Version 1.7.5.

Somehow testing in qemu resulted sometimes in an endless loop.
Either the timing or the settle fixed the issue.
When the VM was in an endless loop, an strace showed, that the first 512
and 1024 of the crypt partition was read over and over. Either it was
the udev blkid, or some device mapper udev rule.
Maybe the reencrypt tool opens and closes the device fd, where the close
triggers a udev blkid and causes the reencrypt tool to reread the device...
Anyhow.. with this settle the issue was not seen anymore.

AUTHORS

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>

ChangeLog

@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ Since version 1.6 this file is no longer maintained.
 See docs/*ReleaseNotes for release changes documentation.
 
 See version control history for full commit messages.
-  http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/source/list
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/commits/master

README

@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ setup cryptographic volumes for dm-crypt (including LUKS extension)
 
 WEB PAGE:
 
-      http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/
+      https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/
 
 FAQ:
 
-      http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
+      https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
 
 MAILING LIST:
 
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ MAILING LIST:
 
 DOWNLOAD:
 
-      http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/downloads/
+      https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/
 
 SOURCE CODE:
 
-      URL: http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/source/browse/
-      Checkout: git clone https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/
+      URL: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master
+      Checkout: git clone https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git
 
 NLS (PO TRANSLATIONS):
 

README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+![LUKS logo](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/luks-logo.png)
+
+What the ...?
+=============
+**Cryptsetup** is utility used to conveniently setup disk encryption based
+on [DMCrypt](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt) kernel module.
+
+These include **plain** **dm-crypt** volumes, **LUKS** volumes, **loop-AES**
+and **TrueCrypt** (including **VeraCrypt** extension) format.
+
+Project also includes **veritysetup** utility used to conveniently setup
+[DMVerity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity) block integrity checking kernel module.
+
+LUKS Design
+-----------
+**LUKS** is the standard for Linux hard disk encryption. By providing a standard on-disk-format, it does not  
+only facilitate compatibility among distributions, but also provides secure management of multiple user passwords.  
+In contrast to existing solution, LUKS stores all setup necessary setup information in the partition header,  
+enabling the user to transport or migrate his data seamlessly.
+
+Why LUKS?
+---------
+ * compatiblity via standardization,
+ * secure against low entropy attacks,
+ * support for multiple keys,
+ * effective passphrase revocation,
+ * free.
+
+[Project home page](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/).
+-----------------
+
+[Frequently asked questions (FAQ)](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions)
+--------------------------------
+
+Download
+--------
+All release tarballs and release notes are hosted on [kernel.org](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/).
+
+**The latest cryptsetup version is 1.7.4**
+  * [cryptsetup-1.7.4.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.4.tar.xz)
+  * Signature [cryptsetup-1.7.4.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.4.tar.sign)
+    _(You need to decompress file first to check signature.)_
+  * [Cryptsetup 1.7.4 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes).
+
+Previous versions
+ * [Version 1.7.3](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.3.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.3.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.2](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.2.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.2.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.2-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.1](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.1.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.0](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.0.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.0.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes).
+
+Source and API docs
+-------------------
+For development version code, please refer to [source](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master) page,
+mirror on [kernel.org](https://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git/) or [GitHub](https://github.com/mbroz/cryptsetup).
+
+For libcryptsetup documentation see [libcryptsetup API](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/API/index.html) page.
+
+The libcryptsetup API/ABI changes are tracked in [compatibility report](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/ABI-tracker/timeline/libcryptsetup/index.html).
+
+NLS PO files are maintained by [TranslationProject](http://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html).
+
+Help!
+-----
+Please always read [FAQ](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions) first.
+For cryptsetup and LUKS related questions, please use the dm-crypt mailing list, [dm-crypt@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt@saout.de).
+
+If you want to subscribe just send an empty mail to [dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de).
+
+You can also browse [list archive](http://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/) or read it through
+[web interface](http://news.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.device-mapper.dm-crypt).

TODO

@@ -4,5 +4,5 @@ Version 1.7:
 - TRIM for keyslots
 - Do we need crypt_data_path() - path to data device (if differs)?
 - Resync ETA time is not accurate, calculate it better (last minute window?).
-- Crypt benchmark cannot ttest ECB mode.
-- Log doesn't work yet in early binary start (FIPS message).
+- Extend existing LUKS header to use another KDF? (https://password-hashing.net/)
+- Fix all crazy automake warnings (or switch to Cmake).

autogen.sh

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ autopoint --force $AP_OPTS
 libtoolize --force --copy
 aclocal -I m4 $AL_OPTS
 autoheader $AH_OPTS
-automake --add-missing --gnu $AM_OPTS
+automake --add-missing --copy --gnu $AM_OPTS
 autoconf $AC_OPTS
 
 if test x$NOCONFIGURE = x; then

configure.ac

@@ -1,17 +1,22 @@
 AC_PREREQ([2.67])
-AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[1.6.1])
+AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[1.7.5])
 
 dnl library version from <major>.<minor>.<release>[-<suffix>]
 LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION=$(echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | cut -f1 -d-)
-LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=9:0:5
-dnl library file name for FIPS selfcheck
-LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_FIPS="libcryptsetup.so.4"
+LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=11:0:7
 
+AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR(src/cryptsetup.c)
 AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
 
 AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h:config.h.in])
-AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(dist-bzip2)
+
+# We do not want to run test in parallel. Really.
+# http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/automake/2013-01/msg00060.html
+
+# For old automake use this
+#AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(dist-xz)
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([dist-xz 1.12 serial-tests])
 
 if test "x$prefix" = "xNONE"; then
 	sysconfdir=/etc
@@ -32,7 +37,7 @@ PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
 AC_HEADER_DIRENT
 AC_HEADER_STDC
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
-	ctype.h unistd.h locale.h)
+	sys/sysmacros.h ctype.h unistd.h locale.h byteswap.h endian.h)
 
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(uuid/uuid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
 AC_CHECK_HEADER(libdevmapper.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the device-mapper library.])])
@@ -42,14 +47,20 @@ AC_CHECK_LIB(uuid, uuid_clear, ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
 AC_SUBST(UUID_LIBS, $LIBS)
 LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime],[rt posix4])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign clock_gettime])
+
+if test "x$enable_largefile" = "xno" ; then
+  AC_MSG_ERROR([Building with --disable-largefile is not supported, it can cause data corruption.])
+fi
 
 AC_C_CONST
 AC_C_BIGENDIAN
 AC_TYPE_OFF_T
 AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
-
+AC_FUNC_FSEEKO
 AC_PROG_GCC_TRADITIONAL
+AC_FUNC_STRERROR_R
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 
@@ -65,25 +76,17 @@ AC_SUBST(POPT_LIBS, $LIBS)
 LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
-dnl FIPS extensions
+dnl FIPS extensions (only for RHEL)
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([fips], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fips],[enable FIPS mode restrictions]),
 [with_fips=$enableval],
 [with_fips=no])
 
 if test "x$with_fips" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_FIPS, 1, [Enable FIPS mode restrictions])
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_FIPS, ["$LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_FIPS"],
-		[library file name for FIPS selfcheck])
 
 	if test "x$enable_static" = "xyes" -o "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([Static build is not compatible with FIPS.])
 	fi
-
-	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(fipscheck, FIPSCHECK_verify, ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the fipscheck library.])])
-	AC_SUBST(FIPSCHECK_LIBS, $LIBS)
-	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
-
 fi
 
 AC_DEFUN([NO_FIPS], [
@@ -94,12 +97,14 @@ AC_DEFUN([NO_FIPS], [
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl pwquality library (cryptsetup CLI only)
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([pwquality], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pwquality],[enable password quality checking]),
-[with_pwquality=$enableval],
-[with_pwquality=no])
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([pwquality],
+	      AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pwquality],
+			     [enable password quality checking using pwquality library]),
+	      [with_pwquality=$enableval],
+	      [with_pwquality=no])
 
 if test "x$with_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
-	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PWQUALITY, 1, [Enable password quality checking])
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PWQUALITY, 1, [Enable password quality checking using pwquality library])
 	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([PWQUALITY], [pwquality >= 1.0.0],,
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need pwquality library.]))
 
@@ -107,6 +112,31 @@ if test "x$with_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
 	PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS="$PWQUALITY_LIBS -lcrack -lz"
 fi
 
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl passwdqc library (cryptsetup CLI only)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([passwdqc],
+	      AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-passwdqc@<:@=CONFIG_PATH@:>@],
+			     [enable password quality checking using passwdqc library (optionally with CONFIG_PATH)]),
+	      [enable_passwdqc=$enableval],
+	      [enable_passwdqc=no])
+
+case "$enable_passwdqc" in
+	yes|no) use_passwdqc_config="" ;;
+	/*) use_passwdqc_config="$enable_passwdqc"; enable_passwdqc=yes ;;
+	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unrecognized --enable-passwdqc parameter.]) ;;
+esac
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PASSWDQC_CONFIG_FILE], ["$use_passwdqc_config"], [passwdqc library config file])
+
+if test "x$enable_passwdqc" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PASSWDQC, 1, [Enable password quality checking using passwdqc library])
+
+	PASSWDQC_LIBS="-lpasswdqc"
+fi
+
+if test "x$with_pwquality$enable_passwdqc" = "xyesyes"; then
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-pwquality and --enable-passwdqc are mutually incompatible.])
+fi
+
 dnl ==========================================================================
 dnl Crypto backend functions
 
@@ -118,10 +148,22 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_GCRYPT], [
 	fi
 	dnl Check if we can use gcrypt PBKDF2 (1.6.0 supports empty password)
 	AC_ARG_ENABLE([gcrypt-pbkdf2], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-gcrypt-pbkdf2],[force enable internal gcrypt PBKDF2]),
-		[use_internal_pbkdf2=0],
-		[AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT([1.6.0], [use_internal_pbkdf2=0], [use_internal_pbkdf2=1])])
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xyes"; then
+			[use_internal_pbkdf2=0]
+		else
+			[use_internal_pbkdf2=1]
+		fi,
+		[AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT([1.6.1], [use_internal_pbkdf2=0], [use_internal_pbkdf2=1])])
 	AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT($GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the gcrypt library.])])
 
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if internal cryptsetup PBKDF2 is compiled-in])
+	if test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 0; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		NO_FIPS([])
+	fi
+
 	if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 		saved_LIBS=$LIBS
 		LIBS="$saved_LIBS $LIBGCRYPT_LIBS -static"
@@ -149,8 +191,8 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_OPENSSL], [
 	if test x$enable_static_cryptsetup = xyes; then
 		saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
 		PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --static"
-		PKG_CHECK_MODULES([OPENSSL], [openssl])
-		CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$OPENSSL_LIBS
+		PKG_CHECK_MODULES([OPENSSL_STATIC], [openssl])
+		CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$OPENSSL_STATIC_LIBS
 		PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
 	fi
 	NO_FIPS([])
@@ -192,13 +234,13 @@ AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NETTLE], [
 		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Nettle cryptographic library.])])
 
 	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(nettle, nettle_ripemd160_init,,
-		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Nettle library version 2.4 or more recent.])])
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(nettle, nettle_pbkdf2_hmac_sha256,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Nettle library version 2.6 or more recent.])])
 	CRYPTO_LIBS=$LIBS
 	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
 
 	CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$CRYPTO_LIBS
-	use_internal_pbkdf2=1
+	use_internal_pbkdf2=0
 	NO_FIPS([])
 ])
 
@@ -330,13 +372,14 @@ AC_SUBST([DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS])
 AC_SUBST([PWQUALITY_LIBS])
 AC_SUBST([PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS])
 
+AC_SUBST([PASSWDQC_LIBS])
+
 AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_CFLAGS])
 AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_LIBS])
 AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS])
 
 AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION])
 AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO])
-AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_FIPS])
 
 dnl ==========================================================================
 AC_ARG_ENABLE([dev-random], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-dev-random],
@@ -367,15 +410,27 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE([python], AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-python],[enable Python bindings
 [with_python=$enableval],
 [with_python=no])
 
-if test "x$with_python" = "xyes"; then
-	AM_PATH_PYTHON([2.4])
+AC_ARG_WITH([python_version],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-python_version=VERSION], [required Python version [2.6]]),
+	[PYTHON_VERSION=$withval], [PYTHON_VERSION=2.6])
 
-	if ! test -x "$PYTHON-config" ; then
-            AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find python development packages to build bindings])
+if test "x$with_python" = "xyes"; then
+	AM_PATH_PYTHON([$PYTHON_VERSION])
+
+	AC_PATH_PROGS([PYTHON_CONFIG], [python${PYTHON_VERSION}-config python-config], [no])
+	if test "${PYTHON_CONFIG}" = "no"; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot find python${PYTHON_VERSION}-config or python-config in PATH])
 	fi
 
-	PYTHON_INCLUDES=$($PYTHON-config --includes)
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for python headers using $PYTHON_CONFIG --includes)
+	PYTHON_INCLUDES=$($PYTHON_CONFIG --includes)
+	AC_MSG_RESULT($PYTHON_INCLUDES)
 	AC_SUBST(PYTHON_INCLUDES)
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for python libraries using $PYTHON_CONFIG --libs)
+	PYTHON_LIBS=$($PYTHON_CONFIG --libs)
+	AC_MSG_RESULT($PYTHON_LIBS)
+	AC_SUBST(PYTHON_LIBS)
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL([PYTHON_CRYPTSETUP], [test "x$with_python" = "xyes"])
 
@@ -385,11 +440,11 @@ CS_STR_WITH([plain-cipher], [cipher for plain mode], [aes])
 CS_STR_WITH([plain-mode],   [cipher mode for plain mode], [cbc-essiv:sha256])
 CS_NUM_WITH([plain-keybits],[key length in bits for plain mode], [256])
 
-CS_STR_WITH([luks1-hash],   [hash function for LUKS1 header], [sha1])
+CS_STR_WITH([luks1-hash],   [hash function for LUKS1 header], [sha256])
 CS_STR_WITH([luks1-cipher], [cipher for LUKS1], [aes])
 CS_STR_WITH([luks1-mode],   [cipher mode for LUKS1], [xts-plain64])
 CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-keybits],[key length in bits for LUKS1], [256])
-CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-iter-time],[PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS1 (in ms)], [1000])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-iter-time],[PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS1 (in ms)], [2000])
 
 CS_STR_WITH([loopaes-cipher], [cipher for loop-AES mode], [aes])
 CS_NUM_WITH([loopaes-keybits],[key length in bits for loop-AES mode], [256])

docs/ChangeLog.old

@@ -834,16 +834,16 @@
 	* lib/utils.c: Add read|write_blockwise functions, to use in
 	O_DIRECT file accesses. 
 
-2004-03-11 Thursday 15:52   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-11 Thursday 15:52   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* lib/blockdev.h: BLKGETSIZE64 really uses size_t as third
 	  argument, the rest is wrong.
 
-2004-03-10 Wednesday 17:50   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-10 Wednesday 17:50   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* lib/: libcryptsetup.h, libdevmapper.c: Small fixes.
 
-2004-03-09 Tuesday 21:41   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-09 Tuesday 21:41   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* lib/internal.h, lib/libcryptsetup.h, lib/libdevmapper.c,
 	  lib/setup.c, po/de.po, src/cryptsetup.c: Added internal flags to
@@ -851,7 +851,7 @@
 	  add a function to free the memory. Also add a readonly flag to
 	  libcryptsetup.
 
-2004-03-09 Tuesday 16:03   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-09 Tuesday 16:03   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* ChangeLog, configure.in, setup-gettext, lib/Makefile.am,
 	  lib/backends.c, lib/blockdev.h, lib/gcrypt.c, lib/internal.h,
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@
 	  lib/utils.c, po/de.po, src/Makefile.am, src/cryptsetup.c: More
 	  reorganization work.
 
-2004-03-08 Monday 01:38   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-08 Monday 01:38   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* ChangeLog, Makefile.am, acinclude.m4, configure.in,
 	  lib/Makefile.am, lib/backends.c, lib/blockdev.h, lib/gcrypt.c,
@@ -867,19 +867,19 @@
 	  src/Makefile.am: BLKGETSIZE64 fixes and started modularity
 	  enhancements
 
-2004-03-04 Thursday 21:06   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-04 Thursday 21:06   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* Makefile.am, po/de.po, src/cryptsetup.c, src/cryptsetup.h: First
 	  backward compatible working version.
 
-2004-03-04 Thursday 00:42   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-04 Thursday 00:42   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* NEWS, AUTHORS, ChangeLog, Makefile.am, README, autogen.sh,
 	  configure.in, setup-gettext, po/ChangeLog, po/LINGUAS,
 	  po/POTFILES.in, po/de.po, src/cryptsetup.c, src/cryptsetup.h,
 	  src/Makefile.am (utags: initial): Initial checkin.
 
-2004-03-04 Thursday 00:42   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-04 Thursday 00:42   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* NEWS, AUTHORS, ChangeLog, Makefile.am, README, autogen.sh,
 	  configure.in, setup-gettext, po/ChangeLog, po/LINGUAS,

docs/doxygen_index

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  *			in a persistent way on the device. Keyslot area is an array beyond LUKS header, where
  *			volume key is stored in the encrypted form using user input passphrase. For more info about
  *			LUKS keyslots and how it's actually protected, please look at
- *			<A HREF="http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/Specification">LUKS specification</A>.
+ *			<A HREF="https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification">LUKS specification</A>.
  *			There are two basic methods to create a new keyslot:
  *
  *			@subsection ckeyslot_vol crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key()

docs/examples/crypt_log_usage.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * An example of using logging through libcryptsetup API
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

docs/examples/crypt_luks_usage.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * An example of using LUKS device through libcryptsetup API
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public

docs/v1.6.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.1
+
+* Print error and fail if more device arguments are present for isLuks command.
+
+* Fix cipher specification string parsing (found by gcc -fsanitize=address option).
+
+* Try to map TCRYPT system encryption through partition
+  (allows to activate mapping when other partition on the same device is mounted).
+
+* Print a warning if system encryption is used and device is a partition.
+  (TCRYPT system encryption uses whole device argument.)
+
+* Disallow explicit small payload offset for LUKS detached header.
+  LUKS detached header only allows data payload 0 (whole data device is used)
+  or explicit offset larger than header + keyslots size.
+
+* Fix boundary condition for verity device that caused failure for certain device sizes.
+
+* Various fixes to documentation, including update FAQ, default modes
+  and TCRYPT description.
+
+* Workaround for some recent changes in automake (serial-tests).

docs/v1.6.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.2
+
+* Fix cryptsetup reencryption tool to work properly
+  with devices using 4kB sectors.
+
+* Always use page size if running through loop device,
+  this fixes failures for external LUKS header and
+  filesystem requiring 4kB block size.
+
+* Fix TCRYPT system encryption mapping for multiple partitions.
+  Since this commit, one can use partition directly as device parameter.
+  If you need to activate such partition from image in file,
+  please first use map partitioned loop device (losetup -P)
+  on image.
+  (Cryptsetup require partition offsets visible in kernel sysfs
+  in this mode.)
+
+* Support activation of old TrueCrypt containers using CBC mode
+  and whitening (created in TrueCrypt version < 4.1).
+  This requires Linux kernel 3.13 or later.
+  (Containers with cascade CBC ciphers are not supported.)
+
+* Properly display keys in dump --dump-master-key command
+  for TrueCrypt CBC containers.
+
+* Rewrite cipher benchmark loop which was unreliable
+  on very fast machines.
+
+* Add warning if LUKS device was activated using non-cryptsetup
+  library which did not set UUID properly (e.g. cryptmount).
+  (Some commands, like luksSuspend, are not available then.)
+
+* Support length limitation also for plain (no hash) length.
+  This can be used for mapping problematic cryptosystems which
+  wipes some key (losetup sometimes set last 32 byte to zero,
+  which can be now configured as --hash plain:31 parameter).
+
+* Fix hash limit if parameter is not a number.
+  (The whole key was set to zero instead of command failure.)
+
+* Unify --key-slot behavior in cryptsetup_reencrypt tool.
+
+* Update dracut example scripts for system reencryption on first boot.
+
+* Add command line option --tcrypt-backup to access TCRYPT backup header.
+
+* Fix static compilation with OpenSSL.

docs/v1.6.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.3
+
+* Implement new erase (with alias luksErase) command.
+
+  The erase cryptsetup command can be used to permanently erase
+  all keyslots and make the LUKS container inaccessible.
+  (The only way to unlock such device is to use LUKS header backup
+  created before erase command was used.)
+
+  You do not need to provide any password for this operation.
+
+  This operation is irreversible.
+
+* Add internal "whirlpool_gcryptbug hash" for accessing flawed
+  Whirlpool hash in gcrypt (requires gcrypt 1.6.1 or above).
+
+  The gcrypt version of Whirlpool hash algorithm was flawed in some
+  situations.
+
+  This means that if you used Whirlpool in LUKS header and upgraded
+  to new gcrypt library your LUKS container become inaccessible.
+
+  Please refer to cryptsetup FAQ for detail how to fix this situation.
+
+* Allow to use --disable-gcrypt-pbkdf2 during configuration
+  to force use internal PBKDF2 code.
+
+* Require gcrypt 1.6.1 for imported implementation of PBKDF2
+  (PBKDF2 in gcrypt 1.6.0 is too slow).
+
+* Add --keep-key to cryptsetup-reencrypt.
+
+  This allows change of LUKS header hash (and iteration count) without
+  the need to reencrypt the whole data area.
+  (Reencryption of LUKS header only without master key change.)
+
+* By default verify new passphrase in luksChangeKey and luksAddKey
+  commands (if input is from terminal).
+
+* Fix memory leak in Nettle crypto backend.
+
+* Support --tries option even for TCRYPT devices in cryptsetup.
+
+* Support --allow-discards option even for TCRYPT devices.
+  (Note that this could destroy hidden volume and it is not suggested
+   by original TrueCrypt security model.)
+
+* Link against -lrt for clock_gettime to fix undefined reference
+  to clock_gettime error (introduced in 1.6.2).
+
+* Fix misleading error message when some algorithms are not available.
+
+* Count system time in PBKDF2 benchmark if kernel returns no self usage info.
+  (Workaround to broken getrusage() syscall with some hypervisors.)

docs/v1.6.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.4
+
+* Allow LUKS header operation handling without requiring root privilege.
+  It means that you can manipulate with keyslots as a regular user, only
+  write access to device (or image) is required.
+
+  This requires kernel crypto wrapper (similar to TrueCrypt device handling)
+  to be available (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER kernel option).
+  If this kernel interface is not available, code fallbacks to old temporary
+  keyslot device creation (where root privilege is required).
+
+  Note that activation, deactivation, resize and suspend operations still
+  need root privilege (limitation of kernel device-mapper backend).
+
+* Fix internal PBKDF2 key derivation function implementation for alternative
+  crypto backends (kernel, NSS) which do not support PBKDF2 directly and have
+  issues with longer HMAC keys.
+
+  This fixes the problem for long keyfiles where either calculation is too slow
+  (because of internal rehashing in every iteration) or there is a limit
+  (kernel backend seems to not support HMAC key longer than 20480 bytes).
+
+  (Note that for recent version of gcrypt, nettle or openssl the internal
+  PBKDF2 code is not compiled in and crypto library internal functions are
+  used instead.)
+
+* Support for Python3 for simple Python binding.
+  Python >= 2.6 is now required. You can set Python compiled version by setting
+  --with-python_version configure option (together with --enable-python).
+
+* Use internal PBKDF2 in Nettle library for Nettle crypto backend.
+  Cryptsetup compilation requires Nettle >= 2.6 (if using Nettle crypto backend).
+
+* Allow simple status of crypt device without providing metadata header.
+  The command "cryptsetup status" will print basic info, even if you
+  do not provide detached header argument.
+
+* Allow to specify ECB mode in cryptsetup benchmark.
+
+* Add some LUKS images for regression testing.
+  Note that if image with Whirlpool fails, the most probable cause is that
+  you have old gcrypt library with flawed whirlpool hash.
+  Read FAQ section 8.3 for more info.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function trhough crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.

docs/v1.6.6-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.6 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.5
+
+* LUKS: Fix keyslot device access for devices which
+  do not support direct IO operations. (Regression in 1.6.5.)
+
+* LUKS: Fallback to old temporary keyslot device mapping method
+  if hash (for ESSIV) is not supported by userspace crypto
+  library. (Regression in 1.6.5.)
+
+* Properly activate device with discard (TRIM for SSDs)
+  if requested even if dm_crypt module is not yet loaded.
+  Only if discard is not supported by the old kernel then
+  the discard option is ignored.
+
+* Fix some static analysis build warnings (scan-build).
+
+* Report crypto lib version only once (and always add kernel
+  version) in debug output.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function through crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.

docs/v1.6.7-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.7 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.6
+
+* Cryptsetup git and wiki are now hosted on GitLab.
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup
+
+  Repository of stable releases remains on kernel.org site
+  https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/
+
+  For more info please see README file.
+
+* Cryptsetup TCRYPT mode now supports VeraCrypt devices (TrueCrypt extension).
+
+  The VeraCrypt extension only increases iteration count for the key
+  derivation function (on-disk format is the same as TrueCrypt format).
+
+  Note that unlocking of a VeraCrypt device can take very long time if used
+  on slow machines.
+
+  To use this extension, add --veracrypt option, for example
+    cryptsetup open --type tcrypt --veracrypt <container> <name>
+
+  For use through libcryptsetup, just add CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES flag.
+
+* Support keyfile-offset and keyfile-size options even for plain volumes.
+
+* Support keyfile option for luksAddKey if the master key is specified.
+
+* For historic reasons, hashing in the plain mode is not used
+  if keyfile is specified (with exception of --key-file=-).
+  Print a warning if these parameters are ignored.
+
+* Support permanent device decryption for cryptsetup-reencrypt.
+  To remove LUKS encryption from a device, you can now use --decrypt option.
+
+* Allow to use --header option in all LUKS commands.
+  The --header always takes precedence over positional device argument.
+
+* Allow luksSuspend without need to specify a detached header.
+
+* Detect if O_DIRECT is usable on a device allocation.
+  There are some strange storage stack configurations which wrongly allows
+  to open devices with direct-io but fails on all IO operations later.
+
+  Cryptsetup now tries to read the device first sector to ensure it can use
+  direct-io.
+
+*  Add low-level performance options tuning for dmcrypt (for Linux 4.0 and later).
+
+   Linux kernel 4.0 contains rewritten dmcrypt code which tries to better utilize
+   encryption on parallel CPU cores.
+
+   While tests show that this change increases performance on most configurations,
+   dmcrypt now provides some switches to change its new behavior.
+
+   You can use them (per-device) with these cryptsetup switches:
+      --perf-same_cpu_crypt
+      --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus
+
+  Please use these only in the case of serious performance problems.
+  Refer to the cryptsetup man page and dm-crypt documentation
+  (for same_cpu_crypt and submit_from_crypt_cpus options).
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
+
+* Get rid of libfipscheck library.
+  (Note that this option was used only for Red Hat and derived distributions.)
+  With recent FIPS changes we do not need to link to this FIPS monster anymore.
+  Also drop some no longer needed FIPS mode checks.
+
+* Many fixes and clarifications to man pages.
+
+* Prevent compiler to optimize-out zeroing of buffers for on-stack variables.
+
+* Fix a crash if non-GNU strerror_r is used.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function through crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.

docs/v1.6.8-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.8 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.7
+
+* If the null cipher (no encryption) is used, allow only empty password for LUKS.
+  (Previously cryptsetup accepted any password in this case.)
+
+  The null cipher can be used only for testing and it is used temporarily during
+  offline encrypting not yet encrypted device (cryptsetup-reencrypt tool).
+
+  Accepting only empty password prevents situation when someone adds another
+  LUKS device using the same UUID (UUID of existing LUKS device) with faked
+  header containing null cipher.
+  This could force user to use different LUKS device (with no encryption)
+  without noticing.
+  (IOW it prevents situation when attacker intentionally forces
+  user to boot into different system just by LUKS header manipulation.)
+
+  Properly configured systems should have an additional integrity protection
+  in place here (LUKS here provides only confidentiality) but it is better
+  to not allow this situation in the first place.
+
+  (For more info see QubesOS Security Bulletin QSB-019-2015.)
+
+* Properly support stdin "-" handling for luksAddKey for both new and old
+  keyfile parameters.
+
+* If encrypted device is file-backed (it uses underlying loop device),
+  cryptsetup resize will try to resize underlying loop device as well.
+  (It can be used to grow up file-backed device in one step.)
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows to use empty password through stdin pipe.
+  (Intended only for testing in scripts.)
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+
+Direct terminal handling and password calling callback for passphrase
+entry will be removed from libcryptsetup in next major (2.x) version
+(application should handle it itself).
+It means that application have to always provide password in API calls.
+
+Functions returning last error will be removed in next major version (2.x).
+These functions did not work properly for early initialization errors
+and application can implement better function easily using own error callback.
+
+See comments in libcryptsetup.h for more info about deprecated functions.

docs/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+The cryptsetup 1.7 release changes defaults for LUKS,
+there are no API changes.
+
+Changes since version 1.6.8
+
+* Default hash function is now SHA256 (used in key derivation function
+  and anti-forensic splitter).
+
+  Note that replacing SHA1 with SHA256 is not for security reasons.
+  (LUKS does not have problems even if collisions are found for SHA1,
+  for details see FAQ item 5.20).
+
+  Using SHA256 as default is mainly to prevent compatibility problems
+  on hardened systems where SHA1 is already be phased out.
+
+  Note that all checks (kernel crypto API availability check) now uses
+  SHA256 as well.
+
+* Default iteration time for PBKDF2 is now 2 seconds.
+
+  Increasing iteration time is in combination with PBKDF2 benchmark
+  fixes a try to keep PBKDF2 iteration count still high enough and
+  also still acceptable for users.
+
+  N.B. Long term is to replace PBKDF2 algorithm with Password Hashing
+  Competition winner - Argon2.
+
+  Distributions can still change these defaults in compilation time.
+
+  You can change iteration time and used hash function in existing LUKS
+  header with cryptsetup-reencrypt utility even without full reencryption
+  of device (see --keep-key option).
+
+* Fix PBKDF2 iteration benchmark for longer key sizes.
+
+  The previous PBKDF2 benchmark code did not take into account
+  output key length properly.
+
+  For SHA1 (with 160-bits output) and 256-bit keys (and longer)
+  it means that the final iteration value was higher than it should be.
+
+  For other hash algorithms (like SHA256 or SHA512) it caused
+  that iteration count was lower (in comparison to SHA1) than
+  expected for the requested time period.
+
+  The PBKDF2 benchmark code is now fixed to use the key size for
+  the formatted device (or default LUKS key size if running in informational
+  benchmark mode).
+
+  Thanks to A.Visconti, S.Bossi, A.Calo and H.Ragab
+  (http://www.club.di.unimi.it/) for point this out.
+  (Based on "What users should know about Full Disk Encryption
+  based on LUKS" paper to be presented on CANS2015).
+
+* Remove experimental warning for reencrypt tool.
+  The strong request for full backup before using reencryption utility
+  still applies :)
+
+* Add optional libpasswdqc support for new LUKS passwords.
+
+  If password is entered through terminal (no keyfile specified) and
+  cryptsetup is compiled with --enable-passwdqc[=/etc/passwdqc.conf],
+  configured system passwdqc settings are used to check password quality.
+
+* Update FAQ document.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+
+Direct terminal handling and password calling callback for passphrase
+entry will be removed from libcryptsetup in next major (2.x) version
+(application should handle it itself).
+It means that application have to always provide password in API calls.
+
+Functions returning last error will be removed in next major version (2.x).
+These functions did not work properly for early initialization errors
+and application can implement better function easily using own error callback.
+
+See comments in libcryptsetup.h for more info about deprecated functions.

docs/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.0
+
+* Code now uses kernel crypto API backend according to new
+  changes introduced in mainline kernel
+
+  While mainline kernel should contain backward compatible
+  changes, some stable series kernels do not contain fully
+  backported compatibility patches.
+  Without these patches  most of cryptsetup operations
+  (like unlocking device) fail.
+
+  This change in cryptsetup ensures that all operations using
+  kernel crypto API works even on these kernels.
+
+* The cryptsetup-reencrypt utility now properly detects removal
+  of underlying link to block device and does not remove
+  ongoing re-encryption log.
+  This allows proper recovery (resume) of reencrypt operation later.
+
+  NOTE: Never use /dev/disk/by-uuid/ path for reencryption utility,
+  this link disappears once the device metadata is temporarily
+  removed from device.
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows special "-" (standard input) keyfile handling
+  even for TCRYPT (TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt compatible) devices.
+
+* Cryptsetup now fails if there are more keyfiles specified
+  for non-TCRYPT device.
+
+* The luksKillSlot command now does not suppress provided password
+  in batch mode (if password is wrong slot is not destroyed).
+  Note that not providing password in batch mode means that keyslot
+  is destroyed unconditionally.

docs/v1.7.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.1
+
+* Update LUKS documentation format.
+  Clarify fixed sector size and keyslots alignment.
+
+* Support activation options for error handling modes in Linux kernel
+  dm-verity module:
+
+  --ignore-corruption - dm-verity just logs detected corruption
+
+  --restart-on-corruption - dm-verity restarts the kernel if corruption is detected
+
+  If the options above are not specified, default behavior for dm-verity remains.
+  Default is that I/O operation fails with I/O error if corrupted block is detected.
+
+  --ignore-zero-blocks - Instructs dm-verity to not verify blocks that are expected
+  to contain zeroes and always return zeroes directly instead.
+
+  NOTE that these options could have security or functional impacts,
+  do not use them without assessing the risks!
+
+* Fix help text for cipher benchmark specification (mention --cipher option).
+
+* Fix off-by-one error in maximum keyfile size.
+  Allow keyfiles up to compiled-in default and not that value minus one.
+
+* Support resume of interrupted decryption in cryptsetup-reencrypt utility.
+  To resume decryption, LUKS device UUID (--uuid option) option must be used.
+
+* Do not use direct-io for LUKS header with unaligned keyslots.
+  Such headers were used only by the first cryptsetup-luks-1.0.0 release (2005).
+
+* Fix device block size detection to properly work on particular file-based
+  containers over underlying devices with 4k sectors.

docs/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.2
+
+* Fix device access to hash offsets located beyond the 2GB device boundary in veritysetup.
+
+* Set configured (compile-time) default iteration time for devices created directly through
+  libcryptsetup (default was hardcoded 1 second, the configured value applied only
+  for cryptsetup application).
+
+* Fix PBKDF2 benchmark to not double iteration count for specific corner case.
+  If the measurement function returns exactly 500 ms, the iteration calculation loop
+  doubled iteration count but instead of repeating measurement it used this value directly.
+
+* Verify passphrase in cryptsetup-reencrypt when encrypting a new drive.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: fix memory leak if hash context was repeatedly reused.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: add support for OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+* Fix several minor spelling errors.
+
+* Properly check maximal buffer size when parsing UUID from /dev/disk/.

docs/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.3
+
+* Allow to specify LUKS1 hash algorithm in Python luksFormat wrapper.
+
+* Use LUKS1 compiled-in defaults also in Python wrapper.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: Fix OpenSSL 1.1.0 support without backward compatible API.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: Fix LibreSSL compatibility.
+
+* Check for data device and hash device area overlap in veritysetup.
+
+* Fix a possible race while allocating a free loop device.
+
+* Fix possible file descriptor leaks if libcryptsetup is run from a forked process.
+
+* Fix missing same_cpu_crypt flag in status command.
+
+* Various updates to FAQ and man pages.

