Update README.

crypt_reencrypt_status() returns this flag if old
online-reencrypt requirement is detected and reencryption
keyslot digest is missing.

crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase() with same flag applied
repairs (upgrade) reencryption metadata so that
automatic reencryption recovery during activation
is again possible and reencryption operation can be resumed
post CVE-2021-4122 fix.

.gitignore

@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ missing
 po/Makevars.template
 po/POTFILES
 po/Rules-quot
-po/*.pot
 po/*.header
 po/*.sed
 po/*.sin
@@ -45,3 +44,12 @@ scripts/cryptsetup.conf
 stamp-h1
 veritysetup
 tests/valglog.*
+*/*.dirstamp
+*-debug-luks2-backup*
+tests/api-test
+tests/api-test-2
+tests/differ
+tests/luks1-images
+tests/tcrypt-images
+tests/unit-utils-io
+tests/vectors-test

.gitlab/issue_templates/Bug.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+### Issue description
+<!-- Please, shortly describe the issue here. -->
+
+### Steps for reproducing the issue
+<!-- How it can be reproduced? Include all important steps. -->
+
+### Additional info
+<!-- Please mention what distribution you are using. -->
+
+### Debug log
+<!-- Paste a debug log of the failing command (add --debug option) between the markers below (to keep raw debug format).-->
+```
+Output with --debug option:
+
+```

.gitlab/issue_templates/Documentation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+### Documentation issue
+<!-- Please, shortly describe the issue in documentation here. -->
+
+### Additional info
+<!-- Please mention what cryptsetup version you are using. -->

.gitlab/issue_templates/Feature.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+### New feature description
+<!-- Please, shortly describe the requested feature here. -->
+
+### Additional info
+<!-- Please mention what distribution and cryptsetup version you are using. -->

.travis-functions.sh

@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ function check_nonroot
 	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
 
 	configure_travis \
-		--enable-python \
 		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
 		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
 		"$cfg_opts" \
@@ -44,13 +43,6 @@ function check_nonroot
 
 	$MAKE || return
 
-	sudo modprobe dm-crypt
-	sudo modprobe dm-verity
-	sudo modprobe dm-integrity
-	uname -a
-	sudo dmsetup version
-	sudo dmsetup targets
-
 	make check
 }
 
@@ -61,7 +53,6 @@ function check_root
 	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
 
     configure_travis \
-		--enable-python \
 		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
 		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
 		"$cfg_opts" \
@@ -69,13 +60,6 @@ function check_root
 
 	$MAKE || return
 
-	sudo modprobe dm-crypt
-	sudo modprobe dm-verity
-	sudo modprobe dm-integrity
-	uname -a
-	sudo dmsetup version
-	sudo dmsetup targets
-
 	# FIXME: we should use -E option here
 	sudo make check
 }
@@ -87,7 +71,6 @@ function check_nonroot_compile_only
 	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
 
 	configure_travis \
-		--enable-python \
 		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
 		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
 		"$cfg_opts" \
@@ -101,7 +84,6 @@ function travis_install_script
 	# install some packages from Ubuntu's default sources
 	sudo apt-get -qq update
 	sudo apt-get install -qq >/dev/null \
-		python-dev \
 		sharutils \
 		libgcrypt20-dev \
 		libssl-dev \
@@ -120,7 +102,13 @@ function travis_install_script
 		keyutils \
 		libjson-c-dev \
 		libblkid-dev \
+		dkms \
+		linux-headers-$(uname -r) \
+		linux-modules-extra-$(uname -r) \
 		|| return
+
+	# For VeraCrypt test
+	sudo apt-get install gost-crypto-dkms
 }
 
 function travis_before_script
@@ -154,6 +142,13 @@ function travis_script
 	openssl_compile)
 		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=openssl"
 		;;
+	kernel)
+		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=kernel" && \
+		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=kernel"
+		;;
+	kernel_compile)
+		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=kernel"
+		;;
 	*)
 		echo "error, check environment (travis.yml)" >&2
 		false

.travis.yml

@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
 language: c
 
 sudo: required
-dist: trusty
+os: linux
+dist: focal
+group: edge
 
 compiler:
   - gcc
 
 env:
-  - MAKE_CHECK="gcrypt"
+  # MAKE_CHECK="gcrypt"
   - MAKE_CHECK="openssl"
+  # MAKE_CHECK="kernel"
 
 branches:
   only:
     - master
     - wip-luks2
+    - v2.3.x
 
 before_install:
   - uname -a

AUTHORS

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>

Makefile.am

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 EXTRA_DIST = COPYING.LGPL FAQ docs misc
 SUBDIRS = po tests
-TESTS =
 CLEANFILES =
 DISTCLEAN_TARGETS =
 
@@ -16,6 +15,8 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS = \
 AM_CFLAGS = -Wall
 AM_LDFLAGS =
 
+LDADD = $(LTLIBINTL) -lm
+
 tmpfilesddir = @DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR@
 
 noinst_LTLIBRARIES =
@@ -25,8 +26,6 @@ tmpfilesd_DATA =
 
 include man/Makemodule.am
 
-include python/Makemodule.am
-
 include scripts/Makemodule.am
 
 if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2
@@ -40,7 +39,6 @@ include src/Makemodule.am
 ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4
 
 DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS = 	\
-	--enable-python		\
 	--with-tmpfilesdir=$$dc_install_base/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d \
 	--enable-internal-argon2 --enable-internal-sse-argon2
 

README

@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ FAQ:
 MAILING LIST:
 
       E-MAIL: dm-crypt@saout.de
-      URL:    http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
+      URL:    https://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
+      ARCHIVE: https://lore.kernel.org/dm-crypt/
 
 DOWNLOAD:
 
@@ -28,4 +29,4 @@ SOURCE CODE:
 NLS (PO TRANSLATIONS):
 
       PO files are maintained by:
-          http://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html
+          https://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html

README.md

@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
 
 What the ...?
 =============
-**Cryptsetup** is utility used to conveniently setup disk encryption based
-on [DMCrypt](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt) kernel module.
+**Cryptsetup** is a utility used to conveniently set up disk encryption based
+on the [DMCrypt](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt) kernel module.
 
-These include **plain** **dm-crypt** volumes, **LUKS** volumes, **loop-AES**
-and **TrueCrypt** (including **VeraCrypt** extension) format.
+These include **plain** **dm-crypt** volumes, **LUKS** volumes, **loop-AES**,
+**TrueCrypt** (including **VeraCrypt** extension) and **BitLocker** formats.
 
-Project also includes **veritysetup** utility used to conveniently setup
+The project also includes a **veritysetup** utility used to conveniently setup
 [DMVerity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity) block integrity checking kernel module
 and, since version 2.0,  **integritysetup** to setup
 [DMIntegrity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMIntegrity) block integrity kernel module.
@@ -18,10 +18,12 @@ LUKS Design
 -----------
 **LUKS** is the standard for Linux hard disk encryption. By providing a standard on-disk-format, it does not  
 only facilitate compatibility among distributions, but also provides secure management of multiple user passwords.  
-In contrast to existing solution, LUKS stores all setup necessary setup information in the partition header,  
-enabling the user to transport or migrate his data seamlessly.
+LUKS stores all necessary setup information in the partition header, enabling to transport or migrate data seamlessly.
 
-Last version of the LUKS format specification is
+Last version of the LUKS2 format specification is
+[available here](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs).
+
+Last version of the LUKS1 format specification is
 [available here](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/LUKS_docs/on-disk-format.pdf).
 
 Why LUKS?
@@ -42,51 +44,30 @@ Download
 --------
 All release tarballs and release notes are hosted on [kernel.org](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/).
 
-**The latest cryptsetup version is 2.0.3**
-  * [cryptsetup-2.0.3.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.3.tar.xz)
-  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.0.3.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.3.tar.sign)
+**The latest stable cryptsetup version is 2.4.3**
+  * [cryptsetup-2.4.3.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/cryptsetup-2.4.3.tar.xz)
+  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.4.3.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/cryptsetup-2.4.3.tar.sign)
     _(You need to decompress file first to check signature.)_
-  * [Cryptsetup 2.0.3 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.3-ReleaseNotes).
+  * [Cryptsetup 2.4.3 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/v2.4.3-ReleaseNotes).
 
 Previous versions
- * [Version 2.0.2](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.2.tar.xz) -
-   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.2.tar.sign) -
-   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.2-ReleaseNotes).
- * [Version 2.0.1](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.1.tar.xz) -
-   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.1.tar.sign) -
-   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.1-ReleaseNotes).
- * [Version 2.0.0](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.0.tar.xz) -
-   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.0.tar.sign) -
-   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.0-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 2.3.7](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.7.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.7.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/v2.3.7-ReleaseNotes).
  * [Version 1.7.5](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.5.tar.xz) -
    [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.5.tar.sign) -
    [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes).
- * [Version 1.7.4](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.4.tar.xz) -
-   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.4.tar.sign) -
-   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes).
- * [Version 1.7.3](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.3.tar.xz) -
-   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.3.tar.sign) -
-   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes).
- * [Version 1.7.2](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.2.tar.xz) -
-   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.2.tar.sign) -
-   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.2-ReleaseNotes).
- * [Version 1.7.1](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.xz) -
-   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.sign) -
-   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes).
- * [Version 1.7.0](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.0.tar.xz) -
-   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.0.tar.sign) -
-   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes).
 
 Source and API docs
 -------------------
 For development version code, please refer to [source](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master) page,
 mirror on [kernel.org](https://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git/) or [GitHub](https://github.com/mbroz/cryptsetup).
 
-For libcryptsetup documentation see [libcryptsetup API](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/API/index.html) page.
+For libcryptsetup documentation see [libcryptsetup API](https://mbroz.fedorapeople.org/libcryptsetup_API/) page.
 
 The libcryptsetup API/ABI changes are tracked in [compatibility report](https://abi-laboratory.pro/tracker/timeline/cryptsetup/).
 
-NLS PO files are maintained by [TranslationProject](http://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html).
+NLS PO files are maintained by [TranslationProject](https://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html).
 
 Help!
 -----
@@ -95,5 +76,5 @@ For cryptsetup and LUKS related questions, please use the dm-crypt mailing list,
 
 If you want to subscribe just send an empty mail to [dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de).
 
-You can also browse [list archive](http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/) or read it through
-[web interface](https://marc.info/?l=dm-crypt).
+You can also browse [list archive](https://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/) or read and search it through
+[web interface on lore.kernel.org](https://lore.kernel.org/dm-crypt/) or alternatively on [marc.info](https://marc.info/?l=dm-crypt).

autogen.sh

@@ -9,16 +9,23 @@ DIE=0
 (autopoint --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
   echo "**Error**: You must have autopoint installed."
-  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution,"
-  echo "or see http://www.gnu.org/software/gettext"
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
   DIE=1
 }
 
+
+(msgfmt --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+  echo
+  echo "**Warning**: You should have gettext installed."
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
+  echo "To disable translation, you can also use --disable-nls"
+  echo "configure option."
+}
+
 (autoconf --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
-  echo "**Error**: You must have autoconf installed to."
-  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution,"
-  echo "or get the source tarball at ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
+  echo "**Error**: You must have autoconf installed."
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
   DIE=1
 }
 
@@ -26,8 +33,7 @@ DIE=0
   (libtool --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
     echo
     echo "**Error**: You must have libtool installed."
-    echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
-    echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
+    echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
     DIE=1
   }
 }
@@ -35,8 +41,7 @@ DIE=0
 (automake --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
   echo "**Error**: You must have automake installed."
-  echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
-  echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
   DIE=1
   NO_AUTOMAKE=yes
 }
@@ -47,8 +52,6 @@ test -n "$NO_AUTOMAKE" || (aclocal --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
   echo "**Error**: Missing aclocal.  The version of automake"
   echo "installed doesn't appear recent enough."
-  echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
-  echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
   DIE=1
 }
 

configure.ac

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 AC_PREREQ([2.67])
-AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[2.0.4])
+AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[2.3.7])
 
 dnl library version from <major>.<minor>.<release>[-<suffix>]
 LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION=$(echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | cut -f1 -d-)
-LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=15:0:3
+LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=18:0:6
 
 AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR(src/cryptsetup.c)
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ AC_PROG_MAKE_SET
 AC_ENABLE_STATIC(no)
 LT_INIT
 PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
+AM_ICONV
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl define PKG_CHECK_VAR for old pkg-config <= 0.28
@@ -56,14 +57,21 @@ dnl ==========================================================================
 AC_C_RESTRICT
 
 AC_HEADER_DIRENT
-AC_HEADER_STDC
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
 	sys/sysmacros.h sys/statvfs.h ctype.h unistd.h locale.h byteswap.h endian.h stdint.h)
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_CLOEXEC],,[AC_DEFINE([O_CLOEXEC],[0], [Defined to 0 if not provided])],
+[[
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+]])
 
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(uuid/uuid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
 AC_CHECK_HEADER(libdevmapper.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the device-mapper library.])])
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(keyring, AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-keyring],[disable kernel keyring support and builtin kernel keyring token]),[], [enable_keyring=yes])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([keyring],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-keyring], [disable kernel keyring support and builtin kernel keyring token]),
+	[], [enable_keyring=yes])
 if test "x$enable_keyring" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/keyctl.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with kernel keyring service compiled.])])
 
@@ -84,7 +92,7 @@ if test "x$enable_keyring" = "xyes"; then
 
 	AC_DEFINE(KERNEL_KEYRING, 1, [Enable kernel keyring service support])
 fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(KERNEL_KEYRING, test x$enable_keyring = xyes)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(KERNEL_KEYRING, test "x$enable_keyring" = "xyes")
 
 saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 AC_CHECK_LIB(uuid, uuid_clear, ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
@@ -92,9 +100,9 @@ AC_SUBST(UUID_LIBS, $LIBS)
 LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime],[rt posix4])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign clock_gettime posix_fallocate])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign clock_gettime posix_fallocate explicit_bzero])
 
-if test "x$enable_largefile" = "xno" ; then
+if test "x$enable_largefile" = "xno"; then
   AC_MSG_ERROR([Building with --disable-largefile is not supported, it can cause data corruption.])
 fi
 
@@ -120,12 +128,10 @@ AC_SUBST(POPT_LIBS, $LIBS)
 LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
-dnl FIPS extensions (only for RHEL)
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([fips], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fips],[enable FIPS mode restrictions]),
-[with_fips=$enableval],
-[with_fips=no])
-
-if test "x$with_fips" = "xyes"; then
+dnl FIPS extensions
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([fips],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fips], [enable FIPS mode restrictions]))
+if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_FIPS, 1, [Enable FIPS mode restrictions])
 
 	if test "x$enable_static" = "xyes" -o "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes" ; then
@@ -134,20 +140,25 @@ if test "x$with_fips" = "xyes"; then
 fi
 
 AC_DEFUN([NO_FIPS], [
-	if test "x$with_fips" = "xyes"; then
+	if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([This option is not compatible with FIPS.])
 	fi
 ])
 
+dnl LUKS2 online reencryption
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([luks2-reencryption],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-luks2-reencryption], [disable LUKS2 online reencryption extension]),
+	[], [enable_luks2_reencryption=yes])
+if test "x$enable_luks2_reencryption" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION, 1, [Use LUKS2 online reencryption extension])
+fi
+
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl pwquality library (cryptsetup CLI only)
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([pwquality],
-	      AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pwquality],
-			     [enable password quality checking using pwquality library]),
-	      [with_pwquality=$enableval],
-	      [with_pwquality=no])
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pwquality], [enable password quality checking using pwquality library]))
 
-if test "x$with_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
+if test "x$enable_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PWQUALITY, 1, [Enable password quality checking using pwquality library])
 	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([PWQUALITY], [pwquality >= 1.0.0],,
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need pwquality library.]))
@@ -159,13 +170,11 @@ fi
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl passwdqc library (cryptsetup CLI only)
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([passwdqc],
-	      AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-passwdqc@<:@=CONFIG_PATH@:>@],
-			     [enable password quality checking using passwdqc library (optionally with CONFIG_PATH)]),
-	      [enable_passwdqc=$enableval],
-	      [enable_passwdqc=no])
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-passwdqc@<:@=CONFIG_PATH@:>@],
+		       [enable password quality checking using passwdqc library (optionally with CONFIG_PATH)]))
 
 case "$enable_passwdqc" in
-	yes|no) use_passwdqc_config="" ;;
+	""|yes|no) use_passwdqc_config="" ;;
 	/*) use_passwdqc_config="$enable_passwdqc"; enable_passwdqc=yes ;;
 	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unrecognized --enable-passwdqc parameter.]) ;;
 esac
@@ -174,10 +183,18 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PASSWDQC_CONFIG_FILE], ["$use_passwdqc_config"], [passwdqc l
 if test "x$enable_passwdqc" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PASSWDQC, 1, [Enable password quality checking using passwdqc library])
 
-	PASSWDQC_LIBS="-lpasswdqc"
+	saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([passwdqc_check], [passwdqc])
+	case "$ac_cv_search_passwdqc_check" in
+		no) AC_MSG_ERROR([failed to find passwdqc_check]) ;;
+		-l*) PASSWDQC_LIBS="$ac_cv_search_passwdqc_check" ;;
+		*) PASSWDQC_LIBS= ;;
+	esac
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([passwdqc_params_free])
+	LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
 fi
 
-if test "x$with_pwquality$enable_passwdqc" = "xyesyes"; then
+if test "x$enable_pwquality$enable_passwdqc" = "xyesyes"; then
 	AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-pwquality and --enable-passwdqc are mutually incompatible.])
 fi
 
@@ -185,20 +202,26 @@ dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl Crypto backend functions
 
 AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_GCRYPT], [
-	if test "x$with_fips" = "xyes"; then
+	if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
 		GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION=1.4.5
 	else
 		GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION=1.1.42
 	fi
-	dnl Check if we can use gcrypt PBKDF2 (1.6.0 supports empty password)
-	AC_ARG_ENABLE([gcrypt-pbkdf2], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-gcrypt-pbkdf2],[force enable internal gcrypt PBKDF2]),
+
+	dnl libgcrypt rejects to use pkgconfig, use AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT from gcrypt-devel here.
+	dnl Do not require gcrypt-devel if other crypto backend is used.
+	m4_ifdef([AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT],[
+	AC_ARG_ENABLE([gcrypt-pbkdf2],
+		dnl Check if we can use gcrypt PBKDF2 (1.6.0 supports empty password)
+		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-gcrypt-pbkdf2], [force enable internal gcrypt PBKDF2]),
 		if test "x$enableval" = "xyes"; then
 			[use_internal_pbkdf2=0]
 		else
 			[use_internal_pbkdf2=1]
 		fi,
 		[AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT([1.6.1], [use_internal_pbkdf2=0], [use_internal_pbkdf2=1])])
-	AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT($GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the gcrypt library.])])
+	AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT($GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the gcrypt library.])])],
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([Missing support for gcrypt: install gcrypt and regenerate configure.]))
 
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if internal cryptsetup PBKDF2 is compiled-in])
 	if test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 0; then
@@ -208,7 +231,9 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_GCRYPT], [
 		NO_FIPS([])
 	fi
 
-	if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_XTS], [], [], [#include <gcrypt.h>])
+
+	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
 		saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 		LIBS="$saved_LIBS $LIBGCRYPT_LIBS -static"
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(gcrypt, gcry_check_version,,
@@ -232,7 +257,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_OPENSSL], [
 	CRYPTO_LIBS=$OPENSSL_LIBS
 	use_internal_pbkdf2=0
 
-	if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
+	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
 		saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
 		PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --static"
 		PKG_CHECK_MODULES([OPENSSL_STATIC], [openssl])
@@ -242,7 +267,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_OPENSSL], [
 ])
 
 AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NSS], [
-	if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
+	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([Static build of cryptsetup is not supported with NSS.])
 	fi
 
@@ -275,6 +300,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_KERNEL], [
 AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NETTLE], [
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(nettle/sha.h,,
 		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Nettle cryptographic library.])])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(nettle/version.h)
 
 	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(nettle, nettle_pbkdf2_hmac_sha256,,
@@ -291,43 +317,42 @@ dnl ==========================================================================
 saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([static-cryptsetup],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-static-cryptsetup],
-	[enable build of static version of tools]))
-if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
-	if test x$enable_static = xno; then
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-static-cryptsetup], [enable build of static version of tools]))
+if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+	if test "x$enable_static" = "xno"; then
 		AC_MSG_WARN([Requested static cryptsetup build, enabling static library.])
 		enable_static=yes
 	fi
 fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(STATIC_TOOLS, test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(STATIC_TOOLS, test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes")
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(cryptsetup,
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup],
-	[disable cryptsetup support]),[], [enable_cryptsetup=yes])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTSETUP, test x$enable_cryptsetup = xyes)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([cryptsetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup], [disable cryptsetup support]),
+	[], [enable_cryptsetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTSETUP, test "x$enable_cryptsetup" = "xyes")
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(veritysetup,
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-veritysetup],
-	[disable veritysetup support]),[], [enable_veritysetup=yes])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(VERITYSETUP, test x$enable_veritysetup = xyes)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([veritysetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-veritysetup], [disable veritysetup support]),
+	[], [enable_veritysetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(VERITYSETUP, test "x$enable_veritysetup" = "xyes")
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([cryptsetup-reencrypt],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup-reencrypt],
-	[disable cryptsetup-reencrypt tool]),[], [enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt=yes])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(REENCRYPT, test x$enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt = xyes)
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup-reencrypt], [disable cryptsetup-reencrypt tool]),
+	[], [enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(REENCRYPT, test "x$enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt" = "xyes")
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(integritysetup,
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-integritysetup],
-	[disable integritysetup support]),[], [enable_integritysetup=yes])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(INTEGRITYSETUP, test x$enable_integritysetup = xyes)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([integritysetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-integritysetup], [disable integritysetup support]),
+	[], [enable_integritysetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(INTEGRITYSETUP, test "x$enable_integritysetup" = "xyes")
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(selinux,
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-selinux],
-	[disable selinux support [default=auto]]),[], [])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([selinux],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-selinux], [disable selinux support [default=auto]]),
+	[], [enable_selinux=yes])
 
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([udev],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-udev],
-	[disable udev support]),[], enable_udev=yes)
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-udev], [disable udev support]),
+	[], [enable_udev=yes])
 
 dnl Try to use pkg-config for devmapper, but fallback to old detection
 PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEVMAPPER], [devmapper >= 1.02.03],, [
@@ -345,6 +370,8 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_retry_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_deferred_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_mounted_fs], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_holders], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_get_name], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([DM_DEVICE_GET_TARGET_VERSION], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 AC_CHECK_DECLS([DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG], [have_cookie=yes], [have_cookie=no], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
 if test "x$enable_udev" = xyes; then
 	if test "x$have_cookie" = xno; then
@@ -357,20 +384,20 @@ LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
 dnl Check for JSON-C used in LUKS2
 PKG_CHECK_MODULES([JSON_C], [json-c])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([json_object_object_add_ex], [], [], [#include <json-c/json.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([json_object_deep_copy], [], [], [#include <json-c/json.h>])
 
 dnl Crypto backend configuration.
 AC_ARG_WITH([crypto_backend],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-crypto_backend=BACKEND], [crypto backend (gcrypt/openssl/nss/kernel/nettle) [gcrypt]]),
-	[], with_crypto_backend=gcrypt
-)
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-crypto_backend=BACKEND], [crypto backend (gcrypt/openssl/nss/kernel/nettle) [openssl]]),
+	[], [with_crypto_backend=openssl])
 
 dnl Kernel crypto API backend needed for benchmark and tcrypt
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([kernel_crypto], AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-kernel_crypto],
-	[disable kernel userspace crypto (no benchmark and tcrypt)]),
-	[with_kernel_crypto=$enableval],
-	[with_kernel_crypto=yes])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([kernel_crypto],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-kernel_crypto], [disable kernel userspace crypto (no benchmark and tcrypt)]),
+	[], [enable_kernel_crypto=yes])
 
-if test "x$with_kernel_crypto" = "xyes"; then
+if test "x$enable_kernel_crypto" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/if_alg.h,,
 		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with userspace crypto interface. (Or use --disable-kernel_crypto.)])])
 	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_AF_ALG, 1, [Enable using of kernel userspace crypto])
@@ -384,23 +411,24 @@ case $with_crypto_backend in
 	nettle)  CONFIGURE_NETTLE([]) ;;
 	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown crypto backend.]) ;;
 esac
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT,  test $with_crypto_backend = gcrypt)
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_OPENSSL, test $with_crypto_backend = openssl)
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NSS,     test $with_crypto_backend = nss)
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_KERNEL,  test $with_crypto_backend = kernel)
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE,  test $with_crypto_backend = nettle)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "gcrypt")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_OPENSSL, test "$with_crypto_backend" = "openssl")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NSS,     test "$with_crypto_backend" = "nss")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_KERNEL,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "kernel")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "nettle")
 
 AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_PBKDF2, test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 1)
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2, [$use_internal_pbkdf2], [Use internal PBKDF2])
 
 dnl Argon2 implementation
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(internal-argon2, AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-internal-argon2],
-	[disable internal implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]),[], [enable_internal_argon2=yes])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([internal-argon2],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-internal-argon2], [disable internal implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]),
+	[], [enable_internal_argon2=yes])
 
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([libargon2], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-libargon2],
-	[enable external libargon2 (PHC) library (disables internal bundled version) ]),[], [enable_libargon2=no])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([libargon2],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-libargon2], [enable external libargon2 (PHC) library (disables internal bundled version)]))
 
-if test x$enable_libargon2 = xyes ; then
+if test "x$enable_libargon2" = "xyes" ; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(argon2.h,,
 		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need libargon2 development library installed.])])
 	AC_CHECK_DECL(Argon2_id,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need more recent Argon2 library with support for Argon2id.])], [#include <argon2.h>])
@@ -409,10 +437,10 @@ if test x$enable_libargon2 = xyes ; then
 else
 	AC_MSG_WARN([Argon2 bundled (slow) reference implementation will be used, please consider to use system library with --enable-libargon2.])
 
-	AC_ARG_ENABLE(internal-sse-argon2, AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-internal-sse-argon2],
-		[enable internal SSE implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]),[], [enable_internal_sse_argon2=no])
+	AC_ARG_ENABLE([internal-sse-argon2],
+		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-internal-sse-argon2], [enable internal SSE implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]))
 
-	if test x$enable_internal_sse_argon2 = xyes ; then
+	if test "x$enable_internal_sse_argon2" = "xyes"; then
 		AC_MSG_CHECKING(if Argon2 SSE optimization can be used)
 		AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
 			#include <emmintrin.h>
@@ -424,17 +452,18 @@ else
 	fi
 fi
 
-if test x$enable_internal_argon2 = xyes ; then
+if test "x$enable_internal_argon2" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_INTERNAL_ARGON2, 1, [Use internal Argon2])
 fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2, test x$enable_internal_argon2 = xyes)
-AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_SSE_ARGON2, test x$enable_internal_sse_argon2 = xyes)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2, test "x$enable_internal_argon2" = "xyes")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_SSE_ARGON2, test "x$enable_internal_sse_argon2" = "xyes")
 
 dnl Link with blkid to check for other device types
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(blkid, AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-blkid],
-	[disable use of blkid for device signature detection and wiping.]), [], [enable_blkid=yes])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([blkid],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-blkid], [disable use of blkid for device signature detection and wiping]),
+	[], [enable_blkid=yes])
 
-if test x$enable_blkid = xyes ; then
+if test "x$enable_blkid" = "xyes"; then
 	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([BLKID], [blkid],[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BLKID], 1, [Define to 1 to use blkid for detection of disk signatures.])],[LIBBLKID_LIBS="-lblkid"])
 
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(blkid/blkid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need blkid development library installed.])])
@@ -458,12 +487,12 @@ if test x$enable_blkid = xyes ; then
 		       [AC_MSG_ERROR([Can not compile with blkid support, disable it by --disable-blkid.])],
 		       [#include <blkid/blkid.h>])
 fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID, test x$enable_blkid = xyes)
-AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID_WIPE, test x$enable_blkid_wipe = xyes)
-AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID_STEP_BACK, test x$enable_blkid_step_back = xyes)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID, test "x$enable_blkid" = "xyes")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID_WIPE, test "x$enable_blkid_wipe" = "xyes")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID_STEP_BACK, test "x$enable_blkid_step_back" = "xyes")
 
 dnl Magic for cryptsetup.static build.
-if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
+if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
 	saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
 	PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --static"
 
@@ -475,7 +504,7 @@ if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 	LIBS="$saved_LIBS -static"
 	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEVMAPPER_STATIC], [devmapper >= 1.02.27],,[
 		DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS=$DEVMAPPER_LIBS
-		if test "x$enable_selinux" != xno; then
+		if test "x$enable_selinux" = "xyes"; then
 			AC_CHECK_LIB(sepol, sepol_bool_set)
 			AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled)
 			DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS="$DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS $LIBS"
@@ -551,36 +580,6 @@ AC_DEFUN([CS_ABSPATH], [
 	esac
 ])
 
-dnl ==========================================================================
-dnl Python bindings
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([python], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-python],[enable Python bindings]),
-[with_python=$enableval],
-[with_python=no])
-
-AC_ARG_WITH([python_version],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-python_version=VERSION], [required Python version [2.6]]),
-	[PYTHON_VERSION=$withval], [PYTHON_VERSION=2.6])
-
-if test "x$with_python" = "xyes"; then
-	AM_PATH_PYTHON([$PYTHON_VERSION])
-
-	AC_PATH_PROGS([PYTHON_CONFIG], [python${PYTHON_VERSION}-config python-config], [no])
-	if test "${PYTHON_CONFIG}" = "no"; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot find python${PYTHON_VERSION}-config or python-config in PATH])
-	fi
-
-	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for python headers using $PYTHON_CONFIG --includes)
-	PYTHON_INCLUDES=$($PYTHON_CONFIG --includes)
-	AC_MSG_RESULT($PYTHON_INCLUDES)
-	AC_SUBST(PYTHON_INCLUDES)
-
-	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for python libraries using $PYTHON_CONFIG --libs)
-	PYTHON_LIBS=$($PYTHON_CONFIG --libs)
-	AC_MSG_RESULT($PYTHON_LIBS)
-	AC_SUBST(PYTHON_LIBS)
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL([PYTHON_CRYPTSETUP], [test "x$with_python" = "xyes"])
-
 dnl ==========================================================================
 CS_STR_WITH([plain-hash],   [password hashing function for plain mode], [ripemd160])
 CS_STR_WITH([plain-cipher], [cipher for plain mode], [aes])
@@ -592,17 +591,28 @@ CS_STR_WITH([luks1-cipher], [cipher for LUKS1], [aes])
 CS_STR_WITH([luks1-mode],   [cipher mode for LUKS1], [xts-plain64])
 CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-keybits],[key length in bits for LUKS1], [256])
 
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([luks_adjust_xts_keysize], AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-luks-adjust-xts-keysize],
+	[XTS mode requires two keys, double default LUKS keysize if needed]),
+	[], [enable_luks_adjust_xts_keysize=yes])
+if test "x$enable_luks_adjust_xts_keysize" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE, 1, [XTS mode - double default LUKS keysize if needed])
+fi
+
 CS_STR_WITH([luks2-pbkdf],           [Default PBKDF algorithm (pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id) for LUKS2], [argon2i])
 CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-iter-time],       [PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS1 (in ms)], [2000])
 CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-iter-time],       [Argon2 PBKDF iteration time for LUKS2 (in ms)], [2000])
 CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-memory-kb],       [Argon2 PBKDF memory cost for LUKS2 (in kB)], [1048576])
 CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-parallel-threads],[Argon2 PBKDF max parallel cost for LUKS2 (if CPUs available)], [4])
 
+CS_STR_WITH([luks2-keyslot-cipher], [fallback cipher for LUKS2 keyslot (if data encryption is incompatible)], [aes-xts-plain64])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-keyslot-keybits],[fallback key size for LUKS2 keyslot (if data encryption is incompatible)], [512])
+
 CS_STR_WITH([loopaes-cipher], [cipher for loop-AES mode], [aes])
 CS_NUM_WITH([loopaes-keybits],[key length in bits for loop-AES mode], [256])
 
 CS_NUM_WITH([keyfile-size-maxkb],[maximum keyfile size (in KiB)], [8192])
-CS_NUM_WITH([passphrase-size-max],[maximum keyfile size (in characters)], [512])
+CS_NUM_WITH([integrity-keyfile-size-maxkb],[maximum integritysetup keyfile size (in KiB)], [4])
+CS_NUM_WITH([passphrase-size-max],[maximum passphrase size (in characters)], [512])
 
 CS_STR_WITH([verity-hash],       [hash function for verity mode], [sha256])
 CS_NUM_WITH([verity-data-block], [data block size for verity mode], [4096])
@@ -632,9 +642,8 @@ AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS)
 
 dnl Override default LUKS format version (for cryptsetup or cryptsetup-reencrypt format actions only).
 AC_ARG_WITH([default_luks_format],
-	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-default-luks-format=FORMAT], [default LUKS format version (LUKS1/LUKS2) [LUKS1]]),
-	[], with_default_luks_format=LUKS1
-)
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-default-luks-format=FORMAT], [default LUKS format version (LUKS1/LUKS2) [LUKS2]]),
+	[], [with_default_luks_format=LUKS2])
 
 case $with_default_luks_format in
 	LUKS1) default_luks=CRYPT_LUKS1 ;;

docs/ChangeLog.old

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
 
 2011-03-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
 	* Add exception to COPYING for binary distribution linked with OpenSSL library.
-	* Set secure data flag (wipe all ioclt buffers) if devmapper library supports it.
+	* Set secure data flag (wipe all ioctl buffers) if devmapper library supports it.
 
 2011-01-29  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
 	* Fix mapping removal if device disappeared but node still exists.
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@
 
 2006-03-15  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* configure.in: 1.0.3-rc3. Most unplease release ever. 
+	* configure.in: 1.0.3-rc3. Most displease release ever. 
 	* lib/setup.c (__crypt_create_device): More verbose error message.
 
 2006-02-26  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>

docs/examples/crypt_log_usage.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
- * An example of using logging through libcryptsetup API
+ * libcryptsetup API log example
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -25,10 +25,8 @@
 #include <libcryptsetup.h>
 
 /*
- * This is an example of function that can be registered using crypt_set_log_callback API.
+ * This is an example of crypt_set_log_callback API callback.
  *
- * Its prototype is void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr) as defined
- * in crypt_set_log_callback
  */
 static void simple_syslog_wrapper(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
 {
@@ -71,7 +69,7 @@ int main(void)
 		return 2;
 	}
 
-	/* crypt_set_log_callback() - register a log function for crypt context */
+	/* crypt_set_log_callback() - register a log callback for crypt context */
 	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, &simple_syslog_wrapper, (void *)usrprefix);
 
 	/* send messages ithrough the crypt_log() interface */
@@ -83,7 +81,7 @@ int main(void)
 	/* release crypt context */
 	crypt_free(cd);
 
-	/* Initialize default (global) log function */
+	/* Initialize default (global) log callback */
 	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, &simple_syslog_wrapper, NULL);
 
 	crypt_log(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, "This is normal log message");

docs/examples/crypt_luks_usage.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
- * An example of using LUKS device through libcryptsetup API
+ *  libcryptsetup API - using LUKS device example
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -29,23 +29,18 @@
 static int format_and_add_keyslots(const char *path)
 {
 	struct crypt_device *cd;
-	struct crypt_params_luks1 params;
 	int r;
 
 	/*
-	 * crypt_init() call precedes most of operations of cryptsetup API. The call is used
-	 * to initialize crypt device context stored in structure referenced by _cd_ in
-	 * the example. Second parameter is used to pass underlaying device path.
+	 * The crypt_init() call is used  to initialize crypt_device context,
+	 * The path parameter specifies a device path.
 	 *
-	 * Note:
-	 * If path refers to a regular file it'll be attached to a first free loop device.
-	 * crypt_init() operation fails in case there's no more loop device available.
-	 * Also, loop device will have the AUTOCLEAR flag set, so the file loopback will
-	 * be detached automatically.
+	 * For path, you can use either link to a file or block device.
+	 * The loopback device will be detached automatically.
 	 */
 
 	r = crypt_init(&cd, path);
-	if (r < 0 ) {
+	if (r < 0) {
 		printf("crypt_init() failed for %s.\n", path);
 		return r;
 	}
@@ -53,73 +48,37 @@ static int format_and_add_keyslots(const char *path)
 	printf("Context is attached to block device %s.\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
 
 	/*
-	 * So far no data were written on your device. This will change with call of
-	 * crypt_format() only if you specify CRYPT_LUKS1 as device type.
+	 * So far, no data were written to the device.
 	 */
-	printf("Device %s will be formatted to LUKS device after 5 seconds.\n"
+	printf("Device %s will be formatted as a LUKS device after 5 seconds.\n"
 	       "Press CTRL+C now if you want to cancel this operation.\n", path);
 	sleep(5);
 
-
-	/*
-	 * Prepare LUKS format parameters
-	 *
-	 * hash parameter defines PBKDF2 hash algorithm used in LUKS header.
-	 * For compatibility reason we use SHA1 here.
-	 */
-	params.hash = "sha1";
-
-	/*
-	 * data_alignment parameter is relevant only in case of the luks header
-	 * and the payload are both stored on same device.
-	 *
-	 * if you set data_alignment = 0, cryptsetup will autodetect
-	 * data_alignment according to underlaying device topology.
-	 */
-	params.data_alignment = 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * data_device parameter defines that no external device
-	 * for luks header will be used
-	 */
-	params.data_device = NULL;
-
 	/*
 	 * NULLs for uuid and volume_key means that these attributes will be
-	 * generated during crypt_format(). Volume key is generated with respect
-	 * to key size parameter passed to function.
-	 *
-	 * crypt_format() checks device size (LUKS header must fit there).
+	 * generated during crypt_format().
 	 */
 	r = crypt_format(cd,		/* crypt context */
-			 CRYPT_LUKS1,	/* LUKS1 is standard LUKS header */
+			 CRYPT_LUKS2,	/* LUKS2 is a new LUKS format; use CRYPT_LUKS1 for LUKS1 */
 			 "aes",		/* used cipher */
-			 "xts-plain64",	/* used block mode and IV generator*/
+			 "xts-plain64",	/* used block mode and IV */
 			 NULL,		/* generate UUID */
 			 NULL,		/* generate volume key from RNG */
-			 256 / 8,	/* 256bit key - here AES-128 in XTS mode, size is in bytes */
-			 &params);	/* parameters above */
+			 512 / 8,	/* 512bit key - here AES-256 in XTS mode, size is in bytes */
+			 NULL);		/* default parameters */
 
-	if(r < 0) {
+	if (r < 0) {
 		printf("crypt_format() failed on device %s\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
 		crypt_free(cd);
 		return r;
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * The device now contains LUKS1 header, but there is
-	 * no active keyslot with encrypted volume key yet.
-	 */
-
-	/*
-	 * cryptt_kesylot_add_* call stores volume_key in encrypted form into keyslot.
-	 * Without keyslot you can't manipulate with LUKS device after the context will be freed.
+	 * The device now contains a LUKS header, but there is no active keyslot.
 	 *
-	 * To create a new keyslot you need to supply the existing one (to get the volume key from) or
-	 * you need to supply the volume key.
+	 * crypt_keyslot_add_* call stores the volume_key in the encrypted form into the keyslot.
 	 *
-	 * After format, we have volume key stored internally in context so add new keyslot
-	 * using this internal volume key.
+	 * After format, the volume key is stored internally.
 	 */
 	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd,			/* crypt context */
 					    CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,	/* just use first free slot */
@@ -137,8 +96,8 @@ static int format_and_add_keyslots(const char *path)
 	printf("The first keyslot is initialized.\n");
 
 	/*
-	 * Add another keyslot, now using the first keyslot.
-	 * It will decrypt volume key from the first keyslot and creates new one with another passphrase.
+	 * Add another keyslot, now authenticating with the first keyslot.
+	 * It decrypts the volume key from the first keyslot and creates a new one with the specified passphrase.
 	 */
 	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd,			/* crypt context */
 					    CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,	/* just use first free slot */
@@ -164,21 +123,18 @@ static int activate_and_check_status(const char *path, const char *device_name)
 
 	/*
 	 * LUKS device activation example.
-	 * It's sequence of sub-steps: device initialization, LUKS header load
-	 * and the device activation itself.
 	 */
 	r = crypt_init(&cd, path);
-	if (r < 0 ) {
+	if (r < 0) {
 		printf("crypt_init() failed for %s.\n", path);
 		return r;
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * crypt_load() is used to load the LUKS header from block device
-	 * into crypt_device context.
+	 * crypt_load() is used to load existing LUKS header from a block device
 	 */
 	r = crypt_load(cd,		/* crypt context */
-		       CRYPT_LUKS1,	/* requested type */
+		       CRYPT_LUKS,	/* requested type - here LUKS of any type */
 		       NULL);		/* additional parameters (not used) */
 
 	if (r < 0) {
@@ -188,11 +144,11 @@ static int activate_and_check_status(const char *path, const char *device_name)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Device activation creates device-mapper devie mapping with name device_name.
+	 * Device activation creates a device-mapper device with the specified name.
 	 */
 	r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd,		/* crypt context */
 					 device_name,	/* device name to activate */
-					 CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,/* which slot use (ANY - try all) */
+					 CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,/* the keyslot use (try all here) */
 					 "foo", 3,	/* passphrase */
 					 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY); /* flags */
 	if (r < 0) {
@@ -201,13 +157,13 @@ static int activate_and_check_status(const char *path, const char *device_name)
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	printf("LUKS device %s/%s is active.\n", crypt_get_dir(), device_name);
+	printf("%s device %s/%s is active.\n", crypt_get_type(cd), crypt_get_dir(), device_name);
 	printf("\tcipher used: %s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd));
 	printf("\tcipher mode: %s\n", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
 	printf("\tdevice UUID: %s\n", crypt_get_uuid(cd));
 
 	/*
-	 * Get info about active device (query DM backend)
+	 * Get info about the active device.
 	 */
 	r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, device_name, &cad);
 	if (r < 0) {
@@ -235,7 +191,7 @@ static int handle_active_device(const char *device_name)
 	int r;
 
 	/*
-	 * crypt_init_by_name() initializes device context and loads LUKS header from backing device
+	 * crypt_init_by_name() initializes context by an active device-mapper name
 	 */
 	r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, device_name);
 	if (r < 0) {
@@ -252,7 +208,7 @@ static int handle_active_device(const char *device_name)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * crypt_deactivate() is used to deactivate device
+	 * crypt_deactivate() is used to deactivate a device
 	 */
 	r = crypt_deactivate(cd, device_name);
 	if (r < 0) {

docs/v1.5.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Side effect of reencryption is that final device will contain
 only ciphertext (for all sectors) so even if device was not properly
 wiped by random data, after reencryption you cannot distinguish
 which sectors are used.
-(Reecryption is done always for the whole device.)
+(Reencryption is done always for the whole device.)
 
