Update README.md.

The old API is still supported and because we support very old
OpenSSL, this is the best wrokaround for the warnings.

Once we switch to the new OpenSSL version requirement, we can rewrite
HMAC to new EVP_MAC API.

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+po/*gmo
+*~
+Makefile
+Makefile.in
+Makefile.in.in
+*.lo
+*.la
+*.o
+**/*.dirstamp
+.deps/
+.libs/
+src/cryptsetup
+src/veritysetup
+ABOUT-NLS
+aclocal.m4
+autom4te.cache/
+compile
+config.guess
+config.h
+config.h.in
+config.log
+config.rpath
+config.status
+config.sub
+configure
+cryptsetup
+cryptsetup-reencrypt
+cryptsetup-ssh
+depcomp
+install-sh
+integritysetup
+lib/libcryptsetup.pc
+libtool
+ltmain.sh
+m4/
+missing
+po/Makevars.template
+po/POTFILES
+po/Rules-quot
+po/*.header
+po/*.sed
+po/*.sin
+po/stamp-po
+scripts/cryptsetup.conf
+stamp-h1
+veritysetup
+tests/valglog.*
+*/*.dirstamp
+*-debug-luks2-backup*
+tests/api-test
+tests/api-test-2
+tests/differ
+tests/luks1-images
+tests/tcrypt-images
+tests/unit-utils-io
+tests/vectors-test

.gitlab/issue_templates/Bug.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+### Issue description
+<!-- Please, shortly describe the issue here. -->
+
+### Steps for reproducing the issue
+<!-- How it can be reproduced? Include all important steps. -->
+
+### Additional info
+<!-- Please mention what distribution you are using. -->
+
+### Debug log
+<!-- Paste a debug log of the failing command (add --debug option) between the markers below (to keep raw debug format).-->
+```
+Output with --debug option:
+
+```

.gitlab/issue_templates/Documentation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+### Documentation issue
+<!-- Please, shortly describe the issue in documentation here. -->
+
+### Additional info
+<!-- Please mention what cryptsetup version you are using. -->

.gitlab/issue_templates/Feature.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+### New feature description
+<!-- Please, shortly describe the requested feature here. -->
+
+### Additional info
+<!-- Please mention what distribution and cryptsetup version you are using. -->

.travis-functions.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# .travis-functions.sh:
+#   - helper functions to be sourced from .travis.yml
+#   - designed to respect travis' environment but testing locally is possible
+#   - modified copy from util-linux project
+#
+
+if [ ! -f "configure.ac" ]; then
+	echo ".travis-functions.sh must be sourced from source dir" >&2
+	return 1 || exit 1
+fi
+
+## some config settings
+# travis docs say we get 1.5 CPUs
+MAKE="make -j2"
+DUMP_CONFIG_LOG="short"
+export TS_OPT_parsable="yes"
+
+export RUN_SSH_PLUGIN_TEST=1
+
+function configure_travis
+{
+	./configure "$@"
+	err=$?
+	if [ "$DUMP_CONFIG_LOG" = "short" ]; then
+		grep -B1 -A10000 "^## Output variables" config.log | grep -v "_FALSE="
+	elif [ "$DUMP_CONFIG_LOG" = "full" ]; then
+		cat config.log
+	fi
+	return $err
+}
+
+function check_nonroot
+{
+	local cfg_opts="$1"
+
+	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
+
+	configure_travis \
+		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
+		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
+		--enable-external-tokens \
+		--enable-ssh-token \
+		"$cfg_opts" \
+		|| return
+
+	$MAKE || return
+
+	make check
+}
+
+function check_root
+{
+	local cfg_opts="$1"
+
+	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
+
+	configure_travis \
+		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
+		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
+		--enable-external-tokens \
+		--enable-ssh-token \
+		"$cfg_opts" \
+		|| return
+
+	$MAKE || return
+
+	# FIXME: we should use -E option here
+	sudo make check
+}
+
+function check_nonroot_compile_only
+{
+	local cfg_opts="$1"
+
+	[ -z "$cfg_opts" ] && return
+
+	configure_travis \
+		--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt \
+		--enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
+		"$cfg_opts" \
+		|| return
+
+	$MAKE
+}
+
+function travis_install_script
+{
+	# install some packages from Ubuntu's default sources
+	sudo apt-get -qq update
+	sudo apt-get install -qq >/dev/null \
+		sharutils \
+		libgcrypt20-dev \
+		libssl-dev \
+		libdevmapper-dev \
+		libpopt-dev \
+		uuid-dev \
+		libsepol1-dev \
+		libtool \
+		dmsetup \
+		autoconf \
+		automake \
+		pkg-config \
+		autopoint \
+		gettext \
+		expect \
+		keyutils \
+		libjson-c-dev \
+		libblkid-dev \
+		dkms \
+		linux-headers-$(uname -r) \
+		linux-modules-extra-$(uname -r) \
+		libssh-dev \
+		sshpass \
+		|| return
+
+	# For VeraCrypt test
+	sudo apt-get install gost-crypto-dkms
+}
+
+function travis_before_script
+{
+	set -o xtrace
+
+	./autogen.sh
+	ret=$?
+
+	set +o xtrace
+	return $ret
+}
+
+function travis_script
+{
+	local ret
+	set -o xtrace
+
+	case "$MAKE_CHECK" in
+	gcrypt)
+		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt" && \
+		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt"
+		;;
+	gcrypt_compile)
+		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=gcrypt"
+		;;
+	openssl)
+		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=openssl" && \
+		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=openssl"
+		;;
+	openssl_compile)
+		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=openssl"
+		;;
+	kernel)
+		check_nonroot "--with-crypto_backend=kernel" && \
+		check_root "--with-crypto_backend=kernel"
+		;;
+	kernel_compile)
+		check_nonroot_compile_only "--with-crypto_backend=kernel"
+		;;
+	*)
+		echo "error, check environment (travis.yml)" >&2
+		false
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	ret=$?
+	set +o xtrace
+	return $ret
+}
+
+function travis_after_script
+{
+	return 0
+}

.travis.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+language: c
+
+sudo: required
+os: linux
+dist: focal
+group: edge
+
+compiler:
+  - gcc
+
+env:
+  # MAKE_CHECK="gcrypt"
+  - MAKE_CHECK="openssl"
+  # MAKE_CHECK="kernel"
+
+branches:
+  only:
+    - master
+    - wip-luks2
+    - v2.3.x
+
+before_install:
+  - uname -a
+  - $CC --version
+  - which $CC
+  # workaround clang not system wide, fail on sudo make install
+  - export CC=`which $CC`
+  # workaround travis-ci issue #5301
+  - unset PYTHON_CFLAGS
+
+install:
+  - source ./.travis-functions.sh
+  - travis_install_script
+
+before_script:
+  - travis_before_script
+
+script:
+  - travis_script
+
+after_script:
+  - travis_after_script

AUTHORS

@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
-Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>

COPYING

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-		    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
-		       Version 2, June 1991
+                    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+                       Version 2, June 1991
 
- Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-     59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
+ Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
  Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
  of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
 
-			    Preamble
+                            Preamble
 
   The licenses for most software are designed to take away your
 freedom to share and change it.  By contrast, the GNU General Public
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ software--to make sure the software is free for all its users.  This
 General Public License applies to most of the Free Software
 Foundation's software and to any other program whose authors commit to
 using it.  (Some other Free Software Foundation software is covered by
-the GNU Library General Public License instead.)  You can apply it to
+the GNU Lesser General Public License instead.)  You can apply it to
 your programs, too.
 
   When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ patent must be licensed for everyone's free use or not licensed at all.
 
   The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
 modification follow.
-
-		    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+
+                    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
    TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
 
   0. This License applies to any program or other work which contains
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ above, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:
     License.  (Exception: if the Program itself is interactive but
     does not normally print such an announcement, your work based on
     the Program is not required to print an announcement.)
-
+
 These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole.  If
 identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the Program,
 and can be reasonably considered independent and separate works in
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ access to copy from a designated place, then offering equivalent
 access to copy the source code from the same place counts as
 distribution of the source code, even though third parties are not
 compelled to copy the source along with the object code.
-
+
   4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Program
 except as expressly provided under this License.  Any attempt
 otherwise to copy, modify, sublicense or distribute the Program is
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ impose that choice.
 
 This section is intended to make thoroughly clear what is believed to
 be a consequence of the rest of this License.
-
+
   8. If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in
 certain countries either by patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the
 original copyright holder who places the Program under this License
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ make exceptions for this.  Our decision will be guided by the two goals
 of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free software and
 of promoting the sharing and reuse of software generally.
 
-			    NO WARRANTY
+                            NO WARRANTY
 
   11. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
 FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
@@ -277,9 +277,9 @@ YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
 PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
 POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
 
-		     END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
-
-	    How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
+                     END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
+
+            How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
 
   If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest
 possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it
@@ -303,17 +303,16 @@ the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
     MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
     GNU General Public License for more details.
 
-    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-    along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
-    Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
-
+    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+    with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+    51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
 
 Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
 
 If the program is interactive, make it output a short notice like this
 when it starts in an interactive mode:
 
-    Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) year  name of author
+    Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) year name of author
     Gnomovision comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
     This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
     under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
@@ -336,5 +335,20 @@ necessary.  Here is a sample; alter the names:
 This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into
 proprietary programs.  If your program is a subroutine library, you may
 consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the
-library.  If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Library General
+library.  If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General
 Public License instead of this License.
+
+-----
+In addition, as a special exception, the copyright holders give
+permission to link the code of portions of this program with the
+OpenSSL library under certain conditions as described in each
+individual source file, and distribute linked combinations
+including the two.
+
+You must obey the GNU General Public License in all respects
+for all of the code used other than OpenSSL.  If you modify
+file(s) with this exception, you may extend this exception to your
+version of the file(s), but you are not obligated to do so.  If you
+do not wish to do so, delete this exception statement from your
+version.  If you delete this exception statement from all source
+files in the program, then also delete it here.

COPYING.LGPL

@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+                  GNU LESSER GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+                       Version 2.1, February 1999
+
+ Copyright (C) 1991, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA  02110-1301  USA
+ Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
+ of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
+
+[This is the first released version of the Lesser GPL.  It also counts
+ as the successor of the GNU Library Public License, version 2, hence
+ the version number 2.1.]
+
+                            Preamble
+
+  The licenses for most software are designed to take away your
+freedom to share and change it.  By contrast, the GNU General Public
+Licenses are intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change
+free software--to make sure the software is free for all its users.
+
+  This license, the Lesser General Public License, applies to some
+specially designated software packages--typically libraries--of the
+Free Software Foundation and other authors who decide to use it.  You
+can use it too, but we suggest you first think carefully about whether
+this license or the ordinary General Public License is the better
+strategy to use in any particular case, based on the explanations below.
+
+  When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom of use,
+not price.  Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that
+you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge
+for this service if you wish); that you receive source code or can get
+it if you want it; that you can change the software and use pieces of
+it in new free programs; and that you are informed that you can do
+these things.
+
+  To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid
+distributors to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender these
+rights.  These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for
+you if you distribute copies of the library or if you modify it.
+
+  For example, if you distribute copies of the library, whether gratis
+or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that we gave
+you.  You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the source
+code.  If you link other code with the library, you must provide
+complete object files to the recipients, so that they can relink them
+with the library after making changes to the library and recompiling
+it.  And you must show them these terms so they know their rights.
+
+  We protect your rights with a two-step method: (1) we copyright the
+library, and (2) we offer you this license, which gives you legal
+permission to copy, distribute and/or modify the library.
+
+  To protect each distributor, we want to make it very clear that
+there is no warranty for the free library.  Also, if the library is
+modified by someone else and passed on, the recipients should know
+that what they have is not the original version, so that the original
+author's reputation will not be affected by problems that might be
+introduced by others.
+
+  Finally, software patents pose a constant threat to the existence of
+any free program.  We wish to make sure that a company cannot
+effectively restrict the users of a free program by obtaining a
+restrictive license from a patent holder.  Therefore, we insist that
+any patent license obtained for a version of the library must be
+consistent with the full freedom of use specified in this license.
+
+  Most GNU software, including some libraries, is covered by the
+ordinary GNU General Public License.  This license, the GNU Lesser
+General Public License, applies to certain designated libraries, and
+is quite different from the ordinary General Public License.  We use
+this license for certain libraries in order to permit linking those
+libraries into non-free programs.
+
+  When a program is linked with a library, whether statically or using
+a shared library, the combination of the two is legally speaking a
+combined work, a derivative of the original library.  The ordinary
+General Public License therefore permits such linking only if the
+entire combination fits its criteria of freedom.  The Lesser General
+Public License permits more lax criteria for linking other code with
+the library.
+
+  We call this license the "Lesser" General Public License because it
+does Less to protect the user's freedom than the ordinary General
+Public License.  It also provides other free software developers Less
+of an advantage over competing non-free programs.  These disadvantages
+are the reason we use the ordinary General Public License for many
+libraries.  However, the Lesser license provides advantages in certain
+special circumstances.
+
+  For example, on rare occasions, there may be a special need to
+encourage the widest possible use of a certain library, so that it becomes
+a de-facto standard.  To achieve this, non-free programs must be
+allowed to use the library.  A more frequent case is that a free
+library does the same job as widely used non-free libraries.  In this
+case, there is little to gain by limiting the free library to free
+software only, so we use the Lesser General Public License.
+
+  In other cases, permission to use a particular library in non-free
+programs enables a greater number of people to use a large body of
+free software.  For example, permission to use the GNU C Library in
+non-free programs enables many more people to use the whole GNU
+operating system, as well as its variant, the GNU/Linux operating
+system.
+
+  Although the Lesser General Public License is Less protective of the
+users' freedom, it does ensure that the user of a program that is
+linked with the Library has the freedom and the wherewithal to run
+that program using a modified version of the Library.
+
+  The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
+modification follow.  Pay close attention to the difference between a
+"work based on the library" and a "work that uses the library".  The
+former contains code derived from the library, whereas the latter must
+be combined with the library in order to run.
+
+                  GNU LESSER GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
+   TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
+
+  0. This License Agreement applies to any software library or other
+program which contains a notice placed by the copyright holder or
+other authorized party saying it may be distributed under the terms of
+this Lesser General Public License (also called "this License").
+Each licensee is addressed as "you".
+
+  A "library" means a collection of software functions and/or data
+prepared so as to be conveniently linked with application programs
+(which use some of those functions and data) to form executables.
+
+  The "Library", below, refers to any such software library or work
+which has been distributed under these terms.  A "work based on the
+Library" means either the Library or any derivative work under
+copyright law: that is to say, a work containing the Library or a
+portion of it, either verbatim or with modifications and/or translated
+straightforwardly into another language.  (Hereinafter, translation is
+included without limitation in the term "modification".)
+
+  "Source code" for a work means the preferred form of the work for
+making modifications to it.  For a library, complete source code means
+all the source code for all modules it contains, plus any associated
+interface definition files, plus the scripts used to control compilation
+and installation of the library.
+
+  Activities other than copying, distribution and modification are not
+covered by this License; they are outside its scope.  The act of
+running a program using the Library is not restricted, and output from
+such a program is covered only if its contents constitute a work based
+on the Library (independent of the use of the Library in a tool for
+writing it).  Whether that is true depends on what the Library does
+and what the program that uses the Library does.
+
+  1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Library's
+complete source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that
+you conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy an
+appropriate copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty; keep intact
+all the notices that refer to this License and to the absence of any
+warranty; and distribute a copy of this License along with the
+Library.
+
+  You may charge a fee for the physical act of transferring a copy,
+and you may at your option offer warranty protection in exchange for a
+fee.
+
+  2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Library or any portion
+of it, thus forming a work based on the Library, and copy and
+distribute such modifications or work under the terms of Section 1
+above, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:
+
+    a) The modified work must itself be a software library.
+
+    b) You must cause the files modified to carry prominent notices
+    stating that you changed the files and the date of any change.
+
+    c) You must cause the whole of the work to be licensed at no
+    charge to all third parties under the terms of this License.
+
+    d) If a facility in the modified Library refers to a function or a
+    table of data to be supplied by an application program that uses
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+    in the event an application does not supply such function or
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+    its purpose remains meaningful.
+
+    (For example, a function in a library to compute square roots has
+    a purpose that is entirely well-defined independent of the
+    application.  Therefore, Subsection 2d requires that any
+    application-supplied function or table used by this function must
+    be optional: if the application does not supply it, the square
+    root function must still compute square roots.)
+
+These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole.  If
+identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the Library,
+and can be reasonably considered independent and separate works in
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+on the Library, the distribution of the whole must be on the terms of
+this License, whose permissions for other licensees extend to the
+entire whole, and thus to each and every part regardless of who wrote
+it.
+
+Thus, it is not the intent of this section to claim rights or contest
+your rights to work written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to
+exercise the right to control the distribution of derivative or
+collective works based on the Library.
+
+In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Library
+with the Library (or with a work based on the Library) on a volume of
+a storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under
+the scope of this License.
+
+  3. You may opt to apply the terms of the ordinary GNU General Public
+License instead of this License to a given copy of the Library.  To do
+this, you must alter all the notices that refer to this License, so
+that they refer to the ordinary GNU General Public License, version 2,
+instead of to this License.  (If a newer version than version 2 of the
+ordinary GNU General Public License has appeared, then you can specify
+that version instead if you wish.)  Do not make any other change in
+these notices.
+
+  Once this change is made in a given copy, it is irreversible for
+that copy, so the ordinary GNU General Public License applies to all
+subsequent copies and derivative works made from that copy.
+
+  This option is useful when you wish to copy part of the code of
+the Library into a program that is not a library.
+
+  4. You may copy and distribute the Library (or a portion or
+derivative of it, under Section 2) in object code or executable form
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+
+  If distribution of object code is made by offering access to copy
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+
+  5. A program that contains no derivative of any portion of the
+Library, but is designed to work with the Library by being compiled or
+linked with it, is called a "work that uses the Library".  Such a
+work, in isolation, is not a derivative work of the Library, and
+therefore falls outside the scope of this License.
+
+  However, linking a "work that uses the Library" with the Library
+creates an executable that is a derivative of the Library (because it
+contains portions of the Library), rather than a "work that uses the
+library".  The executable is therefore covered by this License.
+Section 6 states terms for distribution of such executables.
+
+  When a "work that uses the Library" uses material from a header file
+that is part of the Library, the object code for the work may be a
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+threshold for this to be true is not precisely defined by law.
+
+  If such an object file uses only numerical parameters, data
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+work.  (Executables containing this object code plus portions of the
+Library will still fall under Section 6.)
+
+  Otherwise, if the work is a derivative of the Library, you may
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+                     END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
+
+           How to Apply These Terms to Your New Libraries
+
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+possible use to the public, we recommend making it free software that
+everyone can redistribute and change.  You can do so by permitting
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+
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+    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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+    Lesser General Public License for more details.
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+
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+
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+
+  <signature of Ty Coon>, 1 April 1990
+  Ty Coon, President of Vice
+
+That's all there is to it!
+
+-----
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+
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+do not wish to do so, delete this exception statement from your
+version.  If you delete this exception statement from all source
+files in the program, then also delete it here.

