ret_val == -ENOENT) && !is_builtin_candidate(type)) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "%s token handler returned %d. Changing to %d.", type, ret_val, -EPERM);
-		ret_val = -EPERM;
+	if ((ret_val > 0 || ret_val == -EINVAL || ret_val == -EPERM) && !is_builtin_candidate(type)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "%s token handler returned %d. Changing to %d.", type, ret_val, -ENOENT);
+		ret_val = -ENOENT;
 	}
 
 	return ret_val;
@@ -467,6 +477,7 @@ static int LUKS2_token_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	json_object *jobj_token,
 	const char *type,
 	int segment,
+	crypt_keyslot_priority priority,
 	const char *pin,
 	size_t pin_size,
 	char **buffer,
@@ -479,6 +490,7 @@ static int LUKS2_token_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	assert(token >= 0);
 	assert(jobj_token);
+	assert(priority >= 0);
 
 	if (type) {
 		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "type", &jobj_type))
@@ -487,10 +499,10 @@ static int LUKS2_token_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
-	r = token_for_segment(hdr, jobj_token, segment);
+	r = token_is_usable(hdr, jobj_token, segment, priority);
 	if (r < 0) {
 		if (r == -ENOENT)
-			log_dbg(cd, "Token %d unusable for segment %d.", token, segment);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Token %d unusable for segment %d with desired keyslot priority %d.", token, segment, priority);
 		return r;
 	}
 
@@ -529,17 +541,38 @@ static void LUKS2_token_buffer_free(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	}
 }
 
+static bool break_loop_retval(int r)
+{
+	if (r == -ENOENT || r == -EPERM || r == -EAGAIN || r == -ENOANO)
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void update_return_errno(int r, int *stored)
+{
+	if (*stored == -ENOANO)
+		return;
+	else if (r == -ENOANO)
+		*stored = r;
+	else if (r == -EAGAIN && *stored != -ENOANO)
+		*stored = r;
+	else if (r == -EPERM && (*stored != -ENOANO && *stored != -EAGAIN))
+		*stored = r;
+}
+
 static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int token,
 	int segment,
+	crypt_keyslot_priority priority,
 	const char *buffer,
 	size_t buffer_len,
 	struct volume_key **vk)
 {
+	crypt_keyslot_priority keyslot_priority;
 	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_token_keyslots, *jobj_type, *jobj;
 	unsigned int num = 0;
-	int i, r;
+	int i, r = -ENOENT, stored_retval = -ENOENT;
 
 	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
 	if (!jobj_token)
@@ -553,20 +586,160 @@ static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Try to open keyslot referenced in token */
-	r = -ENOENT;
 	for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_token_keyslots) && r < 0; i++) {
 		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_token_keyslots, i);
 		num = atoi(json_object_get_string(jobj));
+		keyslot_priority = LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(hdr, num);
+		if (keyslot_priority == CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (keyslot_priority < priority)
+			continue;
 		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to open keyslot %u with token %d (type %s).", num, token, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
 		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, num, segment, buffer, buffer_len, vk);
+		/* short circuit on fatal error */
+		if (r < 0 && r != -EPERM && r != -ENOENT)
+			return r;
+		/* save -EPERM in case no other keyslot is usable */
+		if (r == -EPERM)
+			stored_retval = r;
 	}
 
 	if (r < 0)
-		return r;
+		return stored_retval;
 