 There are for sure bugs, please TEST IT IN TEST ENVIRONMENT before
 use for your data.

docs/v2.0.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with new features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.4
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Wipe full header areas (including unused) during LUKS format.
+
+  Since this version, the whole area up to the data offset is zeroed,
+  and subsequently, all keyslots areas are wiped with random data.
+  This ensures that no remaining old data remains in the LUKS header
+  areas, but it could slow down format operation on some devices.
+  Previously only first 4k (or 32k for LUKS2) and the used keyslot
+  was overwritten in the format operation.
+
+* Several fixes to error messages that were unintentionally replaced
+  in previous versions with a silent exit code.
+  More descriptive error messages were added, including error
+  messages if
+   - a device is unusable (not a block device, no access, etc.),
+   - a LUKS device is not detected,
+   - LUKS header load code detects unsupported version,
+   - a keyslot decryption fails (also happens in the cipher check),
+   - converting an inactive keyslot.
+
+* Device activation fails if data area overlaps with LUKS header.
+
+* Code now uses explicit_bzero to wipe memory if available
+  (instead of own implementation).
+
+* Additional VeraCrypt modes are now supported, including Camellia
+  and Kuznyechik symmetric ciphers (and cipher chains) and Streebog
+  hash function. These were introduced in a recent VeraCrypt upstream.
+
+  Note that Kuznyechik requires out-of-tree kernel module and
+  Streebog hash function is available only with the gcrypt cryptographic
+  backend for now.
+
+* Fixes static build for integritysetup if the pwquality library is used.
+
+* Allows passphrase change for unbound keyslots.
+
+* Fixes removed keyslot number in verbose message for luksKillSlot,
+  luksRemoveKey and erase command.
+
+* Adds blkid scan when attempting to open a plain device and warn the user
+  about existing device signatures in a ciphertext device.
+
+* Remove LUKS header signature if luksFormat fails to add the first keyslot.
+
+* Remove O_SYNC from device open and use fsync() to speed up
+  wipe operation considerably.
+
+* Create --master-key-file in luksDump and fail if the file already exists.
+
+* Fixes a bug when LUKS2 authenticated encryption with a detached header
+  wiped the header device instead of dm-integrity data device area (causing
+  unnecessary LUKS2 header auto recovery).
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Authenticated encryption should use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  AEGIS and MORUS are already available in kernel 4.18.
+
+  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
+  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
+
+  Please note that authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
+  and can have performance problems for hish-speed devices and device
+  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.

docs/v2.0.6-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.6 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+All users of cryptsetup 2.0.x should upgrade to this version.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.5
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix support of larger metadata areas in LUKS2 header.
+
+  This release properly supports all specified metadata areas, as documented
+  in LUKS2 format description (see docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf in archive).
+
+  Currently, only default metadata area size is used (in format or convert).
+  Later cryptsetup versions will allow increasing this metadata area size.
+
+* If AEAD (authenticated encryption) is used, cryptsetup now tries to check
+  if the requested AEAD algorithm with specified key size is available
+  in kernel crypto API.
+  This change avoids formatting a device that cannot be later activated.
+
+  For this function, the kernel must be compiled with the
+  CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD option enabled.
+  Note that kernel user crypto API options (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API and
+  CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER) are already mandatory for LUKS2.
+
+* Fix setting of integrity no-journal flag.
+  Now you can store this flag to metadata using --persistent option.
+
+* Fix cryptsetup-reencrypt to not keep temporary reencryption headers
+  if interrupted during initial password prompt.
+
+* Adds early check to plain and LUKS2 formats to disallow device format
+  if device size is not aligned to requested sector size.
+  Previously it was possible, and the device was rejected to activate by
+  kernel later.
+
+* Fix checking of hash algorithms availability for PBKDF early.
+  Previously LUKS2 format allowed non-existent hash algorithm with
+  invalid keyslot preventing the device from activation.
+
+* Allow Adiantum cipher construction (a non-authenticated length-preserving
+  fast encryption scheme), so it can be used both for data encryption and
+  keyslot encryption in LUKS1/2 devices.
+
+  For benchmark, use:
+    # cryptsetup benchmark -c xchacha12,aes-adiantum
+    # cryptsetup benchmark -c xchacha20,aes-adiantum
+
+  For LUKS format:
+    # cryptsetup luksFormat -c xchacha20,aes-adiantum-plain64 -s 256 <device>
+
+  The support for Adiantum will be merged in Linux kernel 4.21.
+  For more info see the paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Authenticated encryption should use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  AEGIS and MORUS are already available in kernel 4.18.
+
+  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
+  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
+
+  Please note that authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
+  and can have performance problems for high-speed devices and device
+  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.

docs/v2.1.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.1.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with new features and bug fixes.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.1 version uses a new on-disk LUKS2 format as the default
+LUKS format and increases default LUKS2 header size.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported forever
+as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+When upgrading a stable distribution, please use configure option
+--with-default-luks-format=LUKS1 to maintain backward compatibility.
+
+This release also switches to OpenSSL as a default cryptographic
+backend for LUKS header processing. Use --with-crypto_backend=gcrypt
+configure option if you need to preserve legacy libgcrypt backend.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or
+in production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.6
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* The default for cryptsetup LUKS format action is now LUKS2.
+  You can use LUKS1 with cryptsetup option --type luks1.
+
+* The default size of the LUKS2 header is increased to 16 MB.
+  It includes metadata and the area used for binary keyslots;
+  it means that LUKS header backup is now 16MB in size.
+
+  Note, that used keyslot area is much smaller, but this increase
+  of reserved space allows implementation of later extensions
+  (like online reencryption).
+  It is fully compatible with older cryptsetup 2.0.x versions.
+  If you require to create LUKS2 header with the same size as
+  in the 2.0.x version, use --offset 8192 option for luksFormat
+  (units are in 512-bytes sectors; see notes below).
+
+* Cryptsetup now doubles LUKS default key size if XTS mode is used
+  (XTS mode uses two internal keys). This does not apply if key size
+  is explicitly specified on the command line and it does not apply
+  for the plain mode.
+  This fixes a confusion with AES and 256bit key in XTS mode where
+  code used AES128 and not AES256 as often expected.
+
+  Also, the default keyslot encryption algorithm (if cannot be derived
+  from data encryption algorithm) is now available as configure
+  options --with-luks2-keyslot-cipher and --with-luks2-keyslot-keybits.
+  The default is aes-xts-plain64 with 2 * 256-bits key.
+
+* Default cryptographic backend used for LUKS header processing is now
+  OpenSSL. For years, OpenSSL provided better performance for PBKDF.
+
+  NOTE: Cryptsetup/libcryptsetup supports several cryptographic
+  library backends. The fully supported are libgcrypt, OpenSSL and
+  kernel crypto API. FIPS mode extensions are maintained only for
+  libgcrypt and OpenSSL. Nettle and NSS are usable only for some
+  subset of algorithms and cannot provide full backward compatibility.
+  You can always switch to other backends by using a configure switch,
+  for libgcrypt (compatibility for older distributions) use:
+  --with-crypto_backend=gcrypt
+
+* The Python bindings are no longer supported and the code was removed
+  from cryptsetup distribution. Please use the libblockdev project
+  that already covers most of the libcryptsetup functionality
+  including LUKS2.
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows using --offset option also for luksFormat.
+  It means that the specified offset value is used for data offset.
+  LUKS2 header areas are automatically adjusted according to this value.
+  (Note units are in 512-byte sectors due to the previous definition
+  of this option in plain mode.)
+  This option can replace --align-payload with absolute alignment value.
+
+* Cryptsetup now supports new refresh action (that is the alias for
+  "open --refresh").
+  It allows changes of parameters for an active device (like root
+  device mapping), for example, it can enable or disable TRIM support
+  on-the-fly.
+  It is supported for LUKS1, LUKS2, plain and loop-AES devices.
+
+* Integritysetup now supports mode with detached data device through
+  new --data-device option.
+  Since kernel 4.18 there is a possibility to specify external data
+  device for dm-integrity that stores all integrity tags.
+
+* Integritysetup now supports automatic integrity recalculation
+  through new --integrity-recalculate option.
+  Linux kernel since version 4.18 supports automatic background
+  recalculation of integrity tags for dm-integrity.
+
+Other changes and fixes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix for crypt_wipe call to allocate space if the header is backed
+  by a file. This means that if you use detached header file, it will
+  now have always the full size after luksFormat, even if only
+  a few keyslots are used.
+
+* Fixes to offline cryptsetup-reencrypt to preserve LUKS2 keyslots
+  area sizes after reencryption and fixes for some other issues when
+  creating temporary reencryption headers.
+
+* Added some FIPS mode workarounds. We cannot (yet) use Argon2 in
+  FIPS mode, libcryptsetup now fallbacks to use PBKDF2 in FIPS mode.
+
+* Rejects conversion to LUKS1 if PBKDF2 hash algorithms
+  in keyslots differ.
+
+* The hash setting on command line now applies also to LUKS2 PBKDF2
+  digest. In previous versions, the LUKS2 key digest used PBKDF2-SHA256
+  (except for converted headers).
+
+* Allow LUKS2 keyslots area to increase if data offset allows it.
+  Cryptsetup can fine-tune LUKS2 metadata area sizes through
+  --luks2-metadata-size=BYTES and --luks2-keyslots-size=BYTES.
+  Please DO NOT use these low-level options until you need it for
+  some very specific additional feature.
+  Also, the code now prints these LUKS2 header area sizes in dump
+  command.
+
+* For LUKS2, keyslot can use different encryption that data with
+  new options --keyslot-key-size=BITS and --keyslot-cipher=STRING
+  in all commands that create new LUKS keyslot.
+  Please DO NOT use these low-level options until you need it for
+  some very specific additional feature.
+
+* Code now avoids data flush when reading device status through
+  device-mapper.
+
+* The Nettle crypto backend and the userspace kernel crypto API
+  backend were enhanced to allow more available hash functions
+  (like SHA3 variants).
+
+* Upstream code now does not require libgcrypt-devel
+  for autoconfigure, because OpenSSL is the default.
+  The libgcrypt does not use standard pkgconfig detection and
+  requires specific macro (part of libgcrypt development files)
+  to be always present during autoconfigure.
+  With other crypto backends, like OpenSSL, this makes no sense,
+  so this part of autoconfigure is now optional.
+
+* Cryptsetup now understands new --debug-json option that allows
+  an additional dump of some JSON information. These are no longer
+  present in standard debug output because it could contain some
+  specific LUKS header parameters.
+
+* The luksDump contains the hash algorithm used in Anti-Forensic
+  function.
+
+* All debug messages are now sent through configured log callback
+  functions, so an application can easily use own debug messages
+  handling. In previous versions debug messages were printed directly
+  to standard output.)
+
+Libcryptsetup API additions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+These new calls are now exported, for details see libcryptsetup.h:
+
+ * crypt_init_data_device
+ * crypt_get_metadata_device_name
+     functions to init devices with separate metadata and data device
+     before a format function is called.
+
+ * crypt_set_data_offset
+     sets the data offset for LUKS to the specified value
+     in 512-byte sectors.
+     It should replace alignment calculation in LUKS param structures.
+
+ * crypt_get_metadata_size
+ * crypt_set_metadata_size
+     allows to set/get area sizes in LUKS header
+     (according to specification).
+
+ * crypt_get_default_type
+     get default compiled-in LUKS type (version).
+
+ * crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params
+     allows to get compiled-in PBKDF parameters.
+
+ * crypt_keyslot_set_encryption
+ * crypt_keyslot_get_encryption
+     allows to set/get per-keyslot encryption algorithm for LUKS2.
+
+ * crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf
+     allows to get PBKDF parameters per-keyslot.
+
+ and these new defines:
+ * CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON (message type for JSON debug)
+ * CRYPT_DEBUG_JSON (log level for JSON debug)
+ * CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE (dm-integrity recalculate flag)
+ * CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH (new open with refresh flag)
+
+All existing API calls should remain backward compatible.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Optional authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
+  and can have performance problems for high-speed devices and device
+  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
+
+* Authenticated encryption does not use encryption for a dm-integrity
+  journal. While it does not influence data confidentiality or
+  integrity protection, an attacker can get some more information
+  from data journal or cause that system will corrupt sectors after
+  journal replay. (That corruption will be detected though.)
+
+* The LUKS2 metadata area increase is mainly needed for the new online
+  reencryption as the major feature for the next release.

docs/v2.2.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.2.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with new experimental features and bug fixes.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.2 version introduces a new LUKS2 online reencryption
+extension that allows reencryption of mounted LUKS2 devices
+(device in use) in the background.
+
+Online reencryption is a complex feature. Please be sure you
+have a full data backup before using this feature.
+
+Changes since version 2.1.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+LUKS2 online reencryption
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The reencryption is intended to provide a reliable way to change
+volume key or an algorithm change while the encrypted device is still
+in use.
+
+It is based on userspace-only approach (no kernel changes needed)
+that uses the device-mapper subsystem to remap active devices on-the-fly
+dynamically. The device is split into several segments (encrypted by old
+key, new key and so-called hotzone, where reencryption is actively running).
+
+The flexible LUKS2 metadata format is used to store intermediate states
+(segment mappings) and both version of keyslots (old and new keys).
+Also, it provides a binary area (in the unused keyslot area space)
+to provide recovery metadata in the case of unexpected failure during
+reencryption. LUKS2 header is during the reencryption marked with
+"online-reencryption" keyword. After the reencryption is finished,
+this keyword is removed, and the device is backward compatible with all
+older cryptsetup tools (that support LUKS2).
+
+The recovery supports three resilience modes:
+
+  - checksum: default mode, where individual checksums of ciphertext hotzone
+    sectors are stored, so the recovery process can detect which sectors were
+    already reencrypted. It requires that the device sector write is atomic.
+
+  - journal: the hotzone is journaled in the binary area
+    (so the data are written twice)
+
+  - none: performance mode; there is no protection
+    (similar to old offline reencryption)
+
+These resilience modes are not available if reencryption uses data shift.
+
+Note: until we have full documentation (both of the process and metadata),
+please refer to Ondrej's slides (some slight details are no longer relevant)
+https://okozina.fedorapeople.org/online-disk-reencryption-with-luks2-compact.pdf
+
+The offline reencryption tool (cryptsetup-reencrypt) is still supported
+for both LUKS1 and LUKS2 format.
+
+Cryptsetup examples for reencryption
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The reencryption feature is integrated directly into cryptsetup utility
+as the new "reencrypt" action (command).
+
+There are three basic modes - to perform reencryption (change of already
+existing LUKS2 device), to add encryption to plaintext device and to remove
+encryption from a device (decryption).
+
+In all cases, if existing LUKS2 metadata contains information about
+the ongoing reencryption process, following reencrypt command continues
+with the ongoing reencryption process until it is finished.
+
+You can activate a device with ongoing reencryption as the standard LUKS2
+device, but the reencryption process will not continue until the cryptsetup
+reencrypt command is issued.
+
+
+1) Reencryption
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+This mode is intended to change any attribute of the data encryption
+(change of the volume key, algorithm or sector size).
+Note that authenticated encryption is not yet supported.
+
+You can start the reencryption process by specifying a LUKS2 device or with
+a detached LUKS2 header.
+The code should automatically recognize if the device is in use (and if it
+should use online mode of reencryption).
+
+If you do not specify parameters, only volume key is changed
+(a new random key is generated).
+
+# cryptsetup reencrypt <device> [--header <hdr>]
+
+You can also start reencryption using active mapped device name:
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt --active-name <name>
+
+You can also specify the resilience mode (none, checksum, journal) with
+--resilience=<mode> option, for checksum mode also the hash algorithm with
+--resilience-hash=<alg> (only hash algorithms supported by cryptographic
+backend are available).
+
+The maximal size of reencryption hotzone can be limited by
+--hotzone-size=<size> option and applies to all reencryption modes.
+Note that for checksum and journal mode hotzone size is also limited
+by available space in binary keyslot area.
+
+2) Encryption
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+This mode provides a way to encrypt a plaintext device to LUKS2 format.
+This option requires reduction of device size (for LUKS2 header) or new
+detached header.
+
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device> --encrypt --reduce-device-size <size>
+
+Or with detached header:
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device> --encrypt --header <hdr>
+
+3) Decryption
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+This mode provides the removal of existing LUKS2 encryption and replacing
+a device with plaintext content only.
+For now, we support only decryption with a detached header.
+
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device> --decrypt --header <hdr>
+
+For all three modes, you can split the process to metadata initialization
+(prepare keyslots and segments but do not run reencryption yet) and the data
+reencryption step by using --init-only option.
+
+Prepares metadata:
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt --init-only <parameters>
+
+Starts the data processing:
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device>
+
+Please note, that due to the Linux kernel limitation, the encryption or
+decryption process cannot be run entirely online - there must be at least
+short offline window where operation adds/removes device-mapper crypt (LUKS2) layer.
+This step should also include modification of /etc/crypttab and fstab UUIDs,
+but it is out of the scope of cryptsetup tools.
+
+Limitations
+~~~~~~~~~~~
+Most of these limitations will be (hopefully) fixed in next versions.
+
+* Only one active keyslot is supported (all old keyslots will be removed
+  after reencryption).
+
+* Only block devices are now supported as parameters. As a workaround
+  for images in a file, please explicitly map a loop device over the image
+  and use the loop device as the parameter.
+
+* Devices with authenticated encryption are not supported. (Later it will
+  be limited by the fixed per-sector metadata, per-sector metadata size
+  cannot be changed without a new device format operation.)
+
+* The reencryption uses userspace crypto library, with fallback to
+  the kernel (if available). There can be some specific configurations
+  where the fallback does not provide optimal performance.
+
+* There are no translations of error messages until the final release
+  (some messages can be rephrased as well).
+
+* The repair command is not finished; the recovery of interrupted
+  reencryption is made automatically on the first device activation.
+
+* Reencryption triggers too many udev scans on metadata updates (on closing
+  write enabled file descriptors). This has a negative performance impact on the whole
+  reencryption and generates excessive I/O load on the system.
+
+New libcryptsetup reencryption API
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The libcryptsetup contains new API calls that are used to setup and
+run the reencryption.
+
+Note that there can be some changes in API implementation of these functions
+and/or some new function can be introduced in final cryptsetup 2.2 release.
+
+New API symbols (see documentation in libcryptsetup.h)
+* struct crypt_params_reencrypt - reencryption parameters
+
+* crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase
+* crypt_reencrypt_init_by_keyring
+  - function to configure LUKS2 metadata for reencryption;
+    if metadata already exists, it configures the context from this metadata
+
+* crypt_reencrypt
+  - run the reencryption process (processing the data)
+  - the optional callback function can be used to interrupt the reencryption
+    or report the progress.
+
+* crypt_reencrypt_status
+  - function to query LUKS2 metadata about the reencryption state
+
+Other changes and fixes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Add optional global serialization lock for memory hard PBKDF.
+  (The --serialize-memory-hard-pbkdf option in cryptsetup and
+  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF in activation flag.)
+
+  This is an "ugly" optional workaround for a situation when multiple devices
+  are being activated in parallel (like systemd crypttab activation).
+  The system instead of returning ENOMEM (no memory available) starts
+  out-of-memory (OOM) killer to kill processes randomly.
+
+  Until we find a reliable way how to work with memory-hard function
+  in these situations, cryptsetup provide a way how to serialize memory-hard
+  unlocking among parallel cryptsetup instances to workaround this problem.
+  This flag is intended to be used only in very specific situations,
+  never use it directly :-)
+
+* Abort conversion to LUKS1 with incompatible sector size that is
+  not supported in LUKS1.
+
+* Report error (-ENOENT) if no LUKS keyslots are available. User can now
+  distinguish between a wrong passphrase and no keyslot available.
+
+* Fix a possible segfault in detached header handling (double free).
+
+* Add integritysetup support for bitmap mode introduced in Linux kernel 5.2.
+  Integritysetup now supports --integrity-bitmap-mode option and
+  --bitmap-sector-per-bit and --bitmap-flush-time commandline options.
+
+  In the bitmap operation mode, if a bit in the bitmap is 1, the corresponding
+  region's data and integrity tags are not synchronized - if the machine
+  crashes, the unsynchronized regions will be recalculated.
+  The bitmap mode is faster than the journal mode because we don't have
+  to write the data twice, but it is also less reliable, because if data
+  corruption happens when the machine crashes, it may not be detected.
+  This can be used only for standalone devices, not with dm-crypt.
+
+* The libcryptsetup now keeps all file descriptors to underlying device
+  open during the whole lifetime of crypt device context to avoid excessive
+  scanning in udev (udev run scan on every descriptor close).
+
+* The luksDump command now prints more info for reencryption keyslot
+  (when a device is in-reencryption).
+
+* New --device-size parameter is supported for LUKS2 reencryption.
+  It may be used to encrypt/reencrypt only the initial part of the data
+  device if the user is aware that the rest of the device is empty.
+
+  Note: This change causes API break since the last rc0 release
+  (crypt_params_reencrypt structure contains additional field).
+
+* New --resume-only parameter is supported for LUKS2 reencryption.
+  This flag resumes reencryption process if it exists (not starting
+  new reencryption).
+
+* The repair command now tries LUKS2 reencryption recovery if needed.
+
+* If reencryption device is a file image, an interactive dialog now
+  asks if reencryption should be run safely in offline mode
+  (if autodetection of active devices failed).
+
+* Fix activation through a token where dm-crypt volume key was not
+  set through keyring (but using old device-mapper table parameter mode).
+
+* Online reencryption can now retain all keyslots (if all passphrases
+  are provided). Note that keyslot numbers will change in this case.
+
+* Allow volume key file to be used if no LUKS2 keyslots are present.
+  If all keyslots are removed, LUKS2 has no longer information about
+  the volume key size (there is only key digest present).
+  Please use --key-size option to open the device or add a new keyslot
+  in these cases.
+
+* Print a warning if online reencrypt is called over LUKS1 (not supported).
+
+* Fix TCRYPT KDF failure in FIPS mode.
+  Some crypto backends support plain hash in FIPS mode but not for PBKDF2.
+
+* Remove FIPS mode restriction for crypt_volume_key_get.
+  It is an application responsibility to use this API in the proper context.
+
+* Reduce keyslots area size in luksFormat when the header device is too small.
+  Unless user explicitly asks for keyslots areas size  (either via
+  --luks2-keyslots-size or --offset) reduce keyslots size so that it fits
+  in metadata device.
+
+* Make resize action accept --device-size parameter (supports units suffix).

docs/v2.2.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.2.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+This version contains a fix for a possible data corruption bug
+on 32-bit platforms.
+All users of cryptsetup 2.1 and 2.2 should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.2.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix possible data length and IV offset overflow on 32bit architectures.
+  Other 64-bit architectures are not affected.
+
+  The flawed helper function prototypes (introduced in version 2.1.0) used
+  size_t type, that is 32-bit integer on 32-bit systems.
+  This patch fixes the problem to properly use 64-bit types.
+
+  If the offset parameter addresses devices larger than 2TB, the value
+  overflows and stores incorrect information in the metadata.
+  For example, integrity device is smaller than expected size if used
+  over large disk on 32-bit architecture.
+
+  This issue is not present with the standard LUKS1/LUKS2 devices without
+  integrity extensions.
+
+* Fix a regression in TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt system partition activation.
+
+* Reinstate missing backing file hint for loop device.
+
+  If the encrypted device is backed by a file (loopback), cryptsetup now
+  shows the path to the backing file in passphrase query (as in 1.x version).
+
+* LUKS2 reencryption block size is now aligned to reported optimal IO size.
+  This change eliminates possible non-aligned device warnings in kernel log
+  during reencryption.

docs/v2.2.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.2.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.1 and 2.2 should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.2.1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Print error message if a keyslot open failed for a different reason
+  than wrong passwords (for example there is not enough memory).
+  Only an exit code was present in this case.
+
+* The progress function switches unit sizes (B/s to GiB/s) according
+  to the actual speed. Also, it properly calculates speed in the case
+  of a resumed reencryption operation.
+
+* The --version now supports short -V short option and better handles
+  common option priorities.
+
+* If cryptsetup wipes signatures during format actions through blkid,
+  it also prints signature device offsets.
+
+* Compilation now properly uses LTLIBINTL gettext setting in Makefiles.
+
+* Device-mapper backend now supports new DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION ioctl
+  (available since Linux kernel 5.4).
+  This should help to detect some kernel/userspace incompatibilities
+  earlier later after a failed device activation.
+
+* Fixes LUKS2 reencryption on systems without kernel keyring.
+
+* Fixes unlocking prompt for partitions mapped through loop devices
+  (to properly show the backing device).
+
+* For LUKS2 decryption, a device is now marked for deferred removal
+  to be automatically deactivated.
+
+* Reencryption now limits hotzone size to be maximal 1 GiB or 1/4
+  system memory (if lower).
+
+* Reencryption now retains activation flags during online reencryption.
+
+* Reencryption now allows LUKS2 device to activate device right after
+  LUKS2 encryption is initialized through optional active device name
+  for cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt command.
+  This could help with automated encryption during boot.
+
+  NOTE: It means that part of the device is still not encrypted during
+  activation. Use with care!
+
+* Fixes failure in resize and plain format activation if activated device
+  size was not aligned to underlying logical device size.
+
+* Fixes conversion to LUKS2 format with detached header if a detached
+  header size was smaller than the expected aligned LUKS1 header size.

docs/v2.3.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with new experimental features and bug fixes.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.3 version introduces support for BitLocker-compatible
+devices (BITLK format). This format is used in Windows systems,
+and in combination with a filesystem driver, cryptsetup now provides
+native read-write access to BitLocker Full Disk Encryption devices.
+
+The BITLK implementation is based on publicly available information
+and it is an independent and opensource implementation that allows
+to access this proprietary disk encryption.
+
+Changes since version 2.2.2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* BITLK (Windows BitLocker compatible) device access
+
+  BITLK userspace implementation is based on the master thesis and code
+  provided by Vojtech Trefny. Also, thanks to other opensource projects
+  like libbde (that provide alternative approach to decode this format)
+  we were able to verify cryptsetup implementation.
+
+  NOTE: Support for the BITLK device is EXPERIMENTAL and will require
+  a lot of testing. If you get some error message (mainly unsupported
+  metadata in the on-disk header), please help us by submitting an issue
+  to cryptsetup project, so we can fix it. Thank you!
+
+  Cryptsetup supports BITLK activation through passphrase or recovery
+  passphrase for existing devices (BitLocker and Bitlocker to Go).
+
+  Activation through TPM, SmartCard, or any other key protector
+  is not supported. And in some situations, mainly for TPM bind to some
+  PCR registers, it could be even impossible on Linux in the future.
+
+  All metadata (key protectors) are handled read-only, cryptsetup cannot
+  create or modify them. Except for old devices (created in old Vista
+  systems), all format variants should be recognized.
+
+  Data devices can be activated read-write (followed by mounting through
+  the proper filesystem driver). To access filesystem on the decrypted device
+  you need properly installed driver (vfat, NTFS or exFAT).
+
+  Foe AES-XTS, activation is supported on all recent Linux kernels.
+
+  For older AES-CBC encryption, Linux Kernel version 5.3 is required
+  (support for special IV variant); for AES-CBC with Elephant diffuser,
+  Linux Kernel 5.6 is required.
+
+  Please note that CBC variants are legacy, and we provide it only
+  for backward compatibility (to be able to access old drives).
+
+  Cryptsetup command now supports the new "bitlk" format and implement dump,
+  open, status, and close actions.
+
+  To activate a BITLK device, use
+
+    # cryptsetup open --type bitlk <device> <name>
+      or with alias
+    # cryptsetup bitlkOpen <device> <name>
+
+  Then with properly installed fs driver (usually NTFS, vfat or exFAT),
+  you can mount the plaintext device /dev/mapper<name> device as a common
+  filesystem.
+
+ To print metadata information about BITLK device, use
+   # crypotsetup bitlkDump <device>
+
+ To print information about the active device, use
+   # cryptsetup status <name>
+
+ Example (activation of disk image):
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+  # Recent blkid recognizes BitLocker device,just to verity
+  # blkid bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img
+    bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img: TYPE="BitLocker"
+
+  # Print visible metadata information (on-disk, form the image)
+  # cryptsetup bitlkDump bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img
+    Info for BITLK device bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img.
+    Version:        2
+    GUID:           ...
+    Created:        Wed Oct 23 17:38:15 2019
+    Description:    DESKTOP-xxxxxxx E: 23.10.2019
+    Cipher name:    aes
+    Cipher mode:    xts-plain64
+    Cipher key:     128 bits
+
+    Keyslots:
+     0: VMK
+            GUID:           ...
+            Protection:     VMK protected with passphrase
+            Salt:           ...
+            Key data size:  44 [bytes]
+     1: VMK
+            GUID:           ...
+            Protection:     VMK protected with recovery passphrase
+            Salt:           ...
+            Key data size:  44 [bytes]
+     2: FVEK
+           Key data size:  44 [bytes]
+
+  # Activation (recovery passphrase works the same as password)
+  # cryptsetup bitlkOpen bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img test -v
+    Enter passphrase for bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img:
+    Command successful.
+
+  # Information about the active device
+  # cryptsetup status test
+    /dev/mapper/test is active.
+    type:    BITLK
+    cipher:  aes-xts-plain64
+    keysize: 128 bits
+    ...
+
+  # Plaintext device should now contain decrypted NTFS filesystem
+  # blkid /dev/mapper/test
+    /dev/mapper/test: UUID="..." TYPE="ntfs"
+
+  # And can be mounted
+  # mount /dev/mapper/test /mnt/tst
+
+  # Deactivation
+  # umount /mnt/tst
+  # cryptsetup close test
+
+* Veritysetup now supports activation with additional PKCS7 signature
+  of root hash through --root-hash-signature option.
+  The signature uses an in-kernel trusted key to validate the signature
+  of the root hash during activation. This option requires Linux kernel
+  5.4 with DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG option.
+
+  Verity devices activated with signature now has a special flag
+  (with signature) active in device status (veritysetup status <name>).
+
+  Usage:
+  # veritysetup open <data_device> name <hash_device> <root_hash> \
+    --root-hash-signature=<roothash_p7_sig_file>
+
+* Integritysetup now calculates hash integrity size according to algorithm
+  instead of requiring an explicit tag size.
+
+  Previously, when integritysetup formats a device with hash or
+  HMAC integrity checksums, it required explicitly tag size entry from
+  a user (or used default value).
+  This led to confusion and unexpected shortened tag sizes.
+
+  Now, libcryptsetup calculates tag size according to real hash output.
+  Tag size can also be specified, then it warns if these values differ.
+
+* Integritysetup now supports fixed padding for dm-integrity devices.
+
+  There was an in-kernel bug that wasted a lot of space when using metadata
+  areas for integrity-protected devices if a larger sector size than
+  512 bytes was used.
+  This problem affects both stand-alone dm-integrity and also LUKS2 with
+  authenticated encryption and larger sector size.
+
+  The new extension to dm-integrity superblock is needed, so devices
+  with the new optimal padding cannot be activated on older systems.
+
+  Integritysetup/Cryptsetup will use new padding automatically if it
+  detects the proper kernel. To create a compatible device with
+  the old padding, use --integrity-legacy-padding option.
+
+* A lot of fixes to online LUKS2 reecryption.
+
+* Add crypt_resume_by_volume_key() function to libcryptsetup.
+  If a user has a volume key available, the LUKS device can be resumed
+  directly using the provided volume key.
+  No keyslot derivation is needed, only the key digest is checked.
+
+* Implement active device suspend info.
+  Add CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED bit to crypt_get_active_device() flags
+  that informs the caller that device is suspended (luksSuspend).
+
+* Allow --test-passphrase for a detached header.
+  Before this fix, we required a data device specified on the command
+  line even though it was not necessary for the passphrase check.
+
+* Allow --key-file option in legacy offline encryption.
+  The option was ignored for LUKS1 encryption initialization.
+
+* Export memory safe functions.
+  To make developing of some extensions simpler, we now export
+  functions to handle memory with proper wipe on deallocation.
+
+* Fail crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf for inactive LUKS1 keyslot.
+
+Libcryptsetup API extensions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The libcryptsetup API is backward compatible for existing symbols.
+
+New symbols
+ crypt_set_compatibility
+ crypt_get_compatibility;
+ crypt_resume_by_volume_key;
+ crypt_activate_by_signed_key;
+ crypt_safe_alloc;
+ crypt_safe_realloc;
+ crypt_safe_free;
+ crypt_safe_memzero;
+
+New defines introduced :
+  CRYPT_BITLK "BITLK" - BITLK (BitLocker-compatible mode
+  CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING - dm-integrity legacy padding
+  CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE - dm-verity root hash signature
+  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED - device suspended info flag

docs/v2.3.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Support VeraCrypt 128 bytes passwords.
+  VeraCrypt now allows passwords of maximal length 128 bytes
+  (compared to legacy TrueCrypt where it was limited by 64 bytes).
+
+* Strip extra newline from BitLocker recovery keys
+  There might be a trailing newline added by the text editor when
+  the recovery passphrase was passed using the --key-file option.
+
+* Detect separate libiconv library.
+  It should fix compilation issues on distributions with iconv
+  implemented in a separate library.
+
+* Various fixes and workarounds to build on old Linux distributions.
+
+* Split lines with hexadecimal digest printing for large key-sizes.
+
+* Do not wipe the device with no integrity profile.
+  With --integrity none we performed useless full device wipe.
+
+* Workaround for dm-integrity kernel table bug.
+  Some kernels show an invalid dm-integrity mapping table
+  if superblock contains the "recalculate" bit. This causes
+  integritysetup to not recognize the dm-integrity device.
+  Integritysetup now specifies kernel options such a way that
+  even on unpatched kernels mapping table is correct.
+
+* Print error message if LUKS1 keyslot cannot be processed.
+  If the crypto backend is missing support for hash algorithms
+  used in PBKDF2, the error message was not visible.
+
+* Properly align LUKS2 keyslots area on conversion.
+  If the LUKS1 payload offset (data offset) is not aligned
+  to 4 KiB boundary, new LUKS2 keyslots area in now aligned properly.
+
+* Validate LUKS2 earlier on conversion to not corrupt the device
+  if binary keyslots areas metadata are not correct.

docs/v2.3.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Support compilation with json-c library version 0.14.
+
+* Update FAQ document for some LUKS2 specific information.
+
+* Add option to dump content of LUKS2 unbound keyslot:
+    cryptsetup luksDump --unbound -S <slot> <device>
+  or optionally with --master-key-file option.
+
+  The slot number --key-slot (-S) option is mandatory here.
+
+  An unbound keyslot store a key is that is not assigned to data
+  area on disk (LUKS2 allows to store arbitrary keys).
+
+* Rephrase some error messages and remove redundant end-of-lines.
+
+* Add support for discards (TRIM) for standalone dm-integrity devices.
+  Linux kernel 5.7 adds support for optional discard/TRIM operation
+  over dm-integrity devices.
+
+  It is now supported through --allow-discards integritysetup option.
+  Note you need to add this flag in all activation calls.
+
+  Note that this option cannot be used for LUKS2 authenticated encryption
+  (that uses dm-integrity for storing additional per-sector metadata).
+
+* Fix cryptsetup-reencrypt to work on devices that do not allow
+  direct-io device access.
+
+* Fix a crash in the BitLocker-compatible code error path.
+
+* Fix Veracrypt compatible support for longer (>64 bytes) passphrases.
+  It allows some older images to be correctly opened again.
+  The issue was introduced in version 2.3.1.

docs/v2.3.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix BitLocker compatible device access that uses native 4kB sectors.
+
+  Devices formatted with storage that natively support 4096-bytes
+  sectors can also use this sector size for encryption units.
+
+* Support large IV count (--iv-large-sectors) cryptsetup option
+  for plain device mapping.
+
+  The large IV count is supported in dm-crypt together with larger
+  sector encryption. It counts the Initialization Vector (IV) in
+  a larger sector size instead of 512-bytes sectors.
+
+  This option does not have any performance or security impact,
+  but it can be used for accessing incompatible existing disk images
+  from other systems.
+
+  Only open action with plain device type and sector size > 512 bytes
+  are supported.
+
+* Fix a memory leak in BitLocker compatible handling.
+
+* Allow EBOIV (Initialization Vector algorithm) use.
+
+  The EBOIV initialization vector is intended to be used internally
+  with BitLocker devices (for CBC mode). It can now be used also
+  outside of the BitLocker compatible code.
+
+* Require both keyslot cipher and key size options.
+
+  If these LUKS2 keyslot parameters were not specified together,
+  cryptsetup silently failed.
+
+* Update to man pages and FAQ.

docs/v2.3.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with a security fix (32-bit only).
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.2.x and later should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.3
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix a possible out-of-bounds memory write while validating LUKS2 data
+  segments metadata (CVE-2020-14382).
+
+  This problem can be triggered only on 32-bit builds (64-bit systems
+  are not affected).
+
+  LUKS2 format validation code contains a bug in segments validation code
+  where the code does not check for possible overflow on memory allocation.
+
+  Due to the bug, the libcryptsetup can be tricked to expect such allocation
+  was successful. Later it may read data from image crafted by an attacker and
+  actually write such data beyond allocated memory.
+
+  The bug was introduced in cryptsetup 2.2.0. All later releases until 2.3.4
+  are affected.
+
+  If you only backport the fix for this CVE, these master branch git commits
+  should be backported:
+    52f5cb8cedf22fb3e14c744814ec8af7614146c7
+    46ee71edcd13e1dad50815ad65c28779aa6f7503
+    752c9a52798f11d3b765b673ebaa3058eb25316e
+
+  Thanks to Tobias Stoeckmann for discovering this issue.
+
+* Ignore reported optimal IO size if not aligned to minimal page size.
+
+  Some USB enclosures report bogus block device topology (see lsblk -t) that
+  prevents LUKS2 format with 4k sector size (reported values are not correctly
+  aligned). The code now ignores such values and uses the default alignment.
+
+* Added support for new no_read/write_wrokqueue dm-crypt options (kernel 5.9).
+
+  These performance options, introduced in kernel 5.9, configure dm-crypt
+  to bypass read or write workqueues and run encryption synchronously.
+
+  Use --perf-no_read_workqueue or --perf-no_write_workqueue cryptsetup arguments
+  to use these dm-crypt flags.
+
+  These options are available only for low-level dm-crypt performance tuning,
+  use only if you need a change to default dm-crypt behavior.
+
+  For LUKS2, these flags can be persistently stored in metadata with
+  the --persistent option.
+
+* Added support panic_on_corruption option for dm-verity devices (kernel 5.9).
+
+  Veritysetup now supports --panic-on-corruption argument that configures
+  the dm-verity device to panics kernel if a corruption is detected.
+
+  This option is intended for specific configurations, do not use it in
+  standard configurations.
+
+* Support --master-key-file option for online LUKS2 reencryption
+
+  This can be used for reencryption of devices that uses protected key AES cipher
+  on some mainframes crypto accelerators.
+
+* Always return EEXIST error code if a device already exists.
+
+  Some libcryptsetup functions (activate_by*) now return EEXIST error code,
+  so the caller can distinguish that call fails because some parallel process
+  already activated the device.
+  Previously all fails returned EINVAL (invalid value).
+
+* Fix a problem in integritysetup if a hash algorithm has dash in the name.
+
+  If users want to use blake2b/blake2s, the kernel algorithm name includes
+  a dash (like "blake2s-256").
+  Theses algorithms can now be used for integritysetup devices.
+
+* Fix crypto backend to properly handle ECB mode.
+
+  Even though it should never be used, it should still work for testing :)
+  This fixes a bug introduced in cryptsetup version 2.3.2.
+
+* TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt compatible mode now supports the activation of devices
+  with a larger sector.
+
+  TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt always uses 512-byte sector for encryption, but for devices
+  with a larger native sector, it stores this value in the header.
+
+  This patch allows activation of such devices, basically ignoring
+  the mentioned sector size.
+
+* LUKS2: Do not create excessively large headers.
+
+  When creating a LUKS2 header with a specified --offset larger than
+  the LUKS2 header size, do not create a larger file than needed.
+
+* Fix unspecified sector size for BitLocker compatible mode.
+
+  Some BitLocker devices can contain zeroed sector size in the header.
+  In this case, the 512-byte sector should be used.
+  The bug was introduced in version 2.3.3.
+
+* Fix reading key data size in metadata for BitLocker compatible mode.
+
+  Such devices with an unexpected entry in metadata can now be activated.
+
+  Thanks to all users reporting these problems, BitLocker metadata documentation
+  is not publicly available, and we depend only on these reports.
+
+* Fix typos in documentation.

docs/v2.3.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with minor extensions.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.x and later should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.4
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix partial reads of passphrase from an interactive terminal.
+  Some stable kernels (5.3.11) started to return buffer from a terminal
+  in parts of maximal size 64 bytes.
+  This breaks the reading of passphrases longer than 64 characters
+  entered through an interactive terminal. The change is already fixed
+  in later kernel releases, but tools now support such partial read from
+  terminal properly.
+
+* Fix maximal length of password entered through a terminal.
+  Now the maximal interactive passphrase length is exactly
+  512 characters (not 511).
+
+* integritysetup: support new dm-integrity HMAC recalculation options.
+
+  In older kernels (since version 4.19), an attacker can force
+  an automatic recalculation of integrity tags by modifying
+  the dm-integrity superblock.
+  This is a problem with a keyed algorithms (HMAC), where it expects
+  nobody can trigger such recalculation without the key.
+  (Automatic recalculation will start after the next activation.)
+
+  Note that dm-integrity in standalone mode was *not* supposed
+  to provide cryptographic data integrity protection.
+  Despite that, we try to keep the system secure if keyed algorithms
+  are used.
+  Thank Daniel Glöckner for the original report of this problem.
+
+  Authenticated encryption that provides data integrity protection (in
+  combination with dm-crypt and LUKS2) is not affected by this problem.
+
+  The fix in the kernel for this problem contains two parts.
+
+  Firstly, the dm-integrity kernel module disables integrity
+  recalculation if keyed algorithms (HMAC) are used.
+  This change is included in long-term stable kernels.
+
+  Secondly, since the kernel version 5.11, dm-integrity introduces
+  modified protection where a journal-integrity algorithm guards
+  superblock; also, journal sections are protected. An attacker cannot
+  copy sectors from one journal section to another, and the superblock
+  also contains salt to prevent header replacement from another device.
+
+  If you want to protect data with HMAC, you should always also use HMAC
+  for --journal-integrity. Keys can be independent.
+  If HMAC is used for data but not for the journal, the recalculation
+  option is disabled.
+
+  If you need to use (insecure) backward compatibility implementation,
+  two new integritysetup options are introduced:
+    - Use --integrity-legacy-recalc (instead of --integrity-recalc)
+      to allow recalculation on legacy devices.
+    - Use --integrity-legacy-hmac in format action to force old insecure
+      HMAC format.
+
+  Libcryptsetup API also introduces flags
+    CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC and
+    CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC
+  to set these through crypt_set_compatibility() call.
+
+* integritysetup: display of recalculating sector in dump command.
+
+* veritysetup: fix verity FEC if stored in the same image with hashes.
+
+  Optional FEC (Forward Error Correction) data should cover the whole
+  data area, hashes (Merkle tree), and optionally additional metadata
+  (located after hash area).
+
+  Unfortunately, if FEC data is stored in the same file as hash,
+  the calculation wrongly used the whole file size, thus overlaps with
+  the FEC area itself. This produced unusable and too large FEC data.
+  There is no problem if the FEC image is a separate image.
+
+  The problem is now fixed, introducing FEC blocks calculation as:
+    - If the hash device is in a separate image, metadata covers the
+      whole rest of the image after the hash area. (Unchanged behavior.)
+    - If hash and FEC device is in the image, metadata ends on the FEC
+      area offset.
+
+  Note: there is also a fix for FEC in the dm-verity kernel (on the way
+  to stable kernels) that fixes error correction with larger RS roots.
+
+* veritysetup: run FEC repair check even if root hash fails.
+
+  Note: The userspace FEC verify command reports are only informational
+  for now. Code does not check verity hash after FEC recovery in
+  userspace. The Reed-Solomon decoder can then report the possibility
+  that it fixed data even if parity is too damaged.
+  This will be fixed in the next major release.
+
+* veritysetup: do not process hash image if hash area is empty.
+
+  Sometimes the device is so small that there is only a root hash
+  needed, and the hash area is not used.
+  Also, the size of the hash image is not increased for hash block
+  alignment in this case.
+
+* veritysetup: store verity hash algorithm in superblock in lowercase.
+
+  Otherwise, the kernel could refuse the activation of the device.
+
+* bitlk: fix a crash if the device disappears during BitLocker scan.
+
+* bitlk: show a better error when trying to open an NTFS device.
+
+  Both BitLocker version 1 and NTFS have the same signature.
+  If a user opens an NTFS device without BitLocker, it now correctly
+  informs that it is not a BITLK device.
+
+* bitlk: add support for startup key protected VMKs.
+
+  The startup key can be provided in --key-file option for open command.
+
+* Fix LUKS1 repair code (regression since version 1.7.x).
+
+  We cannot trust possibly broken keyslots metadata in repair, so the
+  code recalculates them instead.
+  This makes the repair code working again when the master boot record
+  signature overwrites the LUKS header.
+
+* Fix luksKeyChange for LUKS2 with assigned tokens.
+
+  The token references are now correctly assigned to the new keyslot
+  number.
+
+* Fix cryptsetup resize using LUKS2 tokens.
+
+  Code needlessly asked for passphrase even though volume key was
+  already unlocked via LUKS2 token.
+
+* Print a visible error if device resize is not supported.
+
+* Add error message when suspending wrong non-LUKS device.
+
+* Fix default XTS mode key size in reencryption.
+
+  The same luksFormat logic (double key size because XTS uses two keys)
+  is applied in the reencryption code.
+
+* Rephrase missing locking directory warning and move it to debug level.
+
+  The system should later provide a safe transition to tempdir
+  configuration, so creating locking directory inside libcryptsetup
+  call is safe.
+
+* Many fixes for the use of cipher_null (empty debug cipher).
+
+  Support for this empty cipher was intended as a debug feature and for
+  measuring performance overhead. Unfortunately, many systems started to
+  use it as an "empty shell" for LUKS (to enable encryption later).
+
+  This use is very dangerous and it creates a false sense of security.
+
+  Anyway, to not break such systems, we try to support these
+  configurations.
+  Using cipher_null in any production system is strongly discouraged!
+
+  Fixes include:
+   - allow LUKS resume for a device with cipher_null.
+   - do not upload key in keyring when data cipher is null.
+   - switch to default cipher when reencrypting cipher_null device.
+   - replace possible bogus cipher_null keyslots before reencryption.
+   - fix broken detection of null cipher in LUKS2.
+     cipher_null is no longer possible to be used in keyslot encryption
+     in LUKS2, it can be used only for data for debugging purposes.
+
+* Fixes for libpasswdqc 2.0.x (optional passphrase quality check).
+
+* Fixes for problems discovered by various tools for code analysis.
+
+  Fixes include a rework of libpopt command line option string leaks.
+
+* Various fixes to man pages.

docs/v2.3.6-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.6 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with minor extensions.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.x and later should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.5
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* integritysetup: Fix possible dm-integrity mapping table truncation.
+
+  While integritysetup in standalone mode (no encryption) was not
+  designed to provide keyed (and cryptographically strong) data
+  integrity protection, some options can use such algorithms (HMAC).
+
+  If a key is used, it is directly sent to the kernel dm-integrity as
+  a mapping table option (no key derivation is performed).
+  For HMAC, such a key could be quite long (up to 4096 bytes in
+  integritysetup CLI).
+
+  Unfortunately, due to fixed buffers and not correctly checking string
+  truncation, some parameter combinations could cause truncation
+  of the dm-integrity mapping table.
+  In most cases, the table was rejected by the kernel.
+  The worst possible case was key truncation for HMAC options
+  (internal_hash and journal_mac dm-integrity table options).
+
+  This release fixes possible truncation and also adds more sanity
+  checks to reject truncated options.
+  Also, integritysetup now mentions maximal allowed key size
+  in --help output.
+
+  For old standalone dm-integrity devices where the key length was
+  truncated, you have to modify (shorten) --integrity-key-size
+  resp. --journal-integrity-key-size option now.
+
+  This bug is _not_ present for dm-crypt/LUKS, LUKS2 (including
+  integrity protection), or dm-verity devices; it affects only
+  standalone dm-integrity with HMAC integrity protection.
+
+* cryptsetup: Backup header can be used to activate TCRYPT device.
+  Use --header option to specify the header.
+
+* cryptsetup: Avoid LUKS2 decryption without detached header.
+  This feature will be added later and is currently not supported.
+
+* Additional fixes and workarounds for common warnings produced
+  by some static analysis tools (like gcc-11 analyzer) and additional
+  code hardening.
+
+* Fix standalone libintl detection for compiled tests.
+
+* Add Blake2b and Blake2s hash support for crypto backends.
+  Kernel and gcrypt crypto backend support all variants.
+  OpenSSL supports only Blake2b-512 and Blake2s-256.
+  Crypto backend supports kernel notation e.g. "blake2b-512".

docs/v2.3.7-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.7 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable security bug-fix release that fixes CVE-2021-4122.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.3.x must upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.6
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
+  reencryption extension crash recovery (CVE-2021-4122).
+
+  An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
+  progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
+  decrypt part of the LUKS device.
+
+  This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but
+  no knowledge of user passphrases.
+
+  The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates
+  the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata.
+  There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened
+  (except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed
+  afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with
+  possible modification of revealed plaintext.
+
+  The size of possible decrypted data depends on configured LUKS2 header
+  size (metadata size is configurable for LUKS2).
+  With the default parameters (16 MiB LUKS2 header) and only one
+  allocated keyslot (512 bit key for AES-XTS), simulated decryption with
+  checksum resilience SHA1 (20 bytes checksum for 4096-byte blocks),
+  the maximal decrypted size can be over 3GiB.
+
+  The attack is not applicable to LUKS1 format, but the attacker can
+  update metadata in place to LUKS2 format as an additional step.
+  For such a converted LUKS2 header, the keyslot area is limited to
+  decrypted size (with SHA1 checksums) over 300 MiB.
+
+  The issue is present in all cryptsetup releases since 2.2.0.
+  Versions 1.x, 2.0.x, and 2.1.x are not affected, as these do not
+  contain LUKS2 reencryption extension.
+
+  The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual
+  reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new
+  encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires
+  calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to
+  initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no
+  encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not
+  protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects
+  visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect
+  against intentional modification but such modification must not cause
+  a violation of data confidentiality.
+
+  The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption
+  metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical
+  reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata
+  digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots.
+  For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0.
+
+  The former reencryption operation (without the additional digest) is no
+  longer supported (reencryption with the digest is not backward
+  compatible). You need to finish in-progress reencryption before
+  updating to new packages. The alternative approach is to perform
+  a repair command from the updated package to recalculate reencryption
+  digest and fix metadata.
+  The reencryption repair operation always require a user passphrase.
+
+  WARNING: Devices with older reencryption in progress can be no longer
+  activated without performing the action mentioned above.
+
+  Encryption in progress can be detected by running the luksDump command
+  (output includes reencrypt keyslot with reencryption parameters). Also,
+  during the active reencryption, no keyslot operations are available
+  (change of passphrases, etc.).
+
+  The issue was found by Milan Broz as cryptsetup maintainer.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Add configure option --disable-luks2-reencryption to completely disable
+  LUKS2 reencryption code.
+
+  When used, the libcryptsetup library can read metadata with
+  reencryption code, but all reencryption API calls and cryptsetup
+  reencrypt commands are disabled.
+
+  Devices with online reencryption in progress cannot be activated.
+  This option can cause some incompatibilities. Please use with care.
+
+* Improve internal metadata validation code for reencryption metadata.
+
+* Add updated documentation for LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification
+  version 1.1.0 (with reencryption extension description and updated
+  metadata description). See docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf or online
+  version in https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs repository.

lib/Makemodule.am

@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ libcryptsetup_la_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \
 	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/loopaes		\
 	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/verity		\
 	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/tcrypt		\
-	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/integrity
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/integrity		\
+	-I $(top_srcdir)/lib/bitlk
 
 libcryptsetup_la_DEPENDENCIES = libutils_io.la libcrypto_backend.la lib/libcryptsetup.sym
 
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ libcryptsetup_la_LIBADD = \
 	@LIBARGON2_LIBS@	\
 	@JSON_C_LIBS@		\
 	@BLKID_LIBS@		\
+	$(LTLIBICONV)		\
 	libcrypto_backend.la	\
 	libutils_io.la
 
@@ -64,6 +66,9 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
 	lib/utils_device_locking.c	\
 	lib/utils_device_locking.h	\
 	lib/utils_pbkdf.c		\
+	lib/utils_safe_memory.c		\
+	lib/utils_storage_wrappers.c	\
+	lib/utils_storage_wrappers.h	\
 	lib/libdevmapper.c		\
 	lib/utils_dm.h			\
 	lib/volumekey.c			\
@@ -72,7 +77,7 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
 	lib/base64.h			\
 	lib/base64.c			\
 	lib/integrity/integrity.h	\
-	lib/integrity/integrity.c       \
+	lib/integrity/integrity.c	\
 	lib/loopaes/loopaes.h		\
 	lib/loopaes/loopaes.c		\
 	lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h		\
@@ -88,7 +93,7 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
 	lib/verity/verity.h		\
 	lib/verity/rs_encode_char.c	\
 	lib/verity/rs_decode_char.c	\
-	lib/verity/rs.h                 \
+	lib/verity/rs.h		\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c	\
@@ -97,9 +102,15 @@ libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
 	lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_segment.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_token.c		\
 	lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h	\
 	lib/luks2/luks2.h		\
 	lib/utils_blkid.c		\
-	lib/utils_blkid.h
+	lib/utils_blkid.h		\
+	lib/bitlk/bitlk.h		\
+	lib/bitlk/bitlk.c

lib/base64.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* base64.c -- Encode binary data using printable characters.
-   Copyright (C) 1999-2001, 2004-2006, 2009-2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+   Copyright (C) 1999-2001, 2004-2006, 2009-2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 
    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ base64_encode_fast (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen, char *restrict out)
 {
   while (inlen)
     {
-      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2];
+      *out++ = b64c[(to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2) & 0x3f];
       *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4) + (to_uchar (in[1]) >> 4)) & 0x3f];
       *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[1]) << 2) + (to_uchar (in[2]) >> 6)) & 0x3f];
       *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[2]) & 0x3f];
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ base64_encode (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
 
   while (inlen && outlen)
     {
-      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2];
+      *out++ = b64c[(to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2) & 0x3f];
       if (!--outlen)
         break;
       *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4)

lib/base64.h

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* base64.h -- Encode binary data using printable characters.
-   Copyright (C) 2004-2006, 2009-2018 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+   Copyright (C) 2004-2006, 2009-2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
    Written by Simon Josefsson.
 