INSTALL

@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
-Copyright 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software
-Foundation, Inc.
-
-   This file is free documentation; the Free Software Foundation gives
-unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
-
-Basic Installation
-==================
-
-   These are generic installation instructions.
-
-   The `configure' shell script attempts to guess correct values for
-various system-dependent variables used during compilation.  It uses
-those values to create a `Makefile' in each directory of the package.
-It may also create one or more `.h' files containing system-dependent
-definitions.  Finally, it creates a shell script `config.status' that
-you can run in the future to recreate the current configuration, and a
-file `config.log' containing compiler output (useful mainly for
-debugging `configure').
-
-   It can also use an optional file (typically called `config.cache'
-and enabled with `--cache-file=config.cache' or simply `-C') that saves
-the results of its tests to speed up reconfiguring.  (Caching is
-disabled by default to prevent problems with accidental use of stale
-cache files.)
-
-   If you need to do unusual things to compile the package, please try
-to figure out how `configure' could check whether to do them, and mail
-diffs or instructions to the address given in the `README' so they can
-be considered for the next release.  If you are using the cache, and at
-some point `config.cache' contains results you don't want to keep, you
-may remove or edit it.
-
-   The file `configure.ac' (or `configure.in') is used to create
-`configure' by a program called `autoconf'.  You only need
-`configure.ac' if you want to change it or regenerate `configure' using
-a newer version of `autoconf'.
-
-The simplest way to compile this package is:
-
-  1. `cd' to the directory containing the package's source code and type
-     `./configure' to configure the package for your system.  If you're
-     using `csh' on an old version of System V, you might need to type
-     `sh ./configure' instead to prevent `csh' from trying to execute
-     `configure' itself.
-
-     Running `configure' takes awhile.  While running, it prints some
-     messages telling which features it is checking for.
-
-  2. Type `make' to compile the package.
-
-  3. Optionally, type `make check' to run any self-tests that come with
-     the package.
-
-  4. Type `make install' to install the programs and any data files and
-     documentation.
-
-  5. You can remove the program binaries and object files from the
-     source code directory by typing `make clean'.  To also remove the
-     files that `configure' created (so you can compile the package for
-     a different kind of computer), type `make distclean'.  There is
-     also a `make maintainer-clean' target, but that is intended mainly
-     for the package's developers.  If you use it, you may have to get
-     all sorts of other programs in order to regenerate files that came
-     with the distribution.
-
-Compilers and Options
-=====================
-
-   Some systems require unusual options for compilation or linking that
-the `configure' script does not know about.  Run `./configure --help'
-for details on some of the pertinent environment variables.
-
-   You can give `configure' initial values for configuration parameters
-by setting variables in the command line or in the environment.  Here
-is an example:
-
-     ./configure CC=c89 CFLAGS=-O2 LIBS=-lposix
-
-   *Note Defining Variables::, for more details.
-
-Compiling For Multiple Architectures
-====================================
-
-   You can compile the package for more than one kind of computer at the
-same time, by placing the object files for each architecture in their
-own directory.  To do this, you must use a version of `make' that
-supports the `VPATH' variable, such as GNU `make'.  `cd' to the
-directory where you want the object files and executables to go and run
-the `configure' script.  `configure' automatically checks for the
-source code in the directory that `configure' is in and in `..'.
-
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-variable, you have to compile the package for one architecture at a
-time in the source code directory.  After you have installed the
-package for one architecture, use `make distclean' before reconfiguring
-for another architecture.
-
-Installation Names
-==================
-
-   By default, `make install' will install the package's files in
-`/usr/local/bin', `/usr/local/man', etc.  You can specify an
-installation prefix other than `/usr/local' by giving `configure' the
-option `--prefix=PATH'.
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-PATH as the prefix for installing programs and libraries.
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-
-   In addition, if you use an unusual directory layout you can give
-options like `--bindir=PATH' to specify different values for particular
-kinds of files.  Run `configure --help' for a list of the directories
-you can set and what kinds of files go in them.
-
-   If the package supports it, you can cause programs to be installed
-with an extra prefix or suffix on their names by giving `configure' the
-option `--program-prefix=PREFIX' or `--program-suffix=SUFFIX'.
-
-Optional Features
-=================
-
-   Some packages pay attention to `--enable-FEATURE' options to
-`configure', where FEATURE indicates an optional part of the package.
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-package recognizes.
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-you can use the `configure' options `--x-includes=DIR' and
-`--x-libraries=DIR' to specify their locations.
-
-Specifying the System Type
-==========================
-
-   There may be some features `configure' cannot figure out
-automatically, but needs to determine by the type of machine the package
-will run on.  Usually, assuming the package is built to be run on the
-_same_ architectures, `configure' can figure that out, but if it prints
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-
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-
-where SYSTEM can have one of these forms:
-
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-
-   See the file `config.sub' for the possible values of each field.  If
-`config.sub' isn't included in this package, then this package doesn't
-need to know the machine type.
-
-   If you are _building_ compiler tools for cross-compiling, you should
-use the `--target=TYPE' option to select the type of system they will
-produce code for.
-
-   If you want to _use_ a cross compiler, that generates code for a
-platform different from the build platform, you should specify the
-"host" platform (i.e., that on which the generated programs will
-eventually be run) with `--host=TYPE'.
-
-Sharing Defaults
-================
-
-   If you want to set default values for `configure' scripts to share,
-you can create a site shell script called `config.site' that gives
-default values for variables like `CC', `cache_file', and `prefix'.
-`configure' looks for `PREFIX/share/config.site' if it exists, then
-`PREFIX/etc/config.site' if it exists.  Or, you can set the
-`CONFIG_SITE' environment variable to the location of the site script.
-A warning: not all `configure' scripts look for a site script.
-
-Defining Variables
-==================
-
-   Variables not defined in a site shell script can be set in the
-environment passed to `configure'.  However, some packages may run
-configure again during the build, and the customized values of these
-variables may be lost.  In order to avoid this problem, you should set
-them in the `configure' command line, using `VAR=value'.  For example:
-
-     ./configure CC=/usr/local2/bin/gcc
-
-will cause the specified gcc to be used as the C compiler (unless it is
-overridden in the site shell script).
-
-`configure' Invocation
-======================
-
-   `configure' recognizes the following options to control how it
-operates.
-
-`--help'
-`-h'
-     Print a summary of the options to `configure', and exit.
-
-`--version'
-`-V'
-     Print the version of Autoconf used to generate the `configure'
-     script, and exit.
-
-`--cache-file=FILE'
-     Enable the cache: use and save the results of the tests in FILE,
-     traditionally `config.cache'.  FILE defaults to `/dev/null' to
-     disable caching.
-
-`--config-cache'
-`-C'
-     Alias for `--cache-file=config.cache'.
-
-`--quiet'
-`--silent'
-`-q'
-     Do not print messages saying which checks are being made.  To
-     suppress all normal output, redirect it to `/dev/null' (any error
-     messages will still be shown).
-
-`--srcdir=DIR'
-     Look for the package's source code in directory DIR.  Usually
-     `configure' can determine that directory automatically.
-
-`configure' also accepts some other, not widely useful, options.  Run
-`configure --help' for more details.
-

Makefile.am

@@ -1,9 +1,56 @@
-SUBDIRS = \
-	luks \
-	lib \
-	src \
-	man \
-	tests \
-	po
+EXTRA_DIST = README.md COPYING.LGPL FAQ docs misc
+SUBDIRS = po tests
+CLEANFILES =
+DISTCLEAN_TARGETS =
+
+AM_CPPFLAGS = \
+	-include config.h \
+	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib \
+        -DDATADIR=\""$(datadir)"\"              \
+        -DLOCALEDIR=\""$(datadir)/locale"\"     \
+        -DLIBDIR=\""$(libdir)"\"                \
+        -DPREFIX=\""$(prefix)"\"                \
+        -DSYSCONFDIR=\""$(sysconfdir)"\"        \
+        -DVERSION=\""$(VERSION)"\"              \
+        -DEXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH=\"${EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH}\"
+AM_CFLAGS = -Wall
+AM_LDFLAGS =
+
+LDADD = $(LTLIBINTL) -lm
+
+tmpfilesddir = @DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR@
+
+include_HEADERS =
+lib_LTLIBRARIES =
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES =
+sbin_PROGRAMS =
+man8_MANS =
+tmpfilesd_DATA =
+pkgconfig_DATA =
+
+include man/Makemodule.am
+
+include scripts/Makemodule.am
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2
+include lib/crypto_backend/argon2/Makemodule.am
+endif
+include lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am
+include lib/Makemodule.am
+
+include src/Makemodule.am
+include tokens/Makemodule.am
 
 ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4
+
+DISTCHECK_CONFIGURE_FLAGS = 	\
+	--with-tmpfilesdir=$$dc_install_base/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d \
+	--enable-internal-argon2 --enable-internal-sse-argon2 \
+	--enable-external-tokens --enable-ssh-token
+
+distclean-local:
+	-find . -name \*~ -o -name \*.orig -o -name \*.rej | xargs rm -f
+	rm -rf autom4te.cache
+
+clean-local:
+	-rm -rf docs/doxygen_api_docs libargon2.la

README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+![LUKS logo](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/luks-logo.png)
+
+What the ...?
+=============
+**Cryptsetup** is a utility used to conveniently set up disk encryption based
+on the [DMCrypt](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt) kernel module.
+
+These include **plain** **dm-crypt** volumes, **LUKS** volumes, **loop-AES**,
+**TrueCrypt** (including **VeraCrypt** extension) and **BitLocker** formats.
+
+The project also includes a **veritysetup** utility used to conveniently setup
+[DMVerity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity) block integrity checking kernel module
+and **integritysetup** to setup
+[DMIntegrity](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMIntegrity) block integrity kernel module.
+
+
+LUKS Design
+-----------
+**LUKS** is the standard for Linux hard disk encryption. By providing a standard on-disk-format, it does not  
+only facilitate compatibility among distributions, but also provides secure management of multiple user passwords.  
+LUKS stores all necessary setup information in the partition header, enabling to transport or migrate data seamlessly.
+
+Last version of the LUKS2 format specification is
+[available here](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs).
+
+Last version of the LUKS1 format specification is
+[available here](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/LUKS_docs/on-disk-format.pdf).
+
+Why LUKS?
+---------
+ * compatibility via standardization,
+ * secure against low entropy attacks,
+ * support for multiple keys,
+ * effective passphrase revocation,
+ * free.
+
+[Project home page](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/).
+-----------------
+
+[Frequently asked questions (FAQ)](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions)
+--------------------------------
+
+Download
+--------
+All release tarballs and release notes are hosted on [kernel.org](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/).
+
+**The latest release candidate cryptsetup version is 2.4.0-rc0**
+  * [cryptsetup-2.4.0-rc0.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/cryptsetup-2.4.0-rc0.tar.xz)
+  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.4.0-rc0.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/cryptsetup-2.4.0-rc0.tar.sign)
+    _(You need to decompress file first to check signature.)_
+  * [Cryptsetup 2.4.0-rc0 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.4/v2.4.0-rc0-ReleaseNotes).
+
+**The latest stable cryptsetup version is 2.3.6**
+  * [cryptsetup-2.3.6.tar.xz](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.6.tar.xz)
+  * Signature [cryptsetup-2.3.6.tar.sign](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/cryptsetup-2.3.6.tar.sign)
+    _(You need to decompress file first to check signature.)_
+  * [Cryptsetup 2.3.6 Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.3/v2.3.6-ReleaseNotes).
+
+Previous versions
+ * [Version 2.0.6](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.6.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-2.0.6.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/v2.0.6-ReleaseNotes).
+ * [Version 1.7.5](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.5.tar.xz) -
+   [Signature](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/cryptsetup-1.7.5.tar.sign) -
+   [Release Notes](https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v1.7/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes).
+
+Source and API docs
+-------------------
+For development version code, please refer to [source](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/tree/master) page,
+mirror on [kernel.org](https://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.git/) or [GitHub](https://github.com/mbroz/cryptsetup).
+
+For libcryptsetup documentation see [libcryptsetup API](https://mbroz.fedorapeople.org/libcryptsetup_API/) page.
+
+The libcryptsetup API/ABI changes are tracked in [compatibility report](https://abi-laboratory.pro/tracker/timeline/cryptsetup/).
+
+NLS PO files are maintained by [TranslationProject](https://translationproject.org/domain/cryptsetup.html).
+
+Required packages
+-----------------
+All distributions provide cryptsetup as distro package. If you need to compile cryptsetup youfself, some packages are required for compilation. Please always prefer distro specific build tools to manually configuring cryptsetup.
+Fo available compile options, check ``configure --help`` for more info. If you are using a git snapshot, you need to generate configure script with ``autogen.sh`` script.
+
+Here is the list of packages needed for the compilation of project for particular distributions:
+ * For Fedora: `git gcc make autoconf automake gettext-devel pkgconfig openssl-devel popt-devel device-mapper-devel libuuid-devel json-c-devel libblkid-devel findutils libtool libssh-devel tar`. Optionally `libargon2-devel libpwquality-devel`. To run internal testsuite you also need `sharutils device-mapper jq vim-common expect keyutils netcat shadow-utils openssh-clients openssh sshpass`.
+
+ * For Debian and Ubuntu: `git gcc make autoconf automake autopoint pkg-config libtool gettext libssl-dev libdevmapper-dev libpopt-dev uuid-dev libsepol1-dev libjson-c-dev libssh-dev libblkid-dev tar`. Optionally `libargon2-0-dev libpwquality-dev`. To run internal testsuite you also need `sharutils dmsetup jq xxd expect keyutils netcat passwd openssh-client sshpass`
+
+Note that the list could change as distributions evolve.
+
+Help!
+-----
+Please always read [FAQ](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions) first.
+For cryptsetup and LUKS related questions, please use the dm-crypt mailing list, [dm-crypt@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt@saout.de).
+
+If you want to subscribe just send an empty mail to [dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de](mailto:dm-crypt-subscribe@saout.de).
+
+You can also browse [list archive](https://www.saout.de/pipermail/dm-crypt/) or read and search it through
+[web interface on lore.kernel.org](https://lore.kernel.org/dm-crypt/) or alternatively on [marc.info](https://marc.info/?l=dm-crypt).

TODO

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-For 1.02
-
-* Add LUKS key copy cmd: luksKeyCopy
-* Add option to supply a master key directly. For LUKS commands: luksFormat, luksOpen and luksAddKey.
-
-For 2.0
-
-* LUKS header version bump:
-  * Add LUKS partition footer. 
-    * change luks_write_phdr stuff.
-    * change luks_read_phdr stuff
-  * change hashing according to conversation with Sarah.

acinclude.m4

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-dnl MODULE_HELPER(NAME, HELP, DEFAULT, COMMANDS)
-AC_DEFUN([MODULE_HELPER],[
-	unset have_module
-	AC_ARG_ENABLE([$1], [$2],,[
-		if test "x${enable_all}" = "xdefault"; then
-			enable_[$1]=[$3]
-		else
-			enable_[$1]="${enable_all}"
-		fi
-	])
-	if test "x${enable_[$1]}" != "xno"; then
-		$4
-		AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build $1 module])
-		if test -n "${have_module+set}"; then
-			if test "x${enable_[$1]}" = "xauto"; then
-				if test "x${enable_plugins}" != "xno"; then
-					AC_MSG_RESULT([yes, as plugin]) 
-					build_static=no
-					build_shared=yes
-				else
-					AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) 
-					build_static=yes
-					build_shared=no
-				fi
-			elif test "x${enable_[$1]}" = "xshared"; then
-				if test "x${enable_plugins}" != "xno"; then
-					AC_MSG_RESULT([yes, as plugin]) 
-					build_static=no
-					build_shared=yes
-				else
-					AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) 
-					AC_MSG_ERROR([Can't build [$1] module, plugins are disabled])
-				fi
-			else
-				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) 
-				build_static=yes
-				build_shared=no
-			fi
-		elif test "x${enable_[$1]}" != "xauto"; then
-			AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) 
-			AC_MSG_ERROR([Unable to build $1 plugin, see messages above])
-		else	
-			AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) 
-			build_static=no
-			build_shared=no
-		fi
-	else
-		AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build $1 module])
-		AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) 
-		build_static=no
-		build_shared=no
-	fi
-])

autogen.sh

@@ -9,25 +9,31 @@ DIE=0
 (autopoint --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
   echo "**Error**: You must have autopoint installed."
-  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution,"
-  echo "or see http://www.gnu.org/software/gettext"
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
   DIE=1
 }
 
+
+(msgfmt --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+  echo
+  echo "**Warning**: You should have gettext installed."
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
+  echo "To disable translation, you can also use --disable-nls"
+  echo "configure option."
+}
+
 (autoconf --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
-  echo "**Error**: You must have autoconf installed to."
-  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution,"
-  echo "or get the source tarball at ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
+  echo "**Error**: You must have autoconf installed."
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
   DIE=1
 }
 
-(grep "^AM_PROG_LIBTOOL" $srcdir/configure.in >/dev/null) && {
+(grep "^AM_PROG_LIBTOOL" $srcdir/configure.ac >/dev/null) && {
   (libtool --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
     echo
     echo "**Error**: You must have libtool installed."
-    echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
-    echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
+    echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
     DIE=1
   }
 }
@@ -35,8 +41,7 @@ DIE=0
 (automake --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
   echo "**Error**: You must have automake installed."
-  echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
-  echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
+  echo "Download the appropriate package for your distribution."
   DIE=1
   NO_AUTOMAKE=yes
 }
@@ -47,8 +52,6 @@ test -n "$NO_AUTOMAKE" || (aclocal --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
   echo
   echo "**Error**: Missing aclocal.  The version of automake"
   echo "installed doesn't appear recent enough."
-  echo "Get ftp://ftp.gnu.org/pub/gnu/"
-  echo "(or a newer version if it is available)"
   DIE=1
 }
 
@@ -56,13 +59,6 @@ if test "$DIE" -eq 1; then
   exit 1
 fi
 
-if test -z "$*"; then
-  echo
-  echo "**Warning**: I am going to run 'configure' with no arguments."
-  echo "If you wish to pass any to it, please specify them on the"
-  echo \'$0\'" command line."
-fi
-
 echo
 echo "Generate build-system by:"
 echo "   autopoint:  $(autopoint --version | head -1)"
@@ -78,13 +74,9 @@ autopoint --force $AP_OPTS
 libtoolize --force --copy
 aclocal -I m4 $AL_OPTS
 autoheader $AH_OPTS
-automake --add-missing --gnu $AM_OPTS
+automake --add-missing --copy --gnu $AM_OPTS
 autoconf $AC_OPTS
 
-if test x$NOCONFIGURE = x; then
-  echo Running $srcdir/configure $conf_flags "$@" ...
-  $srcdir/configure $conf_flags "$@" \
-  && echo Now type \`make\' to compile $PKG_NAME
-else
-  echo Skipping configure process.
-fi
+echo
+echo "Now type '$srcdir/configure' and 'make' to compile."
+echo