 	return num;
 }
 
+static bool token_is_blocked(int token, uint32_t *block_list)
+{
+	/* it is safe now, but have assert in case LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX grows */
+	assert(token >= 0 && (size_t)token < BITFIELD_SIZE(block_list));
+
+	return (*block_list & (1 << token));
+}
+
+static void token_block(int token, uint32_t *block_list)
+{
+	/* it is safe now, but have assert in case LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX grows */
+	assert(token >= 0 && (size_t)token < BITFIELD_SIZE(block_list));
+
+	*block_list |= (1 << token);
+}
+
+static int token_open_priority(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	json_object *jobj_tokens,
+	const char *type,
+	int segment,
+	crypt_keyslot_priority priority,
+	const char *pin,
+	size_t pin_size,
+	void *usrptr,
+	int *stored_retval,
+	uint32_t *block_list,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	char *buffer;
+	size_t buffer_size;
+	int token, r;
+
+	assert(stored_retval);
+	assert(block_list);
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_tokens, slot, val) {
+		token = atoi(slot);
+		if (token_is_blocked(token, block_list))
+			continue;
+		r = LUKS2_token_open(cd, hdr, token, val, type, segment, priority, pin, pin_size, &buffer, &buffer_size, usrptr);
+		if (!r) {
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(cd, hdr, token, segment, priority,
+							buffer, buffer_size, vk);
+			LUKS2_token_buffer_free(cd, token, buffer, buffer_size);
+		}
+
+		if (r == -ENOANO)
+			token_block(token, block_list);
+
+		if (break_loop_retval(r))
+			return r;
+
+		update_return_errno(r, stored_retval);
+	}
+
+	return *stored_retval;
+}
+
+static int token_open_any(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type, int segment, const char *pin, size_t pin_size, void *usrptr, struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_tokens;
+	int r, retval = -ENOENT;
+	uint32_t blocked = 0; /* bitmap with tokens blocked from loop by returning -ENOANO (wrong/missing pin) */
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens);
+
+	/* passing usrptr for CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN does not make sense without specific type */
+	if (!type)
+		usrptr = NULL;
+
+	r = token_open_priority(cd, hdr, jobj_tokens, type, segment, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_PREFER, pin, pin_size, usrptr, &retval, &blocked, vk);
+	if (break_loop_retval(r))
+		return r;
+
+	return token_open_priority(cd, hdr, jobj_tokens, type, segment, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL, pin, pin_size, usrptr, &retval, &blocked, vk);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_token_unlock_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int token,
+	const char *type,
+	const char *pin,
+	size_t pin_size,
+	uint32_t flags,
+	void *usrptr,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	char *buffer;
+	size_t buffer_size;
+	json_object *jobj_token;
+	int segment, r = -ENOENT;
+
+	assert(vk);
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY)
+		segment = CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT;
+	else {
+		segment = LUKS2_get_default_segment(hdr);
+		if (segment < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (token >= 0 && token < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX) {
+		if ((jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token))) {
+			r = LUKS2_token_open(cd, hdr, token, jobj_token, type, segment, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_IGNORE,  pin, pin_size, &buffer, &buffer_size, usrptr);
+			if (!r) {
+				r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(cd, hdr, token, segment, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_IGNORE,
+								buffer, buffer_size, vk);
+				LUKS2_token_buffer_free(cd, token, buffer, buffer_size);
+			}
+		}
+	} else if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN)
+		/*
+		 * return priorities (ordered form least to most significant):
+		 * ENOENT - unusable for activation (no token handler, invalid token metadata, not assigned to volume segment, etc)
+		 * EPERM  - usable but token provided passphrase did not not unlock any assigned keyslot
+		 * EAGAIN - usable but not ready (token HW is missing)
+		 * ENOANO - ready, but token pin is wrong or missing
+		 *
+		 * success (>= 0) or any other negative errno short-circuits token activation loop
+		 * immediately
+		 */
+		r = token_open_any(cd, hdr, type, segment, pin, pin_size, usrptr, vk);
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
 int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int token,
@@ -578,53 +751,15 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	void *usrptr)
 {
 	bool use_keyring;
-	char *buffer;
-	size_t buffer_size;
-	json_object *jobj_tokens, *jobj_token;
-	int keyslot, segment, r = -ENOENT;
+	int keyslot, r;
 	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
 
-	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY)
-		segment = CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT;
-	else {
-		segment = LUKS2_get_default_segment(hdr);
-		if (segment < 0)
-			return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	if (token >= 0 && token < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX) {
-		if ((jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token))) {
-			r = LUKS2_token_open(cd, hdr, token, jobj_token, type, segment, pin, pin_size, &buffer, &buffer_size, usrptr);
-			if (!r) {
-				r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(cd, hdr, token, segment,
-								buffer, buffer_size, &vk);
-				LUKS2_token_buffer_free(cd, token, buffer, buffer_size);
-			}
-		}
-	} else if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN) {
-		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens);
-
-		/* passing usrptr for CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN does not make sense without specific type */
-		if (!type)
-			usrptr = NULL;
-
-		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_tokens, slot, val) {
-			token = atoi(slot);
-			r = LUKS2_token_open(cd, hdr, token, val, type, segment, pin, pin_size, &buffer, &buffer_size, usrptr);
-			if (!r) {
-				r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(cd, hdr, token, segment,
-								buffer, buffer_size, &vk);
-				LUKS2_token_buffer_free(cd, token, buffer, buffer_size);
-			}
-			if (r != -ENOENT && r != -EPERM)
-				break;
-		}
-	} else
-		return -EINVAL;
-
+	r = LUKS2_token_unlock_volume_key(cd, hdr, token, type, pin, pin_size, flags, usrptr, &vk);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
+	assert(vk);
+
 	keyslot = r;
 
 	if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
@@ -662,8 +797,7 @@ void LUKS2_token_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int token)
 	}
 }
 