    This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify

lib/bitlk/bitlk.h

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+ * BITLK (BitLocker-compatible) header definition
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Vojtech Trefny
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_BITLK_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_BITLK_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct device;
+
+#define BITLK_NONCE_SIZE 12
+#define BITLK_SALT_SIZE 16
+#define BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE 16
+
+#define BITLK_STATE_NORMAL 0x0004
+
+typedef enum {
+	BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_NORMAL = 0,
+	BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_EOW,
+	BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
+} BITLKEncryptionType;
+
+typedef enum {
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY = 0,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_TPM,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_TPM_PIN,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_RECOVERY_PASSPHRASE,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_SMART_CARD,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_UNKNOWN,
+} BITLKVMKProtection;
+
+typedef enum {
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_PROPERTY = 0x0000,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VMK = 0x0002,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_FVEK = 0x0003,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_STARTUP_KEY = 0x0006,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_DESCRIPTION = 0x0007,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VOLUME_HEADER = 0x000f,
+} BITLKFVEEntryType;
+
+typedef enum {
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_ERASED = 0x0000,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_KEY = 0x0001,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRING = 0x0002,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRETCH_KEY = 0x0003,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_USE_KEY = 0x0004,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_ENCRYPTED_KEY = 0x0005,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_TPM_KEY = 0x0006,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_VALIDATION = 0x0007,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_VMK = 0x0008,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_EXTERNAL_KEY = 0x0009,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_OFFSET_SIZE = 0x000f,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_RECOVERY_TIME = 0x015,
+} BITLKFVEEntryValue;
+
+struct bitlk_vmk {
+	char *guid;
+	char *name;
+	BITLKVMKProtection protection;
+	uint8_t salt[BITLK_SALT_SIZE];
+	uint8_t mac_tag[BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE];
+	uint8_t nonce[BITLK_NONCE_SIZE];
+	struct volume_key *vk;
+	struct bitlk_vmk *next;
+};
+
+struct bitlk_fvek {
+	uint8_t mac_tag[BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE];
+	uint8_t nonce[BITLK_NONCE_SIZE];
+	struct volume_key *vk;
+};
+
+struct bitlk_metadata {
+	uint16_t sector_size;
+	bool togo;
+	bool state;
+	BITLKEncryptionType type;
+	const char *cipher;
+	const char *cipher_mode;
+	uint16_t key_size;
+	char *guid;
+	uint64_t creation_time;
+	char *description;
+	uint64_t metadata_offset[3];
+	uint32_t metadata_version;
+	uint64_t volume_header_offset;
+	uint64_t volume_header_size;
+	struct bitlk_vmk *vmks;
+	struct bitlk_fvek *fvek;
+};
+
+int BITLK_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct bitlk_metadata *params);
+
+int BITLK_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, struct bitlk_metadata *params);
+
+int BITLK_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		   const char *name,
+		   const char *password,
+		   size_t passwordLen,
+		   const struct bitlk_metadata *params,
+		   uint32_t flags);
+
+void BITLK_bitlk_fvek_free(struct bitlk_fvek *fvek);
+void BITLK_bitlk_vmk_free(struct bitlk_vmk *vmk);
+void BITLK_bitlk_metadata_free(struct bitlk_metadata *params);
+
+#endif

lib/crypt_plain.c

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /*
  * cryptsetup plain device helper functions
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int hash(const char *hash_name, size_t key_size, char *key,
 
 #define PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX 256
 
-int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)),
+int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     const char *hash_name,
 		     char *key, size_t key_size,
 		     const char *passphrase, size_t passphrase_size)
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)),
 	size_t hash_size, pad_size;
 	int r;
 
-	log_dbg("Plain: hashing passphrase using %s.", hash_name);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Plain: hashing passphrase using %s.", hash_name);
 
 	if (strlen(hash_name) >= PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -85,11 +85,11 @@ int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)),
 		*s = '\0';
 		s++;
 		if (!*s || sscanf(s, "%zd", &hash_size) != 1) {
-			log_dbg("Hash length is not a number");
+			log_dbg(cd, "Hash length is not a number");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		if (hash_size > key_size) {
-			log_dbg("Hash length %zd > key length %zd",
+			log_dbg(cd, "Hash length %zd > key length %zd",
 				hash_size, key_size);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)),
 	/* No hash, copy passphrase directly */
 	if (!strcmp(hash_name_buf, "plain")) {
 		if (passphrase_size < hash_size) {
-			log_dbg("Too short plain passphrase.");
+			log_dbg(cd, "Too short plain passphrase.");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		memcpy(key, passphrase, hash_size);

lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am

@@ -4,12 +4,14 @@ libcrypto_backend_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
 
 libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES = \
 	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend_internal.h \
 	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c \
 	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c \
 	lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c \
 	lib/crypto_backend/crc32.c \
 	lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c \
-	lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c
+	lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/cipher_check.c
 
 if CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT
 libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.c

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ int argon2_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
     }
 
     /* No field can be longer than the encoded length */
+    /* coverity[strlen_assign] */
     max_field_len = (uint32_t)encoded_len;
 
     ctx.saltlen = max_field_len;
@@ -449,6 +450,8 @@ const char *argon2_error_message(int error_code) {
 
 size_t argon2_encodedlen(uint32_t t_cost, uint32_t m_cost, uint32_t parallelism,
                          uint32_t saltlen, uint32_t hashlen, argon2_type type) {
+  if (!argon2_type2string(type, 0))
+      return 0;
   return strlen("$$v=$m=,t=,p=$$") + strlen(argon2_type2string(type, 0)) +
          numlen(t_cost) + numlen(m_cost) + numlen(parallelism) +
          b64len(saltlen) + b64len(hashlen) + numlen(ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER) + 1;

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.h

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2-impl.h

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2.h

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2b.c

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-opt.h

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-ref.h

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ void NOT_OPTIMIZED secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
     SecureZeroMemory(v, n);
 #elif defined memset_s
     memset_s(v, n, 0, n);
-#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
+#elif defined(HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO)
     explicit_bzero(v, n);
 #else
     static void *(*const volatile memset_sec)(void *, int, size_t) = &memset;
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static int fill_memory_blocks_mt(argon2_instance_t *instance) {
 
     for (r = 0; r < instance->passes; ++r) {
         for (s = 0; s < ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS; ++s) {
-            uint32_t l;
+            uint32_t l, ll;
 
             /* 2. Calling threads */
             for (l = 0; l < instance->lanes; ++l) {
@@ -324,6 +324,9 @@ static int fill_memory_blocks_mt(argon2_instance_t *instance) {
                        sizeof(argon2_position_t));
                 if (argon2_thread_create(&thread[l], &fill_segment_thr,
                                          (void *)&thr_data[l])) {
+                    /* Wait for already running threads */
+                    for (ll = 0; ll < l; ++ll)
+                        argon2_thread_join(thread[ll]);
                     rc = ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL;
                     goto fail;
                 }

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.h

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.c

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.h

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/opt.c

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/ref.c

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.c

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.h

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
  * these licenses can be found at:
  *
- * - CC0 1.0 Universal : http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
- * - Apache 2.0        : http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
  *
  * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
  * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Argon2 PBKDF2 library wrapper
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <errno.h>
-#include "crypto_backend.h"
+#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
 #if HAVE_ARGON2_H
 #include <argon2.h>
 #else
@@ -77,117 +77,3 @@ int argon2(const char *type, const char *password, size_t password_length,
 	return r;
 #endif
 }
-
-#if 0
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-struct test_vector {
-	argon2_type type;
-	unsigned int memory;
-	unsigned int iterations;
-	unsigned int parallelism;
-	const char *password;
-	unsigned int password_length;
-	const char *salt;
-	unsigned int salt_length;
-	const char *key;
-	unsigned int key_length;
-	const char *ad;
-	unsigned int ad_length;
-	const char *output;
-	unsigned int output_length;
-};
-
-struct test_vector test_vectors[] = {
-	/* Argon2 RFC */
-	{
-		Argon2_i, 32, 3, 4,
-		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
-		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
-		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
-		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01", 32,
-		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02"
-		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02", 16,
-		"\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03", 8,
-		"\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04"
-		"\x04\x04\x04\x04", 12,
-		"\xc8\x14\xd9\xd1\xdc\x7f\x37\xaa"
-		"\x13\xf0\xd7\x7f\x24\x94\xbd\xa1"
-		"\xc8\xde\x6b\x01\x6d\xd3\x88\xd2"
-		"\x99\x52\xa4\xc4\x67\x2b\x6c\xe8", 32
-	},
-	{
-		Argon2_id, 32, 3, 4,
-		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
-		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
-		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01"
-		"\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01", 32,
-		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02"
-		"\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02", 16,
-		"\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03\x03", 8,
-		"\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04\x04"
-		"\x04\x04\x04\x04", 12,
-		"\x0d\x64\x0d\xf5\x8d\x78\x76\x6c"
-		"\x08\xc0\x37\xa3\x4a\x8b\x53\xc9"
-		"\xd0\x1e\xf0\x45\x2d\x75\xb6\x5e"
-		"\xb5\x25\x20\xe9\x6b\x01\xe6\x59", 32
-	}
-};
-
-static void printhex(const char *s, const char *buf, size_t len)
-{
-	size_t i;
-
-	printf("%s: ", s);
-	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
-		printf("\\x%02x", (unsigned char)buf[i]);
-	printf("\n");
-	fflush(stdout);
-}
-
-static int argon2_test_vectors(void)
-{
-	char result[64];
-	int i, r;
-	struct test_vector *vec;
-	argon2_context context;
-
-	printf("Argon2 running test vectors\n");
-
-	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(test_vectors) / sizeof(*test_vectors)); i++) {
-		vec = &test_vectors[i];
-		memset(result, 0, sizeof(result));
-		memset(&context, 0, sizeof(context));
-
-		context.flags = ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
-		context.version = ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER;
-		context.out = (uint8_t *)result;
-		context.outlen = (uint32_t)vec->output_length;
-		context.pwd = (uint8_t *)vec->password;
-		context.pwdlen = (uint32_t)vec->password_length;
-		context.salt = (uint8_t *)vec->salt;
-		context.saltlen = (uint32_t)vec->salt_length;
-		context.secret = (uint8_t *)vec->key;
-		context.secretlen = (uint32_t)vec->key_length;;
-		context.ad = (uint8_t *)vec->ad;
-		context.adlen = (uint32_t)vec->ad_length;
-		context.t_cost = vec->iterations;
-		context.m_cost = vec->memory;
-		context.lanes = vec->parallelism;
-		context.threads = vec->parallelism;
-
-		r = argon2_ctx(&context, vec->type);
-		if (r != ARGON2_OK) {
-			printf("Argon2 failed %i, vector %d\n", r, i);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		if (memcmp(result, vec->output, vec->output_length) != 0) {
-			printf("vector %u\n", i);
-			printhex(" got", result, vec->output_length);
-			printhex("want", vec->output, vec->output_length);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif

lib/crypto_backend/cipher_check.c

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/*
+ * Cipher performance check
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
+
+#ifndef CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW
+#define CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW CLOCK_MONOTONIC
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This is not simulating storage, so using disk block causes extreme overhead.
+ * Let's use some fixed block size where results are more reliable...
+ */
+#define CIPHER_BLOCK_BYTES 65536
+
+/*
+ * If the measured value is lower, encrypted buffer is probably too small
+ * and calculated values are not reliable.
+ */
+#define CIPHER_TIME_MIN_MS 0.001
+
+/*
+ * The whole test depends on Linux kernel usermode crypto API for now.
+ * (The same implementations are used in dm-crypt though.)
+ */
+
+static int time_ms(struct timespec *start, struct timespec *end, double *ms)
+{
+	double start_ms, end_ms;
+
+	start_ms = start->tv_sec * 1000.0 + start->tv_nsec / (1000.0 * 1000);
+	end_ms   = end->tv_sec * 1000.0 + end->tv_nsec / (1000.0 * 1000);
+
+	*ms = end_ms - start_ms;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cipher_perf_one(const char *name, const char *mode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
+			  const char *key, size_t key_size, const char *iv, size_t iv_size, int enc)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher_kernel cipher;
+	size_t done = 0, block = CIPHER_BLOCK_BYTES;
+	int r;
+
+	if (buffer_size < block)
+		block = buffer_size;
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init_kernel(&cipher, name, mode, key, key_size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	while (done < buffer_size) {
+		if ((done + block) > buffer_size)
+			block = buffer_size - done;
+
+		if (enc)
+			r = crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(&cipher, &buffer[done], &buffer[done],
+						 block, iv, iv_size);
+		else
+			r = crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(&cipher, &buffer[done], &buffer[done],
+						 block, iv, iv_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+
+		done += block;
+	}
+
+	crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&cipher);
+
+	return r;
+}
+static int cipher_measure(const char *name, const char *mode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
+			  const char *key, size_t key_size, const char *iv, size_t iv_size,
+			  int encrypt, double *ms)
+{
+	struct timespec start, end;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Using getrusage would be better here but the precision
+	 * is not adequate, so better stick with CLOCK_MONOTONIC
+	 */
+	if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW, &start) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = cipher_perf_one(name, mode, buffer, buffer_size, key, key_size, iv, iv_size, encrypt);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW, &end) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = time_ms(&start, &end, ms);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (*ms < CIPHER_TIME_MIN_MS)
+		return -ERANGE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static double speed_mbs(unsigned long bytes, double ms)
+{
+	double speed = bytes, s = ms / 1000.;
+
+	return speed / (1024 * 1024) / s;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_perf_kernel(const char *name, const char *mode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
+			     const char *key, size_t key_size, const char *iv, size_t iv_size,
+			     double *encryption_mbs, double *decryption_mbs)
+{
+	double ms_enc, ms_dec, ms;
+	int r, repeat_enc, repeat_dec;
+
+	ms_enc = 0.0;
+	repeat_enc = 1;
+	while (ms_enc < 1000.0) {
+		r = cipher_measure(name, mode, buffer, buffer_size, key, key_size, iv, iv_size, 1, &ms);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		ms_enc += ms;
+		repeat_enc++;
+	}
+
+	ms_dec = 0.0;
+	repeat_dec = 1;
+	while (ms_dec < 1000.0) {
+		r = cipher_measure(name, mode, buffer, buffer_size, key, key_size, iv, iv_size, 0, &ms);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		ms_dec += ms;
+		repeat_dec++;
+	}
+
+	*encryption_mbs = speed_mbs(buffer_size * repeat_enc, ms_enc);
+	*decryption_mbs = speed_mbs(buffer_size * repeat_dec, ms_dec);
+
+	return  0;
+}

lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Linux kernel cipher generic utilities
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -26,53 +26,65 @@
 
 struct cipher_alg {
 	const char *name;
+	const char *mode;
 	int blocksize;
 	bool wrapped_key;
 };
 
 /* FIXME: Getting block size should be dynamic from cipher backend. */
 static const struct cipher_alg cipher_algs[] = {
-	{ "cipher_null", 16, false },
-	{ "aes",         16, false },
-	{ "serpent",     16, false },
-	{ "twofish",     16, false },
-	{ "anubis",      16, false },
-	{ "blowfish",     8, false },
-	{ "camellia",    16, false },
-	{ "cast5",        8, false },
-	{ "cast6",       16, false },
-	{ "des",          8, false },
-	{ "des3_ede",     8, false },
-	{ "khazad",       8, false },
-	{ "seed",        16, false },
-	{ "tea",          8, false },
-	{ "xtea",         8, false },
-	{ "paes",        16,  true }, /* protected AES, s390 wrapped key scheme */
-	{ NULL,           0, false }
+	{ "cipher_null", NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "aes",         NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "serpent",     NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "twofish",     NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "anubis",      NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "blowfish",    NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "camellia",    NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "cast5",       NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "cast6",       NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "des",         NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "des3_ede",    NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "khazad",      NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "seed",        NULL, 16, false },
+	{ "tea",         NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "xtea",        NULL,  8, false },
+	{ "paes",        NULL, 16,  true }, /* protected AES, s390 wrapped key scheme */
+	{ "xchacha12,aes", "adiantum", 32, false },
+	{ "xchacha20,aes", "adiantum", 32, false },
+	{ "sm4",         NULL, 16, false },
+	{ NULL,          NULL,  0, false }
 };
 
-static const struct cipher_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
+static const struct cipher_alg *_get_alg(const char *name, const char *mode)
 {
 	int i = 0;
 
 	while (name && cipher_algs[i].name) {
 		if (!strcasecmp(name, cipher_algs[i].name))
-			return &cipher_algs[i];
+			if (!mode || !cipher_algs[i].mode ||
+			    !strncasecmp(mode, cipher_algs[i].mode, strlen(cipher_algs[i].mode)))
+				return &cipher_algs[i];
 		i++;
 	}
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-int crypt_cipher_blocksize(const char *name)
+int crypt_cipher_ivsize(const char *name, const char *mode)
 {
-	const struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name);
+	const struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name, mode);
 
-	return ca ? ca->blocksize : -EINVAL;
+	if (!ca)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (mode && !strcasecmp(mode, "ecb"))
+		return 0;
+
+	return ca->blocksize;
 }
 
-int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name)
+int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name, const char *mode)
 {
-	const struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name);
+	const struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name, mode);
 
 	return ca ? (int)ca->wrapped_key : 0;
 }

lib/crypto_backend/crc32.c

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  *  order from highest-order term to lowest-order term.  UARTs transmit
  *  characters in order from LSB to MSB.  By storing the CRC this way,
  *  we hand it to the UART in the order low-byte to high-byte; the UART
- *  sends each low-bit to hight-bit; and the result is transmission bit
+ *  sends each low-bit to high-bit; and the result is transmission bit
  *  by bit from highest- to lowest-order term without requiring any bit
  *  shuffling on our part.  Reception works similarly.
  *
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
 
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 
-
 static const uint32_t crc32_tab[] = {
 	0x00000000L, 0x77073096L, 0xee0e612cL, 0x990951baL, 0x076dc419L,
 	0x706af48fL, 0xe963a535L, 0x9e6495a3L, 0x0edb8832L, 0x79dcb8a4L,
@@ -113,4 +112,3 @@ uint32_t crypt_crc32(uint32_t seed, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
 
 	return crc;
 }
-

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -22,16 +22,16 @@
 #define _CRYPTO_BACKEND_H
 
 #include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
-struct crypt_device;
 struct crypt_hash;
 struct crypt_hmac;
 struct crypt_cipher;
 struct crypt_storage;
 
-int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx);
+int crypt_backend_init(void);
 void crypt_backend_destroy(void);
 
 #define CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL (1 << 0)	/* Crypto uses kernel part, for benchmark */
@@ -58,14 +58,15 @@ void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx);
 enum { CRYPT_RND_NORMAL = 0, CRYPT_RND_KEY = 1, CRYPT_RND_SALT = 2 };
 int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips);
 
+
+/* PBKDF*/
 struct crypt_pbkdf_limits {
 	uint32_t min_iterations, max_iterations;
 	uint32_t min_memory, max_memory;
 	uint32_t min_parallel, max_parallel;
 };
-int crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(const char *kdf, struct crypt_pbkdf_limits *l);
 
-/* PBKDF*/
+int crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(const char *kdf, struct crypt_pbkdf_limits *l);
 int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		const char *password, size_t password_length,
 		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
@@ -79,28 +80,12 @@ int crypt_pbkdf_perf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		uint32_t *iterations_out, uint32_t *memory_out,
 		int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr), void *usrptr);
 
-#if USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
-/* internal PBKDF2 implementation */
-int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
-		 const char *P, size_t Plen,
-		 const char *S, size_t Slen,
-		 unsigned int c,
-		 unsigned int dkLen, char *DK,
-		 unsigned int hash_block_size);
-#endif
-
-/* Argon2 implementation wrapper */
-int argon2(const char *type, const char *password, size_t password_length,
-	   const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
-	   char *key, size_t key_length,
-	   uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel);
-
 /* CRC32 */
 uint32_t crypt_crc32(uint32_t seed, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
 
-/* ciphers */
-int crypt_cipher_blocksize(const char *name);
-int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name);
+/* Block ciphers */
+int crypt_cipher_ivsize(const char *name, const char *mode);
+int crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(const char *name, const char *mode);
 int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
 		    const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length);
 void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx);
@@ -110,22 +95,44 @@ int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
 			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length);
+bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx);
 
-/* storage encryption wrappers */
-int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx, uint64_t sector_start,
+/* Benchmark of kernel cipher performance */
+int crypt_cipher_perf_kernel(const char *name, const char *mode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
+			     const char *key, size_t key_size, const char *iv, size_t iv_size,
+			     double *encryption_mbs, double *decryption_mbs);
+
+/* Check availability of a cipher (in kernel only) */
+int crypt_cipher_check_kernel(const char *name, const char *mode,
+			      const char *integrity, size_t key_length);
+
+/* Storage encryption wrappers */
+int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx, size_t sector_size,
 		       const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
-		       const void *key, size_t key_length);
+		       const void *key, size_t key_length, bool large_iv);
 void crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx);
-int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t sector,
-			  size_t count, char *buffer);
-int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t sector,
-			  size_t count, char *buffer);
+int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t iv_offset,
+			  uint64_t length, char *buffer);
+int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t iv_offset,
+			  uint64_t length, char *buffer);
+
+bool crypt_storage_kernel_only(struct crypt_storage *ctx);
+
+/* Temporary Bitlk helper */
+int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
+			    const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			    const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+			    const char *tag, size_t tag_length);
 
 /* Memzero helper (memset on stack can be optimized out) */
 static inline void crypt_backend_memzero(void *s, size_t n)
 {
+#ifdef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+	explicit_bzero(s, n);
+#else
 	volatile uint8_t *p = (volatile uint8_t *)s;
 	while(n--) *p++ = 0;
+#endif
 }
 
 #endif /* _CRYPTO_BACKEND_H */

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend_internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * crypto backend implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_BACKEND_INTERNAL_H
+#define _CRYPTO_BACKEND_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+#if USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
+/* internal PBKDF2 implementation */
+int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
+		 const char *P, size_t Plen,
+		 const char *S, size_t Slen,
+		 unsigned int c,
+		 unsigned int dkLen, char *DK,
+		 unsigned int hash_block_size);
+#endif
+
+/* Argon2 implementation wrapper */
+int argon2(const char *type, const char *password, size_t password_length,
+	   const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+	   char *key, size_t key_length,
+	   uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel);
+
+/* Block ciphers: fallback to kernel crypto API */
+
+struct crypt_cipher_kernel {
+	int tfmfd;
+	int opfd;
+};
+
+int crypt_cipher_init_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx, const char *name,
+			     const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length);
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
+				const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+				const char *iv, size_t iv_length);
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
+				const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+				const char *iv, size_t iv_length);
+void crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx);
+int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(const void *key, size_t key_length,
+				   const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+				   const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+				   const char *tag, size_t tag_length);
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_BACKEND_INTERNAL_H */

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation (skcipher)
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -22,11 +22,12 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
-#include "crypto_backend.h"
+#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_AF_ALG
 
@@ -39,10 +40,9 @@
 #define SOL_ALG 279
 #endif
 
-struct crypt_cipher {
-	int tfmfd;
-	int opfd;
-};
+#ifndef ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE
+#define ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE 5
+#endif
 
 /*
  * ciphers
@@ -51,57 +51,69 @@ struct crypt_cipher {
  * ENOTSUP - AF_ALG family not available
  * (but cannot check specifically for skcipher API)
  */
-int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
-		    const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
+static int _crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
+			      const void *key, size_t key_length,
+			      size_t tag_length, struct sockaddr_alg *sa)
+{
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ctx->opfd = -1;
+	ctx->tfmfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+	if (ctx->tfmfd < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(ctx);
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (bind(ctx->tfmfd, (struct sockaddr *)sa, sizeof(*sa)) < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(ctx);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (setsockopt(ctx->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, key_length) < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(ctx);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (tag_length && setsockopt(ctx->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_AEAD_AUTHSIZE, NULL, tag_length) < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(ctx);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	ctx->opfd = accept(ctx->tfmfd, NULL, 0);
+	if (ctx->opfd < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(ctx);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_init_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx, const char *name,
+			     const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
-	struct crypt_cipher *h;
 	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
 		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
 		.salg_type = "skcipher",
 	};
-
-	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
-	if (!h)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name),
-		 "%s(%s)", mode, name);
-
-	h->opfd = -1;
-	h->tfmfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
-	if (h->tfmfd < 0) {
-		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
-		return -ENOTSUP;
-	}
-
-	if (bind(h->tfmfd, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) {
-		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
-		return -ENOENT;
-	}
+	int r;
 
 	if (!strcmp(name, "cipher_null"))
 		key_length = 0;
 
-	if (setsockopt(h->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, key_length) < 0) {
-		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+	r = snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name), "%s(%s)", mode, name);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(sa.salg_name))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
-	h->opfd = accept(h->tfmfd, NULL, 0);
-	if (h->opfd < 0) {
-		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	*ctx = h;
-	return 0;
+	return _crypt_cipher_init(ctx, key, key_length, 0, &sa);
 }
 
 /* The in/out should be aligned to page boundary */
-static int crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
-			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
-			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
-			 uint32_t direction)
+static int _crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
+			       const char *in, size_t in_length,
+			       char *out, size_t out_length,
+			       const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+			       uint32_t direction)
 {
 	int r = 0;
 	ssize_t len;
@@ -110,7 +122,7 @@ static int crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 	uint32_t *type;
 	struct iovec iov = {
 		.iov_base = (void*)(uintptr_t)in,
-		.iov_len = length,
+		.iov_len = in_length,
 	};
 	int iv_msg_size = iv ? CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(*alg_iv) + iv_length) : 0;
 	char buffer[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(*type)) + iv_msg_size];
@@ -121,7 +133,7 @@ static int crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 		.msg_iovlen = 1,
 	};
 
-	if (!in || !out || !length)
+	if (!in || !out || !in_length)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if ((!iv && iv_length) || (iv && !iv_length))
@@ -143,6 +155,9 @@ static int crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 	/* Set IV */
 	if (iv) {
 		header = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, header);
+		if (!header)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		header->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
 		header->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_IV;
 		header->cmsg_len = iv_msg_size;
@@ -152,67 +167,186 @@ static int crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 	}
 
 	len = sendmsg(ctx->opfd, &msg, 0);
-	if (len != (ssize_t)length) {
+	if (len != (ssize_t)(in_length)) {
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto bad;
 	}
 
-	len = read(ctx->opfd, out, length);
-	if (len != (ssize_t)length)
+	len = read(ctx->opfd, out, out_length);
+	if (len != (ssize_t)out_length)
 		r = -EIO;
 bad:
 	crypt_backend_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 	return r;
 }
 
-int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
-			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
-			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
+				const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+				const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
 {
-	return crypt_cipher_crypt(ctx, in, out, length,
-				  iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_ENCRYPT);
+	return _crypt_cipher_crypt(ctx, in, length, out, length,
+				   iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_ENCRYPT);
 }
 
-int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
-			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
-			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
+				const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+				const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
 {
-	return crypt_cipher_crypt(ctx, in, out, length,
-				  iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_DECRYPT);
+	return _crypt_cipher_crypt(ctx, in, length, out, length,
+				   iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_DECRYPT);
 }
 
-void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+void crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx->tfmfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->tfmfd);
 	if (ctx->opfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->opfd);
-	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
-	free(ctx);
+
+	ctx->tfmfd = -1;
+	ctx->opfd = -1;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_check_kernel(const char *name, const char *mode,
+			      const char *integrity, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher_kernel c;
+	char mode_name[64], tmp_salg_name[180], *real_mode = NULL, *cipher_iv = NULL, *key;
+	const char *salg_type;
+	bool aead;
+	int r;
+	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
+		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
+	};
+
+	aead = integrity && strcmp(integrity, "none");
+
+	/* Remove IV if present */
+	if (mode) {
+		strncpy(mode_name, mode, sizeof(mode_name));
+		mode_name[sizeof(mode_name) - 1] = 0;
+		cipher_iv = strchr(mode_name, '-');
+		if (cipher_iv) {
+			*cipher_iv = '\0';
+			real_mode = mode_name;
+		}
+	}
+
+	salg_type = aead ? "aead" : "skcipher";
+	r = snprintf((char *)sa.salg_type, sizeof(sa.salg_type), "%s", salg_type);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(sa.salg_name))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(tmp_salg_name, 0, sizeof(tmp_salg_name));
+
+	/* FIXME: this is duplicating a part of devmapper backend */
+	if (aead && !strcmp(integrity, "poly1305"))
+		r = snprintf(tmp_salg_name, sizeof(tmp_salg_name), "rfc7539(%s,%s)", name, integrity);
+	else if (!real_mode)
+		r = snprintf(tmp_salg_name, sizeof(tmp_salg_name), "%s", name);
+	else if (aead && !strcmp(real_mode, "ccm"))
+		r = snprintf(tmp_salg_name, sizeof(tmp_salg_name), "rfc4309(%s(%s))", real_mode, name);
+	else
+		r = snprintf(tmp_salg_name, sizeof(tmp_salg_name), "%s(%s)", real_mode, name);
+
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(tmp_salg_name))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(sa.salg_name, tmp_salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name));
+
+	key = malloc(key_length);
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* We cannot use RNG yet, any key works here, tweak the first part if it is split key (XTS). */
+	memset(key, 0xab, key_length);
+	*key = 0xef;
+
+	r = _crypt_cipher_init(&c, key, key_length, 0, &sa);
+	crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&c);
+	free(key);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(const void *key, size_t key_length,
+				   const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+				   const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+				   const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher_kernel c;
+	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
+		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
+		.salg_type = "aead",
+		.salg_name = "ccm(aes)",
+	};
+	int r;
+	char buffer[128], ccm_iv[16];
+
+	if (length + tag_length > sizeof(buffer))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (iv_length > sizeof(ccm_iv) - 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = _crypt_cipher_init(&c, key, key_length, tag_length, &sa);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	memcpy(buffer, in, length);
+	memcpy(buffer + length, tag, tag_length);
+
+	/* CCM IV - RFC3610 */
+	memset(ccm_iv, 0, sizeof(ccm_iv));
+	ccm_iv[0] = 15 - iv_length - 1;
+	memcpy(ccm_iv + 1, iv, iv_length);
+	memset(ccm_iv + 1 + iv_length, 0, ccm_iv[0] + 1);
+	iv_length = sizeof(ccm_iv);
+
+	r =  _crypt_cipher_crypt(&c, buffer, length + tag_length, out, length,
+				 ccm_iv, iv_length, ALG_OP_DECRYPT);
+
+	crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&c);
+	crypt_backend_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+
+	return r;
 }
 
 #else /* ENABLE_AF_ALG */
-int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
-		    const char *mode, const void *buffer, size_t length)
+int crypt_cipher_init_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx, const char *name,
+			     const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
 	return -ENOTSUP;
 }
 
-void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+void crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx)
 {
 	return;
 }
 
-int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
-			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
-			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
+				const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+				const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
-int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
-			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
-			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(struct crypt_cipher_kernel *ctx,
+				const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+				const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
+int crypt_cipher_check_kernel(const char *name, const char *mode,
+			      const char *integrity, size_t key_length)
+{
+	/* Cannot check, expect success. */
+	return 0;
+}
+int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(const void *key, size_t key_length,
+				   const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+				   const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+				   const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
+{
+	return -ENOTSUP;
+}
 #endif

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * GCRYPT crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <gcrypt.h>
-#include "crypto_backend.h"
+#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
 
 static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
 static int crypto_backend_secmem = 1;
@@ -43,9 +43,22 @@ struct crypt_hmac {
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
+struct crypt_cipher {
+	bool use_kernel;
+	union {
+	struct crypt_cipher_kernel kernel;
+	gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
+	} u;
+};
+
+struct hash_alg {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *gcrypt_name;
+};
+
 /*
  * Test for wrong Whirlpool variant,
- * Ref: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gcrypt-devel/2014-January/002889.html
+ * Ref: https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gcrypt-devel/2014-January/002889.html
  */
 static void crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(void)
 {
@@ -81,8 +94,10 @@ static void crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(void)
 		crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 1;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+int crypt_backend_init(void)
 {
+	int r;
+
 	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -112,11 +127,12 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
 	crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug();
 
-	snprintf(version, 64, "gcrypt %s%s%s",
+	r = snprintf(version, sizeof(version), "gcrypt %s%s%s",
 		 gcry_check_version(NULL),
 		 crypto_backend_secmem ? "" : ", secmem disabled",
-		 crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug > 0 ? ", flawed whirlpool" : ""
-		);
+		 crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug > 0 ? ", flawed whirlpool" : "");
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(version))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -142,10 +158,24 @@ uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
 static const char *crypt_hash_compat_name(const char *name, unsigned int *flags)
 {
 	const char *hash_name = name;
+	int i;
+	static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
+	{ "blake2b-160", "blake2b_160" },
+	{ "blake2b-256", "blake2b_256" },
+	{ "blake2b-384", "blake2b_384" },
+	{ "blake2b-512", "blake2b_512" },
+	{ "blake2s-128", "blake2s_128" },
+	{ "blake2s-160", "blake2s_160" },
+	{ "blake2s-224", "blake2s_224" },
+	{ "blake2s-256", "blake2s_256" },
+	{ NULL,          NULL,         }};
+
+	if (!name)
+		return NULL;
 
 	/* "whirlpool_gcryptbug" is out shortcut to flawed whirlpool
 	 * in libgcrypt < 1.6.0 */
-	if (name && !strcasecmp(name, "whirlpool_gcryptbug")) {
+	if (!strcasecmp(name, "whirlpool_gcryptbug")) {
 #if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010601
 		if (flags)
 			*flags |= GCRY_MD_FLAG_BUGEMU1;
@@ -153,6 +183,15 @@ static const char *crypt_hash_compat_name(const char *name, unsigned int *flags)
 		hash_name = "whirlpool";
 	}
 
+	i = 0;
+	while (hash_algs[i].name) {
+		if (!strcasecmp(name, hash_algs[i].name)) {
+			hash_name =  hash_algs[i].gcrypt_name;
+			break;
+		}
+		i++;
+	}
+
 	return hash_name;
 }
 
@@ -366,3 +405,148 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 			      key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
+
+/* Block ciphers */
+static int _cipher_init(gcry_cipher_hd_t *hd, const char *name,
+			const char *mode, const void *buffer, size_t length)
+{
+	int cipher_id, mode_id;
+
+	cipher_id = gcry_cipher_map_name(name);
+	if (cipher_id == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_NONE)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (!strcmp(mode, "ecb"))
+		mode_id = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_ECB;
+	else if (!strcmp(mode, "cbc"))
+		mode_id = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC;
+#if HAVE_DECL_GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_XTS
+	else if (!strcmp(mode, "xts"))
+		mode_id = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_XTS;
+#endif
+	else
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (gcry_cipher_open(hd, cipher_id, mode_id, 0))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (gcry_cipher_setkey(*hd, buffer, length)) {
+		gcry_cipher_close(*hd);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher *h;
+	int r;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!_cipher_init(&h->u.hd, name, mode, key, key_length)) {
+		h->use_kernel = false;
+		*ctx = h;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init_kernel(&h->u.kernel, name, mode, key, key_length);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		free(h);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	h->use_kernel = true;
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->use_kernel)
+		crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&ctx->u.kernel);
+	else
+		gcry_cipher_close(ctx->u.hd);
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	if (ctx->use_kernel)
+		return crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(&ctx->u.kernel, in, out, length, iv, iv_length);
+
+	if (iv && gcry_cipher_setiv(ctx->u.hd, iv, iv_length))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (gcry_cipher_encrypt(ctx->u.hd, out, length, in, length))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	if (ctx->use_kernel)
+		return crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(&ctx->u.kernel, in, out, length, iv, iv_length);
+
+	if (iv && gcry_cipher_setiv(ctx->u.hd, iv, iv_length))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (gcry_cipher_decrypt(ctx->u.hd, out, length, in, length))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	return ctx->use_kernel;
+}
+
+int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
+			    const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			    const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+			    const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
+{
+#ifdef GCRY_CCM_BLOCK_LEN
+	gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
+	uint64_t l[3];
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (gcry_cipher_open(&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 0))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (gcry_cipher_setkey(hd, key, key_length))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (gcry_cipher_setiv(hd, iv, iv_length))
+		goto out;
+
+	l[0] = length;
+	l[1] = 0;
+	l[2] = tag_length;
+	if (gcry_cipher_ctl(hd, GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS, l, sizeof(l)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (gcry_cipher_decrypt(hd, out, length, in, length))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (gcry_cipher_checktag(hd, tag, tag_length))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	gcry_cipher_close(hd);
+	return r;
+#else
+	return -ENOTSUP;
+#endif
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/if_alg.h>
-#include "crypto_backend.h"
+#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
 
 /* FIXME: remove later */
 #ifndef AF_ALG
@@ -48,12 +48,29 @@ struct hash_alg {
 };
 
 static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
-	{ "sha1",      "sha1",   20,  64 },
-	{ "sha256",    "sha256", 32,  64 },
-	{ "sha512",    "sha512", 64, 128 },
-	{ "ripemd160", "rmd160", 20,  64 },
-	{ "whirlpool", "wp512",  64,  64 },
-	{ NULL,        NULL,      0,   0 }
+	{ "sha1",      "sha1",        20,  64 },
+	{ "sha224",    "sha224",      28,  64 },
+	{ "sha256",    "sha256",      32,  64 },
+	{ "sha384",    "sha384",      48, 128 },
+	{ "sha512",    "sha512",      64, 128 },
+	{ "ripemd160", "rmd160",      20,  64 },
+	{ "whirlpool", "wp512",       64,  64 },
+	{ "sha3-224",  "sha3-224",    28, 144 },
+	{ "sha3-256",  "sha3-256",    32, 136 },
+	{ "sha3-384",  "sha3-384",    48, 104 },
+	{ "sha3-512",  "sha3-512",    64,  72 },
+	{ "stribog256","streebog256", 32,  64 },
+	{ "stribog512","streebog512", 64,  64 },
+	{ "sm3",       "sm3",         32,  64 },
+	{ "blake2b-160","blake2b-160",20, 128 },
+	{ "blake2b-256","blake2b-256",32, 128 },
+	{ "blake2b-384","blake2b-384",48, 128 },
+	{ "blake2b-512","blake2b-512",64, 128 },
+	{ "blake2s-128","blake2s-128",16,  64 },
+	{ "blake2s-160","blake2s-160",20,  64 },
+	{ "blake2s-224","blake2s-224",28,  64 },
+	{ "blake2s-256","blake2s-256",32,  64 },
+	{ NULL,        NULL,           0,   0 }
 };
 
 struct crypt_hash {
@@ -68,6 +85,10 @@ struct crypt_hmac {
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
+struct crypt_cipher {
+	struct crypt_cipher_kernel ck;
+};
+
 static int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *opfd,
 				    const void *key, size_t key_length)
 {
@@ -97,7 +118,7 @@ static int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *op
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+int crypt_backend_init(void)
 {
 	struct utsname uts;
 	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
@@ -105,7 +126,7 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 		.salg_type = "hash",
 		.salg_name = "sha256",
 	};
-	int tfmfd = -1, opfd = -1;
+	int r, tfmfd = -1, opfd = -1;
 
 	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
 		return 0;
@@ -113,15 +134,17 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	if (uname(&uts) == -1 || strcmp(uts.sysname, "Linux"))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	r = snprintf(version, sizeof(version), "%s %s kernel cryptoAPI",
+		uts.sysname, uts.release);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(version))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &tfmfd, &opfd, NULL, 0) < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	close(tfmfd);
 	close(opfd);
 
-	snprintf(version, sizeof(version), "%s %s kernel cryptoAPI",
-		 uts.sysname, uts.release);
-
 	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -181,7 +204,7 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 	}
 	h->hash_len = ha->length;
 
-	strncpy((char *)sa.salg_name, ha->kernel_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name));
+	strncpy((char *)sa.salg_name, ha->kernel_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name)-1);
 
 	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd, NULL, 0) < 0) {
 		free(h);
@@ -242,6 +265,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
 		.salg_type = "hash",
 	};
+	int r;
 
 	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
 	if (!h)
@@ -254,8 +278,12 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 	}
 	h->hash_len = ha->length;
 
-	snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name),
+	r = snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name),
 		 "hmac(%s)", ha->kernel_name);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(sa.salg_name)) {
+		free(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd, key, key_length) < 0) {
 		free(h);
@@ -333,3 +361,58 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
+
+/* Block ciphers */
+int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher *h;
+	int r;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init_kernel(&h->ck, name, mode, key, key_length);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		free(h);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&ctx->ck);
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	return crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(&ctx->ck, in, out, length, iv, iv_length);
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	return crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(&ctx->ck, in, out, length, iv, iv_length);
+}
+
+bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
+			    const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			    const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+			    const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
+{
+	return crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(key, key_length, in, out, length,
+					      iv, iv_length, tag, tag_length);
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Nettle crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2018 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -23,11 +23,19 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <nettle/sha.h>
+#include <nettle/sha3.h>
 #include <nettle/hmac.h>
 #include <nettle/pbkdf2.h>
-#include "crypto_backend.h"
+#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
 
-static char *version = "Nettle";
+#if HAVE_NETTLE_VERSION_H
+#include <nettle/version.h>
+#define VSTR(s) STR(s)
+#define STR(s) #s
+static const char *version = "Nettle "VSTR(NETTLE_VERSION_MAJOR)"."VSTR(NETTLE_VERSION_MINOR);
+#else
+static const char *version = "Nettle";
+#endif
 
 typedef void (*init_func) (void *);
 typedef void (*update_func) (void *, size_t, const uint8_t *);
@@ -45,6 +53,24 @@ struct hash_alg {
 	set_key_func hmac_set_key;
 };
 
+/* Missing HMAC wrappers in Nettle */
+#define HMAC_FCE(xxx) \
+struct xhmac_##xxx##_ctx HMAC_CTX(struct xxx##_ctx); \
+static void xhmac_##xxx##_set_key(struct xhmac_##xxx##_ctx *ctx, \
+size_t key_length, const uint8_t *key) \
+{HMAC_SET_KEY(ctx, &nettle_##xxx, key_length, key);} \
+static void xhmac_##xxx##_update(struct xhmac_##xxx##_ctx *ctx, \
+size_t length, const uint8_t *data) \
+{xxx##_update(&ctx->state, length, data);} \
+static void xhmac_##xxx##_digest(struct xhmac_##xxx##_ctx *ctx, \
+size_t length, uint8_t *digest) \
+{HMAC_DIGEST(ctx, &nettle_##xxx, length, digest);}
+
+HMAC_FCE(sha3_224);
+HMAC_FCE(sha3_256);
+HMAC_FCE(sha3_384);
+HMAC_FCE(sha3_512);
+
 static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
 	{ "sha1", SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 		(init_func) sha1_init,
@@ -94,6 +120,41 @@ static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
 		(digest_func) hmac_ripemd160_digest,
 		(set_key_func) hmac_ripemd160_set_key,
 	},
+/* Nettle prior to version 3.2 has incompatible SHA3 implementation */
+#if NETTLE_SHA3_FIPS202
+	{ "sha3-224", SHA3_224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha3_224_init,
+		(update_func) sha3_224_update,
+		(digest_func) sha3_224_digest,
+		(update_func) xhmac_sha3_224_update,
+		(digest_func) xhmac_sha3_224_digest,
+		(set_key_func) xhmac_sha3_224_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "sha3-256", SHA3_256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha3_256_init,
+		(update_func) sha3_256_update,
+		(digest_func) sha3_256_digest,
+		(update_func) xhmac_sha3_256_update,
+		(digest_func) xhmac_sha3_256_digest,
+		(set_key_func) xhmac_sha3_256_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "sha3-384", SHA3_384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha3_384_init,
+		(update_func) sha3_384_update,
+		(digest_func) sha3_384_digest,
+		(update_func) xhmac_sha3_384_update,
+		(digest_func) xhmac_sha3_384_digest,
+		(set_key_func) xhmac_sha3_384_set_key,
+	},
+	{ "sha3-512", SHA3_512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		(init_func) sha3_512_init,
+		(update_func) sha3_512_update,
+		(digest_func) sha3_512_digest,
+		(update_func) xhmac_sha3_512_update,
+		(digest_func) xhmac_sha3_512_digest,
+		(set_key_func) xhmac_sha3_512_set_key,
+	},
+#endif
 	{ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, }
 };
 
@@ -105,6 +166,11 @@ struct crypt_hash {
 		struct sha256_ctx sha256;
 		struct sha384_ctx sha384;
 		struct sha512_ctx sha512;
+		struct ripemd160_ctx ripemd160;
+		struct sha3_224_ctx sha3_224;
+		struct sha3_256_ctx sha3_256;
+		struct sha3_384_ctx sha3_384;
+		struct sha3_512_ctx sha3_512;
 	} nettle_ctx;
 };
 
@@ -116,11 +182,20 @@ struct crypt_hmac {
 		struct hmac_sha256_ctx sha256;
 		struct hmac_sha384_ctx sha384;
 		struct hmac_sha512_ctx sha512;
+		struct hmac_ripemd160_ctx ripemd160;
+		struct xhmac_sha3_224_ctx sha3_224;
+		struct xhmac_sha3_256_ctx sha3_256;
+		struct xhmac_sha3_384_ctx sha3_384;
+		struct xhmac_sha3_512_ctx sha3_512;
 	} nettle_ctx;
 	size_t key_length;
 	uint8_t *key;
 };
 
+struct crypt_cipher {
+	struct crypt_cipher_kernel ck;
+};
+
 uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -138,7 +213,7 @@ static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+int crypt_backend_init(void)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -299,8 +374,8 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		if (r < 0)
 			return r;
 
-		nettle_pbkdf2(&h->nettle_ctx, h->hash->nettle_hmac_update,
-			      h->hash->nettle_hmac_digest, h->hash->length, iterations,
+		nettle_pbkdf2(&h->nettle_ctx, h->hash->hmac_update,
+			      h->hash->hmac_digest, h->hash->length, iterations,
 			      salt_length, (const uint8_t *)salt, key_length,
 			      (uint8_t *)key);
 		crypt_hmac_destroy(h);
@@ -312,3 +387,58 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
+
+/* Block ciphers */
+int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher *h;
+	int r;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init_kernel(&h->ck, name, mode, key, key_length);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		free(h);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&ctx->ck);
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	return crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(&ctx->ck, in, out, length, iv, iv_length);
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	return crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(&ctx->ck, in, out, length, iv, iv_length);
+}
+
+bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
+			    const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			    const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+			    const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
+{
+	return crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(key, key_length, in, out, length,
+					      iv, iv_length, tag, tag_length);
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * NSS crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <nss.h>
 #include <pk11pub.h>
-#include "crypto_backend.h"
+#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
 
 #define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
 
@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ struct crypt_hmac {
 	const struct hash_alg *hash;
 };
 
+struct crypt_cipher {
+	struct crypt_cipher_kernel ck;
+};
+
 static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
 {
 	int i = 0;
@@ -71,8 +75,10 @@ static struct hash_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+int crypt_backend_init(void)
 {
+	int r;
+
 	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -80,10 +86,13 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 #if HAVE_DECL_NSS_GETVERSION
-	snprintf(version, 64, "NSS %s", NSS_GetVersion());
+	r = snprintf(version, sizeof(version), "NSS %s", NSS_GetVersion());
 #else
-	snprintf(version, 64, "NSS");
+	r = snprintf(version, sizeof(version), "NSS");
 #endif
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(version))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -331,3 +340,58 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
+
+/* Block ciphers */
+int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher *h;
+	int r;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init_kernel(&h->ck, name, mode, key, key_length);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		free(h);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&ctx->ck);
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	return crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(&ctx->ck, in, out, length, iv, iv_length);
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	return crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(&ctx->ck, in, out, length, iv, iv_length);
+}
+
+bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
+			    const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			    const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+			    const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
+{
+	return crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key_kernel(key, key_length, in, out, length,
+					      iv, iv_length, tag, tag_length);
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * OPENSSL crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "crypto_backend.h"
+#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
+
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
 
 static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
 
@@ -49,6 +51,23 @@ struct crypt_hmac {
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
+struct crypt_cipher {
+	bool use_kernel;
+	union {
+	struct crypt_cipher_kernel kernel;
+	struct {
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX *hd_enc;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX *hd_dec;
+		size_t iv_length;
+	} lib;
+	} u;
+};
+
+struct hash_alg {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *openssl_name;
+};
+
 /*
  * Compatible wrappers for OpenSSL < 1.1.0 and LibreSSL < 2.7.0
  */
@@ -107,7 +126,7 @@ static const char *openssl_backend_version(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+int crypt_backend_init(void)
 {
 	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
 		return 0;
@@ -133,11 +152,36 @@ const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
 	return openssl_backend_version();
 }
 
+static const char *crypt_hash_compat_name(const char *name)
+{
+	const char *hash_name = name;
+	int i;
+	static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
+	{ "blake2b-512", "blake2b512" },
+	{ "blake2s-256", "blake2s256" },
+	{ NULL,          NULL,         }};
+
+	if (!name)
+		return NULL;
+
+	i = 0;
+	while (hash_algs[i].name) {
+		if (!strcasecmp(name, hash_algs[i].name)) {
+			hash_name =  hash_algs[i].openssl_name;
+			break;
+		}
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return hash_name;
+}
+
 /* HASH */
 int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
 {
-	const EVP_MD *hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
+	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
 
+	hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(crypt_hash_compat_name(name));
 	if (!hash_id)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -158,7 +202,7 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
+	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(crypt_hash_compat_name(name));
 	if (!h->hash_id) {
 		EVP_MD_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
@@ -243,7 +287,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
+	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(crypt_hash_compat_name(name));
 	if (!h->hash_id) {
 		HMAC_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
@@ -319,12 +363,12 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) {
-		hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(hash);
+		hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(crypt_hash_compat_name(hash));
 		if (!hash_id)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, (int)password_length,
-		    (unsigned char *)salt, (int)salt_length,
+		    (const unsigned char *)salt, (int)salt_length,
 	            (int)iterations, hash_id, (int)key_length, (unsigned char *)key))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		return 0;
@@ -335,3 +379,198 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
+
+/* Block ciphers */
+static void _cipher_destroy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_enc, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_dec)
+{
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(*hd_enc);
+	*hd_enc = NULL;
+
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(*hd_dec);
+	*hd_dec = NULL;
+}
+
+static int _cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_enc, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **hd_dec, const char *name,
+			const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length, size_t *iv_length)
+{
+	char cipher_name[256];
+	const EVP_CIPHER *type;
+	int r, key_bits;
+
+	key_bits = key_length * 8;
+	if (!strcmp(mode, "xts"))
+		key_bits /= 2;
+
+	r = snprintf(cipher_name, sizeof(cipher_name), "%s-%d-%s", name, key_bits, mode);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(cipher_name))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	type = EVP_get_cipherbyname(cipher_name);
+	if (!type)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_key_length(type) != (int)key_length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*hd_enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	*hd_dec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	*iv_length = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(type);
+
+	if (!*hd_enc || !*hd_dec)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(*hd_enc, type, NULL, key, NULL) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_DecryptInit_ex(*hd_dec, type, NULL, key, NULL) != 1) {
+		_cipher_destroy(hd_enc, hd_dec);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(*hd_enc, 0) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(*hd_dec, 0) != 1) {
+		_cipher_destroy(hd_enc, hd_dec);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
+		    const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher *h;
+	int r;
+
+	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!_cipher_init(&h->u.lib.hd_enc, &h->u.lib.hd_dec, name, mode, key,
+			  key_length, &h->u.lib.iv_length)) {
+		h->use_kernel = false;
+		*ctx = h;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init_kernel(&h->u.kernel, name, mode, key, key_length);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		free(h);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	h->use_kernel = true;
+	*ctx = h;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->use_kernel)
+		crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&ctx->u.kernel);
+	else
+		_cipher_destroy(&ctx->u.lib.hd_enc, &ctx->u.lib.hd_dec);
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+static int _cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+			   int length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	int len;
+
+	if (ctx->u.lib.iv_length != iv_length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->u.lib.hd_enc, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx->u.lib.hd_enc, out, &len, in, length) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx->u.lib.hd_enc, out + len, &len) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx, const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
+			   int length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	int len;
+
+	if (ctx->u.lib.iv_length != iv_length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx->u.lib.hd_dec, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx->u.lib.hd_dec, out, &len, in, length) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx->u.lib.hd_dec, out + len, &len) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	if (ctx->use_kernel)
+		return crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(&ctx->u.kernel, in, out, length, iv, iv_length);
+
+	return _cipher_encrypt(ctx, (const unsigned char*)in,
+			       (unsigned char *)out, length, (const unsigned char*)iv, iv_length);
+}
+
+int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
+			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length)
+{
+	if (ctx->use_kernel)
+		return crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(&ctx->u.kernel, in, out, length, iv, iv_length);
+
+	return _cipher_decrypt(ctx, (const unsigned char*)in,
+			       (unsigned char *)out, length, (const unsigned char*)iv, iv_length);
+}
+
+bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
+{
+	return ctx->use_kernel;
+}
+
+int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length,
+			    const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
+			    const char *iv, size_t iv_length,
+			    const char *tag, size_t tag_length)
+{
+#ifdef EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+	int len = 0, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_ccm(), NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	//EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)
+	//EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)
+
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN, iv_length, NULL) != 1)
+		goto out;
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG, tag_length, CONST_CAST(void*)tag) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, (const unsigned char*)iv) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char*)out, &len, (const unsigned char*)in, length) == 1)
+		r = 0;
+out:
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+	return r;
+#else
+	return -ENOTSUP;
+#endif
+}