configure.ac

@@ -0,0 +1,691 @@
+AC_PREREQ([2.67])
+AC_INIT([cryptsetup],[2.4.0-rc0])
+
+dnl library version from <major>.<minor>.<release>[-<suffix>]
+LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION=$(echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | cut -f1 -d-)
+LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=19:0:7
+
+AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
+AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR(src/cryptsetup.c)
+AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
+
+AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h:config.h.in])
+
+# We do not want to run test in parallel. Really.
+# http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/automake/2013-01/msg00060.html
+
+# For old automake use this
+#AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(dist-xz subdir-objects)
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([dist-xz 1.12 serial-tests subdir-objects foreign])
+
+if test "x$prefix" = "xNONE"; then
+	sysconfdir=/etc
+fi
+AC_PREFIX_DEFAULT(/usr)
+
+AC_CANONICAL_HOST
+AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS
+AC_PROG_CC
+AM_PROG_CC_C_O
+AC_PROG_CPP
+AC_PROG_INSTALL
+AC_PROG_MAKE_SET
+AC_ENABLE_STATIC(no)
+LT_INIT
+PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
+AM_ICONV
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl define PKG_CHECK_VAR for old pkg-config <= 0.28
+m4_ifndef([AS_VAR_COPY],
+[m4_define([AS_VAR_COPY],
+[AS_LITERAL_IF([$1[]$2], [$1=$$2], [eval $1=\$$2])])
+])
+m4_ifndef([PKG_CHECK_VAR], [
+AC_DEFUN([PKG_CHECK_VAR],
+[AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])
+AC_ARG_VAR([$1], [value of $3 for $2, overriding pkg-config])
+
+_PKG_CONFIG([$1], [variable="][$3]["], [$2])
+AS_VAR_COPY([$1], [pkg_cv_][$1])
+
+AS_VAR_IF([$1], [""], [$5], [$4])
+])
+])
+dnl ==========================================================================
+
+AC_C_RESTRICT
+
+AC_HEADER_DIRENT
+AC_HEADER_STDC
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
+	sys/sysmacros.h sys/statvfs.h ctype.h unistd.h locale.h byteswap.h endian.h stdint.h)
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_CLOEXEC],,[AC_DEFINE([O_CLOEXEC],[0], [Defined to 0 if not provided])],
+[[
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+]])
+
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(uuid/uuid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
+AC_CHECK_HEADER(libdevmapper.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the device-mapper library.])])
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([keyring],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-keyring], [disable kernel keyring support and builtin kernel keyring token]),
+	[], [enable_keyring=yes])
+if test "x$enable_keyring" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/keyctl.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with kernel keyring service compiled.])])
+
+	dnl ==========================================================================
+	dnl check whether kernel is compiled with kernel keyring service syscalls
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_add_key,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing add_key syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_keyctl,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing keyctl syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(__NR_request_key,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([The kernel is missing request_key syscall.])], [#include <syscall.h>])
+
+	dnl ==========================================================================
+	dnl check that key_serial_t hasn't been adopted yet in stdlib
+	AC_CHECK_TYPES([key_serial_t], [], [], [
+	AC_INCLUDES_DEFAULT
+	#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_KEYCTL_H
+	# include <linux/keyctl.h>
+	#endif
+	])
+
+	AC_DEFINE(KERNEL_KEYRING, 1, [Enable kernel keyring service support])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(KERNEL_KEYRING, test "x$enable_keyring" = "xyes")
+
+saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+AC_CHECK_LIB(uuid, uuid_clear, ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the uuid library.])])
+AC_SUBST(UUID_LIBS, $LIBS)
+LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime],[rt posix4])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign clock_gettime posix_fallocate explicit_bzero])
+
+if test "x$enable_largefile" = "xno"; then
+  AC_MSG_ERROR([Building with --disable-largefile is not supported, it can cause data corruption.])
+fi
+
+AC_C_CONST
+AC_C_BIGENDIAN
+AC_TYPE_OFF_T
+AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
+AC_FUNC_FSEEKO
+AC_PROG_GCC_TRADITIONAL
+AC_FUNC_STRERROR_R
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl LUKS2 external tokens
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([external-tokens],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-external-tokens], [disable external LUKS2 tokens]),
+	[], [enable_external_tokens=yes])
+if test "x$enable_external_tokens" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_EXTERNAL_TOKENS, 1, [Use external tokens])
+fi
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([ssh-token],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-ssh-token], [disable LUKS2 ssh-token]),
+	[], [enable_ssh_token=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(SSHPLUGIN_TOKEN, test "x$enable_ssh_token" = "xyes")
+
+if test "x$enable_ssh_token" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_external_tokens" = "xno"; then
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([Requested LUKS2 ssh-token build, but external tokens are disabled.])
+fi
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+
+AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external],[need-ngettext])
+AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.18.3])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+
+saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+AC_CHECK_LIB(popt, poptConfigFileToString,,
+	[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need popt 1.7 or newer to compile.])])
+AC_SUBST(POPT_LIBS, $LIBS)
+LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl FIPS extensions
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([fips],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fips], [enable FIPS mode restrictions]))
+if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_FIPS, 1, [Enable FIPS mode restrictions])
+
+	if test "x$enable_static" = "xyes" -o "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Static build is not compatible with FIPS.])
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_DEFUN([NO_FIPS], [
+	if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([This option is not compatible with FIPS.])
+	fi
+])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl pwquality library (cryptsetup CLI only)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([pwquality],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-pwquality], [enable password quality checking using pwquality library]))
+
+if test "x$enable_pwquality" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PWQUALITY, 1, [Enable password quality checking using pwquality library])
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([PWQUALITY], [pwquality >= 1.0.0],,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need pwquality library.]))
+
+	dnl FIXME: this is really hack for now
+	PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS="$PWQUALITY_LIBS -lcrack -lz"
+fi
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl passwdqc library (cryptsetup CLI only)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([passwdqc],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-passwdqc@<:@=CONFIG_PATH@:>@],
+		       [enable password quality checking using passwdqc library (optionally with CONFIG_PATH)]))
+
+case "$enable_passwdqc" in
+	""|yes|no) use_passwdqc_config="" ;;
+	/*) use_passwdqc_config="$enable_passwdqc"; enable_passwdqc=yes ;;
+	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unrecognized --enable-passwdqc parameter.]) ;;
+esac
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PASSWDQC_CONFIG_FILE], ["$use_passwdqc_config"], [passwdqc library config file])
+
+if test "x$enable_passwdqc" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_PASSWDQC, 1, [Enable password quality checking using passwdqc library])
+
+	saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([passwdqc_check], [passwdqc])
+	case "$ac_cv_search_passwdqc_check" in
+		no) AC_MSG_ERROR([failed to find passwdqc_check]) ;;
+		-l*) PASSWDQC_LIBS="$ac_cv_search_passwdqc_check" ;;
+		*) PASSWDQC_LIBS= ;;
+	esac
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([passwdqc_params_free])
+	LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+fi
+
+if test "x$enable_pwquality$enable_passwdqc" = "xyesyes"; then
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-pwquality and --enable-passwdqc are mutually incompatible.])
+fi
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+dnl Crypto backend functions
+
+AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_GCRYPT], [
+	if test "x$enable_fips" = "xyes"; then
+		GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION=1.4.5
+	else
+		GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION=1.1.42
+	fi
+
+	dnl libgcrypt rejects to use pkgconfig, use AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT from gcrypt-devel here.
+	dnl Do not require gcrypt-devel if other crypto backend is used.
+	m4_ifdef([AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT],[
+	AC_ARG_ENABLE([gcrypt-pbkdf2],
+		dnl Check if we can use gcrypt PBKDF2 (1.6.0 supports empty password)
+		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-gcrypt-pbkdf2], [force enable internal gcrypt PBKDF2]),
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xyes"; then
+			[use_internal_pbkdf2=0]
+		else
+			[use_internal_pbkdf2=1]
+		fi,
+		[AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT([1.6.1], [use_internal_pbkdf2=0], [use_internal_pbkdf2=1])])
+	AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT($GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the gcrypt library.])])],
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([Missing support for gcrypt: install gcrypt and regenerate configure.]))
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if internal cryptsetup PBKDF2 is compiled-in])
+	if test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 0; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		NO_FIPS([])
+	fi
+
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_XTS], [], [], [#include <gcrypt.h>])
+
+	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+		saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+		LIBS="$saved_LIBS $LIBGCRYPT_LIBS -static"
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(gcrypt, gcry_check_version,,
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find static gcrypt library.]),
+			[-lgpg-error])
+		LIBGCRYPT_STATIC_LIBS="$LIBGCRYPT_LIBS -lgpg-error"
+		LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+        fi
+
+	CRYPTO_CFLAGS=$LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS
+	CRYPTO_LIBS=$LIBGCRYPT_LIBS
+	CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$LIBGCRYPT_STATIC_LIBS
+
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION, ["$GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION"], [Requested gcrypt version])
+])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_OPENSSL], [
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([OPENSSL], [openssl >= 0.9.8],,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need openssl library.]))
+	CRYPTO_CFLAGS=$OPENSSL_CFLAGS
+	CRYPTO_LIBS=$OPENSSL_LIBS
+	use_internal_pbkdf2=0
+
+	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+		saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
+		PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --static"
+		PKG_CHECK_MODULES([OPENSSL_STATIC], [openssl])
+		CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$OPENSSL_STATIC_LIBS
+		PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
+	fi
+])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NSS], [
+	if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Static build of cryptsetup is not supported with NSS.])
+	fi
+
+	AC_MSG_WARN([NSS backend does NOT provide backward compatibility (missing ripemd160 hash).])
+
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([NSS], [nss],,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([You need nss library.]))
+
+	saved_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $NSS_CFLAGS"
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([NSS_GetVersion], [], [], [#include <nss.h>])
+	CFLAGS=$saved_CFLAGS
+
+	CRYPTO_CFLAGS=$NSS_CFLAGS
+	CRYPTO_LIBS=$NSS_LIBS
+	use_internal_pbkdf2=1
+	NO_FIPS([])
+])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_KERNEL], [
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/if_alg.h,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with userspace crypto interface.])])
+#	AC_CHECK_DECLS([AF_ALG],,
+#		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel with userspace crypto interface.])],
+#		[#include <sys/socket.h>])
+	use_internal_pbkdf2=1
+	NO_FIPS([])
+])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CONFIGURE_NETTLE], [
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(nettle/sha.h,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Nettle cryptographic library.])])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(nettle/version.h)
+
+	saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(nettle, nettle_pbkdf2_hmac_sha256,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Nettle library version 2.6 or more recent.])])
+	CRYPTO_LIBS=$LIBS
+	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+
+	CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS=$CRYPTO_LIBS
+	use_internal_pbkdf2=0
+	NO_FIPS([])
+])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+saved_LIBS=$LIBS
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([static-cryptsetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-static-cryptsetup], [enable build of static version of tools]))
+if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+	if test "x$enable_static" = "xno"; then
+		AC_MSG_WARN([Requested static cryptsetup build, enabling static library.])
+		enable_static=yes
+	fi
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(STATIC_TOOLS, test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([cryptsetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup], [disable cryptsetup support]),
+	[], [enable_cryptsetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTSETUP, test "x$enable_cryptsetup" = "xyes")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([veritysetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-veritysetup], [disable veritysetup support]),
+	[], [enable_veritysetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(VERITYSETUP, test "x$enable_veritysetup" = "xyes")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([cryptsetup-reencrypt],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-cryptsetup-reencrypt], [disable cryptsetup-reencrypt tool]),
+	[], [enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(REENCRYPT, test "x$enable_cryptsetup_reencrypt" = "xyes")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([integritysetup],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-integritysetup], [disable integritysetup support]),
+	[], [enable_integritysetup=yes])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(INTEGRITYSETUP, test "x$enable_integritysetup" = "xyes")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([selinux],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-selinux], [disable selinux support [default=auto]]),
+	[], [enable_selinux=yes])
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([udev],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-udev], [disable udev support]),
+	[], [enable_udev=yes])
+
+dnl Try to use pkg-config for devmapper, but fallback to old detection
+PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEVMAPPER], [devmapper >= 1.02.03],, [
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(devmapper, dm_task_set_name,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need the device-mapper library.])])
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(devmapper, dm_task_set_message,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([The device-mapper library on your system is too old.])])
+	DEVMAPPER_LIBS=$LIBS
+])
+LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+
+LIBS="$LIBS $DEVMAPPER_LIBS"
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_secure_data], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_retry_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_task_deferred_remove], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_mounted_fs], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_has_holders], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([dm_device_get_name], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([DM_DEVICE_GET_TARGET_VERSION], [], [], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG], [have_cookie=yes], [have_cookie=no], [#include <libdevmapper.h>])
+if test "x$enable_udev" = xyes; then
+	if test "x$have_cookie" = xno; then
+		AC_MSG_WARN([The device-mapper library on your system has no udev support, udev support disabled.])
+	else
+		AC_DEFINE(USE_UDEV, 1, [Try to use udev synchronisation?])
+	fi
+fi
+LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+
+dnl Check for JSON-C used in LUKS2
+PKG_CHECK_MODULES([JSON_C], [json-c])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([json_object_object_add_ex], [], [], [#include <json-c/json.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([json_object_deep_copy], [], [], [#include <json-c/json.h>])
+
+dnl Check for libssh for SSH plugin
+if test "x$enable_ssh_token" = "xyes"; then
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBSSH], [libssh])
+fi
+
+dnl Crypto backend configuration.
+AC_ARG_WITH([crypto_backend],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-crypto_backend=BACKEND], [crypto backend (gcrypt/openssl/nss/kernel/nettle) [openssl]]),
+	[], [with_crypto_backend=openssl])
+
+dnl Kernel crypto API backend needed for benchmark and tcrypt
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([kernel_crypto],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-kernel_crypto], [disable kernel userspace crypto (no benchmark and tcrypt)]),
+	[], [enable_kernel_crypto=yes])
+
+if test "x$enable_kernel_crypto" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(linux/if_alg.h,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need Linux kernel headers with userspace crypto interface. (Or use --disable-kernel_crypto.)])])
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_AF_ALG, 1, [Enable using of kernel userspace crypto])
+fi
+
+case $with_crypto_backend in
+	gcrypt)  CONFIGURE_GCRYPT([]) ;;
+	openssl) CONFIGURE_OPENSSL([]) ;;
+	nss)     CONFIGURE_NSS([]) ;;
+	kernel)  CONFIGURE_KERNEL([]) ;;
+	nettle)  CONFIGURE_NETTLE([]) ;;
+	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown crypto backend.]) ;;
+esac
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "gcrypt")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_OPENSSL, test "$with_crypto_backend" = "openssl")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NSS,     test "$with_crypto_backend" = "nss")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_KERNEL,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "kernel")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE,  test "$with_crypto_backend" = "nettle")
+
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_PBKDF2, test $use_internal_pbkdf2 = 1)
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2, [$use_internal_pbkdf2], [Use internal PBKDF2])
+
+dnl Argon2 implementation
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([internal-argon2],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-internal-argon2], [disable internal implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]),
+	[], [enable_internal_argon2=yes])
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([libargon2],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-libargon2], [enable external libargon2 (PHC) library (disables internal bundled version)]))
+
+if test "x$enable_libargon2" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(argon2.h,,
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need libargon2 development library installed.])])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL(Argon2_id,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need more recent Argon2 library with support for Argon2id.])], [#include <argon2.h>])
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBARGON2], [libargon2],,[LIBARGON2_LIBS="-largon2"])
+	enable_internal_argon2=no
+else
+	AC_MSG_WARN([Argon2 bundled (slow) reference implementation will be used, please consider to use system library with --enable-libargon2.])
+
+	AC_ARG_ENABLE([internal-sse-argon2],
+		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-internal-sse-argon2], [enable internal SSE implementation of Argon2 PBKDF]))
+
+	if test "x$enable_internal_sse_argon2" = "xyes"; then
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING(if Argon2 SSE optimization can be used)
+		AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+			#include <emmintrin.h>
+			__m128i testfunc(__m128i *a, __m128i *b) {
+			  return _mm_xor_si128(_mm_loadu_si128(a), _mm_loadu_si128(b));
+			}
+		]])],,[enable_internal_sse_argon2=no])
+		AC_MSG_RESULT($enable_internal_sse_argon2)
+	fi
+fi
+
+if test "x$enable_internal_argon2" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_INTERNAL_ARGON2, 1, [Use internal Argon2])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2, test "x$enable_internal_argon2" = "xyes")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTO_INTERNAL_SSE_ARGON2, test "x$enable_internal_sse_argon2" = "xyes")
+
+dnl Link with blkid to check for other device types
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([blkid],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-blkid], [disable use of blkid for device signature detection and wiping]),
+	[], [enable_blkid=yes])
+
+if test "x$enable_blkid" = "xyes"; then
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([BLKID], [blkid],[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BLKID], 1, [Define to 1 to use blkid for detection of disk signatures.])],[LIBBLKID_LIBS="-lblkid"])
+
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(blkid/blkid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need blkid development library installed.])])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL([blkid_do_wipe],
+		      [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BLKID_WIPE], 1, [Define to 1 to use blkid_do_wipe.])
+			enable_blkid_wipe=yes
+		      ],,
+		      [#include <blkid/blkid.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL([blkid_probe_step_back],
+		      [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BLKID_STEP_BACK], 1, [Define to 1 to use blkid_probe_step_back.])
+			enable_blkid_step_back=yes
+		      ],,
+		      [#include <blkid/blkid.h>])
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([ blkid_reset_probe,
+			 blkid_probe_set_device,
+			 blkid_probe_filter_superblocks_type,
+			 blkid_do_safeprobe,
+			 blkid_do_probe,
+			 blkid_probe_lookup_value
+		       ],,
+		       [AC_MSG_ERROR([Can not compile with blkid support, disable it by --disable-blkid.])],
+		       [#include <blkid/blkid.h>])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID, test "x$enable_blkid" = "xyes")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID_WIPE, test "x$enable_blkid_wipe" = "xyes")
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_BLKID_STEP_BACK, test "x$enable_blkid_step_back" = "xyes")
+
+dnl Magic for cryptsetup.static build.
+if test "x$enable_static_cryptsetup" = "xyes"; then
+	saved_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
+	PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --static"
+
+	LIBS="$saved_LIBS -static"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(popt, poptGetContext,,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find static popt library.]))
+
+	dnl Try to detect needed device-mapper static libraries, try pkg-config first.
+	LIBS="$saved_LIBS -static"
+	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEVMAPPER_STATIC], [devmapper >= 1.02.27],,[
+		DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS=$DEVMAPPER_LIBS
+		if test "x$enable_selinux" = "xyes"; then
+			AC_CHECK_LIB(sepol, sepol_bool_set)
+			AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled)
+			DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS="$DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS $LIBS"
+		fi
+	])
+	LIBS="$saved_LIBS $DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(devmapper, dm_task_set_uuid,,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot link with static device-mapper library.]))
+
+	dnl Try to detect uuid static library.
+	LIBS="$saved_LIBS -static"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(uuid, uuid_generate,,
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find static uuid library.]))
+
+	LIBS=$saved_LIBS
+	PKG_CONFIG=$saved_PKG_CONFIG
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for systemd tmpfiles config directory])
+PKG_CHECK_VAR([systemd_tmpfilesdir], [systemd], [tmpfilesdir], [], [systemd_tmpfilesdir=no])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$systemd_tmpfilesdir])
+
+AC_SUBST([DEVMAPPER_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([DEVMAPPER_STATIC_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([PWQUALITY_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([PWQUALITY_STATIC_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([PASSWDQC_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_CFLAGS])
+AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([CRYPTO_STATIC_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([JSON_C_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([LIBARGON2_LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([BLKID_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([LIBSSH_LIBS])
+
+AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION])
+AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([dev-random],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-dev-random], [use /dev/random by default for key generation (otherwise use /dev/urandom)]))
+if test "x$enable_dev_random" = "xyes"; then
+	default_rng=/dev/random
+else
+	default_rng=/dev/urandom
+fi
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEFAULT_RNG, ["$default_rng"], [default RNG type for key generator])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+AC_DEFUN([CS_DEFINE],
+	[AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEFAULT_[]m4_translit([$1], [-a-z], [_A-Z]), [$2], [$3])
+])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CS_STR_WITH], [AC_ARG_WITH([$1],
+	[AS_HELP_STRING(--with-[$1], [default $2 [$3]])],
+	[CS_DEFINE([$1], ["$withval"], [$2])],
+	[CS_DEFINE([$1], ["$3"], [$2])]
+)])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CS_NUM_WITH], [AC_ARG_WITH([$1],
+	[AS_HELP_STRING(--with-[$1], [default $2 [$3]])],
+	[CS_DEFINE([$1], [$withval], [$2])],
+	[CS_DEFINE([$1], [$3], [$2])]
+)])
+
+AC_DEFUN([CS_ABSPATH], [
+	case "$1" in
+		/*) ;;
+		*) AC_MSG_ERROR([$2 argument must be an absolute path.]);;
+	esac
+])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+CS_STR_WITH([plain-hash],   [password hashing function for plain mode], [ripemd160])
+CS_STR_WITH([plain-cipher], [cipher for plain mode], [aes])
+CS_STR_WITH([plain-mode],   [cipher mode for plain mode], [cbc-essiv:sha256])
+CS_NUM_WITH([plain-keybits],[key length in bits for plain mode], [256])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks1-hash],   [hash function for LUKS1 header], [sha256])
+CS_STR_WITH([luks1-cipher], [cipher for LUKS1], [aes])
+CS_STR_WITH([luks1-mode],   [cipher mode for LUKS1], [xts-plain64])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-keybits],[key length in bits for LUKS1], [256])
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([luks_adjust_xts_keysize], AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-luks-adjust-xts-keysize],
+	[XTS mode requires two keys, double default LUKS keysize if needed]),
+	[], [enable_luks_adjust_xts_keysize=yes])
+if test "x$enable_luks_adjust_xts_keysize" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE, 1, [XTS mode - double default LUKS keysize if needed])
+fi
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks2-pbkdf],           [Default PBKDF algorithm (pbkdf2 or argon2i/argon2id) for LUKS2], [argon2id])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-iter-time],       [PBKDF2 iteration time for LUKS1 (in ms)], [2000])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-iter-time],       [Argon2 PBKDF iteration time for LUKS2 (in ms)], [2000])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-memory-kb],       [Argon2 PBKDF memory cost for LUKS2 (in kB)], [1048576])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-parallel-threads],[Argon2 PBKDF max parallel cost for LUKS2 (if CPUs available)], [4])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks2-keyslot-cipher], [fallback cipher for LUKS2 keyslot (if data encryption is incompatible)], [aes-xts-plain64])
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-keyslot-keybits],[fallback key size for LUKS2 keyslot (if data encryption is incompatible)], [512])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([loopaes-cipher], [cipher for loop-AES mode], [aes])
+CS_NUM_WITH([loopaes-keybits],[key length in bits for loop-AES mode], [256])
+
+CS_NUM_WITH([keyfile-size-maxkb],[maximum keyfile size (in KiB)], [8192])
+CS_NUM_WITH([integrity-keyfile-size-maxkb],[maximum integritysetup keyfile size (in KiB)], [4])
+CS_NUM_WITH([passphrase-size-max],[maximum passphrase size (in characters)], [512])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([verity-hash],       [hash function for verity mode], [sha256])
+CS_NUM_WITH([verity-data-block], [data block size for verity mode], [4096])
+CS_NUM_WITH([verity-hash-block], [hash block size for verity mode], [4096])
+CS_NUM_WITH([verity-salt-size],  [salt size for verity mode], [32])
+CS_NUM_WITH([verity-fec-roots],  [parity bytes for verity FEC], [2])
+
+CS_STR_WITH([tmpfilesdir], [override default path to directory with systemd temporary files], [])
+test -z "$with_tmpfilesdir" && with_tmpfilesdir=$systemd_tmpfilesdir
+test "x$with_tmpfilesdir" = "xno" || {
+	CS_ABSPATH([${with_tmpfilesdir}],[with-tmpfilesdir])
+	DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR=$with_tmpfilesdir
+	AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR)
+}
+AM_CONDITIONAL(CRYPTSETUP_TMPFILE, test -n "$DEFAULT_TMPFILESDIR")
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks2-lock-path], [path to directory for LUKSv2 locks], [/run/cryptsetup])
+test -z "$with_luks2_lock_path" && with_luks2_lock_path=/run/cryptsetup
+CS_ABSPATH([${with_luks2_lock_path}],[with-luks2-lock-path])
+DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH=$with_luks2_lock_path
+AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_PATH)
+
+CS_NUM_WITH([luks2-lock-dir-perms], [default luks2 locking directory permissions], [0700])
+test -z "$with_luks2_lock_dir_perms" && with_luks2_lock_dir_perms=0700
+DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS=$with_luks2_lock_dir_perms
+AC_SUBST(DEFAULT_LUKS2_LOCK_DIR_PERMS)
+
+CS_STR_WITH([luks2-external-tokens-path], [path to directory with LUKSv2 external token handlers (plugins)], [LIBDIR/cryptsetup])
+if test -n "$with_luks2_external_tokens_path"; then
+	CS_ABSPATH([${with_luks2_external_tokens_path}],[with-luks2-external-tokens-path])
+	EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH=$with_luks2_external_tokens_path
+else
+	EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH="\${libdir}/cryptsetup"
+fi
+AC_SUBST(EXTERNAL_LUKS2_TOKENS_PATH)
+
+dnl Override default LUKS format version (for cryptsetup or cryptsetup-reencrypt format actions only).
+AC_ARG_WITH([default_luks_format],
+	AS_HELP_STRING([--with-default-luks-format=FORMAT], [default LUKS format version (LUKS1/LUKS2) [LUKS2]]),
+	[], [with_default_luks_format=LUKS2])
+
+case $with_default_luks_format in
+	LUKS1) default_luks=CRYPT_LUKS1 ;;
+	LUKS2) default_luks=CRYPT_LUKS2 ;;
+	*) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown default LUKS format. Use LUKS1 or LUKS2 only.]) ;;
+esac
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([DEFAULT_LUKS_FORMAT], [$default_luks], [default LUKS format version])
+
+dnl ==========================================================================
+
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([ Makefile
+lib/libcryptsetup.pc
+po/Makefile.in
+scripts/cryptsetup.conf
+tests/Makefile
+])
+AC_OUTPUT