-int LUKS2_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-			   int token, const char **json)
+int LUKS2_token_json_get(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int token, const char **json)
 {
 	json_object *jobj_token;
 
@@ -778,8 +912,7 @@ static int token_is_assigned(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int token)
 	return -ENOENT;
 }
 
-int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-			    int keyslot, int token)
+int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int token)
 {
 	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX || token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;

lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, kernel keyring token
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Ondrej Kozina
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2022 Ondrej Kozina
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int LUKS2_token_keyring_json(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int LUKS2_token_keyring_get(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)), struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+int LUKS2_token_keyring_get(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int token, struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *keyring_params)
 {
 	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj;

lib/random.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * cryptsetup kernel RNG access functions
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -42,8 +42,7 @@ static int random_fd = -1;
 #define RANDOM_DEVICE_TIMEOUT	5
 
 /* URANDOM_DEVICE access */
-static int _get_urandom(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)),
-			char *buf, size_t len)
+static int _get_urandom(char *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	int r;
 	size_t old_len = len;
@@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ static int _get_urandom(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)),
 
 	assert(urandom_fd != -1);
 
-	while(len) {
+	while (len) {
 		r = read(urandom_fd, buf, len);
 		if (r == -1 && errno != EINTR)
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -178,13 +177,13 @@ int crypt_random_get(struct crypt_device *ctx, char *buf, size_t len, int qualit
 
 	switch(quality) {
 	case CRYPT_RND_NORMAL:
-		status = _get_urandom(ctx, buf, len);
+		status = _get_urandom(buf, len);
 		break;
 	case CRYPT_RND_SALT:
 		if (crypt_fips_mode())
 			status = crypt_backend_rng(buf, len, quality, 1);
 		else
-			status = _get_urandom(ctx, buf, len);
+			status = _get_urandom(buf, len);
 		break;
 	case CRYPT_RND_KEY:
 		if (crypt_fips_mode()) {
@@ -195,7 +194,7 @@ int crypt_random_get(struct crypt_device *ctx, char *buf, size_t len, int qualit
 				 crypt_random_default_key_rng();
 		switch (rng_type) {
 		case CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM:
-			status = _get_urandom(ctx, buf, len);
+			status = _get_urandom(buf, len);
 			break;
 		case CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM:
 			status = _get_random(ctx, buf, len);

lib/setup.c

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	r = crypt_backend_init();
+	r = crypt_backend_init(crypt_fips_mode());
 	if (r < 0)
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto backend."));
 
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static int keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(struct crypt_device *cd, int *keyslot)
 	switch (ki) {
 		case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID:
 			log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."),
-				*keyslot, LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1);
+				*keyslot, crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type) - 1);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		case CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE:
 			break;
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ static void _luks2_reload(struct crypt_device *cd)
 }
 
 static int _crypt_load_luks(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *requested_type,
-			    int require_header, int repair)
+			    bool quiet, bool repair)
 {
 	char *cipher_spec;
 	struct luks_phdr hdr = {};
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static int _crypt_load_luks(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *requested_type,
 				return r;
 		}
 
-		r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, require_header, repair, cd);
+		r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, !quiet, repair, cd);
 		if (r)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -829,6 +829,8 @@ static int _crypt_load_luks(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *requested_type,
 		r =  _crypt_load_luks2(cd, cd->type != NULL, repair);
 		if (!r)
 			device_set_block_size(crypt_data_device(cd), LUKS2_get_sector_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr));
+		else if (!quiet)
+			log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), mdata_device_path(cd));
 	} else {
 		if (version > 2)
 			log_err(cd, _("Unsupported LUKS version %d."), version);
@@ -972,8 +974,7 @@ static int _crypt_load_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int _crypt_load_bitlk(struct crypt_device *cd,
-			     struct bitlk_metadata *params __attribute__((unused)))
+static int _crypt_load_bitlk(struct crypt_device *cd)
 {
 	int r;
 