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Generic wrapper for storage encryption modes and Initial Vectors
  * (reimplementation of some functions from Linux dm-crypt kernel)
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2014-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2014-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -25,23 +25,23 @@
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 
 #define SECTOR_SHIFT	9
-#define SECTOR_SIZE	(1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)
 
 /*
  * Internal IV helper
  * IV documentation: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
  */
 struct crypt_sector_iv {
-	enum { IV_NONE, IV_NULL, IV_PLAIN, IV_PLAIN64, IV_ESSIV, IV_BENBI, IV_PLAIN64BE } type;
+	enum { IV_NONE, IV_NULL, IV_PLAIN, IV_PLAIN64, IV_ESSIV, IV_BENBI, IV_PLAIN64BE, IV_EBOIV } type;
 	int iv_size;
 	char *iv;
-	struct crypt_cipher *essiv_cipher;
-	int benbi_shift;
+	struct crypt_cipher *cipher;
+	int shift;
 };
 
 /* Block encryption storage context */
 struct crypt_storage {
-	uint64_t sector_start;
+	size_t sector_size;
+	unsigned iv_shift;
 	struct crypt_cipher *cipher;
 	struct crypt_sector_iv cipher_iv;
 };
@@ -56,12 +56,15 @@ static int int_log2(unsigned int x)
 
 static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
 			 const char *cipher_name, const char *mode_name,
-			 const char *iv_name, const void *key, size_t key_length)
+			 const char *iv_name, const void *key, size_t key_length,
+			 size_t sector_size)
 {
+	int r;
+
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 
-	ctx->iv_size = crypt_cipher_blocksize(cipher_name);
-	if (ctx->iv_size < 8)
+	ctx->iv_size = crypt_cipher_ivsize(cipher_name, mode_name);
+	if (ctx->iv_size < 0 || (strcmp(mode_name, "ecb") && ctx->iv_size < 8))
 		return -ENOENT;
 
 	if (!strcmp(cipher_name, "cipher_null") ||
@@ -86,7 +89,6 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
 		char *hash_name = strchr(iv_name, ':');
 		int hash_size;
 		char tmp[256];
-		int r;
 
 		if (!hash_name)
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -114,7 +116,7 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
 			return r;
 		}
 
-		r = crypt_cipher_init(&ctx->essiv_cipher, cipher_name, "ecb",
+		r = crypt_cipher_init(&ctx->cipher, cipher_name, "ecb",
 				      tmp, hash_size);
 		crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 		if (r)
@@ -127,7 +129,15 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		ctx->type = IV_BENBI;
-		ctx->benbi_shift = SECTOR_SHIFT - log;
+		ctx->shift = SECTOR_SHIFT - log;
+	} else if (!strncasecmp(iv_name, "eboiv", 5)) {
+		r = crypt_cipher_init(&ctx->cipher, cipher_name, "ecb",
+				      key, key_length);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+
+		ctx->type = IV_EBOIV;
+		ctx->shift = int_log2(sector_size);
 	} else
 		return -ENOENT;
 
@@ -163,14 +173,20 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector
 	case IV_ESSIV:
 		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
 		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
-		return crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->essiv_cipher,
+		return crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->cipher,
 			ctx->iv, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, NULL, 0);
 		break;
 	case IV_BENBI:
 		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
-		val = cpu_to_be64((sector << ctx->benbi_shift) + 1);
+		val = cpu_to_be64((sector << ctx->shift) + 1);
 		memcpy(ctx->iv + ctx->iv_size - sizeof(val), &val, sizeof(val));
 		break;
+	case IV_EBOIV:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector << ctx->shift);
+		return crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->cipher,
+			ctx->iv, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, NULL, 0);
+		break;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -180,8 +196,8 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector
 
 static void crypt_sector_iv_destroy(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx)
 {
-	if (ctx->type == IV_ESSIV)
-		crypt_cipher_destroy(ctx->essiv_cipher);
+	if (ctx->type == IV_ESSIV || ctx->type == IV_EBOIV)
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(ctx->cipher);
 
 	if (ctx->iv) {
 		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
@@ -194,16 +210,22 @@ static void crypt_sector_iv_destroy(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx)
 /* Block encryption storage wrappers */
 
 int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx,
-		       uint64_t sector_start,
+		       size_t sector_size,
 		       const char *cipher,
 		       const char *cipher_mode,
-		       const void *key, size_t key_length)
+		       const void *key, size_t key_length,
+		       bool large_iv)
 {
 	struct crypt_storage *s;
 	char mode_name[64];
 	char *cipher_iv = NULL;
 	int r = -EIO;
 
+	if (sector_size < (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) ||
+	    sector_size > (1 << (SECTOR_SHIFT + 3)) ||
+	    sector_size & (sector_size - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	s = malloc(sizeof(*s));
 	if (!s)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -224,33 +246,40 @@ int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx,
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	r = crypt_sector_iv_init(&s->cipher_iv, cipher, mode_name, cipher_iv, key, key_length);
+	r = crypt_sector_iv_init(&s->cipher_iv, cipher, mode_name, cipher_iv, key, key_length, sector_size);
 	if (r) {
 		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	s->sector_start = sector_start;
+	s->sector_size = sector_size;
+	s->iv_shift = large_iv ? int_log2(sector_size) - SECTOR_SHIFT : 0;
 
 	*ctx = s;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx,
-		       uint64_t sector, size_t count,
-		       char *buffer)
+		       uint64_t iv_offset,
+		       uint64_t length, char *buffer)
 {
-	unsigned int i;
+	uint64_t i;
 	int r = 0;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-		r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, sector + i);
+	if (length & (ctx->sector_size - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (iv_offset & ((ctx->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < length; i += ctx->sector_size) {
+		r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, (iv_offset + (i >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) >> ctx->iv_shift);
 		if (r)
 			break;
 		r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(ctx->cipher,
-					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
-					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
-					 SECTOR_SIZE,
+					 &buffer[i],
+					 &buffer[i],
+					 ctx->sector_size,
 					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv,
 					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv_size);
 		if (r)
@@ -261,20 +290,26 @@ int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx,
 }
 
 int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx,
-		       uint64_t sector, size_t count,
-		       char *buffer)
+		       uint64_t iv_offset,
+		       uint64_t length, char *buffer)
 {
-	unsigned int i;
+	uint64_t i;
 	int r = 0;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-		r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, sector + i);
+	if (length & (ctx->sector_size - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (iv_offset & ((ctx->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < length; i += ctx->sector_size) {
+		r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, (iv_offset + (i >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) >> ctx->iv_shift);
 		if (r)
 			break;
 		r = crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->cipher,
-					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
-					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
-					 SECTOR_SIZE,
+					 &buffer[i],
+					 &buffer[i],
+					 ctx->sector_size,
 					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv,
 					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv_size);
 		if (r)
@@ -297,3 +332,8 @@ void crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx)
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
 }
+
+bool crypt_storage_kernel_only(struct crypt_storage *ctx)
+{
+	return crypt_cipher_kernel_only(ctx->cipher);
+}

lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation
  *
  * cryptsetup related changes
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <alloca.h>
-#include "crypto_backend.h"
+#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
 
 static int hash_buf(const char *src, size_t src_len,
 		    char *dst, size_t dst_len,
@@ -230,197 +230,3 @@ out:
 
 	return rc;
 }
-
-#if 0
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-struct test_vector {
-	const char *hash;
-	unsigned int hash_block_length;
-	unsigned int iterations;
-	const char *password;
-	unsigned int password_length;
-	const char *salt;
-	unsigned int salt_length;
-	const char *output;
-	unsigned int output_length;
-};
-
-struct test_vector test_vectors[] = {
-	/* RFC 3962 */
-	{
-		"sha1", 64, 1,
-		"password", 8,
-		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
-		"\xcd\xed\xb5\x28\x1b\xb2\xf8\x01"
-		"\x56\x5a\x11\x22\xb2\x56\x35\x15"
-		"\x0a\xd1\xf7\xa0\x4b\xb9\xf3\xa3"
-		"\x33\xec\xc0\xe2\xe1\xf7\x08\x37", 32
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 2,
-		"password", 8,
-		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
-		"\x01\xdb\xee\x7f\x4a\x9e\x24\x3e"
-		"\x98\x8b\x62\xc7\x3c\xda\x93\x5d"
-		"\xa0\x53\x78\xb9\x32\x44\xec\x8f"
-		"\x48\xa9\x9e\x61\xad\x79\x9d\x86", 32
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 1200,
-		"password", 8,
-		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
-		"\x5c\x08\xeb\x61\xfd\xf7\x1e\x4e"
-		"\x4e\xc3\xcf\x6b\xa1\xf5\x51\x2b"
-		"\xa7\xe5\x2d\xdb\xc5\xe5\x14\x2f"
-		"\x70\x8a\x31\xe2\xe6\x2b\x1e\x13", 32
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 5,
-		"password", 8,
-		"\0224VxxV4\022", 8, // "\x1234567878563412
-		"\xd1\xda\xa7\x86\x15\xf2\x87\xe6"
-		"\xa1\xc8\xb1\x20\xd7\x06\x2a\x49"
-		"\x3f\x98\xd2\x03\xe6\xbe\x49\xa6"
-		"\xad\xf4\xfa\x57\x4b\x6e\x64\xee", 32
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 1200,
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 64,
-		"pass phrase equals block size", 29,
-		"\x13\x9c\x30\xc0\x96\x6b\xc3\x2b"
-		"\xa5\x5f\xdb\xf2\x12\x53\x0a\xc9"
-		"\xc5\xec\x59\xf1\xa4\x52\xf5\xcc"
-		"\x9a\xd9\x40\xfe\xa0\x59\x8e\xd1", 32
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 1200,
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
-		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
-		"\x9c\xca\xd6\xd4\x68\x77\x0c\xd5"
-		"\x1b\x10\xe6\xa6\x87\x21\xbe\x61"
-		"\x1a\x8b\x4d\x28\x26\x01\xdb\x3b"
-		"\x36\xbe\x92\x46\x91\x5e\xc8\x2a", 32
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 50,
-		"\360\235\204\236", 4, // g-clef ("\xf09d849e)
-		"EXAMPLE.COMpianist", 18,
-		"\x6b\x9c\xf2\x6d\x45\x45\x5a\x43"
-		"\xa5\xb8\xbb\x27\x6a\x40\x3b\x39"
-		"\xe7\xfe\x37\xa0\xc4\x1e\x02\xc2"
-		"\x81\xff\x30\x69\xe1\xe9\x4f\x52", 32
-	}, {
-	/* RFC-6070 */
-		"sha1", 64, 1,
-		"password", 8,
-		"salt", 4,
-		"\x0c\x60\xc8\x0f\x96\x1f\x0e\x71\xf3\xa9"
-		"\xb5\x24\xaf\x60\x12\x06\x2f\xe0\x37\xa6", 20
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 2,
-		"password", 8,
-		"salt", 4,
-		"\xea\x6c\x01\x4d\xc7\x2d\x6f\x8c\xcd\x1e"
-		"\xd9\x2a\xce\x1d\x41\xf0\xd8\xde\x89\x57", 20
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 4096,
-		"password", 8,
-		"salt", 4,
-		"\x4b\x00\x79\x01\xb7\x65\x48\x9a\xbe\xad"
-		"\x49\xd9\x26\xf7\x21\xd0\x65\xa4\x29\xc1", 20
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 16777216,
-		"password", 8,
-		"salt", 4,
-		"\xee\xfe\x3d\x61\xcd\x4d\xa4\xe4\xe9\x94"
-		"\x5b\x3d\x6b\xa2\x15\x8c\x26\x34\xe9\x84", 20
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 4096,
-		"passwordPASSWORDpassword", 24,
-		"saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", 36,
-		"\x3d\x2e\xec\x4f\xe4\x1c\x84\x9b\x80\xc8"
-		"\xd8\x36\x62\xc0\xe4\x4a\x8b\x29\x1a\x96"
-		"\x4c\xf2\xf0\x70\x38", 25
-	}, {
-		"sha1", 64, 4096,
-		"pass\0word", 9,
-		"sa\0lt", 5,
-		"\x56\xfa\x6a\xa7\x55\x48\x09\x9d\xcc\x37"
-		"\xd7\xf0\x34\x25\xe0\xc3", 16
-	}, {
-	/* empty password test */
-		"sha1", 64, 2,
-		"", 0,
-		"salt", 4,
-		"\x13\x3a\x4c\xe8\x37\xb4\xd2\x52\x1e\xe2"
-		"\xbf\x03\xe1\x1c\x71\xca\x79\x4e\x07\x97", 20
-	}, {
-	/* Password exceeds block size test */
-		"sha256", 64, 1200,
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
-		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
-		"\x22\x34\x4b\xc4\xb6\xe3\x26\x75"
-		"\xa8\x09\x0f\x3e\xa8\x0b\xe0\x1d"
-		"\x5f\x95\x12\x6a\x2c\xdd\xc3\xfa"
-		"\xcc\x4a\x5e\x6d\xca\x04\xec\x58", 32
-	}, {
-		"sha512", 128, 1200,
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 129,
-		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
-		"\x0f\xb2\xed\x2c\x0e\x6e\xfb\x7d"
-		"\x7d\x8e\xdd\x58\x01\xb4\x59\x72"
-		"\x99\x92\x16\x30\x5e\xa4\x36\x8d"
-		"\x76\x14\x80\xf3\xe3\x7a\x22\xb9", 32
-	}, {
-		"whirlpool", 64, 1200,
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
-		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
-		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
-		"\x9c\x1c\x74\xf5\x88\x26\xe7\x6a"
-		"\x53\x58\xf4\x0c\x39\xe7\x80\x89"
-		"\x07\xc0\x31\x19\x9a\x50\xa2\x48"
-		"\xf1\xd9\xfe\x78\x64\xe5\x84\x50", 32
-	}
-};
-
-static void printhex(const char *s, const char *buf, size_t len)
-{
-	size_t i;
-
-	printf("%s: ", s);
-	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
-		printf("\\x%02x", (unsigned char)buf[i]);
-	printf("\n");
-	fflush(stdout);
-}
-
-static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_test_vectors(void)
-{
-	char result[64];
-	unsigned int i, j;
-	struct test_vector *vec;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(test_vectors) / sizeof(*test_vectors)); i++) {
-		vec = &test_vectors[i];
-		for (j = 1; j <= vec->output_length; j++) {
-			if (pkcs5_pbkdf2(vec->hash,
-			    vec->password, vec->password_length,
-			    vec->salt, vec->salt_length,
-			    vec->iterations,
-			    j, result, vec->hash_block_length)) {
-				printf("pbkdf2 failed, vector %d\n", i);
-				return -EINVAL;
-			}
-			if (memcmp(result, vec->output, j) != 0) {
-				printf("vector %u\n", i);
-				printhex(" got", result, j);
-				printhex("want", vec->output, j);
-				return -EINVAL;
-			}
-			memset(result, 0, sizeof(result));
-		}
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif

lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * PBKDF performance check
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Milan Broz
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Ondrej Mosnacek
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2020 Ondrej Mosnacek
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
 #include <sys/resource.h>
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 
+#ifndef CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW
+#define CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW CLOCK_MONOTONIC
+#endif
+
 #define BENCH_MIN_MS 250
 #define BENCH_MIN_MS_FAST 10
 #define BENCH_PERCENT_ATLEAST 95
@@ -48,7 +52,7 @@ int crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(const char *kdf, struct crypt_pbkdf_limits *limits)
 		limits->min_parallel   = 0; /* N/A */
 		limits->max_parallel   = 0; /* N/A */
 		return 0;
-	} else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) {
+	} else if (!strcmp(kdf, "argon2i") || !strcmp(kdf, "argon2id")) {
 		limits->min_iterations = 4;
 		limits->max_iterations = UINT32_MAX;
 		limits->min_memory     = 32;
@@ -151,7 +155,7 @@ static int next_argon2_params(uint32_t *t_cost, uint32_t *m_cost,
 	old_t_cost = *t_cost;
 	old_m_cost = *m_cost;
 
-	if (ms > target_ms) {
+	if ((uint32_t)ms > target_ms) {
 		/* decreasing, first try to lower t_cost, then m_cost */
 		num = (uint64_t)*t_cost * (uint64_t)target_ms;
 		denom = (uint64_t)ms;
@@ -202,7 +206,7 @@ static int next_argon2_params(uint32_t *t_cost, uint32_t *m_cost,
 static int crypt_argon2_check(const char *kdf, const char *password,
 			      size_t password_length, const char *salt,
 			      size_t salt_length, size_t key_length,
-			      uint32_t min_t_cost, uint32_t max_m_cost,
+			      uint32_t min_t_cost, uint32_t min_m_cost, uint32_t max_m_cost,
 			      uint32_t parallel, uint32_t target_ms,
 			      uint32_t *out_t_cost, uint32_t *out_m_cost,
 			      int (*progress)(uint32_t time_ms, void *usrptr),
@@ -210,7 +214,7 @@ static int crypt_argon2_check(const char *kdf, const char *password,
 {
 	int r = 0;
 	char *key = NULL;
-	uint32_t t_cost, m_cost, min_m_cost = 8 * parallel;
+	uint32_t t_cost, m_cost;
 	long ms;
 	long ms_atleast = (long)target_ms * BENCH_PERCENT_ATLEAST / 100;
 	long ms_atmost = (long)target_ms * BENCH_PERCENT_ATMOST / 100;
@@ -218,6 +222,9 @@ static int crypt_argon2_check(const char *kdf, const char *password,
 	if (key_length <= 0 || target_ms <= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (min_m_cost < (parallel * 8))
+		min_m_cost = parallel * 8;
+
 	if (max_m_cost < min_m_cost)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -354,8 +361,10 @@ static int crypt_pbkdf_check(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		ms = time_ms(&rstart, &rend);
 		if (ms) {
 			PBKDF2_temp = (double)iterations * target_ms / ms;
-			if (PBKDF2_temp > UINT32_MAX)
-				return -EINVAL;
+			if (PBKDF2_temp > UINT32_MAX) {
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
 			*iter_secs = (uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp;
 		}
 
@@ -403,6 +412,7 @@ int crypt_pbkdf_perf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 	if (!kdf || !iterations_out || !memory_out)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* FIXME: whole limits propagation should be more clear here */
 	r = crypt_pbkdf_get_limits(kdf, &pbkdf_limits);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
@@ -418,7 +428,9 @@ int crypt_pbkdf_perf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 	else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6))
 		r = crypt_argon2_check(kdf, password, password_size,
 				       salt, salt_size, volume_key_size,
-				       pbkdf_limits.min_iterations, max_memory_kb,
+				       pbkdf_limits.min_iterations,
+				       pbkdf_limits.min_memory,
+				       max_memory_kb,
 				       parallel_threads, time_ms, iterations_out,
 				       memory_out, progress, usrptr);
 	return r;

lib/integrity/integrity.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * Integrity volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <uuid/uuid.h>
 
 #include "integrity.h"
@@ -34,15 +33,14 @@ static int INTEGRITY_read_superblock(struct crypt_device *cd,
 {
 	int devfd, r;
 
-	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
-	if(devfd < 0) {
+	devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if(devfd < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
-	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 		device_alignment(device), sb, sizeof(*sb), offset) != sizeof(*sb) ||
 	    memcmp(sb->magic, SB_MAGIC, sizeof(sb->magic)) ||
-	    (sb->version != SB_VERSION_1 && sb->version != SB_VERSION_2)) {
+	    sb->version < SB_VERSION_1 || sb->version > SB_VERSION_5) {
 		log_std(cd, "No integrity superblock detected on %s.\n",
 			device_path(device));
 		r = -EINVAL;
@@ -55,22 +53,26 @@ static int INTEGRITY_read_superblock(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		r = 0;
 	}
 
-	close(devfd);
 	return r;
 }
 
-int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		      uint32_t *flags)
 {
 	struct superblock sb;
 	int r;
 
-	r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), 0, &sb);
+	r = INTEGRITY_read_superblock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), 0, &sb);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
 	params->sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block;
 	params->tag_size = sb.integrity_tag_size;
 
+	if (flags)
+		*flags = sb.flags;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -90,11 +92,15 @@ int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offs
 	log_std(cd, "journal_sections %u\n", sb.journal_sections);
 	log_std(cd, "provided_data_sectors %" PRIu64 "\n", sb.provided_data_sectors);
 	log_std(cd, "sector_size %u\n", SECTOR_SIZE << sb.log2_sectors_per_block);
-	if (sb.version == SB_VERSION_2 && (sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING))
+	if (sb.version >= SB_VERSION_2 && (sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING))
 		log_std(cd, "recalc_sector %" PRIu64 "\n", sb.recalc_sector);
-	log_std(cd, "flags %s%s\n",
+	log_std(cd, "log2_blocks_per_bitmap %u\n", sb.log2_blocks_per_bitmap_bit);
+	log_std(cd, "flags %s%s%s%s%s\n",
 		sb.flags & SB_FLAG_HAVE_JOURNAL_MAC ? "have_journal_mac " : "",
-		sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING ? "recalculating " : "");
+		sb.flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING ? "recalculating " : "",
+		sb.flags & SB_FLAG_DIRTY_BITMAP ? "dirty_bitmap " : "",
+		sb.flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING ? "fix_padding " : "",
+		sb.flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_HMAC ? "fix_hmac " : "");
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -136,6 +142,27 @@ int INTEGRITY_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *integrity)
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+/* Return hash or hmac(hash) size, if known */
+int INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(const char *integrity)
+{
+	char hash[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	int r;
+
+	if (!integrity)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(integrity, "crc32") || !strcmp(integrity, "crc32c"))
+		return 4;
+
+	r = sscanf(integrity, "hmac(%" MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR "[^)]s", hash);
+	if (r == 1)
+		r = crypt_hash_size(hash);
+	else
+		r = crypt_hash_size(integrity);
+
+	return r < 0 ? 0 : r;
+}
+
 int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		       const char *integrity,
 		       const char *cipher,
@@ -180,60 +207,107 @@ int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	return iv_tag_size + auth_tag_size;
 }
 
+int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		       struct volume_key *vk,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+		       struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+		       uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!dmd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*dmd = (struct crypt_dm_active_device) {
+		.flags = flags,
+	};
+
+	/* Workaround for kernel dm-integrity table bug */
+	if (sb_flags & SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING)
+		dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+				   crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE, &dmd->size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return dm_integrity_target_set(cd, &dmd->segment, 0, dmd->size,
+			crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd),
+			crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk, journal_crypt_key,
+			journal_mac_key, params);
+}
+
+int INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *name,
+		       const char *type,
+		       struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+		       uint32_t sb_flags)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint32_t dmi_flags;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd->segment;
+
+	if (!single_segment(dmd) || tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate INTEGRITY device on top of %s, using name %s, tag size %d, provided sectors %" PRIu64".",
+		device_path(tgt->data_device), name, tgt->u.integrity.tag_size, dmd->size);
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL,
+				tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmd->flags);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
+		r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+	if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-integrity mapping."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0 && (sb_flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING) && !dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) &&
+	    !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-integrity fixed metadata alignment."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0 && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE) &&
+	    !(crypt_get_compatibility(cd) & CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC) &&
+	    ((sb_flags & SB_FLAG_FIXED_HMAC) ?
+	    (tgt->u.integrity.vk && !tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key) :
+	    (tgt->u.integrity.vk || tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel refuses to activate insecure recalculate option (see legacy activation options to override)."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
 int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		       const char *name,
 		       const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
 		       struct volume_key *vk,
 		       struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
 		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
-		       uint32_t flags)
+		       uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags)
 {
-	uint32_t dmi_flags;
-	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdi = {
-		.target      = DM_INTEGRITY,
-		.data_device = crypt_data_device(cd),
-		.flags = flags,
-		.u.integrity = {
-			.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
-			.tag_size = crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
-			.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd),
-			.vk = vk,
-			.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key,
-			.journal_integrity_key = journal_mac_key,
-		}
-	};
-	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+	int r = INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(cd, params, vk, journal_crypt_key,
+					    journal_mac_key, &dmd, flags, sb_flags);
 
-	r = INTEGRITY_data_sectors(cd, dmdi.data_device,
-				   dmdi.u.integrity.offset * SECTOR_SIZE, &dmdi.size);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
-	if (params) {
-		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_size = params->journal_size;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.interleave_sectors = params->interleave_sectors;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.integrity = params->integrity;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_integrity = params->journal_integrity;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_crypt = params->journal_crypt;
-	}
-
-	log_dbg("Trying to activate INTEGRITY device on top of %s, using name %s, tag size %d, provided sectors %" PRIu64".",
-		device_path(dmdi.data_device), name, dmdi.u.integrity.tag_size, dmdi.size);
-
-	r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmdi.data_device, DEV_EXCL,
-				dmdi.u.integrity.offset, NULL, &dmdi.flags);
-	if (r)
-		return r;
-
-	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, "INTEGRITY", &dmdi, 0);
-	if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."));
-		return -ENOTSUP;
-	}
-
+	r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, name, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &dmd, sb_flags);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -245,55 +319,58 @@ int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint32_t dmi_flags;
 	char tmp_name[64], tmp_uuid[40];
 	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdi = {
-		.target      = DM_INTEGRITY,
-		.data_device = crypt_data_device(cd),
 		.size = 8,
 		.flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE, /* We always create journal but it can be unused later */
-		.u.integrity = {
-			.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
-			.tag_size = crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
-			.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd),
-			.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key,
-			.journal_integrity_key = journal_mac_key,
-		}
 	};
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmdi.segment;
 	int r;
 	uuid_t tmp_uuid_bin;
-
-	if (params) {
-		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_size = params->journal_size;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.interleave_sectors = params->interleave_sectors;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_integrity = params->journal_integrity;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.journal_crypt = params->journal_crypt;
-		dmdi.u.integrity.integrity = params->integrity;
-	}
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
 
 	uuid_generate(tmp_uuid_bin);
 	uuid_unparse(tmp_uuid_bin, tmp_uuid);
 
-	snprintf(tmp_name, sizeof(tmp_name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%s", tmp_uuid);
-
-	log_dbg("Trying to format INTEGRITY device on top of %s, tmp name %s, tag size %d.",
-		device_path(dmdi.data_device), tmp_name, dmdi.u.integrity.tag_size);
-
-	r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmdi.data_device, DEV_EXCL, dmdi.u.integrity.offset, NULL, NULL);
-	if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support dm-integrity mapping."));
-		return -ENOTSUP;
-	}
-	if (r)
-		return r;
+	r = snprintf(tmp_name, sizeof(tmp_name), "temporary-cryptsetup-%s", tmp_uuid);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(tmp_name))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* There is no data area, we can actually use fake zeroed key */
 	if (params && params->integrity_key_size)
-		dmdi.u.integrity.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->integrity_key_size, NULL);
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->integrity_key_size, NULL);
 
-	r = dm_create_device(cd, tmp_name, "INTEGRITY", &dmdi, 0);
+	r = dm_integrity_target_set(cd, tgt, 0, dmdi.size, crypt_metadata_device(cd),
+			crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd), vk,
+			journal_crypt_key, journal_mac_key, params);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+		return r;
+	}
 
-	crypt_free_volume_key(dmdi.u.integrity.vk);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to format INTEGRITY device on top of %s, tmp name %s, tag size %d.",
+		device_path(tgt->data_device), tmp_name, tgt->u.integrity.tag_size);
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, DEV_EXCL, tgt->u.integrity.offset, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r < 0 && (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) || !(dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support dm-integrity mapping."));
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+	if (r) {
+		dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) {
+		r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device, DEV_EXCL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r) {
+			dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = dm_create_device(cd, tmp_name, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, &dmdi);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 

lib/integrity/integrity.h

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
- * Integrity header defitinion
+ * Integrity header definition
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -27,14 +27,21 @@ struct crypt_device;
 struct device;
 struct crypt_params_integrity;
 struct volume_key;
+struct crypt_dm_active_device;
 
 /* dm-integrity helper */
 #define SB_MAGIC	"integrt"
 #define SB_VERSION_1	1
 #define SB_VERSION_2	2
+#define SB_VERSION_3	3
+#define SB_VERSION_4	4
+#define SB_VERSION_5	5
 
 #define SB_FLAG_HAVE_JOURNAL_MAC	(1 << 0)
 #define SB_FLAG_RECALCULATING		(1 << 1) /* V2 only */
+#define SB_FLAG_DIRTY_BITMAP		(1 << 2) /* V3 only */
+#define SB_FLAG_FIXED_PADDING		(1 << 3) /* V4 only */
+#define SB_FLAG_FIXED_HMAC		(1 << 4) /* V5 only */
 
 struct superblock {
 	uint8_t magic[8];
@@ -45,11 +52,14 @@ struct superblock {
 	uint64_t provided_data_sectors;
 	uint32_t flags;
 	uint8_t log2_sectors_per_block;
-        uint8_t pad[3];
-        uint64_t recalc_sector; /* V2 only */
+	uint8_t log2_blocks_per_bitmap_bit; /* V3 only */
+	uint8_t pad[2];
+	uint64_t recalc_sector; /* V2 only */
 } __attribute__ ((packed));
 
-int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_integrity *params);
+int INTEGRITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		      uint32_t *flags);
 
 int INTEGRITY_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, uint64_t offset);
 
@@ -62,6 +72,7 @@ int INTEGRITY_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		       const char *integrity,
 		       const char *cipher,
 		       const char *cipher_mode);
+int INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(const char *integrity);
 
 int INTEGRITY_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
@@ -74,5 +85,19 @@ int INTEGRITY_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		       struct volume_key *vk,
 		       struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
 		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
-		       uint32_t flags);
+		       uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags);
+
+int INTEGRITY_create_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const struct crypt_params_integrity *params,
+		       struct volume_key *vk,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key,
+		       struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+		       struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+		       uint32_t flags, uint32_t sb_flags);
+
+int INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		       const char *name,
+		       const char *type,
+		       struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+		       uint32_t sb_flags);
 #endif

lib/internal.h

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /*
  * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library internal
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -27,8 +27,10 @@
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <inttypes.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
 
 #include "nls.h"
 #include "bitops.h"
@@ -40,30 +42,54 @@
 #include "utils_keyring.h"
 #include "utils_io.h"
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
+#include "utils_storage_wrappers.h"
 
 #include "libcryptsetup.h"
 
 /* to silent gcc -Wcast-qual for const cast */
 #define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
 
+#define SHIFT_4K		12
 #define SECTOR_SHIFT		9
 #define SECTOR_SIZE		(1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)
 #define MAX_SECTOR_SIZE		4096 /* min page size among all platforms */
 #define DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT	1048576 /* 1MiB */
 #define DEFAULT_MEM_ALIGNMENT	4096
 #define LOG_MAX_LEN		4096
+#define MAX_DM_DEPS		32
+
+#define CRYPT_SUBDEV           "SUBDEV" /* prefix for sublayered devices underneath public crypt types */
 
 #define at_least(a, b) ({ __typeof__(a) __at_least = (a); (__at_least >= (b))?__at_least:(b); })
 
+#define MISALIGNED(a, b)	((a) & ((b) - 1))
+#define MISALIGNED_4K(a)	MISALIGNED((a), 1 << SHIFT_4K)
+#define MISALIGNED_512(a)	MISALIGNED((a), 1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)
+#define NOTPOW2(a)		MISALIGNED((a), (a))
+
 #ifndef ARRAY_SIZE
 # define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
 #endif
 
+#define MOVE_REF(x, y) \
+	do { \
+		typeof (x) *_px = &(x), *_py = &(y); \
+		*_px = *_py; \
+		*_py = NULL; \
+	} while (0)
+
+#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
+#define O_CLOEXEC 0
+#endif
+
 struct crypt_device;
+struct luks2_reencrypt;
 
 struct volume_key {
+	int id;
 	size_t keylength;
 	const char *key_description;
+	struct volume_key *next;
 	char key[];
 };
 
@@ -71,6 +97,11 @@ struct volume_key *crypt_alloc_volume_key(size_t keylength, const char *key);
 struct volume_key *crypt_generate_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd, size_t keylength);
 void crypt_free_volume_key(struct volume_key *vk);
 int crypt_volume_key_set_description(struct volume_key *key, const char *key_description);
+void crypt_volume_key_set_id(struct volume_key *vk, int id);
+int crypt_volume_key_get_id(const struct volume_key *vk);
+void crypt_volume_key_add_next(struct volume_key **vks, struct volume_key *vk);
+struct volume_key *crypt_volume_key_next(struct volume_key *vk);
+struct volume_key *crypt_volume_key_by_id(struct volume_key *vk, int id);
 
 struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd);
 int init_pbkdf_type(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -81,37 +112,47 @@ int verify_pbkdf_params(struct crypt_device *cd,
 int crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(struct crypt_device *cd,
 				   struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf,
 				   size_t volume_key_size);
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_spec(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /* Device backend */
 struct device;
-int device_alloc(struct device **device, const char *path);
+int device_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device **device, const char *path);
 int device_alloc_no_check(struct device **device, const char *path);
-void device_free(struct device *device);
+void device_close(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+void device_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
 const char *device_path(const struct device *device);
 const char *device_dm_name(const struct device *device);
 const char *device_block_path(const struct device *device);
-void device_topology_alignment(struct device *device,
-			    unsigned long *required_alignment, /* bytes */
-			    unsigned long *alignment_offset,   /* bytes */
-			    unsigned long default_alignment);
-size_t device_block_size(struct device *device);
+void device_topology_alignment(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       struct device *device,
+			       unsigned long *required_alignment, /* bytes */
+			       unsigned long *alignment_offset,   /* bytes */
+			       unsigned long default_alignment);
+size_t device_block_size(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
 int device_read_ahead(struct device *device, uint32_t *read_ahead);
 int device_size(struct device *device, uint64_t *size);
-int device_open(struct device *device, int flags);
+int device_open(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int flags);
+int device_open_excl(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int flags);
+void device_release_excl(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
 void device_disable_direct_io(struct device *device);
 int device_is_identical(struct device *device1, struct device *device2);
 int device_is_rotational(struct device *device);
 size_t device_alignment(struct device *device);
 int device_direct_io(const struct device *device);
 int device_fallocate(struct device *device, uint64_t size);
+void device_sync(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+int device_check_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      struct device *device,
+		      uint64_t req_offset, int falloc);
 
-int device_open_locked(struct device *device, int flags);
+int device_open_locked(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, int flags);
 int device_read_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
 int device_write_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
-void device_read_unlock(struct device *device);
-void device_write_unlock(struct device *device);
+void device_read_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+void device_write_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device);
+bool device_is_locked(struct device *device);
 
-enum devcheck { DEV_OK = 0, DEV_EXCL = 1, DEV_SHARED = 2 };
+enum devcheck { DEV_OK = 0, DEV_EXCL = 1 };
 int device_check_access(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			struct device *device,
 			enum devcheck device_check);
@@ -123,6 +164,13 @@ int device_block_adjust(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			uint32_t *flags);
 size_t size_round_up(size_t size, size_t block);
 
+int create_or_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd);
+
+int create_or_reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+		     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmdi);
+
 /* Receive backend devices from context helpers */
 struct device *crypt_metadata_device(struct crypt_device *cd);
 struct device *crypt_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd);
@@ -137,6 +185,7 @@ char *crypt_get_base_device(const char *dev_path);
 uint64_t crypt_dev_partition_offset(const char *dev_path);
 int lookup_by_disk_id(const char *dm_uuid);
 int lookup_by_sysfs_uuid_field(const char *dm_uuid, size_t max_len);
+int crypt_uuid_cmp(const char *dm_uuid, const char *hdr_uuid);
 
 size_t crypt_getpagesize(void);
 unsigned crypt_cpusonline(void);
@@ -145,7 +194,7 @@ uint64_t crypt_getphysmemory_kb(void);
 int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx);
 
 void logger(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *format, ...) __attribute__ ((format (printf, 5, 6)));
-#define log_dbg(x...) logger(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
+#define log_dbg(c, x...) logger(c, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
 #define log_std(c, x...) logger(c, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
 #define log_verbose(c, x...) logger(c, CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
 #define log_err(c, x...) logger(c, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
@@ -162,7 +211,7 @@ int crypt_random_get(struct crypt_device *ctx, char *buf, size_t len, int qualit
 void crypt_random_exit(void);
 int crypt_random_default_key_rng(void);
 
-int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *ctx,
+int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     const char *hash_name,
 		     char *key, size_t key_size,
 		     const char *passphrase, size_t passphrase_size);
@@ -173,6 +222,11 @@ int PLAIN_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     uint32_t flags);
 
 void *crypt_get_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type);
+void crypt_set_luks2_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_reencrypt *rh);
+struct luks2_reencrypt *crypt_get_luks2_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+int onlyLUKS2(struct crypt_device *cd);
+int onlyLUKS2mask(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t mask);
 
 int crypt_wipe_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct device *device,
@@ -191,8 +245,9 @@ int crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd);
 int crypt_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd);
 void crypt_set_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, unsigned key_in_keyring);
 int crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, struct volume_key *vk);
-int crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(const struct crypt_device *cd);
-void crypt_drop_keyring_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *key_description);
+int crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(struct crypt_device *cd);
+void crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *key_description, key_type_t ktype);
+void crypt_drop_keyring_key(struct crypt_device *cd, struct volume_key *vks);
 
 static inline uint64_t version(uint16_t major, uint16_t minor, uint16_t patch, uint16_t release)
 {
@@ -201,4 +256,22 @@ static inline uint64_t version(uint16_t major, uint16_t minor, uint16_t patch, u
 
 int kernel_version(uint64_t *kversion);
 
+int crypt_serialize_lock(struct crypt_device *cd);
+void crypt_serialize_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+bool crypt_string_in(const char *str, char **list, size_t list_size);
+int crypt_strcmp(const char *a, const char *b);
+int crypt_compare_dm_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const struct crypt_dm_active_device *src,
+			       const struct crypt_dm_active_device *tgt);
+static inline void *crypt_zalloc(size_t size) { return calloc(1, size); }
+
+static inline bool uint64_mult_overflow(uint64_t *u, uint64_t b, size_t size)
+{
+	*u = (uint64_t)b * size;
+	if ((uint64_t)(*u / size) != b)
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
 #endif /* INTERNAL_H */

lib/libcryptsetup.h

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /*
  * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -64,6 +64,23 @@ struct crypt_device; /* crypt device handle */
  */
 int crypt_init(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *device);
 
+/**
+ * Initialize crypt device handle with optional data device and check
+ * if devices exist.
+ *
+ * @param cd Returns pointer to crypt device handle
+ * @param device Path to the backing device or detached header.
+ * @param data_device Path to the data device or @e NULL.
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Note that logging is not initialized here, possible messages use
+ * 	 default log function.
+ */
+int crypt_init_data_device(struct crypt_device **cd,
+	const char *device,
+	const char *data_device);
+
 /**
  * Initialize crypt device handle from provided active device name,
  * and, optionally, from separate metadata (header) device
@@ -131,8 +148,29 @@ void crypt_set_confirm_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param device path to device
  *
+ * @returns 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
  */
 int crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device);
+
+/**
+ * Set data device offset in 512-byte sectors.
+ * Used for LUKS.
+ * This function is replacement for data alignment fields in LUKS param struct.
+ * If set to 0 (default), old behaviour is preserved.
+ * This value is reset on @link crypt_load @endlink.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param data_offset data offset in bytes
+ *
+ * @returns 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note Data offset must be aligned to multiple of 8 (alignment to 4096-byte sectors)
+ * and must be big enough to accommodate the whole LUKS header with all keyslots.
+ * @note Data offset is enforced by this function, device topology
+ * information is no longer used after calling this function.
+ */
+int crypt_set_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t data_offset);
+
 /** @} */
 
 /**
@@ -151,6 +189,8 @@ int crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device);
 #define CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE  2
 /** debug log level - always on stdout */
 #define CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG -1
+/** debug log level - additional JSON output (for LUKS2) */
+#define CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON -2
 
 /**
  * Set log function.
@@ -246,6 +286,16 @@ struct crypt_pbkdf_type {
 int crypt_set_pbkdf_type(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	 const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf);
 
+/**
+ * Get PBKDF (Password-Based Key Derivation Algorithm) parameters.
+ *
+ * @param pbkdf_type type of PBKDF
+ *
+ * @return struct on success or NULL value otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params(const char *pbkdf_type);
+
 /**
  * Get default PBKDF (Password-Based Key Derivation Algorithm) settings for keyslots.
  * Works only with LUKS device handles (both versions).
@@ -307,6 +357,39 @@ int crypt_memory_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, int lock);
  * 	 In current version locking can be only switched off and cannot be switched on later.
  */
 int crypt_metadata_locking(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable);
+
+/**
+ * Set metadata header area sizes. This applies only to LUKS2.
+ * These values limit amount of metadata anf number of supportable keyslots.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
+ * @param metadata_size size in bytes of JSON area + 4k binary header
+ * @param keyslots_size size in bytes of binary keyslots area
+ *
+ * @returns @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note The metadata area is stored twice and both copies contain 4k binary header.
+ * Only 16,32,64,128,256,512,1024,2048 and 4096 kB value is allowed (see LUKS2 specification).
+ * @note Keyslots area size must be multiple of 4k with maximum 128MB.
+ */
+int crypt_set_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	uint64_t metadata_size,
+	uint64_t keyslots_size);
+
+/**
+ * Get metadata header area sizes. This applies only to LUKS2.
+ * These values limit amount of metadata anf number of supportable keyslots.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param metadata_size size in bytes of JSON area + 4k binary header
+ * @param keyslots_size size in bytes of binary keyslots area
+ *
+ * @returns @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_get_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	uint64_t *metadata_size,
+	uint64_t *keyslots_size);
+
 /** @} */
 
 /**
@@ -331,6 +414,8 @@ int crypt_metadata_locking(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable);
 #define CRYPT_TCRYPT "TCRYPT"
 /** INTEGRITY dm-integrity device */
 #define CRYPT_INTEGRITY "INTEGRITY"
+/** BITLK (BitLocker-compatible mode) */
+#define CRYPT_BITLK "BITLK"
 
 /** LUKS any version */
 #define CRYPT_LUKS NULL
@@ -343,6 +428,13 @@ int crypt_metadata_locking(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable);
  */
 const char *crypt_get_type(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
+/**
+ * Get device default LUKS type
+ *
+ * @return string according to device type (CRYPT_LUKS1 or CRYPT_LUKS2).
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_default_type(void);
+
 /**
  *
  * Structure used as parameter for PLAIN device type.
@@ -368,7 +460,7 @@ struct crypt_params_plain {
  */
 struct crypt_params_luks1 {
 	const char *hash;        /**< hash used in LUKS header */
-	size_t data_alignment;   /**< data alignment in sectors, data offset is multiple of this */
+	size_t data_alignment;   /**< data area alignment in 512B sectors, data offset is multiple of this */
 	const char *data_device; /**< detached encrypted data device or @e NULL */
 };
 
@@ -415,6 +507,8 @@ struct crypt_params_verity {
 #define CRYPT_VERITY_CHECK_HASH  (1 << 1)
 /** Create hash - format hash device */
 #define CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH (1 << 2)
+/** Root hash signature required for activation */
+#define CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE (1 << 3)
 
 /**
  *
@@ -456,11 +550,15 @@ struct crypt_params_tcrypt {
  *
  * @see crypt_format, crypt_load
  *
+ * @note In bitmap tracking mode, the journal is implicitly disabled.
+ *       As an ugly workaround for compatibility, journal_watermark is overloaded
+ *       to mean 512-bytes sectors-per-bit and journal_commit_time means bitmap flush time.
+ *       All other journal parameters are not applied in the bitmap mode.
  */
 struct crypt_params_integrity {
 	uint64_t journal_size;               /**< size of journal in bytes */
-	unsigned int journal_watermark;      /**< journal flush watermark in percents */
-	unsigned int journal_commit_time;    /**< journal commit time in ms */
+	unsigned int journal_watermark;      /**< journal flush watermark in percents; in bitmap mode sectors-per-bit  */
+	unsigned int journal_commit_time;    /**< journal commit time (or bitmap flush time) in ms */
 	uint32_t interleave_sectors;         /**< number of interleave sectors (power of two) */
 	uint32_t tag_size;                   /**< tag size per-sector in bytes */
 	uint32_t sector_size;                /**< sector size in bytes */
@@ -490,7 +588,7 @@ struct crypt_params_luks2 {
 	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf; /**< PBKDF (and hash) parameters or @e NULL*/
 	const char *integrity;                /**< integrity algorithm or @e NULL */
 	const struct crypt_params_integrity *integrity_params; /**< Data integrity parameters or @e NULL*/
-	size_t data_alignment;   /**< data alignment in sectors, data offset is multiple of this */
+	size_t data_alignment;   /**< data area alignment in 512B sectors, data offset is multiple of this */
 	const char *data_device; /**< detached encrypted data device or @e NULL */
 	uint32_t sector_size;    /**< encryption sector size */
 	const char *label;       /**< header label or @e NULL*/
@@ -535,6 +633,30 @@ int crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t volume_key_size,
 	void *params);
 
+/**
+ * Set format compatibility flags.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param flags CRYPT_COMPATIBILITY_* flags
+ */
+void crypt_set_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * Get compatibility flags.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @returns compatibility flags
+ */
+uint32_t crypt_get_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
+/** dm-integrity device uses less effective (legacy) padding (old kernels) */
+#define CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING (1 << 0)
+/** dm-integrity device does not protect superblock with HMAC (old kernels) */
+#define CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC (1 << 1)
+/** dm-integrity allow recalculating of volumes with HMAC keys (old kernels) */
+#define CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC (1 << 2)
+
 /**
  * Convert to new type for already existing device.
  *
@@ -734,6 +856,20 @@ int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
 	const char *keyfile,
 	size_t keyfile_size);
+/**
+ * Resume crypt device using provided volume key.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of device to resume
+ * @param volume_key provided volume key
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size);
 /** @} */
 
 /**
@@ -780,10 +916,6 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param new_passphrase_size size of @e new_passphrase (binary data)
  *
  * @return allocated key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
- *
- * @note This function is just internal implementation of luksChange
- * command to avoid reading of volume key outside libcryptsetup boundary
- * in FIPS mode.
  */
 int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot_old,
@@ -867,6 +999,9 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 /** create keyslot with new volume key and assign it to current dm-crypt segment */
 #define CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET (1 << 1)
 
+/** Assign key to first matching digest before creating new digest */
+#define CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE (1 << 2)
+
 /**
  * Add key slot using provided key.
  *
@@ -958,8 +1093,26 @@ int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
 #define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_PERSISTENT (1 << 14)
 /** dm-verity: check_at_most_once - check data blocks only the first time */
 #define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE (1 << 15)
-/** allow activation check including unbound keyslots (kesylots without segments) */
+/** allow activation check including unbound keyslots (keyslots without segments) */
 #define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY (1 << 16)
+/** dm-integrity: activate automatic recalculation */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE (1 << 17)
+/** reactivate existing and update flags, input only */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH	(1 << 18)
+/** Use global lock to serialize memory hard KDF on activation (OOM workaround) */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF (1 << 19)
+/** dm-integrity: direct writes, use bitmap to track dirty sectors */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP (1 << 20)
+/** device is suspended (key should be wiped from memory), output only */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED (1 << 21)
+/** use IV sector counted in sector_size instead of default 512 bytes sectors */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS (1 << 22)
+/** dm-verity: panic_on_corruption flag - panic kernel on corruption */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION (1 << 23)
+/** dm-crypt: bypass internal workqueue and process read requests synchronously. */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE (1 << 24)
+/** dm-crypt: bypass internal workqueue and process write requests synchronously. */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE (1 << 25)
 
 /**
  * Active device runtime attributes
@@ -1009,6 +1162,8 @@ uint64_t crypt_get_active_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd,
  */
 /** Unfinished offline reencryption */
 #define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_OFFLINE_REENCRYPT	(1 << 0)
+/** Online reencryption in-progress */
+#define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT	(1 << 1)
 /** unknown requirement in header (output only) */
 #define CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_UNKNOWN		(1 << 31)
 
@@ -1149,6 +1304,31 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t volume_key_size,
 	uint32_t flags);
 
+/**
+ * Activate VERITY device using provided key and optional signature).
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of device to create
+ * @param volume_key provided volume key
+ * @param volume_key_size size of volume_key
+ * @param signature buffer with signature for the key
+ * @param signature_size bsize of signature buffer
+ * @param flags activation flags
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note For VERITY the volume key means root hash required for activation.
+ *	Because kernel dm-verity is always read only, you have to provide
+ *	CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY flag always.
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_signed_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	const char *signature,
+	size_t signature_size,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
 /**
  * Activate device using passphrase stored in kernel keyring.
  *
@@ -1219,6 +1399,7 @@ int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
  *
  * @note For TCRYPT cipher chain is the volume key concatenated
  * 	 for all ciphers in chain.
+ * @note For VERITY the volume key means root hash used for activation.
  */
 int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
@@ -1308,15 +1489,25 @@ const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd);
 const char *crypt_get_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /**
- * Get path to underlaying device.
+ * Get path to underlying device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  *
- * @return path to underlaying device name
+ * @return path to underlying device name
  *
  */
 const char *crypt_get_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
+/**
+ * Get path to detached metadata device or @e NULL if it is not detached.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ *
+ * @return path to underlying device name
+ *
+ */
+const char *crypt_get_metadata_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd);
+
 /**
  * Get device offset in 512-bytes sectors where real data starts (on underlying device).
  *
@@ -1344,6 +1535,8 @@ uint64_t crypt_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd);
  *
  * @return volume key size
  *
+ * @note For LUKS2, this function can be used only if there is at least
+ *       one keyslot assigned to data segment.
  */
 int crypt_get_volume_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
@@ -1528,7 +1721,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_area(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint64_t *length);
 