configure.in

@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
-AC_PREREQ(2.57)
-AC_INIT(cryptsetup,1.1.1)
-
-dnl library version from <major>.<minor>.<release>[-<suffix>]
-LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION=$(echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | cut -f1 -d-)
-LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO=1:0:0
-
-AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR(src/cryptsetup.c)
-AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
-
-AM_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h:config.h.in])
-AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(dist-bzip2)
-
-if test "x$prefix" = "xNONE"; then
-	sysconfdir=/etc
-fi
-AC_PREFIX_DEFAULT(/usr)
-
-AC_CANONICAL_HOST
-AC_GNU_SOURCE
-AC_PROG_CC
-AM_PROG_CC_C_O
-AC_PROG_CPP
-AC_PROG_INSTALL
-AC_PROG_MAKE_SET
-AC_ENABLE_STATIC(no)
-AM_PROG_LIBTOOL
-
-AC_HEADER_DIRENT
-AC_HEADER_STDC
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h malloc.h inttypes.h sys/ioctl.h sys/mman.h \
-	ctype.h unistd.h locale.h)
-
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(uuid/uuid.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR('You need the uuid library')])
-AC_CHECK_HEADER(libdevmapper.h,,[AC_MSG_ERROR('You need the device-mapper library')])
-
-saved_LIBS=$LIBS
-AC_CHECK_LIB(uuid, uuid_clear, ,[AC_MSG_ERROR('You need the uuid library')])
-AC_SUBST(UUID_LIBS, $LIBS)
-LIBS=$saved_LIBS
-
-
-AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT(1.1.42,,[AC_MSG_ERROR('You need the gcrypt library')])
-
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([posix_memalign])
-
-AC_C_CONST
-AC_C_BIGENDIAN
-AC_TYPE_OFF_T
-AC_STRUCT_ST_RDEV
-AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
-
-AC_PROG_GCC_TRADITIONAL
-
-dnl ==========================================================================
-
-AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external],[need-ngettext])
-AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.15])
-
-dnl ==========================================================================
-
-saved_LIBS=$LIBS
-AC_CHECK_LIB(popt, poptConfigFileToString,,
-	[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need popt 1.7 or newer to compile.])])
-AC_SUBST(POPT_LIBS, $LIBS)
-LIBS=$saved_LIBS
-
-dnl ==========================================================================
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(shared-library,
-[  --disable-shared-library
-                          disable building of shared cryptsetup library],,
-enable_shared_library=yes)
-AM_CONDITIONAL(STATIC_LIBRARY, test x$enable_shared_library = xno)
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(selinux,
-[  --disable-selinux       disable selinux support [[default=auto]]],[], [])
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE([udev],AS_HELP_STRING([--disable-udev],[disable udev support]),[], enable_udev=yes)
-
-dnl Try to use pkg-config for devmapper, but fallback to old detection
-saved_LIBS=$LIBS
-if AC_RUN_LOG([pkg-config --exists --print-errors devmapper]); then
-	PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
-	if test x$enable_static = xyes; then
-		PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG --static"
-	fi
-	PKG_CHECK_MODULES([DEVMAPPER], [devmapper >= 1.02.03])
-	LIBS="$LIBS $DEVMAPPER_LIBS"
-else
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(devmapper, dm_task_set_name,,
-		[AC_MSG_ERROR('You need the device-mapper library')])
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(devmapper, dm_task_set_message,,
-		[AC_MSG_ERROR([The device-mapper library on your system is too old.])])
-	DEVMAPPER_LIBS=$LIBS
-fi
-
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dm_task_set_cookie], [have_cookie=yes], [have_cookie=no])
-if test "x$enable_udev" = xyes; then
-	if test "x$have_cookie" = xno; then
-		AC_MSG_WARN([The device-mapper library on your system has no udev support, udev support disabled.])
-	else
-		AC_DEFINE(USE_UDEV, 1, [Try to use udev synchronisation?])
-	fi
-fi
-
-LIBS=$saved_LIBS
-if test "x$enable_selinux" != xno; then
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(sepol, sepol_bool_set)
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled)
-	if test x$enable_static = xyes; then
-		SELINUX_STATIC_LIBS=$LIBS
-		# Check if we need -pthread with --enable-static and selinux
-		saved_LIBS2=$LIBS
-		LIBS="$LIBS -static"
-		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([pthread_mutex_lock], [pthread],
-			[test "$ac_cv_search_pthread_mutex_lock" = "none required" || LIB_PTHREAD=-lpthread])
-		LIBS=$saved_LIBS2
-	fi
-fi
-
-LIBS=$saved_LIBS
-
-DEVMAPPER_LIBS="$DEVMAPPER_LIBS $LIB_PTHREAD"
-AC_SUBST([DEVMAPPER_LIBS])
-AC_SUBST([SELINUX_STATIC_LIBS])
-AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION])
-AC_SUBST([LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO])
-
-dnl ==========================================================================
-AC_DEFUN([CS_DEFINE],
-	[AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEFAULT_[]m4_translit([$1], [-a-z], [_A-Z]), [$2], [$3])
-])
-
-AC_DEFUN([CS_STR_WITH], [AC_ARG_WITH([$1],
-	[AS_HELP_STRING(--with-[$1], [default $2 [$3]])],
-	[CS_DEFINE([$1], ["$withval"], [$2])],
-	[CS_DEFINE([$1], ["$3"], [$2])]
-)])
-
-AC_DEFUN([CS_NUM_WITH], [AC_ARG_WITH([$1],
-	[AS_HELP_STRING(--with-[$1], [default $2 [$3]])],
-	[CS_DEFINE([$1], [$withval], [$2])],
-	[CS_DEFINE([$1], [$3], [$2])]
-)])
-
-CS_STR_WITH([plain-hash],   [password hashing function for plain mode], [ripemd160])
-CS_STR_WITH([plain-cipher], [cipher for plain mode], [aes])
-CS_STR_WITH([plain-mode],   [cipher mode for plain mode], [cbc-essiv:sha256])
-CS_NUM_WITH([plain-keybits],[key length in bits for plain mode], [256])
-
-CS_STR_WITH([luks1-hash],   [hash function for LUKS1 header], [sha1])
-CS_STR_WITH([luks1-cipher], [cipher for LUKS1], [aes])
-CS_STR_WITH([luks1-mode],   [cipher mode for LUKS1], [cbc-essiv:sha256])
-CS_NUM_WITH([luks1-keybits],[key length in bits for LUKS1], [256])
-
-dnl ==========================================================================
-
-AM_CONDITIONAL(STATIC_CRYPTSETUP, test x$enable_static = xyes)
-AM_CONDITIONAL(DYNAMIC_CRYPTSETUP, test x$enable_static = xno)
-
-dnl ==========================================================================
-
-AC_OUTPUT([ Makefile
-lib/Makefile
-lib/libcryptsetup.pc
-src/Makefile
-po/Makefile.in
-luks/Makefile
-man/Makefile
-tests/Makefile
-])

docs/ChangeLog.old

@@ -1,3 +1,303 @@
+2012-12-21  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Since version 1.6 This file is no longer maintained.
+	* See version control log http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/source/list
+
+2012-10-11  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Added keyslot checker (by Arno Wagner).
+	* Version 1.5.1.
+
+2012-09-11  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Add crypt_keyslot_area() API call.
+
+2012-08-27  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Optimize seek to keyfile-offset (Issue #135, thx to dreisner).
+	* Fix luksHeaderBackup for very old v1.0 unaligned LUKS headers.
+
+2012-08-12  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Allocate loop device late (only when real block device needed).
+	* Rework underlying device/file access functions.
+	* Create hash image if doesn't exist in veritysetup format.
+	* Provide better error message if running as non-root user (device-mapper, loop).
+
+2012-07-10  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Version 1.5.0.
+
+2012-06-25  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Add --device-size option for reencryption tool.
+	* Switch to use unit suffix for --reduce-device-size option.
+	* Remove open device debugging feature (no longer needed).
+	* Fix library name for FIPS check.
+
+2012-06-20  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Version 1.5.0-rc2.
+
+2012-06-18  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Introduce cryptsetup-reencrypt - experimental offline LUKS reencryption tool.
+	* Fix luks-header-from-active script (do not use LUKS header on-disk, add UUID).
+	* Add --test-passphrase option for luksOpen (check passphrase only).
+
+2012-06-11  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Introduce veritysetup for dm-verity target management.
+	* Version 1.5.0-rc1.
+
+2012-06-10  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Both data and header device can now be a file.
+	* Loop is automatically allocated in crypt_set_data_device().
+	* Require only up to last keyslot area for header device (ignore data offset).
+	* Fix header backup and restore to work on files with large data offset.
+
+2012-05-27  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Fix readonly activation if underlying device is readonly (1.4.0).
+	* Include stddef.h in libdevmapper.h (size_t definition).
+	* Version 1.4.3.
+
+2012-05-21  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Add --enable-fips for linking with fipscheck library.
+	* Initialize binary and library selfcheck if running in FIPS mode.
+	* Use FIPS RNG in FIPS mode for KEY and SALT (only gcrypt backend supported).
+
+2012-05-09  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Fix keyslot removal (wipe keyslot) for device with 4k hw block (1.4.0).
+	* Allow empty cipher (cipher_null) for testing.
+
+2012-05-02  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Fix loop mapping on readonly file.
+	* Relax --shared test, allow mapping even for overlapping segments.
+	* Support shared flag for LUKS devices (dangerous).
+	* Switch on retry on device remove for libdevmapper.
+	* Allow "private" activation (skip some udev global rules) flag.
+
+2012-04-09  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Fix header check to support old (cryptsetup 1.0.0) header alignment. (1.4.0)
+	* Version 1.4.2.
+
+2012-03-16  Milan Broz  <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+	* Add --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset parameters to API and CLI.
+	* Add repair command and crypt_repair() for known LUKS metadata problems repair.
+	* Allow to specify --align-payload only for luksFormat.
+
+2012-03-16  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Unify password verification option.
+	* Support password verification with quiet flag if possible. (1.2.0)
+	* Fix retry if entered passphrases (with verify option) do not match.
+	* Support UUID=<LUKS_UUID> format for device specification.
+
+2012-02-11  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add --master-key-file option to luksOpen (open using volume key).
+
+2012-01-12  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix use of empty keyfile.
+
+2011-11-13  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix error message for luksClose and detached LUKS header.
+	* Allow --header for status command to get full info with detached header.
+
+2011-11-09  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.4.1.
+
+2011-11-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Merge pycryptsetup (Python libcryptsetup bindings).
+	* Fix stupid typo in set_iteration_time API call.
+	* Fix cryptsetup status output if parameter is device path.
+
+2011-10-27  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix crypt_get_volume_key_size() for plain device.
+	* Fix FSF address in license text.
+
+2011-10-25  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Print informative message in isLuks only in verbose mode.
+	* Version 1.4.0.
+
+2011-10-10  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.4.0-rc1.
+
+2011-10-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Support Nettle 2.4 crypto backend (for ripemd160).
+	* If device is not rotational, do not use Gutmann wipe method.
+	* Add crypt_last_error() API call.
+	* Fix luksKillSLot exit code if slot is inactive or invalid.
+	* Fix exit code if passphrases do not match in luksAddKey.
+	* Add LUKS on-disk format description into package.
+
+2011-09-22  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Support key-slot option for luksOpen (use only explicit keyslot).
+
+2011-08-22  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add more paranoid checks for LUKS header and keyslot attributes.
+	* Fix crypt_load to properly check device size.
+	* Use new /dev/loop-control (kernel 3.1) if possible.
+	* Enhance check of device size before writing LUKS header.
+	* Do not allow context format of already formatted device.
+
+2011-07-25  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Remove hash/hmac restart from crypto backend and make it part of hash/hmac final.
+	* Improve check for invalid offset and size values.
+
+2011-07-19  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Revert default initialisation of volume key in crypt_init_by_name().
+	* Do not allow key retrieval while suspended (key could be wiped).
+	* Do not allow suspend for non-LUKS devices.
+	* Support retries and timeout parameters for luksSuspend.
+	* Add --header option for detached metadata (on-disk LUKS header) device.
+	* Add crypt_init_by_name_and_header() and crypt_set_data_device() to API.
+	* Allow different data offset setting for detached header.
+
+2011-07-07  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Remove old API functions (all functions using crypt_options).
+	* Add --enable-discards option to allow discards/TRIM requests.
+	* Add crypt_get_iv_offset() function to API.
+
+2011-07-01  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add --shared option for creating non-overlapping crypt segments.
+	* Add shared flag to libcryptsetup api.
+	* Fix plain crypt format parameters to include size option (API change).
+
+2011-06-08  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix return code for status command when device doesn't exists.
+
+2011-05-24  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.3.1.
+
+2011-05-17  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix keyfile=- processing in create command (1.3.0).
+	* Simplify device path status check.
+
+2011-05-03  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Do not ignore size argument for create command (1.2.0).
+
+2011-04-18  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix error paths in blockwise code and lseek_write call.
+	* Add Nettle crypto backend support.
+
+2011-04-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.3.0.
+
+2011-03-22  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Also support --skip and --hash option for loopaesOpen.
+	* Fix return code when passphrase is read from pipe.
+	* Document cryptsetup exit codes.
+
+2011-03-18  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Respect maximum keyfile size parameter.
+	* Introduce maximum default keyfile size, add configure option.
+	* Require the whole key read from keyfile in create command (broken in 1.2.0).
+	* Fix offset option for loopaesOpen.
+	* Lock memory also in luksDump command.
+	* Version 1.3.0-rc2.
+
+2011-03-14  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.3.0-rc1.
+
+2011-03-11  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add loop manipulation code and support mapping of images in file.
+	* Add backing device loop info into status message.
+	* Add luksChangeKey command.
+
+2011-03-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add exception to COPYING for binary distribution linked with OpenSSL library.
+	* Set secure data flag (wipe all ioctl buffers) if devmapper library supports it.
+
+2011-01-29  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix mapping removal if device disappeared but node still exists.
+	* Fix luksAddKey return code if master key is used.
+
+2011-01-25  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add loop-AES handling (loopaesOpen and loopaesClose commands).
+	 (requires kernel 2.6.38 and above)
+
+2011-01-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix static build (--disable-static-cryptsetup now works properly).
+
+2010-12-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add compile time crypto backends implementation
+	  (gcrypt, OpenSSL, NSS and userspace Linux kernel crypto api).
+	* Currently NSS is lacking ripemd160, cannot provide full plain compatibility.
+	* Use --with-crypto_backend=[gcrypt|openssl|nss|kernel] to configure.
+
+2010-12-20  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.2.0.
+
+2010-11-25  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix crypt_activate_by_keyfile() to work with PLAIN devices.
+	* Fix create command to properly handle keyfile size.
+
+2010-11-16  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.2.0-rc1.
+
+2010-11-13  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix password callback call.
+	* Fix default plain password entry from terminal in activate_by_passphrase.
+	* Add --dump-master-key option for luksDump to allow volume key dump.
+	* Allow to activate by internally cached volume key
+	  (format/activate without keyslots active - used for temporary devices).
+	* Initialize volume key from active device in crypt_init_by_name()
+	* Fix cryptsetup binary exitcodes.
+	* Increase library version (still binary compatible with 1.1.x release).
+
+2010-11-01  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* No longer support luksDelKey, reload and --non-exclusive.
+	* Remove some obsolete info from man page.
+	* Add crypt_get_type(), crypt_resize(), crypt_keyslot_max()
+	and crypt_get_active_device() to API.
+	* Rewrite all implementations in cryptsetup to new API.
+	* Fix luksRemoveKey to behave as documented (do not ask
+	for remaining keyslot passphrase).
+	* Add more regression tests for commands.
+	* Disallow mapping of device which is already in use (mapped or mounted).
+	* Disallow luksFormat on device in use.
+
+2010-10-27  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Rewrite cryptsetup luksFormat, luksOpen, luksAddKey to use new API
+	  to allow adding new features.
+	* Implement --use-random and --use-urandom for luksFormat to allow
+	  setting of RNG for volume key generator.
+	* Add crypt_set_rng_type() and crypt_get_rng_type() to API.
+	* Add crypt_set_uuid() to API.
+	* Allow UUID setting in luksFormat and luksUUID (--uuid parameter).
+	* Add --keyfile-size and --new-keyfile-size (in bytes) size and disallow overloading
+	  of --key-size for limiting keyfile reads.
+	* Fix luksFormat to properly use key file with --master-key-file switch.
+	* Fix possible double free when handling master key file.
+
+2010-10-17  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Add crypt_get_device_name() to API (get underlying device name).
+	* Change detection for static libraries.
+	* Fix pkg-config use in automake scripts.
+	* Remove --disable-shared-library switch and handle static library build
+	  by common libtool logic (using --enable-static).
+	* Add --enable-static-cryptsetup option to build cryptsetup.static binary
+	  together with shared build.
+
+2010-08-05  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Wipe iteration and salt after KillSlot in LUKS header.
+	* Rewrite file differ test to C (and fix it to really work).
+	* Switch to 1MiB default alignment of data.
+	  For more info see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=621684
+	* Do not query non-existent device twice (cryptsetup status /dev/nonexistent).
+	* Check if requested hash is supported before writing LUKS header.
+
+2010-07-28  Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
+	* Add FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) file to distribution.
+
+2010-07-03  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix udev support for old libdevmapper with not compatible definition.
+	* Version 1.1.3.
+
+2010-06-01  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix device alignment ioctl calls parameters.
+	* Fix activate_by_* API calls to handle NULL device name as documented.
+
+2010-05-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Version 1.1.2.
+
+2010-05-27  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
+	* Fix luksFormat/luksOpen reading passphrase from stdin and "-" keyfile.
+	* Support --key-file/-d option for luksFormat.
+	* Fix description of --key-file and add --verbose and --debug options to man page.
+	* Add verbose log level and move unlocking message there.
+	* Remove device even if underlying device disappeared.
+	* Fix (deprecated) reload device command to accept new device argument.
+
 2010-05-23  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
 	* Fix luksClose operation for stacked DM devices.
 	* Version 1.1.1.
@@ -34,13 +334,13 @@
 	* Version 1.1.0.
 
 2010-01-10  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
-	* Fix initialisation of gcrypt duting luksFormat.
-	* Convert hash name to lower case in header (fix sha1 backward comatible header)
+	* Fix initialisation of gcrypt during luksFormat.
+	* Convert hash name to lower case in header (fix sha1 backward compatible header)
 	* Check for minimum required gcrypt version.
 
 2009-12-30  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
 	* Fix key slot iteration count calculation (small -i value was the same as default).
-	* The slot and key digest iteration minimun is now 1000.
+	* The slot and key digest iteration minimum is now 1000.
 	* The key digest iteration # is calculated from iteration time (approx 1/8 of that).
 	* Version 1.1.0-rc4.
 
@@ -95,16 +395,16 @@
 	* Require device device-mapper to build and do not use backend wrapper for dm calls.
 	* Move memory locking and dm initialization to command layer.
 	* Increase priority of process if memory is locked.
-	* Add log macros and make logging modre consitent.
+	* Add log macros and make logging more consistent.
 	* Move command successful messages to verbose level.
 	* Introduce --debug parameter.
 	* Move device utils code and provide context parameter (for log).
 	* Keyfile now must be provided by path, only stdin file descriptor is used (api only).
 	* Do not call isatty() on closed keyfile descriptor.
-	* Run performance check for PBKDF2 from LUKS code, do not mix hash algoritms results.
+	* Run performance check for PBKDF2 from LUKS code, do not mix hash algorithms results.
 	* Add ability to provide pre-generated master key and UUID in LUKS header format.
 	* Add LUKS function to verify master key digest.
-	* Move key slot manuipulation function into LUKS specific code.
+	* Move key slot manipulation function into LUKS specific code.
 	* Replace global options struct with separate parameters in helper functions.
 	* Add new libcryptsetup API (documented in libcryptsetup.h).
 	* Implement old API calls using new functions.
@@ -112,7 +412,7 @@
 	* Add --master-key-file option for luksFormat and luksAddKey.
 
 2009-08-17  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
-	* Fix PBKDF2 speed calculation for large passhrases.
+	* Fix PBKDF2 speed calculation for large passphrases.
 	* Allow using passphrase provided in options struct for LuksOpen.
 	* Allow restrict keys size in LuksOpen.
 