@@ -1025,7 +1026,7 @@ int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
-		r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 0);
+		r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, true, false);
 	} else if (isVERITY(requested_type)) {
 		if (cd->type && !isVERITY(cd->type)) {
 			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
@@ -1049,7 +1050,7 @@ int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd, params);
+		r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd);
 	} else
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1269,7 +1270,7 @@ static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
 		cd->u.loopaes.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength / key_nums;
 	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type) || isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
 		if (crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
-			r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, cd->type, 0, 0);
+			r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, cd->type, true, false);
 			if (r < 0) {
 				log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header does not match active device.");
 				crypt_set_null_type(cd);
@@ -1296,7 +1297,7 @@ static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
 		r = TCRYPT_init_by_name(cd, name, dmd.uuid, tgt, &cd->device,
 					&cd->u.tcrypt.params, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr);
 	} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
-		r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd, NULL);
+		r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd);
 		if (r < 0) {
 			log_dbg(cd, "BITLK device header not available.");
 			crypt_set_null_type(cd);
@@ -1742,6 +1743,16 @@ static int _crypt_format_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (params && params->sector_size)
 		sector_size_autodetect = false;
 
+	if (params && params->data_device) {
+		if (!cd->metadata_device)
+			cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
+		else
+			device_free(cd, cd->device);
+		cd->device = NULL;
+		if (device_alloc(cd, &cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
 	if (sector_size_autodetect) {
 		sector_size = device_optimal_encryption_sector_size(cd, crypt_data_device(cd));
 		log_dbg(cd, "Auto-detected optimal encryption sector size for device %s is %d bytes.",
@@ -1775,13 +1786,13 @@ static int _crypt_format_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			params->integrity_params->journal_integrity)
 				return -ENOTSUP;
 		}
-		if (!INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, integrity, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+		if (!INTEGRITY_tag_size(integrity, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
 			if (!strcmp(integrity, "none"))
 				integrity = NULL;
 			else
 				return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		integrity_key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, integrity);
+		integrity_key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(integrity);
 		if ((integrity_key_size < 0) || (integrity_key_size >= (int)volume_key_size)) {
 			log_err(cd, _("Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."));
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -1812,16 +1823,6 @@ static int _crypt_format_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
-	if (params && params->data_device) {
-		if (!cd->metadata_device)
-			cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
-		else
-			device_free(cd, cd->device);
-		cd->device = NULL;
-		if (device_alloc(cd, &cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
 	if (params && cd->metadata_device) {
 		/* For detached header the alignment is used directly as data offset */
 		if (!cd->data_offset)
@@ -1840,7 +1841,7 @@ static int _crypt_format_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	if (sector_size_autodetect) {
 		if (cd->data_offset && MISALIGNED(cd->data_offset, sector_size)) {
-			log_dbg(cd, "Data offset not alligned to sector size. Reverting to 512 bytes.");
+			log_dbg(cd, "Data offset not aligned to sector size. Reverting to 512 bytes.");
 			sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
 		} else if (MISALIGNED(dev_size - (uint64_t)required_alignment - (uint64_t)alignment_offset, sector_size)) {
 			/* underflow does not affect misalignment checks */
@@ -1860,7 +1861,7 @@ static int _crypt_format_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	}
 
 	if ((!integrity || integrity_key_size) && !crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher, cipher_mode) &&
-	    !INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, NULL, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+	    !INTEGRITY_tag_size(NULL, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
 		r = LUKS_check_cipher(cd, volume_key_size - integrity_key_size,
 				      cipher, cipher_mode);
 		if (r < 0)
@@ -2154,7 +2155,7 @@ static int _crypt_format_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			if (!(cd->u.verity.uuid = strdup(uuid)))
 				r = -ENOMEM;
 		} else
-			r = VERITY_UUID_generate(cd, &cd->u.verity.uuid);
+			r = VERITY_UUID_generate(&cd->u.verity.uuid);
 
 		if (!r)
 			r = VERITY_write_sb(cd, cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset,
@@ -2378,7 +2379,7 @@ int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Load with repair */
-	r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 1);
+	r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, false, true);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
@@ -2402,7 +2403,7 @@ static int _compare_volume_keys(struct volume_key *svk, unsigned skeyring_only,
 		return 1;
 
 	if (!skeyring_only && !tkeyring_only)
-		return memcmp(svk->key, tvk->key, svk->keylength);
+		return crypt_backend_memeq(svk->key, tvk->key, svk->keylength);
 