docs/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.5
+
+* Fixes to luksFormat to properly support recent kernel running in FIPS mode.
+
+  Cryptsetup must never use a weak key even if it is just used for testing
+  of algorithm availability. In FIPS mode, weak keys are always rejected.
+
+  A weak key is for example detected if the XTS encryption mode use
+  the same key for the tweak and the encryption part.
+
+* Fixes accesses to unaligned hidden legacy TrueCrypt header.
+
+  On a native 4k-sector device the old hidden TrueCrypt header is not
+  aligned with the hw sector size (this problem was fixed in later TrueCrypt
+  on-disk format versions).
+
+  Cryptsetup now properly aligns the read so it does not fail.
+
+* Fixes to optional dracut ramdisk scripts for offline re-encryption on initial boot.

lib/Makefile.am

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
 pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig
 pkgconfig_DATA = libcryptsetup.pc
 
-AM_CPPFLAGS = \
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -include config.h \
 	-I$(top_srcdir)				\
 	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend	\
 	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib/luks1		\
@@ -16,10 +16,7 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS = \
 	-DLIBDIR=\""$(libdir)"\"		\
 	-DPREFIX=\""$(prefix)"\"		\
 	-DSYSCONFDIR=\""$(sysconfdir)"\"	\
-	-DVERSION=\""$(VERSION)"\"		\
-	-D_GNU_SOURCE				\
-	-D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE			\
-	-D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
+	-DVERSION=\""$(VERSION)"\"
 
 lib_LTLIBRARIES = libcryptsetup.la
 
@@ -32,17 +29,16 @@ common_ldadd = \
 
 libcryptsetup_la_DEPENDENCIES = $(common_ldadd) libcryptsetup.sym
 
-libcryptsetup_la_LDFLAGS = \
+libcryptsetup_la_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -no-undefined \
 	-Wl,--version-script=$(top_srcdir)/lib/libcryptsetup.sym \
 	-version-info @LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO@
 
-libcryptsetup_la_CFLAGS = -Wall @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+libcryptsetup_la_CFLAGS = -Wall $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
 
 libcryptsetup_la_LIBADD = \
 	@UUID_LIBS@				\
 	@DEVMAPPER_LIBS@			\
 	@CRYPTO_LIBS@				\
-	@FIPSCHECK_LIBS@			\
 	$(common_ldadd)
 
 

lib/crypt_plain.c

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /*
  * cryptsetup plain device helper functions
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <string.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 
 #include "libcryptsetup.h"
@@ -83,7 +83,11 @@ int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)),
 	/* hash[:hash_length] */
 	if ((s = strchr(hash_name_buf, ':'))) {
 		*s = '\0';
-		hash_size = atoi(++s);
+		s++;
+		if (!*s || sscanf(s, "%zd", &hash_size) != 1) {
+			log_dbg("Hash length is not a number");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		if (hash_size > key_size) {
 			log_dbg("Hash length %zd > key length %zd",
 				hash_size, key_size);
@@ -95,7 +99,16 @@ int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *ctx __attribute__((unused)),
 		pad_size = 0;
 	}
 
-	r = hash(hash_name_buf, hash_size, key, passphrase_size, passphrase);
+	/* No hash, copy passphrase directly */
+	if (!strcmp(hash_name_buf, "plain")) {
+		if (passphrase_size < hash_size) {
+			log_dbg("Too short plain passphrase.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		memcpy(key, passphrase, hash_size);
+		r = 0;
+	} else
+		r = hash(hash_name_buf, hash_size, key, passphrase_size, passphrase);
 
 	if (r == 0 && pad_size)
 		memset(key + hash_size, 0, pad_size);

lib/crypto_backend/Makefile.am

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@ moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
 
 noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libcrypto_backend.la
 
-libcrypto_backend_la_CFLAGS = -Wall @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+libcrypto_backend_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -Wall @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
 
 libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES = crypto_backend.h \
-	crypto_cipher_kernel.c pbkdf_check.c crc32.c
+	crypto_cipher_kernel.c crypto_storage.c pbkdf_check.c crc32.c
 
 if CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT
 libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += crypto_gcrypt.c
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
 libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += pbkdf2_generic.c
 endif
 
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -I$(top_srcdir)/lib
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -include config.h -I$(top_srcdir)/lib

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@
 
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include "config.h"
 
 struct crypt_device;
 struct crypt_hash;
 struct crypt_hmac;
 struct crypt_cipher;
+struct crypt_storage;
 
 int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx);
 
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips);
 
 /* PBKDF*/
 int crypt_pbkdf_check(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
-		      const char *password, size_t password_size,
-		      const char *salt, size_t salt_size,
-		      uint64_t *iter_secs);
+		      const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		      const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		      size_t key_length, uint64_t *iter_secs);
 int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		const char *password, size_t password_length,
 		const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
@@ -73,13 +73,15 @@ int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
 		 const char *P, size_t Plen,
 		 const char *S, size_t Slen,
 		 unsigned int c,
-		 unsigned int dkLen,char *DK);
+		 unsigned int dkLen, char *DK,
+		 unsigned int hash_block_size);
 #endif
 
 /* CRC32 */
 uint32_t crypt_crc32(uint32_t seed, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
 
 /* ciphers */
+int crypt_cipher_blocksize(const char *name);
 int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
 		    const char *mode, const void *buffer, size_t length);
 int crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx);
@@ -90,4 +92,21 @@ int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 			 const char *in, char *out, size_t length,
 			 const char *iv, size_t iv_length);
 
+/* storage encryption wrappers */
+int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx, uint64_t sector_start,
+		       const char *cipher, const char *cipher_mode,
+		       char *key, size_t key_length);
+int crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx);
+int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t sector,
+			  size_t count, char *buffer);
+int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx, uint64_t sector,
+			  size_t count, char *buffer);
+
+/* Memzero helper (memset on stack can be optimized out) */
+static inline void crypt_backend_memzero(void *s, size_t n)
+{
+	volatile uint8_t *p = (volatile uint8_t *)s;
+	while(n--) *p++ = 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* _CRYPTO_BACKEND_H */

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation (skcipher)
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -44,33 +44,52 @@ struct crypt_cipher {
 	int opfd;
 };
 
-/* Shared with hash kernel backend */
-int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *opfd);
+struct cipher_alg {
+	const char *name;
+	int blocksize;
+};
 
-int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *opfd)
+/* FIXME: Getting block size should be dynamic from cipher backend. */
+static struct cipher_alg cipher_algs[] = {
+	{ "cipher_null", 16 },
+	{ "aes",         16 },
+	{ "serpent",     16 },
+	{ "twofish",     16 },
+	{ "anubis",      16 },
+	{ "blowfish",     8 },
+	{ "camellia",    16 },
+	{ "cast5",        8 },
+	{ "cast6",       16 },
+	{ "des",          8 },
+	{ "des3_ede",     8 },
+	{ "khazad",       8 },
+	{ "seed",        16 },
+	{ "tea",          8 },
+	{ "xtea",         8 },
+	{ NULL,           0 }
+};
+
+static struct cipher_alg *_get_alg(const char *name)
 {
-	*tfmfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
-	if (*tfmfd == -1)
-		return -ENOTSUP;
+	int i = 0;
 
-	if (bind(*tfmfd, (struct sockaddr *)sa, sizeof(*sa)) == -1) {
-		close(*tfmfd);
-		*tfmfd = -1;
-		return -ENOENT;
+	while (name && cipher_algs[i].name) {
+		if (!strcasecmp(name, cipher_algs[i].name))
+			return &cipher_algs[i];
+		i++;
 	}
+	return NULL;
+}
 
-	*opfd = accept(*tfmfd, NULL, 0);
-	if (*opfd == -1) {
-		close(*tfmfd);
-		*tfmfd = -1;
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+int crypt_cipher_blocksize(const char *name)
+{
+	struct cipher_alg *ca = _get_alg(name);
 
-	return 0;
+	return ca ? ca->blocksize : -EINVAL;
 }
 
 /*
- *ciphers
+ * ciphers
  *
  * ENOENT - algorithm not available
  * ENOTSUP - AF_ALG family not available
@@ -84,7 +103,6 @@ int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
 		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
 		.salg_type = "skcipher",
 	};
-	int r;
 
 	h = malloc(sizeof(*h));
 	if (!h)
@@ -93,13 +111,28 @@ int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
 	snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name),
 		 "%s(%s)", mode, name);
 
-	r = crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd);
-	if (r < 0) {
-		free(h);
-		return r;
+	h->opfd = -1;
+	h->tfmfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+	if (h->tfmfd < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+		return -ENOTSUP;
 	}
 
-	if (setsockopt(h->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buffer, length) == -1) {
+	if (bind(h->tfmfd, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (!strcmp(name, "cipher_null"))
+		length = 0;
+
+	if (setsockopt(h->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buffer, length) < 0) {
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	h->opfd = accept(h->tfmfd, NULL, 0);
+	if (h->opfd < 0) {
 		crypt_cipher_destroy(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -142,6 +175,9 @@ static int crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 
 	/* Set encrypt/decrypt operation */
 	header = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	if (!header)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	header->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG;
 	header->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_OP;
 	header->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(*type));
@@ -169,7 +205,7 @@ static int crypt_cipher_crypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 	if (len != (ssize_t)length)
 		r = -EIO;
 bad:
-	memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -191,9 +227,9 @@ int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx,
 
 int crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
 {
-	if (ctx->tfmfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->tfmfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->tfmfd);
-	if (ctx->opfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->opfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->opfd);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
@@ -202,6 +238,11 @@ int crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx)
 
 #else /* ENABLE_AF_ALG */
 
+int crypt_cipher_blocksize(const char *name)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name,
 		    const char *mode, const void *buffer, size_t length)
 {

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * GCRYPT crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 
 static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
 static int crypto_backend_secmem = 1;
+static int crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = -1;
 static char version[64];
 
 struct crypt_hash {
@@ -42,6 +43,44 @@ struct crypt_hmac {
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Test for wrong Whirlpool variant,
+ * Ref: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gcrypt-devel/2014-January/002889.html
+ */
+static void crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *h;
+	char buf[2] = "\0\0", hash_out1[64], hash_out2[64];
+	int r;
+
+	if (crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug >= 0)
+		return;
+
+	crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 0;
+	if (crypt_hash_init(&h, "whirlpool"))
+		return;
+
+	/* One shot */
+	if ((r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[0], 2)) ||
+	    (r = crypt_hash_final(h, hash_out1, 64))) {
+		crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Split buf (crypt_hash_final resets hash state) */
+	if ((r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[0], 1)) ||
+	    (r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[1], 1)) ||
+	    (r = crypt_hash_final(h, hash_out2, 64))) {
+		crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+
+	if (memcmp(hash_out1, hash_out2, 64))
+		crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 1;
+}
+
 int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
 	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
@@ -70,10 +109,15 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 		gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
 	}
 
-	snprintf(version, 64, "gcrypt %s%s",
-		 gcry_check_version(NULL),
-		 crypto_backend_secmem ? "" : ", secmem disabled");
 	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
+	crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug();
+
+	snprintf(version, 64, "gcrypt %s%s%s",
+		 gcry_check_version(NULL),
+		 crypto_backend_secmem ? "" : ", secmem disabled",
+		 crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug > 0 ? ", flawed whirlpool" : ""
+		);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -87,6 +131,23 @@ uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static const char *crypt_hash_compat_name(const char *name, unsigned int *flags)
+{
+	const char *hash_name = name;
+
+	/* "whirlpool_gcryptbug" is out shortcut to flawed whirlpool
+	 * in libgcrypt < 1.6.0 */
+	if (name && !strcasecmp(name, "whirlpool_gcryptbug")) {
+#if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010601
+		if (flags)
+			*flags |= GCRY_MD_FLAG_BUGEMU1;
+#endif
+		hash_name = "whirlpool";
+	}
+
+	return hash_name;
+}
+
 /* HASH */
 int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
 {
@@ -94,7 +155,7 @@ int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
 
 	assert(crypto_backend_initialised);
 
-	hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(name);
+	hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, NULL));
 	if (!hash_id)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -104,6 +165,7 @@ int crypt_hash_size(const char *name)
 int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 {
 	struct crypt_hash *h;
+	unsigned int flags = 0;
 
 	assert(crypto_backend_initialised);
 
@@ -111,13 +173,13 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 	if (!h)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	h->hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(name);
+	h->hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, &flags));
 	if (!h->hash_id) {
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (gcry_md_open(&h->hd, h->hash_id, 0)) {
+	if (gcry_md_open(&h->hd, h->hash_id, flags)) {
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -173,6 +235,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 		    const void *buffer, size_t length)
 {
 	struct crypt_hmac *h;
+	unsigned int flags = GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC;
 
 	assert(crypto_backend_initialised);
 
@@ -180,13 +243,13 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 	if (!h)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	h->hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(name);
+	h->hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, &flags));
 	if (!h->hash_id) {
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (gcry_md_open(&h->hd, h->hash_id, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC)) {
+	if (gcry_md_open(&h->hd, h->hash_id, flags)) {
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -261,15 +324,17 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		char *key, size_t key_length,
 		unsigned int iterations)
 {
+	const char *hash_name = crypt_hash_compat_name(hash, NULL);
+
 #if USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
 	if (!kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
-			    iterations, key_length, key);
+	return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash_name, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
+			    iterations, key_length, key, 0);
 
 #else /* USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2 */
-	int hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(hash);
+	int hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(hash_name);
 	int kdf_id;
 
 	if (!hash_id)

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Linux kernel userspace API crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -44,15 +44,16 @@ struct hash_alg {
 	const char *name;
 	const char *kernel_name;
 	int length;
+	unsigned int block_length;
 };
 
 static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
-	{ "sha1", "sha1", 20 },
-	{ "sha256", "sha256", 32 },
-	{ "sha512", "sha512", 64 },
-	{ "ripemd160", "rmd160", 20 },
-	{ "whirlpool", "wp512", 64 },
-	{ NULL, NULL, 0 }
+	{ "sha1",      "sha1",   20,  64 },
+	{ "sha256",    "sha256", 32,  64 },
+	{ "sha512",    "sha512", 64, 128 },
+	{ "ripemd160", "rmd160", 20,  64 },
+	{ "whirlpool", "wp512",  64,  64 },
+	{ NULL,        NULL,      0,   0 }
 };
 
 struct crypt_hash {
@@ -67,8 +68,34 @@ struct crypt_hmac {
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
-/* Defined in crypt_kernel_ciphers.c */
-extern int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *opfd);
+static int crypt_kernel_socket_init(struct sockaddr_alg *sa, int *tfmfd, int *opfd,
+				    const void *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	*tfmfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+	if (*tfmfd < 0)
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (bind(*tfmfd, (struct sockaddr *)sa, sizeof(*sa)) < 0) {
+		close(*tfmfd);
+		*tfmfd = -1;
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (key && setsockopt(*tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, key_length) < 0) {
+		close(*tfmfd);
+		*tfmfd = -1;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	*opfd = accept(*tfmfd, NULL, 0);
+	if (*opfd < 0) {
+		close(*tfmfd);
+		*tfmfd = -1;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
 
 int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
@@ -76,7 +103,7 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	struct sockaddr_alg sa = {
 		.salg_family = AF_ALG,
 		.salg_type = "hash",
-		.salg_name = "sha1",
+		.salg_name = "sha256",
 	};
 	int tfmfd = -1, opfd = -1;
 
@@ -86,7 +113,7 @@ int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	if (uname(&uts) == -1 || strcmp(uts.sysname, "Linux"))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &tfmfd, &opfd) < 0)
+	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &tfmfd, &opfd, NULL, 0) < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	close(tfmfd);
@@ -151,7 +178,7 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 
 	strncpy((char *)sa.salg_name, ha->kernel_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name));
 
-	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd) < 0) {
+	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd, NULL, 0) < 0) {
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -187,9 +214,9 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 
 int crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 {
-	if (ctx->tfmfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->tfmfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->tfmfd);
-	if (ctx->opfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->opfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->opfd);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
@@ -226,16 +253,11 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 	snprintf((char *)sa.salg_name, sizeof(sa.salg_name),
 		 "hmac(%s)", ha->kernel_name);
 
-	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd) < 0) {
+	if (crypt_kernel_socket_init(&sa, &h->tfmfd, &h->opfd, buffer, length) < 0) {
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (setsockopt(h->tfmfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buffer, length) == -1) {
-		crypt_hmac_destroy(h);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
 	*ctx = h;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -267,9 +289,9 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 
 int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
-	if (ctx->tfmfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->tfmfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->tfmfd);
-	if (ctx->opfd != -1)
+	if (ctx->opfd >= 0)
 		close(ctx->opfd);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
@@ -289,9 +311,11 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		char *key, size_t key_length,
 		unsigned int iterations)
 {
-	if (!kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
+	struct hash_alg *ha = _get_alg(hash);
+
+	if (!ha || !kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
-			    iterations, key_length, key);
+			    iterations, key_length, key, ha->block_length);
 }

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * Nettle crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2017 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -24,14 +24,15 @@
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <nettle/sha.h>
 #include <nettle/hmac.h>
+#include <nettle/pbkdf2.h>
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 
 static char *version = "Nettle";
 
 typedef void (*init_func) (void *);
-typedef void (*update_func) (void *, unsigned, const uint8_t *);
-typedef void (*digest_func) (void *, unsigned, uint8_t *);
-typedef void (*set_key_func) (void *, unsigned, const uint8_t *);
+typedef void (*update_func) (void *, size_t, const uint8_t *);
+typedef void (*digest_func) (void *, size_t, uint8_t *);
+typedef void (*set_key_func) (void *, size_t, const uint8_t *);
 
 struct hash_alg {
 	const char *name;
@@ -265,8 +266,8 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
 	memset(ctx->key, 0, ctx->key_length);
-	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx->key);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -284,10 +285,21 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		char *key, size_t key_length,
 		unsigned int iterations)
 {
+	struct crypt_hmac *h;
+	int r;
+
 	if (!kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/* FIXME: switch to internal implementation in Nettle 2.6 */
-	return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
-			    iterations, key_length, key);
+	r = crypt_hmac_init(&h, hash, password, password_length);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	nettle_pbkdf2(&h->nettle_ctx, h->hash->nettle_hmac_update,
+		      h->hash->nettle_hmac_digest, h->hash->length, iterations,
+		      salt_length, (const uint8_t *)salt, key_length,
+		      (uint8_t *)key);
+	crypt_hmac_destroy(h);
+
+	return 0;
 }

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * NSS crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -35,14 +35,15 @@ struct hash_alg {
 	SECOidTag oid;
 	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ck_type;
 	int length;
+	unsigned int block_length;
 };
 
 static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = {
-	{ "sha1", SEC_OID_SHA1, CKM_SHA_1_HMAC, 20 },
-	{ "sha256", SEC_OID_SHA256, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, 32 },
-	{ "sha384", SEC_OID_SHA384, CKM_SHA384_HMAC, 48 },
-	{ "sha512", SEC_OID_SHA512, CKM_SHA512_HMAC, 64 },
-//	{ "ripemd160", SEC_OID_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, 20 },
+	{ "sha1",   SEC_OID_SHA1,   CKM_SHA_1_HMAC,  20,  64 },
+	{ "sha256", SEC_OID_SHA256, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, 32,  64 },
+	{ "sha384", SEC_OID_SHA384, CKM_SHA384_HMAC, 48, 128 },
+	{ "sha512", SEC_OID_SHA512, CKM_SHA512_HMAC, 64, 128 },
+//	{ "ripemd160", SEC_OID_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, 20, 64 },
 	{ NULL, 0, 0, 0 }
 };
 
@@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
-	memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 
 	if (tmp_len < length)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -265,7 +266,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
-	memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 
 	if (tmp_len < length)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -308,9 +309,11 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		char *key, size_t key_length,
 		unsigned int iterations)
 {
-	if (!kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
+	struct hash_alg *ha = _get_alg(hash);
+
+	if (!ha || !kdf || strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length,
-			    iterations, key_length, key);
+			    iterations, key_length, key, ha->block_length);
 }

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * OPENSSL crypto backend implementation
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -38,23 +38,79 @@
 static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0;
 
 struct crypt_hash {
-	EVP_MD_CTX md;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *md;
 	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
 struct crypt_hmac {
-	HMAC_CTX md;
+	HMAC_CTX *md;
 	const EVP_MD *hash_id;
 	int hash_len;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Compatible wrappers for OpenSSL < 1.1.0
+ */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+static void openssl_backend_init(void)
+{
+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+}
+
+static const char *openssl_backend_version(void)
+{
+	return SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION);
+}
+
+static EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void)
+{
+	EVP_MD_CTX *md = malloc(sizeof(*md));
+
+	if (md)
+		EVP_MD_CTX_init(md);
+
+	return md;
+}
+
+static void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *md)
+{
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(md);
+	free(md);
+}
+
+static HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void)
+{
+	HMAC_CTX *md = malloc(sizeof(*md));
+
+	if (md)
+		HMAC_CTX_init(md);
+
+	return md;
+}
+
+static void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *md)
+{
+	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(md);
+	free(md);
+}
+#else
+static void openssl_backend_init(void)
+{
+}
+
+static const char *openssl_backend_version(void)
+{
+    return OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
+}
+#endif
+
 int crypt_backend_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
 	if (crypto_backend_initialised)
 		return 0;
 
-	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+	openssl_backend_init();
 
 	crypto_backend_initialised = 1;
 	return 0;
@@ -67,7 +123,7 @@ uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void)
 
 const char *crypt_backend_version(void)
 {
-	return SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION);
+	return openssl_backend_version();
 }
 
 /* HASH */
@@ -89,13 +145,21 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 	if (!h)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	h->md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+	if (!h->md) {
+		free(h);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
 	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
 	if (!h->hash_id) {
+		EVP_MD_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (EVP_DigestInit(&h->md, h->hash_id) != 1) {
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(h->md, h->hash_id, NULL) != 1) {
+		EVP_MD_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -107,7 +171,7 @@ int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name)
 
 static int crypt_hash_restart(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 {
-	if (EVP_DigestInit(&ctx->md, ctx->hash_id) != 1)
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->md, ctx->hash_id, NULL) != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -115,7 +179,7 @@ static int crypt_hash_restart(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 
 int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
 {
-	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md, buffer, length) != 1)
+	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->md, buffer, length) != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -129,11 +193,11 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len) != 1)
+	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len) != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
-	memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 
 	if (tmp_len < length)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -146,7 +210,7 @@ int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 
 int crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx)
 {
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->md);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
 	return 0;
@@ -167,14 +231,20 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 	if (!h)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	h->md = HMAC_CTX_new();
+	if (!h->md) {
+		free(h);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
 	h->hash_id = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
 	if (!h->hash_id) {
+		HMAC_CTX_free(h->md);
 		free(h);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&h->md);
-	HMAC_Init_ex(&h->md, buffer, length, h->hash_id, NULL);
+	HMAC_Init_ex(h->md, buffer, length, h->hash_id, NULL);
 
 	h->hash_len = EVP_MD_size(h->hash_id);
 	*ctx = h;
@@ -183,12 +253,12 @@ int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name,
 
 static void crypt_hmac_restart(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
-	HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx->md, NULL, 0, ctx->hash_id, NULL);
+	HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->md, NULL, 0, ctx->hash_id, NULL);
 }
 
 int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length)
 {
-	HMAC_Update(&ctx->md, (const unsigned char *)buffer, length);
+	HMAC_Update(ctx->md, (const unsigned char *)buffer, length);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -200,10 +270,10 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 	if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	HMAC_Final(&ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len);
+	HMAC_Final(ctx->md, tmp, &tmp_len);
 
 	memcpy(buffer, tmp, length);
-	memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 
 	if (tmp_len < length)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -215,7 +285,7 @@ int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length)
 
 int crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx)
 {
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md);
+	HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->md);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
 	free(ctx);
 	return 0;
@@ -250,7 +320,7 @@ int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, (int)password_length,
-	    (unsigned char *)salt, (int)salt_length,
+	    (const unsigned char *)salt, (int)salt_length,
             (int)iterations, hash_id, (int)key_length, (unsigned char *)key))
 		return -EINVAL;
 

lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+/*
+ * Generic wrapper for storage encryption modes and Initial Vectors
+ * (reimplementation of some functions from Linux dm-crypt kernel)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014-2017, Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include "bitops.h"
+#include "crypto_backend.h"
+
+#define SECTOR_SHIFT	9
+#define SECTOR_SIZE	(1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)
+
+/*
+ * Internal IV helper
+ * IV documentation: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
+ */
+struct crypt_sector_iv {
+	enum { IV_NONE, IV_NULL, IV_PLAIN, IV_PLAIN64, IV_ESSIV, IV_BENBI } type;
+	int iv_size;
+	char *iv;
+	struct crypt_cipher *essiv_cipher;
+	int benbi_shift;
+};
+
+/* Block encryption storage context */
+struct crypt_storage {
+	uint64_t sector_start;
+	struct crypt_cipher *cipher;
+	struct crypt_sector_iv cipher_iv;
+};
+
+static int int_log2(unsigned int x)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	for (x >>= 1; x > 0; x >>= 1)
+		r++;
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
+			 const char *cipher_name, const char *mode_name,
+			 const char *iv_name, char *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+	ctx->iv_size = crypt_cipher_blocksize(cipher_name);
+	if (ctx->iv_size < 0)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	if (!iv_name ||
+	    !strcmp(cipher_name, "cipher_null") ||
+	    !strcmp(mode_name, "ecb")) {
+		ctx->type = IV_NONE;
+		ctx->iv_size = 0;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "null")) {
+		ctx->type = IV_NULL;
+	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "plain64")) {
+		ctx->type = IV_PLAIN64;
+	} else if (!strcasecmp(iv_name, "plain")) {
+		ctx->type = IV_PLAIN;
+	} else if (!strncasecmp(iv_name, "essiv:", 6)) {
+		struct crypt_hash *h = NULL;
+		char *hash_name = strchr(iv_name, ':');
+		int hash_size;
+		char tmp[256];
+		int r;
+
+		if (!hash_name)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		hash_size = crypt_hash_size(++hash_name);
+		if (hash_size < 0)
+			return -ENOENT;
+
+		if ((unsigned)hash_size > sizeof(tmp))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (crypt_hash_init(&h, hash_name))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = crypt_hash_write(h, key, key_length);
+		if (r) {
+			crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+			return r;
+		}
+
+		r = crypt_hash_final(h, tmp, hash_size);
+		crypt_hash_destroy(h);
+		if (r) {
+			crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+			return r;
+		}
+
+		r = crypt_cipher_init(&ctx->essiv_cipher, cipher_name, "ecb",
+				      tmp, hash_size);
+		crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+
+		ctx->type = IV_ESSIV;
+	} else if (!strncasecmp(iv_name, "benbi", 5)) {
+		int log = int_log2(ctx->iv_size);
+		if (log > SECTOR_SHIFT)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ctx->type = IV_BENBI;
+		ctx->benbi_shift = SECTOR_SHIFT - log;
+	} else
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	ctx->iv = malloc(ctx->iv_size);
+	if (!ctx->iv)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypt_sector_iv_generate(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, uint64_t sector)
+{
+	uint64_t val;
+
+	switch (ctx->type) {
+	case IV_NONE:
+		break;
+	case IV_NULL:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		break;
+	case IV_PLAIN:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		*(uint32_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le32(sector & 0xffffffff);
+		break;
+	case IV_PLAIN64:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
+		break;
+	case IV_ESSIV:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		*(uint64_t *)ctx->iv = cpu_to_le64(sector);
+		return crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->essiv_cipher,
+			ctx->iv, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+	case IV_BENBI:
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		val = cpu_to_be64((sector << ctx->benbi_shift) + 1);
+		memcpy(ctx->iv + ctx->iv_size - sizeof(val), &val, sizeof(val));
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypt_sector_iv_destroy(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->type == IV_ESSIV)
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(ctx->essiv_cipher);
+
+	if (ctx->iv) {
+		memset(ctx->iv, 0, ctx->iv_size);
+		free(ctx->iv);
+	}
+
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Block encryption storage wrappers */
+
+int crypt_storage_init(struct crypt_storage **ctx,
+		       uint64_t sector_start,
+		       const char *cipher,
+		       const char *cipher_mode,
+		       char *key, size_t key_length)
+{
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	char mode_name[64];
+	char *cipher_iv = NULL;
+	int r = -EIO;
+
+	s = malloc(sizeof(*s));
+	if (!s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
+
+	/* Remove IV if present */
+	strncpy(mode_name, cipher_mode, sizeof(mode_name));
+	mode_name[sizeof(mode_name) - 1] = 0;
+	cipher_iv = strchr(mode_name, '-');
+	if (cipher_iv) {
+		*cipher_iv = '\0';
+		cipher_iv++;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init(&s->cipher, cipher, mode_name, key, key_length);
+	if (r) {
+		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_sector_iv_init(&s->cipher_iv, cipher, mode_name, cipher_iv, key, key_length);
+	if (r) {
+		crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	s->sector_start = sector_start;
+
+	*ctx = s;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_storage_decrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx,
+		       uint64_t sector, size_t count,
+		       char *buffer)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, sector + i);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+		r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(ctx->cipher,
+					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
+					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
+					 SECTOR_SIZE,
+					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv,
+					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv_size);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_storage_encrypt(struct crypt_storage *ctx,
+		       uint64_t sector, size_t count,
+		       char *buffer)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		r = crypt_sector_iv_generate(&ctx->cipher_iv, sector + i);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+		r = crypt_cipher_encrypt(ctx->cipher,
+					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
+					 &buffer[i * SECTOR_SIZE],
+					 SECTOR_SIZE,
+					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv,
+					 ctx->cipher_iv.iv_size);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_storage_destroy(struct crypt_storage *ctx)
+{
+	if (!ctx)
+		return 0;
+
+	crypt_sector_iv_destroy(&ctx->cipher_iv);
+
+	if (ctx->cipher)
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(ctx->cipher);
+
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	free(ctx);
+
+	return 0;
+}

lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation
  *
  * cryptsetup related changes
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -26,6 +27,25 @@
 #include <alloca.h>
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 
+static int hash_buf(const char *src, size_t src_len,
+		    char *dst, size_t dst_len,
+		    const char *hash_name)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *hd = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (crypt_hash_init(&hd, hash_name))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_hash_write(hd, src, src_len);
+
+	if (!r)
+		r = crypt_hash_final(hd, dst, dst_len);
+
+	crypt_hash_destroy(hd);
+	return r;
+}
+
 /*
  * 5.2 PBKDF2
  *
@@ -52,17 +72,26 @@
  *  Output:         DK         derived key, a dkLen-octet string
  */
 
+/*
+ * if hash_block_size is not zero, the HMAC key is pre-hashed
+ * inside this function.
+ * This prevents situation when crypto backend doesn't support
+ * long HMAC keys or it tries hash long key in every iteration
+ * (because of crypt_final() cannot do simple key reset.
+ */
+
 #define MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN 80
 
 int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
 			const char *P, size_t Plen,
 			const char *S, size_t Slen,
 			unsigned int c, unsigned int dkLen,
-			char *DK)
+			char *DK, unsigned int hash_block_size)
 {
 	struct crypt_hmac *hmac;
 	char U[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN];
 	char T[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN];
+	char P_hash[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN];
 	int i, k, rc = -EINVAL;
 	unsigned int u, hLen, l, r;
 	size_t tmplen = Slen + 4;
@@ -152,8 +181,18 @@ int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
 	 *
 	 */
 