 /**
- * Get size (in bytes) of key for particular keyslot.
+ * Get size (in bytes) of stored key in particular keyslot.
  * Use for LUKS2 unbound keyslots, for other keyslots it is the same as @ref crypt_get_volume_key_size
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
@@ -1539,6 +1732,50 @@ int crypt_keyslot_area(struct crypt_device *cd,
  */
 int crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
 
+/**
+ * Get cipher and key size for keyslot encryption.
+ * Use for LUKS2 keyslot to set different encryption type than for data encryption.
+ * Parameters will be used for next keyslot operations.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot keyslot number of CRYPT_ANY_SLOT for default
+ * @param key_size encryption key size (in bytes)
+ *
+ * @return cipher specification on success or @e NULL.
+ *
+ * @note This is the encryption of keyslot itself, not the data encryption algorithm!
+ */
+const char *crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, size_t *key_size);
+
+/**
+ * Get PBKDF parameters for keyslot.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param keyslot keyslot number
+ * @param pbkdf struct with returned PBKDF parameters
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf);
+
+/**
+ * Set encryption for keyslot.
+ * Use for LUKS2 keyslot to set different encryption type than for data encryption.
+ * Parameters will be used for next keyslot operations that create or change a keyslot.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param cipher (e.g. "aes-xts-plain64")
+ * @param key_size encryption key size (in bytes)
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note To reset to default keyslot encryption (the same as for data)
+ *       set cipher to NULL and key size to 0.
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *cipher,
+	size_t key_size);
+
 /**
  * Get directory where mapped crypt devices are created
  *
@@ -1591,6 +1828,8 @@ int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 /** Debug all */
 #define CRYPT_DEBUG_ALL  -1
+/** Debug all with additional JSON dump (for LUKS2) */
+#define CRYPT_DEBUG_JSON  -2
 /** Debug none */
 #define CRYPT_DEBUG_NONE  0
 
@@ -1948,6 +2187,193 @@ int crypt_activate_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint32_t flags);
 /** @} */
 
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-reencryption LUKS2 volume reencryption support
+ *
+ * Set of functions to handling LUKS2 volume reencryption
+ *
+ * @addtogroup crypt-reencryption
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Initialize reencryption metadata but do not run reencryption yet. (in) */
+#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INITIALIZE_ONLY    (1 << 0)
+/** Move the first segment, used only with data shift. (in/out) */
+#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_MOVE_FIRST_SEGMENT (1 << 1)
+/** Resume already initialized reencryption only. (in) */
+#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_RESUME_ONLY        (1 << 2)
+/** Run reencryption recovery only. (in) */
+#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_RECOVERY           (1 << 3)
+/** Reencryption requires metadata protection. (in/out) */
+#define CRYPT_REENCRYPT_REPAIR_NEEDED      (1 << 4)
+
+/**
+ * Reencryption direction
+ */
+typedef enum {
+	CRYPT_REENCRYPT_FORWARD = 0, /**< forward direction */
+	CRYPT_REENCRYPT_BACKWARD     /**< backward direction */
+} crypt_reencrypt_direction_info;
+
+/**
+ * Reencryption mode
+ */
+typedef enum {
+	CRYPT_REENCRYPT_REENCRYPT = 0, /**< Reencryption mode */
+	CRYPT_REENCRYPT_ENCRYPT,       /**< Encryption mode */
+	CRYPT_REENCRYPT_DECRYPT,       /**< Decryption mode */
+} crypt_reencrypt_mode_info;
+
+/**
+ * LUKS2 reencryption options.
+ */
+struct crypt_params_reencrypt {
+	crypt_reencrypt_mode_info mode;           /**< Reencryption mode, immutable after first init. */
+	crypt_reencrypt_direction_info direction; /**< Reencryption direction, immutable after first init. */
+	const char *resilience;                   /**< Resilience mode: "none", "checksum", "journal" or "shift" (only "shift" is immutable after init) */
+	const char *hash;                         /**< Used hash for "checksum" resilience type, ignored otherwise. */
+	uint64_t data_shift;                      /**< Used in "shift" mode, must be non-zero, immutable after first init. */
+	uint64_t max_hotzone_size;                /**< Exact hotzone size for "none" mode. Maximum hotzone size for "checksum" and "journal" modes. */
+	uint64_t device_size;			  /**< Reencrypt only initial part of the data device. */
+	const struct crypt_params_luks2 *luks2;   /**< LUKS2 parameters for the final reencryption volume.*/
+	uint32_t flags;                           /**< Reencryption flags. */
+};
+
+/**
+ * Initialize reencryption metadata using passphrase.
+ *
+ * This function initializes on-disk metadata to include all reencryption segments,
+ * according to the provided options.
+ * If metadata already contains ongoing reencryption metadata, it loads these parameters
+ * (in this situation all parameters except @e name and @e passphrase can be omitted).
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of active device or @e NULL for offline reencryption
+ * @param passphrase passphrase used to unlock volume key
+ * @param passphrase_size size of @e passphrase (binary data)
+ * @param keyslot_old keyslot to unlock existing device or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param keyslot_new existing (unbound) reencryption keyslot; must be set except for decryption
+ * @param cipher cipher specification (e.g. "aes")
+ * @param cipher_mode cipher mode and IV (e.g. "xts-plain64")
+ * @param params reencryption parameters @link crypt_params_reencrypt @endlink.
+ *
+ * @return reencryption key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	int keyslot_old,
+	int keyslot_new,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
+
+/**
+ * Initialize reencryption metadata using passphrase in keyring.
+ *
+ * This function initializes on-disk metadata to include all reencryption segments,
+ * according to the provided options.
+ * If metadata already contains ongoing reencryption metadata, it loads these parameters
+ * (in this situation all parameters except @e name and @e key_description can be omitted).
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param name name of active device or @e NULL for offline reencryption
+ * @param key_description passphrase (key) identification in keyring
+ * @param keyslot_old keyslot to unlock existing device or CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
+ * @param keyslot_new existing (unbound) reencryption keyslot; must be set except for decryption
+ * @param cipher cipher specification (e.g. "aes")
+ * @param cipher_mode cipher mode and IV (e.g. "xts-plain64")
+ * @param params reencryption parameters @link crypt_params_reencrypt @endlink.
+ *
+ * @return reencryption key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_reencrypt_init_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *key_description,
+	int keyslot_old,
+	int keyslot_new,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
+
+/**
+ * Run data reencryption.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param progress is a callback function reporting device \b size,
+ * current \b offset of reencryption and provided \b usrptr identification
+ *
+ * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ */
+int crypt_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		    int (*progress)(uint64_t size, uint64_t offset, void *usrptr));
+
+/**
+ * Reencryption status info
+ */
+typedef enum {
+	CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE = 0, /**< No reencryption in progress */
+	CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN,    /**< Ongoing reencryption in a clean state. */
+	CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH,    /**< Aborted reencryption that need internal recovery. */
+	CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID   /**< Invalid state. */
+} crypt_reencrypt_info;
+
+/**
+ * LUKS2 reencryption status.
+ *
+ * @param cd crypt device handle
+ * @param params reencryption parameters
+ *
+ * @return reencryption status info and parameters.
+ */
+crypt_reencrypt_info crypt_reencrypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
+/** @} */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup crypt-memory Safe memory helpers functions
+ * @addtogroup crypt-memory
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Allocate safe memory (content is safely wiped on deallocation).
+ *
+ * @param size size of memory in bytes
+ *
+ * @return pointer to allocated memory or @e NULL.
+ */
+void *crypt_safe_alloc(size_t size);
+
+/**
+ * Release safe memory, content is safely wiped.
+ * The pointer must be allocated with @link crypt_safe_alloc @endlink
+ *
+ * @param data pointer to memory to be deallocated
+ */
+void crypt_safe_free(void *data);
+
+/**
+ * Reallocate safe memory (content is copied and safely wiped on deallocation).
+ *
+ * @param data pointer to memory to be deallocated
+ * @param size new size of memory in bytes
+ *
+ * @return pointer to allocated memory or @e NULL.
+ */
+void *crypt_safe_realloc(void *data, size_t size);
+
+/**
+ * Safe clear memory area (compile should not compile this call out).
+ *
+ * @param data pointer to memory to be cleared
+ * @param size size of memory in bytes
+ */
+void crypt_safe_memzero(void *data, size_t size);
+
+/** @} */
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif

lib/libcryptsetup.sym

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
 	global:
 		crypt_init;
+		crypt_init_data_device;
 		crypt_init_by_name;
 		crypt_init_by_name_and_header;
 
@@ -11,6 +12,9 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
 		crypt_set_label;
 		crypt_set_data_device;
 
+		crypt_set_compatibility;
+		crypt_get_compatibility;
+
 		crypt_memory_lock;
 		crypt_metadata_locking;
 		crypt_format;
@@ -23,6 +27,7 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
 		crypt_resume_by_keyfile;
 		crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset;
 		crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset;
+		crypt_resume_by_volume_key;
 		crypt_free;
 
 		crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase;
@@ -54,6 +59,7 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
 		crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset;
 		crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset;
 		crypt_activate_by_volume_key;
+		crypt_activate_by_signed_key;
 		crypt_activate_by_keyring;
 		crypt_deactivate;
 		crypt_deactivate_by_name;
@@ -68,14 +74,19 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
 		crypt_get_cipher_mode;
 		crypt_get_integrity_info;
 		crypt_get_uuid;
+		crypt_set_data_offset;
 		crypt_get_data_offset;
 		crypt_get_iv_offset;
 		crypt_get_volume_key_size;
 		crypt_get_device_name;
+		crypt_get_metadata_device_name;
+		crypt_get_metadata_size;
+		crypt_set_metadata_size;
 		crypt_get_verity_info;
 		crypt_get_sector_size;
 
 		crypt_get_type;
+		crypt_get_default_type;
 		crypt_get_active_device;
 		crypt_get_active_integrity_failures;
 		crypt_persistent_flags_set;
@@ -85,12 +96,17 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
 		crypt_get_rng_type;
 		crypt_set_pbkdf_type;
 		crypt_get_pbkdf_type;
+		crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params;
 		crypt_get_pbkdf_default;
 
 		crypt_keyslot_max;
 		crypt_keyslot_area;
 		crypt_keyslot_status;
 		crypt_keyslot_get_key_size;
+		crypt_keyslot_set_encryption;
+		crypt_keyslot_get_encryption;
+		crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf;
+
 		crypt_get_dir;
 		crypt_set_debug_level;
 		crypt_log;
@@ -102,6 +118,16 @@ CRYPTSETUP_2.0 {
 		crypt_keyfile_device_read;
 
 		crypt_wipe;
+
+		crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase;
+		crypt_reencrypt_init_by_keyring;
+		crypt_reencrypt;
+		crypt_reencrypt_status;
+
+		crypt_safe_alloc;
+		crypt_safe_realloc;
+		crypt_safe_free;
+		crypt_safe_memzero;
 	local:
 		*;
 };

lib/loopaes/loopaes.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * loop-AES compatible volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static int hash_keys(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *hash_name;
 	char tweak, *key_ptr;
 	unsigned int i;
-	int r;
+	int r = 0;
 
 	hash_name = hash_override ?: get_hash(key_len_output);
 	tweak = get_tweak(keys_count);
@@ -137,13 +137,13 @@ int LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	unsigned int key_lengths[LOOPAES_KEYS_MAX];
 	unsigned int i, key_index, key_len, offset;
 
-	log_dbg("Parsing loop-AES keyfile of size %zu.", buffer_len);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Parsing loop-AES keyfile of size %zu.", buffer_len);
 
 	if (!buffer_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (keyfile_is_gpg(buffer, buffer_len)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile.\n"));
+		log_err(cd, _("Detected not yet supported GPG encrypted keyfile."));
 		log_std(cd, _("Please use gpg --decrypt <KEYFILE> | cryptsetup --keyfile=- ...\n"));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			key_lengths[key_index]++;
 		}
 		if (offset == buffer_len) {
-			log_dbg("Unterminated key #%d in keyfile.", key_index);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Unterminated key #%d in keyfile.", key_index);
 			log_err(cd, _("Incompatible loop-AES keyfile detected."));
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ int LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	key_len = key_lengths[0];
 	for (i = 0; i < key_index; i++)
 		if (!key_lengths[i] || (key_lengths[i] != key_len)) {
-			log_dbg("Unexpected length %d of key #%d (should be %d).",
+			log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected length %d of key #%d (should be %d).",
 				key_lengths[i], i, key_len);
 			key_len = 0;
 			break;
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ int LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Keyfile: %d keys of length %d.", key_index, key_len);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Keyfile: %d keys of length %d.", key_index, key_len);
 
 	*keys_count = key_index;
 	return hash_keys(cd, vk, hash, keys, key_index,
@@ -203,25 +203,15 @@ int LOOPAES_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     struct volume_key *vk,
 		     uint32_t flags)
 {
-	char *cipher = NULL;
-	uint32_t req_flags, dmc_flags;
 	int r;
+	uint32_t req_flags, dmc_flags;
+	char *cipher = NULL;
 	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
-		.target = DM_CRYPT,
-		.size   = 0,
-		.flags  = flags,
-		.data_device = crypt_data_device(cd),
-		.u.crypt  = {
-			.cipher = NULL,
-			.vk     = vk,
-			.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
-			.iv_offset = crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
-			.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd),
-		}
+		.flags = flags,
 	};
 
-	r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmd.data_device, DEV_EXCL,
-				dmd.u.crypt.offset, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), DEV_EXCL,
+				crypt_get_data_offset(cd), &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
@@ -235,18 +225,29 @@ int LOOPAES_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (r < 0)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	dmd.u.crypt.cipher = cipher;
-	log_dbg("Trying to activate loop-AES device %s using cipher %s.",
-		name, dmd.u.crypt.cipher);
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+			vk, cipher, crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+			crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
 
-	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_LOOPAES, &dmd, 0);
+	if (r) {
+		free(cipher);
+		return r;
+	}
 
-	if (r < 0 && !dm_flags(DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) &&
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate loop-AES device %s using cipher %s.",
+		name, cipher);
+
+	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_LOOPAES, &dmd);
+
+	if (r < 0 && !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) &&
 	    (dmc_flags & req_flags) != req_flags) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support loop-AES compatible mapping."));
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support loop-AES compatible mapping."));
 		r = -ENOTSUP;
 	}
 
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
 	free(cipher);
+
 	return r;
 }

lib/loopaes/loopaes.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * loop-AES compatible volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

lib/luks1/af.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
  * therefore supporting secure data destruction.
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 #include "af.h"
@@ -34,7 +33,7 @@ static void XORblock(const char *src1, const char *src2, char *dst, size_t n)
 {
 	size_t j;
 
-	for(j = 0; j < n; ++j)
+	for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
 		dst[j] = src1[j] ^ src2[j];
 }
 
@@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ static int hash_buf(const char *src, char *dst, uint32_t iv,
 	char *iv_char = (char *)&iv;
 	int r;
 
-	iv = htonl(iv);
+	iv = be32_to_cpu(iv);
 	if (crypt_hash_init(&hd, hash_name))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -61,34 +60,38 @@ out:
 	return r;
 }
 
-/* diffuse: Information spreading over the whole dataset with
+/*
+ * diffuse: Information spreading over the whole dataset with
  * the help of hash function.
  */
-
 static int diffuse(char *src, char *dst, size_t size, const char *hash_name)
 {
-	int hash_size = crypt_hash_size(hash_name);
+	int r, hash_size = crypt_hash_size(hash_name);
 	unsigned int digest_size;
 	unsigned int i, blocks, padding;
 
 	if (hash_size <= 0)
-		return 1;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	digest_size = hash_size;
 
 	blocks = size / digest_size;
 	padding = size % digest_size;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++)
-		if(hash_buf(src + digest_size * i,
+	for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+		r = hash_buf(src + digest_size * i,
 			    dst + digest_size * i,
-			    i, (size_t)digest_size, hash_name))
-			return 1;
+			    i, (size_t)digest_size, hash_name);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
 
-	if(padding)
-		if(hash_buf(src + digest_size * i,
+	if (padding) {
+		r = hash_buf(src + digest_size * i,
 			    dst + digest_size * i,
-			    i, (size_t)padding, hash_name))
-			return 1;
+			    i, (size_t)padding, hash_name);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -98,53 +101,57 @@ static int diffuse(char *src, char *dst, size_t size, const char *hash_name)
  * blocknumbers. The same blocksize and blocknumbers values
  * must be supplied to AF_merge to recover information.
  */
-
-int AF_split(const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize,
-	     unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash)
+int AF_split(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *src, char *dst,
+	     size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 	char *bufblock;
-	int r = -EINVAL;
+	int r;
 
-	if((bufblock = calloc(blocksize, 1)) == NULL) return -ENOMEM;
+	bufblock = crypt_safe_alloc(blocksize);
+	if (!bufblock)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* process everything except the last block */
-	for(i=0; i<blocknumbers-1; i++) {
-		r = crypt_random_get(NULL, dst+(blocksize*i), blocksize, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
-		if(r < 0) goto out;
+	for (i = 0; i < blocknumbers - 1; i++) {
+		r = crypt_random_get(ctx, dst + blocksize * i, blocksize, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
 
-		XORblock(dst+(blocksize*i),bufblock,bufblock,blocksize);
-		if(diffuse(bufblock, bufblock, blocksize, hash))
+		XORblock(dst + blocksize * i, bufblock, bufblock, blocksize);
+		r = diffuse(bufblock, bufblock, blocksize, hash);
+		if (r < 0)
 			goto out;
 	}
 	/* the last block is computed */
-	XORblock(src,bufblock,dst+(i*blocksize),blocksize);
+	XORblock(src, bufblock, dst + blocksize * i, blocksize);
 	r = 0;
 out:
-	free(bufblock);
+	crypt_safe_free(bufblock);
 	return r;
 }
 
-int AF_merge(const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize,
-	     unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash)
+int AF_merge(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)), const char *src, char *dst,
+	     size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 	char *bufblock;
-	int r = -EINVAL;
+	int r;
 
-	if((bufblock = calloc(blocksize, 1)) == NULL)
+	bufblock = crypt_safe_alloc(blocksize);
+	if (!bufblock)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	memset(bufblock,0,blocksize);
-	for(i=0; i<blocknumbers-1; i++) {
-		XORblock(src+(blocksize*i),bufblock,bufblock,blocksize);
-		if(diffuse(bufblock, bufblock, blocksize, hash))
+	for(i = 0; i < blocknumbers - 1; i++) {
+		XORblock(src + blocksize * i, bufblock, bufblock, blocksize);
+		r = diffuse(bufblock, bufblock, blocksize, hash);
+		if (r < 0)
 			goto out;
 	}
 	XORblock(src + blocksize * i, bufblock, dst, blocksize);
 	r = 0;
 out:
-	free(bufblock);
+	crypt_safe_free(bufblock);
 	return r;
 }
 

lib/luks1/af.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
  * therefore supporting secure data destruction.
@@ -39,8 +39,10 @@
  * On error, both functions return -1, 0 otherwise.
  */
 
-int AF_split(const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
-int AF_merge(const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
+int AF_split(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *src, char *dst,
+	     size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
+int AF_merge(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *src, char *dst, size_t blocksize,
+	     unsigned int blocknumbers, const char *hash);
 size_t AF_split_sectors(size_t blocksize, unsigned int blocknumbers);
 
 int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(

lib/luks1/keyencryption.c

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
 #include "luks.h"
 #include "af.h"
 #include "internal.h"
@@ -57,25 +57,15 @@ static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 	char name[PATH_MAX], path[PATH_MAX];
 	char cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN * 3];
 	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
-		.target = DM_CRYPT,
-		.uuid   = NULL,
-		.flags  = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE,
-		.data_device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx),
-		.u.crypt = {
-			.cipher = cipher_spec,
-			.vk     = vk,
-			.offset = sector,
-			.iv_offset = 0,
-			.sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE,
-		}
+		.flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE,
 	};
-	int r, devfd = -1;
+	int r, devfd = -1, remove_dev = 0;
 	size_t bsize, keyslot_alignment, alignment;
 
-	log_dbg("Using dmcrypt to access keyslot area.");
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Using dmcrypt to access keyslot area.");
 
-	bsize = device_block_size(dmd.data_device);
-	alignment = device_alignment(dmd.data_device);
+	bsize = device_block_size(ctx, crypt_metadata_device(ctx));
+	alignment = device_alignment(crypt_metadata_device(ctx));
 	if (!bsize || !alignment)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -95,27 +85,35 @@ static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 	if (snprintf(cipher_spec, sizeof(cipher_spec), "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	r = device_block_adjust(ctx, dmd.data_device, DEV_OK,
-				dmd.u.crypt.offset, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
+	r = device_block_adjust(ctx, crypt_metadata_device(ctx), DEV_OK,
+				sector, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
 	if (r < 0) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s doesn't exist or access denied."),
-			device_path(dmd.data_device));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s does not exist or access denied."),
+			device_path(crypt_metadata_device(ctx)));
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
 	if (mode != O_RDONLY && dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
-			device_path(dmd.data_device));
+			device_path(crypt_metadata_device(ctx)));
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-	r = dm_create_device(ctx, name, "TEMP", &dmd, 0);
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size,
+			crypt_metadata_device(ctx), vk, cipher_spec, 0, sector,
+			NULL, 0, SECTOR_SIZE);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = dm_create_device(ctx, name, "TEMP", &dmd);
 	if (r < 0) {
 		if (r != -EACCES && r != -ENOTSUP)
-			_error_hint(ctx, device_path(dmd.data_device),
+			_error_hint(ctx, device_path(crypt_metadata_device(ctx)),
 				    cipher, cipher_mode, vk->keylength * 8);
-		return -EIO;
+		r = -EIO;
+		goto out;
 	}
+	remove_dev = 1;
 
 	devfd = open(path, mode | O_DIRECT | O_SYNC);
 	if (devfd == -1) {
@@ -131,9 +129,11 @@ static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 	} else
 		r = 0;
  out:
+	dm_targets_free(ctx, &dmd);
 	if (devfd != -1)
 		close(devfd);
-	dm_remove_device(ctx, name, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE);
+	if (remove_dev)
+		dm_remove_device(ctx, name, CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE);
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -144,20 +144,19 @@ int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 			    unsigned int sector,
 			    struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
-
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
 	struct crypt_storage *s;
-	int devfd = -1, r = 0;
+	int devfd, r = 0;
 
 	/* Only whole sector writes supported */
-	if (srcLength % SECTOR_SIZE)
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(srcLength))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Encrypt buffer */
-	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength, false);
 
 	if (r)
-		log_dbg("Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
 			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
 
 	/* Fallback to old temporary dmcrypt device */
@@ -171,9 +170,9 @@ int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Using userspace crypto wrapper to access keyslot area.");
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Using userspace crypto wrapper to access keyslot area.");
 
-	r = crypt_storage_encrypt(s, 0, srcLength / SECTOR_SIZE, src);
+	r = crypt_storage_encrypt(s, 0, srcLength, src);
 	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
 
 	if (r)
@@ -182,19 +181,21 @@ int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 	r = -EIO;
 
 	/* Write buffer to device */
-	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
+	if (device_is_locked(device))
+		devfd = device_open_locked(ctx, device, O_RDWR);
+	else
+		devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDWR);
 	if (devfd < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device),
 				  device_alignment(device), src, srcLength,
 				  sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
 		goto out;
 
 	r = 0;
 out:
-	if (devfd >= 0)
-		close(devfd);
+	device_sync(ctx, device);
 	if (r)
 		log_err(ctx, _("IO error while encrypting keyslot."));
 
@@ -210,16 +211,17 @@ int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
 {
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
 	struct crypt_storage *s;
-	int devfd = -1, r = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+	int devfd, r = 0;
 
 	/* Only whole sector reads supported */
-	if (dstLength % SECTOR_SIZE)
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(dstLength))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength, false);
 
 	if (r)
-		log_dbg("Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
 			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
 
 	/* Fallback to old temporary dmcrypt device */
@@ -233,32 +235,33 @@ int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Using userspace crypto wrapper to access keyslot area.");
-
-	r = -EIO;
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Using userspace crypto wrapper to access keyslot area.");
 
 	/* Read buffer from device */
-	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
-	if (devfd < 0)
-		goto bad;
+	if (device_is_locked(device))
+		devfd = device_open_locked(ctx, device, O_RDONLY);
+	else
+		devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
+		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
 
-	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device),
 				 device_alignment(device), dst, dstLength,
-				 sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
-		goto bad;
+				 sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0) {
+		if (!fstat(devfd, &st) && (st.st_size < (off_t)dstLength))
+			log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is too small."), device_path(device));
+		else
+			log_err(ctx, _("IO error while decrypting keyslot."));
 
-	close(devfd);
+		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
 
 	/* Decrypt buffer */
-	r = crypt_storage_decrypt(s, 0, dstLength / SECTOR_SIZE, dst);
-	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
-
-	return r;
-bad:
-	if (devfd >= 0)
-		close(devfd);
-
-	log_err(ctx, _("IO error while decrypting keyslot."));
+	r = crypt_storage_decrypt(s, 0, dstLength, dst);
 	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
 
 	return r;

lib/luks1/keymanage.c

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2013-2018, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -37,23 +36,6 @@
 #include "af.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
-/* Get size of struct luks_phdr with all keyslots material space */
-static size_t LUKS_calculate_device_sectors(size_t keyLen)
-{
-	size_t keyslot_sectors, sector;
-	int i;
-
-	keyslot_sectors = AF_split_sectors(keyLen, LUKS_STRIPES);
-	sector = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
-		sector = size_round_up(sector, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE);
-		sector += keyslot_sectors;
-	}
-
-	return sector;
-}
-
 int LUKS_keyslot_area(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
 	uint64_t *offset,
@@ -111,13 +93,13 @@ static int LUKS_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *ctx, const struct luks_ph
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (device_size(device, &dev_sectors)) {
-		log_dbg("Cannot get device size for device %s.", device_path(device));
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Cannot get device size for device %s.", device_path(device));
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
 	dev_sectors >>= SECTOR_SHIFT;
 	hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr);
-	log_dbg("Key length %u, device size %" PRIu64 " sectors, header size %"
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Key length %u, device size %" PRIu64 " sectors, header size %"
 		PRIu64 " sectors.", hdr->keyBytes, dev_sectors, hdr_sectors);
 
 	if (hdr_sectors > dev_sectors) {
@@ -144,7 +126,7 @@ static int LUKS_check_keyslots(struct crypt_device *ctx, const struct luks_phdr
 	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
 		/* enforce stripes == 4000 */
 		if (phdr->keyblock[i].stripes != LUKS_STRIPES) {
-			log_dbg("Invalid stripes count %u in keyslot %u.",
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Invalid stripes count %u in keyslot %u.",
 				phdr->keyblock[i].stripes, i);
 			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
 			return -1;
@@ -152,7 +134,7 @@ static int LUKS_check_keyslots(struct crypt_device *ctx, const struct luks_phdr
 
 		/* First sectors is the header itself */
 		if (phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < sizeof(*phdr)) {
-			log_dbg("Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u.",
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u.",
 				phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset, i);
 			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
 			return -1;
@@ -163,7 +145,7 @@ static int LUKS_check_keyslots(struct crypt_device *ctx, const struct luks_phdr
 			continue;
 
 		if (phdr->payloadOffset <= phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset) {
-			log_dbg("Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
 				phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset, i,
 				phdr->payloadOffset);
 			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), i);
@@ -171,7 +153,7 @@ static int LUKS_check_keyslots(struct crypt_device *ctx, const struct luks_phdr
 		}
 
 		if (phdr->payloadOffset < (phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset + secs_per_stripes)) {
-			log_dbg("Invalid keyslot size %u (offset %u, stripes %u) in "
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Invalid keyslot size %u (offset %u, stripes %u) in "
 				"keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
 				secs_per_stripes,
 				phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset,
@@ -188,7 +170,7 @@ static int LUKS_check_keyslots(struct crypt_device *ctx, const struct luks_phdr
 		next = sorted_areas[i];
 		if (phdr->keyblock[next].keyMaterialOffset <
 		    (phdr->keyblock[prev].keyMaterialOffset + secs_per_stripes)) {
-			log_dbg("Not enough space in LUKS keyslot %d.", prev);
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Not enough space in LUKS keyslot %d.", prev);
 			log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid."), prev);
 			return -1;
 		}
@@ -217,9 +199,10 @@ int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
 	struct luks_phdr hdr;
-	int r = 0, devfd = -1;
+	int fd, devfd, r = 0;
 	size_t hdr_size;
 	size_t buffer_size;
+	ssize_t ret;
 	char *buffer = NULL;
 
 	r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
@@ -235,31 +218,30 @@ int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes).",
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes).",
 		sizeof(hdr), hdr_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
 
-	log_dbg("Output backup file size: %zu bytes.", buffer_size);
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Output backup file size: %zu bytes.", buffer_size);
 
-	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
+	devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDONLY);
 	if (devfd < 0) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), device_path(device));
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device),
-			   buffer, hdr_size) < (ssize_t)hdr_size) {
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device), device_alignment(device),
+			   buffer, hdr_size, 0) < (ssize_t)hdr_size) {
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	close(devfd);
 
 	/* Wipe unused area, so backup cannot contain old signatures */
 	if (hdr.keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE == LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS)
 		memset(buffer + sizeof(hdr), 0, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS - sizeof(hdr));
 
-	devfd = open(backup_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR);
-	if (devfd == -1) {
+	fd = open(backup_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR);
+	if (fd == -1) {
 		if (errno == EEXIST)
 			log_err(ctx, _("Requested header backup file %s already exists."), backup_file);
 		else
@@ -267,7 +249,9 @@ int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (write_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < (ssize_t)buffer_size) {
+	ret = write_buffer(fd, buffer, buffer_size);
+	close(fd);
+	if (ret < (ssize_t)buffer_size) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write header backup file %s."), backup_file);
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
@@ -275,9 +259,7 @@ int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 
 	r = 0;
 out:
-	if (devfd >= 0)
-		close(devfd);
-	crypt_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+	crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
 	crypt_safe_free(buffer);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -288,8 +270,8 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 	struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
-	int r = 0, devfd = -1, diff_uuid = 0;
-	ssize_t buffer_size = 0;
+	int fd, r = 0, devfd = -1, diff_uuid = 0;
+	ssize_t ret, buffer_size = 0;
 	char *buffer = NULL, msg[200];
 	struct luks_phdr hdr_file;
 
@@ -301,7 +283,7 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 		buffer_size = LUKS_device_sectors(&hdr_file) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
 
 	if (r || buffer_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header."));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Backup file does not contain valid LUKS header."));
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -312,24 +294,24 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY);
-	if (devfd == -1) {
+	fd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd == -1) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s."), backup_file);
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (read_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+	ret = read_buffer(fd, buffer, buffer_size);
+	close(fd);
+	if (ret < buffer_size) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot read header backup file %s."), backup_file);
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	close(devfd);
-	devfd = -1;
 
 	r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 0, 0, ctx);
 	if (r == 0) {
-		log_dbg("Device %s already contains LUKS header, checking UUID and offset.", device_path(device));
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Device %s already contains LUKS header, checking UUID and offset.", device_path(device));
 		if(hdr->payloadOffset != hdr_file.payloadOffset ||
 		   hdr->keyBytes != hdr_file.keyBytes) {
 			log_err(ctx, _("Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed."));
@@ -353,10 +335,10 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes) to device %s.",
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes) to device %s.",
 		sizeof(*hdr), buffer_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS, device_path(device));
 
-	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
+	devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDWR);
 	if (devfd < 0) {
 		if (errno == EACCES)
 			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
@@ -367,19 +349,16 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device),
-			    buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device), device_alignment(device),
+			    buffer, buffer_size, 0) < buffer_size) {
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	close(devfd);
-	devfd = -1;
 
 	/* Be sure to reload new data */
 	r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
 out:
-	if (devfd >= 0)
-		close(devfd);
+	device_sync(ctx, device);
 	crypt_safe_free(buffer);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -396,8 +375,13 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 		log_err(ctx, _("Non standard key size, manual repair required."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	/* cryptsetup 1.0 did not align to 4k, cannot repair this one */
-	if (LUKS_keyslots_offset(phdr) < (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
+
+	/*
+	 * cryptsetup 1.0 did not align keyslots to 4k, cannot repair this one
+	 * Also we cannot trust possibly broken keyslots metadata here through LUKS_keyslots_offset().
+	 * Expect first keyslot is aligned, if not, then manual repair is neccessary.
+	 */
+	if (phdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset < (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -407,22 +391,23 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(phdr->keyBytes, NULL);
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	log_verbose(ctx, _("Repairing keyslots."));
 
-	log_dbg("Generating second header with the same parameters for check.");
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Generating second header with the same parameters for check.");
 	/* cipherName, cipherMode, hashSpec, uuid are already null terminated */
 	/* payloadOffset - cannot check */
 	r = LUKS_generate_phdr(&temp_phdr, vk, phdr->cipherName, phdr->cipherMode,
-			       phdr->hashSpec,phdr->uuid, LUKS_STRIPES,
-			       phdr->payloadOffset, 0,
-			       1, ctx);
+			       phdr->hashSpec, phdr->uuid,
+			       phdr->payloadOffset * SECTOR_SIZE, 0, 0, ctx);
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
 
 	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) {
 		if (phdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)  {
-			log_dbg("Skipping repair for active keyslot %i.", i);
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Skipping repair for active keyslot %i.", i);
 			continue;
 		}
 
@@ -474,7 +459,7 @@ out:
 	if (r)
 		log_err(ctx, _("Repair failed."));
 	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
-	crypt_memzero(&temp_phdr, sizeof(temp_phdr));
+	crypt_safe_memzero(&temp_phdr, sizeof(temp_phdr));
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -489,7 +474,7 @@ static int _check_and_convert_hdr(const char *device,
 	char luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
 
 	if(memcmp(hdr->magic, luksMagic, LUKS_MAGIC_L)) { /* Check magic */
-		log_dbg("LUKS header not detected.");
+		log_dbg(ctx, "LUKS header not detected.");
 		if (require_luks_device)
 			log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device."), device);
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -563,7 +548,7 @@ int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(const char *backup_file,
 	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr);
 	int devfd = 0, r = 0;
 
-	log_dbg("Reading LUKS header of size %d from backup file %s",
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Reading LUKS header of size %d from backup file %s",
 		(int)hdr_size, backup_file);
 
 	devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY);
@@ -589,9 +574,9 @@ int LUKS_read_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 		   int repair,
 		   struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
+	int devfd, r = 0;
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
 	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr);
-	int devfd = 0, r = 0;
 
 	/* LUKS header starts at offset 0, first keyslot on LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS */
 	assert(sizeof(struct luks_phdr) <= LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
@@ -602,17 +587,17 @@ int LUKS_read_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	if (repair && !require_luks_device)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	log_dbg("Reading LUKS header of size %zu from device %s",
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Reading LUKS header of size %zu from device %s",
 		hdr_size, device_path(device));
 
-	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
+	devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDONLY);
 	if (devfd < 0) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device),
-			   hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device), device_alignment(device),
+			   hdr, hdr_size, 0) < hdr_size)
 		r = -EIO;
 	else
 		r = _check_and_convert_hdr(device_path(device), hdr, require_luks_device,
@@ -627,11 +612,10 @@ int LUKS_read_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	 * has bigger sector size.
 	 */
 	if (!r && hdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
-		log_dbg("Old unaligned LUKS keyslot detected, disabling direct-io.");
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Old unaligned LUKS keyslot detected, disabling direct-io.");
 		device_disable_direct_io(device);
 	}
 
-	close(devfd);
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -645,14 +629,14 @@ int LUKS_write_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	struct luks_phdr convHdr;
 	int r;
 
-	log_dbg("Updating LUKS header of size %zu on device %s",
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Updating LUKS header of size %zu on device %s",
 		sizeof(struct luks_phdr), device_path(device));
 
 	r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr, 1);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
-	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
+	devfd = device_open(ctx, device, O_RDWR);
 	if (devfd < 0) {
 		if (errno == EACCES)
 			log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied."),
@@ -677,11 +661,12 @@ int LUKS_write_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 		convHdr.keyblock[i].stripes            = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].stripes);
 	}
 
-	r = write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device),
-			    &convHdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size ? -EIO : 0;
+	r = write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(ctx, device), device_alignment(device),
+			    &convHdr, hdr_size, 0) < hdr_size ? -EIO : 0;
 	if (r)
 		log_err(ctx, _("Error during update of LUKS header on device %s."), device_path(device));
-	close(devfd);
+
+	device_sync(ctx, device);
 
 	/* Re-read header from disk to be sure that in-memory and on-disk data are the same. */
 	if (!r) {
@@ -701,7 +686,7 @@ int LUKS_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *ctx, size_t keylength, const char *ci
 	struct volume_key *empty_key;
 	char buf[SECTOR_SIZE];
 
-	log_dbg("Checking if cipher %s-%s is usable.", cipher, cipher_mode);
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Checking if cipher %s-%s is usable.", cipher, cipher_mode);
 
 	empty_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(keylength, NULL);
 	if (!empty_key)
@@ -713,35 +698,58 @@ int LUKS_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *ctx, size_t keylength, const char *ci
 		r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(buf, sizeof(buf), cipher, cipher_mode, empty_key, 0, ctx);
 
 	crypt_free_volume_key(empty_key);
-	crypt_memzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	crypt_safe_memzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
 	return r;
 }
 
 int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
-		       const struct volume_key *vk,
-		       const char *cipherName, const char *cipherMode, const char *hashSpec,
-		       const char *uuid, unsigned int stripes,
-		       unsigned int alignPayload,
-		       unsigned int alignOffset,
-		       int detached_metadata_device,
-		       struct crypt_device *ctx)
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	const char *cipherName,
+	const char *cipherMode,
+	const char *hashSpec,
+	const char *uuid,
+	uint64_t data_offset,        /* in bytes */
+	uint64_t align_offset,       /* in bytes */
+	uint64_t required_alignment, /* in bytes */
+	struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
-	unsigned int i = 0, hdr_sectors = LUKS_calculate_device_sectors(vk->keylength);
-	size_t blocksPerStripeSet, currentSector;
-	int r;
+	int i, r;
+	size_t keyslot_sectors, header_sectors;
 	uuid_t partitionUuid;
 	struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
 	double PBKDF2_temp;
 	char luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
 
-	/* For separate metadata device allow zero alignment */
-	if (alignPayload == 0 && !detached_metadata_device)
-		alignPayload = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT / SECTOR_SIZE;
+	if (data_offset % SECTOR_SIZE || align_offset % SECTOR_SIZE ||
+	    required_alignment % SECTOR_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (alignPayload && detached_metadata_device && alignPayload < hdr_sectors) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Data offset for detached LUKS header must be "
-			       "either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors)."),
-			       hdr_sectors);
+	memset(header, 0, sizeof(struct luks_phdr));
+
+	keyslot_sectors = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, LUKS_STRIPES);
+	header_sectors = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		header->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
+		header->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = header_sectors;
+		header->keyblock[i].stripes = LUKS_STRIPES;
+		header_sectors = size_round_up(header_sectors + keyslot_sectors,
+					       LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE);
+	}
+	/* In sector is now size of all keyslot material space */
+
+	/* Data offset has priority */
+	if (data_offset)
+		header->payloadOffset = data_offset / SECTOR_SIZE;
+	else if (required_alignment) {
+		header->payloadOffset = size_round_up(header_sectors, (required_alignment / SECTOR_SIZE));
+		header->payloadOffset += (align_offset / SECTOR_SIZE);
+	} else
+		header->payloadOffset = 0;
+
+	if (header->payloadOffset && header->payloadOffset < header_sectors) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Data offset for LUKS header must be "
+			       "either 0 or higher than header size."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -757,8 +765,6 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 	if (!uuid)
 		uuid_generate(partitionUuid);
 
-	memset(header,0,sizeof(struct luks_phdr));
-
 	/* Set Magic */
 	memcpy(header->magic,luksMagic,LUKS_MAGIC_L);
 	header->version=1;
@@ -770,7 +776,7 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 
 	LUKS_fix_header_compatible(header);
 
-	log_dbg("Generating LUKS header version %d using hash %s, %s, %s, MK %d bytes",
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Generating LUKS header version %d using hash %s, %s, %s, MK %d bytes",
 		header->version, header->hashSpec ,header->cipherName, header->cipherMode,
 		header->keyBytes);
 
@@ -787,43 +793,29 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 		return r;
 	assert(pbkdf->iterations);
 
-	PBKDF2_temp = (double)pbkdf->iterations * LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS / pbkdf->time_ms;
+	if (pbkdf->flags & CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK && pbkdf->time_ms == 0)
+		PBKDF2_temp = LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN;
+	else	/* iterations per ms * LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS */
+		PBKDF2_temp = (double)pbkdf->iterations * LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS / pbkdf->time_ms;
+
 	if (PBKDF2_temp > (double)UINT32_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	header->mkDigestIterations = at_least((uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp, LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN);
+	assert(header->mkDigestIterations);
 
 	r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, header->hashSpec, vk->key,vk->keylength,
 			header->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
 			header->mkDigest,LUKS_DIGESTSIZE,
 			header->mkDigestIterations, 0, 0);
-	if(r < 0) {
+	if (r < 0) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s)."),
 			header->hashSpec);
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	currentSector = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE;
-	blocksPerStripeSet = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, stripes);
-	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) {
-		header->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
-		header->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = currentSector;
-		header->keyblock[i].stripes = stripes;
-		currentSector = size_round_up(currentSector + blocksPerStripeSet,
-						LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE);
-	}
-
-	if (detached_metadata_device) {
-		/* for separate metadata device use alignPayload directly */
-		header->payloadOffset = alignPayload;
-	} else {
-		/* alignOffset - offset from natural device alignment provided by topology info */
-		currentSector = size_round_up(currentSector, alignPayload);
-		header->payloadOffset = currentSector + alignOffset;
-	}
-
         uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, header->uuid);
 
-	log_dbg("Data offset %d, UUID %s, digest iterations %" PRIu32,
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Data offset %d, UUID %s, digest iterations %" PRIu32,
 		header->payloadOffset, header->uuid, header->mkDigestIterations);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -871,7 +863,7 @@ int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 	         return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Calculating data for key slot %d", keyIndex);
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Calculating data for key slot %d", keyIndex);
 	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf(ctx);
 	r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(ctx, pbkdf, vk->keylength);
 	if (r < 0)
@@ -883,7 +875,7 @@ int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 	 */
 	hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations =
 		at_least(pbkdf->iterations, LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN);
-	log_dbg("Key slot %d use %" PRIu32 " password iterations.", keyIndex,
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Key slot %d use %" PRIu32 " password iterations.", keyIndex,
 		hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
 
 	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
@@ -913,13 +905,13 @@ int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Using hash %s for AF in key slot %d, %d stripes",
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Using hash %s for AF in key slot %d, %d stripes",
 		hdr->hashSpec, keyIndex, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes);
-	r = AF_split(vk->key,AfKey,vk->keylength,hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes,hdr->hashSpec);
+	r = AF_split(ctx, vk->key, AfKey, vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes, hdr->hashSpec);
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	log_dbg("Updating key slot %d [0x%04x] area.", keyIndex,
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Updating key slot %d [0x%04x] area.", keyIndex,
 		hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset << 9);
 	/* Encryption via dm */
 	r = LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(AfKey,
@@ -932,7 +924,7 @@ int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Mark the key as active in phdr */
-	r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, (int)keyIndex, 1);
+	r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, (int)keyIndex, 1, ctx);
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -970,16 +962,16 @@ static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 		  const char *password,
 		  size_t passwordLen,
 		  struct luks_phdr *hdr,
-		  struct volume_key *vk,
+		  struct volume_key **vk,
 		  struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
 	crypt_keyslot_info ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(hdr, keyIndex);
 	struct volume_key *derived_key;
-	char *AfKey;
+	char *AfKey = NULL;
 	size_t AFEKSize;
 	int r;
 
-	log_dbg("Trying to open key slot %d [%s].", keyIndex,
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Trying to open key slot %d [%s].", keyIndex,
 		dbg_slot_state(ki));
 
 	if (ki < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
@@ -989,8 +981,13 @@ static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 	if (!derived_key)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	assert(vk->keylength == hdr->keyBytes);
-	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
+	if (!*vk) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes) * SECTOR_SIZE;
 	AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
 	if (!AfKey) {
 		r = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1001,10 +998,12 @@ static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
 			derived_key->key, hdr->keyBytes,
 			hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations, 0, 0);
-	if (r < 0)
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open keyslot (using hash %s)."), hdr->hashSpec);
 		goto out;
+	}
 
-	log_dbg("Reading key slot %d area.", keyIndex);
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Reading key slot %d area.", keyIndex);
 	r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(AfKey,
 				      AFEKSize,
 				      hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode,
@@ -1014,16 +1013,20 @@ static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	r = AF_merge(AfKey,vk->key,vk->keylength,hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes,hdr->hashSpec);
+	r = AF_merge(ctx, AfKey, (*vk)->key, (*vk)->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes, hdr->hashSpec);
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(hdr, vk);
+	r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(hdr, *vk);
 
 	/* Allow only empty passphrase with null cipher */
-	if (!r && !strcmp(hdr->cipherName, "cipher_null") && passwordLen)
+	if (!r && crypt_is_cipher_null(hdr->cipherName) && passwordLen)
 		r = -EPERM;
 out:
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
+		*vk = NULL;
+	}
 	crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
 	crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
 	return r;
@@ -1036,28 +1039,28 @@ int LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(int keyIndex,
 			   struct volume_key **vk,
 			   struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
-	unsigned int i;
+	unsigned int i, tried = 0;
 	int r;
 
-	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
-
 	if (keyIndex >= 0) {
-		r = LUKS_open_key(keyIndex, password, passwordLen, hdr, *vk, ctx);
+		r = LUKS_open_key(keyIndex, password, passwordLen, hdr, vk, ctx);
 		return (r < 0) ? r : keyIndex;
 	}
 
-	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
-		r = LUKS_open_key(i, password, passwordLen, hdr, *vk, ctx);
-		if(r == 0)
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		r = LUKS_open_key(i, password, passwordLen, hdr, vk, ctx);
+		if (r == 0)
 			return i;
 
 		/* Do not retry for errors that are no -EPERM or -ENOENT,
 		   former meaning password wrong, latter key slot inactive */
 		if ((r != -EPERM) && (r != -ENOENT))
 			return r;
+		if (r == -EPERM)
+			tried++;
 	}
 	/* Warning, early returns above */
-	return -EPERM;
+	return tried ? -EPERM : -ENOENT;
 }
 
 int LUKS_del_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
@@ -1072,7 +1075,7 @@ int LUKS_del_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
-	r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, keyIndex, 0);
+	r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, keyIndex, 0, ctx);
 	if (r) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d."),
 			keyIndex, LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1);
@@ -1151,7 +1154,7 @@ int LUKS_keyslot_active_count(struct luks_phdr *hdr)
 	return num;
 }
 
-int LUKS_keyslot_set(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, int enable)
+int LUKS_keyslot_set(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, int enable, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
 	crypt_keyslot_info ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot);
 
@@ -1159,7 +1162,7 @@ int LUKS_keyslot_set(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, int enable)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	hdr->keyblock[keyslot].active = enable ? LUKS_KEY_ENABLED : LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
-	log_dbg("Key slot %d was %s in LUKS header.", keyslot, enable ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Key slot %d was %s in LUKS header.", keyslot, enable ? "enabled" : "disabled");
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1169,40 +1172,87 @@ int LUKS1_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		   uint32_t flags)
 {
 	int r;
-	char *dm_cipher = NULL;
-	enum devcheck device_check;
 	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
-		.target = DM_CRYPT,
-		.uuid   = crypt_get_uuid(cd),
-		.flags  = flags,
-		.size   = 0,
-		.data_device = crypt_data_device(cd),
-		.u.crypt = {
-			.cipher = NULL,
-			.vk     = vk,
-			.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
-			.iv_offset = 0,
-			.sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd),
-		}
+		.flags = flags,
+		.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd),
 	};
 
-	if (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED)
-		device_check = DEV_SHARED;
-	else
-		device_check = DEV_EXCL;
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+			vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd), crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+			crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+	if (!r)
+		r = create_or_reload_device(cd, name, CRYPT_LUKS1, &dmd);
 
-	r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmd.data_device, device_check,
-				 dmd.u.crypt.offset, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
-	if (r)
-		return r;
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
 