 	if (svk->key_description && tvk->key_description)
 		return strcmp(svk->key_description, tvk->key_description);
@@ -2435,7 +2436,7 @@ static int _compare_device_types(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected uuid prefix %s in target device.", tgt->uuid);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-	} else {
+	} else if (!isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
 		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device type %s for reload.", cd->type ?: "<empty>");
 		return -ENOTSUP;
 	}
@@ -2524,15 +2525,6 @@ static int _compare_integrity_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* unsupported underneath dm-crypt with auth. encryption */
-	if (src->u.integrity.meta_device || tgt->u.integrity.meta_device)
-		return -ENOTSUP;
-
-	if (src->size != tgt->size) {
-		log_dbg(cd, "Device size parameters do not match.");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
 	if (device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device) <= 0) {
 		log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -2605,13 +2597,13 @@ static int _reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 
 	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
 				  DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
-				  DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &tdmd);
+				  DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS | DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEY, &tdmd);
 	if (r < 0) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (!single_segment(&tdmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT || tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+	if (!single_segment(&tdmd) || (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY) || (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && tgt->u.crypt.tag_size)) {
 		r = -ENOTSUP;
 		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
 		goto out;
@@ -2631,11 +2623,11 @@ static int _reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 	else
 		sdmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
 
-	if (sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+	if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
 		r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(tgt->u.crypt.vk, src->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
 		if (r)
 			goto out;
-	} else {
+	} else if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
 		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
 		tgt->u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(src->u.crypt.vk->keylength, src->u.crypt.vk->key);
 		if (!tgt->u.crypt.vk) {
@@ -2644,8 +2636,15 @@ static int _reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 		}
 	}
 
-	r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
-				src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+	if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+		r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+					src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+	else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+		r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+					src->u.integrity.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
 	if (r)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -2709,6 +2708,10 @@ static int _reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/* unsupported underneath dm-crypt with auth. encryption */
+	if (sdmdi->segment.u.integrity.meta_device || tdmdi.segment.u.integrity.meta_device)
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
 	src = &sdmd->segment;
 	srci = &sdmdi->segment;
 
@@ -2830,6 +2833,9 @@ int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
 {
 	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdq, dmd = {};
 	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmdq.segment;
+	struct crypt_params_integrity params = {};
+	uint32_t supported_flags = 0;
+	uint64_t old_size;
 	int r;
 
 	/*
@@ -2848,12 +2854,12 @@ int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
 
 	log_dbg(cd, "Resizing device %s to %" PRIu64 " sectors.", name, new_size);
 
-	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &dmdq);
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS | DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_JOURNAL_MAC_KEY, &dmdq);
 	if (r < 0) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (!single_segment(&dmdq) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT) {
+	if (!single_segment(&dmdq) || (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)) {
 		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
@@ -2885,12 +2891,52 @@ int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
 			log_err(cd, _("Cannot resize loop device."));
 	}
 
+
+	/*
+	 * Integrity device metadata are maintained by the kernel. We need to
+	 * reload the device (with the same parameters) and let the kernel
+	 * calculate the maximum size of integrity device and store it in the
+	 * superblock.
+	 */
+	if (!new_size && tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+		r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+					   crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &old_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+
+		dmd.size = dmdq.size;
+		dmd.flags = dmdq.flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE;
+
+		r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &params);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd.segment, 0, dmdq.segment.size,
+				crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+				crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+				crypt_get_sector_size(cd), tgt->u.integrity.vk, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, &params);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+		r = _reload_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+				crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &new_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		log_dbg(cd, "Maximum integrity device size from kernel %" PRIu64, new_size);
+
+		if (old_size == new_size && new_size == dmdq.size && !dm_flags(cd, tgt->type, &supported_flags) && !(supported_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RESIZE_SUPPORTED))
+			log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Maximum size already set or kernel doesn't support resize.\n"));
+	}
+
 	r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), DEV_OK,
-				crypt_get_data_offset(cd), &new_size, &dmdq.flags);
+			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), &new_size, &dmdq.flags);
 	if (r)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (MISALIGNED(new_size, tgt->u.crypt.sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+	if (MISALIGNED(new_size, (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT ? tgt->u.crypt.sector_size : tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
@@ -2905,13 +2951,27 @@ int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
 	dmd.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
 	dmd.size = new_size;
 	dmd.flags = dmdq.flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
-	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, new_size, crypt_data_device(cd),
-			tgt->u.crypt.vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd),
-			crypt_get_iv_offset(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
-			crypt_get_integrity(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
-			crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
-	if (r < 0)
-		goto out;
+
+	if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+		r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, new_size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+				tgt->u.crypt.vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd),
+				crypt_get_iv_offset(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+				crypt_get_integrity(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+				crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	} else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+		r = crypt_get_integrity_info(cd, &params);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd.segment, 0, new_size,
+				crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+				crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+				crypt_get_sector_size(cd), tgt->u.integrity.vk, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, &params);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	if (new_size == dmdq.size) {
 		log_dbg(cd, "Device has already requested size %" PRIu64
@@ -2924,6 +2984,9 @@ int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
 			r = LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0, 0);
 		if (!r)
 			r = _reload_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+
+		if (r && tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY && !dm_flags(cd, tgt->type, &supported_flags) && !(supported_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RESIZE_SUPPORTED))
+			log_err(cd, _("Resize failed, the kernel doesn't support it."));
 	}
 out:
 	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
@@ -2976,6 +3039,22 @@ int crypt_set_label(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *label, const char *subs
 	return LUKS2_hdr_labels(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, label, subsystem, 1);
 }
 