-	if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P, Plen))
-		return -EINVAL;
+	/* If hash_block_size is provided, hash password in advance. */
+	if (hash_block_size > 0 && Plen > hash_block_size) {
+		if (hash_buf(P, Plen, P_hash, hLen, hash))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P_hash, hLen))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		crypt_backend_memzero(P_hash, sizeof(P_hash));
+	} else {
+		if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P, Plen))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 1; (unsigned int) i <= l; i++) {
 		memset(T, 0, hLen);
@@ -185,5 +224,203 @@ int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
 	rc = 0;
 out:
 	crypt_hmac_destroy(hmac);
+	crypt_backend_memzero(U, sizeof(U));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(T, sizeof(T));
+	crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, tmplen);
+
 	return rc;
 }
+
+#if 0
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+struct test_vector {
+	const char *hash;
+	unsigned int hash_block_length;
+	unsigned int iterations;
+	const char *password;
+	unsigned int password_length;
+	const char *salt;
+	unsigned int salt_length;
+	const char *output;
+	unsigned int output_length;
+};
+
+struct test_vector test_vectors[] = {
+	/* RFC 3962 */
+	{
+		"sha1", 64, 1,
+		"password", 8,
+		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
+		"\xcd\xed\xb5\x28\x1b\xb2\xf8\x01"
+		"\x56\x5a\x11\x22\xb2\x56\x35\x15"
+		"\x0a\xd1\xf7\xa0\x4b\xb9\xf3\xa3"
+		"\x33\xec\xc0\xe2\xe1\xf7\x08\x37", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 2,
+		"password", 8,
+		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
+		"\x01\xdb\xee\x7f\x4a\x9e\x24\x3e"
+		"\x98\x8b\x62\xc7\x3c\xda\x93\x5d"
+		"\xa0\x53\x78\xb9\x32\x44\xec\x8f"
+		"\x48\xa9\x9e\x61\xad\x79\x9d\x86", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 1200,
+		"password", 8,
+		"ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21,
+		"\x5c\x08\xeb\x61\xfd\xf7\x1e\x4e"
+		"\x4e\xc3\xcf\x6b\xa1\xf5\x51\x2b"
+		"\xa7\xe5\x2d\xdb\xc5\xe5\x14\x2f"
+		"\x70\x8a\x31\xe2\xe6\x2b\x1e\x13", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 5,
+		"password", 8,
+		"\0224VxxV4\022", 8, // "\x1234567878563412
+		"\xd1\xda\xa7\x86\x15\xf2\x87\xe6"
+		"\xa1\xc8\xb1\x20\xd7\x06\x2a\x49"
+		"\x3f\x98\xd2\x03\xe6\xbe\x49\xa6"
+		"\xad\xf4\xfa\x57\x4b\x6e\x64\xee", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 1200,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 64,
+		"pass phrase equals block size", 29,
+		"\x13\x9c\x30\xc0\x96\x6b\xc3\x2b"
+		"\xa5\x5f\xdb\xf2\x12\x53\x0a\xc9"
+		"\xc5\xec\x59\xf1\xa4\x52\xf5\xcc"
+		"\x9a\xd9\x40\xfe\xa0\x59\x8e\xd1", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 1200,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x9c\xca\xd6\xd4\x68\x77\x0c\xd5"
+		"\x1b\x10\xe6\xa6\x87\x21\xbe\x61"
+		"\x1a\x8b\x4d\x28\x26\x01\xdb\x3b"
+		"\x36\xbe\x92\x46\x91\x5e\xc8\x2a", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 50,
+		"\360\235\204\236", 4, // g-clef ("\xf09d849e)
+		"EXAMPLE.COMpianist", 18,
+		"\x6b\x9c\xf2\x6d\x45\x45\x5a\x43"
+		"\xa5\xb8\xbb\x27\x6a\x40\x3b\x39"
+		"\xe7\xfe\x37\xa0\xc4\x1e\x02\xc2"
+		"\x81\xff\x30\x69\xe1\xe9\x4f\x52", 32
+	}, {
+	/* RFC-6070 */
+		"sha1", 64, 1,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\x0c\x60\xc8\x0f\x96\x1f\x0e\x71\xf3\xa9"
+		"\xb5\x24\xaf\x60\x12\x06\x2f\xe0\x37\xa6", 20
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 2,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\xea\x6c\x01\x4d\xc7\x2d\x6f\x8c\xcd\x1e"
+		"\xd9\x2a\xce\x1d\x41\xf0\xd8\xde\x89\x57", 20
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 4096,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\x4b\x00\x79\x01\xb7\x65\x48\x9a\xbe\xad"
+		"\x49\xd9\x26\xf7\x21\xd0\x65\xa4\x29\xc1", 20
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 16777216,
+		"password", 8,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\xee\xfe\x3d\x61\xcd\x4d\xa4\xe4\xe9\x94"
+		"\x5b\x3d\x6b\xa2\x15\x8c\x26\x34\xe9\x84", 20
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 4096,
+		"passwordPASSWORDpassword", 24,
+		"saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", 36,
+		"\x3d\x2e\xec\x4f\xe4\x1c\x84\x9b\x80\xc8"
+		"\xd8\x36\x62\xc0\xe4\x4a\x8b\x29\x1a\x96"
+		"\x4c\xf2\xf0\x70\x38", 25
+	}, {
+		"sha1", 64, 4096,
+		"pass\0word", 9,
+		"sa\0lt", 5,
+		"\x56\xfa\x6a\xa7\x55\x48\x09\x9d\xcc\x37"
+		"\xd7\xf0\x34\x25\xe0\xc3", 16
+	}, {
+	/* empty password test */
+		"sha1", 64, 2,
+		"", 0,
+		"salt", 4,
+		"\x13\x3a\x4c\xe8\x37\xb4\xd2\x52\x1e\xe2"
+		"\xbf\x03\xe1\x1c\x71\xca\x79\x4e\x07\x97", 20
+	}, {
+	/* Password exceeds block size test */
+		"sha256", 64, 1200,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x22\x34\x4b\xc4\xb6\xe3\x26\x75"
+		"\xa8\x09\x0f\x3e\xa8\x0b\xe0\x1d"
+		"\x5f\x95\x12\x6a\x2c\xdd\xc3\xfa"
+		"\xcc\x4a\x5e\x6d\xca\x04\xec\x58", 32
+	}, {
+		"sha512", 128, 1200,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 129,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x0f\xb2\xed\x2c\x0e\x6e\xfb\x7d"
+		"\x7d\x8e\xdd\x58\x01\xb4\x59\x72"
+		"\x99\x92\x16\x30\x5e\xa4\x36\x8d"
+		"\x76\x14\x80\xf3\xe3\x7a\x22\xb9", 32
+	}, {
+		"whirlpool", 64, 1200,
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
+		"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65,
+		"pass phrase exceeds block size", 30,
+		"\x9c\x1c\x74\xf5\x88\x26\xe7\x6a"
+		"\x53\x58\xf4\x0c\x39\xe7\x80\x89"
+		"\x07\xc0\x31\x19\x9a\x50\xa2\x48"
+		"\xf1\xd9\xfe\x78\x64\xe5\x84\x50", 32
+	}
+};
+
+static void printhex(const char *s, const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	printf("%s: ", s);
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		printf("\\x%02x", (unsigned char)buf[i]);
+	printf("\n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_test_vectors(void)
+{
+	char result[64];
+	unsigned int i, j;
+	struct test_vector *vec;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(test_vectors) / sizeof(*test_vectors)); i++) {
+		vec = &test_vectors[i];
+		for (j = 1; j <= vec->output_length; j++) {
+			if (pkcs5_pbkdf2(vec->hash,
+			    vec->password, vec->password_length,
+			    vec->salt, vec->salt_length,
+			    vec->iterations,
+			    j, result, vec->hash_block_length)) {
+				printf("pbkdf2 failed, vector %d\n", i);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			if (memcmp(result, vec->output, j) != 0) {
+				printf("vector %u\n", i);
+				printhex(" got", result, j);
+				printhex("want", vec->output, j);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			memset(result, 0, sizeof(result));
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * PBKDF performance check
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
  * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
  */
 
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #include <sys/resource.h>
@@ -25,12 +26,24 @@
 
 static long time_ms(struct rusage *start, struct rusage *end)
 {
+	int count_kernel_time = 0;
 	long ms;
 
+	if (crypt_backend_flags() & CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL)
+		count_kernel_time = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: if there is no self usage info, count system time.
+	 * This seem like getrusage() bug in some hypervisors...
+	 */
+	if (!end->ru_utime.tv_sec && !start->ru_utime.tv_sec &&
+	    !end->ru_utime.tv_usec && !start->ru_utime.tv_usec)
+		count_kernel_time = 1;
+
 	ms = (end->ru_utime.tv_sec - start->ru_utime.tv_sec) * 1000;
 	ms += (end->ru_utime.tv_usec - start->ru_utime.tv_usec) / 1000;
 
-	if (crypt_backend_flags() & CRYPT_BACKEND_KERNEL) {
+	if (count_kernel_time) {
 		ms += (end->ru_stime.tv_sec - start->ru_stime.tv_sec) * 1000;
 		ms += (end->ru_stime.tv_usec - start->ru_stime.tv_usec) / 1000;
 	}
@@ -40,31 +53,39 @@ static long time_ms(struct rusage *start, struct rusage *end)
 
 /* This code benchmarks PBKDF and returns iterations/second using specified hash */
 int crypt_pbkdf_check(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
-		      const char *password, size_t password_size,
-		      const char *salt, size_t salt_size,
-		      uint64_t *iter_secs)
+		      const char *password, size_t password_length,
+		      const char *salt, size_t salt_length,
+		      size_t key_length, uint64_t *iter_secs)
 {
 	struct rusage rstart, rend;
 	int r = 0, step = 0;
 	long ms = 0;
-	char buf;
+	char *key = NULL;
 	unsigned int iterations;
 
-	if (!kdf || !hash)
+	if (!kdf || !hash || key_length <= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	key = malloc(key_length);
+	if (!key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	iterations = 1 << 15;
-	while (ms < 500) {
-		if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rstart) < 0)
-			return -EINVAL;
+	while (1) {
+		if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rstart) < 0) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 
-		r = crypt_pbkdf(kdf, hash, password, password_size, salt,
-				salt_size, &buf, 1, iterations);
+		r = crypt_pbkdf(kdf, hash, password, password_length, salt,
+				salt_length, key, key_length, iterations);
 		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
+			goto out;
 
-		if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rend) < 0)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rend) < 0) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 
 		ms = time_ms(&rstart, &rend);
 		if (ms > 500)
@@ -79,11 +100,18 @@ int crypt_pbkdf_check(const char *kdf, const char *hash,
 		else
 			iterations <<= 1;
 
-		if (++step > 10 || !iterations)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (++step > 10 || !iterations) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (iter_secs)
 		*iter_secs = (iterations * 1000) / ms;
+out:
+	if (key) {
+		crypt_backend_memzero(key, key_length);
+		free(key);
+	}
 	return r;
 }

lib/internal.h

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /*
  * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library internal
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -24,10 +24,6 @@
 #ifndef INTERNAL_H
 #define INTERNAL_H
 
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-#	include "config.h"
-#endif
-
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
@@ -61,8 +57,8 @@ struct volume_key {
 	char key[];
 };
 
-struct volume_key *crypt_alloc_volume_key(unsigned keylength, const char *key);
-struct volume_key *crypt_generate_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd, unsigned keylength);
+struct volume_key *crypt_alloc_volume_key(size_t keylength, const char *key);
+struct volume_key *crypt_generate_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd, size_t keylength);
 void crypt_free_volume_key(struct volume_key *vk);
 
 /* Device backend */
@@ -79,6 +75,9 @@ int device_block_size(struct device *device);
 int device_read_ahead(struct device *device, uint32_t *read_ahead);
 int device_size(struct device *device, uint64_t *size);
 int device_open(struct device *device, int flags);
+void device_disable_direct_io(struct device *device);
+int device_is_identical(struct device *device1, struct device *device2);
+
 
 enum devcheck { DEV_OK = 0, DEV_EXCL = 1, DEV_SHARED = 2 };
 int device_block_adjust(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -96,16 +95,23 @@ struct device *crypt_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd);
 int crypt_confirm(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *msg);
 
 char *crypt_lookup_dev(const char *dev_id);
-int crypt_sysfs_get_rotational(int major, int minor, int *rotational);
+int crypt_dev_is_rotational(int major, int minor);
+int crypt_dev_is_partition(const char *dev_path);
+char *crypt_get_partition_device(const char *dev_path, uint64_t offset, uint64_t size);
+char *crypt_get_base_device(const char *dev_path);
+uint64_t crypt_dev_partition_offset(const char *dev_path);
 
+ssize_t write_buffer(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count);
+ssize_t read_buffer(int fd, void *buf, size_t count);
 ssize_t write_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *buf, size_t count);
-ssize_t read_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *_buf, size_t count);
-ssize_t write_lseek_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, char *buf, size_t count, off_t offset);
+ssize_t read_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *buf, size_t count);
+ssize_t write_lseek_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset);
+ssize_t read_lseek_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset);
 
 unsigned crypt_getpagesize(void);
 int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx);
 
-void logger(struct crypt_device *cd, int class, const char *file, int line, const char *format, ...);
+void logger(struct crypt_device *cd, int class, const char *file, int line, const char *format, ...) __attribute__ ((format (printf, 5, 6)));
 #define log_dbg(x...) logger(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
 #define log_std(c, x...) logger(c, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)
 #define log_verbose(c, x...) logger(c, CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE, __FILE__, __LINE__, x)

lib/libcryptsetup.h

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /*
  * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ void crypt_log(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *msg);
 /** @} */
 
 /**
- * Set confirmation callback (yes/no)
+ * Set confirmation callback (yes/no).
  *
  * If code need confirmation (like resetting uuid or restoring LUKS header from file)
  * this function is called. If not defined, everything is confirmed.
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ void crypt_set_confirm_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	void *usrptr);
 
 /**
- * Set password query callback.
+ * Set password query callback. DEPRECATED
  *
  * If code need @e _interactive_ query for password, this callback is called.
  * If not defined, compiled-in default is called (uses terminal input).
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ void crypt_set_confirm_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @note Only zero terminated passwords can be entered this way, for complex
  *   use API functions directly.
  * @note Maximal length of password is limited to @e length @e - @e 1 (minimal 511 chars)
+ * @note This function is DEPRECATED and will be removed in future versions.
  *
  * @see Callback function is used in these call provided, that certain conditions are met:
  * @li crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase
@@ -192,7 +193,7 @@ void crypt_set_password_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 /**
  * Set timeout for interactive password entry using default
- * password callback
+ * password callback. DEPRECATED
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param timeout_sec timeout in seconds
@@ -200,16 +201,18 @@ void crypt_set_password_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
 void crypt_set_timeout(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t timeout_sec);
 
 /**
- * Set number of retries in case password input has been incorrect
+ * Set number of retries in case password input has been incorrect. DEPRECATED.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param tries the number
+ *
+ * @note This function is DEPRECATED and will be removed in future versions.
  */
 void crypt_set_password_retry(struct crypt_device *cd, int tries);
 
 /**
  * Set how long should cryptsetup iterate in PBKDF2 function.
- * Default value heads towards the iterations which takes around 1 second
+ * Default value heads towards the iterations which takes around 1 second.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param iteration_time_ms the time in ms
@@ -220,10 +223,12 @@ void crypt_set_iterarion_time(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t iteration_time_m
 
 /**
  * Set whether passphrase will be verified on input
- * (user has to input same passphrase twice)
+ * (user has to input same passphrase twice). DEPRECATED
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param password_verify @e 0 = false, @e !0 true
+ *
+ * @note This function is DEPRECATED and will be removed in future versions.
  */
 void crypt_set_password_verify(struct crypt_device *cd, int password_verify);
 
@@ -261,7 +266,7 @@ int crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device);
 void crypt_set_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd, int rng_type);
 
 /**
- * Get which RNG (random number generator) is used for generating long term key
+ * Get which RNG (random number generator) is used for generating long term key.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @return RNG type on success or negative errno value otherwise.
@@ -272,7 +277,7 @@ int crypt_get_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd);
 /** @} */
 
 /**
- * Helper to lock/unlock memory to avoid swap sensitive data to disk
+ * Helper to lock/unlock memory to avoid swap sensitive data to disk.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
  * @param lock 0 to unlock otherwise lock memory
@@ -304,7 +309,7 @@ int crypt_memory_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, int lock);
 #define CRYPT_LOOPAES "LOOPAES"
 /** dm-verity mode */
 #define CRYPT_VERITY "VERITY"
-/** TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible) mode */
+/** TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible and VeraCrypt-compatible) mode */
 #define CRYPT_TCRYPT "TCRYPT"
 
 /**
@@ -317,7 +322,7 @@ const char *crypt_get_type(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /**
  *
- * Structure used as parameter for PLAIN device type
+ * Structure used as parameter for PLAIN device type.
  *
  * @see crypt_format
  */
@@ -329,7 +334,7 @@ struct crypt_params_plain {
 };
 
 /**
- * Structure used as parameter for LUKS device type
+ * Structure used as parameter for LUKS device type.
  *
  * @see crypt_format, crypt_load
  *
@@ -345,7 +350,7 @@ struct crypt_params_luks1 {
 
 /**
  *
- * Structure used as parameter for loop-AES device type
+ * Structure used as parameter for loop-AES device type.
  *
  * @see crypt_format
  *
@@ -358,7 +363,7 @@ struct crypt_params_loopaes {
 
 /**
  *
- * Structure used as parameter for dm-verity device type
+ * Structure used as parameter for dm-verity device type.
  *
  * @see crypt_format, crypt_load
  *
@@ -386,7 +391,7 @@ struct crypt_params_verity {
 
 /**
  *
- * Structure used as parameter for TCRYPT device type
+ * Structure used as parameter for TCRYPT device type.
  *
  * @see crypt_load
  *
@@ -403,7 +408,7 @@ struct crypt_params_tcrypt {
 	uint32_t flags;            /**< CRYPT_TCRYPT* flags */
 };
 
-/** Include legacy modes ehn scannig for header*/
+/** Include legacy modes when scanning for header */
 #define CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES    (1 << 0)
 /** Try to load hidden header (describing hidden device) */
 #define CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER   (1 << 1)
@@ -411,11 +416,16 @@ struct crypt_params_tcrypt {
 #define CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER   (1 << 2)
 /** Device contains encrypted system (with boot loader) */
 #define CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER   (1 << 3)
+/** Include VeraCrypt modes when scanning for header,
+ *  all other TCRYPT flags applies as well.
+ *  VeraCrypt device is reported as TCRYPT type.
+ */
+#define CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES      (1 << 4)
 
 /** @} */
 
 /**
- * Create (format) new crypt device (and possible header on-disk) but not activates it.
+ * Create (format) new crypt device (and possible header on-disk) but do not activate it.
  *
  * @pre @e cd contains initialized and not formatted device context (device type must @b not be set)
  *
@@ -445,7 +455,7 @@ int crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	void *params);
 
 /**
- * Set new UUID for already existing device
+ * Set new UUID for already existing device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param uuid requested UUID or @e NULL if it should be generated
@@ -458,7 +468,7 @@ int crypt_set_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		   const char *uuid);
 
 /**
- * Load crypt device parameters from on-disk header
+ * Load crypt device parameters from on-disk header.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param requested_type @link crypt_type @endlink or @e NULL for all known
@@ -477,7 +487,7 @@ int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	       void *params);
 
 /**
- * Try to repair crypt device on-disk header if invalid
+ * Try to repair crypt device on-disk header if invalid.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param requested_type @link crypt_type @endlink or @e NULL for all known
@@ -491,7 +501,7 @@ int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		 void *params);
 
 /**
- * Resize crypt device
+ * Resize crypt device.
  *
  * @param cd - crypt device handle
  * @param name - name of device to resize
@@ -504,7 +514,7 @@ int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		 uint64_t new_size);
 
 /**
- * Suspends crypt device.
+ * Suspend crypt device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
  * @param name name of device to suspend
@@ -518,7 +528,7 @@ int crypt_suspend(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		  const char *name);
 
 /**
- * Resumes crypt device using passphrase.
+ * Resume crypt device using passphrase.
  *
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
@@ -530,6 +540,8 @@ int crypt_suspend(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
  *
  * @note Only LUKS device type is supported
+ * @note If passphrase is @e NULL always use crypt_set_password_callback.
+ * Internal terminal password query is DEPRECATED and will be removed in next version.
  */
 int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *name,
@@ -538,7 +550,7 @@ int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t passphrase_size);
 
 /**
- * Resumes crypt device using key file.
+ * Resume crypt device using key file.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param name name of device to resume
@@ -548,6 +560,9 @@ int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param keyfile_offset number of bytes to skip at start of keyfile
  *
  * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note If passphrase is @e NULL always use crypt_set_password_callback.
+ * Internal terminal password query is DEPRECATED and will be removed in next version.
  */
 int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *name,
@@ -565,7 +580,7 @@ int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t keyfile_size);
 
 /**
- * Releases crypt device context and used memory.
+ * Release crypt device context and used memory.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  */
@@ -582,7 +597,7 @@ void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd);
 #define CRYPT_ANY_SLOT -1
 
 /**
- * Add key slot using provided passphrase
+ * Add key slot using provided passphrase.
  *
  * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS device context
  *
@@ -594,6 +609,9 @@ void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd);
  * @param new_passphrase_size size of @e new_passphrase (binary data)
  *
  * @return allocated key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note If passphrase is @e NULL always use crypt_set_password_callback.
+ * Internal terminal password query is DEPRECATED and will be removed in next version.
  */
 int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
@@ -603,7 +621,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t new_passphrase_size);
 
 /**
- * Change defined key slot using provided passphrase
+ * Change defined key slot using provided passphrase.
  *
  * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS device context
  *
@@ -620,6 +638,9 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @note This function is just internal implementation of luksChange
  * command to avoid reading of volume key outside libcryptsetup boundary
  * in FIPS mode.
+ *
+ * @note If passphrase is @e NULL always use crypt_set_password_callback.
+ * Internal terminal password query is DEPRECATED and will be removed in next version.
  */
 int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot_old,
@@ -630,7 +651,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t new_passphrase_size);
 
 /**
-* Add key slot using provided key file path
+* Add key slot using provided key file path.
  *
  * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS device context
  *
@@ -645,8 +666,8 @@ int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
  *
  * @return allocated key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
  *
- * @note Note that @e keyfile can be "-" for STDIN
- *
+ * @note Note that @e keyfile can be "-" for STDIN. This special handling is DEPRECATED
+ * and will be removed in next version.
  */
 int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
@@ -667,7 +688,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t new_keyfile_size);
 
 /**
- * Add key slot using provided volume key
+ * Add key slot using provided volume key.
  *
  * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS device context
  *
@@ -680,6 +701,8 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
  *
  * @return allocated key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
  *
+ * @note If passphrase is @e NULL always use crypt_set_password_callback.
+ * Internal terminal password query is DEPRECATED and will be removed in next version.
  */
 int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int keyslot,
@@ -689,7 +712,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t passphrase_size);
 
 /**
- * Destroy (and disable) key slot
+ * Destroy (and disable) key slot.
  *
  * @pre @e cd contains initialized and formatted LUKS device context
  *
@@ -725,6 +748,17 @@ int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
 #define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE (1 << 4)
 /** corruption detected (verity), output only */
 #define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED (1 << 5)
+/** use same_cpu_crypt option for dm-crypt */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT (1 << 6)
+/** use submit_from_crypt_cpus for dm-crypt */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS (1 << 7)
+/** dm-verity: ignore_corruption flag - ignore corruption, log it only */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION (1 << 8)
+/** dm-verity: restart_on_corruption flag - restart kernel on corruption */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION (1 << 9)
+/** dm-verity: ignore_zero_blocks - do not verify zero blocks */
+#define CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS (1 << 10)
+
 
 /**
  * Active device runtime attributes
@@ -737,7 +771,7 @@ struct crypt_active_device {
 };
 
 /**
- * Receives runtime attributes of active crypt device
+ * Receive runtime attributes of active crypt device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle (can be @e NULL)
  * @param name name of active device
@@ -753,7 +787,7 @@ int crypt_get_active_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
 /** @} */
 
 /**
- * Activate device or check passphrase
+ * Activate device or check passphrase.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param name name of device to create, if @e NULL only check passphrase
@@ -763,6 +797,9 @@ int crypt_get_active_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param flags activation flags
  *
  * @return unlocked key slot number or negative errno otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note If passphrase is @e NULL always use crypt_set_password_callback.
+ * Internal terminal password query is DEPRECATED and will be removed in next version.
  */
 int crypt_activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *name,
@@ -772,7 +809,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint32_t flags);
 
 /**
- * Activate device or check using key file
+ * Activate device or check using key file.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param name name of device to create, if @e NULL only check keyfile
@@ -802,7 +839,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint32_t flags);
 
 /**
- * Activate device using provided volume key
+ * Activate device using provided volume key.
  *
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
@@ -842,7 +879,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
 
 /**
- * Get volume key from of crypt device
+ * Get volume key from crypt device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param keyslot use this keyslot or @e CRYPT_ANY_SLOT
@@ -865,7 +902,7 @@ int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t passphrase_size);
 
 /**
- * Verify that provided volume key is valid for crypt device
+ * Verify that provided volume key is valid for crypt device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param volume_key provided volume key
@@ -894,7 +931,7 @@ typedef enum {
 } crypt_status_info;
 
 /**
- * Get status info about device name
+ * Get status info about device name.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle, can be @e NULL
  * @param name crypt device name
@@ -905,7 +942,7 @@ typedef enum {
 crypt_status_info crypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
 
 /**
- * Dump text-formatted information about crypt or verity device to log output
+ * Dump text-formatted information about crypt or verity device to log output.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  *
@@ -914,7 +951,7 @@ crypt_status_info crypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name);
 int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /**
- * Get cipher used in device
+ * Get cipher used in device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  *
@@ -924,7 +961,7 @@ int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd);
 const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /**
- * Get cipher mode used in device
+ * Get cipher mode used in device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  *
@@ -934,7 +971,7 @@ const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd);
 const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /**
- * Get device UUID
+ * Get device UUID.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  *
@@ -944,7 +981,7 @@ const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd);
 const char *crypt_get_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /**
- * Get path to underlaying device
+ * Get path to underlaying device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  *
@@ -954,7 +991,7 @@ const char *crypt_get_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd);
 const char *crypt_get_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /**
- * Get device offset in sectors where real data starts on underlying device)
+ * Get device offset in sectors where real data starts (on underlying device).
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  *
@@ -964,7 +1001,7 @@ const char *crypt_get_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd);
 uint64_t crypt_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /**
- * Get IV offset in sectors (skip)
+ * Get IV offset in sectors (skip).
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  *
@@ -974,7 +1011,7 @@ uint64_t crypt_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd);
 uint64_t crypt_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /**
- * Get size (in bytes) of volume key for crypt device
+ * Get size (in bytes) of volume key for crypt device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  *
@@ -984,7 +1021,7 @@ uint64_t crypt_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd);
 int crypt_get_volume_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 /**
- * Get device parameters for VERITY device
+ * Get device parameters for VERITY device.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param vp verity device info
@@ -1007,7 +1044,7 @@ int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
  */
 
 /**
- * Informational benchmark for ciphers
+ * Informational benchmark for ciphers.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param cipher (e.g. "aes")
@@ -1019,6 +1056,9 @@ int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
  * @param decryption_mbs measured decryption speed in MiB/s
  *
  * @return @e 0 on success or negative errno value otherwise.
+ *
+ * @note If encryption_buffer_size is too small and encryption time
+ *       cannot be properly measured, -ERANGE is returned.
  */
 int crypt_benchmark(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *cipher,
@@ -1030,7 +1070,7 @@ int crypt_benchmark(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	double *decryption_mbs);
 
 /**
- * Informational benchmark for KDF
+ * Informational benchmark for KDF.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param kdf Key derivation function (e.g. "pbkdf2")
@@ -1071,7 +1111,7 @@ typedef enum {
 } crypt_keyslot_info;
 
 /**
- * Get information about particular key slot
+ * Get information about particular key slot.
  *
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
@@ -1094,7 +1134,7 @@ crypt_keyslot_info crypt_keyslot_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot);
 int crypt_keyslot_max(const char *type);
 
 /**
- * Get keyslot area pointers (relative to metadata device)
+ * Get keyslot area pointers (relative to metadata device).
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param keyslot keyslot number
@@ -1110,7 +1150,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_area(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	uint64_t *length);
 
 /**
- * Backup header and keyslots to file
+ * Backup header and keyslots to file.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param requested_type @link crypt_type @endlink or @e NULL for all known
@@ -1124,7 +1164,7 @@ int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *backup_file);
 
 /**
- * Restore header and keyslots from backup file
+ * Restore header and keyslots from backup file.
  *
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
@@ -1139,14 +1179,14 @@ int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	const char *backup_file);
 
 /**
- * Receives last reported error
+ * Receive last reported error, DEPRECATED.
  *
  * @param cd crypt device handle
  * @param buf buffef for message
  * @param size size of buffer
  *
- * @note Note that this is old API function using global context.
- * All error messages are reported also through log callback.
+ * @note This function is DEPRECATED and will be removed in future versions.
+ * @note All error messages are reported also through log callback.
  */
 void crypt_last_error(struct crypt_device *cd, char *buf, size_t size);
 
@@ -1156,8 +1196,7 @@ void crypt_last_error(struct crypt_device *cd, char *buf, size_t size);
  * @param buf buffef for message
  * @param size size of buffer
  *
- * @note Note that this is old API function using global context.
- * All error messages are reported also through log callback.
+ * @note This function is DEPRECATED and will be removed in future versions.
  */
 void crypt_get_error(char *buf, size_t size);
 

lib/libdevmapper.c

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /*
  * libdevmapper - device-mapper backend for cryptsetup
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <uuid/uuid.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -85,12 +86,12 @@ static void set_dm_error(int level,
 	va_start(va, f);
 	if (vasprintf(&msg, f, va) > 0) {
 		if (level < 4 && !_quiet_log) {
-			log_err(_context, msg);
+			log_err(_context, "%s", msg);
 			log_err(_context, "\n");
 		} else {
 			/* We do not use DM visual stack backtrace here */
 			if (strncmp(msg, "<backtrace>", 11))
-				log_dbg(msg);
+				log_dbg("%s", msg);
 		}
 	}
 	free(msg);
@@ -99,6 +100,18 @@ static void set_dm_error(int level,
 
 static int _dm_simple(int task, const char *name, int udev_wait);
 
+static int _dm_satisfies_version(unsigned target_maj, unsigned target_min,
+				 unsigned actual_maj, unsigned actual_min)
+{
+	if (actual_maj > target_maj)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (actual_maj == target_maj && actual_min >= target_min)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void _dm_set_crypt_compat(const char *dm_version, unsigned crypt_maj,
 				 unsigned crypt_min, unsigned crypt_patch)
 {
@@ -110,24 +123,32 @@ static void _dm_set_crypt_compat(const char *dm_version, unsigned crypt_maj,
 	log_dbg("Detected dm-crypt version %i.%i.%i, dm-ioctl version %u.%u.%u.",
 		crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch, dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch);
 
-	if (crypt_maj >= 1 && crypt_min >= 2)
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 2, crypt_maj, crypt_min))
 		_dm_crypt_flags |= DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED;
 	else
 		log_dbg("Suspend and resume disabled, no wipe key support.");
 
-	if (crypt_maj >= 1 && crypt_min >= 10)
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 10, crypt_maj, crypt_min))
 		_dm_crypt_flags |= DM_LMK_SUPPORTED;
 
-	if (dm_maj >= 4 && dm_min >= 20)
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(4, 20, dm_maj, dm_min))
 		_dm_crypt_flags |= DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED;
 
 	/* not perfect, 2.6.33 supports with 1.7.0 */
-	if (crypt_maj >= 1 && crypt_min >= 8)
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 8, crypt_maj, crypt_min))
 		_dm_crypt_flags |= DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED;
 
-	if (crypt_maj >= 1 && crypt_min >= 11)
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 11, crypt_maj, crypt_min))
 		_dm_crypt_flags |= DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED;
 
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 13, crypt_maj, crypt_min))
+		_dm_crypt_flags |= DM_TCW_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 14, crypt_maj, crypt_min)) {
+		_dm_crypt_flags |= DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED;
+		_dm_crypt_flags |= DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
 	/* Repeat test if dm-crypt is not present */
 	if (crypt_maj > 0)
 		_dm_crypt_checked = 1;
@@ -138,6 +159,15 @@ static void _dm_set_verity_compat(const char *dm_version, unsigned verity_maj,
 {
 	if (verity_maj > 0)
 		_dm_crypt_flags |= DM_VERITY_SUPPORTED;
+	else
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * ignore_corruption, restart_on corruption is available since 1.2 (kernel 4.1)
+	 * ignore_zero_blocks since 1.3 (kernel 4.5)
+	 * (but some dm-verity targets 1.2 don't support it)
+	 */
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 3, verity_maj, verity_min))
+		_dm_crypt_flags |= DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED;
 
 	log_dbg("Detected dm-verity version %i.%i.%i.",
 		verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch);
@@ -277,23 +307,30 @@ static void hex_key(char *hexkey, size_t key_size, const char *key)
 		sprintf(&hexkey[i * 2], "%02x", (unsigned char)key[i]);
 }
 
-/* http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMCrypt */
-static char *get_dm_crypt_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt */
+static char *get_dm_crypt_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd, uint32_t flags)
 {
-	int r, max_size, null_cipher = 0;
+	int r, max_size, null_cipher = 0, num_options = 0;
 	char *params, *hexkey;
-	const char *features = "";
+	char features[256];
 
 	if (!dmd)
 		return NULL;
 
-	if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) {
-		if (dm_flags() & DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED) {
-			features = " 1 allow_discards";
-			log_dbg("Discard/TRIM is allowed.");
-		} else
-			log_dbg("Discard/TRIM is not supported by the kernel.");
-	}
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)
+		num_options++;
+
+	if (num_options)
+		snprintf(features, sizeof(features)-1, " %d%s%s%s", num_options,
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) ? " allow_discards" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT) ? " same_cpu_crypt" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) ? " submit_from_crypt_cpus" : "");
+	else
+		*features = '\0';
 
 	if (!strncmp(dmd->u.crypt.cipher, "cipher_null-", 12))
 		null_cipher = 1;
@@ -327,16 +364,37 @@ out:
 	return params;
 }
 
-/* http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMVerity */
+/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity */
 static char *get_dm_verity_params(struct crypt_params_verity *vp,
-				   struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+				   struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd, uint32_t flags)
 {
-	int max_size, r;
+	int max_size, r, num_options = 0;
 	char *params = NULL, *hexroot = NULL, *hexsalt = NULL;
+	char features[256];
 
 	if (!vp || !dmd)
 		return NULL;
 
+	/* These flags are not compatible */
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) &&
+	    (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION))
+		flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS)
+		num_options++;
+
+	if (num_options)
+		snprintf(features, sizeof(features)-1, " %d%s%s%s", num_options,
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) ? " ignore_corruption" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION) ? " restart_on_corruption" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS) ? " ignore_zero_blocks" : "");
+	else
+		*features = '\0';
+
 	hexroot = crypt_safe_alloc(dmd->u.verity.root_hash_size * 2 + 1);
 	if (!hexroot)
 		goto out;
@@ -353,19 +411,19 @@ static char *get_dm_verity_params(struct crypt_params_verity *vp,
 	max_size = strlen(hexroot) + strlen(hexsalt) +
 		   strlen(device_block_path(dmd->data_device)) +
 		   strlen(device_block_path(dmd->u.verity.hash_device)) +
-		   strlen(vp->hash_name) + 128;
+		   strlen(vp->hash_name) + strlen(features) + 128;
 
 	params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
 	if (!params)
 		goto out;
 
 	r = snprintf(params, max_size,
-		     "%u %s %s %u %u %" PRIu64 " %" PRIu64 " %s %s %s",
+		     "%u %s %s %u %u %" PRIu64 " %" PRIu64 " %s %s %s %s",
 		     vp->hash_type, device_block_path(dmd->data_device),
 		     device_block_path(dmd->u.verity.hash_device),
 		     vp->data_block_size, vp->hash_block_size,
 		     vp->data_size, dmd->u.verity.hash_offset,
-		     vp->hash_name, hexroot, hexsalt);
+		     vp->hash_name, hexroot, hexsalt, features);
 	if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
 		crypt_safe_free(params);
 		params = NULL;
@@ -406,7 +464,7 @@ static int _dm_simple(int task, const char *name, int udev_wait)
 	if (udev_wait)
 		(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
 
-      out:
+out:
 	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -503,7 +561,7 @@ static int dm_prepare_uuid(const char *name, const char *type, const char *uuid,
 	if (uuid) {
 		if (uuid_parse(uuid, uu) < 0) {
 			log_dbg("Requested UUID %s has invalid format.", uuid);
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return 0;
 		}
 
 		for (ptr = uuid2, i = 0; i < UUID_LEN; i++)
@@ -522,7 +580,7 @@ static int dm_prepare_uuid(const char *name, const char *type, const char *uuid,
 	if (i >= buflen)
 		log_err(NULL, _("DM-UUID for device %s was truncated.\n"), name);
 
-	return 0;
+	return 1;
 }
 
 static int _dm_create_device(const char *name, const char *type,
@@ -538,6 +596,9 @@ static int _dm_create_device(const char *name, const char *type,
 	uint32_t cookie = 0;
 	uint16_t udev_flags = 0;
 
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE)
 		udev_flags = CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS;
 
@@ -549,9 +610,8 @@ static int _dm_create_device(const char *name, const char *type,
 		if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
 			goto out_no_removal;
 	} else {
-		r = dm_prepare_uuid(name, type, uuid, dev_uuid, sizeof(dev_uuid));
-		if (r < 0)
-			return r;
+		if (!dm_prepare_uuid(name, type, uuid, dev_uuid, sizeof(dev_uuid)))
+			goto out_no_removal;
 
 		if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_CREATE)))
 			goto out_no_removal;
@@ -561,9 +621,6 @@ static int _dm_create_device(const char *name, const char *type,
 
 		if (!dm_task_set_uuid(dmt, dev_uuid))
 			goto out_no_removal;
-
-		if (_dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
-			goto out_no_removal;
 	}
 
 	if ((dm_flags() & DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED) && !dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
@@ -580,6 +637,9 @@ static int _dm_create_device(const char *name, const char *type,
 	    !dm_task_set_read_ahead(dmt, read_ahead, DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG))
 		goto out_no_removal;
 #endif
+	/* do not set cookie for DM_DEVICE_RELOAD task */
+	if (!reload && _dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
+		goto out_no_removal;
 
 	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
 		goto out_no_removal;
@@ -615,12 +675,14 @@ out_no_removal:
 	if (cookie && _dm_use_udev())
 		(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
 