-	r = asprintf(&dm_cipher, "%s-%s", crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
-	if (r < 0)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	dmd.u.crypt.cipher = dm_cipher;
-	r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_LUKS1, &dmd, 0);
-
-	free(dm_cipher);
 	return r;
 }
+
+int LUKS_wipe_header_areas(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	int i, r;
+	uint64_t offset, length;
+	size_t wipe_block;
+
+	/* Wipe complete header, keyslots and padding areas with zeroes. */
+	offset = 0;
+	length = (uint64_t)hdr->payloadOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	wipe_block = 1024 * 1024;
+
+	/* On detached header or bogus header, wipe at least the first 4k */
+	if (length == 0 || length > (LUKS_MAX_KEYSLOT_SIZE * LUKS_NUMKEYS)) {
+		length = 4096;
+		wipe_block = 4096;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(ctx, "Wiping LUKS areas (0x%06" PRIx64 " - 0x%06" PRIx64") with zeroes.",
+		offset, length + offset);
+
+	r = crypt_wipe_device(ctx, crypt_metadata_device(ctx), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,
+			      offset, length, wipe_block, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Wipe keyslots areas */
+	wipe_block = 1024 * 1024;
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		r = LUKS_keyslot_area(hdr, i, &offset, &length);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+
+		/* Ignore too big LUKS1 keyslots here */
+		if (length > LUKS_MAX_KEYSLOT_SIZE ||
+		    offset > (LUKS_MAX_KEYSLOT_SIZE - length))
+			continue;
+
+		if (length == 0 || offset < 4096)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Wiping keyslot %i area (0x%06" PRIx64 " - 0x%06" PRIx64") with random data.",
+			i, offset, length + offset);
+
+		r = crypt_wipe_device(ctx, crypt_metadata_device(ctx), CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM,
+				offset, length, wipe_block, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS_keyslot_pbkdf(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
+{
+	if (LUKS_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	pbkdf->type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2;
+	pbkdf->hash = hdr->hashSpec;
+	pbkdf->iterations = hdr->keyblock[keyslot].passwordIterations;
+	pbkdf->max_memory_kb = 0;
+	pbkdf->parallel_threads = 0;
+	pbkdf->time_ms = 0;
+	pbkdf->flags = 0;
+	return 0;
+}

lib/luks1/luks.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@
 /* Offset to keyslot area [in bytes] */
 #define LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS 4096
 
+/* Maximal LUKS header size, for wipe [in bytes] */
+#define LUKS_MAX_KEYSLOT_SIZE 0x1000000 /* 16 MB, up to 32768 bits key */
+
 /* Any integer values are stored in network byte order on disk and must be
 converted */
 
@@ -104,17 +107,15 @@ int LUKS_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *ctx,
 		      const char *cipher,
 		      const char *cipher_mode);
 
-int LUKS_generate_phdr(
-	struct luks_phdr *header,
+int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 	const struct volume_key *vk,
 	const char *cipherName,
 	const char *cipherMode,
 	const char *hashSpec,
 	const char *uuid,
-	unsigned int stripes,
-	unsigned int alignPayload,
-	unsigned int alignOffset,
-	int detached_metadata_device,
+	uint64_t data_offset,
+	uint64_t align_offset,
+	uint64_t required_alignment,
 	struct crypt_device *ctx);
 
 int LUKS_read_phdr(
@@ -168,16 +169,22 @@ int LUKS_del_key(
 	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	struct crypt_device *ctx);
 
+int LUKS_wipe_header_areas(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+	struct crypt_device *ctx);
+
 crypt_keyslot_info LUKS_keyslot_info(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot);
 int LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks_phdr *hdr);
 int LUKS_keyslot_active_count(struct luks_phdr *hdr);
-int LUKS_keyslot_set(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, int enable);
+int LUKS_keyslot_set(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, int enable,
+		     struct crypt_device *ctx);
 int LUKS_keyslot_area(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
 	uint64_t *offset,
 	uint64_t *length);
 size_t LUKS_device_sectors(const struct luks_phdr *hdr);
 size_t LUKS_keyslots_offset(const struct luks_phdr *hdr);
+int LUKS_keyslot_pbkdf(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot,
+		       struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf);
 
 int LUKS1_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		   const char *name,

lib/luks2/luks2.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@
 #ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_ONDISK_H
 #define _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_ONDISK_H
 
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
 #include "libcryptsetup.h"
 
 #define LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST "LUKS\xba\xbe"
@@ -35,6 +39,7 @@
 
 #define LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX       32
 #define LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX         32
+#define LUKS2_SEGMENT_MAX        32
 
 #define LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX "luks2-"
 #define LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN 6
@@ -44,11 +49,23 @@
 #define LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX 8
 
 #define CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT -1
-#define CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT 0
-#define CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT_STR "0"
+#define CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT -2
+#define CRYPT_ONE_SEGMENT -3
 
 #define CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST -1
 
+/* 20 MiBs */
+#define LUKS2_DEFAULT_NONE_REENCRYPTION_LENGTH 0x1400000
+
+/* 1 GiB */
+#define LUKS2_REENCRYPT_MAX_HOTZONE_LENGTH 0x40000000
+
+struct device;
+struct luks2_reencrypt;
+struct crypt_lock_handle;
+struct crypt_dm_active_device;
+struct luks_phdr; /* LUKS1 for conversion */
+
 /*
  * LUKS2 header on-disk.
  *
@@ -83,7 +100,6 @@ struct luks2_hdr_disk {
 /*
  * LUKS2 header in-memory.
  */
-typedef struct json_object json_object;
 struct luks2_hdr {
 	size_t		hdr_size;
 	uint64_t	seqid;
@@ -94,7 +110,7 @@ struct luks2_hdr {
 	uint8_t		salt1[LUKS2_SALT_L];
 	uint8_t		salt2[LUKS2_SALT_L];
 	char		uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L];
-	json_object	*jobj;
+	void		*jobj;
 };
 
 struct luks2_keyslot_params {
@@ -124,19 +140,23 @@ struct luks2_keyslot_params {
 
 #define LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN sizeof(struct luks2_hdr_disk)
 
-#define LUKS2_HDR_DEFAULT_LEN 0x400000 /* 4 MiB */
+//#define LUKS2_DEFAULT_HDR_SIZE 0x400000  /* 4 MiB */
+#define LUKS2_DEFAULT_HDR_SIZE 0x1000000 /* 16 MiB */
 
 #define LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE 0x8000000 /* 128 MiB */
 
+#define LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX 0x400000 /* 4 MiB */
+
 /* Offsets for secondary header (for scan if primary header is corrupted). */
 #define LUKS2_HDR2_OFFSETS { 0x04000, 0x008000, 0x010000, 0x020000, \
-                             0x40000, 0x080000, 0x100000, 0x200000, 0x400000 }
+                             0x40000, 0x080000, 0x100000, 0x200000, LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX }
 
 int LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *backup_file);
 
 int LUKS2_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int repair);
 int LUKS2_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_hdr_write_force(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
 int LUKS2_hdr_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
 
 int LUKS2_hdr_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -149,7 +169,7 @@ int LUKS2_hdr_labels(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *subsystem,
 	int commit);
 
-void LUKS2_hdr_free(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+void LUKS2_hdr_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
 
 int LUKS2_hdr_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
@@ -158,10 +178,11 @@ int LUKS2_hdr_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		      struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 		      const char *backup_file);
 
-uint64_t LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(json_object *jobj);
-uint64_t LUKS2_keyslots_size(json_object *jobj);
+uint64_t LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+uint64_t LUKS2_keyslots_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+uint64_t LUKS2_metadata_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
 
-int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cipher_spec);
 
 /*
  * Generic LUKS2 keyslot
@@ -173,6 +194,13 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t password_len,
 	struct volume_key **vk);
 
+int LUKS2_keyslot_open_all_segments(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot_old,
+	int keyslot_new,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vks);
+
 int LUKS2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
@@ -186,9 +214,6 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
 	int wipe_area_only);
 
-int LUKS2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	int keyslot);
-
 crypt_keyslot_priority LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot);
@@ -219,6 +244,12 @@ int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
 	int token);
 
+int LUKS2_token_assignment_copy(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			int keyslot_from,
+			int keyslot_to,
+			int commit);
+
 int LUKS2_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int token,
@@ -255,31 +286,23 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate_any(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *name,
 	uint32_t flags);
 
-int LUKS2_tokens_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
-
 /*
  * Generic LUKS2 digest
  */
-int LUKS2_digest_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	int segment);
+int LUKS2_digest_any_matching(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		const struct volume_key *vk);
 
 int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int segment,
 	const struct volume_key *vk);
 
-void LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
-
 int LUKS2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	struct volume_key *vk,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
 	int keyslot);
 
-int LUKS2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	int digest);
-
 int LUKS2_digest_assign(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
@@ -294,9 +317,9 @@ int LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int assign,
 	int commit);
 
-int LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	int keyslot);
+int LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_by_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
 
 int LUKS2_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *type,
@@ -311,11 +334,17 @@ int LUKS2_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct volume_key *vk,
 	uint32_t flags);
 
-int LUKS2_keyslot_luks2_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+int LUKS2_activate_multi(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	struct volume_key *vks,
+	uint64_t device_size,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+int LUKS2_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	int keyslot,
-	const char *cipher,
-	size_t keylength);
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+	uint32_t flags);
 
 int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
 	struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -326,28 +355,37 @@ int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
 	const char *integrity,
 	const char *uuid,
 	unsigned int sector_size,
-	unsigned int alignPayload,
-	unsigned int alignOffset,
-	int detached_metadata_device);
+	uint64_t data_offset,
+	uint64_t align_offset,
+	uint64_t required_alignment,
+	uint64_t metadata_size,
+	uint64_t keyslots_size);
+
+int LUKS2_check_metadata_area_size(uint64_t metadata_size);
+int LUKS2_check_keyslots_area_size(uint64_t keyslots_size);
+
+int LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr, bool detached_header);
 
 uint64_t LUKS2_get_data_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_get_data_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint64_t *size, bool *dynamic);
 int LUKS2_get_sector_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
 const char *LUKS2_get_cipher(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
 const char *LUKS2_get_integrity(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
 int LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	size_t key_size, struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
-int LUKS2_get_keyslot_params(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot,
-	struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
+	 struct luks2_keyslot_params *params);
 int LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
-int LUKS2_get_keyslot_key_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
-int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type);
+int LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
+const char *LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, size_t *key_size);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
 int LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
-int LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment);
 crypt_keyslot_info LUKS2_keyslot_info(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot);
 int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
 	uint64_t *offset,
 	uint64_t *length);
+int LUKS2_keyslot_pbkdf(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf);
+
 /*
  * Permanent activation flags stored in header
  */
@@ -358,7 +396,9 @@ int LUKS2_config_set_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint3
  * Requirements for device activation or header modification
  */
 int LUKS2_config_get_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t *reqs);
-int LUKS2_config_set_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs);
+int LUKS2_config_set_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs, bool commit);
+
+int LUKS2_config_get_reencrypt_version(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t *version);
 
 int LUKS2_unmet_requirements(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint32_t reqs_mask, int quiet);
 
@@ -366,8 +406,9 @@ int LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int segment);
 int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int keyslot);
+int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int digest);
 
-struct luks_phdr;
 int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			 struct luks_phdr *hdr1,
 			 struct luks2_hdr *hdr2);
@@ -375,4 +416,44 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			 struct luks2_hdr *hdr2,
 			 struct luks_phdr *hdr1);
 
+/*
+ * LUKS2 reencryption
+ */
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_locked_recovery_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot_old,
+	int keyslot_new,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags,
+	struct volume_key **vks);
+
+void LUKS2_reencrypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_reencrypt *rh);
+
+crypt_reencrypt_info LUKS2_reencrypt_status(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+crypt_reencrypt_info LUKS2_reencrypt_get_params(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
+
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_lock(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct crypt_lock_handle **reencrypt_lock);
+
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_lock_by_dm_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *dm_uuid,
+	struct crypt_lock_handle **reencrypt_lock);
+
+void LUKS2_reencrypt_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock);
+
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	uint64_t check_size,
+	uint64_t *dev_size,
+	bool activation,
+	bool dynamic);
+
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vks);
+
 #endif

lib/luks2/luks2_digest.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, digest handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static const digest_handler *digest_handlers[LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX] = {
 	NULL
 };
 
-const digest_handler *LUKS2_digest_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+static const digest_handler *LUKS2_digest_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
 {
 	int i;
 
@@ -86,14 +86,12 @@ int LUKS2_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (digest < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	log_dbg("Creating new digest %d (%s).", digest, type);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Creating new digest %d (%s).", digest, type);
 
 	return dh->store(cd, digest, vk->key, vk->keylength) ?: digest;
 }
 
-int LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	int keyslot)
+int LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
 {
 	char keyslot_name[16];
 	json_object *jobj_digests, *jobj_digest_keyslots;
@@ -112,32 +110,43 @@ int LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	return -ENOENT;
 }
 
-int LUKS2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	struct volume_key *vk,
-	int keyslot)
+	int digest,
+	const struct volume_key *vk)
 {
 	const digest_handler *h;
-	int digest, r;
+	int r;
 
-	digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, keyslot);
-	if (digest < 0)
-		return digest;
-
-	log_dbg("Verifying key from keyslot %d, digest %d.", keyslot, digest);
 	h = LUKS2_digest_handler(cd, digest);
 	if (!h)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	r = h->verify(cd, digest, vk->key, vk->keylength);
 	if (r < 0) {
-		log_dbg("Digest %d (%s) verify failed with %d.", digest, h->name, r);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Digest %d (%s) verify failed with %d.", digest, h->name, r);
 		return r;
 	}
 
 	return digest;
 }
 
+int LUKS2_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const struct volume_key *vk,
+	int keyslot)
+{
+	int digest;
+
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return digest;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Verifying key from keyslot %d, digest %d.", keyslot, digest);
+
+	return LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, digest, vk);
+}
+
 int LUKS2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
 {
 	const digest_handler *h;
@@ -148,41 +157,36 @@ int LUKS2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
 	return h->dump(cd, digest);
 }
 
+int LUKS2_digest_any_matching(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		const struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	int digest;
+
+	for (digest = 0; digest < LUKS2_DIGEST_MAX; digest++)
+		if (LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, digest, vk) == digest)
+			return digest;
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
 int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int segment,
 	const struct volume_key *vk)
 {
-	const digest_handler *h;
-	int digest, r;
-
-	digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(cd, hdr, segment);
-	if (digest < 0)
-		return digest;
-
-	log_dbg("Verifying key digest %d.", digest);
-
-	h = LUKS2_digest_handler(cd, digest);
-	if (!h)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	r = h->verify(cd, digest, vk->key, vk->keylength);
-	if (r < 0) {
-		log_dbg("Digest %d (%s) verify failed with %d.", digest, h->name, r);
-		return r;
-	}
-
-	return digest;
+	return LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, segment), vk);
 }
 
 /* FIXME: segment can have more digests */
-int LUKS2_digest_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
-	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	int segment)
+int LUKS2_digest_by_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment)
 {
 	char segment_name[16];
 	json_object *jobj_digests, *jobj_digest_segments;
 
+	if (segment == CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT)
+		segment = LUKS2_get_default_segment(hdr);
+
 	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
 
 	if (snprintf(segment_name, sizeof(segment_name), "%u", segment) < 1)
@@ -205,7 +209,7 @@ static int assign_one_digest(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_digest, *jobj_digest_keyslots;
 	char num[16];
 
-	log_dbg("Keyslot %i %s digest %i.", keyslot, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", digest);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %i %s digest %i.", keyslot, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", digest);
 
 	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest);
 	if (!jobj_digest)
@@ -215,7 +219,9 @@ static int assign_one_digest(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	if (!jobj_digest_keyslots)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
+	if (snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (assign) {
 		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_keyslots, num);
 		if (!jobj1)
@@ -254,13 +260,10 @@ int LUKS2_digest_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
 }
 
-static int assign_one_segment(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-			     int segment, int digest, int assign)
+static int assign_all_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			     int digest, int assign)
 {
 	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_digest, *jobj_digest_segments;
-	char num[16];
-
-	log_dbg("Segment %i %s digest %i.", segment, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", digest);
 
 	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest);
 	if (!jobj_digest)
@@ -270,7 +273,42 @@ static int assign_one_segment(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	if (!jobj_digest_segments)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", segment);
+	if (assign) {
+		json_object_object_foreach(LUKS2_get_segments_jobj(hdr), key, value) {
+			UNUSED(value);
+			jobj1 = LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_segments, key);
+			if (!jobj1)
+				json_object_array_add(jobj_digest_segments, json_object_new_string(key));
+		}
+	} else {
+		jobj1 = json_object_new_array();
+		if (!jobj1)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "segments", jobj1);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int assign_one_segment(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			     int segment, int digest, int assign)
+{
+	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_digest, *jobj_digest_segments;
+	char num[16];
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Segment %i %s digest %i.", segment, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", digest);
+
+	jobj_digest = LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(hdr, digest);
+	if (!jobj_digest)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "segments", &jobj_digest_segments);
+	if (!jobj_digest_segments)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", segment) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (assign) {
 		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_digest_segments, num);
 		if (!jobj1)
@@ -290,17 +328,27 @@ int LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	json_object *jobj_digests;
 	int r = 0;
 
+	if (segment == CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT)
+		segment = LUKS2_get_default_segment(hdr);
+
 	if (digest == CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST) {
 		json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "digests", &jobj_digests);
 
 		json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
 			UNUSED(val);
-			r = assign_one_segment(cd, hdr, segment, atoi(key), assign);
+			if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
+				r = assign_all_segments(cd, hdr, atoi(key), assign);
+			else
+				r = assign_one_segment(cd, hdr, segment, atoi(key), assign);
 			if (r < 0)
 				break;
 		}
-	} else
-		r = assign_one_segment(cd, hdr, segment, digest, assign);
+	} else {
+		if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
+			r = assign_all_segments(cd, hdr, digest, assign);
+		else
+			r = assign_one_segment(cd, hdr, segment, digest, assign);
+	}
 
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
@@ -335,7 +383,7 @@ void LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_digests, key, val) {
 		if (digest_unused(val)) {
-			log_dbg("Erasing unused digest %d.", atoi(key));
+			log_dbg(cd, "Erasing unused digest %d.", atoi(key));
 			json_object_object_del(jobj_digests, key);
 		}
 	}
@@ -374,7 +422,7 @@ static char *get_key_description_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd, int digest)
 int LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int segment)
 {
-	char *desc = get_key_description_by_digest(cd, LUKS2_digest_by_segment(cd, hdr, segment));
+	char *desc = get_key_description_by_digest(cd, LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, segment));
 	int r;
 
 	r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(vk, desc);
@@ -385,7 +433,21 @@ int LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(struct crypt_device *cd,
 int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int keyslot)
 {
-	char *desc = get_key_description_by_digest(cd, LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, keyslot));
+	char *desc = get_key_description_by_digest(cd, LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot));
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(vk, desc);
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(cd, vk);
+
+	free(desc);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk, int digest)
+{
+	char *desc = get_key_description_by_digest(cd, digest);
 	int r;
 
 	r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(vk, desc);

lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, PBKDF2 digest handler (LUKS1 compatible)
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -94,18 +94,25 @@ static int PBKDF2_digest_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t volume_key_len)
 {
 	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj_digests;
-	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], digest_raw[128], num[16];
+	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], digest_raw[128];
 	int hmac_size, r;
 	char *base64_str;
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
 	struct crypt_pbkdf_limits pbkdf_limits;
+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf_cd;
 	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf = {
 		.type = CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2,
-		.hash = "sha256",
 		.time_ms = LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MS,
 	};
 
-	log_dbg("Setting PBKDF2 type key digest %d.", digest);
+	/* Inherit hash from PBKDF setting */
+	pbkdf_cd = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd);
+	if (pbkdf_cd)
+		pbkdf.hash = pbkdf_cd->hash;
+	if (!pbkdf.hash)
+		pbkdf.hash = DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Setting PBKDF2 type key digest %d.", digest);
 
 	r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
 	if (r < 0)
@@ -124,8 +131,8 @@ static int PBKDF2_digest_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	}
 
 	hmac_size = crypt_hmac_size(pbkdf.hash);
-	if (hmac_size < 0)
-		return hmac_size;
+	if (hmac_size < 0 || hmac_size > (int)sizeof(digest_raw))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	r = crypt_pbkdf(CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2, pbkdf.hash, volume_key, volume_key_len,
 			salt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, digest_raw, hmac_size,
@@ -163,12 +170,10 @@ static int PBKDF2_digest_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_digest, "digest", json_object_new_string(base64_str));
 	free(base64_str);
 
-	if (jobj_digests) {
-		snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", digest);
-		json_object_object_add(jobj_digests, num, jobj_digest);
-	}
+	if (jobj_digests)
+		json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_digests, digest, jobj_digest);
 
-	JSON_DBG(jobj_digest, "Digest JSON");
+	JSON_DBG(cd, jobj_digest, "Digest JSON:");
 	return 0;
 }
 

lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -26,34 +26,37 @@
 /*
  * Helper functions
  */
-json_object *parse_json_len(const char *json_area, int length, int *end_offset)
+static json_object *parse_json_len(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *json_area,
+			    uint64_t max_length, int *json_len)
 {
 	json_object *jobj;
 	struct json_tokener *jtok;
 
-	if (!json_area || length <= 0)
+	 /* INT32_MAX is internal (json-c) json_tokener_parse_ex() limit */
+	if (!json_area || max_length > INT32_MAX)
 		return NULL;
 
 	jtok = json_tokener_new();
 	if (!jtok) {
-		log_dbg("ERROR: Failed to init json tokener");
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Failed to init json tokener");
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	jobj = json_tokener_parse_ex(jtok, json_area, length);
+	jobj = json_tokener_parse_ex(jtok, json_area, max_length);
 	if (!jobj)
-		log_dbg("ERROR: Failed to parse json data (%d): %s",
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Failed to parse json data (%d): %s",
 			json_tokener_get_error(jtok),
 			json_tokener_error_desc(json_tokener_get_error(jtok)));
 	else
-		*end_offset = jtok->char_offset;
+		*json_len = jtok->char_offset;
 
 	json_tokener_free(jtok);
 
 	return jobj;
 }
 
-static void log_dbg_checksum(const uint8_t *csum, const char *csum_alg, const char *info)
+static void log_dbg_checksum(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			     const uint8_t *csum, const char *csum_alg, const char *info)
 {
 	char csum_txt[2*LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L+1];
 	int i;
@@ -62,7 +65,7 @@ static void log_dbg_checksum(const uint8_t *csum, const char *csum_alg, const ch
 		snprintf(&csum_txt[i*2], 3, "%02hhx", (const char)csum[i]);
 	csum_txt[i*2+1] = '\0'; /* Just to be safe, sprintf should write \0 there. */
 
-	log_dbg("Checksum:%s (%s)", &csum_txt[0], info);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Checksum:%s (%s)", &csum_txt[0], info);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -97,7 +100,8 @@ static int hdr_checksum_calculate(const char *alg, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_di
 /*
  * Compare hash (checksum) of on-disk and in-memory header.
  */
-static int hdr_checksum_check(const char *alg, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
+static int hdr_checksum_check(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			      const char *alg, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
 			      const char *json_area, size_t json_len)
 {
 	struct luks2_hdr_disk hdr_tmp;
@@ -115,8 +119,8 @@ static int hdr_checksum_check(const char *alg, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
-	log_dbg_checksum(hdr_disk->csum, alg, "on-disk");
-	log_dbg_checksum(hdr_tmp.csum, alg, "in-memory");
+	log_dbg_checksum(cd, hdr_disk->csum, alg, "on-disk");
+	log_dbg_checksum(cd, hdr_tmp.csum, alg, "in-memory");
 
 	if (memcmp(hdr_tmp.csum, hdr_disk->csum, (size_t)hash_size))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -171,13 +175,13 @@ static void hdr_to_disk(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	hdr_disk->hdr_offset  = cpu_to_be64(offset);
 	hdr_disk->seqid       = cpu_to_be64(hdr->seqid);
 
-	strncpy(hdr_disk->label, hdr->label, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	memcpy(hdr_disk->label, hdr->label, MIN(strlen(hdr->label), LUKS2_LABEL_L));
 	hdr_disk->label[LUKS2_LABEL_L - 1] = '\0';
-	strncpy(hdr_disk->subsystem, hdr->subsystem, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
+	memcpy(hdr_disk->subsystem, hdr->subsystem, MIN(strlen(hdr->subsystem), LUKS2_LABEL_L));
 	hdr_disk->subsystem[LUKS2_LABEL_L - 1] = '\0';
-	strncpy(hdr_disk->checksum_alg, hdr->checksum_alg, LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L);
+	memcpy(hdr_disk->checksum_alg, hdr->checksum_alg, MIN(strlen(hdr->checksum_alg), LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L));
 	hdr_disk->checksum_alg[LUKS2_CHECKSUM_ALG_L - 1] = '\0';
-	strncpy(hdr_disk->uuid, hdr->uuid, LUKS2_UUID_L);
+	memcpy(hdr_disk->uuid, hdr->uuid, MIN(strlen(hdr->uuid), LUKS2_UUID_L));
 	hdr_disk->uuid[LUKS2_UUID_L - 1] = '\0';
 
 	memcpy(hdr_disk->salt, secondary ? hdr->salt2 : hdr->salt1, LUKS2_SALT_L);
@@ -186,7 +190,8 @@ static void hdr_to_disk(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 /*
  * Sanity checks before checksum is validated
  */
-static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr,
+static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				     struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr,
 				     size_t *hdr_json_size, int secondary,
 				     uint64_t offset)
 {
@@ -194,19 +199,25 @@ static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (be16_to_cpu(hdr->version) != 2) {
-		log_dbg("Unsupported LUKS2 header version %u.", be16_to_cpu(hdr->version));
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported LUKS2 header version %u.", be16_to_cpu(hdr->version));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (offset != be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_offset)) {
-		log_dbg("LUKS2 offset 0x%04x on device differs to expected offset 0x%04x.",
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04x on device differs to expected offset 0x%04x.",
 			(unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_offset), (unsigned)offset);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (secondary && (offset != be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04x in secondary header does not match size 0x%04x.",
+			(unsigned)offset, (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	/* FIXME: sanity check checksum alg. */
 
-	log_dbg("LUKS2 header version %u of size %u bytes, checksum %s.",
+	log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header version %u of size %u bytes, checksum %s.",
 		(unsigned)be16_to_cpu(hdr->version), (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size),
 		hdr->checksum_alg);
 
@@ -217,16 +228,17 @@ static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr,
 /*
  * Read LUKS2 header from disk at specific offset.
  */
-static int hdr_read_disk(struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
+static int hdr_read_disk(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			 struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
 			 char **json_area, uint64_t offset, int secondary)
 {
 	size_t hdr_json_size = 0;
-	int devfd = -1, r;
+	int devfd, r;
 
-	log_dbg("Trying to read %s LUKS2 header at offset 0x%" PRIx64 ".",
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to read %s LUKS2 header at offset 0x%" PRIx64 ".",
 		secondary ? "secondary" : "primary", offset);
 
-	devfd = device_open_locked(device, O_RDONLY);
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
 	if (devfd < 0)
 		return devfd == -1 ? -EIO : devfd;
 
@@ -234,16 +246,14 @@ static int hdr_read_disk(struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
 	 * Read binary header and run sanity check before reading
 	 * JSON area and validating checksum.
 	 */
-	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 				 device_alignment(device), hdr_disk,
 				 LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, offset) != LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN) {
-		close(devfd);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
-	r = hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(hdr_disk, &hdr_json_size, secondary, offset);
+	r = hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(cd, hdr_disk, &hdr_json_size, secondary, offset);
 	if (r < 0) {
-		close(devfd);
 		return r;
 	}
 
@@ -252,27 +262,23 @@ static int hdr_read_disk(struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
 	 */
 	*json_area = malloc(hdr_json_size);
 	if (!*json_area) {
-		close(devfd);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 				 device_alignment(device), *json_area, hdr_json_size,
 				 offset + LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN) != (ssize_t)hdr_json_size) {
-		close(devfd);
 		free(*json_area);
 		*json_area = NULL;
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
-	close(devfd);
-
 	/*
 	 * Calculate and validate checksum and zero it afterwards.
 	 */
-	if (hdr_checksum_check(hdr_disk->checksum_alg, hdr_disk,
+	if (hdr_checksum_check(cd, hdr_disk->checksum_alg, hdr_disk,
 				*json_area, hdr_json_size)) {
-		log_dbg("LUKS2 header checksum error (offset %" PRIu64 ").", offset);
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header checksum error (offset %" PRIu64 ").", offset);
 		r = -EINVAL;
 	}
 	memset(hdr_disk->csum, 0, LUKS2_CHECKSUM_L);
@@ -283,20 +289,21 @@ static int hdr_read_disk(struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr_disk *hdr_disk,
 /*
  * Write LUKS2 header to disk at specific offset.
  */
-static int hdr_write_disk(struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-		   const char *json_area, int secondary)
+static int hdr_write_disk(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			  struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			  const char *json_area, int secondary)
 {
 	struct luks2_hdr_disk hdr_disk;
 	uint64_t offset = secondary ? hdr->hdr_size : 0;
 	size_t hdr_json_len;
-	int devfd = -1, r;
+	int devfd, r;
 
-	log_dbg("Trying to write LUKS2 header (%zu bytes) at offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to write LUKS2 header (%zu bytes) at offset %" PRIu64 ".",
 		hdr->hdr_size, offset);
 
 	/* FIXME: read-only device silent fail? */
 
-	devfd = device_open_locked(device, O_RDWR);
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDWR);
 	if (devfd < 0)
 		return devfd == -1 ? -EINVAL : devfd;
 
@@ -307,21 +314,19 @@ static int hdr_write_disk(struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	/*
 	 * Write header without checksum but with proper seqid.
 	 */
-	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 				  device_alignment(device), (char *)&hdr_disk,
 				  LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, offset) < (ssize_t)LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN) {
-		close(devfd);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Write json area.
 	 */
-	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 				  device_alignment(device),
 				  CONST_CAST(char*)json_area, hdr_json_len,
 				  LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN + offset) < (ssize_t)hdr_json_len) {
-		close(devfd);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
@@ -331,41 +336,62 @@ static int hdr_write_disk(struct device *device, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	r = hdr_checksum_calculate(hdr_disk.checksum_alg, &hdr_disk,
 				   json_area, hdr_json_len);
 	if (r < 0) {
-		close(devfd);
 		return r;
 	}
-	log_dbg_checksum(hdr_disk.csum, hdr_disk.checksum_alg, "in-memory");
+	log_dbg_checksum(cd, hdr_disk.csum, hdr_disk.checksum_alg, "in-memory");
 
-	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 				  device_alignment(device), (char *)&hdr_disk,
 				  LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, offset) < (ssize_t)LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN)
 		r = -EIO;
 
-	close(devfd);
+	device_sync(cd, device);
 	return r;
 }
 
-static int LUKS2_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device,
-				   uint64_t hdr_size, int falloc)
+static int LUKS2_check_sequence_id(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct device *device)
 {
-	uint64_t dev_size;
+	int devfd;
+	struct luks2_hdr_disk dhdr;
 
-	if (device_size(device, &dev_size)) {
-		log_dbg("Cannot get device size for device %s.", device_path(device));
+	if (!hdr)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		return devfd == -1 ? -EINVAL : devfd;
+
+	/* we need only first 512 bytes, see luks2_hdr_disk structure */
+	if ((read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+	     device_alignment(device), &dhdr, 512, 0) != 512))
 		return -EIO;
+
+	/* there's nothing to check if there's no LUKS2 header */
+	if ((be16_to_cpu(dhdr.version) != 2) ||
+	    memcmp(dhdr.magic, LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L) ||
+	    strcmp(dhdr.uuid, hdr->uuid))
+		return 0;
+
+	return hdr->seqid != be64_to_cpu(dhdr.seqid);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_device_write_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct device *device)
+{
+	int r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return r;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Device size %" PRIu64 ", header size %"
-		PRIu64 ".", dev_size, hdr_size);
-
-	if (hdr_size > dev_size) {
-		/* If it is header file, increase its size */
-		if (falloc && !device_fallocate(device, hdr_size))
-			return 0;
-
-		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is too small. (LUKS2 requires at least %" PRIu64 " bytes.)"),
-			device_path(device), hdr_size);
-		return -EINVAL;
+	/* run sequence id check only on first write lock (r == 1) and w/o LUKS2 reencryption in-progress */
+	if (r == 1 && !crypt_get_luks2_reencrypt(cd)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Checking context sequence id matches value stored on disk.");
+		if (LUKS2_check_sequence_id(cd, hdr, device)) {
+			device_write_unlock(cd, device);
+			log_err(cd, _("Detected attempt for concurrent LUKS2 metadata update. Aborting operation."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -375,7 +401,7 @@ static int LUKS2_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *devic
  * Convert in-memory LUKS2 header and write it to disk.
  * This will increase sequence id, write both header copies and calculate checksum.
  */
-int LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct device *device)
+int LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct device *device, bool seqid_check)
 {
 	char *json_area;
 	const char *json_text;
@@ -383,16 +409,11 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct
 	int r;
 
 	if (hdr->version != 2) {
-		log_dbg("Unsupported LUKS2 header version (%u).", hdr->version);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported LUKS2 header version (%u).", hdr->version);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (hdr->hdr_size != LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN) {
-		log_dbg("Unsupported LUKS2 header size (%zu).", hdr->hdr_size);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	r = LUKS2_check_device_size(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr->jobj), 1);
+	r = device_check_size(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr), 1);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
@@ -400,10 +421,9 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct
 	 * Allocate and zero JSON area (of proper header size).
 	 */
 	json_area_len = hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
-	json_area = malloc(json_area_len);
+	json_area = crypt_zalloc(json_area_len);
 	if (!json_area)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	memset(json_area, 0, json_area_len);
 
 	/*
 	 * Generate text space-efficient JSON representation to json area.
@@ -411,117 +431,118 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct
 	json_text = json_object_to_json_string_ext(hdr->jobj,
 			JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE);
 	if (!json_text || !*json_text) {
-		log_dbg("Cannot parse JSON object to text representation.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot parse JSON object to text representation.");
 		free(json_area);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 	if (strlen(json_text) > (json_area_len - 1)) {
-		log_dbg("JSON is too large (%zu > %zu).", strlen(json_text), json_area_len);
+		log_dbg(cd, "JSON is too large (%zu > %zu).", strlen(json_text), json_area_len);
 		free(json_area);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	strncpy(json_area, json_text, json_area_len);
 
-	/* Increase sequence id before writing it to disk. */
-	hdr->seqid++;
-
-	r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
-	if (r) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write device lock."));
+	if (seqid_check)
+		r = LUKS2_device_write_lock(cd, hdr, device);
+	else
+		r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
+	if (r < 0) {
 		free(json_area);
 		return r;
 	}
 
+	/* Increase sequence id before writing it to disk. */
+	hdr->seqid++;
+
 	/* Write primary and secondary header */
-	r = hdr_write_disk(device, hdr, json_area, 0);
+	r = hdr_write_disk(cd, device, hdr, json_area, 0);
 	if (!r)
-		r = hdr_write_disk(device, hdr, json_area, 1);
+		r = hdr_write_disk(cd, device, hdr, json_area, 1);
 
 	if (r)
-		log_dbg("LUKS2 header write failed (%d).", r);
+		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header write failed (%d).", r);
 
-	device_write_unlock(device);
-
-	/* FIXME: try recovery here? */
+	device_write_unlock(cd, device);
 
 	free(json_area);
 	return r;
 }
-
-static int validate_json_area(const char *json_area, int start, int length)
+static int validate_json_area(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *json_area,
+			      uint64_t json_len, uint64_t max_length)
 {
 	char c;
 
 	/* Enforce there are no needless opening bytes */
 	if (*json_area != '{') {
-		log_dbg("ERROR: Opening character must be left curly bracket: '{'.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Opening character must be left curly bracket: '{'.");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (start >= length) {
-		log_dbg("ERROR: Missing trailing null byte beyond parsed json data string.");
+	if (json_len >= max_length) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Missing trailing null byte beyond parsed json data string.");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * TODO:
 	 *	validate there are legal json format characters between
-	 *	'json_area' and 'json_area + start'
+	 *	'json_area' and 'json_area + json_len'
 	 */
 
 	do {
-		c = *(json_area + start);
+		c = *(json_area + json_len);
 		if (c != '\0') {
-			log_dbg("ERROR: Forbidden ascii code 0x%02hhx found beyond json data string at offset %d.",
-				c, start);
+			log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Forbidden ascii code 0x%02hhx found beyond json data string at offset %" PRIu64,
+				c, json_len);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-	} while (++start < length);
+	} while (++json_len < max_length);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int validate_luks2_json_object(json_object *jobj_hdr)
+static int validate_luks2_json_object(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_hdr, uint64_t length)
 {
 	int r;
 
 	/* we require top level object to be of json_type_object */
 	r = !json_object_is_type(jobj_hdr, json_type_object);
 	if (r) {
-		log_dbg("ERROR: Resulting object is not a json object type");
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: Resulting object is not a json object type");
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	r = LUKS2_hdr_validate(jobj_hdr);
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, jobj_hdr, length);
 	if (r) {
-		log_dbg("Repairing JSON metadata.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Repairing JSON metadata.");
 		/* try to correct known glitches */
-		LUKS2_hdr_repair(jobj_hdr);
+		LUKS2_hdr_repair(cd, jobj_hdr);
 
 		/* run validation again */
-		r = LUKS2_hdr_validate(jobj_hdr);
+		r = LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, jobj_hdr, length);
 	}
 
 	if (r)
-		log_dbg("ERROR: LUKS2 validation failed");
+		log_dbg(cd, "ERROR: LUKS2 validation failed");
 
 	return r;
 }
 
-static json_object *parse_and_validate_json(const char *json_area, int length)
+static json_object *parse_and_validate_json(struct crypt_device *cd,
+					    const char *json_area, uint64_t max_length)
 {
-	int offset, r;
-	json_object *jobj = parse_json_len(json_area, length, &offset);
+	int json_len, r;
+	json_object *jobj = parse_json_len(cd, json_area, max_length, &json_len);
 
 	if (!jobj)
 		return NULL;
 
 	/* successful parse_json_len must not return offset <= 0 */
-	assert(offset > 0);
+	assert(json_len > 0);
 
-	r = validate_json_area(json_area, offset, length);
+	r = validate_json_area(cd, json_area, json_len, max_length);
 	if (!r)
-		r = validate_luks2_json_object(jobj);
+		r = validate_luks2_json_object(cd, jobj, max_length);
 
 	if (r) {
 		json_object_put(jobj);
@@ -531,19 +552,19 @@ static json_object *parse_and_validate_json(const char *json_area, int length)
 	return jobj;
 }
 
-static int detect_device_signatures(const char *path)
+static int detect_device_signatures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *path)
 {
 	blk_probe_status prb_state;
 	int r;
 	struct blkid_handle *h;
 
 	if (!blk_supported()) {
-		log_dbg("Blkid probing of device signatures disabled.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Blkid probing of device signatures disabled.");
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if ((r = blk_init_by_path(&h, path))) {
-		log_dbg("Failed to initialize blkid_handle by path.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Failed to initialize blkid_handle by path.");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -557,22 +578,22 @@ static int detect_device_signatures(const char *path)
 
 	switch (prb_state) {
 	case PRB_AMBIGUOUS:
-		log_dbg("Blkid probe couldn't decide device type unambiguously.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Blkid probe couldn't decide device type unambiguously.");
 		/* fall through */
 	case PRB_FAIL:
-		log_dbg("Blkid probe failed.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Blkid probe failed.");
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		break;
 	case PRB_OK: /* crypto_LUKS type is filtered out */
 		r = -EINVAL;
 
 		if (blk_is_partition(h))
-			log_dbg("Blkid probe detected partition type '%s'", blk_get_partition_type(h));
+			log_dbg(cd, "Blkid probe detected partition type '%s'", blk_get_partition_type(h));
 		else if (blk_is_superblock(h))
-			log_dbg("blkid probe detected superblock type '%s'", blk_get_superblock_type(h));
+			log_dbg(cd, "blkid probe detected superblock type '%s'", blk_get_superblock_type(h));
 		break;
 	case PRB_EMPTY:
-		log_dbg("Blkid probe detected no foreign device signature.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Blkid probe detected no foreign device signature.");
 	}
 	blk_free(h);
 	return r;
@@ -597,16 +618,16 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	/* Skip auto-recovery if locks are disabled and we're not doing LUKS2 explicit repair */
 	if (do_recovery && do_blkprobe && !crypt_metadata_locking_enabled()) {
 		do_recovery = 0;
-		log_dbg("Disabling header auto-recovery due to locking being disabled.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Disabling header auto-recovery due to locking being disabled.");
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Read primary LUKS2 header (offset 0).
 	 */
 	state_hdr1 = HDR_FAIL;
-	r = hdr_read_disk(device, &hdr_disk1, &json_area1, 0, 0);
+	r = hdr_read_disk(cd, device, &hdr_disk1, &json_area1, 0, 0);
 	if (r == 0) {
-		jobj_hdr1 = parse_and_validate_json(json_area1, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+		jobj_hdr1 = parse_and_validate_json(cd, json_area1, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
 		state_hdr1 = jobj_hdr1 ? HDR_OK : HDR_OBSOLETE;
 	} else if (r == -EIO)
 		state_hdr1 = HDR_FAIL_IO;
@@ -616,9 +637,9 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	 */
 	state_hdr2 = HDR_FAIL;
 	if (state_hdr1 != HDR_FAIL && state_hdr1 != HDR_FAIL_IO) {
-		r = hdr_read_disk(device, &hdr_disk2, &json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.hdr_size), 1);
+		r = hdr_read_disk(cd, device, &hdr_disk2, &json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk1.hdr_size), 1);
 		if (r == 0) {
-			jobj_hdr2 = parse_and_validate_json(json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+			jobj_hdr2 = parse_and_validate_json(cd, json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
 			state_hdr2 = jobj_hdr2 ? HDR_OK : HDR_OBSOLETE;
 		} else if (r == -EIO)
 			state_hdr2 = HDR_FAIL_IO;
@@ -627,10 +648,10 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 		 * No header size, check all known offsets.
 		 */
 		for (r = -EINVAL,i = 0; r < 0 && i < ARRAY_SIZE(hdr2_offsets); i++)
-			r = hdr_read_disk(device, &hdr_disk2, &json_area2, hdr2_offsets[i], 1);
+			r = hdr_read_disk(cd, device, &hdr_disk2, &json_area2, hdr2_offsets[i], 1);
 
 		if (r == 0) {
-			jobj_hdr2 = parse_and_validate_json(json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
+			jobj_hdr2 = parse_and_validate_json(cd, json_area2, be64_to_cpu(hdr_disk2.hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
 			state_hdr2 = jobj_hdr2 ? HDR_OK : HDR_OBSOLETE;
 		} else if (r == -EIO)
 			state_hdr2 = HDR_FAIL_IO;
@@ -648,15 +669,15 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 
 	/* check header with keyslots to fit the device */
 	if (state_hdr1 == HDR_OK)
-		hdr_size = LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(jobj_hdr1);
+		hdr_size = LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size_jobj(jobj_hdr1);
 	else if (state_hdr2 == HDR_OK)
-		hdr_size = LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(jobj_hdr2);
+		hdr_size = LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size_jobj(jobj_hdr2);
 	else {
 		r = (state_hdr1 == HDR_FAIL_IO && state_hdr2 == HDR_FAIL_IO) ? -EIO : -EINVAL;
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-	r = LUKS2_check_device_size(cd, device, hdr_size, 0);
+	r = device_check_size(cd, device, hdr_size, 0);
 	if (r)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -664,9 +685,9 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	 * Try to rewrite (recover) bad header. Always regenerate salt for bad header.
 	 */
 	if (state_hdr1 == HDR_OK && state_hdr2 != HDR_OK) {
-		log_dbg("Secondary LUKS2 header requires recovery.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Secondary LUKS2 header requires recovery.");
 
-		if (do_blkprobe && (r = detect_device_signatures(device_path(device)))) {
+		if (do_blkprobe && (r = detect_device_signatures(cd, device_path(device)))) {
 			log_err(cd, _("Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
 				      "Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."));
 			goto err;
@@ -674,20 +695,20 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 
 		if (do_recovery) {
 			memcpy(&hdr_disk2, &hdr_disk1, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
-			r = crypt_random_get(NULL, (char*)hdr_disk2.salt, sizeof(hdr_disk2.salt), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+			r = crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr_disk2.salt, sizeof(hdr_disk2.salt), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
 			if (r)
-				log_dbg("Cannot generate master salt.");
+				log_dbg(cd, "Cannot generate master salt.");
 			else {
 				hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk1, &hdr_disk2, hdr, 0);
-				r = hdr_write_disk(device, hdr, json_area1, 1);
+				r = hdr_write_disk(cd, device, hdr, json_area1, 1);
 			}
 			if (r)
-				log_dbg("Secondary LUKS2 header recovery failed.");
+				log_dbg(cd, "Secondary LUKS2 header recovery failed.");
 		}
 	} else if (state_hdr1 != HDR_OK && state_hdr2 == HDR_OK) {
-		log_dbg("Primary LUKS2 header requires recovery.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Primary LUKS2 header requires recovery.");
 
-		if (do_blkprobe && (r = detect_device_signatures(device_path(device)))) {
+		if (do_blkprobe && (r = detect_device_signatures(cd, device_path(device)))) {
 			log_err(cd, _("Device contains ambiguous signatures, cannot auto-recover LUKS2.\n"
 				      "Please run \"cryptsetup repair\" for recovery."));
 			goto err;
@@ -695,15 +716,15 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 
 		if (do_recovery) {
 			memcpy(&hdr_disk1, &hdr_disk2, LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN);
-			r = crypt_random_get(NULL, (char*)hdr_disk1.salt, sizeof(hdr_disk1.salt), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+			r = crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr_disk1.salt, sizeof(hdr_disk1.salt), CRYPT_RND_SALT);
 			if (r)
-				log_dbg("Cannot generate master salt.");
+				log_dbg(cd, "Cannot generate master salt.");
 			else {
 				hdr_from_disk(&hdr_disk2, &hdr_disk1, hdr, 1);
-				r = hdr_write_disk(device, hdr, json_area2, 0);
+				r = hdr_write_disk(cd, device, hdr, json_area2, 0);
 			}
 			if (r)
-				log_dbg("Primary LUKS2 header recovery failed.");
+				log_dbg(cd, "Primary LUKS2 header recovery failed.");
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -735,7 +756,7 @@ int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	 */
 	return 0;
 err:
-	log_dbg("LUKS2 header read failed (%d).", r);
+	log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header read failed (%d).", r);
 
 	free(json_area1);
 	free(json_area2);
@@ -756,7 +777,7 @@ int LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *backup_file)
 
 	if (!backup_file)
 		device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
-	else if (device_alloc(&device, backup_file) < 0)
+	else if (device_alloc(cd, &device, backup_file) < 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!device)
@@ -770,7 +791,7 @@ int LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *backup_file)
 	if (devfd < 0)
 		goto err;
 
-	if ((read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if ((read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 	     device_alignment(device), &hdr, sizeof(hdr), 0) == sizeof(hdr)) &&
 	    !memcmp(hdr.magic, LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L))
 		r = (int)be16_to_cpu(hdr.version);
@@ -779,7 +800,7 @@ err:
 		close(devfd);
 
 	if (backup_file)
-		device_free(device);
+		device_free(cd, device);
 
 	return r;
 }

lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 #define _CRYPTSETUP_LUKS2_INTERNAL_H
 
 #include <stdio.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <json-c/json.h>
 
@@ -44,7 +43,9 @@
 int LUKS2_disk_hdr_read(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 			struct device *device, int do_recovery, int do_blkprobe);
 int LUKS2_disk_hdr_write(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-			 struct device *device);
+			 struct device *device, bool seqid_check);
+int LUKS2_device_write_lock(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct device *device);
 
 /*
  * JSON struct access helpers
@@ -54,42 +55,47 @@ json_object *LUKS2_get_token_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int token);
 json_object *LUKS2_get_digest_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int digest);
 json_object *LUKS2_get_segment_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment);
 json_object *LUKS2_get_tokens_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+json_object *LUKS2_get_segments_jobj(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
 
 void hexprint_base64(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj,
 		     const char *sep, const char *line_sep);
 
-json_object *parse_json_len(const char *json_area, int length, int *end_offset);
-uint64_t json_object_get_uint64(json_object *jobj);
-uint32_t json_object_get_uint32(json_object *jobj);
-json_object *json_object_new_uint64(uint64_t value);
+uint64_t crypt_jobj_get_uint64(json_object *jobj);
+uint32_t crypt_jobj_get_uint32(json_object *jobj);
+json_object *crypt_jobj_new_uint64(uint64_t value);
 
-void JSON_DBG(json_object *jobj, const char *desc);
+int json_object_object_add_by_uint(json_object *jobj, unsigned key, json_object *jobj_val);
+void json_object_object_del_by_uint(json_object *jobj, unsigned key);
+int json_object_copy(json_object *jobj_src, json_object **jobj_dst);
+
+void JSON_DBG(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj, const char *desc);
 
 /*
  * LUKS2 JSON validation
  */
 
 /* validation helper */
-json_object *json_contains(json_object *jobj, const char *name, const char *section,
-		      const char *key, json_type type);
+json_bool validate_json_uint32(json_object *jobj);
+json_object *json_contains(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj, const char *name,
+			   const char *section, const char *key, json_type type);
 
-int LUKS2_hdr_validate(json_object *hdr_jobj);
-int LUKS2_keyslot_validate(json_object *hdr_jobj, json_object *hdr_keyslot, const char *key);
-int LUKS2_check_json_size(const struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
-int LUKS2_token_validate(json_object *hdr_jobj, json_object *jobj_token, const char *key);
+int LUKS2_hdr_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj, uint64_t json_size);
+int LUKS2_check_json_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_token_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj,
+			 json_object *jobj_token, const char *key);
 void LUKS2_token_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int token);
 
 /*
  * LUKS2 JSON repair for known glitches
  */
-void LUKS2_hdr_repair(json_object *jobj_hdr);
-void LUKS2_keyslots_repair(json_object *jobj_hdr);
+void LUKS2_hdr_repair(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_hdr);
+void LUKS2_keyslots_repair(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_hdr);
 
 /*
  * JSON array helpers
  */
-struct json_object *LUKS2_array_jobj(struct json_object *array, const char *num);
-struct json_object *LUKS2_array_remove(struct json_object *array, const char *num);
+json_object *LUKS2_array_jobj(json_object *array, const char *num);
+json_object *LUKS2_array_remove(json_object *array, const char *num);
 
 /*
  * Plugins API
@@ -122,7 +128,7 @@ int placeholder_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t volume_key_len);
 