@@ -124,7 +424,7 @@
 	* Switch PBKDF2 from internal SHA1 to libgcrypt, make hash algorithm not hardcoded to SHA1 here.
 	* Add required parameters for changing hash used in LUKS key setup scheme.
 	* Do not export simple XOR helper now used only inside AF functions.
-	* Completely remove internal SHA1 implementanion code, not needed anymore.
+	* Completely remove internal SHA1 implementation code, not needed anymore.
 	* Enable hash algorithm selection for LUKS through -h luksFormat option.
 
 2009-07-28  Milan Broz  <mbroz@redhat.com>
@@ -220,7 +520,7 @@
 	* configure.in (AC_OUTPUT): Add m4/Makefile.
 	(AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION): Bump to 0.15.
 
-2006-10-22  David Härdeman  <david@hardeman.nu>
+2006-10-22  David Härdeman  <david@hardeman.nu>
 
 	* Allow hashing of keys passed through stdin.
 
@@ -287,7 +587,7 @@
 
 2006-08-04  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Applied patch from David Härdeman
+	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Applied patch from David Härdeman
 	<david@2gen.com> for reading binary keys from stdin using
 	the "-" as key file.
 
@@ -304,7 +604,7 @@
 
 2006-07-23  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* Applied patches from David Härdeman <david@2gen.com> to fix 64
+	* Applied patches from David Härdeman <david@2gen.com> to fix 64
 	bit compiler warning issues.
 
 2006-05-19  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
@@ -323,7 +623,7 @@
 
 	* configure.in: Release 1.0.3.
 
-	* Applied patch by Johannes Weißl for more meaningful exit codes
+	* Applied patch by Johannes Weißl for more meaningful exit codes
 	and password retries
 
 2006-03-30  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
@@ -336,7 +636,7 @@
 
 2006-03-15  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* configure.in: 1.0.3-rc3. Most unplease release ever. 
+	* configure.in: 1.0.3-rc3. Most displease release ever. 
 	* lib/setup.c (__crypt_create_device): More verbose error message.
 
 2006-02-26  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
@@ -405,7 +705,7 @@
 
 2005-12-06  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* man/cryptsetup.8: Correct "seconds" to "microseconds" in the explaination for -i.
+	* man/cryptsetup.8: Correct "seconds" to "microseconds" in the explanation for -i.
 
 2005-11-09  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
@@ -426,7 +726,7 @@
 
 2005-09-08  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
 
-	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Fixed another incompatiblity with
+	* lib/setup.c (get_key): Fixed another incompatibility with
 	original cryptsetup.
 
 2005-08-20  Clemens Fruhwirth  <clemens@endorphin.org>
@@ -516,7 +816,7 @@
 
 	* man/cryptsetup.1: Add man page.
 
-	* lib/setup.c: Remove unneccessary LUKS_write_phdr call, so the
+	* lib/setup.c: Remove unnecessary LUKS_write_phdr call, so the
 	phdr is written after passphrase reading, so the user can change
 	his mind, and not have a partial written LUKS header on it's disk.
 
@@ -534,16 +834,16 @@
 	* lib/utils.c: Add read|write_blockwise functions, to use in
 	O_DIRECT file accesses. 
 
-2004-03-11 Thursday 15:52   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-11 Thursday 15:52   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* lib/blockdev.h: BLKGETSIZE64 really uses size_t as third
 	  argument, the rest is wrong.
 
-2004-03-10 Wednesday 17:50   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-10 Wednesday 17:50   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* lib/: libcryptsetup.h, libdevmapper.c: Small fixes.
 
-2004-03-09 Tuesday 21:41   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-09 Tuesday 21:41   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* lib/internal.h, lib/libcryptsetup.h, lib/libdevmapper.c,
 	  lib/setup.c, po/de.po, src/cryptsetup.c: Added internal flags to
@@ -551,7 +851,7 @@
 	  add a function to free the memory. Also add a readonly flag to
 	  libcryptsetup.
 
-2004-03-09 Tuesday 16:03   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-09 Tuesday 16:03   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* ChangeLog, configure.in, setup-gettext, lib/Makefile.am,
 	  lib/backends.c, lib/blockdev.h, lib/gcrypt.c, lib/internal.h,
@@ -559,7 +859,7 @@
 	  lib/utils.c, po/de.po, src/Makefile.am, src/cryptsetup.c: More
 	  reorganization work.
 
-2004-03-08 Monday 01:38   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-08 Monday 01:38   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* ChangeLog, Makefile.am, acinclude.m4, configure.in,
 	  lib/Makefile.am, lib/backends.c, lib/blockdev.h, lib/gcrypt.c,
@@ -567,19 +867,19 @@
 	  src/Makefile.am: BLKGETSIZE64 fixes and started modularity
 	  enhancements
 
-2004-03-04 Thursday 21:06   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-04 Thursday 21:06   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* Makefile.am, po/de.po, src/cryptsetup.c, src/cryptsetup.h: First
 	  backward compatible working version.
 
-2004-03-04 Thursday 00:42   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-04 Thursday 00:42   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* NEWS, AUTHORS, ChangeLog, Makefile.am, README, autogen.sh,
 	  configure.in, setup-gettext, po/ChangeLog, po/LINGUAS,
 	  po/POTFILES.in, po/de.po, src/cryptsetup.c, src/cryptsetup.h,
 	  src/Makefile.am (utags: initial): Initial checkin.
 
-2004-03-04 Thursday 00:42   Christophe Saout <christophe@saout.de>
+2004-03-04 Thursday 00:42   Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
 
 	* NEWS, AUTHORS, ChangeLog, Makefile.am, README, autogen.sh,
 	  configure.in, setup-gettext, po/ChangeLog, po/LINGUAS,

docs/Keyring.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+Integration with kernel keyring service
+---------------------------------------
+
+We have two different use cases for kernel keyring service:
+
+I) Volume keys
+
+Since upstream kernel 4.10 dm-crypt device mapper target allows loading volume
+key (VK) in kernel keyring service. The key offloaded in kernel keyring service
+is only referenced (by key description) in dm-crypt target and the VK is therefore
+no longer stored directly in dm-crypt target. Starting with cryptsetup 2.0 we
+load VK in kernel keyring by default for LUKSv2 devices (when dm-crypt with the
+feature is available).
+
+Currently cryptsetup loads VK in 'logon' type kernel key so that VK is passed in
+the kernel and can't be read from userspace afterward. Also cryptsetup loads VK in
+thread keyring (before passing the reference to dm-crypt target) so that the key
+lifetime is directly bound to the process that performs the dm-crypt setup. When
+cryptsetup process exits (for whatever reason) the key gets unlinked in kernel
+automatically. In summary, the key description visible in dm-crypt table line is
+a reference to VK that usually no longer exists in kernel keyring service if you
+used cryptsetup to for device activation.
+
+Using this feature dm-crypt no longer maintains a direct key copy (but there's
+always at least one copy in kernel crypto layer).
+
+II) Keyslot passphrase
+The second use case for kernel keyring is to allow cryptsetup reading the keyslot
+passphrase stored in kernel keyring instead. The user may load passphrase in kernel
+keyring and notify cryptsetup to read it from there later. Currently, cryptsetup
+cli supports kernel keyring for passphrase only via LUKS2 internal token
+(luks2-keyring). Library also provides a general method for device activation by
+reading passphrase from keyring: crypt_activate_by_keyring(). The key type
+for use case II) must always be 'user' since we need to read the actual key
+data from userspace unlike with VK in I). Ability to read keyslot passphrase
+from kernel keyring also allows easily auto-activate LUKS2 devices.
+
+Simple example how to use kernel keyring for keyslot passphrase:
+
+1) create LUKS2 keyring token for keyslot 0 (in LUKS2 device/image)
+cryptsetup token add --key-description my:key -S 0 /dev/device
+
+2) Load keyslot passphrase in user keyring
+read -s -p "Keyslot passphrase: "; echo -n $REPLY | keyctl padd user my:key @u
+
+3) Activate device using passphrase stored in kernel keyring
+cryptsetup open /dev/device my_unlocked_device
+
+4a) unlink the key when no longer needed by
+keyctl unlink %user:my:key @u
+
+4b) or revoke it immediately by
+keyctl revoke %user:my:key
+
+If cryptsetup asks for passphrase in step 3) something went wrong with keyring
+activation. See --debug output then.

docs/LUKS2-locking.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+LUKS2 device locking overview
+=============================
+
+Why
+~~~
+
+LUKS2 format keeps two identical copies of metadata stored consecutively
+at the head of metadata device (file or bdev). The metadata
+area (both copies) must be updated in a single atomic operation to avoid
+header corruption during concurrent write.
+
+While with LUKS1 users may have clear knowledge of when a LUKS header is
+being updated (written to) or when it's being read solely the need for
+locking with legacy format was not so obvious as it is with the LUKSv2 format.
+
+With LUKS2 the boundary between read-only and read-write is blurry and what
+used to be the exclusively read-only operation (i.e., cryptsetup open command) may
+easily become read-update operation silently without user's knowledge.
+Major feature of LUKS2 format is resilience against accidental
+corruption of metadata (i.e., partial header overwrite by parted or cfdisk
+while creating partition on mistaken block device).
+Such header corruption is detected early on header read and auto-recovery
+procedure takes place (the corrupted header with checksum mismatch is being
+replaced by the secondary one if that one is intact).
+On current Linux systems header load operation may be triggered without user
+direct intervention for example by udev rule or from systemd service.
+Such clash of header read and auto-recovery procedure could have severe
+consequences with the worst case of having LUKS2 device unaccessible or being
+broken beyond repair.
+
+The whole locking of LUKSv2 device headers split into two categories depending
+what backend the header is stored on:
+
+I) block device
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+We perform flock() on file descriptors of files stored in a private
+directory (by default /run/lock/cryptsetup). The file name is derived
+from major:minor couple of affected block device. Note we recommend
+that access to private locking directory is supposed to be limited
+to superuser only. For this method to work the distribution needs
+to install the locking directory with appropriate access rights.
+
+II) regular files
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+First notable difference between headers stored in a file
+vs. headers stored in a block device is that headers in a file may be
+manipulated by the regular user unlike headers on block devices. Therefore
+we perform flock() protection on file with the luks2 header directly.
+
+Limitations
+~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+a) In general, the locking model provides serialization of I/Os targeting
+the header only. It means the header is always written or read at once
+while locking is enabled.
+We do not suppress any other negative effect that two or more concurrent
+writers of the same header may cause.
+
+b) The locking is not cluster aware in any way.

docs/doxyfile

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docs/doxygen_index.h

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/*! \mainpage Cryptsetup API
+ *
+ * <b>The</b> documentation covers public parts of cryptsetup API. In the following sections you'll find
+ * the examples that describe some features of cryptsetup API.
+ * For more info about libcryptsetup API versions see
+ * <a href="https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/ABI-tracker/timeline/libcryptsetup/index.html">API Tracker</a>.
+ *
+ * <OL type="A">
+ *	<LI>@ref cexamples "Cryptsetup API examples"</LI>
+ *	<OL type="1">
+ *		<LI>@ref cluks "crypt_luks_usage" - cryptsetup LUKS device type usage examples</LI>
+ *			<UL>
+ *				<LI>@ref cinit "crypt_init()"</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref cformat "crypt_format()" - header and payload on mutual device</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref ckeys "Keyslot operations" </LI>
+ *				<UL>
+ *					<LI>@ref ckeyslot_vol "crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key()"</LI>
+ *					<LI>@ref ckeyslot_pass "crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase()"</LI>
+ *				</UL>
+ *				<LI>@ref cload "crypt_load()"
+ *				<LI>@ref cactivate "crypt_activate_by_passphrase()"</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref cactive_pars "crypt_get_active_device()"</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref cinit_by_name "crypt_init_by_name()"</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref cdeactivate "crypt_deactivate()"</LI>
+ *				<LI>@ref cluks_ex "crypt_luks_usage.c"</LI>
+ *			</UL>
+ *		<LI>@ref clog "crypt_log_usage" - cryptsetup logging API examples</LI>
+ *	</OL>
+ * </OL>
+ *
+ * @section cexamples Cryptsetup API examples
+ * 	@section cluks crypt_luks_usage - cryptsetup LUKS device type usage
+ *	 	@subsection cinit crypt_init()
+ *			Every time you need to do something with cryptsetup or dmcrypt device
+ *			you need a valid context. The first step to start your work is
+ *			@ref crypt_init call. You can call it either with path
+ *			to the block device or path to the regular file. If you don't supply the path,
+ *			empty context is initialized.
+ *
+ *		@subsection cformat crypt_format() - header and payload on mutual device
+ *	 		This section covers basic use cases for formatting LUKS devices. Format operation
+ *			sets device type in context and in case of LUKS header is written at the beginning
+ *			of block device. In the example below we use the scenario where LUKS header and data
+ *			are both stored on the same device. There's also a possibility to store header and
+ *			data separately.
+ *
+ *			<B>Bear in mind</B> that @ref crypt_format() is destructive operation and it
+ *			overwrites part of the backing block device.
+ *
+ *		@subsection ckeys Keyslot operations examples
+ *			After successful @ref crypt_format of LUKS device, volume key is not stored
+ *			in a persistent way on the device. Keyslot area is an array beyond LUKS header, where
+ *			volume key is stored in the encrypted form using user input passphrase. For more info about
+ *			LUKS keyslots and how it's actually protected, please look at
+ *			<A HREF="https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification">LUKS specification</A>.
+ *			There are two basic methods to create a new keyslot:
+ *
+ *			@subsection ckeyslot_vol crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key()
+ *				Creates a new keyslot directly by encrypting volume_key stored in the device
+ *				context. Passphrase should be supplied or user is prompted if passphrase param is
+ *				NULL.
+ *
+ *			@subsection ckeyslot_pass crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase()
+ *				Creates a new keyslot for the volume key by opening existing active keyslot,
+ *				extracting volume key from it and storing it into a new keyslot
+ *				protected by a new passphrase
+ *
+ *		@subsection cload crypt_load()
+ *			Function loads header from backing block device into device context.
+ *
+ *		@subsection cactivate crypt_activate_by_passphrase()
+ *			Activates crypt device by user supplied password for keyslot containing the volume_key.
+ *			If <I>keyslot</I> parameter is set to <I>CRYPT_ANY_SLOT</I> then all active keyslots
+ *			are tried one by one until the volume key is found.
+ *
+ *	 	@subsection cactive_pars crypt_get_active_device()
+ *	 		This call returns structure containing runtime attributes of active device.
+ *
+ *	 	@subsection cinit_by_name crypt_init_by_name()
+ *	 		In case you need to do operations with active device (device which already
+ *	 		has its corresponding mapping) and you miss valid device context stored in
+ *	 		*crypt_device reference, you should use this call. Function tries to
+ *	 		get path to backing device from DM, initializes context for it and loads LUKS
+ *	 		header.
+ *
+ *			@subsection cdeactivate crypt_deactivate()
+ *			Deactivates crypt device (removes DM mapping and safely erases volume key from kernel).
+ *
+ *		@subsection cluks_ex crypt_luks_usage.c - Complex example
+ *			To compile and run use following commands in examples directory:
+ *
+ * @code
+ * make
+ * ./crypt_luks_usage _path_to_[block_device]_file
+ * @endcode
+ *			Note that you need to have the cryptsetup library compiled. @include crypt_luks_usage.c
+ *
+ *	@section clog crypt_log_usage - cryptsetup logging API example
+ *		Example describes basic use case for cryptsetup logging. To compile and run
+ * 		use following commands in examples directory:
+ *
+ * @code
+ * make
+ * ./crypt_log_usage
+ * @endcode
+ *		Note that you need to have the cryptsetup library compiled. @include crypt_log_usage.c
+ *
+ *		@example crypt_luks_usage.c
+ *		@example crypt_log_usage.c
+ */

docs/examples/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+TARGETS=crypt_log_usage crypt_luks_usage
+CFLAGS=-O0 -g -Wall -D_GNU_SOURCE
+LDLIBS=-lcryptsetup
+CC=gcc
+
+all: $(TARGETS)
+
+crypt_log_usage: crypt_log_usage.o
+	$(CC) -o $@ $^ $(LDLIBS)
+
+crypt_luks_usage: crypt_luks_usage.o
+	$(CC) -o $@ $^ $(LDLIBS)
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *~ core $(TARGETS)
+
+.PHONY: clean

docs/examples/crypt_log_usage.c

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/*
+ * libcryptsetup API log example
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <libcryptsetup.h>
+
+/*
+ * This is an example of crypt_set_log_callback API callback.
+ *
+ */
+static void simple_syslog_wrapper(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr)
+{
+	const char *prefix = (const char *)usrptr;
+	int priority;
+
+	switch(level) {
+		case CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL:  priority = LOG_NOTICE; break;
+		case CRYPT_LOG_ERROR:   priority = LOG_ERR;    break;
+		case CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE: priority = LOG_INFO;   break;
+		case CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG:   priority = LOG_DEBUG;  break;
+		default:
+			fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported log level requested!\n");
+			return;
+	}
+
+	if (prefix)
+		syslog(priority, "%s:%s", prefix, msg);
+	else
+		syslog(priority, "%s", msg);
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	char usrprefix[] = "cslog_example";
+	int r;
+
+	if (geteuid()) {
+		printf("Using of libcryptsetup requires super user privileges.\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	openlog("cryptsetup", LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_USER);
+
+	/* Initialize empty crypt device context */
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, NULL);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_init() failed.\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	/* crypt_set_log_callback() - register a log callback for crypt context */
+	crypt_set_log_callback(cd, &simple_syslog_wrapper, (void *)usrprefix);
+
+	/* send messages ithrough the crypt_log() interface */
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, "This is normal log message");
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "This is error log message");
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE, "This is verbose log message");
+	crypt_log(cd, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, "This is debug message");
+
+	/* release crypt context */
+	crypt_free(cd);
+
+	/* Initialize default (global) log callback */
+	crypt_set_log_callback(NULL, &simple_syslog_wrapper, NULL);
+
+	crypt_log(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL, "This is normal log message");
+	crypt_log(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_ERROR, "This is error log message");
+	crypt_log(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE, "This is verbose log message");
+	crypt_log(NULL, CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG, "This is debug message");
+
+	closelog();
+	return 0;
+}

docs/examples/crypt_luks_usage.c

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/*
+ *  libcryptsetup API - using LUKS device example
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <libcryptsetup.h>
+
+static int format_and_add_keyslots(const char *path)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * The crypt_init() call is used  to initialize crypt_device context,
+	 * The path parameter specifies a device path.
+	 *
+	 * For path, you can use either link to a file or block device.
+	 * The loopback device will be detached automatically.
+	 */
+
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, path);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_init() failed for %s.\n", path);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("Context is attached to block device %s.\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+	/*
+	 * So far, no data were written to the device.
+	 */
+	printf("Device %s will be formatted as a LUKS device after 5 seconds.\n"
+	       "Press CTRL+C now if you want to cancel this operation.\n", path);
+	sleep(5);
+
+	/*
+	 * NULLs for uuid and volume_key means that these attributes will be
+	 * generated during crypt_format().
+	 */
+	r = crypt_format(cd,		/* crypt context */
+			 CRYPT_LUKS2,	/* LUKS2 is a new LUKS format; use CRYPT_LUKS1 for LUKS1 */
+			 "aes",		/* used cipher */
+			 "xts-plain64",	/* used block mode and IV */
+			 NULL,		/* generate UUID */
+			 NULL,		/* generate volume key from RNG */
+			 512 / 8,	/* 512bit key - here AES-256 in XTS mode, size is in bytes */
+			 NULL);		/* default parameters */
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_format() failed on device %s\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The device now contains a LUKS header, but there is no active keyslot.
+	 *
+	 * crypt_keyslot_add_* call stores the volume_key in the encrypted form into the keyslot.
+	 *
+	 * After format, the volume key is stored internally.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd,			/* crypt context */
+					    CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,	/* just use first free slot */
+					    NULL,		/* use internal volume key */
+					    0,			/* unused (size of volume key) */
+					    "foo",		/* passphrase - NULL means query*/
+					    3);			/* size of passphrase */
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("Adding keyslot failed.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("The first keyslot is initialized.\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * Add another keyslot, now authenticating with the first keyslot.
+	 * It decrypts the volume key from the first keyslot and creates a new one with the specified passphrase.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(cd,			/* crypt context */
+					    CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,	/* just use first free slot */
+					    "foo", 3,		/* passphrase for the old keyslot */
+					    "bar", 3);		/* passphrase for the new kesylot */
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("Adding keyslot failed.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("The second keyslot is initialized.\n");
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int activate_and_check_status(const char *path, const char *device_name)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	struct crypt_active_device cad;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * LUKS device activation example.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_init(&cd, path);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_init() failed for %s.\n", path);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * crypt_load() is used to load existing LUKS header from a block device
+	 */
+	r = crypt_load(cd,		/* crypt context */
+		       CRYPT_LUKS,	/* requested type - here LUKS of any type */
+		       NULL);		/* additional parameters (not used) */
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_load() failed on device %s.\n", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Device activation creates a device-mapper device with the specified name.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd,		/* crypt context */
+					 device_name,	/* device name to activate */
+					 CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,/* the keyslot use (try all here) */
+					 "foo", 3,	/* passphrase */
+					 CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY); /* flags */
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("Device %s activation failed.\n", device_name);
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("%s device %s/%s is active.\n", crypt_get_type(cd), crypt_get_dir(), device_name);
+	printf("\tcipher used: %s\n", crypt_get_cipher(cd));
+	printf("\tcipher mode: %s\n", crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+	printf("\tdevice UUID: %s\n", crypt_get_uuid(cd));
+
+	/*
+	 * Get info about the active device.
+	 */
+	r = crypt_get_active_device(cd, device_name, &cad);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("Get info about active device %s failed.\n", device_name);
+		crypt_deactivate(cd, device_name);
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("Active device parameters for %s:\n"
+		"\tDevice offset (in sectors): %" PRIu64 "\n"
+		"\tIV offset (in sectors)    : %" PRIu64 "\n"
+		"\tdevice size (in sectors)  : %" PRIu64 "\n"
+		"\tread-only flag            : %s\n",
+		device_name, cad.offset, cad.iv_offset, cad.size,
+		cad.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY ? "1" : "0");
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_active_device(const char *device_name)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *cd;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * crypt_init_by_name() initializes context by an active device-mapper name
+	 */
+	r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, device_name);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_init_by_name() failed for %s.\n", device_name);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_status(cd, device_name) == CRYPT_ACTIVE)
+		printf("Device %s is still active.\n", device_name);
+	else {
+		printf("Something failed perhaps, device %s is not active.\n", device_name);
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * crypt_deactivate() is used to deactivate a device
+	 */
+	r = crypt_deactivate(cd, device_name);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		printf("crypt_deactivate() failed.\n");
+		crypt_free(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	printf("Device %s is now deactivated.\n", device_name);
+
+	crypt_free(cd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	if (geteuid()) {
+		printf("Using of libcryptsetup requires super user privileges.\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (argc != 2) {
+		printf("usage: ./crypt_luks_usage <path>\n"
+			"<path> refers to either a regular file or a block device.\n"
+			"       WARNING: the file or device will be wiped.\n");
+		return 2;
+	}
+
+	if (format_and_add_keyslots(argv[1]))
+		return 3;
+
+	if (activate_and_check_status(argv[1], "example_device"))
+		return 4;
+
+	if (handle_active_device("example_device"))
+		return 5;
+
+	return 0;
+}