-	if (params)
-		crypt_safe_free(params);
 	if (dmt)
 		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
 
 	dm_task_update_nodes();
+
+	/* If code just loaded target module, update versions */
+	_dm_check_versions();
+
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -630,7 +692,8 @@ int dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 		     int reload)
 {
 	char *table_params = NULL;
-	int r = -EINVAL;
+	uint32_t dmd_flags;
+	int r;
 
 	if (!type)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -638,15 +701,40 @@ int dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 	if (dm_init_context(cd))
 		return -ENOTSUP;
 
-	if (dmd->target == DM_CRYPT)
-		table_params = get_dm_crypt_params(dmd);
-	else if (dmd->target == DM_VERITY)
-		table_params = get_dm_verity_params(dmd->u.verity.vp, dmd);
+	dmd_flags = dmd->flags;
 
-	if (table_params)
-		r = _dm_create_device(name, type, dmd->data_device,
-				      dmd->flags, dmd->uuid, dmd->size,
-				      table_params, reload);
+	if (dmd->target == DM_CRYPT)
+		table_params = get_dm_crypt_params(dmd, dmd_flags);
+	else if (dmd->target == DM_VERITY)
+		table_params = get_dm_verity_params(dmd->u.verity.vp, dmd, dmd_flags);
+
+	r = _dm_create_device(name, type, dmd->data_device, dmd_flags,
+			      dmd->uuid, dmd->size, table_params, reload);
+
+	/* If discard not supported try to load without discard */
+	if (!reload && r && dmd->target == DM_CRYPT &&
+	    (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+	    !(dm_flags() & DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED)) {
+		log_dbg("Discard/TRIM is not supported, retrying activation.");
+		dmd_flags = dmd_flags & ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+		crypt_safe_free(table_params);
+		table_params = get_dm_crypt_params(dmd, dmd_flags);
+		r = _dm_create_device(name, type, dmd->data_device, dmd_flags,
+				      dmd->uuid, dmd->size, table_params, reload);
+	}
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL &&
+	    dmd_flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) &&
+	    !(dm_flags() & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED|DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED)))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported.\n"));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd_flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION|
+					  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION|
+					  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS) &&
+	    !(dm_flags() & DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported.\n"));
+
+	crypt_safe_free(table_params);
 	dm_exit_context();
 	return r;
 }
@@ -833,11 +921,15 @@ static int _dm_query_crypt(uint32_t get_flags,
 			arg = strsep(&params, " ");
 			if (!strcasecmp(arg, "allow_discards"))
 				dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "same_cpu_crypt"))
+				dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "submit_from_crypt_cpus"))
+				dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
 			else /* unknown option */
 				return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
-		/* All parameters shold be processed */
+		/* All parameters should be processed */
 		if (params)
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -880,7 +972,8 @@ static int _dm_query_verity(uint32_t get_flags,
 	uint32_t val32;
 	uint64_t val64;
 	ssize_t len;
-	char *str, *str2;
+	char *str, *str2, *arg;
+	unsigned int i;
 	int r;
 
 	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS)
@@ -976,8 +1069,6 @@ static int _dm_query_verity(uint32_t get_flags,
 
 	/* salt */
 	str = strsep(&params, " ");
-	if (params)
-		return -EINVAL;
 	if (vp) {
 		if (!strcmp(str, "-")) {
 			vp->salt_size = 0;
@@ -991,6 +1082,33 @@ static int _dm_query_verity(uint32_t get_flags,
 		}
 	}
 
+	/* Features section, available since verity target version 1.3 */
+	if (params) {
+		/* Number of arguments */
+		val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+		if (*params != ' ')
+			return -EINVAL;
+		params++;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < val64; i++) {
+			if (!params)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			arg = strsep(&params, " ");
+			if (!strcasecmp(arg, "ignore_corruption"))
+				dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "restart_on_corruption"))
+				dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "ignore_zero_blocks"))
+				dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS;
+			else /* unknown option */
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		/* All parameters should be processed */
+		if (params)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

lib/loopaes/Makefile.am

@@ -2,15 +2,13 @@ moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
 
 noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libloopaes.la
 
-libloopaes_la_CFLAGS = -Wall @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+libloopaes_la_CFLAGS = -Wall $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
 
 libloopaes_la_SOURCES = \
 	loopaes.c \
 	loopaes.h
 
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE			\
-	-D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE                   \
-	-D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64                  \
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -include config.h \
         -I$(top_srcdir)/lib			\
         -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend
 

lib/loopaes/loopaes.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * loop-AES compatible volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2013, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	unsigned int key_lengths[LOOPAES_KEYS_MAX];
 	unsigned int i, key_index, key_len, offset;
 
-	log_dbg("Parsing loop-AES keyfile of size %d.", buffer_len);
+	log_dbg("Parsing loop-AES keyfile of size %zu.", buffer_len);
 
 	if (!buffer_len)
 		return -EINVAL;

lib/loopaes/loopaes.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * loop-AES compatible volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2013, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 #define _LOOPAES_H
 
 #include <unistd.h>
-#include "config.h"
 
 struct crypt_device;
 struct volume_key;

lib/luks1/Makefile.am

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
 
 noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libluks1.la
 
-libluks1_la_CFLAGS = -Wall @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+libluks1_la_CFLAGS = -Wall $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
 
 libluks1_la_SOURCES = \
 	af.c \
@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ libluks1_la_SOURCES = \
 	af.h \
 	luks.h
 
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE			\
-	-D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE                   \
-	-D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64                  \
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -include config.h \
         -I$(top_srcdir)/lib			\
         -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend
 

lib/luks1/af.c

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
  * therefor supporting secure data destruction.

lib/luks1/af.h

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * AFsplitter - Anti forensic information splitter
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * AFsplitter diffuses information over a large stripe of data,
  * therefor supporting secure data destruction.

lib/luks1/keyencryption.c

@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -26,8 +27,13 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 static void _error_hint(struct crypt_device *ctx, const char *device,
-			const char *cipher_spec, const char *mode, size_t keyLength)
+			const char *cipher, const char *mode, size_t keyLength)
 {
+	char cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN * 3];
+
+	if (snprintf(cipher_spec, sizeof(cipher_spec), "%s-%s", cipher, mode) < 0)
+		return;
+
 	log_err(ctx, _("Failed to setup dm-crypt key mapping for device %s.\n"
 			"Check that kernel supports %s cipher (check syslog for more info).\n"),
 			device, cipher_spec);
@@ -60,6 +66,8 @@ static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 	};
 	int r, bsize, devfd = -1;
 
+	log_dbg("Using dmcrypt to access keyslot area.");
+
 	bsize = device_block_size(dmd.data_device);
 	if (bsize <= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -94,7 +102,7 @@ static int LUKS_endec_template(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 	if (r < 0) {
 		if (r != -EACCES && r != -ENOTSUP)
 			_error_hint(ctx, device_path(dmd.data_device),
-				    cipher_spec, cipher_mode, vk->keylength * 8);
+				    cipher, cipher_mode, vk->keylength * 8);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
@@ -125,8 +133,64 @@ int LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(char *src, size_t srcLength,
 			    unsigned int sector,
 			    struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
-	return LUKS_endec_template(src, srcLength, cipher, cipher_mode,
-				   vk, sector, write_blockwise, O_RDWR, ctx);
+
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	int devfd = -1, bsize, r = 0;
+
+	/* Only whole sector writes supported */
+	if (srcLength % SECTOR_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Encrypt buffer */
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg("Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
+			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
+
+	/* Fallback to old temporary dmcrypt device */
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP || r == -ENOENT)
+		return LUKS_endec_template(src, srcLength, cipher, cipher_mode,
+					   vk, sector, write_blockwise, O_RDWR, ctx);
+
+	if (r) {
+		_error_hint(ctx, device_path(device), cipher, cipher_mode,
+			    vk->keylength * 8);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg("Using userspace crypto wrapper to access keyslot area.");
+
+	r = crypt_storage_encrypt(s, 0, srcLength / SECTOR_SIZE, src);
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = -EIO;
+
+	/* Write buffer to device */
+	bsize = device_block_size(device);
+	if (bsize <= 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
+	if (devfd == -1)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (lseek(devfd, sector * SECTOR_SIZE, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
+	    write_blockwise(devfd, bsize, src, srcLength) == -1)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if(devfd != -1)
+		close(devfd);
+	if (r)
+		log_err(ctx, _("IO error while encrypting keyslot.\n"));
+
+	return r;
 }
 
 int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
@@ -136,6 +200,61 @@ int LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(char *dst, size_t dstLength,
 			      unsigned int sector,
 			      struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
-	return LUKS_endec_template(dst, dstLength, cipher, cipher_mode,
-				   vk, sector, read_blockwise, O_RDONLY, ctx);
+	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	struct crypt_storage *s;
+	int devfd = -1, bsize, r = 0;
+
+	/* Only whole sector reads supported */
+	if (dstLength % SECTOR_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_storage_init(&s, 0, cipher, cipher_mode, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg("Userspace crypto wrapper cannot use %s-%s (%d).",
+			cipher, cipher_mode, r);
+
+	/* Fallback to old temporary dmcrypt device */
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP || r == -ENOENT)
+		return LUKS_endec_template(dst, dstLength, cipher, cipher_mode,
+					   vk, sector, read_blockwise, O_RDONLY, ctx);
+
+	if (r) {
+		_error_hint(ctx, device_path(device), cipher, cipher_mode,
+			    vk->keylength * 8);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg("Using userspace crypto wrapper to access keyslot area.");
+
+	r = -EIO;
+
+	/* Read buffer from device */
+	bsize = device_block_size(device);
+	if (bsize <= 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (devfd == -1)
+		goto bad;
+
+	if (lseek(devfd, sector * SECTOR_SIZE, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
+	    read_blockwise(devfd, bsize, dst, dstLength) == -1)
+		goto bad;
+
+	close(devfd);
+
+	/* Decrypt buffer */
+	r = crypt_storage_decrypt(s, 0, dstLength / SECTOR_SIZE, dst);
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+
+	return r;
+bad:
+	if(devfd != -1)
+		close(devfd);
+
+	log_err(ctx, _("IO error while decrypting keyslot.\n"));
+	crypt_storage_destroy(s);
+
+	return r;
 }

lib/luks1/keymanage.c

@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ int LUKS_keyslot_area(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	if(keyslot >= LUKS_NUMKEYS || keyslot < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*offset = hdr->keyblock[keyslot].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	*offset = (uint64_t)hdr->keyblock[keyslot].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
 	*length = AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -82,11 +83,12 @@ static int LUKS_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *ctx, size_t keyLength)
 
 	dev_sectors >>= SECTOR_SHIFT;
 	hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(keyLength);
-	log_dbg("Key length %u, device size %" PRIu64 " sectors, header size %"
+	log_dbg("Key length %zu, device size %" PRIu64 " sectors, header size %"
 		PRIu64 " sectors.",keyLength, dev_sectors, hdr_sectors);
 
 	if (hdr_sectors > dev_sectors) {
-		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is too small.\n"), device_path(device));
+		log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is too small. (LUKS requires at least %" PRIu64 " bytes.)\n"),
+			device_path(device), hdr_sectors * SECTOR_SIZE);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -146,29 +148,32 @@ static const char *dbg_slot_state(crypt_keyslot_info ki)
 	}
 }
 
-int LUKS_hdr_backup(
-	const char *backup_file,
-	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
-	struct crypt_device *ctx)
+int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
 	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
+	struct luks_phdr hdr;
 	int r = 0, devfd = -1;
+	ssize_t hdr_size;
 	ssize_t buffer_size;
 	char *buffer = NULL;
 
-	r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
+	r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
-	buffer_size = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr->keyBytes) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	hdr_size = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr.keyBytes) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	buffer_size = size_round_up(hdr_size, crypt_getpagesize());
+
 	buffer = crypt_safe_alloc(buffer_size);
-	if (!buffer || buffer_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
+	if (!buffer || hdr_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS || hdr_size > buffer_size) {
 		r = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Storing backup of header (%u bytes) and keyslot area (%u bytes).",
-		sizeof(*hdr), buffer_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
+	log_dbg("Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes).",
+		sizeof(hdr), hdr_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
+
+	log_dbg("Output backup file size: %zu bytes.", buffer_size);
 
 	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
 	if(devfd == -1) {
@@ -177,15 +182,15 @@ int LUKS_hdr_backup(
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+	if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), buffer, hdr_size) < hdr_size) {
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	close(devfd);
 
 	/* Wipe unused area, so backup cannot contain old signatures */
-	if (hdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE == LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS)
-		memset(buffer + sizeof(*hdr), 0, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS - sizeof(*hdr));
+	if (hdr.keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE == LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS)
+		memset(buffer + sizeof(hdr), 0, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS - sizeof(hdr));
 
 	devfd = open(backup_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR);
 	if (devfd == -1) {
@@ -196,17 +201,17 @@ int LUKS_hdr_backup(
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (write(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+	if (write_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	close(devfd);
 
 	r = 0;
 out:
 	if (devfd != -1)
 		close(devfd);
+	crypt_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
 	crypt_safe_free(buffer);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -248,12 +253,13 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (read(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
+	if (read_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
 		r = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	close(devfd);
+	devfd = -1;
 
 	r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 0, 0, ctx);
 	if (r == 0) {
@@ -281,7 +287,7 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	log_dbg("Storing backup of header (%u bytes) and keyslot area (%u bytes) to device %s.",
+	log_dbg("Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes) to device %s.",
 		sizeof(*hdr), buffer_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS, device_path(device));
 
 	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
@@ -300,6 +306,7 @@ int LUKS_hdr_restore(
 		goto out;
 	}
 	close(devfd);
+	devfd = -1;
 
 	/* Be sure to reload new data */
 	r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
@@ -392,7 +399,7 @@ static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	}
 out:
 	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
-	memset(&temp_phdr, 0, sizeof(temp_phdr));
+	crypt_memzero(&temp_phdr, sizeof(temp_phdr));
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -465,6 +472,13 @@ static void LUKS_fix_header_compatible(struct luks_phdr *header)
 	/* Old cryptsetup expects "sha1", gcrypt allows case insensistive names,
 	 * so always convert hash to lower case in header */
 	_to_lower(header->hashSpec, LUKS_HASHSPEC_L);
+
+	/* ECB mode does not use IV but dmcrypt silently allows it.
+	 * Drop any IV here if ECB is used (that is not secure anyway).*/
+	if (!strncmp(header->cipherMode, "ecb-", 4)) {
+		memset(header->cipherMode, 0, LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L);
+		strcpy(header->cipherMode, "ecb");
+	}
 }
 
 int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(const char *backup_file,
@@ -484,7 +498,7 @@ int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(const char *backup_file,
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
-	if (read(devfd, hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
+	if (read_buffer(devfd, hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
 		r = -EIO;
 	else {
 		LUKS_fix_header_compatible(hdr);
@@ -514,7 +528,7 @@ int LUKS_read_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	if (repair && !require_luks_device)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	log_dbg("Reading LUKS header of size %d from device %s",
+	log_dbg("Reading LUKS header of size %zu from device %s",
 		hdr_size, device_path(device));
 
 	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
@@ -532,6 +546,16 @@ int LUKS_read_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	if (!r)
 		r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr->keyBytes);
 
+	/*
+	 * Cryptsetup 1.0.0 did not align keyslots to 4k (very rare version).
+	 * Disable direct-io to avoid possible IO errors if underlying device
+	 * has bigger sector size.
+	 */
+	if (!r && hdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
+		log_dbg("Old unaligned LUKS keyslot detected, disabling direct-io.");
+		device_disable_direct_io(device);
+	}
+
 	close(devfd);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -546,7 +570,7 @@ int LUKS_write_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	struct luks_phdr convHdr;
 	int r;
 
-	log_dbg("Updating LUKS header of size %d on device %s",
+	log_dbg("Updating LUKS header of size %zu on device %s",
 		sizeof(struct luks_phdr), device_path(device));
 
 	r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr->keyBytes);
@@ -594,6 +618,30 @@ int LUKS_write_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	return r;
 }
 
+/* Check that kernel supports requested cipher by decryption of one sector */
+static int LUKS_check_cipher(struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct volume_key *empty_key;
+	char buf[SECTOR_SIZE];
+
+	log_dbg("Checking if cipher %s-%s is usable.", hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode);
+
+	empty_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
+	if (!empty_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No need to get KEY quality random but it must avoid known weak keys. */
+	r = crypt_random_get(ctx, empty_key->key, empty_key->keylength, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
+	if (!r)
+		r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(buf, sizeof(buf), hdr->cipherName,
+					      hdr->cipherMode, empty_key, 0, ctx);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(empty_key);
+	crypt_memzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	return r;
+}
+
 int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 		       const struct volume_key *vk,
 		       const char *cipherName, const char *cipherMode, const char *hashSpec,
@@ -605,7 +653,7 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 		       int detached_metadata_device,
 		       struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
-	unsigned int i=0;
+	unsigned int i = 0, hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(vk->keylength);
 	size_t blocksPerStripeSet, currentSector;
 	int r;
 	uuid_t partitionUuid;
@@ -615,6 +663,13 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 	if (alignPayload == 0 && !detached_metadata_device)
 		alignPayload = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT / SECTOR_SIZE;
 
+	if (alignPayload && detached_metadata_device && alignPayload < hdr_sectors) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Data offset for detached LUKS header must be "
+			       "either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors).\n"),
+			       hdr_sectors);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (crypt_hmac_size(hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"), hashSpec);
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -632,14 +687,18 @@ int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
 	/* Set Magic */
 	memcpy(header->magic,luksMagic,LUKS_MAGIC_L);
 	header->version=1;
-	strncpy(header->cipherName,cipherName,LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L);
-	strncpy(header->cipherMode,cipherMode,LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L);
-	strncpy(header->hashSpec,hashSpec,LUKS_HASHSPEC_L);
+	strncpy(header->cipherName,cipherName,LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1);
+	strncpy(header->cipherMode,cipherMode,LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1);
+	strncpy(header->hashSpec,hashSpec,LUKS_HASHSPEC_L-1);
 
 	header->keyBytes=vk->keylength;
 
 	LUKS_fix_header_compatible(header);
 
+	r = LUKS_check_cipher(header, ctx);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
 	log_dbg("Generating LUKS header version %d using hash %s, %s, %s, MK %d bytes",
 		header->version, header->hashSpec ,header->cipherName, header->cipherMode,
 		header->keyBytes);
@@ -758,14 +817,14 @@ int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 	 * Avoid floating point operation
 	 * Final iteration count is at least LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN
 	 */
-	PBKDF2_temp = (*PBKDF2_per_sec / 2) * (uint64_t)iteration_time_ms;
+	PBKDF2_temp = *PBKDF2_per_sec * (uint64_t)iteration_time_ms;
 	PBKDF2_temp /= 1024;
 	if (PBKDF2_temp > UINT32_MAX)
 		PBKDF2_temp = UINT32_MAX;
 	hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations = at_least((uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp,
 							      LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN);
 
-	log_dbg("Key slot %d use %d password iterations.", keyIndex, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
+	log_dbg("Key slot %d use %" PRIu32 " password iterations.", keyIndex, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
 
 	derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
 	if (!derived_key)
@@ -900,6 +959,11 @@ static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
 		goto out;
 
 	r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(hdr, vk);
+
+	/* Allow only empty passphrase with null cipher */
+	if (!r && !strcmp(hdr->cipherName, "cipher_null") && passwordLen)
+		r = -EPERM;
+
 	if (!r)
 		log_verbose(ctx, _("Key slot %d unlocked.\n"), keyIndex);
 out:

lib/luks1/luks.h

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -130,7 +130,6 @@ int LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(
 
 int LUKS_hdr_backup(
 	const char *backup_file,
-	struct luks_phdr *hdr,
 	struct crypt_device *ctx);
 
 int LUKS_hdr_restore(

lib/random.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * cryptsetup kernel RNG access functions
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@
 #include "libcryptsetup.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
+#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
+#define O_CLOEXEC 0
+#endif
+
 static int random_initialised = 0;
 
 #define URANDOM_DEVICE	"/dev/urandom"
@@ -152,16 +156,19 @@ int crypt_random_init(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 
 	/* Used for CRYPT_RND_NORMAL */
 	if(urandom_fd == -1)
-		urandom_fd = open(URANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY);
+		urandom_fd = open(URANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if(urandom_fd == -1)
 		goto fail;
 
 	/* Used for CRYPT_RND_KEY */
 	if(random_fd == -1)
-		random_fd = open(RANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
+		random_fd = open(RANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if(random_fd == -1)
 		goto fail;
 
+	if (crypt_fips_mode())
+		log_verbose(ctx, _("Running in FIPS mode.\n"));
+
 	random_initialised = 1;
 	return 0;
 fail:
@@ -231,9 +238,11 @@ void crypt_random_exit(void)
 
 int crypt_random_default_key_rng(void)
 {
+	/* coverity[pointless_string_compare] */
 	if (!strcmp(DEFAULT_RNG, RANDOM_DEVICE))
 		return CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM;
 
+	/* coverity[pointless_string_compare] */
 	if (!strcmp(DEFAULT_RNG, URANDOM_DEVICE))
 		return CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM;
 

lib/setup.c

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /*
  * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2013, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 
@@ -78,6 +79,13 @@ struct crypt_device {
 		struct crypt_params_tcrypt params;
 		struct tcrypt_phdr hdr;
 	} tcrypt;
+	struct { /* used if initialized without header by name */
+		char *active_name;
+		/* buffers, must refresh from kernel on every query */
+		char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+		char cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+		unsigned int key_size;
+	} none;
 	} u;
 
 	/* callbacks definitions */
@@ -92,6 +100,9 @@ struct crypt_device {
 	char error[MAX_ERROR_LENGTH];
 };
 
+/* Just to suppress redundant messages about crypto backend */
+static int _crypto_logged = 0;
+
 /* Global error */
 /* FIXME: not thread safe, remove this later */
 static char global_error[MAX_ERROR_LENGTH] = {0};
@@ -181,10 +192,9 @@ struct device *crypt_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd)
 
 int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 {
+	struct utsname uts;
 	int r;
 
-	crypt_fips_libcryptsetup_check(ctx);
-
 	r = crypt_random_init(ctx);
 	if (r < 0) {
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend.\n"));
@@ -195,7 +205,15 @@ int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx)
 	if (r < 0)
 		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto backend.\n"));
 
-	log_dbg("Crypto backend (%s) initialized.", crypt_backend_version());
+	if (!r && !_crypto_logged) {
+		log_dbg("Crypto backend (%s) initialized in cryptsetup library version %s.",
+			crypt_backend_version(), PACKAGE_VERSION);
+		if (!uname(&uts))
+			log_dbg("Detected kernel %s %s %s.",
+				uts.sysname, uts.release, uts.machine);
+		_crypto_logged = 1;
+	}
+
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -259,6 +277,41 @@ static int isTCRYPT(const char *type)
 	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_TCRYPT, type));
 }
 
+static int onlyLUKS(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (cd && !cd->type) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?\n"));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void crypt_set_null_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd->type)
+		return;
+
+	free(cd->type);
+	cd->type = NULL;
+	cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+}
+
+static void crypt_reset_null_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (cd->type)
+		return;
+
+	free(cd->u.none.active_name);
+	cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+}
+
 /* keyslot helpers */
 static int keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(struct crypt_device *cd, int *keyslot)
 {
@@ -316,6 +369,36 @@ static int crypt_uuid_cmp(const char *dm_uuid, const char *hdr_uuid)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * compares type of active device to provided string (only if there is no explicit type)
+ */
+static int crypt_uuid_type_cmp(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Must user header-on-disk if we know type here */
+	if (cd->type || !cd->u.none.active_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg("Checking if active device %s without header has UUID type %s.",
+		cd->u.none.active_name, type);
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, cd->u.none.active_name, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = -ENODEV;
+	len = strlen(type);
+	if (dmd.uuid && strlen(dmd.uuid) > len &&
+	    !strncmp(dmd.uuid, type, len) && dmd.uuid[len] == '-')
+		r = 0;
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	return r;
+}
+
 int PLAIN_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     const char *name,
 		     struct volume_key *vk,
@@ -543,7 +626,7 @@ int crypt_init(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *device)
 
 	dm_backend_init();
 
-	h->iteration_time = 1000;
+	h->iteration_time = DEFAULT_LUKS1_ITER_TIME;
 	h->password_verify = 0;
 	h->tries = 3;
 	h->rng_type = crypt_random_default_key_rng();
@@ -706,6 +789,8 @@ static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
 			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
+	if (r > 0)
+		r = 0;
 
 	if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
 		cd->u.plain.hdr.hash = NULL; /* no way to get this */
@@ -736,8 +821,7 @@ static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
 			r = _crypt_load_luks1(cd, 0, 0);
 			if (r < 0) {
 				log_dbg("LUKS device header does not match active device.");
-				free(cd->type);
-				cd->type = NULL;
+				crypt_set_null_type(cd);
 				r = 0;
 				goto out;
 			}
@@ -746,14 +830,12 @@ static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
 			if (r < 0) {
 				log_dbg("LUKS device header uuid: %s mismatches DM returned uuid %s",
 					cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid, dmd.uuid);
-				free(cd->type);
-				cd->type = NULL;
+				crypt_set_null_type(cd);
 				r = 0;
 			}
 		} else {
 			log_dbg("LUKS device header not available.");
-			free(cd->type);
-			cd->type = NULL;
+			crypt_set_null_type(cd);
 			r = 0;
 		}
 	} else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
@@ -783,6 +865,8 @@ static int _init_by_name_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
 				DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS, &dmd);
 	if (r < 0)
 		goto out;
+	if (r > 0)
+		r = 0;
 
 	if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
 		cd->u.verity.uuid = NULL; // FIXME
@@ -885,7 +969,11 @@ out:
 	if (r < 0) {
 		crypt_free(*cd);
 		*cd = NULL;
+	} else if (!(*cd)->type) {
+		/* For anonymous device (no header found) remember initialized name */
+		(*cd)->u.none.active_name = strdup(name);
 	}
+
 	device_free(dmd.data_device);
 	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
 	return r;
@@ -985,13 +1073,8 @@ static int _crypt_format_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd,
 				       &required_alignment,
 				       &alignment_offset, DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT);
 
-	/* Check early if we cannot allocate block device for key slot access */
-	r = device_block_adjust(cd, cd->device, DEV_OK, 0, NULL, NULL);
-	if(r < 0)
-		return r;
-
 	r = LUKS_generate_phdr(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd->volume_key, cipher, cipher_mode,
-			       (params && params->hash) ? params->hash : "sha1",
+			       (params && params->hash) ? params->hash : DEFAULT_LUKS1_HASH,
 			       uuid, LUKS_STRIPES,
 			       required_alignment / SECTOR_SIZE,
 			       alignment_offset / SECTOR_SIZE,
@@ -1105,6 +1188,12 @@ static int _crypt_format_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	} else
 		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = params->data_size;
 
+	if (device_is_identical(crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd)) &&
+	   (cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size * params->data_block_size) > params->hash_area_offset) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Data area overlaps with hash area.\n"));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	hash_size = crypt_hash_size(params->hash_name);
 	if (hash_size <= 0) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported.\n"),
@@ -1183,6 +1272,8 @@ int crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	log_dbg("Formatting device %s as type %s.", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)", type);
 
+	crypt_reset_null_type(cd);
+
 	r = init_crypto(cd);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
@@ -1203,8 +1294,7 @@ int crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	}
 
 	if (r < 0) {
-		free(cd->type);
-		cd->type = NULL;
+		crypt_set_null_type(cd);
 		crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
 		cd->volume_key = NULL;
 	}
@@ -1224,6 +1314,8 @@ int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	crypt_reset_null_type(cd);
+
 	if (!requested_type || isLUKS(requested_type)) {
 		if (cd->type && !isLUKS(cd->type)) {
 			log_dbg("Context is already initialised to type %s", cd->type);
@@ -1272,10 +1364,8 @@ int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	/* cd->type and header must be set in context */
 	r = crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
-	if (r < 0) {
-		free(cd->type);
-		cd->type = NULL;
-	}
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_set_null_type(cd);
 
 	return r;
 }
@@ -1304,6 +1394,14 @@ int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	if (crypt_loop_device(crypt_get_device_name(cd))) {
+		log_dbg("Trying to resize underlying loop device %s.",
+			crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+		/* Here we always use default size not new_size */
+		if (crypt_loop_resize(crypt_get_device_name(cd)))
+			log_err(NULL, _("Cannot resize loop device.\n"));
+	}
+
 	r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmd.data_device, DEV_OK,
 				dmd.u.crypt.offset, &new_size, &dmd.flags);
 	if (r)
@@ -1364,6 +1462,9 @@ int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if ((requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type)) || !backup_file)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (cd->type && !isLUKS(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	r = init_crypto(cd);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
@@ -1371,13 +1472,15 @@ int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	log_dbg("Requested header backup of device %s (%s) to "
 		"file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type, backup_file);
 
-	return LUKS_hdr_backup(backup_file, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+	r = LUKS_hdr_backup(backup_file, cd);
+	return r;
 }
 
 int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			 const char *requested_type,
 			 const char *backup_file)
 {
+	struct luks_phdr hdr;
 	int r;
 
 	if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
@@ -1393,7 +1496,10 @@ int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	log_dbg("Requested header restore to device %s (%s) from "
 		"file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type, backup_file);
 
-	return LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+	r = LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, isLUKS(cd->type) ? &cd->u.luks1.hdr : &hdr, cd);
+
+	crypt_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+	return r;
 }
 
 void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd)
@@ -1419,11 +1525,13 @@ void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd)
 			free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
 			free(cd->u.verity.root_hash);
 			free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
+		} else if (!cd->type) {
+			free(cd->u.none.active_name);
 		}
 
 		free(cd->type);
 		/* Some structures can contain keys (TCRYPT), wipe it */
-		memset(cd, 0, sizeof(*cd));
+		crypt_memzero(cd, sizeof(*cd));
 		free(cd);
 	}
 }
@@ -1436,12 +1544,17 @@ int crypt_suspend(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	log_dbg("Suspending volume %s.", name);
 
-	if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
-		r = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+	if (cd->type) {
+		r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	} else {
+		r = crypt_uuid_type_cmp(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+		if (r < 0)
+			log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
 	}
 
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
 	ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
 	if (ci < CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not active.\n"), name);
@@ -1481,11 +1594,9 @@ int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	log_dbg("Resuming volume %s.", name);
 
-	if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
-		r = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
 	r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
 	if (r < 0)
@@ -1511,7 +1622,7 @@ int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			log_err(cd, _("Error during resuming device %s.\n"), name);
 	} else
 		r = keyslot;
-out:
+
 	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
 	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
 }
@@ -1530,11 +1641,9 @@ int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	log_dbg("Resuming volume %s.", name);
 
-	if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
-		r = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
 	r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
 	if (r < 0)
@@ -1596,10 +1705,9 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		"new passphrase %sprovided.",
 		passphrase ? "" : "not ", new_passphrase  ? "" : "not ");
 
-	if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
 	r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
 	if (r)
@@ -1645,14 +1753,15 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, new_password, new_passwordLen,
 			 &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd->iteration_time, &cd->u.luks1.PBKDF2_per_sec, cd);
-	if(r < 0) goto out;
+	if(r < 0)
+		goto out;
 
 	r = 0;
 out:
 	if (!new_passphrase)
 		crypt_safe_free(new_password);
 	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
-	return r ?: keyslot;
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
 }
 
 int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -1664,15 +1773,14 @@ int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t new_passphrase_size)
 {
 	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
-	int r = -EINVAL;
+	int r;
 
 	log_dbg("Changing passphrase from old keyslot %d to new %d.",
 		keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
 
-	if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
 	r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot_old, passphrase, passphrase_size,
 				   &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
@@ -1702,10 +1810,10 @@ int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	if (keyslot_old == keyslot_new) {
 		if (r >= 0)
-			log_verbose(cd, _("Key slot %d changed.\n"), r);
+			log_verbose(cd, _("Key slot %d changed.\n"), keyslot_new);
 	} else {
 		if (r >= 0) {
-			log_verbose(cd, _("Replaced with key slot %d.\n"), r);
+			log_verbose(cd, _("Replaced with key slot %d.\n"), keyslot_new);
 			r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old);
 		}
 	}
@@ -1713,7 +1821,7 @@ int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		log_err(cd, _("Failed to swap new key slot.\n"));
 out:
 	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
-	return r ?: keyslot_new;
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot_new;
 }
 
 int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -1733,10 +1841,9 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	log_dbg("Adding new keyslot, existing keyfile %s, new keyfile %s.",
 		keyfile ?: "[none]", new_keyfile ?: "[none]");
 
-	if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
 	r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
 	if (r)
@@ -1809,15 +1916,14 @@ int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t passphrase_size)
 {
 	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
-	int r = -EINVAL;
+	int r;
 	char *new_password = NULL; size_t new_passwordLen;
 
 	log_dbg("Adding new keyslot %d using volume key.", keyslot);
 
-	if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
 	if (volume_key)
 		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
@@ -1857,13 +1963,13 @@ out:
 int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
 {
 	crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+	int r;
 
 	log_dbg("Destroying keyslot %d.", keyslot);
 
-	if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
 	ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot);
 	if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID) {
@@ -2115,7 +2221,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		}
 
 		r = VERITY_activate(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size,
-				    &cd->u.verity.hdr, CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
+				    &cd->u.verity.hdr, flags|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
 
 		if (r == -EPERM) {
 			free(cd->u.verity.root_hash);
@@ -2234,10 +2340,9 @@ int crypt_volume_key_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	struct volume_key *vk;
 	int r;
 
-	if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
 
 	vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
 	if (!vk)
@@ -2267,7 +2372,7 @@ void crypt_set_password_retry(struct crypt_device *cd, int tries)
 
 void crypt_set_iteration_time(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t iteration_time_ms)
 {
-	log_dbg("Iteration time set to %" PRIu64 " miliseconds.", iteration_time_ms);
+	log_dbg("Iteration time set to %" PRIu64 " milliseconds.", iteration_time_ms);
 	cd->iteration_time = iteration_time_ms;
 }
 void crypt_set_iterarion_time(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t iteration_time_ms)
@@ -2341,12 +2446,12 @@ static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	int i;
 
 	log_std(cd, "LUKS header information for %s\n\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
-	log_std(cd, "Version:       \t%d\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.version);
+	log_std(cd, "Version:       \t%" PRIu16 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.version);
 	log_std(cd, "Cipher name:   \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherName);
 	log_std(cd, "Cipher mode:   \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherMode);
 	log_std(cd, "Hash spec:     \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.hashSpec);
-	log_std(cd, "Payload offset:\t%d\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset);
-	log_std(cd, "MK bits:       \t%d\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes * 8);
+	log_std(cd, "Payload offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset);
+	log_std(cd, "MK bits:       \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes * 8);
 	log_std(cd, "MK digest:     \t");
 	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, " ");
 	log_std(cd, "\n");
@@ -2355,12 +2460,12 @@ static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	log_std(cd, "\n               \t");
 	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt+LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
 	log_std(cd, "\n");
-	log_std(cd, "MK iterations: \t%d\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestIterations);
+	log_std(cd, "MK iterations: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestIterations);
 	log_std(cd, "UUID:          \t%s\n\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid);
 	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
 		if(cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) {
 			log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: ENABLED\n",i);
-			log_std(cd, "\tIterations:         \t%d\n",
+			log_std(cd, "\tIterations:         \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
 				cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
 			log_std(cd, "\tSalt:               \t");
 			hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt,
@@ -2370,9 +2475,9 @@ static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
 				 LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
 			log_std(cd, "\n");
 