 /* validate all keyslot implementations in hdr json */
-int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(json_object *hdr_jobj);
+int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj);
 
 typedef struct  {
 	const char *name;
@@ -136,6 +142,12 @@ typedef struct  {
 	keyslot_repair_func repair;
 } keyslot_handler;
 
+/* can not fit prototype alloc function */
+int reenc_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
+
 /**
  * LUKS2 digest handlers (EXPERIMENTAL)
  */
@@ -152,8 +164,6 @@ typedef struct  {
 	digest_dump_func   dump;
 } digest_handler;
 
-const digest_handler *LUKS2_digest_handler_type(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type);
-
 /**
  * LUKS2 token handlers (internal use only)
  */
@@ -173,5 +183,148 @@ int token_keyring_get(json_object *, void *);
 
 int LUKS2_find_area_gap(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 			size_t keylength, uint64_t *area_offset, uint64_t *area_length);
+int LUKS2_find_area_max_gap(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			    uint64_t *area_offset, uint64_t *area_length);
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size_jobj(json_object *jobj);
+
+int LUKS2_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      size_t keylength,
+		      const char *cipher,
+		      const char *cipher_mode);
+
+static inline const char *crypt_reencrypt_mode_to_str(crypt_reencrypt_mode_info mi)
+{
+	if (mi == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_REENCRYPT)
+		return "reencrypt";
+	if (mi == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_ENCRYPT)
+		return "encrypt";
+	if (mi == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_DECRYPT)
+		return "decrypt";
+	return "<unknown>";
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generic LUKS2 keyslot
+ */
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const void *buffer,
+	size_t buffer_length);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_allocate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vks);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(json_object *jobj_keyslot, uint64_t *offset, uint64_t *length);
+
+/* JSON helpers */
+uint64_t json_segment_get_offset(json_object *jobj_segment, unsigned blockwise);
+const char *json_segment_type(json_object *jobj_segment);
+uint64_t json_segment_get_iv_offset(json_object *jobj_segment);
+uint64_t json_segment_get_size(json_object *jobj_segment, unsigned blockwise);
+const char *json_segment_get_cipher(json_object *jobj_segment);
+int json_segment_get_sector_size(json_object *jobj_segment);
+bool json_segment_is_backup(json_object *jobj_segment);
+json_object *json_segments_get_segment(json_object *jobj_segments, int segment);
+unsigned json_segments_count(json_object *jobj_segments);
+void json_segment_remove_flag(json_object *jobj_segment, const char *flag);
+uint64_t json_segments_get_minimal_offset(json_object *jobj_segments, unsigned blockwise);
+json_object *json_segment_create_linear(uint64_t offset, const uint64_t *length, unsigned reencryption);
+json_object *json_segment_create_crypt(uint64_t offset, uint64_t iv_offset, const uint64_t *length, const char *cipher, uint32_t sector_size, unsigned reencryption);
+int json_segments_segment_in_reencrypt(json_object *jobj_segments);
+bool json_segment_cmp(json_object *jobj_segment_1, json_object *jobj_segment_2);
+bool json_segment_contains_flag(json_object *jobj_segment, const char *flag_str, size_t len);
+
+int LUKS2_assembly_multisegment_dmd(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vks,
+	json_object *jobj_segments,
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd);
+
+/*
+ * Generic LUKS2 segment
+ */
+int LUKS2_segments_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+int LUKS2_segment_first_unused_id(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+int LUKS2_segment_set_flag(json_object *jobj_segment, const char *flag);
+
+json_object *LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *flag);
+
+int LUKS2_get_segment_id_by_flag(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *flag);
+
+int LUKS2_segments_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	json_object *jobj_segments,
+	int commit);
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_segment_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment,
+	unsigned blockwise);
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_segment_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment,
+	unsigned blockwise);
+
+int LUKS2_segment_is_type(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int segment,
+	const char *type);
+
+int LUKS2_segment_by_type(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const char *type);
+
+int LUKS2_last_segment_by_type(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const char *type);
+
+int LUKS2_get_default_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_old(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_data_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, bool blockwise);
+
+/*
+ * Generic LUKS2 digest
+ */
+int LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int digest,
+	const struct volume_key *vk);
+
+void LUKS2_digests_erase_unused(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+int LUKS2_digest_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int digest);
+
+/*
+ * Generic LUKS2 token
+ */
+int LUKS2_tokens_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr);
+
+/*
+ * LUKS2 generic
+ */
+int LUKS2_reload(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	struct volume_key *vks,
+	uint64_t device_size,
+	uint32_t flags);
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment);
+int LUKS2_find_keyslot(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type);
+int LUKS2_set_keyslots_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	uint64_t data_offset);
 
 #endif

lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS2 header format code
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include "luks2_internal.h"
 #include <uuid/uuid.h>
+#include <assert.h>
 
 struct area {
 	uint64_t offset;
@@ -38,9 +39,83 @@ static size_t get_min_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
 	return 2 * hdr->hdr_size;
 }
 
-static size_t get_max_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+static size_t get_max_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
 {
-	return crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	return LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_find_area_max_gap(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			uint64_t *area_offset, uint64_t *area_length)
+{
+	struct area areas[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX], sorted_areas[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX+1] = {};
+	int i, j, k, area_i;
+	size_t valid_offset, offset, length;
+
+	/* fill area offset + length table */
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		if (!LUKS2_keyslot_area(hdr, i, &areas[i].offset, &areas[i].length))
+			continue;
+		areas[i].length = 0;
+		areas[i].offset = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* sort table */
+	k = 0; /* index in sorted table */
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		offset = get_max_offset(hdr) ?: UINT64_MAX;
+		area_i = -1;
+		/* search for the smallest offset in table */
+		for (j = 0; j < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; j++)
+			if (areas[j].offset && areas[j].offset <= offset) {
+				area_i = j;
+				offset = areas[j].offset;
+			}
+
+		if (area_i >= 0) {
+			sorted_areas[k].length = areas[area_i].length;
+			sorted_areas[k].offset = areas[area_i].offset;
+			areas[area_i].length = 0;
+			areas[area_i].offset = 0;
+			k++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sorted_areas[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX].offset = get_max_offset(hdr);
+	sorted_areas[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX].length = 1;
+
+	/* search for the gap we can use */
+	length = valid_offset = 0;
+	offset = get_min_offset(hdr);
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX+1; i++) {
+		/* skip empty */
+		if (sorted_areas[i].offset == 0 || sorted_areas[i].length == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/* found bigger gap than the last one */
+		if ((offset < sorted_areas[i].offset) && (sorted_areas[i].offset - offset) > length) {
+			length = sorted_areas[i].offset - offset;
+			valid_offset = offset;
+		}
+
+		/* move beyond allocated area */
+		offset = sorted_areas[i].offset + sorted_areas[i].length;
+	}
+
+	/* this search 'algorithm' does not work with unaligned areas */
+	assert(length == size_round_up(length, 4096));
+	assert(valid_offset == size_round_up(valid_offset, 4096));
+
+	if (!length) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough space in header keyslot area.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Found largest free area %zu -> %zu", valid_offset, length + valid_offset);
+
+	*area_offset = valid_offset;
+	*area_length = length;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int LUKS2_find_area_gap(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
@@ -61,7 +136,7 @@ int LUKS2_find_area_gap(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	/* sort table */
 	k = 0; /* index in sorted table */
 	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
-		offset = get_max_offset(cd) ?: UINT64_MAX;
+		offset = get_max_offset(hdr) ?: UINT64_MAX;
 		area_i = -1;
 		/* search for the smallest offset in table */
 		for (j = 0; j < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; j++)
@@ -95,25 +170,34 @@ int LUKS2_find_area_gap(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 		offset = sorted_areas[i].offset + sorted_areas[i].length;
 	}
 
-	if (get_max_offset(cd) && (offset + length) > get_max_offset(cd)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("No space for new keyslot."));
+	if ((offset + length) > get_max_offset(hdr)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough space in header keyslot area.");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Found area %zu -> %zu", offset, length + offset);
-/*
-	log_dbg("Area offset min: %zu, max %zu, slots max %u",
-	       get_min_offset(hdr), get_max_offset(cd), LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX);
-	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++)
-		log_dbg("SLOT[%02i]: %-8" PRIu64 " -> %-8" PRIu64, i,
-			sorted_areas[i].offset,
-			sorted_areas[i].length + sorted_areas[i].offset);
-*/
+	log_dbg(cd, "Found area %zu -> %zu", offset, length + offset);
+
 	*area_offset = offset;
 	*area_length = length;
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int LUKS2_check_metadata_area_size(uint64_t metadata_size)
+{
+	/* see LUKS2_HDR2_OFFSETS */
+	return (metadata_size != 0x004000 &&
+		metadata_size != 0x008000 && metadata_size != 0x010000 &&
+		metadata_size != 0x020000 && metadata_size != 0x040000 &&
+		metadata_size != 0x080000 && metadata_size != 0x100000 &&
+		metadata_size != 0x200000 && metadata_size != 0x400000);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_check_keyslots_area_size(uint64_t keyslots_size)
+{
+	return (MISALIGNED_4K(keyslots_size) ||
+		keyslots_size > LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE);
+}
+
 int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
 	struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
@@ -122,24 +206,79 @@ int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
 	const char *cipherMode,
 	const char *integrity,
 	const char *uuid,
-	unsigned int sector_size,
-	unsigned int alignPayload,
-	unsigned int alignOffset,
-	int detached_metadata_device)
+	unsigned int sector_size,  /* in bytes */
+	uint64_t data_offset,      /* in bytes */
+	uint64_t align_offset,     /* in bytes */
+	uint64_t required_alignment,
+	uint64_t metadata_size,
+	uint64_t keyslots_size)
 {
 	struct json_object *jobj_segment, *jobj_integrity, *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_segments, *jobj_config;
-	char num[24], cipher[128];
-	uint64_t offset, json_size, keyslots_size;
+	char cipher[128];
 	uuid_t partitionUuid;
-	int digest;
+	int r, digest;
+	uint64_t mdev_size;
+
+	if (!metadata_size)
+		metadata_size = LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
+	hdr->hdr_size = metadata_size;
+
+	if (data_offset && data_offset < get_min_offset(hdr)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested data offset is too small."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Increase keyslot size according to data offset */
+	if (!keyslots_size && data_offset)
+		keyslots_size = data_offset - get_min_offset(hdr);
+
+	/* keyslots size has to be 4 KiB aligned */
+	keyslots_size -= (keyslots_size % 4096);
+
+	if (keyslots_size > LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE)
+		keyslots_size = LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE;
+
+	if (!keyslots_size) {
+		assert(LUKS2_DEFAULT_HDR_SIZE > 2 * LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX);
+		keyslots_size = LUKS2_DEFAULT_HDR_SIZE - get_min_offset(hdr);
+		/* Decrease keyslots_size due to metadata device being too small */
+		if (!device_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), &mdev_size) &&
+		    ((keyslots_size + get_min_offset(hdr)) > mdev_size) &&
+		    device_fallocate(crypt_metadata_device(cd), keyslots_size + get_min_offset(hdr)) &&
+		    (get_min_offset(hdr) <= mdev_size))
+			keyslots_size = mdev_size - get_min_offset(hdr);
+	}
+
+	/* Decrease keyslots_size if we have smaller data_offset */
+	if (data_offset && (keyslots_size + get_min_offset(hdr)) > data_offset) {
+		keyslots_size = data_offset - get_min_offset(hdr);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Decreasing keyslot area size to %" PRIu64
+			" bytes due to the requested data offset %"
+			PRIu64 " bytes.", keyslots_size, data_offset);
+	}
+
+	/* Data offset has priority */
+	if (!data_offset && required_alignment) {
+		data_offset = size_round_up(get_min_offset(hdr) + keyslots_size,
+					    (size_t)required_alignment);
+		data_offset += align_offset;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Formatting LUKS2 with JSON metadata area %" PRIu64
+		" bytes and keyslots area %" PRIu64 " bytes.",
+		metadata_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN, keyslots_size);
+
+	if (keyslots_size < (LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX - 2*LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN))
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: keyslots area (%" PRIu64 " bytes) is very small,"
+			" available LUKS2 keyslot count is very limited.\n"),
+			keyslots_size);
 
-	hdr->hdr_size = LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
 	hdr->seqid = 1;
 	hdr->version = 2;
 	memset(hdr->label, 0, LUKS2_LABEL_L);
 	strcpy(hdr->checksum_alg, "sha256");
-	crypt_random_get(NULL, (char*)hdr->salt1, LUKS2_SALT_L, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
-	crypt_random_get(NULL, (char*)hdr->salt2, LUKS2_SALT_L, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr->salt1, LUKS2_SALT_L, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	crypt_random_get(cd, (char*)hdr->salt2, LUKS2_SALT_L, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
 
 	if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided."));
@@ -151,9 +290,11 @@ int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
 	uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, hdr->uuid);
 
 	if (*cipherMode != '\0')
-		snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", cipherName, cipherMode);
+		r = snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s-%s", cipherName, cipherMode);
 	else
-		snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s", cipherName);
+		r = snprintf(cipher, sizeof(cipher), "%s", cipherName);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(cipher))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	hdr->jobj = json_object_new_object();
 
@@ -167,34 +308,15 @@ int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
 	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "config", jobj_config);
 
 	digest = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", hdr, vk);
-	if (digest < 0) {
-		json_object_put(hdr->jobj);
-		hdr->jobj = NULL;
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	if (digest < 0)
+		goto err;
 
-	if (LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, digest, 1, 0) < 0) {
-		json_object_put(hdr->jobj);
-		hdr->jobj = NULL;
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	if (LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(cd, hdr, 0, digest, 1, 0) < 0)
+		goto err;
 
-	jobj_segment = json_object_new_object();
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "type", json_object_new_string("crypt"));
-	if (detached_metadata_device)
-		offset = (uint64_t)alignPayload * sector_size;
-	else {
-		//FIXME
-		//offset = size_round_up(areas[7].offset + areas[7].length, alignPayload * SECTOR_SIZE);
-		offset = size_round_up(LUKS2_HDR_DEFAULT_LEN, (size_t)alignPayload * sector_size);
-		offset += alignOffset;
-	}
-
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(offset));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "iv_tweak", json_object_new_string("0"));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "size", json_object_new_string("dynamic"));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "encryption", json_object_new_string(cipher));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "sector_size", json_object_new_int(sector_size));
+	jobj_segment = json_segment_create_crypt(data_offset, 0, NULL, cipher, sector_size, 0);
+	if (!jobj_segment)
+		goto err;
 
 	if (integrity) {
 		jobj_integrity = json_object_new_object();
@@ -204,18 +326,72 @@ int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
 		json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "integrity", jobj_integrity);
 	}
 
-	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%u", CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_segments, num, jobj_segment);
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_segments, 0, jobj_segment);
 
-	json_size = hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "json_size", json_object_new_uint64(json_size));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "json_size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(metadata_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "keyslots_size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(keyslots_size));
 
-	/* for detached metadata device compute reasonable keyslot areas size */
-	// FIXME: this is coupled with FIXME above
-	if (detached_metadata_device && !offset)
-		keyslots_size = LUKS2_HDR_DEFAULT_LEN - get_min_offset(hdr);
-	else
-		keyslots_size = offset - get_min_offset(hdr);
+	JSON_DBG(cd, hdr->jobj, "Header JSON:");
+	return 0;
+err:
+	json_object_put(hdr->jobj);
+	hdr->jobj = NULL;
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr, bool detached_header)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint64_t offset, length;
+	size_t wipe_block;
+
+	/* Wipe complete header, keyslots and padding areas with zeroes. */
+	offset = 0;
+	length = LUKS2_get_data_offset(hdr) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	wipe_block = 1024 * 1024;
+
+	if (LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* On detached header wipe at least the first 4k */
+	if (detached_header) {
+		length = 4096;
+		wipe_block = 4096;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Wiping LUKS areas (0x%06" PRIx64 " - 0x%06" PRIx64") with zeroes.",
+		offset, length + offset);
+
+	r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,
+			      offset, length, wipe_block, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Wipe keyslot area */
+	wipe_block = 1024 * 1024;
+	offset = get_min_offset(hdr);
+	length = LUKS2_keyslots_size(hdr);
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Wiping keyslots area (0x%06" PRIx64 " - 0x%06" PRIx64") with random data.",
+		offset, length + offset);
+
+	return crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_RANDOM,
+				 offset, length, wipe_block, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/* FIXME: what if user wanted to keep original keyslots size? */
+int LUKS2_set_keyslots_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		uint64_t data_offset)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_config;
+	uint64_t keyslots_size;
+
+	if (data_offset < get_min_offset(hdr))
+		return 1;
+
+	keyslots_size = data_offset - get_min_offset(hdr);
 
 	/* keep keyslots_size reasonable for custom data alignments */
 	if (keyslots_size > LUKS2_MAX_KEYSLOTS_SIZE)
@@ -224,8 +400,9 @@ int LUKS2_generate_hdr(
 	/* keyslots size has to be 4 KiB aligned */
 	keyslots_size -= (keyslots_size % 4096);
 
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "keyslots_size", json_object_new_uint64(keyslots_size));
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "config", &jobj_config))
+		return 1;
 
-	JSON_DBG(hdr->jobj, "Header JSON");
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_config, "keyslots_size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(keyslots_size));
 	return 0;
 }

lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, keyslot handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -23,9 +23,13 @@
 
 /* Internal implementations */
 extern const keyslot_handler luks2_keyslot;
+extern const keyslot_handler reenc_keyslot;
 
 static const keyslot_handler *keyslot_handlers[LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX] = {
 	&luks2_keyslot,
+#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
+	&reenc_keyslot,
+#endif
 	NULL
 };
 
@@ -63,7 +67,7 @@ static const keyslot_handler
 	return LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj2));
 }
 
-int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type)
+int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
 {
 	int i;
 
@@ -74,24 +78,55 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type)
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-/* Check if a keyslot is asssigned to specific segment */
+/* Check if a keyslot is assigned to specific segment */
+static int _keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment)
+{
+	int keyslot_digest, count = 0;
+	unsigned s;
+
+	keyslot_digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (keyslot_digest < 0)
+		return keyslot_digest;
+
+	if (segment >= 0)
+		return keyslot_digest == LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, segment);
+
+	for (s = 0; s < json_segments_count(LUKS2_get_segments_jobj(hdr)); s++) {
+		if (keyslot_digest == LUKS2_digest_by_segment(hdr, s))
+			count++;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static int _keyslot_for_digest(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int digest)
+{
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	r = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	return r == digest ? 0 : -ENOENT;
+}
+
 int LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment)
 {
-	int keyslot_digest, segment_digest;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
 
 	/* no need to check anything */
 	if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
-		return 0;
+		return 0; /* ok */
+	if (segment == CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT) {
+		segment = LUKS2_get_default_segment(hdr);
+		if (segment < 0)
+			return segment;
+	}
 
-	keyslot_digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(NULL, hdr, keyslot);
-	if (keyslot_digest < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	r = _keyslot_for_segment(hdr, keyslot, segment);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
-	segment_digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(NULL, hdr, segment);
-	if (segment_digest < 0)
-		return segment_digest;
-
-	return segment_digest == keyslot_digest ? 0 : -ENOENT;
+	return r >= 1 ? 0 : -ENOENT;
 }
 
 /* Number of keyslots assigned to a segment or all keyslots for CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT */
@@ -111,61 +146,101 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment)
 	return num;
 }
 
-int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd)
+int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *cipher_spec)
 {
-	const char *cipher = crypt_get_cipher(cd);
+	char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+
+	if (!cipher_spec || crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher_spec))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(cipher_spec, cipher, NULL, cipher_mode) < 0)
+		return 1;
 
 	/* Keyslot is already authenticated; we cannot use integrity tags here */
-	if (crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd) || !cipher)
+	if (crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd))
 		return 1;
 
 	/* Wrapped key schemes cannot be used for keyslot encryption */
-	if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher))
+	if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher, cipher_mode))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Check if crypto backend can use the cipher */
+	if (crypt_cipher_ivsize(cipher, cipher_mode) < 0)
 		return 1;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
 int LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	size_t key_size, struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
+				 struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
 {
-	int r, integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
 	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd);
+	const char *cipher_spec;
+	size_t key_size;
+	int r;
 
 	if (!hdr || !pbkdf || !params)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	params->af_type   = LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AF_LUKS1;
+	/*
+	 * set keyslot area encryption parameters
+	 */
 	params->area_type = LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AREA_RAW;
-
-	/* set keyslot AF parameters */
-	/* currently we use hash for AF from pbkdf settings */
-	r = snprintf(params->af.luks1.hash, sizeof(params->af.luks1.hash),
-		     "%s", pbkdf->hash);
-	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(params->af.luks1.hash))
+	cipher_spec = crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size);
+	if (!cipher_spec || !key_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	params->af.luks1.stripes = 4000;
-
-	/* set keyslot area encryption parameters */
-	/* short circuit authenticated encryption hardcoded defaults */
-	if (LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd) || key_size == 0) {
-		// FIXME: fixed cipher and key size can be wrong
-		snprintf(params->area.raw.encryption, sizeof(params->area.raw.encryption),
-			 "aes-xts-plain64");
-		params->area.raw.key_size = 32;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	r = snprintf(params->area.raw.encryption, sizeof(params->area.raw.encryption),
-		     "%s", LUKS2_get_cipher(hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT));
+	params->area.raw.key_size = key_size;
+	r = snprintf(params->area.raw.encryption, sizeof(params->area.raw.encryption), "%s", cipher_spec);
 	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(params->area.raw.encryption))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/* Slot encryption tries to use the same key size as for the main algorithm */
-	if ((size_t)integrity_key_size > key_size)
+	/*
+	 * set keyslot AF parameters
+	 */
+	params->af_type = LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AF_LUKS1;
+	/* currently we use hash for AF from pbkdf settings */
+	r = snprintf(params->af.luks1.hash, sizeof(params->af.luks1.hash), "%s", pbkdf->hash ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(params->af.luks1.hash))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	params->area.raw.key_size = key_size - integrity_key_size;
+	params->af.luks1.stripes = 4000;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_pbkdf(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_kdf, *jobj;
+
+	if (!hdr || !pbkdf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(pbkdf, 0, sizeof(*pbkdf));
+
+	pbkdf->type = json_object_get_string(jobj);
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "hash", &jobj))
+		pbkdf->hash = json_object_get_string(jobj);
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "iterations", &jobj))
+		pbkdf->iterations = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "time", &jobj))
+		pbkdf->iterations = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "memory", &jobj))
+		pbkdf->max_memory_kb = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+	if (json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "cpus", &jobj))
+		pbkdf->parallel_threads = json_object_get_int(jobj);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -173,7 +248,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 static int LUKS2_keyslot_unbound(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
 {
 	json_object *jobj_digest, *jobj_segments;
-	int digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(NULL, hdr, keyslot);
+	int digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot);
 
 	if (digest < 0)
 		return 0;
@@ -197,7 +272,8 @@ crypt_keyslot_info LUKS2_keyslot_info(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
 	if (!LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot))
 		return CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE;
 
-	if (LUKS2_keyslot_unbound(hdr, keyslot))
+	if (LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(hdr, keyslot) < 0 ||
+	    LUKS2_keyslot_unbound(hdr, keyslot))
 		return CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND;
 
 	if (LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT) == 1 &&
@@ -207,34 +283,104 @@ crypt_keyslot_info LUKS2_keyslot_info(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot)
 	return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE;
 }
 
-int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-	int keyslot,
-	uint64_t *offset,
-	uint64_t *length)
+int LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(json_object *jobj_keyslot, uint64_t *offset, uint64_t *length)
 {
-	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj;
-
-	if(LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
-	if (!jobj_keyslot)
-		return -ENOENT;
+	json_object *jobj_area, *jobj;
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	*offset = json_object_get_int64(jobj);
+	*offset = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj);
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "size", &jobj))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	*length = json_object_get_int64(jobj);
+	*length = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int LUKS2_keyslot_area(struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot) == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	return LUKS2_keyslot_jobj_area(jobj_keyslot, offset, length);
+}
+
+static int _open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	const keyslot_handler *h,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	int r, key_size = LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(hdr, keyslot);
+
+	if (key_size < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
+	if (!*vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = h->open(cd, keyslot, password, password_len, (*vk)->key, (*vk)->keylength);
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d (%s) open failed with %d.", keyslot, h->name, r);
+	else
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, *vk, keyslot);
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
+		*vk = NULL;
+	}
+
+	crypt_volume_key_set_id(*vk, r);
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int LUKS2_open_and_verify_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int digest,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d validation failed.", keyslot);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = _keyslot_for_digest(hdr, keyslot, digest);
+	if (r) {
+		if (r == -ENOENT)
+			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d unusable for digest %d.", keyslot, digest);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return _open_and_verify(cd, hdr, h, keyslot, password, password_len, vk);
+}
+
 static int LUKS2_open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
@@ -244,46 +390,63 @@ static int LUKS2_open_and_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct volume_key **vk)
 {
 	const keyslot_handler *h;
-	int key_size, r;
+	int r;
 
 	if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)))
 		return -ENOENT;
 
 	r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
 	if (r) {
-		log_dbg("Keyslot %d validation failed.", keyslot);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d validation failed.", keyslot);
 		return r;
 	}
 
 	r = LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(hdr, keyslot, segment);
 	if (r) {
 		if (r == -ENOENT)
-			log_dbg("Keyslot %d unusable for segment %d.", keyslot, segment);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d unusable for segment %d.", keyslot, segment);
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	key_size = LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(hdr, segment);
-	if (key_size < 0)
-		key_size = LUKS2_get_keyslot_key_size(hdr, keyslot);
-	if (key_size < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	return _open_and_verify(cd, hdr, h, keyslot, password, password_len, vk);
+}
 
-	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
-	if (!*vk)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	crypt_keyslot_priority priority,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	int digest,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj;
+	crypt_keyslot_priority slot_priority;
+	int keyslot, r = -ENOENT;
 
-	r = h->open(cd, keyslot, password, password_len, (*vk)->key, (*vk)->keylength);
-	if (r < 0)
-		log_dbg("Keyslot %d (%s) open failed with %d.", keyslot, h->name, r);
-	else
-		r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, *vk, keyslot);
+	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots);
 
-	if (r < 0) {
-		crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
-		*vk = NULL;
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(val, "priority", &jobj))
+			slot_priority = CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+		else
+			slot_priority = json_object_get_int(jobj);
+
+		keyslot = atoi(slot);
+		if (slot_priority != priority) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d priority %d != %d (required), skipped.",
+				keyslot, slot_priority, priority);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		r = LUKS2_open_and_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, keyslot, digest, password, password_len, vk);
+
+		/* Do not retry for errors that are no -EPERM or -ENOENT,
+		   former meaning password wrong, latter key slot unusable for segment */
+		if ((r != -EPERM) && (r != -ENOENT))
+			break;
 	}
 
-	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+	return r;
 }
 
 static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -308,7 +471,7 @@ static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 		keyslot = atoi(slot);
 		if (slot_priority != priority) {
-			log_dbg("Keyslot %d priority %d != %d (required), skipped.",
+			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d priority %d != %d (required), skipped.",
 				keyslot, slot_priority, priority);
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -324,6 +487,79 @@ static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	return r;
 }
 
+static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	int digest,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	int r_prio, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (digest < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		r_prio = LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority_digest(cd, hdr, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_PREFER,
+			password, password_len, digest, vk);
+		if (r_prio >= 0)
+			r = r_prio;
+		else if (r_prio != -EPERM && r_prio != -ENOENT)
+			r = r_prio;
+		else
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_priority_digest(cd, hdr, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL,
+				password, password_len, digest, vk);
+		/* Prefer password wrong to no entry from priority slot */
+		if (r_prio == -EPERM && r == -ENOENT)
+			r = r_prio;
+	} else
+		r = LUKS2_open_and_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, keyslot, digest, password, password_len, vk);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_open_all_segments(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot_old,
+	int keyslot_new,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	struct volume_key **vks)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int digest_old, digest_new, r = -EINVAL;
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+	digest_old = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_old(hdr);
+	if (digest_old >= 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to unlock volume key (digest: %d) using keyslot %d.", digest_old, keyslot_old);
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_digest(cd, hdr, keyslot_old, digest_old, password, password_len, &vk);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		crypt_volume_key_add_next(vks, vk);
+	}
+
+	digest_new = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(hdr);
+	if (digest_new >= 0 && digest_old != digest_new) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to unlock volume key (digest: %d) using keyslot %d.", digest_new, keyslot_new);
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_digest(cd, hdr, keyslot_new, digest_new, password, password_len, &vk);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		crypt_volume_key_add_next(vks, vk);
+	}
+out:
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(*vks);
+		*vks = NULL;
+
+		if (r == -ENOMEM)
+			log_err(cd, _("Not enough available memory to open a keyslot."));
+		else if (r != -EPERM)
+			log_err(cd, _("Keyslot open failed."));
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
 int LUKS2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
 	int segment,
@@ -352,9 +588,71 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	} else
 		r = LUKS2_open_and_verify(cd, hdr, keyslot, segment, password, password_len, vk);
 
+	if (r < 0) {
+		if (r == -ENOMEM)
+			log_err(cd, _("Not enough available memory to open a keyslot."));
+		else if (r != -EPERM)
+			log_err(cd, _("Keyslot open failed."));
+	}
+
 	return r;
 }
 
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_allocate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	int r;
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* FIXME: find keyslot by type */
+	h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, "reencrypt");
+	if (!h)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = reenc_keyslot_alloc(cd, hdr, keyslot, params);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(cd, hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_IGNORE, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot validation failed.");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const void *buffer,
+	size_t buffer_length)
+{
+	const keyslot_handler *h;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!(h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler(cd, keyslot)) || strcmp(h->name, "reencrypt"))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot validation failed.");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	return h->store(cd, keyslot, NULL, 0,
+			buffer, buffer_length);
+}
+
 int LUKS2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	int keyslot,
@@ -384,17 +682,20 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 		r = h->update(cd, keyslot, params);
 		if (r) {
-			log_dbg("Failed to update keyslot %d json.", keyslot);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Failed to update keyslot %d json.", keyslot);
 			return r;
 		}
 	}
 
 	r = h->validate(cd, LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot));
 	if (r) {
-		log_dbg("Keyslot validation failed.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot validation failed.");
 		return r;
 	}
 
+	if (LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, hdr->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return h->store(cd, keyslot, password, password_len,
 			vk->key, vk->keylength);
 }
@@ -406,7 +707,6 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
 {
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
 	uint64_t area_offset, area_length;
-	char num[16];
 	int r;
 	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_keyslots;
 	const keyslot_handler *h;
@@ -421,23 +721,17 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -ENOENT;
 
 	if (wipe_area_only)
-		log_dbg("Wiping keyslot %d area only.", keyslot);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Wiping keyslot %d area only.", keyslot);
 
-	/* Just check that nobody uses the metadata now */
-	r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
-	if (r) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."),
-			device_path(device));
+	r = LUKS2_device_write_lock(cd, hdr, device);
+	if (r)
 		return r;
-	}
-	device_write_unlock(device);
 
 	/* secure deletion of possible key material in keyslot area */
 	r = crypt_keyslot_area(cd, keyslot, &area_offset, &area_length);
 	if (r && r != -ENOENT)
-		return r;
+		goto out;
 
-	/* We can destroy the binary keyslot area now without lock */
 	if (!r) {
 		r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, device, CRYPT_WIPE_SPECIAL, area_offset,
 			      area_length, area_length, NULL, NULL);
@@ -448,25 +742,27 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
 				r = -EINVAL;
 			} else
 				log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe device %s."), device_path(device));
-			return r;
+			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (wipe_area_only)
-		return r;
+		goto out;
 
 	/* Slot specific wipe */
 	if (h) {
 		r = h->wipe(cd, keyslot);
 		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
+			goto out;
 	} else
-		log_dbg("Wiping keyslot %d without specific-slot handler loaded.", keyslot);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Wiping keyslot %d without specific-slot handler loaded.", keyslot);
 
-	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
-	json_object_object_del(jobj_keyslots, num);
+	json_object_object_del_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot);
 
-	return LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+out:
+	device_write_unlock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+	return r;
 }
 
 int LUKS2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
@@ -518,10 +814,9 @@ int placeholder_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t volume_key_len)
 {
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
-	char num[16];
 	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area;
 
-	log_dbg("Allocating placeholder keyslot %d for LUKS1 down conversion.", keyslot);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Allocating placeholder keyslot %d for LUKS1 down conversion.", keyslot);
 
 	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -546,13 +841,11 @@ int placeholder_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	/* Area object */
 	jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(area_offset));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", json_object_new_uint64(area_length));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_length));
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area);
 
-	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
-
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslots, num, jobj_keyslot);
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot, jobj_keyslot);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -580,36 +873,61 @@ static unsigned LUKS2_get_keyslot_digests_count(json_object *hdr_jobj, int keysl
 }
 
 /* run only on header that passed basic format validation */
-int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(json_object *hdr_jobj)
+int LUKS2_keyslots_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
 {
 	const keyslot_handler *h;
 	int keyslot;
 	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_type;
+	uint32_t reqs, reencrypt_count = 0;
+	struct luks2_hdr dummy = {
+		.jobj = hdr_jobj
+	};
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (LUKS2_config_get_requirements(cd, &dummy, &reqs))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_keyslots, slot, val) {
 		keyslot = atoi(slot);
 		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "type", &jobj_type);
-		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(NULL, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
 		if (!h)
 			continue;
-		if (h->validate && h->validate(NULL, val)) {
-			log_dbg("Keyslot type %s validation failed on keyslot %d.", h->name, keyslot);
+		if (h->validate && h->validate(cd, val)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot type %s validation failed on keyslot %d.", h->name, keyslot);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		if (!strcmp(h->name, "luks2") && LUKS2_get_keyslot_digests_count(hdr_jobj, keyslot) != 1) {
-			log_dbg("Keyslot %d is not assigned to exactly 1 digest.", keyslot);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %d is not assigned to exactly 1 digest.", keyslot);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
+
+		if (!strcmp(h->name, "reencrypt"))
+			reencrypt_count++;
+	}
+
+	if ((reqs & CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT) && reencrypt_count == 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing reencryption keyslot.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(reqs & CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT) && reencrypt_count) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing reencryption requirement flag.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (reencrypt_count > 1) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Too many reencryption keyslots.");
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void LUKS2_keyslots_repair(json_object *jobj_keyslots)
+void LUKS2_keyslots_repair(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslots)
 {
 	const keyslot_handler *h;
 	json_object *jobj_type;
@@ -621,8 +939,30 @@ void LUKS2_keyslots_repair(json_object *jobj_keyslots)
 		    !json_object_is_type(jobj_type, json_type_string))
 			continue;
 
-		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(NULL, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+		h = LUKS2_keyslot_handler_type(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
 		if (h && h->repair)
-			h->repair(NULL, val);
+			h->repair(cd, val);
 	}
 }
+
+/* assumes valid header */
+int LUKS2_find_keyslot(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type)
+{
+	int i;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_type;
+
+	if (!type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX; i++) {
+		jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, i);
+		if (!jobj_keyslot)
+			continue;
+
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "type", &jobj_type);
+		if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_type), type))
+			return i;
+	}
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS2 type keyslot handler
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -28,63 +28,52 @@
 #define LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN 1000
 #define LUKS_STRIPES 4000
 
+/* Serialize memory-hard keyslot access: optional workaround for parallel processing */
+#define MIN_MEMORY_FOR_SERIALIZE_LOCK_KB 32*1024 /* 32MB */
+
 static int luks2_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 	const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
 	struct volume_key *vk, unsigned int sector,
 	struct crypt_device *cd)
 {
-	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
 #ifndef ENABLE_AF_ALG /* Support for old kernel without Crypto API */
-	int r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
-	if (r) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."), device_path(device));
-		return r;
-	}
-	r = LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(src, srcLength, cipher, cipher_mode, vk, sector, cd);
-	device_write_unlock(crypt_metadata_device(cd));
-	return r;
+	return LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(src, srcLength, cipher, cipher_mode, vk, sector, cd);
 #else
 	struct crypt_storage *s;
-	int devfd = -1, r;
+	int devfd, r;
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
 
 	/* Only whole sector writes supported */
-	if (srcLength % SECTOR_SIZE)
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(srcLength))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Encrypt buffer */
-	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength, false);
 	if (r) {
-		log_dbg("Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
-			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot use %s-%s cipher for keyslot encryption."), cipher, cipher_mode);
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	r = crypt_storage_encrypt(s, 0, srcLength / SECTOR_SIZE, src);
+	r = crypt_storage_encrypt(s, 0, srcLength, src);
 	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
-	if (r)
-		return r;
-
-	r = device_write_lock(cd, device);
 	if (r) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire write lock on device %s."),
-			device_path(device));
+		log_err(cd, _("IO error while encrypting keyslot."));
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	devfd = device_open_locked(device, O_RDWR);
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDWR);
 	if (devfd >= 0) {
-		if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+		if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 					  device_alignment(device), src,
 					  srcLength, sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
 			r = -EIO;
 		else
 			r = 0;
-		close(devfd);
+
+		device_sync(cd, device);
 	} else
 		r = -EIO;
 
-	device_write_unlock(device);
-
 	if (r)
 		log_err(cd, _("IO error while encrypting keyslot."));
 
@@ -104,20 +93,19 @@ static int luks2_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
 		return r;
 	}
 	r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(dst, dstLength, cipher, cipher_mode, vk, sector, cd);
-	device_read_unlock(crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+	device_read_unlock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
 	return r;
 #else
 	struct crypt_storage *s;
-	int devfd = -1, r;
+	int devfd, r;
 
 	/* Only whole sector writes supported */
-	if (dstLength % SECTOR_SIZE)
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(dstLength))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, SECTOR_SIZE, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength, false);
 	if (r) {
-		log_dbg("Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
-			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot use %s-%s cipher for keyslot encryption."), cipher, cipher_mode);
 		return r;
 	}
 
@@ -129,23 +117,22 @@ static int luks2_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
 		return r;
 	}
 
-	devfd = device_open_locked(device, O_RDONLY);
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
 	if (devfd >= 0) {
-		if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+		if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 					 device_alignment(device), dst,
 					 dstLength, sector * SECTOR_SIZE) < 0)
 			r = -EIO;
 		else
 			r = 0;
-		close(devfd);
 	} else
 		r = -EIO;
 
-	device_read_unlock(device);
+	device_read_unlock(cd, device);
 
 	/* Decrypt buffer */
 	if (!r)
-		r = crypt_storage_decrypt(s, 0, dstLength / SECTOR_SIZE, dst);
+		r = crypt_storage_decrypt(s, 0, dstLength, dst);
 	else
 		log_err(cd, _("IO error while decrypting keyslot."));
 
@@ -233,7 +220,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_set_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj2))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	area_offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj2);
+	area_offset = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj2);
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj2))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -279,10 +266,10 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_set_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	r = AF_split(volume_key, AfKey, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
+	r = AF_split(cd, volume_key, AfKey, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
 
 	if (r == 0) {
-		log_dbg("Updating keyslot area [0x%04x].", (unsigned)area_offset);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Updating keyslot area [0x%04x].", (unsigned)area_offset);
 		/* FIXME: sector_offset should be size_t, fix LUKS_encrypt... accordingly */
 		r = luks2_encrypt_to_storage(AfKey, AFEKSize, cipher, cipher_mode,
 				    derived_key, (unsigned)(area_offset / SECTOR_SIZE), cd);
@@ -310,6 +297,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_get_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	json_object *jobj2, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
 	uint64_t area_offset;
 	size_t keyslot_key_len;
+	bool try_serialize_lock = false;
 	int r;
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
@@ -325,7 +313,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_get_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj2))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	area_offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj2);
+	area_offset = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj2);
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj2))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -337,6 +325,13 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_get_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	keyslot_key_len = json_object_get_int(jobj2);
 
+	/*
+	 * If requested, serialize unlocking for memory-hard KDF. Usually NOOP.
+	 */
+	if (pbkdf.max_memory_kb > MIN_MEMORY_FOR_SERIALIZE_LOCK_KB)
+		try_serialize_lock = true;
+	if (try_serialize_lock && crypt_serialize_lock(cd))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	/*
 	 * Allocate derived key storage space.
 	 */
@@ -359,15 +354,18 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_get_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			pbkdf.iterations, pbkdf.max_memory_kb,
 			pbkdf.parallel_threads);
 
+	if (try_serialize_lock)
+		crypt_serialize_unlock(cd);
+
 	if (r == 0) {
-		log_dbg("Reading keyslot area [0x%04x].", (unsigned)area_offset);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Reading keyslot area [0x%04x].", (unsigned)area_offset);
 		/* FIXME: sector_offset should be size_t, fix LUKS_decrypt... accordingly */
 		r = luks2_decrypt_from_storage(AfKey, AFEKSize, cipher, cipher_mode,
 				      derived_key, (unsigned)(area_offset / SECTOR_SIZE), cd);
 	}
 
 	if (r == 0)
-		r = AF_merge(AfKey, volume_key, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
+		r = AF_merge(cd, AfKey, volume_key, volume_key_len, LUKS_STRIPES, af_hash);
 
 	crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
 	crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
@@ -386,27 +384,25 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_update_json(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
 {
 	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf;
-	json_object *jobj_af, *jobj_area, *jobj_kdf, *jobj1;
+	json_object *jobj_af, *jobj_area, *jobj_kdf;
 	char salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE], *salt_base64 = NULL;
-	int r, keyslot_key_len;
+	int r;
 
 	/* jobj_keyslot is not yet validated */
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "af", &jobj_af) ||
-	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area) ||
-	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "key_size", &jobj1))
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/* we do not allow any 'area' object modifications yet */
-	keyslot_key_len = json_object_get_int(jobj1);
-	if (keyslot_key_len < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	/* update area encryption parameters */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "encryption", json_object_new_string(params->area.raw.encryption));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "key_size", json_object_new_int(params->area.raw.key_size));
 
 	pbkdf = crypt_get_pbkdf_type(cd);
 	if (!pbkdf)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(cd, CONST_CAST(struct crypt_pbkdf_type *)pbkdf, keyslot_key_len);
+	r = crypt_benchmark_pbkdf_internal(cd, CONST_CAST(struct crypt_pbkdf_type *)pbkdf, params->area.raw.key_size);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
@@ -440,7 +436,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_update_json(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	/* update 'af' hash */
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_af, "hash", json_object_new_string(params->af.luks1.hash));
 
-	JSON_DBG(jobj_keyslot, "Keyslot JSON");
+	JSON_DBG(cd, jobj_keyslot, "Keyslot JSON:");
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -450,16 +446,15 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const struct luks2_keyslot_params *params)
 {
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
-	char num[16];
 	uint64_t area_offset, area_length;
 	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_af, *jobj_area;
 	int r;
 
-	log_dbg("Trying to allocate LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to allocate LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
 
 	if (!params || params->area_type != LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AREA_RAW ||
 	    params->af_type != LUKS2_KEYSLOT_AF_LUKS1) {
-		log_dbg("Invalid LUKS2 keyslot parameters.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Invalid LUKS2 keyslot parameters.");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -467,13 +462,13 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
-		keyslot = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(hdr, "luks2");
+		keyslot = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(hdr);
 
 	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot)) {
-		log_dbg("Cannot modify already active keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot modify already active keyslot %d.", keyslot);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -481,8 +476,10 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	r = LUKS2_find_area_gap(cd, hdr, volume_key_len, &area_offset, &area_length);
-	if (r < 0)
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("No space for new keyslot."));
 		return r;
+	}
 
 	jobj_keyslot = json_object_new_object();
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "type", json_object_new_string("luks2"));
@@ -497,25 +494,21 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	/* Area object */
 	jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "type", json_object_new_string("raw"));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "encryption", json_object_new_string(params->area.raw.encryption));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "key_size", json_object_new_int(params->area.raw.key_size));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(area_offset));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", json_object_new_uint64(area_length));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_length));
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area);
 
-	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
-
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslots, num, jobj_keyslot);
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot, jobj_keyslot);
 
 	r = luks2_keyslot_update_json(cd, jobj_keyslot, params);
 
-	if (!r && LUKS2_check_json_size(hdr)) {
-		log_dbg("Not enough space in header json area for new keyslot.");
+	if (!r && LUKS2_check_json_size(cd, hdr)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough space in header json area for new keyslot.");
 		r = -ENOSPC;
 	}
 
 	if (r)
-		json_object_object_del(jobj_keyslots, num);
+		json_object_object_del_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot);
 
 	return r;
 }
@@ -530,7 +523,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
 	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
 
-	log_dbg("Trying to open LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to open LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
 
 	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -559,7 +552,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
 	int r;
 
-	log_dbg("Calculating attributes for LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Calculating attributes for LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
 
 	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -568,17 +561,19 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (!jobj_keyslot)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	r = LUKS2_device_write_lock(cd, hdr, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+	if(r)
+		return r;
+
 	r = luks2_keyslot_set_key(cd, jobj_keyslot,
 				  password, password_len,
 				  volume_key, volume_key_len);
-	if (r < 0)
-		return r;
+	if (!r)
+		r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
 
-	r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
-	if (r < 0)
-		return r;
+	device_write_unlock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
 
-	return keyslot;
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
 }
 
 static int luks2_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
@@ -611,6 +606,9 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
 	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "encryption", &jobj1);
 	log_std(cd, "\tCipher:     %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
 
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "key_size", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tCipher key: %u bits\n", crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj1) * 8);
+
 	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj1);
 	log_std(cd, "\tPBKDF:      %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
 
@@ -619,7 +617,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
 		log_std(cd, "\tHash:       %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
 
 		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "iterations", &jobj1);
-		log_std(cd, "\tIterations: %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_uint64(jobj1));
+		log_std(cd, "\tIterations: %" PRIu64 "\n", crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj1));
 	} else {
 		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "time", &jobj1);
 		log_std(cd, "\tTime cost:  %" PRIu64 "\n", json_object_get_int64(jobj1));
@@ -638,11 +636,14 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
 	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "stripes", &jobj1);
 	log_std(cd, "\tAF stripes: %u\n", json_object_get_int(jobj1));
 
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "hash", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tAF hash:    %s\n", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+
 	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj1);
-	log_std(cd, "\tArea offset:%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", json_object_get_uint64(jobj1));
+	log_std(cd, "\tArea offset:%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj1));
 
 	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "size", &jobj1);
-	log_std(cd, "\tArea length:%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", json_object_get_uint64(jobj1));
+	log_std(cd, "\tArea length:%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj1));
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -663,31 +664,31 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_key
 
 	count = json_object_object_length(jobj_kdf);
 
-	jobj1 = json_contains(jobj_kdf, "", "kdf section", "type", json_type_string);
+	jobj1 = json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "", "kdf section", "type", json_type_string);
 	if (!jobj1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	type = json_object_get_string(jobj1);
 
 	if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2)) {
 		if (count != 4 || /* type, salt, hash, iterations only */
-		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "hash", json_type_string) ||
-		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "iterations", json_type_int) ||
-		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt", json_type_string))
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "hash", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "iterations", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt", json_type_string))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else if (!strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2I) || !strcmp(type, CRYPT_KDF_ARGON2ID)) {
 		if (count != 5 || /* type, salt, time, memory, cpus only */
-		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "time", json_type_int) ||
-		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "memory", json_type_int) ||
-		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "cpus", json_type_int) ||
-		    !json_contains(jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt", json_type_string))
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "time", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "memory", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "cpus", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_kdf, "kdf type", type, "salt", json_type_string))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "type", &jobj1))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), "luks1")) {
-		if (!json_contains(jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "hash", json_type_string) ||
-		    !json_contains(jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "stripes", json_type_int))
+		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "hash", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_af, "", "luks1 af", "stripes", json_type_int))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -696,10 +697,10 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_key
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj1))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj1), "raw")) {
-		if (!json_contains(jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "encryption", json_type_string) ||
-		    !json_contains(jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "key_size", json_type_int) ||
-		    !json_contains(jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "offset", json_type_string) ||
-		    !json_contains(jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "size", json_type_string))
+		if (!json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "encryption", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "key_size", json_type_int) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "offset", json_type_string) ||
+		    !json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "area", "raw type", "size", json_type_string))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -715,7 +716,7 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
 	int r;
 
-	log_dbg("Updating LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Updating LUKS2 keyslot %d.", keyslot);
 
 	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -726,8 +727,8 @@ static int luks2_keyslot_update(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	r = luks2_keyslot_update_json(cd, jobj_keyslot, params);
 