+const char *crypt_get_label(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return cd->u.luks2.hdr.label;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_subsystem(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return cd->u.luks2.hdr.subsystem;
+}
+
 int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			const char *requested_type,
 			const char *backup_file)
@@ -2989,7 +3068,7 @@ int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Load with repair */
-	r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 0);
+	r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, false, false);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
@@ -3055,7 +3134,7 @@ int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		r = -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!r)
-		r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, version == 1 ? CRYPT_LUKS1 : CRYPT_LUKS2, 1, 1);
+		r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, version == 1 ? CRYPT_LUKS1 : CRYPT_LUKS2, false, true);
 
 	return r;
 }
@@ -3081,7 +3160,7 @@ void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	if (!cd)
 		return;
 
-	log_dbg(cd, "Releasing crypt device %s context.", mdata_device_path(cd));
+	log_dbg(cd, "Releasing crypt device %s context.", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "empty");
 
 	dm_backend_exit(cd);
 	crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
@@ -3200,8 +3279,7 @@ static int resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
 		if (digest < 0)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd,
-					&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, digest);
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, vk, digest);
 		if (r < 0)
 			return r;
 	}
@@ -3387,6 +3465,40 @@ int crypt_resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	return r;
 }
 
+int crypt_resume_by_token_pin(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+	const char *type, int token, const char *pin, size_t pin_size,
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int r, keyslot;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s by token (%s type) %d.",
+		name, type ?: "any", token);
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET, 0)))
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_token_unlock_volume_key(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, type, pin, pin_size, 0, usrptr, &vk);
+	keyslot = r;
+	if (r >= 0)
+		r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
 /*
  * Keyslot manipulation
  */
@@ -3901,7 +4013,7 @@ int create_or_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tgt = &dmd->segment;
-	if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+	if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* drop CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH flag if any device is inactive */
@@ -3912,12 +4024,27 @@ int create_or_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 	if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)
 		r = _reload_device(cd, name, dmd);
 	else {
-		device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
+		if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+			device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
 
-		r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
+			r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
 					tgt->u.crypt.offset, &dmd->size, &dmd->flags);
-		if (!r) {
-			tgt->size = dmd->size;
+			if (!r) {
+				tgt->size = dmd->size;
+				r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+			}
+		} else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY) {
+			r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL,
+					tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmd->flags);
+			if (r)
+				return r;
+
+			if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
+				r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+				if (r)
+					return r;
+			}
+
 			r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
 		}
 	}
@@ -3955,25 +4082,6 @@ out:
 	return r;
 }
 
-static int load_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vks)
-{
-	int r;
-	struct volume_key *vk = vks;
-
-	while (vk) {
-		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk));
-		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
-		vk = crypt_volume_key_next(vk);
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* See fixmes in _open_and_activate_luks2 */
-int update_reencryption_flag(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable, bool commit);
-
-/* TODO: This function should 1:1 with pre-reencryption code */
 static int _open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
 	const char *name,
@@ -4017,6 +4125,22 @@ out:
 	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
 }
 
+#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
+static int load_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vks)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct volume_key *vk = vks;
+
+	while (vk) {
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk));
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		vk = crypt_volume_key_next(vk);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int _open_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
@@ -4099,7 +4223,7 @@ static int _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH) {
 		r = LUKS2_reencrypt_locked_recovery_by_passphrase(cd, keyslot,
-				keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
+				keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vks);
 		if (r < 0) {
 			log_err(cd, _("LUKS2 reencryption recovery failed."));
 			goto out;
@@ -4131,6 +4255,12 @@ static int _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			keyslot = r;
 	}
 
+	if (r >= 0) {
+		r = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
 	log_dbg(cd, "Entering clean reencryption state mode.");
 
 	if (r >= 0)
@@ -4158,8 +4288,9 @@ static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint32_t flags)
 {
 	crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
-	int r;
+	int r, rv;
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr = &cd->u.luks2.hdr;
+	struct volume_key *vks = NULL;
 