-			log_std(cd, "\tKey material offset:\t%d\n",
+			log_std(cd, "\tKey material offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n",
 				cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
-			log_std(cd, "\tAF stripes:            \t%d\n",
+			log_std(cd, "\tAF stripes:            \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
 				cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].stripes);
 		}
 		else 
@@ -2417,6 +2522,31 @@ int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+
+static int _init_by_name_crypt_none(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+	int r;
+
+	if (cd->type || !cd->u.none.active_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, cd->u.none.active_name,
+			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
+	if (r >= 0)
+		r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(dmd.u.crypt.cipher,
+					      cd->u.none.cipher, NULL,
+					      cd->u.none.cipher_mode);
+
+	if (!r)
+		cd->u.none.key_size = dmd.u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(dmd.u.crypt.vk);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.u.crypt.cipher);
+	return r;
+}
+
 const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd)
 {
 	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
@@ -2431,6 +2561,9 @@ const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
 		return cd->u.tcrypt.params.cipher;
 
+	if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.cipher;
+
 	return NULL;
 }
 
@@ -2448,6 +2581,9 @@ const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
 		return cd->u.tcrypt.params.mode;
 
+	if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.cipher_mode;
+
 	return NULL;
 }
 
@@ -2489,6 +2625,9 @@ int crypt_get_volume_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
 	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
 		return cd->u.tcrypt.params.key_size;
 
+	if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.key_size;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2528,10 +2667,8 @@ uint64_t crypt_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
 
 crypt_keyslot_info crypt_keyslot_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
 {
-	if (!isLUKS(cd->type)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device.\n"));
+	if (onlyLUKS(cd) < 0)
 		return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
-	}
 
 	return LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot);
 }

lib/tcrypt/Makefile.am

@@ -2,15 +2,13 @@ moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
 
 noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libtcrypt.la
 
-libtcrypt_la_CFLAGS = -Wall @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+libtcrypt_la_CFLAGS = -Wall $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
 
 libtcrypt_la_SOURCES = \
 	tcrypt.c \
 	tcrypt.h
 
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE			\
-	-D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE                   \
-	-D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64                  \
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -include config.h \
         -I$(top_srcdir)/lib			\
         -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend
 

lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
- * TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible) volume handling
+ * TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible) and VeraCrypt volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2013, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -33,16 +33,23 @@
 /* TCRYPT PBKDF variants */
 static struct {
 	unsigned int legacy:1;
+	unsigned int veracrypt:1;
 	const char *name;
 	const char *hash;
 	unsigned int iterations;
 } tcrypt_kdf[] = {
-	{ 0, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160", 2000 },
-	{ 0, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160", 1000 },
-	{ 0, "pbkdf2", "sha512",    1000 },
-	{ 0, "pbkdf2", "whirlpool", 1000 },
-	{ 1, "pbkdf2", "sha1",      2000 },
-	{ 0, NULL,     NULL,           0 }
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160", 2000 },
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160", 1000 },
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "sha512",    1000 },
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "whirlpool", 1000 },
+	{ 1, 0, "pbkdf2", "sha1",      2000 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "sha512",    500000 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160", 655331 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160", 327661 }, // boot only
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "whirlpool", 500000 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "sha256",    500000 }, // VeraCrypt 1.0f
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "sha256",    200000 }, // boot only
+	{ 0, 0, NULL,     NULL,        0 }
 };
 
 struct tcrypt_alg {
@@ -51,6 +58,7 @@ struct tcrypt_alg {
 		unsigned int iv_size;
 		unsigned int key_offset;
 		unsigned int iv_offset; /* or tweak key offset */
+		unsigned int key_extra_size;
 };
 
 struct tcrypt_algs {
@@ -66,101 +74,107 @@ struct tcrypt_algs {
 static struct tcrypt_algs tcrypt_cipher[] = {
 /* XTS mode */
 {0,1,64,"aes","xts-plain64",
-	{{"aes",    64,16,0,32}}},
+	{{"aes",    64,16,0,32,0}}},
 {0,1,64,"serpent","xts-plain64",
-	{{"serpent",64,16,0,32}}},
+	{{"serpent",64,16,0,32,0}}},
 {0,1,64,"twofish","xts-plain64",
-	{{"twofish",64,16,0,32}}},
+	{{"twofish",64,16,0,32,0}}},
 {0,2,128,"twofish-aes","xts-plain64",
-	{{"twofish",64,16, 0,64},
-	 {"aes",    64,16,32,96}}},
+	{{"twofish",64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"aes",    64,16,32,96,0}}},
 {0,3,192,"serpent-twofish-aes","xts-plain64",
-	{{"serpent",64,16, 0, 96},
-	 {"twofish",64,16,32,128},
-	 {"aes",    64,16,64,160}}},
+	{{"serpent",64,16, 0, 96,0},
+	 {"twofish",64,16,32,128,0},
+	 {"aes",    64,16,64,160,0}}},
 {0,2,128,"aes-serpent","xts-plain64",
-	{{"aes",    64,16, 0,64},
-	 {"serpent",64,16,32,96}}},
+	{{"aes",    64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"serpent",64,16,32,96,0}}},
 {0,3,192,"aes-twofish-serpent","xts-plain64",
-	{{"aes",    64,16, 0, 96},
-	 {"twofish",64,16,32,128},
-	 {"serpent",64,16,64,160}}},
+	{{"aes",    64,16, 0, 96,0},
+	 {"twofish",64,16,32,128,0},
+	 {"serpent",64,16,64,160,0}}},
 {0,2,128,"serpent-twofish","xts-plain64",
-	{{"serpent",64,16, 0,64},
-	 {"twofish",64,16,32,96}}},
+	{{"serpent",64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"twofish",64,16,32,96,0}}},
+
 /* LRW mode */
 {0,1,48,"aes","lrw-benbi",
-	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0}}},
+	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0,0}}},
 {0,1,48,"serpent","lrw-benbi",
-	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0}}},
+	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0,0}}},
 {0,1,48,"twofish","lrw-benbi",
-	{{"twofish",48,16,32,0}}},
+	{{"twofish",48,16,32,0,0}}},
 {0,2,96,"twofish-aes","lrw-benbi",
-	{{"twofish",48,16,32,0},
-	 {"aes",    48,16,64,0}}},
+	{{"twofish",48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    48,16,64,0,0}}},
 {0,3,144,"serpent-twofish-aes","lrw-benbi",
-	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0},
-	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0},
-	 {"aes",    48,16,96,0}}},
+	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    48,16,96,0,0}}},
 {0,2,96,"aes-serpent","lrw-benbi",
-	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0},
-	 {"serpent",48,16,64,0}}},
+	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",48,16,64,0,0}}},
 {0,3,144,"aes-twofish-serpent","lrw-benbi",
-	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0},
-	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0},
-	 {"serpent",48,16,96,0}}},
+	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",48,16,96,0,0}}},
 {0,2,96,"serpent-twofish", "lrw-benbi",
-	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0},
-	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0}}},
+	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0,0}}},
+
 /* Kernel LRW block size is fixed to 16 bytes for GF(2^128)
  * thus cannot be used with blowfish where block is 8 bytes.
  * There also no GF(2^64) support.
 {1,1,64,"blowfish_le","lrw-benbi",
-	 {{"blowfish_le",64,8,32,0}}},
+	 {{"blowfish_le",64,8,32,0,0}}},
 {1,2,112,"blowfish_le-aes","lrw-benbi",
-	 {{"blowfish_le",64, 8,32,0},
-	  {"aes",        48,16,88,0}}},
+	 {{"blowfish_le",64, 8,32,0,0},
+	  {"aes",        48,16,88,0,0}}},
 {1,3,160,"serpent-blowfish_le-aes","lrw-benbi",
-	  {{"serpent",    48,16, 32,0},
-	   {"blowfish_le",64, 8, 64,0},
-	   {"aes",        48,16,120,0}}},*/
-/* CBC + "outer" CBC (both with whitening) */
-{1,1,32,"aes","cbc-tcrypt",
-	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0}}},
-{1,1,32,"serpent","cbc-tcrypt",
-	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0}}},
-{1,1,32,"twofish","cbc-tcrypt",
-	{{"twofish",32,16,32,0}}},
-{1,2,64,"twofish-aes","cbci-tcrypt",
-	{{"twofish",32,16,32,0},
-	 {"aes",    32,16,64,0}}},
-{1,3,96,"serpent-twofish-aes","cbci-tcrypt",
-	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0},
-	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0},
-	 {"aes",    32,16,96,0}}},
-{1,2,64,"aes-serpent","cbci-tcrypt",
-	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0},
-	 {"serpent",32,16,64,0}}},
-{1,3,96,"aes-twofish-serpent", "cbci-tcrypt",
-	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0},
-	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0},
-	 {"serpent",32,16,96,0}}},
-{1,2,64,"serpent-twofish", "cbci-tcrypt",
-	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0},
-	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0}}},
-{1,1,16,"cast5","cbc-tcrypt",
-	{{"cast5",   16,8,32,0}}},
-{1,1,24,"des3_ede","cbc-tcrypt",
-	{{"des3_ede",24,8,32,0}}},
-{1,1,56,"blowfish_le","cbc-tcrypt",
-	{{"blowfish_le",56,8,32,0}}},
-{1,2,88,"blowfish_le-aes","cbc-tcrypt",
-	{{"blowfish_le",56, 8,32,0},
-	 {"aes",        32,16,88,0}}},
-{1,3,120,"serpent-blowfish_le-aes","cbc-tcrypt",
-	{{"serpent",    32,16, 32,0},
-	 {"blowfish_le",56, 8, 64,0},
-	 {"aes",        32,16,120,0}}},
+	  {{"serpent",    48,16, 32,0,0},
+	   {"blowfish_le",64, 8, 64,0,0},
+	   {"aes",        48,16,120,0,0}}},*/
+
+/*
+ * CBC + "outer" CBC (both with whitening)
+ * chain_key_size: alg_keys_bytes + IV_seed_bytes + whitening_bytes
+ */
+{1,1,32+16+16,"aes","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0,32}}},
+{1,1,32+16+16,"serpent","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0,32}}},
+{1,1,32+16+16,"twofish","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"twofish",32,16,32,0,32}}},
+{1,2,64+16+16,"twofish-aes","cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"twofish",32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    32,16,64,0,32}}},
+{1,3,96+16+16,"serpent-twofish-aes","cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    32,16,96,0,32}}},
+{1,2,64+16+16,"aes-serpent","cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",32,16,64,0,32}}},
+{1,3,96+16+16,"aes-twofish-serpent", "cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",32,16,96,0,32}}},
+{1,2,64+16+16,"serpent-twofish", "cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0,32}}},
+{1,1,16+8+16,"cast5","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"cast5",   16,8,32,0,24}}},
+{1,1,24+8+16,"des3_ede","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"des3_ede",24,8,32,0,24}}},
+{1,1,56+8+16,"blowfish_le","cbc-tcrypt",
+	{{"blowfish_le",56,8,32,0,24}}},
+{1,2,88+16+16,"blowfish_le-aes","cbc-tcrypt",
+	{{"blowfish_le",56, 8,32,0,0},
+	 {"aes",        32,16,88,0,32}}},
+{1,3,120+16+16,"serpent-blowfish_le-aes","cbc-tcrypt",
+	{{"serpent",    32,16, 32,0,0},
+	 {"blowfish_le",56, 8, 64,0,0},
+	 {"aes",        32,16,120,0,32}}},
 {}
 };
 
@@ -189,7 +203,7 @@ static int TCRYPT_hdr_from_disk(struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
 
 	/* Convert header to cpu format */
 	hdr->d.version  =  be16_to_cpu(hdr->d.version);
-	hdr->d.version_tc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->d.version_tc);
+	hdr->d.version_tc = be16_to_cpu(hdr->d.version_tc);
 
 	hdr->d.keys_crc32 = be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.keys_crc32);
 
@@ -262,8 +276,8 @@ static int decrypt_blowfish_le_cbc(struct tcrypt_alg *alg,
 	}
 
 	crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher);
-	memset(iv, 0, bs);
-	memset(iv_old, 0, bs);
+	crypt_memzero(iv, bs);
+	crypt_memzero(iv_old, bs);
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -289,6 +303,9 @@ static void TCRYPT_copy_key(struct tcrypt_alg *alg, const char *mode,
 		memcpy(&out_key[ks2], key, TCRYPT_LRW_IKEY_LEN);
 	} else if (!strncmp(mode, "cbc", 3)) {
 		memcpy(out_key, &key[alg->key_offset], alg->key_size);
+		/* IV + whitening */
+		memcpy(&out_key[alg->key_size], &key[alg->iv_offset],
+		       alg->key_extra_size);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -297,12 +314,13 @@ static int TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr_one(struct tcrypt_alg *alg, const char *mode,
 {
 	char backend_key[TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN];
 	char iv[TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN] = {};
-	char mode_name[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	char mode_name[MAX_CIPHER_LEN + 1];
 	struct crypt_cipher *cipher;
 	char *c, *buf = (char*)&hdr->e;
 	int r;
 
 	/* Remove IV if present */
+	mode_name[MAX_CIPHER_LEN] = '\0';
 	strncpy(mode_name, mode, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
 	c = strchr(mode_name, '-');
 	if (c)
@@ -326,8 +344,8 @@ static int TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr_one(struct tcrypt_alg *alg, const char *mode,
 		crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher);
 	}
 
-	memset(backend_key, 0, sizeof(backend_key));
-	memset(iv, 0, TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN);
+	crypt_memzero(backend_key, sizeof(backend_key));
+	crypt_memzero(iv, TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN);
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -377,19 +395,19 @@ out:
 		if (cipher[j])
 			crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher[j]);
 
-	memset(iv, 0, bs);
-	memset(iv_old, 0, bs);
+	crypt_memzero(iv, bs);
+	crypt_memzero(iv_old, bs);
 	return r;
 }
 
 static int TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
-			       const char *key, int legacy_modes)
+			       const char *key, uint32_t flags)
 {
 	struct tcrypt_phdr hdr2;
 	int i, j, r = -EINVAL;
 
 	for (i = 0; tcrypt_cipher[i].chain_count; i++) {
-		if (!legacy_modes && tcrypt_cipher[i].legacy)
+		if (!(flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES) && tcrypt_cipher[i].legacy)
 			continue;
 		log_dbg("TCRYPT:  trying cipher %s-%s",
 			tcrypt_cipher[i].long_name, tcrypt_cipher[i].mode);
@@ -421,10 +439,17 @@ static int TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
 			r = i;
 			break;
 		}
+		if ((flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES) &&
+		     !strncmp(hdr2.d.magic, VCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC_LEN)) {
+			log_dbg("TCRYPT: Signature magic detected (Veracrypt).");
+			memcpy(&hdr->e, &hdr2.e, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN);
+			r = i;
+			break;
+		}
 		r = -EPERM;
 	}
 
-	memset(&hdr2, 0, sizeof(hdr2));
+	crypt_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
 	return r;
 }
 
@@ -444,8 +469,7 @@ static int TCRYPT_pool_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
-	/* FIXME: add while */
-	data_size = read(fd, data, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
+	data_size = read_buffer(fd, data, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
 	close(fd);
 	if (data_size < 0) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Error reading keyfile %s.\n"), keyfile);
@@ -461,8 +485,8 @@ static int TCRYPT_pool_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		j %= TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
 	}
 
-	memset(&crc, 0, sizeof(crc));
-	memset(data, 0, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
+	crypt_memzero(&crc, sizeof(crc));
+	crypt_memzero(data, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -475,7 +499,7 @@ static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t passphrase_size;
 	char *key;
 	unsigned int i, skipped = 0;
-	int r = -EINVAL, legacy_modes;
+	int r = -EPERM;
 
 	if (posix_memalign((void*)&key, crypt_getpagesize(), TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN))
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -488,7 +512,7 @@ static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (params->passphrase_size > TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%d) exceeded.\n"),
 			      TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN);
-		return -EPERM;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	/* Calculate pool content from keyfiles */
@@ -502,9 +526,10 @@ static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	for (i = 0; i < params->passphrase_size; i++)
 		pwd[i] += params->passphrase[i];
 
-	legacy_modes = params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES ? 1 : 0;
 	for (i = 0; tcrypt_kdf[i].name; i++) {
-		if (!legacy_modes && tcrypt_kdf[i].legacy)
+		if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES) && tcrypt_kdf[i].legacy)
+			continue;
+		if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES) && tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt)
 			continue;
 		/* Derive header key */
 		log_dbg("TCRYPT: trying KDF: %s-%s-%d.",
@@ -523,16 +548,16 @@ static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			break;
 
 		/* Decrypt header */
-		r = TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr(cd, hdr, key, legacy_modes);
+		r = TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr(cd, hdr, key, params->flags);
 		if (r == -ENOENT) {
 			skipped++;
-			continue;
+			r = -EPERM;
 		}
 		if (r != -EPERM)
 			break;
 	}
 
-	if ((skipped && skipped == i) || r == -ENOTSUP) {
+	if ((r < 0 && r != -EPERM && skipped && skipped == i) || r == -ENOTSUP) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Required kernel crypto interface not available.\n"));
 #ifdef ENABLE_AF_ALG
 		log_err(cd, _("Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded.\n"));
@@ -543,18 +568,19 @@ static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	r = TCRYPT_hdr_from_disk(hdr, params, i, r);
 	if (!r) {
-		log_dbg("TCRYPT: Header version: %d, req. %d, sector %d"
+		log_dbg("TCRYPT: Magic: %s, Header version: %d, req. %d, sector %d"
 			", mk_offset %" PRIu64 ", hidden_size %" PRIu64
-			", volume size %" PRIu64, (int)hdr->d.version,
-			(int)hdr->d.version_tc, (int)hdr->d.sector_size,
+			", volume size %" PRIu64, tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt ?
+			VCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC : TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC,
+			(int)hdr->d.version, (int)hdr->d.version_tc, (int)hdr->d.sector_size,
 			hdr->d.mk_offset, hdr->d.hidden_volume_size, hdr->d.volume_size);
-		log_dbg("TCRYPT: Header cipher %s-%s, key size %d",
+		log_dbg("TCRYPT: Header cipher %s-%s, key size %zu",
 			params->cipher, params->mode, params->key_size);
 	}
 out:
-	memset(pwd, 0, TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN);
+	crypt_memzero(pwd, TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN);
 	if (key)
-		memset(key, 0, TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN);
+		crypt_memzero(key, TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN);
 	free(key);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -563,20 +589,37 @@ int TCRYPT_read_phdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
 		     struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
 {
-	struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	struct device *base_device, *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
 	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct tcrypt_phdr);
+	char *base_device_path;
 	int devfd = 0, r, bs;
 
 	assert(sizeof(struct tcrypt_phdr) == 512);
 
-	log_dbg("Reading TCRYPT header of size %d bytes from device %s.",
+	log_dbg("Reading TCRYPT header of size %zu bytes from device %s.",
 		hdr_size, device_path(device));
 
 	bs = device_block_size(device);
 	if (bs < 0)
 		return bs;
 
-	devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER &&
+	    crypt_dev_is_partition(device_path(device))) {
+		base_device_path = crypt_get_base_device(device_path(device));
+
+		log_dbg("Reading TCRYPT system header from device %s.", base_device_path ?: "?");
+		if (!base_device_path)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = device_alloc(&base_device, base_device_path);
+		free(base_device_path);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		devfd = device_open(base_device, O_RDONLY);
+		device_free(base_device);
+	} else
+		devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
+
 	if (devfd == -1) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s.\n"), device_path(device));
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -584,26 +627,26 @@ int TCRYPT_read_phdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
 
 	r = -EIO;
 	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER) {
-		if (lseek(devfd, TCRYPT_HDR_SYSTEM_OFFSET, SEEK_SET) >= 0 &&
-		    read_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size) == hdr_size)
+		if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size,
+			TCRYPT_HDR_SYSTEM_OFFSET) == hdr_size) {
 			r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+		}
 	} else if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER) {
 		if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER) {
-			if (lseek(devfd, TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_BCK, SEEK_END) >= 0 &&
-			    read_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size) == hdr_size)
+			if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size,
+				TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_BCK) == hdr_size)
 				r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
 		} else {
-			if (lseek(devfd, TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET, SEEK_SET) >= 0 &&
-			    read_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size) == hdr_size)
+			if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size,
+				TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET) == hdr_size)
 				r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
-			if (r &&
-			    lseek(devfd, TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD, SEEK_END) >= 0 &&
-			    read_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size) == hdr_size)
+			if (r && read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size,
+				TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD) == hdr_size)
 				r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
 		}
 	} else if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER) {
-		if (lseek(devfd, TCRYPT_HDR_OFFSET_BCK, SEEK_END) >= 0 &&
-			    read_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size) == hdr_size)
+		if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size,
+			TCRYPT_HDR_OFFSET_BCK) == hdr_size)
 			r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
 	} else if (read_blockwise(devfd, bs, hdr, hdr_size) == hdr_size)
 		r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
@@ -636,10 +679,13 @@ int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		     uint32_t flags)
 {
 	char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], dm_name[PATH_MAX], dm_dev_name[PATH_MAX];
-	struct device *device = NULL;
+	char *part_path;
+	struct device *device = NULL, *part_device = NULL;
 	unsigned int i;
 	int r;
+	uint32_t req_flags;
 	struct tcrypt_algs *algs;
+	enum devcheck device_check;
 	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
 		.target = DM_CRYPT,
 		.size   = 0,
@@ -667,28 +713,69 @@ int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		return -ENOTSUP;
 	}
 
+	if (strstr(params->mode, "-tcw"))
+		req_flags = DM_TCW_SUPPORTED;
+	else
+		req_flags = DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED;
+
 	algs = TCRYPT_get_algs(params->cipher, params->mode);
 	if (!algs)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER)
+	if (hdr->d.sector_size == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER)
+		dmd.size = 0;
+	else if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER)
 		dmd.size = hdr->d.hidden_volume_size / hdr->d.sector_size;
 	else
 		dmd.size = hdr->d.volume_size / hdr->d.sector_size;
 
-	r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmd.data_device, DEV_EXCL,
+	if (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED)
+		device_check = DEV_SHARED;
+	else
+		device_check = DEV_EXCL;
+
+	if ((params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER) &&
+	     !crypt_dev_is_partition(device_path(dmd.data_device))) {
+		part_path = crypt_get_partition_device(device_path(dmd.data_device),
+						       dmd.u.crypt.offset, dmd.size);
+		if (part_path) {
+			if (!device_alloc(&part_device, part_path)) {
+				log_verbose(cd, _("Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s.\n"),
+					    part_path);
+				dmd.data_device = part_device;
+				dmd.u.crypt.offset = 0;
+			}
+			free(part_path);
+		} else
+			/*
+			 * System encryption use the whole device mapping, there can
+			 * be active partitions.
+			 */
+			device_check = DEV_SHARED;
+	}
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmd.data_device, device_check,
 				dmd.u.crypt.offset, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
-	if (r)
+	if (r) {
+		device_free(part_device);
 		return r;
+	}
 
 	/* Frome here, key size for every cipher must be the same */
-	dmd.u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(algs->cipher[0].key_size, NULL);
-	if (!dmd.u.crypt.vk)
+	dmd.u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(algs->cipher[0].key_size +
+						algs->cipher[0].key_extra_size, NULL);
+	if (!dmd.u.crypt.vk) {
+		device_free(part_device);
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	for (i = algs->chain_count; i > 0; i--) {
 		if (i == 1) {
-			strncpy(dm_name, name, sizeof(dm_name));
+			dm_name[sizeof(dm_name)-1] = '\0';
+			strncpy(dm_name, name, sizeof(dm_name)-1);
 			dmd.flags = flags;
 		} else {
 			snprintf(dm_name, sizeof(dm_name), "%s_%d", name, i-1);
@@ -722,11 +809,12 @@ int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			break;
 	}
 
-	if (r < 0 && !(dm_flags() & DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED)) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support plain64 IV.\n"));
+	if (r < 0 && !(dm_flags() & req_flags)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel doesn't support TCRYPT compatible mapping.\n"));
 		r = -ENOTSUP;
 	}
 
+	device_free(part_device);
 	crypt_free_volume_key(dmd.u.crypt.vk);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -829,7 +917,7 @@ int TCRYPT_init_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 			struct tcrypt_phdr *tcrypt_hdr)
 {
 	struct tcrypt_algs *algs;
-	char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN * 4], mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], *tmp;
+	char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN * 4], mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN+1], *tmp;
 	size_t key_size;
 	int r;
 
@@ -843,6 +931,7 @@ int TCRYPT_init_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
 	if (!tmp)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	*tmp = '\0';
+	mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN] = '\0';
 	strncpy(mode, ++tmp, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
 
 	key_size = dmd->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
@@ -876,8 +965,11 @@ uint64_t TCRYPT_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		goto hdr_offset;
 
 	/* Mapping through whole device, not partition! */
-	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER)
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER) {
+		if (crypt_dev_is_partition(device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd))))
+			return 0;
 		goto hdr_offset;
+	}
 
 	if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "xts", 3)) {
 		if (hdr->d.version < 3)
@@ -907,15 +999,21 @@ hdr_offset:
 
 uint64_t TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
 			      struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
-			      struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params
-)
+			      struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
 {
-	if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "xts", 3))
-		return TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, hdr, params);
-	else if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "lrw", 3))
-		return 0;
+	uint64_t iv_offset;
 
-	return hdr->d.mk_offset / hdr->d.sector_size;
+	if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "xts", 3))
+		iv_offset = TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, hdr, params);
+	else if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "lrw", 3))
+		iv_offset = 0;
+	else
+		iv_offset = hdr->d.mk_offset / hdr->d.sector_size;
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER)
+		iv_offset += crypt_dev_partition_offset(device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
+
+	return iv_offset;
 }
 
 int TCRYPT_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
@@ -952,11 +1050,13 @@ int TCRYPT_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
 		struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
 		struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
 {
-	log_std(cd, "TCRYPT header information for %s\n",
+	log_std(cd, "%s header information for %s\n",
+		hdr->d.magic[0] == 'T' ? "TCRYPT" : "VERACRYPT",
 		device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
 	if (hdr->d.version) {
 		log_std(cd, "Version:       \t%d\n", hdr->d.version);
-		log_std(cd, "Driver req.:\t%d\n", hdr->d.version_tc);
+		log_std(cd, "Driver req.:\t%x.%x\n", hdr->d.version_tc >> 8,
+						    hdr->d.version_tc & 0xFF);
 
 		log_std(cd, "Sector size:\t%" PRIu32 "\n", hdr->d.sector_size);
 		log_std(cd, "MK offset:\t%" PRIu64 "\n", hdr->d.mk_offset);
@@ -964,6 +1064,6 @@ int TCRYPT_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	}
 	log_std(cd, "Cipher chain:\t%s\n", params->cipher);
 	log_std(cd, "Cipher mode:\t%s\n", params->mode);
-	log_std(cd, "MK bits:       \t%d\n", params->key_size * 8);
+	log_std(cd, "MK bits:       \t%zu\n", params->key_size * 8);
 	return 0;
 }

lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible)  header defitinion
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2013, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #define TCRYPT_HDR_LEN     448
 #define TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN 192
 #define TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC "TRUE"
+#define VCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC "VERA"
 #define TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC_LEN 4
 
 #define TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD -1536

lib/utils.c

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /*
  * utils - miscellaneous device utilities for cryptsetup
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -56,22 +56,70 @@ static void *aligned_malloc(void **base, int size, int alignment)
 /* Credits go to Michal's padlock patches for this alignment code */
 	char *ptr;
 
-	ptr  = malloc(size + alignment);
-	if(ptr == NULL) return NULL;
+	ptr = malloc(size + alignment);
+	if (!ptr)
+		return NULL;
 
 	*base = ptr;
-	if(alignment > 1 && ((long)ptr & (alignment - 1))) {
+	if (alignment > 1 && ((long)ptr & (alignment - 1)))
 		ptr += alignment - ((long)(ptr) & (alignment - 1));
-	}
+
 	return ptr;
 #endif
 }
 
+ssize_t read_buffer(int fd, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	size_t read_size = 0;
+	ssize_t r;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || !buf)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	do {
+		r = read(fd, buf, count - read_size);
+		if (r == -1 && errno != EINTR)
+			return r;
+		if (r == 0)
+			return (ssize_t)read_size;
+		if (r > 0) {
+			read_size += (size_t)r;
+			buf = (uint8_t*)buf + r;
+		}
+	} while (read_size != count);
+
+	return (ssize_t)count;
+}
+
+ssize_t write_buffer(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	size_t write_size = 0;
+	ssize_t w;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || !buf || !count)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	do {
+		w = write(fd, buf, count - write_size);
+		if (w < 0 && errno != EINTR)
+			return w;
+		if (w == 0)
+			return (ssize_t)write_size;
+		if (w > 0) {
+			write_size += (size_t) w;
+			buf = (const uint8_t*)buf + w;
+		}
+	} while (write_size != count);
+
+	return (ssize_t)write_size;
+}
+
 ssize_t write_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *orig_buf, size_t count)
 {
 	void *hangover_buf, *hangover_buf_base = NULL;
 	void *buf, *buf_base = NULL;
-	int r, hangover, solid, alignment;
+	int r, alignment;
+	size_t hangover, solid;
 	ssize_t ret = -1;
 
 	if (fd == -1 || !orig_buf || bsize <= 0)
@@ -89,29 +137,31 @@ ssize_t write_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *orig_buf, size_t count)
 	} else
 		buf = orig_buf;
 
-	r = write(fd, buf, solid);
-	if (r < 0 || r != solid)
-		goto out;
+	if (solid) {
+		r = write_buffer(fd, buf, solid);
+		if (r < 0 || r != (ssize_t)solid)
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	if (hangover) {
 		hangover_buf = aligned_malloc(&hangover_buf_base, bsize, alignment);
 		if (!hangover_buf)
 			goto out;
 
-		r = read(fd, hangover_buf, bsize);
-		if (r < 0 || r < hangover)
+		r = read_buffer(fd, hangover_buf, bsize);
+		if (r < 0 || r < (ssize_t)hangover)
 			goto out;
 
 		if (r < bsize)
 			bsize = r;
 
-		r = lseek(fd, -bsize, SEEK_CUR);
-		if (r < 0)
+		if (lseek(fd, -bsize, SEEK_CUR) < 0)
 			goto out;
+
 		memcpy(hangover_buf, (char*)buf + solid, hangover);
 
-		r = write(fd, hangover_buf, bsize);
-		if (r < 0 || r < hangover)
+		r = write_buffer(fd, hangover_buf, bsize);
+		if (r < 0 || r < (ssize_t)hangover)
 			goto out;
 	}
 	ret = count;
@@ -122,10 +172,12 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-ssize_t read_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *orig_buf, size_t count) {
+ssize_t read_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *orig_buf, size_t count)
+{
 	void *hangover_buf, *hangover_buf_base = NULL;
 	void *buf, *buf_base = NULL;
-	int r, hangover, solid, alignment;
+	int r, alignment;
+	size_t hangover, solid;
 	ssize_t ret = -1;
 
 	if (fd == -1 || !orig_buf || bsize <= 0)
@@ -142,16 +194,16 @@ ssize_t read_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *orig_buf, size_t count) {
 	} else
 		buf = orig_buf;
 
-	r = read(fd, buf, solid);
-	if(r < 0 || r != solid)
+	r = read_buffer(fd, buf, solid);
+	if (r < 0 || r != (ssize_t)solid)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (hangover) {
 		hangover_buf = aligned_malloc(&hangover_buf_base, bsize, alignment);
 		if (!hangover_buf)
 			goto out;
-		r = read(fd, hangover_buf, bsize);
-		if (r <  0 || r < hangover)
+		r = read_buffer(fd, hangover_buf, bsize);
+		if (r <  0 || r < (ssize_t)hangover)
 			goto out;
 
 		memcpy((char *)buf + solid, hangover_buf, hangover);
@@ -172,7 +224,8 @@ out:
  * is implicitly included in the read/write offset, which can not be set to non-aligned
  * boundaries. Hence, we combine llseek with write.
  */
-ssize_t write_lseek_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, char *buf, size_t count, off_t offset) {
+ssize_t write_lseek_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset)
+{
 	char *frontPadBuf;
 	void *frontPadBuf_base = NULL;
 	int r, frontHang;
@@ -182,6 +235,12 @@ ssize_t write_lseek_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, char *buf, size_t count, off_t
 	if (fd == -1 || !buf || bsize <= 0)
 		return -1;
 
+	if (offset < 0)
+		offset = lseek(fd, offset, SEEK_END);
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return -1;
+
 	frontHang = offset % bsize;
 
 	if (lseek(fd, offset - frontHang, SEEK_SET) < 0)
@@ -193,7 +252,7 @@ ssize_t write_lseek_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, char *buf, size_t count, off_t
 		if (!frontPadBuf)
 			goto out;
 
-		r = read(fd, frontPadBuf, bsize);
+		r = read_buffer(fd, frontPadBuf, bsize);
 		if (r < 0 || r != bsize)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -206,11 +265,11 @@ ssize_t write_lseek_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, char *buf, size_t count, off_t
 		if (lseek(fd, offset - frontHang, SEEK_SET) < 0)
 			goto out;
 
-		r = write(fd, frontPadBuf, bsize);
+		r = write_buffer(fd, frontPadBuf, bsize);
 		if (r < 0 || r != bsize)
 			goto out;
 
-		buf += innerCount;
+		buf = (char*)buf + innerCount;
 		count -= innerCount;
 	}
 
@@ -223,6 +282,58 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+ssize_t read_lseek_blockwise(int fd, int bsize, void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset)
+{
+	char *frontPadBuf;
+	void *frontPadBuf_base = NULL;
+	int r, frontHang;
+	size_t innerCount = 0;
+	ssize_t ret = -1;
+
+	if (fd == -1 || !buf || bsize <= 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		offset = lseek(fd, offset, SEEK_END);
+
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	frontHang = offset % bsize;
+
+	if (lseek(fd, offset - frontHang, SEEK_SET) < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (frontHang) {
+		frontPadBuf = aligned_malloc(&frontPadBuf_base,
+					     bsize, get_alignment(fd));
+
+		if (!frontPadBuf)
+			return ret;
+
+		r = read_buffer(fd, frontPadBuf, bsize);
+		if (r < 0 || r != bsize)
+			goto out;
+
+		innerCount = bsize - frontHang;
+		if (innerCount > count)
+			innerCount = count;
+
+		memcpy(buf, frontPadBuf + frontHang, innerCount);
+
+		buf = (char*)buf + innerCount;
+		count -= innerCount;
+	}
+
+	ret = read_blockwise(fd, bsize, buf, count);
+	if (ret >= 0)
+		ret += innerCount;
+out:
+	free(frontPadBuf_base);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /* MEMLOCK */
 #define DEFAULT_PROCESS_PRIORITY -18
 

lib/utils_benchmark.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library, cipher bechmark
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <time.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -32,6 +31,12 @@
  */
 #define CIPHER_BLOCK_BYTES 65536
 