docs/v1.0.7-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+cryptsetup 1.0.7 Release Notes (2009-07-22)
+===========================================
+
+Changes since 1.0.7-rc1
+------------------------
+[committer name]
+
+ * Allow removal of last slot in luksRemoveKey
+and luksKillSlot. [Milan Broz]
+
+ * Add --disable-selinux option and fix static build if selinux
+is required. [Milan Broz]
+
+ * Reject unsupported --offset and --skip options for luksFormat
+and update man page. [Milan Broz]
+
+
+Changes since 1.0.6
+--------------------
+[committer name]
+
+* Various man page fixes. Also merged some Debian/Ubuntu man page
+fixes. (thanks to Martin Pitt) [Milan Broz]
+
+* Set UUID in device-mapper for LUKS devices. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Retain readahead of underlying device. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Display device name when asking for password. (thanks to Till
+Maas) [Milan Broz]
+
+* Check device size when loading LUKS header. Remove misleading
+error message later.  [Milan Broz]
+
+* Add error hint if dm-crypt mapping failed. (Key size and kernel
+version check for XTS and LRW mode for now.) [Milan Broz]
+
+* Use better error messages if device doesn't exist or is already
+used by other mapping. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Fix make distcheck. (thanks to Mike Kelly) [Milan Broz]
+
+* Check if all slots are full during luksAddKey. [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Fix segfault in set_error (thanks to Oliver Metz). [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Remove precompiled pot files. Fix uninitialized return value
+variable in setup.c. [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Code cleanups. (thanks to Ivan Stankovic) [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Remove unnecessary files from po directory. They will be
+regenerated by autogen.sh. [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Fix wrong output for remaining key at key deletion. Allow deletion
+of key slot while other keys have the same key information. [Clemens
+Fruhwirth]
+
+* Add missing AM_PROG_CC_C_O to configure.in [Milan Broz]
+
+* Remove duplicate sentence in man page (thanks to Till Maas).
+[Milan Broz]
+
+* Wipe start of device (possible fs signature) before
+LUKS-formatting. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Do not process configure.in in hidden directories. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Return more descriptive error in case of IO or header format
+error. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Use remapping to error target instead of calling udevsettle
+for temporary crypt device. [Milan Broz]
+
+* Check device mapper communication and warn user in case the
+communication fails. (thanks to Milan Broz) [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Fix signal handler to proper close device. (thanks to Milan Broz)
+[Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* write_lseek_blockwise: declare innerCount outside the if block,
+add -Wall to the default CFLAGS, * fix some signedness issues
+(thanks to Ivan Stankovic) [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Error handling improvement. (thanks to Erik Edin) [Clemens Fruhwirth]
+
+* Add non-exclusive override to interface definition. [Clemens
+Fruhwirth]
+
+* Refactor key slot selection into keyslot_from_option. Either
+autoselect next free keyslot or honor user choice (after checking).
+[Clemens Fruhwirth]

docs/v1.1.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.1.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.0.7
+----------------------------
+
+Important changes:
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ * IMPORTANT: the default compiled-in cipher parameters changed
+	plain mode: aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 (default is backward incompatible!).
+	LUKS mode: aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 (only key size increased)
+	In both modes is now default key size 256bits.
+
+	 * Default compiled-in parameters are now configurable through configure options:
+	   --with-plain-* / --with-luks1-* (see configure --help)
+
+	 * If you need backward compatible defaults for distribution use
+	   configure --with-plain-mode=cbc-plain --with-luks1-keybits=128
+
+	 Default compiled-in modes are printed in "cryptsetup --help" output.
+
+ * Change in iterations count (LUKS):
+	The slot and key digest iteration minimum count is now 1000.
+	The key digest iteration count is calculated from iteration time (approx 1/8 of req. time).
+	For more info about above items see discussion here: http://tinyurl.com/yaug97y
+
+ * New libcryptsetup API (documented in libcryptsetup.h).
+
+	The old API (using crypt_options struct) is still available but will remain
+	frozen and not used for new functions.
+	Soname of library changed to libcryptsetup.so.1.0.0.
+	(But only recompilation should be needed for old programs.)
+
+	The new API provides much more flexible operation over LUKS device for
+	applications, it is preferred that new applications will use libcryptsetup
+	and not wrapper around cryptsetup binary.
+
+ * New luksHeaderBackup and luksHeaderRestore commands.
+
+	These commands allows binary backup of LUKS header.
+	Please read man page about possible security issues with backup files.
+
+ * New luksSuspend (freeze device and wipe key) and luksResume (with provided passphrase).
+
+	luksSuspend wipe encryption key in kernel memory and set device to suspend
+	(blocking all IO) state. This option can be used for situations when you need
+	temporary wipe encryption key (like suspend to RAM etc.)
+	Please read man page for more information.
+
+ * New --master-key-file option for luksFormat and luksAddKey.
+
+	User can now specify pre-generated master key in file, which allows regenerating
+	LUKS header or add key with only master key knowledge.
+
+ * Uses libgcrypt and enables all gcrypt hash algorithms for LUKS through -h luksFormat option.
+
+	Please note that using different hash for LUKS header make device incompatible with
+	old cryptsetup releases.
+
+ * Introduces --debug parameter.
+
+	Use when reporting bugs (just run cryptsetup with --debug and attach output
+	to issue report.) Sensitive data are never printed to this log.
+
+ * Moves command successful messages to verbose level.
+
+ * Requires device-mapper library and libgcrypt to build.
+
+ * Uses dm-uuid for all crypt devices, contains device type and name now.
+
+ * Removes support for dangerous non-exclusive option
+	(it is ignored now, LUKS device must be always opened exclusive)
+
+Other changes:
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ * Fixed localization to work again. Also cryptsetup is now translated by translationproject.org.
+ * Fix some libcryptsetup problems, including
+    * exported symbols and versions in libcryptsetup (properly use versioned symbols)
+    * Add crypt_log library function.
+    * Add CRYPT_ prefix to enum defined in libcryptsetup.h.
+ * Move duplicate Command failed message to verbose level (error is printed always).
+ * Fix several problems in build system
+    * use autopoint and clean gettext processing.
+    * Check in configure if selinux libraries are required in static version.
+    * Fix build for non-standard location of gcrypt library.
+ * Add temporary debug code to find processes locking internal device.
+ * Fix error handling during reading passphrase.
+ * Fail passphrase read if piped input no longer exists.
+ * Fix man page to not require --size which expands to device size by default.
+ * Clean up Makefiles and configure script.
+ * Try to read first sector from device to properly check that device is ready.
+ * Move memory locking and dm initialization to command layer.
+ * Increase priority of process if memory is locked.
+ * Add log macros and make logging more consistent.
+ * Keyfile now must be provided by path, only stdin file descriptor is used (api only).
+ * Do not call isatty() on closed keyfile descriptor.
+ * Move key slot manipulation function into LUKS specific code.
+ * Replace global options struct with separate parameters in helper functions.
+ * Implement old API calls using new functions.
+ * Allow using passphrase provided in options struct for LuksOpen.
+ * Allow restrict keys size in LuksOpen.
+ * Fix errors when compiled with LUKS_DEBUG.
+ * Print error when getline fails.
+ * Completely remove internal SHA1 implementation code, not needed anymore.
+ * Pad luks header to 512 sector size.
+ * Rework read/write blockwise to not split operation to many pieces.
+ * Use posix_memalign if available.
+ * Fix segfault if provided slot in luksKillslot is invalid.
+ * Remove unneeded timeout when remove of temporary device succeeded.

docs/v1.1.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.1.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.1.1-rc2
+* Fix luksClose error if underlying device is LVM logical volume.
+
+Changes since version 1.1.1-rc1
+* Fix automatic dm-crypt module loading.
+
+Changes since version 1.1.0
+
+Important changes:
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Detects and use device-mapper udev support if available.
+
+  This should allow synchronisation with udev rules and avoid races with udev.
+
+  If package maintainer want to use old, direct libdevmapper device node creation,
+  use configure option --disable-udev.
+
+* Supports device topology detection for data alignment.
+
+  If kernel provides device topology ioctl calls, the LUKS data area
+  alignment is automatically set to optimal value.
+
+  This means that stacked devices (like LUKS over MD/LVM)
+  should use the most optimal data alignment.
+
+  (You can still overwrite this calculation using --align-payload option.)
+
+* Prefers some device paths in status display.
+  (So status command will try to find top level device name, like /dev/sdb.)
+
+* Fix package config file to use proper package version.
+
+Other changes:
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Fix luksOpen reading of passphrase on stdin (if "-" keyfile specified).
+* Fix isLuks to initialise crypto backend (blkid instead is suggested anyway).
+* Properly initialise crypto backend in header backup/restore commands.
+* Do not verify unlocking passphrase in luksAddKey command.
+* Allow no hash specification in plain device constructor - user can provide volume key directly.
+* Try to use pkgconfig for device mapper library in configuration script.
+* Add some compatibility checks and disable LUKS suspend/resume if not supported.
+* Rearrange tests, "make check" now run all available test for package.
+* Avoid class C++ keyword in library header.

docs/v1.1.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+== Cryptsetup 1.1.2 Release Notes ==
+
+This release fixes a regression (introduced in 1.1.1 version) in handling
+key files containing new line characters (affects only files read from
+standard input).
+
+Cryptsetup can accept passphrase on stdin (standard input).
+
+Handling of new line (\n) character is defined by input specification:
+
+ * if keyfile is specified as "-" (using --key-file=- of by "-" positional argument
+   in luksFormat and luksAddKey, like cat file | cryptsetup --key-file=- <action>),
+   input is processed as normal binary file and no new line is interpreted.
+
+ * if there is no key file specification (with default input from stdin pipe
+   like echo passphrase | cryptsetup <action>) input is processed as input from terminal,
+   reading will stop after new line is detected.
+
+Moreover, luksFormat now understands --key-file (in addition to positional key
+file argument).
+
+N.B. Using of standard input and pipes for passphrases should be avoided if possible,
+cryptsetup have no control of used pipe buffers between commands in scripts and cannot
+guarantee that all passphrase/key-file buffers are properly wiped after use.
+
+=== changes since version 1.1.1 ===
+
+ * Fix luksFormat/luksOpen reading passphrase from stdin and "-" keyfile.
+ * Support --key-file/-d option for luksFormat.
+ * Fix description of --key-file and add --verbose and --debug options to man page.
+ * Add verbose log level and move unlocking message there.
+ * Remove device even if underlying device disappeared (remove, luksClose).
+ * Fix (deprecated) reload device command to accept new device argument.

docs/v1.1.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+== Cryptsetup 1.1.3 Release Notes ==
+
+=== changes since version 1.1.2 ===
+
+* Fix device alignment ioctl calls parameters.
+  (Device alignment code was not working properly on some architectures like ppc64.) 
+
+* Fix activate_by_* API calls to handle NULL device name as documented.
+  (To enable check of passphrase/keyfile using libcryptsetup without activating the device.) 
+
+* Fix udev support for old libdevmapper with not compatible definition.
+
+* Added Polish translation file.

docs/v1.2.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.2.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.2.0-rc1
+
+ * Fix crypt_activate_by_keyfile() to work with PLAIN devices.
+ * Fix plain create command to properly handle keyfile size.
+ * Update translations.
+
+Changes since version 1.1.3
+
+Important changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ * Add text version of *FAQ* (Frequently Asked Questions) to distribution.
+
+ * Add selection of random/urandom number generator for luksFormat
+ (option --use-random and --use-urandom).
+
+ (This affects only long term volume key in *luksFormat*,
+ not RNG used for salt and AF splitter).
+
+  You can also set the default to /dev/random during compilation with
+  --enable-dev-random. Compiled-in default is printed in --help output.
+
+  Be very careful before changing default to blocking /dev/random use here.
+
+ * Fix *luksRemoveKey* to not ask for remaining keyslot passphrase,
+ only for removed one.
+
+ * No longer support *luksDelKey* (replaced with luksKillSlot).
+  * if you want to remove particular passphrase, use *luksKeyRemove*
+  * if you want to remove particular keyslot, use *luksKillSlot*
+
+ Note that in batch mode *luksKillSlot* allows removing of any keyslot
+ without question, in normal mode requires passphrase or keyfile from
+ other keyslot.
+
+ * *Default alignment* for device (if not overridden by topology info)
+ is now (multiple of) *1MiB*.
+ This reflects trends in storage technologies and aligns to the same
+ defaults for partitions and volume management.
+
+ * Allow explicit UUID setting in *luksFormat* and allow change it later
+ in *luksUUID* (--uuid parameter).
+
+ * All commands using key file now allows limited read from keyfile using
+ --keyfile-size and --new-keyfile-size parameters (in bytes).
+
+ This change also disallows overloading of --key-size parameter which
+ is now exclusively used for key size specification (in bits.)
+
+ * *luksFormat* using pre-generated master key now properly allows
+ using key file (only passphrase was allowed prior to this update).
+
+ * Add --dump-master-key option for *luksDump* to perform volume (master)
+ key dump. Note that printed information allows accessing device without
+ passphrase so it must be stored encrypted.
+
+ This operation is useful for simple Key Escrow function (volume key and
+ encryption parameters printed on paper on safe place).
+
+ This operation requires passphrase or key file.
+
+ * The reload command is no longer supported.
+ (Use dmsetup reload instead if needed. There is no real use for this
+ function except explicit data corruption:-)
+
+ * Cryptsetup now properly checks if underlying device is in use and
+ disallows *luksFormat*, *luksOpen* and *create* commands on open
+ (e.g. already mapped or mounted) device.
+
+ * Option --non-exclusive (already deprecated) is removed.
+
+Libcryptsetup API additions:
+
+ * new functions
+  * crypt_get_type() - explicit query to crypt device context type
+  * crypt_resize() - new resize command using context
+  * crypt_keyslot_max() - helper to get number of supported keyslots
+  * crypt_get_active_device() - get active device info
+  * crypt_set/get_rng_type() - random/urandom RNG setting
+  * crypt_set_uuid() - explicit UUID change of existing device
+  * crypt_get_device_name() - get underlying device name
+
+ * Fix optional password callback handling.
+
+ * Allow to activate by internally cached volume key immediately after
+ crypt_format() without active slot (for temporary devices with
+ on-disk metadata)
+
+ * libcryptsetup is binary compatible with 1.1.x release and still
+ supports legacy API calls
+
+ * cryptsetup binary now uses only new API calls.
+
+ * Static compilation of both library (--enable-static) and cryptsetup
+ binary (--enable-static-cryptsetup) is now properly implemented by common
+ libtool logic.
+
+ Prior to this it produced miscompiled dynamic cryptsetup binary with
+ statically linked libcryptsetup.
+
+ The static binary is compiled as src/cryptsetup.static in parallel
+ with dynamic build if requested.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ * Fix default plain password entry from terminal in activate_by_passphrase.
+ * Initialize volume key from active device in crypt_init_by_name()
+ * Fix cryptsetup binary exit codes.
+   0 - success, otherwise fail
+   1 - wrong parameters
+   2 - no permission
+   3 - out of memory
+   4 - wrong device specified
+   5 - device already exists or device is busy
+ * Remove some obsolete info from man page.
+ * Add more regression tests for commands.
+ * Fix possible double free when handling master key file.
+ * Fix pkg-config use in automake scripts.
+ * Wipe iteration and salt after luksKillSlot in LUKS header.
+ * Rewrite file differ test to C (and fix it to really work).
+ * Do not query non-existent device twice (cryptsetup status /dev/nonexistent).
+ * Check if requested hash is supported before writing LUKS header.
+ * Fix problems reported by clang scan-build.

docs/v1.3.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.3.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.2.0
+
+Important changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ * Several userspace crypto backends support
+
+   cryptsetup now supports generic crypto backend interface which allows
+   compile package with various crypto libraries, these are already implemented:
+
+   * gcrypt (default, used in previous versions)
+   * OpenSSL
+   * NSS (because of missing ripemd160 it cannot provide full backward compatibility)
+   * kernel userspace API (provided by kernel 2.6.38 and above)
+     (Note that kernel userspace backend is very slow for this type of operation.
+      But it can be useful for embedded systems, because you can avoid userspace
+      crypto library completely.)
+
+   Backend is selected during configure time, using --with-crypto_backend option.
+
+   configure --with-crypto_backend=BACKEND (gcrypt/openssl/nss/kernel) [gcrypt]
+
+   Note that performance checked (iterations) in LUKS header will cause that
+   real iteration time will differ with different backends.
+   (There are huge differences in speed between libraries.)
+
+ * Cryptsetup now automatically allocates loopback device (/dev/loop) if device
+   argument is file and not plain device.
+
+   This require Linux kernel 2.6.25 and above (which implements loop autoclear flag).
+
+   You can see backing file in cryptsetup status output if underlying device is loopback.
+
+ * Introduce maximum default keyfile size, add configure option, visible in --help.
+
+   Cryptsetup now fails if read from keyfile exceeds internal limit.
+   You can always specify keyfile size (overrides limit) by using --keyfile-size option.
+
+ * Adds luksChangeKey command
+
+    cryptestup luksChangeKey --key-file <old keyfile> <new keyfile> [--key-slot X] 
+    cryptestup luksChangeKey [--key-slot X]  (for passphrase change)
+
+   This command allows passphrase/keyfile change in one step. If no key slot is
+   specified (and there is still free key slot on device) new slot is allocated before
+   the old is purged.
+
+   If --key-slot option is specified (or there is no free slot) command will overwrite
+   existing slot.
+   WARNING: Be sure you have another slot active or header backup when using explicit
+            key slot (so you can unlock the device even after possible media failure).
+
+ * Adds compatible support for loop-AES encryption type in loopaesOpen command.
+
+   Linux dm-crypt in 2.6.38 and above supports loop-AES compatible mapping
+   (including multi-key and special CBC mode, all three modes are supported).
+
+   If you have raw loop-AES keyfile (text file with uuencoded per-line keys), you can
+   access loop-AES volume using
+     cryptsetup loopaesOpen <device> <name> [--key-size 128] --key-file <key-file>
+
+   If you are using GPG encrypted keyfile
+     gpg --decrypt <key-file> | cryptsetup loopaesOpen --key-file=- <device> <name>
+
+   Do not forget to specify key size. Version and hash is automatically detected
+   according to number of lines in key file. For special configuration you can
+   override IV sector offset using --skip option, device offset with --offset
+   and hash algorithm using --hash, see man page for details.
+
+   Please note that loopAES dm-crypt mode is provided for compatibility reasons
+   (so you do not need to patch kernel and util-linux to map existing volumes)
+   but it is not, and never will be, optimized for speed.
+   It is experimental feature for now.
+
+ * Require the whole key read from keyfile in create command (regression in 1.2.0).
+
+ * WARNING: This is the last cryptsetup release which supports library with
+            old API (using struct crypt_options).
+            These calls are deprecated since 1.1.0 and AFAIK no application
+            is using it in recent distros. Removing compatible code will allow
+            new features to be implemented easily.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ * Lock memory also in luksDump command.
+ * Fix return code when passphrase is read from pipe.
+ * Increase libcryptsetup version (loopAES change), still fully backward compatible.
+ * Fixes static build (--disable-static-cryptsetup now works properly).
+ * Supports secure data flag for device-mapper ioctl (will be in 2.6.39,
+   forcing kernel to wipe all ioctl buffers with possible key data).
+   To enable this flag you need new device-mapper library, in LVM2 2.02.84.
+ * Add copyright texts into some files and adds GPL exception allowing
+   to distribute resulting binaries linked with OpenSSL.
+ * Update FAQ.
+ * Fix message when locking memory fails.
+ * Fix luksAddKey return code if master key is used.
+ * Update some text files in distributions.
+ * Add docs directory with Release Notes archive.
+ * Do not hardcode loopback device name in tests, use internal loopback library.