 	ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
 	if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
@@ -4169,15 +4300,45 @@ static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		if (name)
 			r = _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(cd, hdr, keyslot, name, passphrase,
 					passphrase_size, flags);
-		else
+		else {
 			r = _open_all_keys(cd, hdr, keyslot, passphrase,
-					   passphrase_size, flags, NULL);
+					   passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
+			if (r < 0)
+				return r;
+
+			rv = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
+			crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
+			if (rv < 0)
+				return rv;
+		}
 	} else
 		r = _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase,
 				passphrase_size, flags);
 
 	return r;
 }
+#else
+static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+
+	ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+	if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+		log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	return _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+}
+#endif
 
 static int _activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *name,
@@ -4527,7 +4688,10 @@ int crypt_activate_by_signed_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s by %skey.", name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "", signature ? "signed " : "");
+	if (name)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Activating volume %s by %skey.", name, signature ? "signed " : "");
+	else
+		log_dbg(cd, "Checking volume by key.");
 
 	if (cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE && !signature) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Root hash signature required."));
@@ -4821,10 +4985,6 @@ int crypt_volume_key_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	else
 		r = -EINVAL;
 
-
-	if (r == -EPERM)
-		log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
-
 	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
 
 	return r >= 0 ? 0 : r;
@@ -4903,13 +5063,6 @@ crypt_status_info crypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
 	return CRYPT_INACTIVE;
 }
 
-static void hexprint(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *d, int n, const char *sep)
-{
-	int i;
-	for(i = 0; i < n; i++)
-		log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", (const char)d[i], sep);
-}
-
 static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -4922,12 +5075,12 @@ static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	log_std(cd, "Payload offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset);
 	log_std(cd, "MK bits:       \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes * 8);
 	log_std(cd, "MK digest:     \t");
-	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, " ");
+	crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, " ", 0, NULL);
 	log_std(cd, "\n");
 	log_std(cd, "MK salt:       \t");
-	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+	crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
 	log_std(cd, "\n               \t");
-	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt+LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+	crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt+LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
 	log_std(cd, "\n");
 	log_std(cd, "MK iterations: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestIterations);
 	log_std(cd, "UUID:          \t%s\n\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid);
@@ -4937,11 +5090,11 @@ static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
 			log_std(cd, "\tIterations:         \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
 				cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
 			log_std(cd, "\tSalt:               \t");
-			hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt,
-				 LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+			crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt,
+				 LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
 			log_std(cd, "\n\t                      \t");
-			hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt +
-				 LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+			crypt_log_hex(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt +
+				 LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ", 0, NULL);
 			log_std(cd, "\n");
 
 			log_std(cd, "\tKey material offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n",
@@ -4955,29 +5108,6 @@ static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int _verity_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
-{
-	log_std(cd, "VERITY header information for %s\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
-	log_std(cd, "UUID:            \t%s\n", cd->u.verity.uuid ?: "");
-	log_std(cd, "Hash type:       \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type);
-	log_std(cd, "Data blocks:     \t%" PRIu64 "\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size);
-	log_std(cd, "Data block size: \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size);
-	log_std(cd, "Hash block size: \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size);
-	log_std(cd, "Hash algorithm:  \t%s\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
-	log_std(cd, "Salt:            \t");
-	if (cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size)
-		hexprint(cd, cd->u.verity.hdr.salt, cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size, "");
-	else
-		log_std(cd, "-");
-	log_std(cd, "\n");
-	if (cd->u.verity.root_hash) {
-		log_std(cd, "Root hash:      \t");
-		hexprint(cd, cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size, "");
-		log_std(cd, "\n");
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
 int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
 {
 	if (!cd)
@@ -4987,7 +5117,9 @@ int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
 		return LUKS2_hdr_dump(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
 	else if (isVERITY(cd->type))
-		return _verity_dump(cd);
+		return VERITY_dump(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr,
+				   cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size,
+				   cd->u.verity.fec_device);
 	else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
 		return TCRYPT_dump(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
 	else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
@@ -5115,13 +5247,15 @@ const char *crypt_get_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd)
 /* INTERNAL only */
 int crypt_get_integrity_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
 {
+	int key_size = 0;
+
 	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
-		return INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+		key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd));
 
 	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
-		return INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+		key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd));
 
-	return 0;
+	return key_size > 0 ? key_size : 0;
 }
 
 /* INTERNAL only */
@@ -5131,7 +5265,7 @@ int crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
 		return cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size;
 