+/*
+ * If the measured value is lower, encrypted buffer is probably too small
+ * and calculated values are not reliable.
+ */
+#define CIPHER_TIME_MIN_MS 0.001
+
 /*
  * The whole test depends on Linux kernel usermode crypto API for now.
  * (The same implementations are used in dm-crypt though.)
@@ -47,19 +52,15 @@ struct cipher_perf {
 	size_t buffer_size;
 };
 
-static long time_ms(struct rusage *start, struct rusage *end)
+static int time_ms(struct timespec *start, struct timespec *end, double *ms)
 {
-	long ms = 0;
+	double start_ms, end_ms;
 
-	/* For kernel backend, we need to measure only tim in kernel.
-	ms = (end->ru_utime.tv_sec - start->ru_utime.tv_sec) * 1000;
-	ms += (end->ru_utime.tv_usec - start->ru_utime.tv_usec) / 1000;
-	*/
+	start_ms = start->tv_sec * 1000.0 + start->tv_nsec / (1000.0 * 1000);
+	end_ms   = end->tv_sec * 1000.0 + end->tv_nsec / (1000.0 * 1000);
 
-	ms += (end->ru_stime.tv_sec - start->ru_stime.tv_sec) * 1000;
-	ms += (end->ru_stime.tv_usec - start->ru_stime.tv_usec) / 1000;
-
-	return ms;
+	*ms = end_ms - start_ms;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int cipher_perf_one(struct cipher_perf *cp, char *buf,
@@ -98,26 +99,39 @@ static int cipher_perf_one(struct cipher_perf *cp, char *buf,
 
 	return r;
 }
-static long cipher_measure(struct cipher_perf *cp, char *buf,
-			   size_t buf_size, int encrypt)
+static int cipher_measure(struct cipher_perf *cp, char *buf,
+			  size_t buf_size, int encrypt, double *ms)
 {
-	struct rusage rstart, rend;
+	struct timespec start, end;
 	int r;
 
-	if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rstart) < 0)
+	/*
+	 * Using getrusage would be better here but the precision
+	 * is not adequate, so better stick with CLOCK_MONOTONIC
+	 */
+	if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &start) < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	r = cipher_perf_one(cp, buf, buf_size, encrypt);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
-	if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rend) < 0)
+	if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &end) < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return time_ms(&rstart, &rend);
+	r = time_ms(&start, &end, ms);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (*ms < CIPHER_TIME_MIN_MS) {
+		log_dbg("Measured cipher runtime (%1.6f) is too low.", *ms);
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static double speed_mbs(unsigned long bytes, unsigned long ms)
+static double speed_mbs(unsigned long bytes, double ms)
 {
 	double speed = bytes, s = ms / 1000.;
 
@@ -127,32 +141,32 @@ static double speed_mbs(unsigned long bytes, unsigned long ms)
 static int cipher_perf(struct cipher_perf *cp,
 	double *encryption_mbs, double *decryption_mbs)
 {
-	long ms_enc, ms_dec, ms;
-	int repeat_enc, repeat_dec;
+	double ms_enc, ms_dec, ms;
+	int r, repeat_enc, repeat_dec;
 	void *buf = NULL;
 
 	if (posix_memalign(&buf, crypt_getpagesize(), cp->buffer_size))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ms_enc = 0;
+	ms_enc = 0.0;
 	repeat_enc = 1;
-	while (ms_enc < 1000) {
-		ms = cipher_measure(cp, buf, cp->buffer_size, 1);
-		if (ms < 0) {
+	while (ms_enc < 1000.0) {
+		r = cipher_measure(cp, buf, cp->buffer_size, 1, &ms);
+		if (r < 0) {
 			free(buf);
-			return (int)ms;
+			return r;
 		}
 		ms_enc += ms;
 		repeat_enc++;
 	}
 
-	ms_dec = 0;
+	ms_dec = 0.0;
 	repeat_dec = 1;
-	while (ms_dec < 1000) {
-		ms = cipher_measure(cp, buf, cp->buffer_size, 0);
-		if (ms < 0) {
+	while (ms_dec < 1000.0) {
+		r = cipher_measure(cp, buf, cp->buffer_size, 0, &ms);
+		if (r < 0) {
 			free(buf);
-			return (int)ms;
+			return r;
 		}
 		ms_dec += ms;
 		repeat_dec++;
@@ -226,7 +240,7 @@ int crypt_benchmark_kdf(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	size_t salt_size,
 	uint64_t *iterations_sec)
 {
-	int r;
+	int r, key_length = 0;
 
 	if (!iterations_sec)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -235,14 +249,21 @@ int crypt_benchmark_kdf(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 
+	// FIXME: this should be in KDF check API parameters later
+	if (cd)
+		key_length = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+
+	if (key_length == 0)
+		key_length = DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS / 8;
+
 	if (!strncmp(kdf, "pbkdf2", 6))
 		r = crypt_pbkdf_check(kdf, hash, password, password_size,
-				      salt, salt_size, iterations_sec);
+				      salt, salt_size, key_length, iterations_sec);
 	else
 		r = -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!r)
-		log_dbg("KDF %s, hash %s: %" PRIu64 " iterations per second.",
-			kdf, hash, *iterations_sec);
+		log_dbg("KDF %s, hash %s: %" PRIu64 " iterations per second (%d-bits key).",
+			kdf, hash, *iterations_sec, key_length * 8);
 	return r;
 }

lib/utils_crypt.c

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
  * utils_crypt - cipher utilities for cryptsetup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -81,12 +82,24 @@ int crypt_parse_name_and_mode(const char *s, char *cipher, int *key_nums,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Replacement for memset(s, 0, n) on stack that can be optimized out
+ * Also used in safe allocations for explicit memory wipe.
+ */
+void crypt_memzero(void *s, size_t n)
+{
+	volatile uint8_t *p = (volatile uint8_t *)s;
+
+	while(n--)
+		*p++ = 0;
+}
+
 /* safe allocations */
 void *crypt_safe_alloc(size_t size)
 {
 	struct safe_allocation *alloc;
 
-	if (!size)
+	if (!size || size > (SIZE_MAX - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data)))
 		return NULL;
 
 	alloc = malloc(size + offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
@@ -94,7 +107,7 @@ void *crypt_safe_alloc(size_t size)
 		return NULL;
 
 	alloc->size = size;
-	memset(&alloc->data, 0, size);
+	crypt_memzero(&alloc->data, size);
 
 	/* coverity[leaked_storage] */
 	return &alloc->data;
@@ -110,7 +123,7 @@ void crypt_safe_free(void *data)
 	alloc = (struct safe_allocation *)
 		((char *)data - offsetof(struct safe_allocation, data));
 
-	memset(data, 0, alloc->size);
+	crypt_memzero(data, alloc->size);
 
 	alloc->size = 0x55aa55aa;
 	free(alloc);
@@ -157,7 +170,7 @@ static int untimed_read(int fd, char *pass, size_t maxlen)
 static int timed_read(int fd, char *pass, size_t maxlen, long timeout)
 {
 	struct timeval t;
-	fd_set fds;
+	fd_set fds = {}; /* Just to avoid scan-build false report for FD_SET */
 	int failed = -1;
 
 	FD_ZERO(&fds);
@@ -176,16 +189,18 @@ static int interactive_pass(const char *prompt, char *pass, size_t maxlen,
 {
 	struct termios orig, tmp;
 	int failed = -1;
-	int infd = STDIN_FILENO, outfd;
+	int infd, outfd;
 
 	if (maxlen < 1)
-		goto out_err;
+		return failed;
 
 	/* Read and write to /dev/tty if available */
-	if ((infd = outfd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+	infd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR);
+	if (infd == -1) {
 		infd = STDIN_FILENO;
 		outfd = STDERR_FILENO;
-	}
+	} else
+		outfd = infd;
 
 	if (tcgetattr(infd, &orig))
 		goto out_err;
@@ -320,7 +335,7 @@ int crypt_get_key(const char *prompt,
 		  struct crypt_device *cd)
 {
 	int fd, regular_file, read_stdin, char_read, unlimited_read = 0;
-	int r = -EINVAL;
+	int r = -EINVAL, newline;
 	char *pass = NULL;
 	size_t buflen, i, file_read_size;
 	struct stat st;
@@ -346,7 +361,7 @@ int crypt_get_key(const char *prompt,
 
 	/* If not requsted otherwise, we limit input to prevent memory exhaustion */
 	if (keyfile_size_max == 0) {
-		keyfile_size_max = DEFAULT_KEYFILE_SIZE_MAXKB * 1024;
+		keyfile_size_max = DEFAULT_KEYFILE_SIZE_MAXKB * 1024 + 1;
 		unlimited_read = 1;
 	}
 
@@ -394,7 +409,7 @@ int crypt_get_key(const char *prompt,
 		goto out_err;
 	}
 
-	for(i = 0; i < keyfile_size_max; i++) {
+	for(i = 0, newline = 0; i < keyfile_size_max; i++) {
 		if(i == buflen) {
 			buflen += 4096;
 			pass = crypt_safe_realloc(pass, buflen);
@@ -412,12 +427,17 @@ int crypt_get_key(const char *prompt,
 		}
 
 		/* Stop on newline only if not requested read from keyfile */
-		if(char_read == 0 || (!key_file && pass[i] == '\n'))
+		if (char_read == 0)
 			break;
+		if (!key_file && pass[i] == '\n') {
+			newline = 1;
+			pass[i] = '\0';
+			break;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* Fail if piped input dies reading nothing */
-	if(!i && !regular_file) {
+	if(!i && !regular_file && !newline) {
 		log_dbg("Nothing read on input.");
 		r = -EPIPE;
 		goto out_err;
@@ -471,68 +491,3 @@ ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *hex, char **result, int safe_alloc)
 	*result = bytes;
 	return i;
 }
-
-/*
- * Device size string parsing, suffixes:
- * s|S - 512 bytes sectors
- * k  |K  |m  |M  |g  |G  |t  |T   - 1024 base
- * kiB|KiB|miB|MiB|giB|GiB|tiB|TiB - 1024 base
- * kb |KB |mM |MB |gB |GB |tB |TB  - 1000 base
- */
-int crypt_string_to_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *s, uint64_t *size)
-{
-	char *endp = NULL;
-	size_t len;
-	uint64_t mult_base, mult, tmp;
-
-	*size = strtoull(s, &endp, 10);
-	if (!isdigit(s[0]) ||
-	    (errno == ERANGE && *size == ULLONG_MAX) ||
-	    (errno != 0 && *size == 0))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (!endp || !*endp)
-		return 0;
-
-	len = strlen(endp);
-	/* Allow "B" and "iB" suffixes */
-	if (len > 3 ||
-	   (len == 3 && (endp[1] != 'i' || endp[2] != 'B')) ||
-	   (len == 2 && endp[1] != 'B'))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (len == 1 || len == 3)
-		mult_base = 1024;
-	else
-		mult_base = 1000;
-
-	mult = 1;
-	switch (endp[0]) {
-	case 's':
-	case 'S': mult = 512;
-		break;
-	case 't':
-	case 'T': mult *= mult_base;
-		 /* Fall through */
-	case 'g':
-	case 'G': mult *= mult_base;
-		 /* Fall through */
-	case 'm':
-	case 'M': mult *= mult_base;
-		 /* Fall through */
-	case 'k':
-	case 'K': mult *= mult_base;
-		break;
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	tmp = *size * mult;
-	if ((tmp / *size) != mult) {
-		log_dbg("Device size overflow.");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	*size = tmp;
-	return 0;
-}

lib/utils_crypt.h

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
  * utils_crypt - cipher utilities for cryptsetup
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -24,10 +24,9 @@
 #define _UTILS_CRYPT_H
 
 #include <unistd.h>
-#include "config.h"
 
 #define MAX_CIPHER_LEN		32
-#define MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR	"32"
+#define MAX_CIPHER_LEN_STR	"31"
 #define MAX_KEYFILES		32
 
 struct crypt_device;
@@ -46,7 +45,8 @@ void *crypt_safe_alloc(size_t size);
 void crypt_safe_free(void *data);
 void *crypt_safe_realloc(void *data, size_t size);
 
+void crypt_memzero(void *s, size_t n);
+
 ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *hex, char **result, int safe_alloc);
-int crypt_string_to_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *s, uint64_t *size);
 
 #endif /* _UTILS_CRYPT_H */

lib/utils_device.c

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /*
  * device backend utilities
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -38,20 +38,108 @@ struct device {
 	char *file_path;
 	int loop_fd;
 
+	int o_direct:1;
 	int init_done:1;
 };
 
-static int device_ready(const char *device)
+static int device_block_size_fd(int fd, size_t *min_size)
 {
-	int devfd, r = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+	int bsize = 0, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		r = (int)crypt_getpagesize();
+		bsize = r;
+	}
+	else if (ioctl(fd, BLKSSZGET, &bsize) >= 0)
+		r = bsize;
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (r < 0 || !min_size)
+		return r;
+
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		/* file can be empty as well */
+		if (st.st_size > bsize)
+			*min_size = bsize;
+		else
+			*min_size = st.st_size;
+	} else {
+		/* block device must have at least one block */
+		*min_size = bsize;
+	}
+
+	return bsize;
+}
+
+static int device_read_test(int devfd)
+{
+	char buffer[512];
+	int blocksize, r = -EIO;
+	size_t minsize = 0;
+
+	blocksize = device_block_size_fd(devfd, &minsize);
+
+	if (blocksize < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (minsize == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (minsize > sizeof(buffer))
+		minsize = sizeof(buffer);
+
+	if (read_blockwise(devfd, blocksize, buffer, minsize) == (ssize_t)minsize)
+		r = 0;
+
+	crypt_memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The direct-io is always preferred. The header is usually mapped to the same
+ * device and can be accessed when the rest of device is mapped to data device.
+ * Using dirct-io encsures that we do not mess with data in cache.
+ * (But proper alignment should prevent this in the first place.)
+ * The read test is needed to detect broken configurations (seen with remote
+ * block devices) that allow open with direct-io but then fails on read.
+ */
+static int device_ready(struct device *device, int check_directio)
+{
+	int devfd = -1, r = 0;
 	struct stat st;
 
-	log_dbg("Trying to open and read device %s.", device);
-	devfd = open(device, O_RDONLY);
+	device->o_direct = 0;
+	if (check_directio) {
+		log_dbg("Trying to open and read device %s with direct-io.",
+			device_path(device));
+		devfd = open(device_path(device), O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
+		if (devfd >= 0) {
+			if (device_read_test(devfd) == 0) {
+				device->o_direct = 1;
+			} else {
+				close(devfd);
+				devfd = -1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (devfd < 0) {
-		log_err(NULL, _("Device %s doesn't exist or access denied.\n"), device);
+		log_dbg("Trying to open device %s without direct-io.",
+			device_path(device));
+		devfd = open(device_path(device), O_RDONLY);
+	}
+
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		log_err(NULL, _("Device %s doesn't exist or access denied.\n"),
+			device_path(device));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+
 	if (fstat(devfd, &st) < 0)
 		r = -EINVAL;
 	else if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
@@ -65,12 +153,14 @@ int device_open(struct device *device, int flags)
 {
 	int devfd;
 
-	devfd = open(device_path(device), flags | O_DIRECT | O_SYNC);
-	if (devfd < 0 && errno == EINVAL) {
-		log_dbg("Trying to open device %s without direct-io.",
-			device_path(device));
-		devfd = open(device_path(device), flags | O_SYNC);
-	}
+	flags |= O_SYNC;
+	if (device->o_direct)
+		flags |= O_DIRECT;
+
+	devfd = open(device_path(device), flags);
+
+	if (devfd < 0)
+		log_dbg("Cannot open device %s.", device_path(device));
 
 	return devfd;
 }
@@ -90,24 +180,24 @@ int device_alloc(struct device **device, const char *path)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	memset(dev, 0, sizeof(struct device));
+	dev->path = strdup(path);
+	if (!dev->path) {
+		free(dev);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 	dev->loop_fd = -1;
 
-	r = device_ready(path);
+	r = device_ready(dev, 1);
 	if (!r) {
 		dev->init_done = 1;
 	} else if (r == -ENOTBLK) {
 		/* alloc loop later */
 	} else if (r < 0) {
+		free(dev->path);
 		free(dev);
 		return -ENOTBLK;
 	}
 
-	dev->path = strdup(path);
-	if (!dev->path) {
-		free(dev);
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
 	*device = dev;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -208,27 +298,23 @@ out:
 
 int device_block_size(struct device *device)
 {
-	struct stat st;
-	int fd, bsize = 0, r = -EINVAL;
+	int fd, r = -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!device)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (device->file_path)
+		return (int)crypt_getpagesize();
+
 	fd = open(device->path, O_RDONLY);
 	if(fd < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
-		goto out;
+	r = device_block_size_fd(fd, NULL);
 
-	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
-		r = (int)crypt_getpagesize();
-		goto out;
-	}
+	if (r <= 0)
+		log_dbg("Cannot get block size for device %s.", device_path(device));
 
-	if (ioctl(fd, BLKSSZGET, &bsize) >= 0)
-		r = bsize;
-out:
 	close(fd);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -333,25 +419,22 @@ out:
 
 static int device_internal_prepare(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device)
 {
-	char *loop_device;
+	char *loop_device = NULL, *file_path = NULL;
 	int r, loop_fd, readonly = 0;
 
 	if (device->init_done)
 		return 0;
 
-	log_dbg("Allocating a free loop device.");
-	loop_device = crypt_loop_get_device();
-	if (!loop_device) {
-		if (getuid() || geteuid())
-			log_err(cd, _("Cannot use a loopback device, "
-				      "running as non-root user.\n"));
-		else
-			log_err(cd, _("Cannot find a free loopback device.\n"));
+	if (getuid() || geteuid()) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot use a loopback device, "
+			      "running as non-root user.\n"));
 		return -ENOTSUP;
 	}
 
+	log_dbg("Allocating a free loop device.");
+
 	/* Keep the loop open, dettached on last close. */
-	loop_fd = crypt_loop_attach(loop_device, device->path, 0, 1, &readonly);
+	loop_fd = crypt_loop_attach(&loop_device, device->path, 0, 1, &readonly);
 	if (loop_fd == -1) {
 		log_err(cd, _("Attaching loopback device failed "
 			"(loop device with autoclear flag is required).\n"));
@@ -359,15 +442,19 @@ static int device_internal_prepare(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *devic
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	r = device_ready(loop_device);
+	file_path = device->path;
+	device->path = loop_device;
+
+	r = device_ready(device, device->o_direct);
 	if (r < 0) {
+		device->path = file_path;
+		crypt_loop_detach(loop_device);
 		free(loop_device);
 		return r;
 	}
 
 	device->loop_fd = loop_fd;
-	device->file_path = device->path;
-	device->path = loop_device;
+	device->file_path = file_path;
 	device->init_done = 1;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -440,3 +527,23 @@ size_t size_round_up(size_t size, unsigned int block)
 	size_t s = (size + (block - 1)) / block;
 	return s * block;
 }
+
+void device_disable_direct_io(struct device *device)
+{
+	device->o_direct = 0;
+}
+
+int device_is_identical(struct device *device1, struct device *device2)
+{
+	if (device1 == device2)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!device1 || !device2 || !device_path(device1) || !device_path(device2))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* This should be better check - major/minor for block device etc */
+	if (!strcmp(device_path(device1), device_path(device2)))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}

lib/utils_devpath.c

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /*
  * devname - search for device name
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2013, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
-#include "utils_dm.h"
-
-char *crypt_lookup_dev(const char *dev_id);
-int crypt_sysfs_get_rotational(int major, int minor, int *rotational);
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h>     /* for major, minor */
+#endif
+#include "internal.h"
 
 static char *__lookup_dev(char *path, dev_t dev, int dir_level, const int max_level)
 {
@@ -170,16 +170,12 @@ char *crypt_lookup_dev(const char *dev_id)
 	return devpath;
 }
 
-int crypt_sysfs_get_rotational(int major, int minor, int *rotational)
+static int _read_uint64(const char *sysfs_path, uint64_t *value)
 {
-	char path[PATH_MAX], tmp[64] = {0};
+	char tmp[64] = {0};
 	int fd, r;
 
-	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/sys/dev/block/%d:%d/queue/rotational",
-		     major, minor) < 0)
-		return 0;
-
-	if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+	if ((fd = open(sysfs_path, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
 		return 0;
 	r = read(fd, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 	close(fd);
@@ -187,8 +183,191 @@ int crypt_sysfs_get_rotational(int major, int minor, int *rotational)
 	if (r <= 0)
 		return 0;
 
-        if (sscanf(tmp, "%d", rotational) != 1)
+        if (sscanf(tmp, "%" PRIu64, value) != 1)
 		return 0;
 
 	return 1;
 }
+
+static int _sysfs_get_uint64(int major, int minor, uint64_t *value, const char *attr)
+{
+	char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/sys/dev/block/%d:%d/%s",
+		     major, minor, attr) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return _read_uint64(path, value);
+}
+
+static int _path_get_uint64(const char *sysfs_path, uint64_t *value, const char *attr)
+{
+	char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s",
+		     sysfs_path, attr) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return _read_uint64(path, value);
+}
+
+int crypt_dev_is_rotational(int major, int minor)
+{
+	uint64_t val;
+
+	if (!_sysfs_get_uint64(major, minor, &val, "queue/rotational"))
+		return 1; /* if failed, expect rotational disk */
+
+	return val ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_dev_is_partition(const char *dev_path)
+{
+	uint64_t val;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(dev_path, &st) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!_sysfs_get_uint64(major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev),
+			      &val, "partition"))
+		return 0;
+
+	return val ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_dev_partition_offset(const char *dev_path)
+{
+	uint64_t val;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!crypt_dev_is_partition(dev_path))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (stat(dev_path, &st) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!_sysfs_get_uint64(major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev),
+			      &val, "start"))
+		return 0;
+
+	return val;
+}
+
+/* Try to find partition which match offset and size on top level device */
+char *crypt_get_partition_device(const char *dev_path, uint64_t offset, uint64_t size)
+{
+	char link[PATH_MAX], path[PATH_MAX], part_path[PATH_MAX], *devname;
+	char *result = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+	size_t devname_len;
+	ssize_t len;
+	struct dirent *entry;
+	DIR *dir;
+	uint64_t part_offset, part_size;
+
+	if (stat(dev_path, &st) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/sys/dev/block/%d:%d",
+		major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	dir = opendir(path);
+	if (!dir)
+		return NULL;
+
+	len = readlink(path, link, sizeof(link) - 1);
+	if (len < 0) {
+		closedir(dir);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Get top level disk name for sysfs search */
+	link[len] = '\0';
+	devname = strrchr(link, '/');
+	if (!devname) {
+		closedir(dir);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	devname++;
+
+	/* DM devices do not use kernel partitions. */
+	if (dm_is_dm_kernel_name(devname)) {
+		closedir(dir);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	devname_len = strlen(devname);
+	while((entry = readdir(dir))) {
+		if (strncmp(entry->d_name, devname, devname_len))
+			continue;
+
+		if (snprintf(part_path, sizeof(part_path), "%s/%s",
+		    path, entry->d_name) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (stat(part_path, &st) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+			if (!_path_get_uint64(part_path, &part_offset, "start") ||
+			    !_path_get_uint64(part_path, &part_size, "size"))
+				continue;
+			if (part_offset == offset && part_size == size &&
+			    snprintf(part_path, sizeof(part_path), "/dev/%s",
+				     entry->d_name) > 0) {
+				result = strdup(part_path);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	closedir(dir);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/* Try to find base device from partition */
+char *crypt_get_base_device(const char *dev_path)
+{
+	char link[PATH_MAX], path[PATH_MAX], part_path[PATH_MAX], *devname;
+	struct stat st;
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	if (!crypt_dev_is_partition(dev_path))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (stat(dev_path, &st) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/sys/dev/block/%d:%d",
+		major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	len = readlink(path, link, sizeof(link) - 1);
+	if (len < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* Get top level disk name for sysfs search */
+	link[len] = '\0';
+	devname = strrchr(link, '/');
+	if (!devname)
+		return NULL;
+	*devname = '\0';
+	devname = strrchr(link, '/');
+	if (!devname)
+		return NULL;
+	devname++;
+
+	if (dm_is_dm_kernel_name(devname))
+		return NULL;
+
+	snprintf(part_path, sizeof(part_path), "/dev/%s", devname);
+	return strdup(part_path);
+}

lib/utils_dm.h

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /*
  * libdevmapper - device-mapper backend for cryptsetup
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004, Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004, Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@ struct device;
 #define DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED  (1 << 3)	/* plain64 IV */
 #define DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED (1 << 4)	/* discards/TRIM option is supported */
 #define DM_VERITY_SUPPORTED   (1 << 5)	/* dm-verity target supported */
+#define DM_TCW_SUPPORTED      (1 << 6)	/* tcw (TCRYPT CBC with whitening) */
+#define DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED (1 << 7) /* same_cpu_crypt */
+#define DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED (1 << 8) /* submit_from_crypt_cpus */
+#define DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED (1 << 9) /* ignore/restart_on_corruption, ignore_zero_block */
+
 uint32_t dm_flags(void);
 
 #define DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE	(1 << 0)

lib/utils_fips.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * FIPS mode utilities
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -18,46 +18,29 @@
  * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
  */
 
-#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
-#include "libcryptsetup.h"
-#include "nls.h"
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
 #include "utils_fips.h"
-#include "config.h"
 
 #if !ENABLE_FIPS
 int crypt_fips_mode(void) { return 0; }
-void crypt_fips_libcryptsetup_check(struct crypt_device *cd) {}
-void crypt_fips_self_check(struct crypt_device *cd) {}
 #else
-#include <fipscheck.h>
+static int kernel_fips_mode(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+	char buf[1] = "";
+
+	if ((fd = open("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled", O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
+		while (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+		close(fd);
+	}
+
+	return (buf[0] == '1') ? 1 : 0;
+}
 
 int crypt_fips_mode(void)
 {
-	return FIPSCHECK_kernel_fips_mode();
-}
-
-static void crypt_fips_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
-			       const char *name, const char *function)
-{
-	if (!crypt_fips_mode())
-		return;
-
-	if (!FIPSCHECK_verify(name, function)) {
-		crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, _("FIPS checksum verification failed.\n"));
-		_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-	}
-
-	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE, _("Running in FIPS mode.\n"));
-}
-
-void crypt_fips_libcryptsetup_check(struct crypt_device *cd)
-{
-	crypt_fips_verify(cd, LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_FIPS, "crypt_init");
-}
-
-void crypt_fips_self_check(struct crypt_device *cd)
-{
-	crypt_fips_verify(cd, NULL, NULL);
+	return kernel_fips_mode() && !access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK);
 }
 #endif /* ENABLE_FIPS */

lib/utils_fips.h

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * FIPS mode utilities
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -21,10 +21,6 @@
 #ifndef _UTILS_FIPS_H
 #define _UTILS_FIPS_H
 
-struct crypt_device;
-
 int crypt_fips_mode(void);
-void crypt_fips_libcryptsetup_check(struct crypt_device *cd);
-void crypt_fips_self_check(struct crypt_device *cd);
 
 #endif /* _UTILS_FIPS_H */

lib/utils_loop.c

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * loopback block device utilities
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
  * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
  */
 
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
@@ -28,6 +29,9 @@
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h>     /* for major, minor */
+#endif
 #include <linux/loop.h>
 
 #include "utils_loop.h"
@@ -42,6 +46,10 @@
 #define LOOP_CTL_GET_FREE 0x4C82
 #endif
 
+#ifndef LOOP_SET_CAPACITY
+#define LOOP_SET_CAPACITY 0x4C07
+#endif
+
 static char *crypt_loop_get_device_old(void)
 {
 	char dev[20];
@@ -66,7 +74,7 @@ static char *crypt_loop_get_device_old(void)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-char *crypt_loop_get_device(void)
+static char *crypt_loop_get_device(void)
 {
 	char dev[64];
 	int i, loop_fd;
@@ -92,12 +100,15 @@ char *crypt_loop_get_device(void)
 	return strdup(dev);
 }
 
-int crypt_loop_attach(const char *loop, const char *file, int offset,
+int crypt_loop_attach(char **loop, const char *file, int offset,
 		      int autoclear, int *readonly)
 {
 	struct loop_info64 lo64 = {0};
+	char *lo_file_name;
 	int loop_fd = -1, file_fd = -1, r = 1;
 
+	*loop = NULL;
+
 	file_fd = open(file, (*readonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR) | O_EXCL);
 	if (file_fd < 0 && (errno == EROFS || errno == EACCES) && !*readonly) {
 		*readonly = 1;
@@ -106,18 +117,33 @@ int crypt_loop_attach(const char *loop, const char *file, int offset,
 	if (file_fd < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	loop_fd = open(loop, *readonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR);
-	if (loop_fd < 0)
-		goto out;
+	while (loop_fd < 0)  {
+		*loop = crypt_loop_get_device();
+		if (!*loop)
+			goto out;
 
-	strncpy((char*)lo64.lo_file_name, file, LO_NAME_SIZE);
+		loop_fd = open(*loop, *readonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR);
+		if (loop_fd < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_SET_FD, file_fd) < 0) {
+			if (errno != EBUSY)
+				goto out;
+			free(*loop);
+			*loop = NULL;
+
+			close(loop_fd);
+			loop_fd = -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	lo_file_name = (char*)lo64.lo_file_name;
+	lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE-1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(lo_file_name, file, LO_NAME_SIZE-1);
 	lo64.lo_offset = offset;
 	if (autoclear)
 		lo64.lo_flags |= LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR;
 
-	if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_SET_FD, file_fd) < 0)
-		goto out;
-
 	if (ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_SET_STATUS64, &lo64) < 0) {
 		(void)ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0);
 		goto out;
@@ -139,6 +165,10 @@ out:
 		close(loop_fd);
 	if (file_fd >= 0)
 		close(file_fd);
+	if (r && *loop) {
+		free(*loop);
+		*loop = NULL;
+	}
 	return r ? -1 : loop_fd;
 }
 
@@ -157,6 +187,21 @@ int crypt_loop_detach(const char *loop)
 	return r;
 }
 
+int crypt_loop_resize(const char *loop)
+{
+	int loop_fd = -1, r = 1;
+
+	loop_fd = open(loop, O_RDONLY);
+	if (loop_fd < 0)
+                return 1;
+
+	if (!ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_SET_CAPACITY, 0))
+		r = 0;
+
+	close(loop_fd);
+	return r;
+}
+
 static char *_ioctl_backing_file(const char *loop)
 {
 	struct loop_info64 lo64 = {0};

lib/utils_loop.h

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 /*
  * loopback block device utilities
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -23,11 +24,11 @@
 
 /* loopback device helpers */
 
-char *crypt_loop_get_device(void);
 char *crypt_loop_backing_file(const char *loop);
 int crypt_loop_device(const char *loop);
-int crypt_loop_attach(const char *loop, const char *file, int offset,
+int crypt_loop_attach(char **loop, const char *file, int offset,
 		      int autoclear, int *readonly);
 int crypt_loop_detach(const char *loop);
+int crypt_loop_resize(const char *loop);
 
 #endif /* _UTILS_LOOP_H */

lib/utils_wipe.c

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
  * utils_wipe - wipe a device
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2007, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (C) 2009-2012, Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Milan Broz
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h>     /* for major, minor */
+#endif
 #include <fcntl.h>
 
 #include "libcryptsetup.h"
@@ -124,11 +127,11 @@ int crypt_wipe(struct device *device,
 {
 	struct stat st;
 	char *buffer;
-	int devfd, flags, rotational, bsize;
+	int devfd, flags, bsize;
 	ssize_t written;
 
 	if (!size || size % SECTOR_SIZE || (size > MAXIMUM_WIPE_BYTES)) {
-		log_dbg("Unsuported wipe size for device %s: %ld.",
+		log_dbg("Unsupported wipe size for device %s: %ld.",
 			device_path(device), (unsigned long)size);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -139,14 +142,12 @@ int crypt_wipe(struct device *device,
 	}
 
 	if (type == CRYPT_WIPE_DISK && S_ISBLK(st.st_mode)) {
-		rotational = 0;
-		if (!crypt_sysfs_get_rotational(major(st.st_rdev),
-						minor(st.st_rdev),
-						&rotational))
-			rotational = 1;
-		log_dbg("Rotational flag is %d.", rotational);
-		if (!rotational)
+		if (!crypt_dev_is_rotational(major(st.st_rdev),
+						minor(st.st_rdev))) {
 			type = CRYPT_WIPE_SSD;
+			log_dbg("Non-rotational device, using SSD wipe mode.");
+		} else
+			log_dbg("Rotational device, using normal wipe mode.");
 	}
 
 	bsize = device_block_size(device);
@@ -185,7 +186,7 @@ int crypt_wipe(struct device *device,
 			written = _crypt_wipe_random(devfd, bsize, buffer, offset, size);
 			break;
 		default:
-			log_dbg("Unsuported wipe type requested: (%d)", type);
+			log_dbg("Unsupported wipe type requested: (%d)", type);
 			written = -1;
 	}
 

lib/verity/Makefile.am

@@ -2,15 +2,13 @@ moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
 
 noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libverity.la
 
-libverity_la_CFLAGS = -Wall @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+libverity_la_CFLAGS = -Wall $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
 
 libverity_la_SOURCES = \
 	verity_hash.c \
 	verity.c \
 	verity.h
 
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE			\
-	-D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE                   \
-	-D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64                  \
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -include config.h \
         -I$(top_srcdir)/lib			\
         -I$(top_srcdir)/lib/crypto_backend

lib/verity/verity.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * dm-verity volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 
 #define VERITY_SIGNATURE "verity\0\0"
 
-/* http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMVerity#Verity_superblock_format */
+/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity#verity-superblock-format */
 struct verity_sb {
 	uint8_t  signature[8];	/* "verity\0\0" */
 	uint32_t version;	/* superblock version */
@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ int VERITY_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct verity_sb);
 	int devfd = 0, sb_version;
 
-	log_dbg("Reading VERITY header of size %u on device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+	log_dbg("Reading VERITY header of size %zu on device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
 		sizeof(struct verity_sb), device_path(device), sb_offset);
 
 	if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Verity device doesn't use on-disk header.\n"),
+		log_err(cd, _("Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header.\n"),
 			device_path(device));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -156,20 +156,21 @@ int VERITY_write_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	int bsize = device_block_size(device);
 	struct verity_sb sb = {};
 	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct verity_sb);
+	char *algorithm;
 	uuid_t uuid;
 	int r, devfd = 0;
 
-	log_dbg("Updating VERITY header of size %u on device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+	log_dbg("Updating VERITY header of size %zu on device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
 		sizeof(struct verity_sb), device_path(device), sb_offset);
 
 	if (!uuid_string || uuid_parse(uuid_string, uuid) == -1) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Wrong VERITY UUID format provided.\n"),
+		log_err(cd, _("Wrong VERITY UUID format provided on device %s.\n"),
 			device_path(device));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER) {
-		log_err(cd, _("Verity device doesn't use on-disk header.\n"),
+		log_err(cd, _("Verity device %s doesn't use on-disk header.\n"),
 			device_path(device));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -187,7 +188,9 @@ int VERITY_write_sb(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	sb.hash_block_size = cpu_to_le32(params->hash_block_size);
 	sb.salt_size       = cpu_to_le16(params->salt_size);
 	sb.data_blocks     = cpu_to_le64(params->data_size);
-	strncpy((char *)sb.algorithm, params->hash_name, sizeof(sb.algorithm));
+	algorithm = (char *)sb.algorithm;
+	algorithm[sizeof(sb.algorithm)-1] = '\0';
+	strncpy(algorithm, params->hash_name, sizeof(sb.algorithm)-1);
 	memcpy(sb.salt, params->salt, params->salt_size);
 	memcpy(sb.uuid, uuid, sizeof(sb.uuid));
 

lib/verity/verity.h

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * dm-verity volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
 #define _VERITY_H
 
 #include <unistd.h>
-#include "config.h"
 
 #define VERITY_MAX_HASH_TYPE 1
 #define VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(x)	((x) % 512 || (x) < 512 || \

lib/verity/verity_hash.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * dm-verity volume handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static int VERITY_create_or_verify_hash(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	off_t hash_level_block[VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
 	off_t hash_level_size[VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
 	off_t data_file_blocks, s;
-	size_t hash_per_block, hash_per_block_bits;
+	size_t hash_per_block_bits;
 	off_t data_device_size = 0, hash_device_size = 0;
 	uint64_t dev_size;
 	int levels, i, r;
@@ -251,7 +251,6 @@ static int VERITY_create_or_verify_hash(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	}
 
 	hash_per_block_bits = get_bits_down(hash_block_size / digest_size);
-	hash_per_block = 1 << hash_per_block_bits;
 	if (!hash_per_block_bits)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -271,8 +270,7 @@ static int VERITY_create_or_verify_hash(struct crypt_device *cd,
 	for (i = levels - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
 		hash_level_block[i] = hash_position;
 		// verity position of block data_file_blocks at level i
-		s = data_file_blocks >> (i * hash_per_block_bits);
-		s = (s + hash_per_block - 1) / hash_per_block;
+		s = (data_file_blocks + ((off_t)1 << ((i + 1) * hash_per_block_bits)) - 1) >> ((i + 1) * hash_per_block_bits);
 		hash_level_size[i] = s;
 		if ((hash_position + s) < hash_position ||
 		    (hash_position + s) < 0) {

lib/volumekey.c

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * cryptsetup volume key implementation
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (C) 2010-2012, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
@@ -20,22 +20,31 @@
  */
 
 #include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
-struct volume_key *crypt_alloc_volume_key(unsigned keylength, const char *key)
+struct volume_key *crypt_alloc_volume_key(size_t keylength, const char *key)
 {
-	struct volume_key *vk = malloc(sizeof(*vk) + keylength);
+	struct volume_key *vk;
 
+	if (keylength > (SIZE_MAX - sizeof(*vk)))
+		return NULL;
+
+	vk = malloc(sizeof(*vk) + keylength);
 	if (!vk)
 		return NULL;
 
 	vk->keylength = keylength;
-	if (key)
-		memcpy(&vk->key, key, keylength);
-	else
-		memset(&vk->key, 0, keylength);
+
+	/* keylength 0 is valid => no key */
+	if (vk->keylength) {
+		if (key)
+			memcpy(&vk->key, key, keylength);
+		else
+			crypt_memzero(&vk->key, keylength);
+	}
 
 	return vk;
 }
@@ -43,13 +52,13 @@ struct volume_key *crypt_alloc_volume_key(unsigned keylength, const char *key)
 void crypt_free_volume_key(struct volume_key *vk)
 {
 	if (vk) {
-		memset(vk->key, 0, vk->keylength);
+		crypt_memzero(vk->key, vk->keylength);
 		vk->keylength = 0;
 		free(vk);
 	}
 }
 
-struct volume_key *crypt_generate_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd, unsigned keylength)
+struct volume_key *crypt_generate_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd, size_t keylength)
 {
 	int r;
 	struct volume_key *vk;

man/cryptsetup-reencrypt.8

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH CRYPTSETUP-REENCRYPT "8" "June 2012" "cryptsetup-reencrypt" "Maintenance Commands"
+.TH CRYPTSETUP-REENCRYPT "8" "March 2017" "cryptsetup-reencrypt" "Maintenance Commands"
 .SH NAME
 cryptsetup-reencrypt - tool for offline LUKS device re-encryption
 .SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@ or kernel failures during reencryption (you can lose you data in this case).
 