-	if (!r && LUKS2_check_json_size(hdr)) {
-		log_dbg("Not enough space in header json area for updated keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+	if (!r && LUKS2_check_json_size(cd, hdr)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough space in header json area for updated keyslot %d.", keyslot);
 		r = -ENOSPC;
 	}
 

lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c

@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, reencryption keyslot handler
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021, Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password,
+	size_t password_len,
+	char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_len)
+{
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+int reenc_keyslot_alloc(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
+{
+	int r;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslots, *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area;
+	uint64_t area_offset, area_length;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Allocating reencrypt keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "keyslots", &jobj_keyslots))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* encryption doesn't require area (we shift data and backup will be available) */
+	if (!params->data_shift) {
+		r = LUKS2_find_area_max_gap(cd, hdr, &area_offset, &area_length);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	} else { /* we can't have keyslot w/o area...bug? */
+		r = LUKS2_find_area_gap(cd, hdr, 1, &area_offset, &area_length);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	jobj_keyslot = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	jobj_area = json_object_new_object();
+
+	if (params->data_shift) {
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "type", json_object_new_string("datashift"));
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "shift_size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(params->data_shift << SECTOR_SHIFT));
+	} else
+		/* except data shift protection, initial setting is irrelevant. Type can be changed during reencryption */
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "type", json_object_new_string("none"));
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_length));
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "type", json_object_new_string("reencrypt"));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "key_size", json_object_new_int(1)); /* useless but mandatory */
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "mode", json_object_new_string(crypt_reencrypt_mode_to_str(params->mode)));
+	if (params->direction == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_FORWARD)
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "direction", json_object_new_string("forward"));
+	else if (params->direction == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_BACKWARD)
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "direction", json_object_new_string("backward"));
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_keyslot, "area", jobj_area);
+
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot, jobj_keyslot);
+	if (LUKS2_check_json_size(cd, hdr)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "New keyslot too large to fit in free metadata space.");
+		json_object_object_del_by_uint(jobj_keyslots, keyslot);
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	}
+
+	JSON_DBG(cd, hdr->jobj, "JSON:");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_store_data(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot,
+	const void *buffer, size_t buffer_len)
+{
+	int devfd, r;
+	json_object *jobj_area, *jobj_offset, *jobj_length;
+	uint64_t area_offset, area_length;
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj_offset) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "size", &jobj_length))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	area_offset = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj_offset);
+	area_length = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj_length);
+
+	if (!area_offset || !area_length || ((uint64_t)buffer_len > area_length))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	devfd = device_open_locked(cd, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd >= 0) {
+		if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+					  device_alignment(device), CONST_CAST(void *)buffer,
+					  buffer_len, area_offset) < 0)
+			r = -EIO;
+		else
+			r = 0;
+	} else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("IO error while encrypting keyslot."));
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_store(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *password __attribute__((unused)),
+	size_t password_len __attribute__((unused)),
+	const char *buffer,
+	size_t buffer_len)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (!cd || !buffer || !buffer_len)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Reencrypt keyslot %d store.", keyslot);
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = LUKS2_device_write_lock(cd, hdr, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = reenc_keyslot_store_data(cd, jobj_keyslot, buffer, buffer_len);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		device_write_unlock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr);
+
+	device_write_unlock(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd));
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_wipe(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot)
+{
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+
+	if (!(hdr = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* remove reencryption verification data */
+	LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj_direction, *jobj_mode, *jobj_resilience,
+		    *jobj1;
+
+	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2), keyslot);
+	if (!jobj_keyslot)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "direction", &jobj_direction) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "mode", &jobj_mode) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_resilience))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_std(cd, "\t%-12s%s\n", "Mode:", json_object_get_string(jobj_mode));
+	log_std(cd, "\t%-12s%s\n", "Direction:", json_object_get_string(jobj_direction));
+	log_std(cd, "\t%-12s%s\n", "Resilience:", json_object_get_string(jobj_resilience));
+
+	if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_resilience), "checksum")) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "hash", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\t%-12s%s\n", "Hash:", json_object_get_string(jobj1));
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "sector_size", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\t%-12s%d [bytes]\n", "Hash data:", json_object_get_int(jobj1));
+	} else if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj_resilience), "datashift")) {
+		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "shift_size", &jobj1);
+		log_std(cd, "\t%-12s%" PRIu64 "[bytes]\n", "Shift size:", crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj1));
+	}
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tArea offset:%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj1));
+
+	json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "size", &jobj1);
+	log_std(cd, "\tArea length:%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj1));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int reenc_keyslot_validate(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *jobj_keyslot)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_mode, *jobj_area, *jobj_type, *jobj_shift_size, *jobj_hash, *jobj_sector_size, *jobj_direction, *jobj_key_size;
+	const char *mode, *type, *direction;
+	uint32_t sector_size;
+	uint64_t shift_size;
+
+	/* mode (string: encrypt,reencrypt,decrypt)
+	 * direction (string:)
+	 * area {
+	 *   type: (string: datashift, journal, checksum, none)
+	 *   	hash: (string: checksum only)
+	 *   	sector_size (uint32: checksum only)
+	 *   	shift_size (uint64: datashift only)
+	 * }
+	 */
+
+	/* area and area type are validated in general validation code */
+	if (!jobj_keyslot || !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	jobj_key_size = json_contains(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "reencrypt keyslot", "key_size", json_type_int);
+	jobj_mode = json_contains(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "reencrypt keyslot", "mode", json_type_string);
+	jobj_direction = json_contains(cd, jobj_keyslot, "", "reencrypt keyslot", "direction", json_type_string);
+
+	if (!jobj_mode || !jobj_direction || !jobj_key_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!validate_json_uint32(jobj_key_size) || crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj_key_size) != 1) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Illegal reencrypt key size.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	mode = json_object_get_string(jobj_mode);
+	type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type);
+	direction = json_object_get_string(jobj_direction);
+
+	if (strcmp(mode, "reencrypt") && strcmp(mode, "encrypt") &&
+	    strcmp(mode, "decrypt")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Illegal reencrypt mode %s.", mode);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(direction, "forward") && strcmp(direction, "backward")) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Illegal reencrypt direction %s.", direction);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, "checksum")) {
+		jobj_hash = json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "type:checksum", "Keyslot area", "hash", json_type_string);
+		jobj_sector_size = json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "type:checksum", "Keyslot area", "sector_size", json_type_int);
+		if (!jobj_hash || !jobj_sector_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!validate_json_uint32(jobj_sector_size))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		sector_size = crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj_sector_size);
+		if (sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE || NOTPOW2(sector_size)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Invalid sector_size (%" PRIu32 ") for checksum resilience mode.", sector_size);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, "datashift")) {
+		if (!(jobj_shift_size = json_contains(cd, jobj_area, "type:datashift", "Keyslot area", "shift_size", json_type_string)))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		shift_size = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj_shift_size);
+		if (!shift_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (MISALIGNED_512(shift_size)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Shift size field has to be aligned to sector size: %" PRIu32, SECTOR_SIZE);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const keyslot_handler reenc_keyslot = {
+	.name  = "reencrypt",
+	.open  = reenc_keyslot_open,
+	.store = reenc_keyslot_store, /* initialization only or also per every chunk write */
+	.wipe  = reenc_keyslot_wipe,
+	.dump  = reenc_keyslot_dump,
+	.validate  = reenc_keyslot_validate
+};

lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, LUKS1 conversion code
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Ondrej Kozina. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2015-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Ondrej Kozina
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -24,6 +24,14 @@
 #include "../luks1/luks.h"
 #include "../luks1/af.h"
 
+int LUKS2_check_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      size_t keylength,
+		      const char *cipher,
+		      const char *cipher_mode)
+{
+	return LUKS_check_cipher(cd, keylength, cipher, cipher_mode);
+}
+
 static int json_luks1_keyslot(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, int keyslot, struct json_object **keyslot_object)
 {
 	char *base64_str, cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L+LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
@@ -83,8 +91,8 @@ static int json_luks1_keyslot(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, int keyslot, struc
 	}
 	area_size = offs_b - offs_a;
 	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "key_size", json_object_new_int(hdr_v1->keyBytes));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(offset));
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", json_object_new_uint64(area_size));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(area_size));
 	json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, "area", jobj_area);
 
 	*keyslot_object = keyslot_obj;
@@ -93,24 +101,22 @@ static int json_luks1_keyslot(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, int keyslot, struc
 
 static int json_luks1_keyslots(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **keyslots_object)
 {
-	char keyslot_str[2];
-	int key_slot, r;
+	int keyslot, r;
 	struct json_object *keyslot_obj, *field;
 
 	keyslot_obj = json_object_new_object();
 	if (!keyslot_obj)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	for (key_slot = 0; key_slot < LUKS_NUMKEYS; key_slot++) {
-		if (hdr_v1->keyblock[key_slot].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
+	for (keyslot = 0; keyslot < LUKS_NUMKEYS; keyslot++) {
+		if (hdr_v1->keyblock[keyslot].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
 			continue;
-		r = json_luks1_keyslot(hdr_v1, key_slot, &field);
+		r = json_luks1_keyslot(hdr_v1, keyslot, &field);
 		if (r) {
 			json_object_put(keyslot_obj);
 			return r;
 		}
-		(void) snprintf(keyslot_str, sizeof(keyslot_str), "%d", key_slot);
-		json_object_object_add(keyslot_obj, keyslot_str, field);
+		json_object_object_add_by_uint(keyslot_obj, keyslot, field);
 	}
 
 	*keyslots_object = keyslot_obj;
@@ -139,7 +145,7 @@ static int json_luks1_segment(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object
 	/* offset field */
 	number = (uint64_t)hdr_v1->payloadOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
 
-	field = json_object_new_uint64(number);
+	field = crypt_jobj_new_uint64(number);
 	if (!field) {
 		json_object_put(segment_obj);
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -190,7 +196,6 @@ static int json_luks1_segment(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object
 
 static int json_luks1_segments(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **segments_object)
 {
-	char num[16];
 	int r;
 	struct json_object *segments_obj, *field;
 
@@ -203,8 +208,7 @@ static int json_luks1_segments(const struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_objec
 		json_object_put(segments_obj);
 		return r;
 	}
-	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%u", CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
-	json_object_object_add(segments_obj, num, field);
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(segments_obj, 0, field);
 
 	*segments_object = segments_obj;
 	return 0;
@@ -397,8 +401,9 @@ static int json_luks1_object(struct luks_phdr *hdr_v1, struct json_object **luks
 	json_object_object_add(luks1_obj, "config", field);
 
 	json_size = LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
-	json_object_object_add(field, "json_size", json_object_new_uint64(json_size));
-	json_object_object_add(field, "keyslots_size", json_object_new_uint64(keyslots_size));
+	json_object_object_add(field, "json_size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(json_size));
+	keyslots_size -= (keyslots_size % 4096);
+	json_object_object_add(field, "keyslots_size", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(keyslots_size));
 
 	*luks1_object = luks1_obj;
 	return 0;
@@ -414,8 +419,8 @@ static void move_keyslot_offset(json_object *jobj, int offset_add)
 		UNUSED(key);
 		json_object_object_get_ex(val, "area", &jobj_area);
 		json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj2);
-		offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj2) + offset_add;
-		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", json_object_new_uint64(offset));
+		offset = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj2) + offset_add;
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_area, "offset", crypt_jobj_new_uint64(offset));
 	}
 }
 
@@ -423,46 +428,46 @@ static void move_keyslot_offset(json_object *jobj, int offset_add)
 static int move_keyslot_areas(struct crypt_device *cd, off_t offset_from,
 			      off_t offset_to, size_t buf_size)
 {
+	int devfd, r = -EIO;
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
 	void *buf = NULL;
-	int r = -EIO, devfd = -1;
 
-	log_dbg("Moving keyslot areas of size %zu from %jd to %jd.",
+	log_dbg(cd, "Moving keyslot areas of size %zu from %jd to %jd.",
 		buf_size, (intmax_t)offset_from, (intmax_t)offset_to);
 
 	if (posix_memalign(&buf, crypt_getpagesize(), buf_size))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
-	if (devfd == -1) {
+	devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
 		free(buf);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
 	/* This can safely fail (for block devices). It only allocates space if it is possible. */
 	if (posix_fallocate(devfd, offset_to, buf_size))
-		log_dbg("Preallocation (fallocate) of new keyslot area not available.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Preallocation (fallocate) of new keyslot area not available.");
 
 	/* Try to read *new* area to check that area is there (trimmed backup). */
-	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 				 device_alignment(device), buf, buf_size,
 				 offset_to)!= (ssize_t)buf_size)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 				 device_alignment(device), buf, buf_size,
 				 offset_from)!= (ssize_t)buf_size)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device),
+	if (write_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
 				  device_alignment(device), buf, buf_size,
 				  offset_to) != (ssize_t)buf_size)
 		goto out;
 
 	r = 0;
 out:
-	close(devfd);
-	crypt_memzero(buf, buf_size);
+	device_sync(cd, device);
+	crypt_safe_memzero(buf, buf_size);
 	free(buf);
 
 	return r;
@@ -472,9 +477,9 @@ static int luks_header_in_use(struct crypt_device *cd)
 {
 	int r;
 
-	r = lookup_dm_dev_by_uuid(crypt_get_uuid(cd), crypt_get_type(cd));
+	r = lookup_dm_dev_by_uuid(cd, crypt_get_uuid(cd), crypt_get_type(cd));
 	if (r < 0)
-		log_err(cd, _("Can not check status of device with uuid: %s."), crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot check status of device with uuid: %s."), crypt_get_uuid(cd));
 
 	return r;
 }
@@ -482,29 +487,28 @@ static int luks_header_in_use(struct crypt_device *cd)
 /* Check if there is a luksmeta area (foreign metadata created by the luksmeta package) */
 static int luksmeta_header_present(struct crypt_device *cd, off_t luks1_size)
 {
+	int devfd, r = 0;
 	static const uint8_t LM_MAGIC[] = { 'L', 'U', 'K', 'S', 'M', 'E', 'T', 'A' };
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
 	void *buf = NULL;
-	int devfd, r = 0;
 
 	if (posix_memalign(&buf, crypt_getpagesize(), sizeof(LM_MAGIC)))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
-	if (devfd == -1) {
+	devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd < 0) {
 		free(buf);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
 	/* Note: we must not detect failure as problem here, header can be trimmed. */
-	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), device_alignment(device),
+	if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device), device_alignment(device),
 		buf, sizeof(LM_MAGIC), luks1_size) == (ssize_t)sizeof(LM_MAGIC) &&
 		!memcmp(LM_MAGIC, buf, sizeof(LM_MAGIC))) {
 			log_err(cd, _("Unable to convert header with LUKSMETA additional metadata."));
 			r = -EBUSY;
 	}
 
-	close(devfd);
 	free(buf);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -515,7 +519,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
 	int r;
 	json_object *jobj = NULL;
 	size_t buf_size, buf_offset, luks1_size, luks1_shift = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
-	uint64_t max_size = crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	uint64_t required_size, max_size = crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE;
 
 	/* for detached headers max size == device size */
 	if (!max_size && (r = device_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), &max_size)))
@@ -527,20 +531,27 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (LUKS_keyslots_offset(hdr1) != (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
-		log_dbg("Unsupported keyslots material offset: %zu.", LUKS_keyslots_offset(hdr1));
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported keyslots material offset: %zu.", LUKS_keyslots_offset(hdr1));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (luksmeta_header_present(cd, luks1_size))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	log_dbg("Max size: %" PRIu64 ", LUKS1 (full) header size %zu , required shift: %zu",
+	log_dbg(cd, "Max size: %" PRIu64 ", LUKS1 (full) header size %zu , required shift: %zu",
 		max_size, luks1_size, luks1_shift);
-	if ((max_size - luks1_size) < luks1_shift) {
+
+	required_size = luks1_size + luks1_shift;
+
+	if ((max_size < required_size) &&
+	    device_fallocate(crypt_metadata_device(cd), required_size)) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Unable to move keyslot area. Not enough space."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (max_size < required_size)
+		max_size = required_size;
+
 	r = json_luks1_object(hdr1, &jobj, max_size - 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
@@ -562,7 +573,13 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
 	 * It duplicates check in LUKS2_hdr_write() but we don't want to move
 	 * keyslot areas in case it would fail later
 	 */
-	if (max_size < LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr2->jobj)) {
+	if (max_size < LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(hdr2)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check future LUKS2 metadata before moving keyslots area */
+	if (LUKS2_hdr_validate(cd, hdr2->jobj, hdr2->hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN)) {
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -576,6 +593,14 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
 	// move keyslots 4k -> 32k offset
 	buf_offset = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
 	buf_size   = luks1_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+
+	/* check future LUKS2 keyslots area is at least as large as LUKS1 keyslots area */
+	if (buf_size > LUKS2_keyslots_size(hdr2)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unable to move keyslot area. LUKS2 keyslots area too small."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	if ((r = move_keyslot_areas(cd, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, buf_offset, buf_size)) < 0) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Unable to move keyslot area."));
 		goto out;
@@ -584,16 +609,18 @@ int LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks_phdr *hdr1, struct
 	// Write JSON hdr2
 	r = LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr2);
 out:
-	LUKS2_hdr_free(hdr2);
+	LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, hdr2);
 
 	return r;
 }
 
-static int keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, uint32_t key_size)
+static int keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+				    int keyslot, uint32_t key_size, const char *hash)
 {
 	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_af;
 	uint64_t l2_offset, l2_length;
-	int ks_key_size;
+	size_t ks_key_size;
+	const char *ks_cipher, *data_cipher;
 
 	jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot);
 	if (!jobj_keyslot)
@@ -607,7 +634,9 @@ static int keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, uint32_t
 	jobj = NULL;
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf) ||
 	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "type", &jobj) ||
-	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2))
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), CRYPT_KDF_PBKDF2) ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "hash", &jobj) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), hash))
 		return 0;
 
 	jobj = NULL;
@@ -618,14 +647,16 @@ static int keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, uint32_t
 
 	jobj = NULL;
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_af, "hash", &jobj) ||
-	    crypt_hash_size(json_object_get_string(jobj)) < 0)
+	    (crypt_hash_size(json_object_get_string(jobj)) < 0) ||
+	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), hash))
 		return 0;
 
 	/* FIXME: should this go to validation code instead (aka invalid luks2 header if assigned to segment 0)? */
 	/* FIXME: check all keyslots are assigned to segment id 0, and segments count == 1 */
-	ks_key_size = LUKS2_get_keyslot_key_size(hdr, keyslot);
-	if (ks_key_size < 0 || (int)key_size != LUKS2_get_keyslot_key_size(hdr, keyslot)) {
-		log_dbg("Key length in keyslot %d is different from volume key length", keyslot);
+	ks_cipher = LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(hdr, keyslot, &ks_key_size);
+	data_cipher = LUKS2_get_cipher(hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (!ks_cipher || !data_cipher || key_size != ks_key_size || strcmp(ks_cipher, data_cipher)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cipher in keyslot %d is different from volume key encryption.", keyslot);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -633,7 +664,7 @@ static int keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, uint32_t
 		return 0;
 
 	if (l2_length != (size_round_up(AF_split_sectors(key_size, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE, 4096))) {
-		log_dbg("Area length in LUKS2 keyslot (%d) is not compatible with LUKS1", keyslot);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Area length in LUKS2 keyslot (%d) is not compatible with LUKS1", keyslot);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -646,6 +677,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 	size_t buf_size, buf_offset;
 	char cipher[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L], cipher_mode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L];
 	char digest[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE], digest_salt[LUKS_SALTSIZE];
+	const char *hash;
 	size_t len;
 	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_digest, *jobj_segment, *jobj_kdf, *jobj_area, *jobj1, *jobj2;
 	uint32_t key_size;
@@ -661,6 +693,11 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 	if (!jobj_segment)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (json_segment_get_sector_size(jobj_segment) != SECTOR_SIZE) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - default segment encryption sector size is not 512 bytes."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr2->jobj, "digests", &jobj1);
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "type", &jobj2) ||
 	    strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj2), "pbkdf2") ||
@@ -668,12 +705,15 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - key slot digests are not LUKS1 compatible."));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "hash", &jobj2))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	hash = json_object_get_string(jobj2);
 
 	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(hdr2, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT), cipher, NULL, cipher_mode);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
-	if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher)) {
+	if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher, cipher_mode)) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - device uses wrapped key cipher %s."), cipher);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -705,7 +745,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
-		if (!keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(hdr2, i, key_size)) {
+		if (!keyslot_LUKS1_compatible(cd, hdr2, i, key_size, hash)) {
 			log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert to LUKS1 format - keyslot %u is not LUKS1 compatible."), i);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -724,7 +764,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 				return -EINVAL;
 			if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "offset", &jobj1))
 				return -EINVAL;
-			offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj1);
+			offset = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj1);
 		} else {
 			if (LUKS2_find_area_gap(cd, hdr2, key_size, &offset, &area_length))
 				return -EINVAL;
@@ -756,7 +796,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 
 		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "iterations", &jobj1))
 			continue;
-		hdr1->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = json_object_get_uint32(jobj1);
+		hdr1->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj1);
 
 		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_kdf, "salt", &jobj1))
 			continue;
@@ -784,8 +824,10 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
-	strncpy(hdr1->cipherName, cipher, sizeof(hdr1->cipherName) - 1);
-	strncpy(hdr1->cipherMode, cipher_mode, sizeof(hdr1->cipherMode) - 1);
+	strncpy(hdr1->cipherName, cipher, LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L - 1);
+	hdr1->cipherName[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(hdr1->cipherMode, cipher_mode, LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L - 1);
+	hdr1->cipherMode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1] = '\0';
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "kdf", &jobj_kdf))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -797,7 +839,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "iterations", &jobj1))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	hdr1->mkDigestIterations = json_object_get_uint32(jobj1);
+	hdr1->mkDigestIterations = crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj1);
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_digest, "digest", &jobj1))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -822,13 +864,14 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "offset", &jobj1))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	offset = json_object_get_uint64(jobj1) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+	offset = crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj1) / SECTOR_SIZE;
 	if (offset > UINT32_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/* FIXME: LUKS1 requires offset == 0 || offset >= luks1_hdr_size */
 	hdr1->payloadOffset = offset;
 
-	strncpy(hdr1->uuid, hdr2->uuid, UUID_STRING_L - 1); /* max 36 chars */
+	strncpy(hdr1->uuid, hdr2->uuid, UUID_STRING_L); /* max 36 chars */
+	hdr1->uuid[UUID_STRING_L-1] = '\0';
 
 	memcpy(hdr1->magic, luksMagic, LUKS_MAGIC_L);
 
@@ -840,7 +883,7 @@ int LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr2, struct
 
 	// move keyslots 32k -> 4k offset
 	buf_offset = 2 * LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN;
-	buf_size   = LUKS2_keyslots_size(hdr2->jobj);
+	buf_size   = LUKS2_keyslots_size(hdr2);
 	r = move_keyslot_areas(cd, buf_offset, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, buf_size);
 	if (r < 0) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Unable to move keyslot area."));

lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt_digest.c

@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, reencryption digest helpers
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2022, Ondrej Kozina
+ * Copyright (C) 2022, Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#define MAX_STR 64
+
+struct jtype {
+	enum { JNONE = 0, JSTR, JU64, JX64, JU32 } type;
+	json_object *jobj;
+	const char *id;
+};
+
+static size_t sr(struct jtype *j, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+	size_t len = 0;
+	uint64_t u64;
+	uint32_t u32;
+
+	if (!json_object_is_type(j->jobj, json_type_object))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(j->jobj, j->id, &jobj))
+		return 0;
+
+	switch(j->type) {
+	case JSTR: /* JSON string */
+		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
+			return 0;
+		len = strlen(json_object_get_string(jobj));
+		if (len > MAX_STR)
+			return 0;
+		if (ptr)
+			memcpy(ptr, json_object_get_string(jobj), len);
+		break;
+	case JU64: /* Unsigned 64bit integer stored as string */
+		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
+			break;
+		len = sizeof(u64);
+		if (ptr) {
+			u64 = cpu_to_be64(crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj));
+			memcpy(ptr, &u64, len);
+		}
+		break;
+	case JX64: /* Unsigned 64bit segment size (allows "dynamic") */
+		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_string))
+			break;
+		if (!strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), "dynamic")) {
+			len = strlen("dynamic");
+			if (ptr)
+				memcpy(ptr, json_object_get_string(jobj), len);
+		} else {
+			len = sizeof(u64);
+			u64 = cpu_to_be64(crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj));
+			if (ptr)
+				memcpy(ptr, &u64, len);
+		}
+		break;
+	case JU32: /* Unsigned 32bit integer, stored as JSON int */
+		if (!json_object_is_type(jobj, json_type_int))
+			return 0;
+		len =  sizeof(u32);
+		if (ptr) {
+			u32 = cpu_to_be32(crypt_jobj_get_uint32(jobj));
+			memcpy(ptr, &u32, len);
+		}
+		break;
+	case JNONE:
+		return 0;
+	};
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+static size_t srs(struct jtype j[], uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+	size_t l, len = 0;
+
+	while(j->jobj) {
+		l = sr(j, ptr);
+		if (!l)
+			return 0;
+		len += l;
+		if (ptr)
+			ptr += l;
+		j++;
+	}
+	return len;
+}
+
+static size_t segment_linear_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	struct jtype j[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_segment, "offset" },
+		{ JX64, jobj_segment, "size" },
+		{}
+	};
+	return srs(j, buffer);
+}
+
+static size_t segment_crypt_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	struct jtype j[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_segment, "offset" },
+		{ JX64, jobj_segment, "size" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_segment, "iv_tweak" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_segment, "encryption" },
+		{ JU32, jobj_segment, "sector_size" },
+		{}
+	};
+	return srs(j, buffer);
+}
+
+static size_t segment_serialize(json_object *jobj_segment, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_type;
+	const char *segment_type;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "type", &jobj_type))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(segment_type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(segment_type, "crypt"))
+		return segment_crypt_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer);
+	else if (!strcmp(segment_type, "linear"))
+		return segment_linear_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static size_t backup_segments_serialize(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_segment;
+	size_t l, len = 0;
+
+	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-previous");
+	if (!jobj_segment || !(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
+		return 0;
+	len += l;
+	if (buffer)
+		buffer += l;
+
+	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-final");
+	if (!jobj_segment || !(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
+		return 0;
+	len += l;
+	if (buffer)
+		buffer += l;
+
+	jobj_segment = LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(hdr, "backup-moved-segment");
+	if (jobj_segment) {
+		if (!(l = segment_serialize(jobj_segment, buffer)))
+			return 0;
+		len += l;
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+static size_t reenc_keyslot_serialize(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_keyslot, *jobj_area, *jobj_type;
+	const char *area_type;
+	int keyslot_reencrypt;
+
+	keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
+	if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(jobj_keyslot = LUKS2_get_keyslot_jobj(hdr, keyslot_reencrypt)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_keyslot, "area", &jobj_area))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_area, "type", &jobj_type))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(area_type = json_object_get_string(jobj_type)))
+		return 0;
+
+	struct jtype j[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "offset" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "size" },
+		{}
+	};
+	struct jtype j_datashift[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "offset" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "size" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "shift_size" },
+		{}
+	};
+	struct jtype j_checksum[] = {
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "mode" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_keyslot, "direction" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "type" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "offset" },
+		{ JU64, jobj_area,    "size" },
+		{ JSTR, jobj_area,    "hash" },
+		{ JU32, jobj_area,    "sector_size" },
+		{}
+	};
+
+	if (!strcmp(area_type, "datashift"))
+		return srs(j_datashift, buffer);
+	else if (!strcmp(area_type, "checksum"))
+		return srs(j_checksum, buffer);
+
+	return srs(j, buffer);
+}
+
+static size_t blob_serialize(void *blob, size_t length, uint8_t *buffer)
+{
+	if (buffer)
+		memcpy(buffer, blob, length);
+
+	return length;
+}
+
+static int reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vks,
+	struct volume_key **verification_data)
+{
+	uint8_t *ptr;
+	int digest_new, digest_old;
+	struct volume_key *data = NULL, *vk_old = NULL, *vk_new = NULL;
+	size_t keyslot_data_len, segments_data_len, data_len = 2;
+
+	/* Keys - calculate length */
+	digest_new = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(hdr);
+	digest_old = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_old(hdr);
+
+	if (digest_old >= 0) {
+		vk_old = crypt_volume_key_by_id(vks, digest_old);
+		if (!vk_old)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		data_len += blob_serialize(vk_old->key, vk_old->keylength, NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (digest_new >= 0 && digest_old != digest_new) {
+		vk_new = crypt_volume_key_by_id(vks, digest_new);
+		if (!vk_new)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		data_len += blob_serialize(vk_new->key, vk_new->keylength, NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (data_len == 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Metadata - calculate length */
+	if (!(keyslot_data_len = reenc_keyslot_serialize(hdr, NULL)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	data_len += keyslot_data_len;
+
+	if (!(segments_data_len = backup_segments_serialize(hdr, NULL)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	data_len += segments_data_len;
+
+	/* Alloc and fill serialization data */
+	data = crypt_alloc_volume_key(data_len, NULL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ptr = (uint8_t*)data->key;
+
+	/* v2 */
+	*ptr++ = 0x76;
+	*ptr++ = 0x32;
+
+	if (vk_old)
+		ptr += blob_serialize(vk_old->key, vk_old->keylength, ptr);
+
+	if (vk_new)
+		ptr += blob_serialize(vk_new->key, vk_new->keylength, ptr);
+
+	if (!reenc_keyslot_serialize(hdr, ptr))
+		goto bad;
+	ptr += keyslot_data_len;
+
+	if (!backup_segments_serialize(hdr, ptr))
+		goto bad;
+	ptr += segments_data_len;
+
+	assert((size_t)(ptr - (uint8_t*)data->key) == data_len);
+
+	*verification_data = data;
+
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(data);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_keyslot_reencrypt_digest_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vks)
+{
+	int digest_reencrypt, keyslot_reencrypt, r;
+	struct volume_key *data;
+
+	keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
+	if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
+		return keyslot_reencrypt;
+
+	r = reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(cd, hdr, vks, &data);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", hdr, data);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(data);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	digest_reencrypt = r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot_reencrypt, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, hdr, keyslot_reencrypt, digest_reencrypt, 1, 0);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	struct volume_key *vks)
+{
+	int r, keyslot_reencrypt;
+	struct volume_key *data;
+
+	keyslot_reencrypt = LUKS2_find_keyslot(hdr, "reencrypt");
+	if (keyslot_reencrypt < 0)
+		return keyslot_reencrypt;
+
+	r = reencrypt_assembly_verification_data(cd, hdr, vks, &data);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, data, keyslot_reencrypt);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(data);
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		if (r == -ENOENT)
+			log_dbg(cd, "Reencryption digest is missing.");
+		log_err(cd, _("Reencryption metadata is invalid."));
+	} else
+		log_dbg(cd, "Reencryption metadata verified.");
+
+	return r;
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_segment.c

@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
+/*
+ * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, internal segment handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021, Ondrej Kozina
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include "luks2_internal.h"
+
+/* use only on already validated 'segments' object */
+uint64_t json_segments_get_minimal_offset(json_object *jobj_segments, unsigned blockwise)
+{
+	uint64_t tmp, min = blockwise ? UINT64_MAX >> SECTOR_SHIFT : UINT64_MAX;
+
+	if (!jobj_segments)
+		return 0;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_segments, key, val) {
+		UNUSED(key);
+
+		if (json_segment_is_backup(val))
+			continue;
+
+		tmp = json_segment_get_offset(val, blockwise);
+
+		if (!tmp)
+			return tmp;
+
+		if (tmp < min)
+			min = tmp;
+	}
+
+	return min;
+}
+
+uint64_t json_segment_get_offset(json_object *jobj_segment, unsigned blockwise)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	if (!jobj_segment ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "offset", &jobj))
+		return 0;
+
+	return blockwise ? crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj) >> SECTOR_SHIFT : crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj);
+}
+
+const char *json_segment_type(json_object *jobj_segment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	if (!jobj_segment ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "type", &jobj))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return json_object_get_string(jobj);
+}
+
+uint64_t json_segment_get_iv_offset(json_object *jobj_segment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	if (!jobj_segment ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "iv_tweak", &jobj))
+		return 0;
+
+	return crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj);
+}
+
+uint64_t json_segment_get_size(json_object *jobj_segment, unsigned blockwise)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	if (!jobj_segment ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "size", &jobj))
+		return 0;
+
+	return blockwise ? crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj) >> SECTOR_SHIFT : crypt_jobj_get_uint64(jobj);
+}
+
+const char *json_segment_get_cipher(json_object *jobj_segment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	/* FIXME: Pseudo "null" cipher should be handled elsewhere */
+	if (!jobj_segment ||
+	    !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "encryption", &jobj))
+		return "null";
+
+	return json_object_get_string(jobj);
+}
+
+int json_segment_get_sector_size(json_object *jobj_segment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	if (!jobj_segment ||
+            !json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "sector_size", &jobj))
+		return -1;
+
+	return json_object_get_int(jobj);
+}
+
+static json_object *json_segment_get_flags(json_object *jobj_segment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+
+	if (!jobj_segment || !(json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "flags", &jobj)))
+		return NULL;
+	return jobj;
+}
+
+bool json_segment_contains_flag(json_object *jobj_segment, const char *flag_str, size_t len)
+{
+	int r, i;
+	json_object *jobj, *jobj_flags = json_segment_get_flags(jobj_segment);
+
+	if (!jobj_flags)
+		return false;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (int)json_object_array_length(jobj_flags); i++) {
+		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_flags, i);
+		if (len)
+			r = strncmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), flag_str, len);
+		else
+			r = strcmp(json_object_get_string(jobj), flag_str);
+		if (!r)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+bool json_segment_is_backup(json_object *jobj_segment)
+{
+	return json_segment_contains_flag(jobj_segment, "backup-", 7);
+}
+
+json_object *json_segments_get_segment(json_object *jobj_segments, int segment)
+{
+	json_object *jobj;
+	char segment_name[16];
+
+	if (snprintf(segment_name, sizeof(segment_name), "%u", segment) < 1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segments, segment_name, &jobj))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return jobj;
+}
+
+unsigned json_segments_count(json_object *jobj_segments)
+{
+	unsigned count = 0;
+
+	if (!jobj_segments)
+		return 0;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_segments, slot, val) {
+		UNUSED(slot);
+		if (!json_segment_is_backup(val))
+			count++;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static void _get_segment_or_id_by_flag(json_object *jobj_segments, const char *flag, unsigned id, void *retval)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_flags, **jobj_ret = (json_object **)retval;
+	int *ret = (int *)retval;
+
+	if (!flag)
+		return;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_segments, key, value) {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(value, "flags", &jobj_flags))
+			continue;
+		if (LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_flags, flag)) {
+			if (id)
+				*ret = atoi(key);
+			else
+				*jobj_ret = value;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+void json_segment_remove_flag(json_object *jobj_segment, const char *flag)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_flags, *jobj_flags_new;
+
+	if (!jobj_segment)
+		return;
+
+	jobj_flags = json_segment_get_flags(jobj_segment);
+	if (!jobj_flags)
+		return;
+
+	jobj_flags_new = LUKS2_array_remove(jobj_flags, flag);
+	if (!jobj_flags_new)
+		return;
+
+	if (json_object_array_length(jobj_flags_new) <= 0) {
+		json_object_put(jobj_flags_new);
+		json_object_object_del(jobj_segment, "flags");
+	} else
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "flags", jobj_flags_new);
+}
+
+static json_object *_segment_create_generic(const char *type, uint64_t offset, const uint64_t *length)
+{
+	json_object *jobj = json_object_new_object();
+	if (!jobj)
+		return NULL;
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "type",		json_object_new_string(type));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "offset",		crypt_jobj_new_uint64(offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "size",		length ? crypt_jobj_new_uint64(*length) : json_object_new_string("dynamic"));
+
+	return jobj;
+}
+
+json_object *json_segment_create_linear(uint64_t offset, const uint64_t *length, unsigned reencryption)
+{
+	json_object *jobj = _segment_create_generic("linear", offset, length);
+	if (reencryption)
+		LUKS2_segment_set_flag(jobj, "in-reencryption");
+	return jobj;
+}
+
+json_object *json_segment_create_crypt(uint64_t offset,
+				  uint64_t iv_offset, const uint64_t *length,
+				  const char *cipher, uint32_t sector_size,
+				  unsigned reencryption)
+{
+	json_object *jobj = _segment_create_generic("crypt", offset, length);
+	if (!jobj)
+		return NULL;
+
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "iv_tweak",	crypt_jobj_new_uint64(iv_offset));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "encryption",	json_object_new_string(cipher));
+	json_object_object_add(jobj, "sector_size",	json_object_new_int(sector_size));
+	if (reencryption)
+		LUKS2_segment_set_flag(jobj, "in-reencryption");
+
+	return jobj;
+}
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_segment_offset(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment, unsigned blockwise)
+{
+	return json_segment_get_offset(LUKS2_get_segment_jobj(hdr, segment), blockwise);
+}
+
+int json_segments_segment_in_reencrypt(json_object *jobj_segments)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_flags;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_segments, slot, val) {
+		if (!json_object_object_get_ex(val, "flags", &jobj_flags) ||
+		    !LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_flags, "in-reencryption"))
+			continue;
+
+		return atoi(slot);
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+uint64_t LUKS2_segment_size(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment, unsigned blockwise)
+{
+	return json_segment_get_size(LUKS2_get_segment_jobj(hdr, segment), blockwise);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_segment_is_type(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int segment, const char *type)
+{
+	return !strcmp(json_segment_type(LUKS2_get_segment_jobj(hdr, segment)) ?: "", type);
+}
+
+int LUKS2_last_segment_by_type(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_segments;
+	int last_found = -1;
+
+	if (!type)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments))
+		return -1;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_segments, slot, val) {
+		if (json_segment_is_backup(val))
+			continue;
+		if (strcmp(type, json_segment_type(val) ?: ""))
+			continue;
+
+		if (atoi(slot) > last_found)
+			last_found = atoi(slot);
+	}
+
+	return last_found;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_segment_by_type(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *type)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_segments;
+	int first_found = -1;
+
+	if (!type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_segments, slot, val) {
+		if (json_segment_is_backup(val))
+			continue;
+		if (strcmp(type, json_segment_type(val) ?: ""))
+			continue;
+
+		if (first_found < 0)
+			first_found = atoi(slot);
+		else if (atoi(slot) < first_found)
+			first_found = atoi(slot);
+	}
+
+	return first_found;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_segment_first_unused_id(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_segments;
+	int id, last_id = -1;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	json_object_object_foreach(jobj_segments, slot, val) {
+		UNUSED(val);
+		id = atoi(slot);
+		if (id > last_id)
+			last_id = id;
+	}
+
+	return last_id + 1;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_segment_set_flag(json_object *jobj_segment, const char *flag)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_flags;
+
+	if (!jobj_segment || !flag)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_segment, "flags", &jobj_flags)) {
+		jobj_flags = json_object_new_array();
+		if (!jobj_flags)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		json_object_object_add(jobj_segment, "flags", jobj_flags);
+	}
+
+	if (LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_flags, flag))
+		return 0;
+
+	json_object_array_add(jobj_flags, json_object_new_string(flag));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_segments_set(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+		       json_object *jobj_segments, int commit)
+{
+	json_object_object_add(hdr->jobj, "segments", jobj_segments);
+
+	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
+}
+
+int LUKS2_get_segment_id_by_flag(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *flag)
+{
+	int ret = -ENOENT;
+	json_object *jobj_segments = LUKS2_get_segments_jobj(hdr);
+
+	if (jobj_segments)
+		_get_segment_or_id_by_flag(jobj_segments, flag, 1, &ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+json_object *LUKS2_get_segment_by_flag(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, const char *flag)
+{
+	json_object *jobj_segment = NULL,
+		    *jobj_segments = LUKS2_get_segments_jobj(hdr);
+
+	if (jobj_segments)
+		_get_segment_or_id_by_flag(jobj_segments, flag, 0, &jobj_segment);
+
+	return jobj_segment;
+}
+
+/* compares key characteristics of both segments */
+bool json_segment_cmp(json_object *jobj_segment_1, json_object *jobj_segment_2)
+{
+	const char *type = json_segment_type(jobj_segment_1);
+	const char *type2 = json_segment_type(jobj_segment_2);
+
+	if (!type || !type2)
+		return false;
+
+	if (strcmp(type, type2))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!strcmp(type, "crypt"))
+		return (json_segment_get_sector_size(jobj_segment_1) == json_segment_get_sector_size(jobj_segment_2) &&
+			!strcmp(json_segment_get_cipher(jobj_segment_1),
+			        json_segment_get_cipher(jobj_segment_2)));
+
+	return true;
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_token.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, token handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Milan Broz. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -45,21 +45,19 @@ int crypt_token_register(const crypt_token_handler *handler)
 	int i;
 
 	if (is_builtin_candidate(handler->name)) {
-		log_dbg("'" LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX "' is reserved prefix for builtin tokens.");
+		log_dbg(NULL, "'" LUKS2_BUILTIN_TOKEN_PREFIX "' is reserved prefix for builtin tokens.");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX && token_handlers[i].h; i++) {
 		if (!strcmp(token_handlers[i].h->name, handler->name)) {
-			log_dbg("Keyslot handler %s is already registered.", handler->name);
+			log_dbg(NULL, "Keyslot handler %s is already registered.", handler->name);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (i == LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX) {
-		log_dbg("No more space for another token handler.");
+	if (i == LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	token_handlers[i].h = handler;
 	return 0;
@@ -149,21 +147,21 @@ int LUKS2_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", token) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Remove token */
-	if (!json) {
-		snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", token);
+	if (!json)
 		json_object_object_del(jobj_tokens, num);
-	} else {
+	else {
 
 		jobj = json_tokener_parse_verbose(json, &jerr);
 		if (!jobj) {
-			log_dbg("Token JSON parse failed.");
+			log_dbg(cd, "Token JSON parse failed.");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
-		snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", token);
-
-		if (LUKS2_token_validate(hdr->jobj, jobj, num)) {
+		if (LUKS2_token_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, jobj, num)) {
 			json_object_put(jobj);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -172,7 +170,7 @@ int LUKS2_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		if (is_builtin_candidate(json_object_get_string(jobj_type))) {
 			th = LUKS2_token_handler_type_internal(cd, json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
 			if (!th || !th->set) {
-				log_dbg("%s is builtin token candidate with missing handler", json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
+				log_dbg(cd, "%s is builtin token candidate with missing handler", json_object_get_string(jobj_type));
 				json_object_put(jobj);
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
@@ -182,13 +180,13 @@ int LUKS2_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 		if (h && h->validate && h->validate(cd, json)) {
 			json_object_put(jobj);
-			log_dbg("Token type %s validation failed.", h->name);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Token type %s validation failed.", h->name);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		json_object_object_add(jobj_tokens, num, jobj);
-		if (LUKS2_check_json_size(hdr)) {
-			log_dbg("Not enough space in header json area for new token.");
+		if (LUKS2_check_json_size(cd, hdr)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Not enough space in header json area for new token.");
 			json_object_object_del(jobj_tokens, num);
 			return -ENOSPC;
 		}
@@ -252,7 +250,6 @@ int LUKS2_builtin_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int commit)
 {
 	const token_handler *th;
-	char num[16];
 	int r;
 	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_tokens;
 
@@ -267,7 +264,6 @@ int LUKS2_builtin_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	}
 	if (token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%u", token);
 
 	r = th->set(&jobj_token, params);
 	if (r) {
@@ -276,17 +272,17 @@ int LUKS2_builtin_token_create(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	}
 
 	// builtin tokens must produce valid json
-	r = LUKS2_token_validate(hdr->jobj, jobj_token, "new");
+	r = LUKS2_token_validate(cd, hdr->jobj, jobj_token, "new");
 	assert(!r);
 	r = th->h->validate(cd, json_object_to_json_string_ext(jobj_token,
 		JSON_C_TO_STRING_PLAIN | JSON_C_TO_STRING_NOSLASHESCAPE));
 	assert(!r);
 
 	json_object_object_get_ex(hdr->jobj, "tokens", &jobj_tokens);
-	json_object_object_add(jobj_tokens, num, jobj_token);
-	if (LUKS2_check_json_size(hdr)) {
-		log_dbg("Not enough space in header json area for new %s token.", type);
-		json_object_object_del(jobj_tokens, num);
+	json_object_object_add_by_uint(jobj_tokens, token, jobj_token);
+	if (LUKS2_check_json_size(cd, hdr)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough space in header json area for new %s token.", type);
+		json_object_object_del_by_uint(jobj_tokens, token);
 		return -ENOSPC;
 	}
 
@@ -315,14 +311,14 @@ static int LUKS2_token_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		if (h->validate(cd, json)) {
-			log_dbg("Token %d (%s) validation failed.", token, h->name);
+			log_dbg(cd, "Token %d (%s) validation failed.", token, h->name);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
 
 	r = h->open(cd, token, buffer, buffer_len, usrptr);
 	if (r < 0)
-		log_dbg("Token %d (%s) open failed with %d.", token, h->name, r);
+		log_dbg(cd, "Token %d (%s) open failed with %d.", token, h->name, r);
 
 	return r;
 }
@@ -334,10 +330,10 @@ static void LUKS2_token_buffer_free(struct crypt_device *cd,
 {
 	const crypt_token_handler *h = LUKS2_token_handler(cd, token);
 
-	if (h->buffer_free)
+	if (h && h->buffer_free)
 		h->buffer_free(buffer, buffer_len);
 	else {
-		crypt_memzero(buffer, buffer_len);
+		crypt_safe_memzero(buffer, buffer_len);
 		free(buffer);
 	}
 }
@@ -352,7 +348,7 @@ static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
 {
 	const crypt_token_handler *h;
 	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_token_keyslots, *jobj;
-	const char *num = NULL;
+	unsigned int num = 0;
 	int i, r;
 
 	if (!(h = LUKS2_token_handler(cd, token)))
@@ -370,15 +366,15 @@ static int LUKS2_keyslot_open_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	r = -EINVAL;
 	for (i = 0; i < (int) json_object_array_length(jobj_token_keyslots) && r < 0; i++) {
 		jobj = json_object_array_get_idx(jobj_token_keyslots, i);
-		num = json_object_get_string(jobj);
-		log_dbg("Trying to open keyslot %s with token %d (type %s).", num, token, h->name);
-		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, atoi(num), segment, buffer, buffer_len, vk);
+		num = atoi(json_object_get_string(jobj));
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to open keyslot %u with token %d (type %s).", num, token, h->name);
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, num, segment, buffer, buffer_len, vk);
 	}
 
-	if (r >= 0 && num)
-		return atoi(num);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
-	return r;
+	return num;
 }
 
 int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -388,6 +384,7 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		uint32_t flags,
 		void *usrptr)
 {
+	bool use_keyring;
 	int keyslot, r;
 	char *buffer;
 	size_t buffer_len;
@@ -409,14 +406,22 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	keyslot = r;
 
-	if ((name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
-		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot);
+	if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		use_keyring = false;
+	else
+		use_keyring = ((name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
+			       (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY));
+
+	if (use_keyring) {
+		if (!(r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot)))
+			flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+	}
 
 	if (r >= 0 && name)
 		r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
 
-	if (r < 0 && vk)
-		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk->key_description);
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
 	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
 
 	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
@@ -454,14 +459,16 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate_any(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	keyslot = r;
 
-	if (r >= 0 && (name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
-		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot);
+	if (r >= 0 && (name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
+		if (!(r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot)))
+			flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+	}
 
 	if (r >= 0 && name)
 		r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
 
-	if (r < 0 && vk)
-		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk->key_description);
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
 	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
 
 	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
@@ -501,7 +508,7 @@ static int assign_one_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	json_object *jobj1, *jobj_token, *jobj_token_keyslots;
 	char num[16];
 
-	log_dbg("Keyslot %i %s token %i.", keyslot, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", token);
+	log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot %i %s token %i.", keyslot, assign ? "assigned to" : "unassigned from", token);
 
 	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
 	if (!jobj_token)
@@ -511,7 +518,9 @@ static int assign_one_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	if (!jobj_token_keyslots)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot);
+	if (snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", keyslot) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (assign) {
 		jobj1 = LUKS2_array_jobj(jobj_token_keyslots, num);
 		if (!jobj1)
@@ -577,16 +586,12 @@ int LUKS2_token_assign(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	return token;
 }
 
-int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
-			    int keyslot, int token)
+static int token_is_assigned(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int token)
 {
 	int i;
-	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_token_keyslots, *jobj;
+	json_object *jobj, *jobj_token_keyslots,
+		    *jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
 
-	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX || token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	jobj_token = LUKS2_get_token_jobj(hdr, token);
 	if (!jobj_token)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
@@ -601,6 +606,15 @@ int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
 	return -ENOENT;
 }
 
+int LUKS2_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			    int keyslot, int token)
+{
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX || token < 0 || token >= LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return token_is_assigned(hdr, keyslot, token);
+}
+
 int LUKS2_tokens_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
 {
 	json_object *jobj_tokens = LUKS2_get_tokens_jobj(hdr);
@@ -609,3 +623,28 @@ int LUKS2_tokens_count(struct luks2_hdr *hdr)
 
 	return json_object_object_length(jobj_tokens);
 }
+
+int LUKS2_token_assignment_copy(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+			int keyslot_from,
+			int keyslot_to,
+			int commit)
+{
+	int i, r;
+
+	if (keyslot_from < 0 || keyslot_from >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX || keyslot_to < 0 || keyslot_to >= LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = LUKS2_tokens_count(hdr);
+	if (r <= 0)
+		return r;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LUKS2_TOKENS_MAX; i++) {
+		if (!token_is_assigned(hdr, keyslot_from, i)) {
+			if ((r = assign_one_token(cd, hdr, keyslot_to, i, 1)))
+				return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return commit ? LUKS2_hdr_write(cd, hdr) : 0;
+}

lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup v2, kernel keyring token
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2016-2018, Ondrej Kozina. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2021 Ondrej Kozina
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ static int keyring_open(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	r = keyring_get_passphrase(json_object_get_string(jobj_key), buffer, buffer_len);
 	if (r == -ENOTSUP) {
-		log_dbg("Kernel keyring features disabled.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Kernel keyring features disabled.");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	} else if (r < 0) {
-		log_dbg("keyring_get_passphrase failed (error %d)", r);
+		log_dbg(cd, "keyring_get_passphrase failed (error %d)", r);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -61,26 +61,26 @@ static int keyring_validate(struct crypt_device *cd __attribute__((unused)),
 	json_object *jobj_token, *jobj_key;
 	int r = 1;
 
-	log_dbg("Validating keyring token json");
+	log_dbg(cd, "Validating keyring token json");
 
 	jobj_token = json_tokener_parse_verbose(json, &jerr);
 	if (!jobj_token) {
-		log_dbg("Keyring token JSON parse failed.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyring token JSON parse failed.");
 		return r;
 	}
 
 	if (json_object_object_length(jobj_token) != 3) {
-		log_dbg("Keyring token is expected to have exactly 3 fields.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyring token is expected to have exactly 3 fields.");
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(jobj_token, "key_description", &jobj_key)) {
-		log_dbg("missing key_description field.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "missing key_description field.");
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (!json_object_is_type(jobj_key, json_type_string)) {
-		log_dbg("key_description is not a string.");
+		log_dbg(cd, "key_description is not a string.");
 		goto out;
 	}
 

lib/random.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * cryptsetup kernel RNG access functions
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2018, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <sys/select.h>
@@ -28,10 +27,6 @@
 #include "libcryptsetup.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
-#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
-#define O_CLOEXEC 0
-#endif
-
 static int random_initialised = 0;
 
 #define URANDOM_DEVICE	"/dev/urandom"