 	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
-		return INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+		return INTEGRITY_tag_size(crypt_get_integrity(cd),
 					  crypt_get_cipher(cd),
 					  crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
 	return 0;
@@ -5485,7 +5619,7 @@ crypt_keyslot_priority crypt_keyslot_get_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int k
 		return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
 
 	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
-		return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+		return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
 
 	return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
 }
@@ -5577,7 +5711,7 @@ int crypt_get_integrity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 		ip->integrity = LUKS2_get_integrity(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
 		ip->integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
-		ip->tag_size = INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, ip->integrity, crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+		ip->tag_size = INTEGRITY_tag_size(ip->integrity, crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
 
 		ip->journal_integrity = NULL;
 		ip->journal_integrity_key_size = 0;
@@ -5690,6 +5824,10 @@ int crypt_activate_by_token_pin(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) && name)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
 	return LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, name, type, pin, pin_size, flags, usrptr);
 }
 
@@ -5711,7 +5849,7 @@ int crypt_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char **json)
 	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
 		return r;
 
-	return LUKS2_token_json_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json) ?: token;
+	return LUKS2_token_json_get(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json) ?: token;
 }
 
 int crypt_token_json_set(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char *json)
@@ -5777,7 +5915,7 @@ int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	return LUKS2_token_keyring_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, params);
+	return LUKS2_token_keyring_get(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, params);
 }
 
 int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -5829,7 +5967,7 @@ int crypt_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
 	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
 		return r;
 
-	return LUKS2_token_is_assigned(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token);
+	return LUKS2_token_is_assigned(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token);
 }
 
 /* Internal only */
@@ -6198,7 +6336,13 @@ void crypt_serialize_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd)
 crypt_reencrypt_info crypt_reencrypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
 {
-	if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+	if (params)
+		memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
+
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+		return CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
 		return CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE;
 
 	if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET, CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT))

lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible) and VeraCrypt volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -264,8 +264,8 @@ static int TCRYPT_hdr_from_disk(struct crypt_device *cd,
  */
 static void TCRYPT_swab_le(char *buf)
 {
-	uint32_t *l = (uint32_t*)&buf[0];
-	uint32_t *r = (uint32_t*)&buf[4];
+	uint32_t *l = VOIDP_CAST(uint32_t*)&buf[0];
+	uint32_t *r = VOIDP_CAST(uint32_t*)&buf[4];
 	*l = swab32(*l);
 	*r = swab32(*r);
 }
@@ -588,7 +588,6 @@ static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
 				    (tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt_pim_mult * params->veracrypt_pim);
 		} else
 			iterations = tcrypt_kdf[i].iterations;
-
 		/* Derive header key */
 		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: trying KDF: %s-%s-%d%s.",
 			tcrypt_kdf[i].name, tcrypt_kdf[i].hash, tcrypt_kdf[i].iterations,
@@ -601,6 +600,8 @@ static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		if (r < 0) {
 			log_verbose(cd, _("PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."),
 				      tcrypt_kdf[i].hash);
+			skipped++;
+			r = -EPERM;
 			continue;
 		}
 
@@ -609,16 +610,18 @@ static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		if (r == -ENOENT) {
 			skipped++;
 			r = -EPERM;
+			continue;
 		}
 		if (r != -EPERM)
 			break;
 	}
 
-	if ((r < 0 && r != -EPERM && skipped && skipped == i) || r == -ENOTSUP) {
+	if ((r < 0 && skipped && skipped == i) || r == -ENOTSUP) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Required kernel crypto interface not available."));
 #ifdef ENABLE_AF_ALG
 		log_err(cd, _("Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."));
 #endif
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
 	}
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -827,7 +830,10 @@ int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			strncpy(dm_name, name, sizeof(dm_name)-1);
 			dmd.flags = flags;
 		} else {
-			snprintf(dm_name, sizeof(dm_name), "%s_%d", name, i-1);
+			if (snprintf(dm_name, sizeof(dm_name), "%s_%d", name, i-1) < 0) {
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
 			dmd.flags = flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE;
 		}
 
@@ -835,8 +841,10 @@ int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 				vk->key, hdr->d.keys);
 
 		if (algs->chain_count != i) {
-			snprintf(dm_dev_name, sizeof(dm_dev_name), "%s/%s_%d",
-				 dm_get_dir(), name, i);
+			if (snprintf(dm_dev_name, sizeof(dm_dev_name), "%s/%s_%d", dm_get_dir(), name, i) < 0) {
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
 			r = device_alloc(cd, &device, dm_dev_name);
 			if (r)
 				break;

lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible)  header definition
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2022 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public