docs/v1.3.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.3.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.3.0
+
+ * Fix keyfile=- processing in create command (regression in 1.3.0).
+
+ * Simplify device path status check (use /sys and do not scan /dev).
+
+ * Do not ignore device size argument for create command (regression in 1.2.0).
+
+ * Fix error paths in blockwise code and lseek_write call.
+
+ * Add optional Nettle crypto backend support.

docs/v1.4.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.4.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.3.1
+
+Important changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+WARNING: This release removes old deprecated API from libcryptsetup
+         (all functions using struct crypt_options).
+
+         This require libcrypsetup version change and
+         rebuild of applications using cryptsetup library.
+         All new API symbols are backward compatible.
+
+* If device is not rotational disk, cryptsetup no longer tries
+  to wipe keyslot with Gutmann algorithm for magnetic media erase
+  but simply rewrites area once by random data.
+
+* The on-disk LUKS header can now be detached (e.g. placed on separate
+  device or in file) using new --header option.
+
+  This option is only relevant for LUKS devices and can be used in
+  luksFormat, luksOpen, luksSuspend, luksResume and resize commands.
+
+  If used with luksFormat the --align-payload option is taken
+  as absolute sector alignment on ciphertext device and can be zero.
+
+  Example:
+    Create LUKS device with ciphertext device on /dev/sdb and header
+    on device /dev/sdc. Use all space on /dev/sdb (no reserved area for header).
+
+          cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdb --header /dev/sdc --align-payload 0
+
+   Activate such device:
+          cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sdb --header /dev/sdc test_disk
+
+   You can use file for LUKS header (loop device will be used while
+   manipulating with such detached header), just you have to create
+   large enough file in advance.
+
+          dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/luks_header bs=1M count=4
+          cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdb --header /mnt/luks_header --align-payload 0
+
+   Activation is the same as above.
+
+          cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sdb --header /mnt/luks_header test_disk
+
+   All keyslot operations need to be run on _header_ not on ciphertext device,
+   an example:
+
+          cryptsetup luksAddKey /mnt/luks_header
+
+   If you do not use --align-payload 0, you can later restore LUKS header
+   on device itself (and use it as normal LUKS device without detached header).
+
+   WARNING: There is no possible check that specified ciphertext device
+            matches detached on-disk header. Use with care, it can destroy
+            your data in case of a mistake.
+
+   WARNING: Storing LUKS header in a file means that anti-forensic splitter
+            cannot properly work (there is filesystem allocation layer between
+            header and disk).
+
+* Support --allow-discards option to allow discards/TRIM requests.
+
+   Since kernel 3.1, dm-crypt devices optionally (not by default) support
+   block discards (TRIM) commands.
+   If you want to enable this operation, you have to enable it manually
+   on every activation using --allow-discards
+
+          cryptsetup luksOpen --allow-discards /dev/sdb test_disk
+
+   WARNING: There are several security consequences, please read at least
+            http://asalor.blogspot.com/2011/08/trim-dm-crypt-problems.html
+            before you enable it.
+
+* Add --shared option for creating non-overlapping crypt segments.
+
+   The --shared options checks that mapped segments are not overlapping
+   and allows non-exclusive access to underlying device.
+   Only plain crypt devices can be used in this mode.
+
+   Example - map 64M of device disk and following 32 M area as another disk.
+
+     cryptsetup create outer_disk /dev/sdb --offset 0 --size 65536
+     cryptsetup create inner_disk /dev/sdb --offset 65536 --size 32768 --shared
+
+ (It can be used to simulate trivial hidden disk concepts.)
+
+libcryptsetup API changes:
+  * Added options to support detached metadata device
+     crypt_init_by_name_and_header()
+     crypt_set_data_device()
+  * Add crypt_last_error() API call.
+  * Fix plain crypt format parameters to include size option.
+  * Add crypt_get_iv_offset() function.
+
+  * Remove old API functions (all functions using crypt_options).
+
+* Support key-slot option for luksOpen (use only explicit keyslot).
+
+   You can now specify key slot in luksOpen and limit checking
+   only to specified slot.
+
+* Support retries and timeout parameters for luksSuspend.
+  (The same way as in luksOpen.)
+
+* Add doxygen-like documentation (it will be available on project page later).
+  (To generate it manually run doxygen in docs directory.)
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Fix crypt_load to properly check device size.
+* Do not allow context format of already formatted device.
+* Do not allow key retrieval while suspended (key could be wiped).
+* Do not allow suspend for non-LUKS devices.
+* Fix luksKillSLot exit code if slot is inactive or invalid.
+* Fix exit code if passphrases do not match in luksAddKey.
+* Fix return code for status command when device doesn't exists.
+* Fix verbose messages in isLuks command.
+* Support Nettle 2.4 crypto backend (supports ripemd160).
+* Add LUKS on-disk format description into package.
+* Enhance check of device size before writing LUKS header.
+* Add more paranoid checks for LUKS header and keyslot attributes.
+* Use new /dev/loop-control (kernel 3.1) if possible.
+* Remove hash/hmac restart from crypto backend and make it part of hash/hmac final.
+* Improve check for invalid offset and size values.
+* Revert default initialisation of volume key in crypt_init_by_name().
+* Add more regression tests.
+* Add some libcryptsetup example files (see docs/examples).

docs/v1.4.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.4.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.4.0
+
+* Merge experimental Python cryptsetup (pycryptsetup) binding.
+
+  This option is disabled by default, you can enable build of Python binding
+  with --enable--python configure switch.
+
+  Note that binding currently covers only partial libcryptsetup functions,
+  mainly LUKS device handling needed for Anaconda installer.
+  Until now provided separately as python-cryptsetup.
+  Thanks to Martin Sivak for the code.
+
+  See python subdirectory for more info.
+
+  Python binding code is experimental for now, no stable API guarantee.
+
+* Fix crypt_get_volume_key_size() for plain device.
+  (cryptsetup status reported zero key size for plain crypt devices).
+
+* Fix typo in set_iteration_time API call (old name remains for compatibility reasons).
+
+* Fix FSF address in license and add LGPL license text.

docs/v1.4.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.4.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.4.1
+
+* Add --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset parameters to API and CLI.
+  These options can be used to skip start of keyfile or device used as keyfile.
+
+* Add repair command and crypt_repair() for known LUKS metadata problems repair.
+
+  Some well-known LUKS metadata corruptions are easy to repair, this
+  command should provide a way to fix these problems.
+
+  Always create binary backup of header device before running repair,
+  (only 4kB - visible header) for example by using dd:
+     dd if=/dev/<LUKS header device> of=repair_bck.img bs=1k count=4
+
+  Then you can try to run repair:
+     cryptsetup repair <device>
+
+ Note, not all problems are possible to repair and if keyslot or some header
+ parameters are overwritten, device is lost permanently.
+
+* Fix header check to support old (cryptsetup 1.0.0) header alignment.
+  (Regression in 1.4.0)
+
+* Allow to specify --align-payload only for luksFormat.
+
+* Add --master-key-file option to luksOpen (open using volume key).
+
+* Support UUID=<LUKS_UUID> format for device specification.
+  You can open device by UUID (only shortcut to /dev/disk/by-uuid/ symlinks).
+
+* Support password verification with quiet flag if possible. (1.2.0)
+  Password verification can be still possible if input is terminal.
+
+* Fix retry if entered passphrases (with verify option) do not match.
+  (It should retry if requested, not fail.)
+
+* Fix use of empty keyfile.
+
+* Fix error message for luksClose and detached LUKS header.
+
+* Allow --header for status command to get full info with detached header.

docs/v1.4.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.4.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.4.2
+
+* Fix readonly activation if underlying device is readonly (1.4.0).
+
+* Fix loop mapping on readonly file.
+
+* Include stddef.h in libdevmapper.h (size_t definition).
+
+* Fix keyslot removal for device with 4k hw block (1.4.0).
+(Wipe keyslot failed in this case.)
+
+* Relax --shared flag to allow mapping even for overlapping segments.
+
+  The --shared flag (and API CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED flag) is now able
+  to map arbitrary overlapping area. From API it is even usable
+  for LUKS devices.
+  It is user responsibility to not cause data corruption though.
+
+  This allows e.g. scubed to work again and also allows some
+  tricky extensions later.
+
+* Allow empty cipher (cipher_null) for testing.
+
+  You can now use "null" (or directly cipher_null-ecb) in cryptsetup.
+  This means no encryption, useful for performance tests
+  (measure dm-crypt layer overhead).
+
+* Switch on retry on device remove for libdevmapper.
+  Device-mapper now retry removal if device is busy.
+
+* Allow "private" activation (skip some udev global rules) flag.
+  Cryptsetup library API now allows to specify CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE,
+  which means that some udev rules are not processed.
+  (Used for temporary devices, like internal keyslot mappings where
+  it is not desirable to run any device scans.)
+
+* This release also includes some Red Hat/Fedora specific extensions
+related to FIPS140-2 compliance.
+
+In fact, all these patches are more formal changes and are just subset
+of building blocks for FIPS certification. See FAQ for more details
+about FIPS.
+
+FIPS extensions are enabled by using --enable-fips configure switch.
+
+In FIPS mode (kernel booted with fips=1 and gcrypt in FIPS mode)
+
+  - it provides library and binary integrity verification using
+  libfipscheck (requires pre-generated checksums)
+
+  - it uses FIPS approved RNG for encryption key and salt generation
+  (note that using /dev/random is not formally FIPS compliant RNG).
+
+ - only gcrypt crypto backend is currently supported in FIPS mode.
+
+The FIPS RNG requirement for salt comes from NIST SP 800-132 recommendation.
+(Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation. Part 1: Storage Applications.
+http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-132/nist-sp800-132.pdf)
+LUKS should be aligned to this recommendation otherwise.

docs/v1.5.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.5.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+This release covers mainly inclusion of:
+
+  * Veritysetup tool (and related libcryptsetup extensions for dm-verity).
+
+  * Experimental cryptsetup-reencrypt tool (LUKS offline reencryption).
+
+Changes since version 1.5.0-rc2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+  * Add --device-size option for reencryption tool.
+
+  * Switch to use unit suffix for --reduce-device-size option.
+
+  * Remove open device debugging feature (no longer needed).
+
+  * Fix library name for FIPS check.
+
+  * Add example of using reencryption inside dracut (see misc/dracut).
+
+Changes since version 1.5.0-rc1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Introduce cryptsetup-reencrypt - experimental offline LUKS reencryption tool.
+
+! cryptsetup-reencrypt tool is EXPERIMENTAL
+! ALWAYS BE SURE YOU HAVE RELIABLE BACKUP BEFORE USING THIS TOOL
+
+This tool tries to simplify situation when you need to re-encrypt the whole
+LUKS device in situ (without need to move data elsewhere).
+
+This can happen for example when you want to change volume (master) key,
+encryption algorithm, or other encryption parameter.
+
+Cryptsetup-reencrypt can even optionally shift data on device
+(reducing data device size - you need some free space at the end of device).
+
+In general, cryptsetup-reencrypt can be used to
+
+ - re-generate volume key
+ - change arbitrary encryption parameters
+ - add encryption to not yet encrypted drive
+
+Side effect of reencryption is that final device will contain
+only ciphertext (for all sectors) so even if device was not properly
+wiped by random data, after reencryption you cannot distinguish
+which sectors are used.
+(Reencryption is done always for the whole device.)
+
+There are for sure bugs, please TEST IT IN TEST ENVIRONMENT before
+use for your data.
+
+This tool is not resistant to HW and kernel failures - hw crash
+will cause serious data corruption.
+
+You can enable compilation of this tool with --enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt
+configure option (it is switched off by default).
+(Tool requires libcryptsetup 1.4.3 and later.)
+
+You have to provide all keyslot passphrases or use --keyslot-option
+(then all other keyslots will be disabled).
+
+EXAMPLES (from man page)
+
+Reencrypt /dev/sdb1 (change volume key)
+   # cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1
+
+Reencrypt and also change cipher and cipher mode
+  # cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 -c aes-xts-plain64
+
+  Note: if you are changing key size, there must be enough space
+  for keyslots in header or you have to use --reduce-device size and
+  reduce fs in advance.
+
+Add LUKS encryption to not yet encrypted device
+  First, be sure you have space added to disk.
+  Or, alternatively, shrink filesystem in advance.
+
+  Here we need 4096 512-bytes sectors (enough for 2x128 bit key).
+
+  # fdisk -u /dev/sdb # move sdb1 partition end + 4096 sectors
+
+  # cryptsetup-reencrypt /dev/sdb1 --new --reduce-device-size 4096
+
+There are some options which can improve performance (depends on system),
+namely --use-directio (use direct IO for all operations) can be faster
+on some systems. See man page.
+
+Progress and estimated time is printed during reencryption.
+
+You can suspend reencryption (using ctrl+c or term signal).
+To continue reencryption you have to provide only
+the device parameter (offset is stored in temporary log file).
+
+Please note LUKS device is marked invalid during reencryption and
+you have to retain tool temporary files until reencryption finishes.
+
+Temporary files are LUKS-<uuid>.[log|org|new]
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+  * Fix luks-header-from-active script (do not use LUKS header on-disk, add UUID).
+
+  * Add --test-passphrase option for luksOpen (check passphrase only).
+
+  * Fix parsing of hexadecimal string (salt or root hash) in veritysetup.
+
+Changes since version 1.4.3
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+Introduce veritysetup tool for dm-verity target management.
+
+The dm-verity device-mapper target was added to Linux kernel 3.4 and
+provides transparent integrity checking of block devices using a cryptographic
+digest provided by the kernel crypto API. This target is read-only.
+
+It is meant to be setup as part of a verified boot path (it was originally
+developed by Chrome OS authors as part of verified boot infrastructure).
+
+For deeper description please see http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMVerity
+and kernel dm-verity documentation.
+
+The libcryptsetup library was extended to support manipulation
+with dm-verity kernel module and new veritysetup CLI tool is added.
+
+There are no additional library requirements (it uses the same crypto
+backend as cryptsetup).
+
+If you want compile cryptsetup without veritysetup tool,
+use --disable-veritysetup configure option.
+For other configuration option see configure --help and veritysetup --help
+(e.g. default parameters).
+
+Supported libcryptsetup functions new CRYPT_VERITY type:
+  crypt_init
+  crypt_init_by_name
+  crypt_set_data device
+  crypt_get_type
+  crypt_format
+  crypt_load
+  crypt_get_active_device
+  crypt_activate_by_volume_key (volume key == root hash here)
+  crypt_dump
+and new introduced function
+  crypt_get_verity_info
+
+Please see comments in libcryptsetup.h and veritysetup.c as an code example
+how to use CRYPT_VERITY API.
+
+The veritysetup tool supports these operations:
+
+  veritysetup format <data_device> <hash_device>
+    Formats <hash_device> (calculates all hash areas according to <data_device>).
+    This is initial command to prepare device <hash_device> for later verification.
+
+  veritysetup create <name> <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>
+    Creates (activates) a dm-verity mapping with <name> backed by device <data_device>
+    and using <hash_device> for in-kernel verification.
+
+  veritysetup verify <data_device> <hash_device> <root_hash>
+    Verifies data in userspace (no kernel device is activated).
+
+  veritysetup remove <name>
+    Removes activated device from kernel (similar to dmsetup remove).
+
+  veritysetup status <name>
+    Reports status for the active kernel dm-verity device.
+
+  veritysetup dump <hash_device>
+    Reports parameters of verity device from on-disk stored superblock.
+
+For more info see veritysetup --help and veritysetup man page.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+  * Both data and header device can now be a file and
+    loop device is automatically allocated.
+
+  * Require only up to last keyslot area for header device, previously
+    backup (and activation) required device/file of size up to data start
+    offset (data payload).
+
+  * Fix header backup and restore to work on files with large data offset.
+    Backup and restore now works even if backup file is smaller than data offset.
+
+Appendix: Examples of veritysetup use
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
+
+ Format device using default parameters, info and final root hash is printed:
+ # veritysetup format /dev/sdb /dev/sdc
+ VERITY header information for /dev/sdc
+ UUID:                   fad30431-0c59-4fa6-9b57-732a90501f75
+ Hash type:              1
+ Data blocks:            52224
+ Data block size:        4096
+ Hash block size:        4096
+ Hash algorithm:         sha256
+ Salt:                   5cc52759af76a092e0c21829cd0ef6938f69831bf86926525106f92a7e9e3aa9
+ Root hash:              7aefa4506f7af497ac491a27f862cf8005ea782a5d97f6426945a6896ab557a1
+
+ Activation of device in-kernel:
+ # veritysetup create vr /dev/sdb /dev/sdc 7aefa4506f7af497ac491a27f862cf8005ea782a5d97f6426945a6896ab557a1
+ Note - if device is corrupted, kernel mapping is created but will report failure:
+ Verity device detected corruption after activation.
+
+ Userspace verification:
+ # veritysetup verify /dev/sdb /dev/sdc 7aefa4506f7af497ac491a27f862cf8005ea782a5d97f6426945a6896ab557a1
+  Verification failed at position 8192.
+  Verification of data area failed.
+
+ Active device status report:
+ # veritysetup status vr
+ /dev/mapper/vr is active.
+   type:        VERITY
+   status:      verified
+   hash type:   1
+   data block:  4096
+   hash block:  4096
+   hash name:   sha256
+   salt:        5cc52759af76a092e0c21829cd0ef6938f69831bf86926525106f92a7e9e3aa9
+   data device: /dev/sdb
+   size:        417792 sectors
+   mode:        readonly
+   hash device: /dev/sdc
+   hash offset: 8 sectors
+
+ Dump of on-disk superblock information:
+ # veritysetup dump /dev/sdc
+ VERITY header information for /dev/sdc
+ UUID:                   fad30431-0c59-4fa6-9b57-732a90501f75
+ Hash type:              1
+ Data blocks:            52224
+ Data block size:        4096
+ Hash block size:        4096
+ Hash algorithm:         sha256
+ Salt:                   5cc52759af76a092e0c21829cd0ef6938f69831bf86926525106f92a7e9e3aa9
+
+ Remove mapping:
+ # veritysetup remove vr

docs/v1.5.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.5.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.5.0
+
+* The libcryptsetup library now tries to initialize device-mapper backend and
+  loop devices only if they are really needed (lazy initializations).
+  This allows some operations to be run by a non-root user.
+
+  (Unfortunately LUKS header keyslot operations still require temporary dm-crypt
+  device and device-mapper subsystem is available only to superuser.)
+
+  Also clear error messages are provided if running as non-root user and
+  operation requires privileged user.
+
+* Veritysetup can be now used by a normal user for creating hash image to file
+  and also it can create hash image if doesn't exist.
+  (Previously it required pre-allocated space.)
+
+* Added crypt_keyslot_area() API call which allows external tools
+  to get exact keyslot offsets and analyse content.
+
+  An example of a tool that searches the keyslot area of a LUKS container
+  for positions where entropy is low and hence there is a high probability
+  of damage is in misc/kesylot_checker.
+  (Thanks to Arno Wagner for the code.)
+
+* Optimized seek to keyfile-offset if key offset is large.
+
+* Fixed luksHeaderBackup for very old v1.0 unaligned LUKS headers.
+
+* Various fixes for problems found by a several static analysis tools.