 \fIALWAYS BE SURE YOU HAVE RELIABLE BACKUP BEFORE USING THIS TOOL.\fR
 .br
-\fITHIS TOOL IS EXPERIMENTAL.\fR
-
 The reencryption can be temporarily suspended (by TERM signal or by
 using ctrl+c) but you need to retain temporary files named LUKS-<uuid>.[log|org|new].
 LUKS device is unavailable until reencryption is finished though.
@@ -36,9 +34,16 @@ To start (or continue) re-encryption for <device> use:
 .PP
 \fIcryptsetup-reencrypt\fR <device>
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-block-size, \-\-cipher, \-\-hash, \-\-iter-time,
-\-\-use-random | \-\-use-urandom, \-\-key-file, \-\-key-slot, \-\-keyfile-offset,
-\-\-keyfile-size, \-\-tries, \-\-use-directio, \-\-use-fsync, \-\-write-log]
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-batch-mode, \-\-block-size, \-\-cipher, \-\-debug,
+\-\-device-size, \-\-hash, \-\-iter-time, \-\-use-random | \-\-use-urandom,
+\-\-keep-key, \-\-key-size, \-\-key-file, \-\-key-slot, \-\-keyfile-offset,
+\-\-keyfile-size, \-\-tries, \-\-use-directio, \-\-use-fsync, \-\-verbose, \-\-write-log,
+\-\-uuid]
+
+To encrypt data on (not yet encrypted) device, use \fI\-\-new\fR with combination
+with \fI\-\-reduce-device-size\fR.
+
+To remove encryption from device, use \fI\-\-decrypt\fR.
 
 For detailed description of encryption and key file options see \fIcryptsetup(8)\fR
 man page.
@@ -56,7 +61,7 @@ Set the cipher specification string.
 .B "\-\-key-size, \-s \fI<bits>\fR"
 Set key size in bits. The argument has to be a multiple of  8.
 
-The possible key-sizes are limited by the cipher and mode used. 
+The possible key-sizes are limited by the cipher and mode used.
 
 If you are increasing key size, there must be enough space in the LUKS header
 for enlarged keyslots (data offset must be large enough) or reencryption
@@ -67,6 +72,9 @@ you can destructively shrink device with \-\-reduce-device-size option.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-hash, \-h \fI<hash-spec>\fR"
 Specifies the hash used in the LUKS key setup scheme and volume key digest.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR if this parameter is not specified, default hash algorithm is always used
+for new device header.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-iter-time, \-i \fI<milliseconds>\fR"
 The number of milliseconds to spend with PBKDF2 passphrase processing for the
@@ -80,7 +88,7 @@ Define which kernel random number generator will be used to create the volume ke
 .B "\-\-key-file, \-d \fIname\fR"
 Read the passphrase from file.
 
-WARNING: \-\-key-file option can be used only if there only one active keyslot,
+\fBWARNING:\fR \-\-key-file option can be used only if there only one active keyslot,
 or alternatively, also if \-\-key-slot option is specified (then all other keyslots
 will be disabled in new LUKS device).
 
@@ -90,7 +98,7 @@ passphrases.
 .B "\-\-key-slot, \-S <0-7>"
 Specify which key slot is used.
 
-WARNING: All other keyslots will be disabled if this option is used.
+\fBWARNING:\fR All other keyslots will be disabled if this option is used.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-keyfile-offset \fIvalue\fR"
 Skip \fIvalue\fR bytes at the beginning of the key file.
@@ -100,6 +108,12 @@ Read a maximum of \fIvalue\fR bytes from the key file.
 Default is to read the whole file up to the compiled-in
 maximum.
 .TP
+.B "\-\-keep-key"
+Do not change encryption key, just reencrypt the LUKS header and keyslots.
+
+This option can be combined only with \fI\-\-hash\fR or \fI\-\-iter-time\fR
+options.
+.TP
 .B "\-\-tries, \-T"
 Number of retries for invalid passphrase entry.
 .TP
@@ -114,14 +128,14 @@ Instead of real device size, use specified value.
 It means that only specified area (from the start of the device
 to the specified size) will be reencrypted.
 
-WARNING: This is destructive operation.
+\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation.
 
 If no unit suffix is specified, the size is in bytes.
 
 Unit suffix can be S for 512 byte sectors, K/M/G/T (or KiB,MiB,GiB,TiB)
 for units with 1024 base or KB/MB/GB/TB for 1000 base (SI scale).
 
-WARNING: This is destructive operation.
+\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-reduce-device-size \fIsize[units]\fR"
 Enlarge data offset to specified value by shrinking device size.
@@ -130,37 +144,49 @@ This means that last sectors on the original device will be lost,
 ciphertext data will be effectively shifted by specified
 number of sectors.
 
-It can be usefull if you e.g. added some space to underlying
+It can be useful if you e.g. added some space to underlying
 partition (so last sectors contains no data).
 
 For units suffix see \-\-device-size parameter description.
 
-WARNING: This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
+\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
 Use with extreme care - shrinked filesystems are usually unrecoverable.
 
 You cannot shrink device more than by 64 MiB (131072 sectors).
 .TP
-.B "\-\-new, N"
+.B "\-\-new, \-N"
 Create new header (encrypt not yet encrypted device).
 
 This option must be used together with \-\-reduce-device-size.
 
-WARNING: This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
+\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-decrypt"
+Remove encryption (decrypt already encrypted device and remove LUKS header).
 
+\fBWARNING:\fR This is destructive operation and cannot be reverted.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-use-directio"
-Use direct-io (O_DIRECT) for all read/write data operations.
+Use direct-io (O_DIRECT) for all read/write data operations related
+to block device undergoing reencryption.
 
-Usefull if direct-io operations perform better than normal buffered
+Useful if direct-io operations perform better than normal buffered
 operations (e.g. in virtual environments).
 .TP
 .B "\-\-use-fsync"
-Use fsync call after every written block.
+Use fsync call after every written block. This applies for reencryption
+log files as well.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-write-log"
 Update log file after every block write. This can slow down reencryption
 but will minimize data loss in the case of system crash.
 .TP
+.B "\-\-uuid" \fI<uuid>\fR
+Use only while resuming an interrupted decryption process (see \-\-decrypt).
+
+To find out what \fI<uuid>\fR to pass look for temporary files LUKS-<uuid>.[|log|org|new]
+of the interrupted decryption process.
+.TP
 .B "\-\-batch-mode, \-q"
 Suppresses all warnings and reencryption progress output.
 .TP
@@ -178,18 +204,24 @@ Reencrypt /dev/sdb1 (change volume key)
 cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1
 .TP
 Reencrypt and also change cipher and cipher mode
-cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 -c aes-xts-plain64
+cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 \-c aes-xts-plain64
 .TP
 Add LUKS encryption to not yet encrypted device
 
 First, be sure you have space added to disk.
+
 Or alternatively shrink filesystem in advance.
 .br
 Here we need 4096 512-bytes sectors (enough for 2x128 bit key).
 
-fdisk -u /dev/sdb # move sdb1 partition end + 4096 sectors
+fdisk \-u /dev/sdb # move sdb1 partition end + 4096 sectors
+(or use resize2fs or tool for your filesystem and shrink it)
 
-cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 --new --reduce-device-size 4096
+cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 \-\-new \-\-reduce-device-size 4096S
+.TP
+Remove LUKS encryption completely
+
+cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 \-\-decrypt
 
 .SH REPORTING BUGS
 Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on
@@ -200,11 +232,11 @@ Please attach the output of the failed command with the
 .SH AUTHORS
 Cryptsetup-reencrypt was written by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>.
 .SH COPYRIGHT
-Copyright \(co 2012 Milan Broz
+Copyright \(co 2012-2017 Milan Broz
 .br
-Copyright \(co 2012 Red Hat, Inc.
+Copyright \(co 2012-2017 Red Hat, Inc.
 
 This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
 warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
 .SH SEE ALSO
-The project website at \fBhttp://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/\fR
+The project website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup\fR

man/cryptsetup.8

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH CRYPTSETUP "8" "May 2012" "cryptsetup" "Maintenance Commands"
+.TH CRYPTSETUP "8" "March 2017" "cryptsetup" "Maintenance Commands"
 .SH NAME
 cryptsetup - manage plain dm-crypt and LUKS encrypted volumes
 .SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ device-mapper mappings. These include plain dm-crypt volumes and
 LUKS volumes. The difference is that LUKS uses a metadata header
 and can hence offer more features than plain dm-crypt. On the other
 hand, the header is visible and vulnerable to damage.
+
+In addition, cryptsetup provides limited support for the use of
+historic loopaes volumes and for TrueCrypt compatible volumes.
+
 .SH PLAIN DM-CRYPT OR LUKS?
 .PP
 Unless you understand the cryptographic background well, use LUKS.
@@ -51,27 +55,27 @@ secure wiping by just overwriting header and key-slot area.
 
 \fBPreviously used partitions:\fR If a partition was previously used,
 it is a very good idea to wipe filesystem signatures, data, etc. before
-creating a LUKS or plain dm-crypt container on it. 
-For a quick removal of filesystem signatures, use "wipefs". Take care 
-though that this may not remove everything. In particular md (RAID) 
-signatures at the end of a device may survive. It also does not 
-remove data. For a full wipe, overwrite the whole partition before 
+creating a LUKS or plain dm-crypt container on it.
+For a quick removal of filesystem signatures, use "wipefs". Take care
+though that this may not remove everything. In particular md (RAID)
+signatures at the end of a device may survive. It also does not
+remove data. For a full wipe, overwrite the whole partition before
 container creation. If you do not know how to to that, the
 cryptsetup FAQ describes several options.
 
 .SH BASIC COMMANDS
 The following are valid actions for all supported device types.
 
-\fIopen\fR <name> <device> \-\-type <device_type>
+\fIopen\fR <device> <name> \-\-type <device_type>
 .IP
-Opens (creates a mapping) with <name> backed by device <device>.
+Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
 
 Device type can be \fIplain\fR, \fIluks\fR (default), \fIloopaes\fR
 or \fItcrypt\fR.
 
 For backward compatibility there are \fBopen\fR command aliases:
 
-\fBcreate\fR: open \-\-type plain <device> <name>\fR switched arguments)
+\fBcreate\fR (argument-order <name> <device>): open \-\-type plain
 .br
 \fBplainOpen\fR: open \-\-type plain
 .br
@@ -82,7 +86,9 @@ For backward compatibility there are \fBopen\fR command aliases:
 \fBtcryptOpen\fR: open \-\-type tcrypt
 
 \fB<options>\fR are type specific and are described below
-for individual device types.
+for individual device types. For \fBcreate\fR, the order of the <name>
+and <device> options is inverted for historical reasons, all other
+aliases use the standard \fB<device> <name>\fR order.
 .PP
 \fIclose\fR <name>
 .IP
@@ -101,15 +107,20 @@ Reports the status for the mapping <name>.
 .IP
 Resizes an active mapping <name>.
 
-If \-\-size (in sectors) is not specified, the size of the
-underlying block device is used. Note that this does not
-change the raw device geometry, it just changes how many
-sectors of the raw device are represented in the mapped device.
+If \-\-size (in sectors) is not specified, the size is computed
+from the underlying device. For LUKS it is the size of the
+underlying device without the area reserved for LUKS header
+(see data payload offset in \fBluksDump\fR command).
+For plain crypt device the whole device size is used.
+
+Note that this does not change the raw device geometry, it just
+changes how many sectors of the raw device are represented
+in the mapped device.
 .SH PLAIN MODE
 Plain dm-crypt encrypts the device sector-by-sector with a
 single, non-salted hash of the passphrase. No checks
 are performed, no metadata is used. There is no formatting operation.
-When the raw device is mapped (created), the usual device operations
+When the raw device is mapped (opened), the usual device operations
 can be used on the mapped device, including filesystem creation.
 Mapped devices usually reside in /dev/mapper/<name>.
 
@@ -119,13 +130,13 @@ The following are valid plain device type actions:
 .br
 \fIcreate\fR <name> <device> (\fBOBSOLETE syntax\fR)
 .IP
-Creates a mapping with <name> backed by device <device>.
+Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
 
 \fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash, \-\-cipher, \-\-verify-passphrase,
 \-\-key-file, \-\-keyfile-offset, \-\-key-size, \-\-offset, \-\-skip, \-\-size,
 \-\-readonly, \-\-shared, \-\-allow-discards]
 
-Example: 'cryptsetup open --type plain /dev/sda10 e1' maps the raw
+Example: 'cryptsetup open \-\-type plain /dev/sda10 e1' maps the raw
 encrypted device /dev/sda10 to the mapped (decrypted) device
 /dev/mapper/e1, which can then be mounted, fsck-ed or have a
 filesystem created on it.
@@ -154,12 +165,20 @@ Key operations that do not specify a slot affect the first slot
 that matches the supplied passphrase or the first empty slot if
 a new passphrase is added.
 
+The \fB<device>\fR parameter can be also specified by a LUKS UUID in the
+format UUID=<uuid>. Translation to real device name uses symlinks
+in /dev/disk/by-uuid directory.
+
+To specify a detached header, the \fB\-\-header\fR parameter can be used
+in all LUKS commands and always takes precedence over positional \fB<device>\fR
+parameter.
+
 The following are valid LUKS actions:
 
 \fIluksFormat\fR <device> [<key file>]
 .IP
 Initializes a LUKS partition and sets the initial passphrase
-(for key-slot 0), 
+(for key-slot 0),
 either via prompting or via <key file>. Note that
 if the second argument is present, then the passphrase
 is taken from the file given there, without the need
@@ -170,10 +189,12 @@ from stdin and the safety-question being skipped.
 
 You can only call luksFormat on a LUKS device that is not mapped.
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-cipher, \-\-verify-passphrase, \-\-key-size,
-\-\-key-slot, \-\-key-file (takes precedence over optional second argument),
-\-\-keyfile-offset, \-\-keyfile-size, \-\-use-random | \-\-use-urandom,
-\-\-uuid, \-\-master-key-file].
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash, \-\-cipher, \-\-verify\-passphrase,
+\-\-key\-size, \-\-key\-slot,
+\-\-key\-file (takes precedence over optional second argument),
+\-\-keyfile\-offset, \-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-use\-random | \-\-use\-urandom,
+\-\-uuid, \-\-master\-key\-file, \-\-iter\-time, \-\-header,
+\-\-force\-password].
 
 \fBWARNING:\fR Doing a luksFormat on an existing LUKS container will
 make all data the old container permanently irretrievable, unless
@@ -188,12 +209,9 @@ successful verification of the supplied passphrase.
 If the passphrase is not supplied via \-\-key-file, the command
 prompts for it interactively.
 
-The <device> parameter can be also specified by LUKS UUID in the
-format UUID=<uuid>, which uses the symlinks in /dev/disk/by-uuid.
-
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key-file, \-\-keyfile-offset,
-\-\-keyfile-size, \-\-readonly, \-\-test-passphrase,
-\-\-allow-discards, \-\-header, \-\-key-slot, \-\-master-key-file].
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-readonly, \-\-test\-passphrase,
+\-\-allow\-discards, \-\-header, \-\-key-slot, \-\-master\-key\-file].
 .PP
 \fIluksSuspend\fR <name>
 .IP
@@ -215,7 +233,7 @@ the mapped device.
 Resumes a suspended device and reinstates the encryption key.
 Prompts interactively for a passphrase if \-\-key-file is not given.
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key-file, \-\-keyfile-size, \-\-header]
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-header]
 .PP
 \fIluksAddKey\fR <device> [<key file with new key>]
 .IP
@@ -224,9 +242,10 @@ interactively or via \-\-key-file.
 The new passphrase to be added can be specified interactively
 or read from the file given as positional argument.
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key-file, \-\-keyfile-offset,
-\-\-keyfile-size, \-\-new-keyfile-offset,
-\-\-new-keyfile-size, \-\-key-slot, \-\-master-key-file].
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-new\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-new\-keyfile\-size, \-\-key\-slot, \-\-master\-key\-file,
+\-\-iter\-time, \-\-force\-password, \-\-header].
 .PP
 \fIluksRemoveKey\fR <device> [<key file with passphrase to be removed>]
 .IP
@@ -234,12 +253,12 @@ Removes the supplied passphrase from the LUKS device. The
 passphrase to be removed can be specified interactively,
 as positional argument or via \-\-key-file.
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key-file, \-\-keyfile-offset,
-\-\-keyfile-size]
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-header]
 
 \fBWARNING:\fR If you read the passphrase from stdin
-(without further argument or with '-' as argument 
-to \-\-key-file), batch-mode (-q) will be implicitely
+(without further argument or with '-' as argument
+to \-\-key\-file), batch-mode (\-q) will be implicitly
 switched on and no warning will be given when you remove the
 last remaining passphrase from a LUKS container. Removing
 the last passphrase makes the LUKS container permanently
@@ -248,7 +267,7 @@ inaccessible.
 \fIluksChangeKey\fR <device> [<new key file>]
 .IP
 Changes an existing passphrase. The passphrase
-to be changed must be supplied interactively or via \-\-key-file.
+to be changed must be supplied interactively or via \-\-key\-file.
 The new passphrase can be supplied interactively or in
 a file given as positional argument.
 
@@ -266,27 +285,43 @@ during this operation can cause the overwrite to fail after
 the old passphrase has been wiped and make the LUKS container
 inaccessible.
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key-file, \-\-keyfile-offset,
-\-\-keyfile-size, \-\-new-keyfile-offset,
-\-\-new-keyfile-size, \-\-key-slot].
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-new\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-new\-keyfile\-size, \-\-key\-slot, \-\-force\-password, \-\-header].
 .PP
 \fIluksKillSlot\fR <device> <key slot number>
 .IP
-Wipe the key-slot number <key slot> from the LUKS device. A remaining
-passphrase must be supplied, either interactively or via \-\-key-file.
+Wipe the key-slot number <key slot> from the LUKS device. Except running
+in batch-mode (\-q) a remaining passphrase must be supplied,
+either interactively or via \-\-key-file.
 This command can remove the last remaining key-slot, but requires
 an interactive confirmation when doing so. Removing the last
 passphrase makes a LUKS container permanently inaccessible.
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key-file, \-\-keyfile-offset, \-\-keyfile-size].
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-keyfile\-offset,
+\-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-header].
 
 \fBWARNING:\fR If you read the passphrase from stdin
 (without further argument or with '-' as argument
-to \-\-key-file), batch-mode (-q) will be implicitely
+to \-\-key-file), batch-mode (\-q) will be implicitly
 switched on and no warning will be given when you remove the
 last remaining passphrase from a LUKS container. Removing
 the last passphrase makes the LUKS container permanently
 inaccessible.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR If there is no passphrase provided (on stdin or through
+\-\-key-file argument) and batch-mode (\-q) is active, the
+key-slot is removed without any other warning.
+
+.PP
+\fIerase\fR <device>
+.br
+\fIluksErase\fR <device>
+.IP
+Erase all keyslots and make the LUKS container permanently inaccessible.
+You do not need to provide any password for this operation.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR This operation is irreversible.
 .PP
 \fIluksUUID\fR <device>
 .IP
@@ -304,7 +339,7 @@ means the device is a LUKS device.
 .IP
 Dump the header information of a LUKS device.
 
-If the \-\-dump-master-key option is used, the LUKS device master key is
+If the \-\-dump\-master\-key option is used, the LUKS device master key is
 dumped instead of the keyslot info. Beware that the master key cannot be
 changed and can be used to decrypt the data stored in the LUKS container
 without a passphrase and even without the LUKS header. This means
@@ -312,16 +347,16 @@ that if the master key is compromised, the whole device has to be
 erased to prevent further access. Use this option carefully.
 
 In order to dump the master key, a passphrase has to be supplied,
-either interactively or via \-\-key-file. 
+either interactively or via \-\-key\-file.
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-dump-master-key, \-\-key-file,
-\-\-keyfile-offset, \-\-keyfile-size].
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-dump\-master\-key, \-\-key\-file,
+\-\-keyfile\-offset, \-\-keyfile\-size, \-\-header].
 
-\fBWARNING:\fR If \-\-dump-master-key is used with \-\-key-file
-and the argument to \-\-key-file is '-', no validation question
+\fBWARNING:\fR If \-\-dump\-master\-key is used with \-\-key\-file
+and the argument to \-\-key\-file is '-', no validation question
 will be asked and no warning given.
 .PP
-\fIluksHeaderBackup\fR <device> \-\-header-backup-file <file>
+\fIluksHeaderBackup\fR <device> \-\-header\-backup\-file <file>
 .IP
 Stores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area.
 .br
@@ -338,7 +373,7 @@ addition or overwrite the encrypted data area as well.
 The second option is less secure, as some sectors
 can survive, e.g. due to defect management.
 .PP
-\fIluksHeaderRestore\fR <device> \-\-header-backup-file <file>
+\fIluksHeaderRestore\fR <device> \-\-header\-backup\-file <file>
 .IP
 Restores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area
 from the specified file.
@@ -356,18 +391,27 @@ the backup will also be written to it.
 cryptsetup supports mapping loop-AES encrypted partition using
 a compatibility mode.
 .PP
-\fIopen\fR \-\-type loopaes <device> <name> \-\-key-file <keyfile>
+\fIopen\fR \-\-type loopaes <device> <name> \-\-key\-file <keyfile>
 .br
-\fIloopaesOpen\fR <device> <name> \-\-key-file <keyfile>  (\fBold syntax\fR)
+\fIloopaesOpen\fR <device> <name> \-\-key\-file <keyfile>  (\fBold syntax\fR)
 .IP
 Opens the loop-AES <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.
 
 If the key file is encrypted with GnuPG, then you have to use
-\-\-key-file=- and decrypt it before use, e.g. like this:
+\-\-key\-file=\- and decrypt it before use, e.g. like this:
 .br
-gpg \-\-decrypt <keyfile> | cryptsetup loopaesOpen \-\-key-file=- <device> <name>
+gpg \-\-decrypt <keyfile> | cryptsetup loopaesOpen \-\-key\-file=\-
+<device> <name>
 
-Use \fB\-\-keyfile-size\fR to specify the proper key length if needed.
+\fBWARNING:\fR The loop-AES extension cannot use direct input of key file
+on real terminal because the keys are separated by end-of-line and only part
+of the multi-key file would be read.
+.br
+If you need it in script, just use the pipe redirection:
+.br
+echo $keyfile | cryptsetup loopaesOpen \-\-key\-file=\- <device> <name>
+
+Use \fB\-\-keyfile\-size\fR to specify the proper key length if needed.
 
 Use \fB\-\-offset\fR to specify device offset. Note that the units
 need to be specified in number of 512 byte sectors.
@@ -381,13 +425,14 @@ Use \fB\-\-hash\fR to override the default hash function for
 passphrase hashing (otherwise it is detected according to key
 size).
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key-file, \-\-key-size, \-\-offset, \-\-skip,
-\-\-hash, \-\-readonly, \-\-allow-discards].
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-key\-size, \-\-offset, \-\-skip,
+\-\-hash, \-\-readonly, \-\-allow\-discards].
 .PP
 See also section 7 of the FAQ and \fBhttp://loop-aes.sourceforge.net\fR
 for more information regarding loop-AES.
-.SH TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible) EXTENSION
-cryptsetup supports mapping of TrueCrypt or tcplay encrypted partition
+.SH TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible and VeraCrypt) EXTENSION
+cryptsetup supports mapping of TrueCrypt, tcplay or VeraCrypt
+(with \fB\-\-veracrypt\fR option) encrypted partition
 using a native Linux kernel API.
 Header formatting and TCRYPT header change is not supported, cryptsetup
 never changes TCRYPT header on-device.
@@ -405,6 +450,11 @@ Cryptsetup should recognize all header variants, except legacy cipher chains
 using LRW encryption mode with 64 bits encryption block (namely Blowfish
 in LRW mode is not recognized, this is limitation of kernel crypto API).
 
+To recognize VeraCrypt device  use \fB\-\-veracrypt\fR option.
+VeraCrypt is just extension of TrueCrypt header with increased
+iteration count so unlocking can take quite a lot of time (in comparison
+with TCRYPT device).
+
 \fBNOTE:\fR Activation with \fBtcryptOpen\fR is supported only for cipher chains
 using LRW or XTS encryption modes.
 
@@ -412,44 +462,73 @@ The \fBtcryptDump\fR command should work for all recognized TCRYPT devices
 and doesn't require superuser privilege.
 
 To map system device (device with boot loader where the whole encrypted
-system resides) use \fB\-\-tcrypt-system\fR option. Use the whole
-device not the system partition as the device parameter.
+system resides) use \fB\-\-tcrypt\-system\fR option.
+You can use partition device as the parameter (parameter must be real partition
+device, not image in file), then only this partition is mapped.
+
+If you have whole TCRYPT device as a file image and you want to map multiple
+partition encrypted with system encryption, please create loopback mapping
+with partitions first (\fBlosetup \-P\fR, see \fPlosetup(8)\fR man page for more info),
+and use loop partition as the device parameter.
+
+If you use whole base device as parameter, one device for the whole system
+encryption is mapped. This mode is available only for backward compatibility
+with older cryptsetup versions which mapped TCRYPT system encryption
+using whole device.
 
 To use hidden header (and map hidden device, if available),
-use \fB\-\-tcrypt-hidden\fR option.
+use \fB\-\-tcrypt\-hidden\fR option.
+
+To explicitly use backup (secondary) header, use \fB\-\-tcrypt\-backup\fR
+option.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR There is no protection for a hidden volume if
+the outer volume is mounted. The reason is that if there
+were any protection, it would require some metadata describing
+what to protect in the outer volume and the hidden volume would
+become detectable.
+
 .PP
 \fIopen\fR \-\-type tcrypt <device> <name>
 .br
 \fItcryptOpen\fR <device> <name>  (\fBold syntax\fR)
 .IP
-Opens the TCRYPT (a TrueCrypt-compatible) <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.
+Opens the TCRYPT (a TrueCrypt-compatible) <device> and sets up
+a mapping <name>.
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key-file, \-\-tcrypt-hidden, \-\-tcrypt-system,
-\-\-readonly, \-\-test-passphrase].
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-key\-file, \-\-tcrypt\-hidden,
+\-\-tcrypt\-system, \-\-tcrypt\-backup, \-\-readonly, \-\-test\-passphrase,
+\-\-allow-discards].
 
 The keyfile parameter allows combination of file content with the
 passphrase and can be repeated. Note that using keyfiles is compatible
 with TCRYPT and is different from LUKS keyfile logic.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR Option \fB\-\-allow\-discards\fR cannot be combined with
+option \fB\-\-tcrypt\-hidden\fR. For normal mapping it can cause
+\fBdestruction of hidden volume\fR (hidden volume appears as unused space
+for outer volume so this space can be discarded).
+
 .PP
 \fItcryptDump\fR <device>
 .IP
 Dump the header information of a TCRYPT device.
 
-If the \-\-dump-master-key option is used, the TCRYPT device master key is
-dumped instead of TCRYPT header info. Beware that the master key
+If the \-\-dump\-master\-key option is used, the TCRYPT device master key
+is dumped instead of TCRYPT header info. Beware that the master key
 (or concatenated master keys if cipher chain is used)
 can be used to decrypt the data stored in the TCRYPT container without
 a passphrase.
 This means that if the master key is compromised, the whole device has
 to be erased to prevent further access. Use this option carefully.
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-dump-master-key, \-\-key-file, \-\-tcrypt-hidden,
-\-\-tcrypt-system].
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-dump\-master\-key, \-\-key\-file,
+\-\-tcrypt\-hidden, \-\-tcrypt\-system, \-\-tcrypt\-backup].
 
 The keyfile parameter allows combination of file content with the
 passphrase and can be repeated.
 .PP
-See also \fBhttp://www.truecrypt.org\fR for more information regarding
+See also \fBhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt\fR for more information regarding
 TrueCrypt.
 
 Please note that cryptsetup does not use TrueCrypt code, please report
@@ -475,7 +554,7 @@ Benchmarks ciphers and KDF (key derivation function).
 Without parameters it tries to measure few common configurations.
 
 To benchmark other ciphers or modes, you need to specify \fB\-\-cipher\fR
-and \fB\-\-key-size\fR options or \fB\-\-hash\fR for KDF test.
+and \fB\-\-key\-size\fR options or \fB\-\-hash\fR for KDF test.
 
 \fBNOTE:\fR This benchmark is using memory only and is only informative.
 You cannot directly predict real storage encryption speed from it.
@@ -486,7 +565,7 @@ If you are configuring kernel yourself, enable
 "User-space interface for symmetric key cipher algorithms" in
 "Cryptographic API" section (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-cipher, \-\-key-size, \-\-hash].
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-cipher, \-\-key\-size, \-\-hash].
 .SH OPTIONS
 .TP
 .B "\-\-verbose, \-v"
@@ -496,15 +575,17 @@ Print more information on command execution.
 Run in debug mode with full diagnostic logs. Debug output
 lines are always prefixed by '#'.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-hash, \-h \fI<hash-spec>\fR"
-Specifies the passphrase hash for \fIopen\fR (for plain and loopaes device types).
+.B "\-\-hash, \-h \fI<hash\-spec>\fR"
+Specifies the passphrase hash for \fIopen\fR (for plain and
+loopaes device types).
 
 Specifies the hash used in the LUKS key setup scheme and volume key digest
-for \fIluksFormat\fR.
+for \fIluksFormat\fR. The specified hash is used as hash-parameter
+for PBKDF2 and for the AF splitter.
 
 The specified hash name is passed to the compiled-in crypto backend.
 Different backends may support different hashes.
-For \fIluksFormat\fR, the hash 
+For \fIluksFormat\fR, the hash
 algorithm must provide at least 160 bits of output, which
 excludes, e.g., MD5. Do not use a non-crypto hash like
 \fB"crc32"\fR as this breaks security.
@@ -515,16 +596,20 @@ Values compatible with old version of cryptsetup are
 
 Use \fIcryptsetup \-\-help\fR to show the defaults.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-cipher, \-c \fI<cipher-spec>\fR"
+.B "\-\-cipher, \-c \fI<cipher\-spec>\fR"
 Set the cipher specification string.
 
 \fIcryptsetup \-\-help\fR shows the compiled-in defaults.
 The current default in the distributed sources is
-"aes-cbc-essiv:sha256" for both plain dm-crypt and LUKS.
+"aes-cbc-essiv:sha256" for plain dm-crypt and
+"aes-xts-plain64" for LUKS.
 
-For XTS mode (a possible future default), use "aes-xts-plain"
-or better "aes-xts-plain64"
-as cipher specification and optionally set a key size of
+If a hash is part of the cipher specification, then it is
+used as part of the IV generation. For example, ESSIV
+needs a hash function, while "plain64" does not and
+hence none is specified.
+
+For XTS mode you can optionally set a key size of
 512 bits with the \-s option. Key size for XTS
 mode is twice that for other modes for the same
 security level.
@@ -536,7 +621,7 @@ kernel 2.6.33 or later. More information can be found in the FAQ.
 When interactively asking for a passphrase, ask for it twice
 and complain if both inputs do not match. Advised when creating
 a regular mapping for the first time, or when running
-\fIluksFormat\fR. Ignores on input from file or stdin.
+\fIluksFormat\fR. Ignored on input from file or stdin.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-key-file, \-d \fIname\fR"
 Read the passphrase from file.
@@ -544,9 +629,9 @@ Read the passphrase from file.
 If the name given is "-", then the passphrase will be read from stdin.
 In this case, reading will not stop at newline characters.
 
-With LUKS, passphrases supplied via \-\-key-file are always
+With LUKS, passphrases supplied via \-\-key\-file are always
 the existing passphrases requested by a command, except in
-the case of \fIluksFormat\fR where \-\-key-file is equivalent
+the case of \fIluksFormat\fR where \-\-key\-file is equivalent
 to the positional key file argument.
 
 If you want to set a new passphrase via key file, you have to
@@ -554,37 +639,37 @@ use a positional argument to \fIluksAddKey\fR.
 
 See section \fBNOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING\fR for more information.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-keyfile-offset \fIvalue\fR"
+.B "\-\-keyfile\-offset \fIvalue\fR"
 Skip \fIvalue\fR bytes at the beginning of the key file.
 Works with all commands that accepts key files.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-keyfile-size, \-l \fIvalue\fR"
+.B "\-\-keyfile\-size, \-l \fIvalue\fR"
 Read a maximum of \fIvalue\fR bytes from the key file.
 Default is to read the whole file up to the compiled-in
 maximum that can be queried with \-\-help. Supplying more
 data than the compiled-in maximum aborts the operation.
 
 This option is useful
-to cut trailing newlines, for example. If \-\-keyfile-offset
+to cut trailing newlines, for example. If \-\-keyfile\-offset
 is also given, the size count starts after the offset.
 Works with all commands that accepts key files.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-new-keyfile-offset \fIvalue\fR"
+.B "\-\-new\-keyfile\-offset \fIvalue\fR"
 Skip \fIvalue\fR bytes at the start when
 adding a new passphrase from key file with
 \fIluksAddKey\fR.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-new-keyfile-size  \fIvalue\fR"
+.B "\-\-new\-keyfile\-size  \fIvalue\fR"
 Read a maximum of \fIvalue\fR bytes when adding
 a new passphrase from key file with \fIluksAddKey\fR.
 Default is to read the whole file up to the compiled-in
 maximum length that can be queried with \-\-help.
 Supplying more than the compiled in maximum aborts the
 operation.
-When \-\-new-keyfile-offset is also given, reading starts
+When \-\-new\-keyfile\-offset is also given, reading starts
 after the offset.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-master-key-file"
+.B "\-\-master\-key\-file"
 Use a master key stored in a file.
 
 For \fIluksFormat\fR this
@@ -594,20 +679,25 @@ LUKS header and all other parameters are the same,
 then the new header decrypts the data encrypted with the
 header the master key was taken from.
 
+\fBWARNING:\fR If you create your own master key, you
+need to make sure to do it right. Otherwise you can end
+up with a low-entropy or otherwise partially predictable
+master key which will compromise security.
+
 For \fIluksAddKey\fR this allows adding a new passphrase
 without having to know an exiting one.
 
-For \fIopen\fR this allows to open the LUKS device
+For \fIopen\fR this allows one to open the LUKS device
 without giving a passphrase.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-dump-master-key"
+.B "\-\-dump\-master\-key"
 For \fIluksDump\fR this option includes the master key in the displayed
 information. Use with care, as the master key can be used to
-bypass the passphrases, see also option \-\-master-key-file.
+bypass the passphrases, see also option \-\-master\-key\-file.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-use-random"
+.B "\-\-use\-random"
 .TP
-.B "\-\-use-urandom"
+.B "\-\-use\-urandom"
 For \fIluksFormat\fR these options define which kernel random number
 generator will be used to create the master key (which is a
 long-term key).
@@ -623,7 +713,7 @@ Using /dev/random can block a long time, potentially
 forever, if not enough entropy can be harvested by
 the kernel.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-key-slot, \-S <0-7>"
+.B "\-\-key\-slot, \-S <0\-7>"
 For LUKS operations that add key material, this options allows you
 to specify which key slot is selected for the new key.
 This option can be used for \fIluksFormat\fR,
@@ -634,7 +724,7 @@ specific key-slot to compare the passphrase against.
 If the given passphrase would only match a different key-slot,
 the operation fails.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-key-size, \-s <bits>"
+.B "\-\-key\-size, \-s <bits>"
 Sets key size in bits. The argument has to be a multiple of
 8. The possible key-sizes are limited by the cipher and
 mode used.
@@ -647,7 +737,7 @@ All other LUKS actions will use the key-size specified in the LUKS header.
 Use \fIcryptsetup \-\-help\fR to show the compiled-in defaults.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-size, \-b <number of 512 byte sectors>"
-Force the size of the underlying device in sectors of 512 bytes.
+Set the size of the device in sectors of 512 bytes.
 This option is only relevant for the \fIopen\fR and \fIresize\fR
 actions.
 .TP
@@ -657,17 +747,14 @@ This option is only relevant for the \fIopen\fR action with plain
 or loopaes device types.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-skip, \-p <number of 512 byte sectors>"
-How many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning.
+Start offset used in IV calculation in 512-byte sectors
+(how many sectors of the encrypted data to skip at the beginning).
 This option is only relevant for the \fIopen\fR action with plain
 or loopaes device types.
 
-This is different from the \-\-offset options with respect to
-the sector numbers used in IV calculation.
-Using \-\-offset will shift the IV calculation by the same negative amount.
-Hence, if \-\-offset \fIn\fR, sector \fIn\fR will get a sector
-number of \fI0\fR for the IV calculation.
-Using \-\-skip causes sector \fIn\fR to also be the first sector
-of the mapped device, but with its number for IV generation is \fIn\fR.
+Hence, if \-\-offset \fIn\fR, and \-\-skip \fIs\fR, sector \fIn\fR
+(the first sector of encrypted device) will get a sector number
+of \fIs\fR for the IV calculation.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-readonly, \-r"
 set up a read-only mapping.
@@ -675,17 +762,17 @@ set up a read-only mapping.
 .B "\-\-shared"
 Creates an additional mapping for one common
 ciphertext device. Arbitrary mappings are supported.
-This option is only relevant for the 
+This option is only relevant for the
 \fIopen \-\-type plain\fR action. Use \-\-offset, \-\-size and \-\-skip to
 specify the mapped area.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-iter-time, \-i <number of milliseconds>"
+.B "\-\-iter\-time, \-i <number of milliseconds>"
 The number of milliseconds to spend with PBKDF2 passphrase processing.
 This option is only relevant for LUKS operations that set or change
 passphrases, such as \fIluksFormat\fR or \fIluksAddKey\fR.
 Specifying 0 as parameter selects the compiled-in default.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-batch-mode, \-q"
+.B "\-\-batch\-mode, \-q"
 Suppresses all confirmation questions. Use with care!
 
 If the \-y option is not specified, this option also switches off
@@ -697,7 +784,7 @@ via terminal. It is relevant every time a passphrase is asked,
 for example for \fIopen\fR, \fIluksFormat\fR or \fIluksAddKey\fR.
 It has no effect if used in conjunction with \-\-key-file.
 .br
-This option is useful when the system 
+This option is useful when the system
 should not stall if the user does not input a passphrase,
 e.g. during boot. The default is a value of 0 seconds,
 which means to wait forever.
@@ -709,7 +796,7 @@ every time a passphrase is asked, for example for
 \fIopen\fR, \fIluksFormat\fR or \fIluksAddKey\fR.
 The default is 3 tries.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-align-payload <number of 512 byte sectors>"
+.B "\-\-align\-payload <number of 512 byte sectors>"
 Align payload at a boundary of \fIvalue\fR 512-byte sectors.
 This option is relevant for \fIluksFormat\fR.
 
@@ -729,7 +816,7 @@ used with the \fIluksUUID\fR command.
 The UUID must be provided in the standard UUID format,
 e.g. 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-allow-discards\fR"
+.B "\-\-allow\-discards\fR"
 Allow the use of discard (TRIM) requests for device.
 This option is only relevant for \fIopen\fR action.
 
@@ -738,22 +825,44 @@ because it can make filesystem-level operations visible on
 the physical device. For example, information leaking
 filesystem type, used space, etc. may be extractable from
 the physical device if the discarded blocks can be located
-later. If in doubt, do no use it.
+later. If in doubt, do not use it.
 
 A kernel version of 3.1 or later is needed. For earlier kernels
 this option is ignored.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-test-passphrase\fR"
+.B "\-\-perf\-same_cpu_crypt\fR"
+Perform encryption using the same cpu that IO was submitted on.
+The default is to use an unbound workqueue so that encryption work
+is automatically balanced between available CPUs.
+This option is only relevant for \fIopen\fR action.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR This option is available only for low-level dm-crypt
+performance tuning, use only if you need a change to default dm-crypt
+behaviour. Needs kernel 4.0 or later.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-perf\-submit_from_crypt_cpus\fR"
+Disable offloading writes to a separate thread after encryption.
+There are some situations where offloading write bios from the
+encryption threads to a single thread degrades performance
+significantly.  The default is to offload write bios to the same
+thread.
+This option is only relevant for \fIopen\fR action.
+
+\fBNOTE:\fR This option is available only for low-level dm-crypt
+performance tuning, use only if you need a change to default dm-crypt
+behaviour. Needs kernel 4.0 or later.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-test\-passphrase\fR"
 Do not activate device, just verify passphrase.
 This option is only relevant for \fIopen\fR action (the device
 mapping name is not mandatory if this option is used).
 .TP
 .B "\-\-header\fR <device or file storing the LUKS header>"
 Use a detached (separated) metadata device or file where the
-LUKS header is stored. This options allows to store ciphertext
+LUKS header is stored. This options allows one to store ciphertext
 and LUKS header on different devices.
 
-This option is only relevant for LUKS devices and can be 
+This option is only relevant for LUKS devices and can be
 used with the \fIluksFormat\fR, \fIopen\fR, \fIluksSuspend\fR,
 \fIluksResume\fR, \fIstatus\fR and \fIresize\fR commands.
 
@@ -765,7 +874,7 @@ For other commands that change the LUKS header (e.g. \fIluksAddKey\fR),
 specify the device or file with the LUKS header directly as the
 LUKS device.
 
-If used with \fIluksFormat\fR, the \-\-align-payload option is taken
+If used with \fIluksFormat\fR, the \-\-align\-payload option is taken
 as absolute sector alignment on ciphertext device and can be zero.
 
 \fBWARNING:\fR There is no check whether the ciphertext device specified
@@ -773,7 +882,7 @@ actually belongs to the header given. In fact you can specify an
 arbitrary device as the ciphertext device for \fIopen\fR
 with the \-\-header option. Use with care.
 .TP
-.B "\-\-force-password\fR"
+.B "\-\-force\-password\fR"
 Do not use password quality checking for new LUKS passwords.
 
 This option applies only to \fIluksFormat\fR, \fIluksAddKey\fR and
@@ -781,7 +890,7 @@ This option applies only to \fIluksFormat\fR, \fIluksAddKey\fR and
 password quality checking support.
 
 For more info about password quality check, see manual page
-for \fBpwquality.conf(5)\fR.
+for \fBpwquality.conf(5)\fR and \fBpasswdqc.conf(5)\fR.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-version"
 Show the program version.
@@ -806,18 +915,18 @@ low-entropy passphrases are easy to attack in plain mode.
 first newline, i.e. '\\n'.
 The input without the newline character is processed with
 the default hash or the hash specified with \-\-hash.
-The has result will be truncated to the key size 
+The hash result will be truncated to the key size
 of the used cipher, or the size specified with \-s.
 
 \fBFrom stdin\fR: Reading will continue until a newline (or until
 the maximum input size is reached), with the trailing newline
 stripped. The maximum input size is defined by the same
-compiled-in default as for the maximum key file size and  can
+compiled-in default as for the maximum key file size and can
 be overwritten using \-\-keyfile-size option.
 
 The data read will be hashed with the default hash
 or the hash specified with \-\-hash.
-The has result will be truncated to the key size
+The hash result will be truncated to the key size
 of the used cipher, or the size specified with \-s.
 
 Note that if \-\-key-file=- is used for reading the key
@@ -831,11 +940,19 @@ directly specifying a binary key.
 No warning will be given if the amount of data read from stdin is
 less than the key size.
 
-\fBFrom a key file\fR: It will be truncated to the 
+\fBFrom a key file\fR: It will be truncated to the
 key size of the used cipher or the size given by \-s
 and directly used as binary key.
-if the key file is shorter than the key, cryptsetup
+
+\fBWARNING\fR: The \-\-hash argument is being ignored.
+The \-\-hash option is usable only for stdin input in plain mode.
+
+If the key file is shorter than the key, cryptsetup
 will quit with an error.
+The maximum input size is defined by the same
+compiled-in default as for the maximum key file size and can
+be overwritten using \-\-keyfile-size option.
+
 
 .SH NOTES ON PASSPHRASE PROCESSING FOR LUKS
 LUKS uses PBKDF2 to protect against dictionary attacks
@@ -849,13 +966,13 @@ the newline character.
 \fBFrom stdin\fR:
 LUKS will read passphrases from stdin up to the
 first newline character or the compiled-in
-maximum key file length. If \-\-keyfile-size is
+maximum key file length. If \-\-keyfile\-size is
 given, it is ignored.
 
 \fBFrom key file\fR:
 The complete keyfile is read up to the compiled-in
 maximum size. Newline characters do not terminate the
-input. The \-\-keyfile-size option can be used to limit
+input. The \-\-keyfile\-size option can be used to limit
 what is read.
 
 \fBPassphrase processing\fR:
@@ -869,7 +986,12 @@ used key length, higher iteration times will not increase security.
 
 The default setting of one second is sufficient for most
 practical cases. The only exception is a low-entropy
-passphrase used on a slow device.
+passphrase used on a device with a slow CPU, as this will
+result in a low iteration count. On a slow device it may
+be advisable to increase the iteration time using the
+\-\-iter\-time option in order to obtain a higher
+iteration count. This does slow down all later luksOpen
+operations accordingly.
 .SH INCOHERENT BEHAVIOR FOR INVALID PASSPHRASES/KEYS
 LUKS checks for a valid passphrase when an encrypted partition
 is unlocked. The behavior of plain dm-crypt is different.
@@ -905,12 +1027,12 @@ and for wiping deleted keyslots.
 
 The second type is used for the volume (master) key. You can switch
 between using /dev/random and /dev/urandom  here, see
-\fP\-\-use-random\fR and \fP\-\-use-urandom\fR
+\fP\-\-use\-random\fR and \fP\-\-use\-urandom\fR
 options. Using /dev/random on a system without enough entropy sources
 can cause \fPluksFormat\fR to block until the requested amount of
 random data is gathered. In a low-entropy situation (embedded system),
 this can take a very long time and potentially forever. At the same
-time, using /dev/urandom in a low-entropy situation will 
+time, using /dev/urandom in a low-entropy situation will
 produce low-quality keys. This is a serious problem, but solving
 it is out of scope for a mere man-page.
 See \fPurandom(4)\fR for more information.
@@ -941,7 +1063,7 @@ or in the 'Issues' section on LUKS website.
 Please attach the output of the failed command with the
 \-\-debug option added.
 .SH AUTHORS
-cryptsetup originally written by Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+cryptsetup originally written by Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 .br
 The LUKS extensions and original man page were written by
 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>.
@@ -950,26 +1072,26 @@ Man page extensions by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>.
 .br
 Man page rewrite and extension by Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>.
 .SH COPYRIGHT
-Copyright \(co 2004 Christophe Saout
+Copyright \(co 2004 Jana Saout
 .br
 Copyright \(co 2004-2006 Clemens Fruhwirth
 .br
-Copyright \(co 2009-2012 Red Hat, Inc.
+Copyright \(co 2009-2017 Red Hat, Inc.
 .br
-Copyright \(co 2009-2012 Milan Broz
+Copyright \(co 2009-2017 Milan Broz
 .br
-Copyright \(co 2012 Arno Wagner
+Copyright \(co 2012-2014 Arno Wagner
 
 This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
 warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
 .SH SEE ALSO
-The LUKS website at \fBhttp://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/\fR
+The LUKS website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/\fR
 
 The cryptsetup FAQ, contained in the distribution package and
 online at
-\fBhttp://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQuestions\fR
+\fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions\fR
 
 The cryptsetup mailing list and list archive, see FAQ entry 1.6.
 
 The LUKS on-disk format specification available at
-\fBhttp://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/Specification\fR
+\fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification\fR

man/veritysetup.8

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH VERITYSETUP "8" "June 2012" "veritysetup" "Maintenance Commands"
+.TH VERITYSETUP "8" "March 2017" "veritysetup" "Maintenance Commands"
 .SH NAME
 veritysetup - manage dm-verity (block level verification) volumes
 .SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ Creates a mapping with <name> backed by device <data_device> and using
 
 The <root_hash> is a hexadecimal string.
 
-\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash-offset, \-\-no-superblock]
+\fB<options>\fR can be [\-\-hash-offset, \-\-no-superblock,
+\-\-ignore-corruption or \-\-restart-on-corruption, \-\-ignore-zero-blocks]
 
 If option \-\-no-superblock is used, you have to use as the same options
 as in initial format operation.
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ Create or use dm-verity without permanent on-disk superblock.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-format=number"
 Specifies the hash version type.
-Format type 0 is original Chrome OS verion. Format type 1 is current version.
+Format type 0 is original Chrome OS version. Format type 1 is current version.
 .TP
 .B "\-\-data-block-size=bytes"
 Used block size for the data device.
@@ -110,14 +111,63 @@ Use the provided UUID for format command instead of generating new one.
 The UUID must be provided in standard UUID format,
 e.g. 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc.
 .TP
+.B "\-\-ignore-corruption", "\-\-restart-on-corruption"
+Defines what to do if data integrity problem is detected (data corruption).
+
+Without these options kernel fails the IO operation with I/O error.
+With \-\-ignore-corruption option the corruption is only logged.
+With \-\-restart-on-corruption the kernel is restarted immediatelly.
+(You have to provide way how to avoid restart loops.)
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR Use these options only for very specific cases.
+These options are available since Linux kernel version 4.1.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-ignore-zero-blocks"
+Instruct kernel to not verify blocks that are expected to contain zeroes
+and always directly return zeroes instead.
+
+\fBWARNING:\fR Use this option only in very specific cases.
+This option is available since Linux kernel version 4.5.
+.TP
+.B "\-\-hash=hash"
+Hash algorithm for dm-verity. For default see \-\-help option.
+.TP
 .B "\-\-version"
 Show the program version.
 .SH RETURN CODES
 Veritysetup returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.
 
-Error codes are: 1 wrong parameters, 2 no permission,
-3 out of memory, 4 wrong device specified, 5 device already exists
-or device is busy.
+Error codes are:
+    1 wrong parameters
+    2 no permission
+    3 out of memory
+    4 wrong device specified
+    5 device already exists or device is busy.
+
+.SH EXAMPLES
+.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 format <data_device> <hash_device>"
+
+Calculates and stores verification data on hash_device for the first 256 blocks (of block-size).
+If hash_device does not exist, it is created (as file image).
+
+.B "veritysetup format <data_device> <hash_device>"
+
+Calculates and stores verification data on hash_device for the whole data_device.
+
+.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 \-\-hash-offset=1052672 format <device> <device>"
+
+Verification data (hashes) is stored on the same device as data (starting at hash-offset).
+Hash-offset must be greater than number of blocks in data-area.
+
+.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 \-\-hash-offset=1052672 create test-device <device> <device> <root_hash>"
+
+Acivatees the verity device named test-device. Options \-\-data-blocks and \-\-hash-offset are the same
+as in the format command. The <root_hash> was calculated in format command.
+
+.B "veritysetup \-\-data-blocks=256 \-\-hash-offset=1052672 verify <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>"
+
+Verifies device without activation (in userspace).
+
 .SH REPORTING BUGS
 Report bugs, including ones in the documentation, on
 the cryptsetup mailing list at <dm-crypt@saout.de>
@@ -130,12 +180,14 @@ The first implementation of veritysetup was written by Chrome OS authors.
 This version is based on verification code written by Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
 and rewritten for libcryptsetup by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>.
 .SH COPYRIGHT
-Copyright \(co 2012 Red Hat, Inc.
+Copyright \(co 2012-2017 Red Hat, Inc.
+.br
+Copyright \(co 2012-2017 Milan Broz
 
 This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
 warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
 .SH SEE ALSO
-The project website at \fBhttp://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/\fR
+The project website at \fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup\fR
 
 The verity on-disk format specification available at
-\fBhttp://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMVerity\fR
+\fBhttps://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity\fR

misc/11-dm-crypt.rules

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Old udev rules historically used in device-mapper.
+# No need to install these until you have some weird configuration.
+# (Code internally set the same flags.)
+
+ACTION!="add|change", GOTO="crypt_end"
+ENV{DM_UDEV_RULES_VSN}!="?*", GOTO="crypt_end"
+
+ENV{DM_UUID}=="CRYPT-TEMP-?*", GOTO="crypt_disable"
+ENV{DM_UUID}!="?*", ENV{DM_NAME}=="temporary-cryptsetup-?*", GOTO="crypt_disable"
+GOTO="crypt_end"
+
+LABEL="crypt_disable"
+ENV{DM_UDEV_DISABLE_SUBSYSTEM_RULES_FLAG}="1"
+ENV{DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG}="1"
+ENV{DM_UDEV_DISABLE_OTHER_RULES_FLAG}="1"
+
+LABEL="crypt_end"

misc/dracut_90reencrypt/README

@@ -2,13 +2,30 @@ Example of simple dracut module for reencryption of system
 LUKS drive on-the-fly.
 
 Install in /usr/[share|lib]/dracut/modules.d/90reencrypt, then
-rebuild intramfs "with dracut -f -a reencrypt".
+build special intramfs "with dracut -a reencrypt -o crypt".
+Reencrypt module doesn't work (has a conflict) with crypt module as
+of now. After successfull reencryption reboot using original initramfs.
 
-Dracut then recognize argument rd_REENCRYPT=name:size,
-e.g. rd_REENCRYPT=sda2:52G means only 52G of device
+Dracut then recognize argument rd.luks.reencrypt=name:size,
+e.g. rd.luks.reencrypt=sda2:52G means only 52G of device
 will be reencrypted (default is whole device).
 (Name is kernel name of device.)
 
+If there's more than single active keyslot in the target luks device
+you're required to select one keyslot explicitly for reencryption via
+rd.luks.reencrypt_keyslot=<keyslot_number> option. Bear in mind that
+if you use this option, all other keyslots will get deactivated in the
+process.
+
+Another argument, rd.luks.reencrypt_key=/dev/sda:/path/to/keyfile
+can be used to read password for specific keyslot from device containing
+filesystem with a keyfile (file with a password). If you omit reencrypt_key
+argument, reencryption would work only in case a LUKS container has
+exactly one keyslot activated.
+
+Arguments rd.luks.reencrypt_keyslot and rd.luks.reencrypt_key are not
+mandatory.
+
 Note that reencryption context is stored in ramdisk, any
 fail can mean complete lost of data!
 

misc/dracut_90reencrypt/module-setup.sh

@@ -7,16 +7,25 @@ check() {
 
 depends() {
     echo dm rootfs-block
-    return 0
 }
 
 installkernel() {
-    instmods dm_crypt =crypto
+    # requires hostonly='' override so that loop module is pulled in initramfs
+    # even if not loaded in actual kernel. dracut bug?
+    hostonly='' instmods dm_crypt =crypto loop
 }
 
 install() {
+    if dracut_module_included crypt; then
+        derror "'reencrypt' can't be installed together with 'crypt'."
+        derror "Add '-o crypt' option to install reencrypt module."
+        return 1
+    fi
+
     dracut_install cryptsetup-reencrypt
 
+    # moddir variable is assigned in dracut general shell lib
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2154
     inst_hook cmdline 30 "$moddir/parse-reencrypt.sh"
     inst_simple "$moddir"/reencrypt.sh /sbin/reencrypt
-}
+}

misc/dracut_90reencrypt/parse-reencrypt.sh

@@ -1,22 +1,33 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 
-REENC=$(getargs rd_REENCRYPT=)
+REENC=$(getargs rd.luks.reencrypt=)
 REENC_DEV=$(echo $REENC | sed 's/:.*//')
 REENC_SIZE=$(echo $REENC | sed -n 's/.*://p')
 
-REENC_KEY=$(getargs rd_REENCRYPT_KEY=)
+REENC_KEY=$(getargs rd.luks.reencrypt_key=)
 if [ -z "$REENC_KEY" ] ; then
     REENC_KEY=none
 fi
 
+REENC_SLOT=$(getargs rd.luks.reencrypt_keyslot=)
+if [ -z "$REENC_SLOT" ] ; then
+    REENC_SLOT=any
+fi
+
 if [ -n "$REENC_DEV" ] ; then
 {
    printf 'SUBSYSTEM!="block", GOTO="reenc_end"\n'
    printf 'ACTION!="add|change", GOTO="reenc_end"\n'
-   printf 'KERNEL!="%s", GOTO="reenc_end"\n' $REENC_DEV
+   printf 'KERNEL=="%s", ' $REENC_DEV
    printf 'ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="crypto_LUKS", RUN+="/sbin/initqueue \
-           --unique --onetime --name crypt-reencrypt-%%k \
-           /sbin/reencrypt $env{DEVNAME} %s"\n' "$REENC_KEY $REENC_SIZE"
+           --unique --onetime --settled --name crypt-reencrypt-%%k \
+           /sbin/reencrypt $env{DEVNAME} %s"\n' "$REENC_KEY $REENC_SLOT $REENC_SIZE"
+
+   printf 'ENV{ID_FS_UUID}=="*%s*", ' $REENC_DEV
+   printf 'ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="crypto_LUKS", RUN+="/sbin/initqueue \
+           --unique --onetime --settled --name crypt-reencrypt-%%k \
+           /sbin/reencrypt $env{DEVNAME} %s"\n' "$REENC_KEY $REENC_SLOT $REENC_SIZE"
    printf 'LABEL="reenc_end"\n'
 } > /etc/udev/rules.d/69-reencryption.rules
+   initqueue --unique --finished --name crypt-reencrypt-finished-${REENC_DEV} [ -e /tmp/reencrypted ]
 fi

misc/dracut_90reencrypt/reencrypt.sh

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 #
-# $1=$device [$2=keyfile|none [$3=size]]
+# $1=$device [$2=keyfile|none [$3=keyslot|any [$4=size]]]
 #
 
 [ -d /sys/module/dm_crypt ] || modprobe dm_crypt
 
+[ -d /sys/module/loop ] || modprobe loop
+
 [ -f /tmp/reencrypted ] && exit 0
 
 . /lib/dracut-lib.sh
@@ -17,8 +19,12 @@ else
 fi
 
 PARAMS="$device -T 1 --use-fsync -B 32"
-if [ -n "$3" ]; then
-    PARAMS="$PARAMS --device-size $3"
+if [ "$3" != "any" ]; then
+    PARAMS="$PARAMS -S $3"
+fi
+
+if [ -n "$4" ]; then
+    PARAMS="$PARAMS --device-size $4"
 fi
 
 reenc_readkey() {
@@ -33,26 +39,43 @@ reenc_readkey() {
 }
 
 reenc_run() {
-    local cwd=$(pwd)
+    local cwd
+    cwd=$(pwd)
+    local _prompt="LUKS password for REENCRYPTING $device"
     cd /tmp
+    udevadm settle
     if [ "$1" = "none" ] ; then
+	if [ "$2" != "any" ]; then
+		_prompt="$_prompt, using keyslot $2"
+	fi
         /bin/plymouth ask-for-password \
-        --prompt "LUKS password for REENCRYPTING $device" \
+        --prompt "$_prompt" \
         --command="/sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt $PARAMS"
     else
         info "REENCRYPT using key $1"
         reenc_readkey "$1" | /sbin/cryptsetup-reencrypt -d - $PARAMS
     fi
+    _ret=$?
     cd $cwd
 }
 
 info "REENCRYPT $device requested"
 # flock against other interactive activities
 { flock -s 9;
-    reenc_run $2
-} 9>/.console.lock
+    reenc_run $2 $3
+} 9>/.console_lock
 
-# do not ask again
->> /tmp/reencrypted
+if [ $_ret -eq 0 ]; then
+    # do not ask again
+    >> /tmp/reencrypted
+    warn "Reencryption of device $device has finished successfully. Use previous"
+    warn "initramfs image (without reencrypt module) to boot the system. When"
+    warn "you leave the emergency shell, the system will reboot."
 
-exit 0
+    emergency_shell -n "(reboot)"
+    [ -x /usr/bin/systemctl ] && /usr/bin/systemctl reboot
+    [ -x /sbin/shutdown ] && /sbin/shutdown -r now
+fi
+
+# panic the kernel otherwise
+exit 1

po/LINGUAS

@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
 cs
+da
 de
+es
 fi
 fr
 id
 it
 nl
 pl
+pt_BR
+sr
 sv
 uk
 vi
+zh_CN

po/id.po

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ msgstr ""
 "PO-Revision-Date: 2010-01-27 07:30+0700\n"
 "Last-Translator: Arif E. Nugroho <arif_endro@yahoo.com>\n"
 "Language-Team: Indonesian <translation-team-id@lists.sourceforge.net>\n"
+"X-Bugs: Report translation errors to the Language-Team address.\n"
 "MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1\n"
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"

python/Makefile.am

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib $(PYTHON_INCLUDES)
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -include $(top_srcdir)/config.h -I$(top_srcdir)/lib $(PYTHON_INCLUDES)
 EXTRA_DIST = pycryptsetup-test.py
 CLEANFILES = *.img
 
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ pyexec_LTLIBRARIES = pycryptsetup.la
 
 pycryptsetup_la_SOURCES = pycryptsetup.c
 pycryptsetup_la_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(PYTHON_CPPFLAGS) -fno-strict-aliasing
-pycryptsetup_la_LDFLAGS = -avoid-version -module
-pycryptsetup_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/libcryptsetup.la -lpython$(PYTHON_VERSION)
+pycryptsetup_la_LDFLAGS = -avoid-version -module -shared -export-dynamic
+pycryptsetup_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/libcryptsetup.la $(PYTHON_LIBS)
 else
 all:
 endif

python/pycryptsetup-test.py

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #
 # Python bindings to libcryptsetup test
 #
-# Copyright (C) 2011, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+# Copyright (C) 2011-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
 #
 # This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 # modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 # License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
 # Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
 
+from __future__ import print_function
+
 import sys
 import os
 
@@ -31,11 +33,11 @@ DEVICE = "pycryptsetup_test_dev"
 
 def log(level, txt):
     if level == pycryptsetup.CRYPT_LOG_ERROR:
-        print txt,
+        print(txt,end="")
     return
 
 def askyes(txt):
-    print "Question:", txt
+    print("Question:", txt)
     return 1
 
 def askpassword(txt):
@@ -43,17 +45,17 @@ def askpassword(txt):
 
 def print_status(c):
     r = c.status()
-    print "status  :",
+    print("status  :",end="")
     if r == pycryptsetup.CRYPT_ACTIVE:
-        print "ACTIVE"
+        print("ACTIVE")
     elif r == pycryptsetup.CRYPT_INACTIVE:
-        print "INACTIVE"
+        print("INACTIVE")
     else:
-       print "ERROR"
+       print("ERROR")
     return
 
 if os.geteuid() != 0:
-	print "WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped."
+	print("WARNING: You must be root to run this test, test skipped.")
 	sys.exit(0)
 
 os.system("dd if=/dev/zero of=" + IMG + " bs=1M count=32 >/dev/null 2>&1")
@@ -69,36 +71,36 @@ c = pycryptsetup.CryptSetup(
 c.debugLevel(pycryptsetup.CRYPT_DEBUG_NONE);
 c.iterationTime(1)
 r =  c.isLuks()
-print "isLuks  :", r
+print("isLuks  :", r)
 c.askyes(message = "Is there anybody out there?")
 c.log(priority = pycryptsetup.CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, message = "Nobody there...\n")
-c.luksFormat(cipher = "aes", cipherMode= "xts-plain64", keysize = 512)
-print "isLuks  :", c.isLuks()
-print "luksUUID:", c.luksUUID()
-print "addKeyVK:", c.addKeyByVolumeKey(newPassphrase = PASSWORD, slot = 2)
-print "addKeyP :", c.addKeyByPassphrase(passphrase = PASSWORD,
-					newPassphrase = PASSWORD2, slot = 3)
-print "removeP :", c.removePassphrase(passphrase = PASSWORD2)
-print "addKeyP :", c.addKeyByPassphrase(PASSWORD, PASSWORD2)
+c.luksFormat(cipher = "aes", cipherMode= "xts-plain64", keysize = 512, hashMode = "sha256")
+print("isLuks  :", c.isLuks())
+print("luksUUID:", c.luksUUID())
+print("addKeyVK:", c.addKeyByVolumeKey(newPassphrase = PASSWORD, slot = 2))
+print("addKeyP :", c.addKeyByPassphrase(passphrase = PASSWORD,
+					newPassphrase = PASSWORD2, slot = 3))
+print("removeP :", c.removePassphrase(passphrase = PASSWORD2))
+print("addKeyP :", c.addKeyByPassphrase(PASSWORD, PASSWORD2))
 # original api required wrong passphrase parameter here
 # print "killSlot:", c.killSlot(passphrase = "xxx", slot = 0)
-print "killSlot:", c.killSlot(slot = 0)
-print "activate:", c.activate(name = DEVICE, passphrase = PASSWORD)
-print "suspend :", c.suspend()
+print("killSlot:", c.killSlot(slot = 0))
+print("activate:", c.activate(name = DEVICE, passphrase = PASSWORD))
+print("suspend :", c.suspend())
 # os.system("dmsetup info -c " + DEVICE)
-print "resume  :", c.resume(passphrase = PASSWORD)
+print("resume  :", c.resume(passphrase = PASSWORD))
 print_status(c)
 info = c.info()
-print "cipher  :", info["cipher"]
-print "cmode   :", info["cipher_mode"]
-print "keysize :", info["keysize"]
-print "dir     :", info["dir"]
-print "device  :", info["device"]
-print "offset  :", info["offset"]
-print "name    :", info["name"]
-print "uuid    :", info["uuid"]
+print("cipher  :", info["cipher"])
+print("cmode   :", info["cipher_mode"])
+print("keysize :", info["keysize"])
+print("dir     :", info["dir"])
+print("device  :", info["device"])
+print("offset  :", info["offset"])
+print("name    :", info["name"])
+print("uuid    :", info["uuid"])
 # os.system("cryptsetup luksDump " + info["device"])
-print "deact.  :", c.deactivate()
+print("deact.  :", c.deactivate())
 
 del c
 
@@ -109,7 +111,7 @@ c = pycryptsetup.CryptSetup(
         logFunc = log,
         passwordDialog = askpassword)
 
-print "activate:", c.activate(name = DEVICE, passphrase = PASSWORD)
+print("activate:", c.activate(name = DEVICE, passphrase = PASSWORD))
 
 c2 = pycryptsetup.CryptSetup(
         name = DEVICE,
@@ -118,13 +120,13 @@ c2 = pycryptsetup.CryptSetup(
         passwordDialog = askpassword)
 
 info = c2.info()
-print "cipher  :", info["cipher"]
-print "cmode   :", info["cipher_mode"]
-print "keysize :", info["keysize"]
+print("cipher  :", info["cipher"])
+print("cmode   :", info["cipher_mode"])
+print("keysize :", info["keysize"])
 
-print "deact.  :", c.deactivate()
+print("deact.  :", c.deactivate())
 r = c2.deactivate()
-print "deact.  :", r
+print("deact.  :", r)
 del c
 del c2