docs/v1.6.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.0-rc1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ * Change LUKS default cipher to to use XTS encryption mode,
+   aes-xts-plain64 (i.e. using AES128-XTS).
+
+   XTS mode becomes standard in hard disk encryption.
+
+   You can still use any old mode:
+    - compile cryptsetup with old default:
+      configure --with-luks1-cipher=aes --with-luks1-mode=cbc-essiv:sha256 --with-luks1-keybits=256
+    - format LUKS device with old default:
+      cryptsetup luksFormat -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 256 <device>
+
+
+ * Skip tests and fix error messages if running on old systems (or with old kernel).
+
+ * Rename configure.in to configure.ac and fix issues with new automake and pkgconfig
+   and --disable-kernel_crypto option to allow compilation with old kernel headers.
+
+ * Allow repair of 512 bits key header.
+
+ * Fix status of device if path argument is used and fix double path prefix
+   for non-existent device path.
+
+
+Changes since version 1.5.1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Important changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+ * Cryptsetup and libcryptsetup is now released under GPLv2+
+   (GPL version 2 or any later).
+   Some internal code handling files (loopaes, verity, tcrypt
+   and crypto backend wrapper) are LGPLv2+.
+
+   Previously code was GPL version 2 only.
+
+
+ * Introducing new unified command open and close.
+
+   Example:
+      cryptsetup open --type plain|luks|loopaes|tcrypt <device> <name>
+      (type defaults to luks)
+
+   with backward-compatible aliases plainOpen, luksOpen, loopaesOpen,
+   tcryptOpen. Basically "open --type xyz" has alias "xyzOpen".
+
+   The "create" command (plain device create) is DEPRECATED but will
+   be still supported.
+   (This command is confusing because of switched arguments order.)
+
+   The close command is generic command to remove mapping and have
+   backward compatible aliases (remove, luksClose, ...) which behaves
+   exactly the same.
+
+   While all old syntax is still supported, I strongly suggest to use
+   new command syntax which is common for all device types (and possible
+   new formats added in future).
+
+
+ * cryptsetup now support directly TCRYPT (TrueCrypt and compatible tc-play)
+   on-disk format
+   (Code is independent implementation not related to original project).
+
+   Only dump (tcryptDump command) and activation (open --type tcrypt or tcryptOpen)
+   of TCRYPT device are supported. No header changes are supported.
+
+   It is intended to easily access containers shared with other operating systems
+   without need to install 3rd party software. For native Linux installations LUKS
+   is the preferred format.
+
+   WARNING: TCRYPT extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be
+   available (introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38).
+   If you are configuring kernel yourself, enable "User-space interface
+   for symmetric key cipher algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section
+   (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
+
+   Because  TCRYPT  header  is encrypted, you have to always provide valid
+   passphrase and keyfiles. Keyfiles are handled exactly the same as in original
+   format (basically, first 1MB of every keyfile is mixed using CRC32 into pool).
+
+   Cryptsetup should recognize all TCRYPT header variants ever released, except
+   legacy  cipher chains  using LRW encryption mode with 64 bits encryption block
+   (namely Blowfish in LRW mode is not recognized, this is limitation of kernel
+   crypto API).
+
+   Device activation is supported only for LRW/XTS modes (again, limitation
+   of kernel dmcrypt which do not implements TCRYPT extensions to CBC mode).
+   (So old containers cannot be activated, but you can use libcryptsetup
+   for lost password search, example of such code is included in misc directory.)
+
+   Hidden header are supported using --tcrypt-hidden option, system encryption
+   using --tcrypt-system option.
+
+   For detailed description see man page.
+
+   EXAMPLE:
+     * Dump device parameters of container in file:
+
+     # cryptsetup tcryptDump tst
+       Enter passphrase: 
+
+     TCRYPT header information for tst
+     Version:        5
+     Driver req.:    7
+     Sector size:    512
+     MK offset:      131072
+     PBKDF2 hash:    sha512
+     Cipher chain:   serpent-twofish-aes
+     Cipher mode:    xts-plain64
+     MK bits:        1536
+
+     You can also dump master key using --dump-master-key.
+     Dump does not require superuser privilege.
+
+     * Activation of this container
+
+     # cryptsetup tcryptOpen tst tcrypt_dev
+       Enter passphrase: 
+      (Chain of dmcrypt devices is activated as /dev/mapper/tcrypt_dev.)
+
+     * See status of active TCRYPT device
+
+     # cryptsetup status tcrypt_dev
+
+     /dev/mapper/tcrypt_dev is active.
+     type:    TCRYPT
+     cipher:  serpent-twofish-aes-xts-plain64
+     keysize: 1536 bits
+     device:  /dev/loop0
+     loop:    /tmp/tst
+     offset:  256 sectors
+     size:    65024 sectors
+     skipped: 256 sectors
+     mode:    read/write
+
+    * And plaintext filesystem now ready to mount
+
+    # blkid /dev/mapper/tcrypt_dev
+    /dev/mapper/tcrypt_dev: SEC_TYPE="msdos" UUID="9F33-2954" TYPE="vfat"
+
+
+ * Add (optional) support for lipwquality for new LUKS passwords.
+
+   If password is entered through terminal (no keyfile specified)
+   and cryptsetup is compiled with --enable-pwquality, default
+   system pwquality settings are used to check password quality.
+
+   You can always override this check by using new --force-password option.
+
+   For more info about pwquality project see http://libpwquality.fedorahosted.org/
+
+
+ * Proper handle interrupt signals (ctrl+c and TERM signal) in tools
+
+   Code should now handle interrupt properly, release and explicitly wipe
+   in-memory key materials on interrupt.
+   (Direct users of libcryptsetup should always call crypt_free() when
+   code is interrupted to wipe all resources. There is no signal handling
+   in library, it is up to the tool using it.)
+
+ 
+ * Add new benchmark command
+
+   The "benchmark" command now tries to benchmark PBKDF2 and some block
+   cipher variants. You can specify you own parameters (--cipher/--key-size
+   for block ciphers, --hash for PBKDF2).
+
+   See man page for detailed description.
+
+   WARNING: benchmark command requires kernel userspace crypto API to be
+   available (introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38).
+   If you are configuring kernel yourself, enable "User-space interface
+   for symmetric key cipher algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section
+   (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER .config option).
+
+   EXAMPLE:
+     # cryptsetup benchmark
+     # Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).
+     PBKDF2-sha1       111077 iterations per second
+     PBKDF2-sha256      53718 iterations per second
+     PBKDF2-sha512      18832 iterations per second
+     PBKDF2-ripemd160   89775 iterations per second
+     PBKDF2-whirlpool   23918 iterations per second
+            #  Algorithm | Key | Encryption | Decryption
+          aes-cbc   128b  212.0 MiB/s  428.0 MiB/s
+      serpent-cbc   128b   23.1 MiB/s   66.0 MiB/s
+      twofish-cbc   128b   46.1 MiB/s   50.5 MiB/s
+          aes-cbc   256b  163.0 MiB/s  350.0 MiB/s
+      serpent-cbc   256b   23.1 MiB/s   66.0 MiB/s
+      twofish-cbc   256b   47.0 MiB/s   50.0 MiB/s
+          aes-xts   256b  190.0 MiB/s  190.0 MiB/s
+      serpent-xts   256b   58.4 MiB/s   58.0 MiB/s
+      twofish-xts   256b   49.0 MiB/s   49.5 MiB/s
+          aes-xts   512b  175.0 MiB/s  175.0 MiB/s
+      serpent-xts   512b   59.0 MiB/s   58.0 MiB/s
+      twofish-xts   512b   48.5 MiB/s   49.5 MiB/s
+
+     Or you can specify cipher yourself:
+     # cryptsetup benchmark --cipher cast5-cbc-essiv:sha256 -s 128
+     # Tests are approximate using memory only (no storage IO).
+     #  Algorithm | Key | Encryption | Decryption
+        cast5-cbc   128b   32.4 MiB/s   35.0 MiB/s
+
+     WARNING: these tests do not use dmcrypt, only crypto API.
+     You have to benchmark the whole device stack and you can get completely
+     different results. But is is usable for basic comparison.
+     (Note for example AES-NI decryption optimization effect in example above.)
+
+Features
+~~~~~~~~
+
+ * Do not maintain ChangeLog file anymore, see git log for detailed changes,
+   e.g. here http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/source/list
+
+ * Move change key into library, add crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase().
+   This change is useful mainly in FIPS mode, where we cannot
+   extract volume key directly from libcryptsetup.
+
+ * Add verbose messages during reencryption.
+
+ * Default LUKS PBKDF2 iteration time is now configurable.
+
+ * Add simple cipher benchmarking API.
+
+ * Add kernel skcipher backend.
+
+ * Add CRC32 implementation (for TCRYPT).
+
+ * Move PBKDF2 into crypto backend wrapper.
+   This allows use it in other formats, use library implementations and
+   also possible use of different KDF function in future.
+
+ * New PBKDF2 benchmark using getrusage().
+
+Fixes
+~~~~~
+
+ * Avoid O_DIRECT open if underlying storage doesn't support it.
+
+ * Fix some non-translated messages.
+
+ * Fix regression in header backup (1.5.1) with container in file.
+
+ * Fix blockwise read/write for end writes near end of device.
+   (was not used in previous versions)
+
+ * Ignore setpriority failure.
+
+ * Code changes to fix/ignore problems found by Coverity static analysis, including
+   - Get page size should never fail.
+   - Fix time of check/use (TOCTOU test) in tools
+   - Fix time of check/use in loop/wipe utils.
+   - Fix time of check/use in device utils.
+
+ * Disallow header restore if context is non-LUKS device.

docs/v1.6.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.0
+
+* Fix loop-AES keyfile parsing.
+  Loop-AES keyfile should be text keyfile, reject keyfiles which
+  are not properly terminated.
+
+* Fix passphrase pool overflow for too long TCRYPT passphrase.
+ (Maximal TCRYPT passphrase length is 64 characters.)
+
+* Return EPERM (translated to exit code 2) for too long TCRYPT passphrase.
+
+* Fix deactivation of device when failed underlying node disappeared.
+
+* Fix API deactivate call for TCRYPT format and NULL context parameter.
+
+* Improve keyslot checker example documentation.
+
+* Report error message if deactivation fails and device is still busy.
+
+* Make passphrase prompts more consistent (and remove "LUKS" form prompt).
+
+* Fix some missing headers (compilation failed with alternative libc).
+
+* Remove not functional API UUID support for plain & loopaes devices.
+  (not persistent activation UUID).
+
+* Properly cleanup devices on interrupt in api-test.
+
+* Support all tests run if kernel is in FIPS mode.

docs/v1.6.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.1
+
+* Print error and fail if more device arguments are present for isLuks command.
+
+* Fix cipher specification string parsing (found by gcc -fsanitize=address option).
+
+* Try to map TCRYPT system encryption through partition
+  (allows to activate mapping when other partition on the same device is mounted).
+
+* Print a warning if system encryption is used and device is a partition.
+  (TCRYPT system encryption uses whole device argument.)
+
+* Disallow explicit small payload offset for LUKS detached header.
+  LUKS detached header only allows data payload 0 (whole data device is used)
+  or explicit offset larger than header + keyslots size.
+
+* Fix boundary condition for verity device that caused failure for certain device sizes.
+
+* Various fixes to documentation, including update FAQ, default modes
+  and TCRYPT description.
+
+* Workaround for some recent changes in automake (serial-tests).

docs/v1.6.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.2
+
+* Fix cryptsetup reencryption tool to work properly
+  with devices using 4kB sectors.
+
+* Always use page size if running through loop device,
+  this fixes failures for external LUKS header and
+  filesystem requiring 4kB block size.
+
+* Fix TCRYPT system encryption mapping for multiple partitions.
+  Since this commit, one can use partition directly as device parameter.
+  If you need to activate such partition from image in file,
+  please first use map partitioned loop device (losetup -P)
+  on image.
+  (Cryptsetup require partition offsets visible in kernel sysfs
+  in this mode.)
+
+* Support activation of old TrueCrypt containers using CBC mode
+  and whitening (created in TrueCrypt version < 4.1).
+  This requires Linux kernel 3.13 or later.
+  (Containers with cascade CBC ciphers are not supported.)
+
+* Properly display keys in dump --dump-master-key command
+  for TrueCrypt CBC containers.
+
+* Rewrite cipher benchmark loop which was unreliable
+  on very fast machines.
+
+* Add warning if LUKS device was activated using non-cryptsetup
+  library which did not set UUID properly (e.g. cryptmount).
+  (Some commands, like luksSuspend, are not available then.)
+
+* Support length limitation also for plain (no hash) length.
+  This can be used for mapping problematic cryptosystems which
+  wipes some key (losetup sometimes set last 32 byte to zero,
+  which can be now configured as --hash plain:31 parameter).
+
+* Fix hash limit if parameter is not a number.
+  (The whole key was set to zero instead of command failure.)
+
+* Unify --key-slot behavior in cryptsetup_reencrypt tool.
+
+* Update dracut example scripts for system reencryption on first boot.
+
+* Add command line option --tcrypt-backup to access TCRYPT backup header.
+
+* Fix static compilation with OpenSSL.

docs/v1.6.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.3
+
+* Implement new erase (with alias luksErase) command.
+
+  The erase cryptsetup command can be used to permanently erase
+  all keyslots and make the LUKS container inaccessible.
+  (The only way to unlock such device is to use LUKS header backup
+  created before erase command was used.)
+
+  You do not need to provide any password for this operation.
+
+  This operation is irreversible.
+
+* Add internal "whirlpool_gcryptbug hash" for accessing flawed
+  Whirlpool hash in gcrypt (requires gcrypt 1.6.1 or above).
+
+  The gcrypt version of Whirlpool hash algorithm was flawed in some
+  situations.
+
+  This means that if you used Whirlpool in LUKS header and upgraded
+  to new gcrypt library your LUKS container become inaccessible.
+
+  Please refer to cryptsetup FAQ for detail how to fix this situation.
+
+* Allow to use --disable-gcrypt-pbkdf2 during configuration
+  to force use internal PBKDF2 code.
+
+* Require gcrypt 1.6.1 for imported implementation of PBKDF2
+  (PBKDF2 in gcrypt 1.6.0 is too slow).
+
+* Add --keep-key to cryptsetup-reencrypt.
+
+  This allows change of LUKS header hash (and iteration count) without
+  the need to reencrypt the whole data area.
+  (Reencryption of LUKS header only without master key change.)
+
+* By default verify new passphrase in luksChangeKey and luksAddKey
+  commands (if input is from terminal).
+
+* Fix memory leak in Nettle crypto backend.
+
+* Support --tries option even for TCRYPT devices in cryptsetup.
+
+* Support --allow-discards option even for TCRYPT devices.
+  (Note that this could destroy hidden volume and it is not suggested
+   by original TrueCrypt security model.)
+
+* Link against -lrt for clock_gettime to fix undefined reference
+  to clock_gettime error (introduced in 1.6.2).
+
+* Fix misleading error message when some algorithms are not available.
+
+* Count system time in PBKDF2 benchmark if kernel returns no self usage info.
+  (Workaround to broken getrusage() syscall with some hypervisors.)

docs/v1.6.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.4
+
+* Allow LUKS header operation handling without requiring root privilege.
+  It means that you can manipulate with keyslots as a regular user, only
+  write access to device (or image) is required.
+
+  This requires kernel crypto wrapper (similar to TrueCrypt device handling)
+  to be available (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER kernel option).
+  If this kernel interface is not available, code fallbacks to old temporary
+  keyslot device creation (where root privilege is required).
+
+  Note that activation, deactivation, resize and suspend operations still
+  need root privilege (limitation of kernel device-mapper backend).
+
+* Fix internal PBKDF2 key derivation function implementation for alternative
+  crypto backends (kernel, NSS) which do not support PBKDF2 directly and have
+  issues with longer HMAC keys.
+
+  This fixes the problem for long keyfiles where either calculation is too slow
+  (because of internal rehashing in every iteration) or there is a limit
+  (kernel backend seems to not support HMAC key longer than 20480 bytes).
+
+  (Note that for recent version of gcrypt, nettle or openssl the internal
+  PBKDF2 code is not compiled in and crypto library internal functions are
+  used instead.)
+
+* Support for Python3 for simple Python binding.
+  Python >= 2.6 is now required. You can set Python compiled version by setting
+  --with-python_version configure option (together with --enable-python).
+
+* Use internal PBKDF2 in Nettle library for Nettle crypto backend.
+  Cryptsetup compilation requires Nettle >= 2.6 (if using Nettle crypto backend).
+
+* Allow simple status of crypt device without providing metadata header.
+  The command "cryptsetup status" will print basic info, even if you
+  do not provide detached header argument.
+
+* Allow to specify ECB mode in cryptsetup benchmark.
+
+* Add some LUKS images for regression testing.
+  Note that if image with Whirlpool fails, the most probable cause is that
+  you have old gcrypt library with flawed whirlpool hash.
+  Read FAQ section 8.3 for more info.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function trhough crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.

docs/v1.6.6-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.6 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.5
+
+* LUKS: Fix keyslot device access for devices which
+  do not support direct IO operations. (Regression in 1.6.5.)
+
+* LUKS: Fallback to old temporary keyslot device mapping method
+  if hash (for ESSIV) is not supported by userspace crypto
+  library. (Regression in 1.6.5.)
+
+* Properly activate device with discard (TRIM for SSDs)
+  if requested even if dm_crypt module is not yet loaded.
+  Only if discard is not supported by the old kernel then
+  the discard option is ignored.
+
+* Fix some static analysis build warnings (scan-build).
+
+* Report crypto lib version only once (and always add kernel
+  version) in debug output.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function through crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.

docs/v1.6.7-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.7 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.6
+
+* Cryptsetup git and wiki are now hosted on GitLab.
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup
+
+  Repository of stable releases remains on kernel.org site
+  https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/
+
+  For more info please see README file.
+
+* Cryptsetup TCRYPT mode now supports VeraCrypt devices (TrueCrypt extension).
+
+  The VeraCrypt extension only increases iteration count for the key
+  derivation function (on-disk format is the same as TrueCrypt format).
+
+  Note that unlocking of a VeraCrypt device can take very long time if used
+  on slow machines.
+
+  To use this extension, add --veracrypt option, for example
+    cryptsetup open --type tcrypt --veracrypt <container> <name>
+
+  For use through libcryptsetup, just add CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES flag.
+
+* Support keyfile-offset and keyfile-size options even for plain volumes.
+
+* Support keyfile option for luksAddKey if the master key is specified.
+
+* For historic reasons, hashing in the plain mode is not used
+  if keyfile is specified (with exception of --key-file=-).
+  Print a warning if these parameters are ignored.
+
+* Support permanent device decryption for cryptsetup-reencrypt.
+  To remove LUKS encryption from a device, you can now use --decrypt option.
+
+* Allow to use --header option in all LUKS commands.
+  The --header always takes precedence over positional device argument.
+
+* Allow luksSuspend without need to specify a detached header.
+
+* Detect if O_DIRECT is usable on a device allocation.
+  There are some strange storage stack configurations which wrongly allows
+  to open devices with direct-io but fails on all IO operations later.
+
+  Cryptsetup now tries to read the device first sector to ensure it can use
+  direct-io.
+
+*  Add low-level performance options tuning for dmcrypt (for Linux 4.0 and later).
+
+   Linux kernel 4.0 contains rewritten dmcrypt code which tries to better utilize
+   encryption on parallel CPU cores.
+
+   While tests show that this change increases performance on most configurations,
+   dmcrypt now provides some switches to change its new behavior.
+
+   You can use them (per-device) with these cryptsetup switches:
+      --perf-same_cpu_crypt
+      --perf-submit_from_crypt_cpus
+
+  Please use these only in the case of serious performance problems.
+  Refer to the cryptsetup man page and dm-crypt documentation
+  (for same_cpu_crypt and submit_from_crypt_cpus options).
+  https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
+
+* Get rid of libfipscheck library.
+  (Note that this option was used only for Red Hat and derived distributions.)
+  With recent FIPS changes we do not need to link to this FIPS monster anymore.
+  Also drop some no longer needed FIPS mode checks.
+
+* Many fixes and clarifications to man pages.
+
+* Prevent compiler to optimize-out zeroing of buffers for on-stack variables.
+
+* Fix a crash if non-GNU strerror_r is used.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+The direct terminal handling for passphrase entry will be removed from
+libcryptsetup in next major version (application should handle it itself).
+
+It means that you have to always either provide password in buffer or set
+your own password callback function through crypt_set_password_callback().
+See API documentation (or libcryptsetup.h) for more info.

docs/v1.6.8-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.6.8 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.6.7
+
+* If the null cipher (no encryption) is used, allow only empty password for LUKS.
+  (Previously cryptsetup accepted any password in this case.)
+
+  The null cipher can be used only for testing and it is used temporarily during
+  offline encrypting not yet encrypted device (cryptsetup-reencrypt tool).
+
+  Accepting only empty password prevents situation when someone adds another
+  LUKS device using the same UUID (UUID of existing LUKS device) with faked
+  header containing null cipher.
+  This could force user to use different LUKS device (with no encryption)
+  without noticing.
+  (IOW it prevents situation when attacker intentionally forces
+  user to boot into different system just by LUKS header manipulation.)
+
+  Properly configured systems should have an additional integrity protection
+  in place here (LUKS here provides only confidentiality) but it is better
+  to not allow this situation in the first place.
+
+  (For more info see QubesOS Security Bulletin QSB-019-2015.)
+
+* Properly support stdin "-" handling for luksAddKey for both new and old
+  keyfile parameters.
+
+* If encrypted device is file-backed (it uses underlying loop device),
+  cryptsetup resize will try to resize underlying loop device as well.
+  (It can be used to grow up file-backed device in one step.)
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows to use empty password through stdin pipe.
+  (Intended only for testing in scripts.)
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+
+Direct terminal handling and password calling callback for passphrase
+entry will be removed from libcryptsetup in next major (2.x) version
+(application should handle it itself).
+It means that application have to always provide password in API calls.
+
+Functions returning last error will be removed in next major version (2.x).
+These functions did not work properly for early initialization errors
+and application can implement better function easily using own error callback.
+
+See comments in libcryptsetup.h for more info about deprecated functions.

docs/v1.7.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+The cryptsetup 1.7 release changes defaults for LUKS,
+there are no API changes.
+
+Changes since version 1.6.8
+
+* Default hash function is now SHA256 (used in key derivation function
+  and anti-forensic splitter).
+
+  Note that replacing SHA1 with SHA256 is not for security reasons.
+  (LUKS does not have problems even if collisions are found for SHA1,
+  for details see FAQ item 5.20).
+
+  Using SHA256 as default is mainly to prevent compatibility problems
+  on hardened systems where SHA1 is already be phased out.
+
+  Note that all checks (kernel crypto API availability check) now uses
+  SHA256 as well.
+
+* Default iteration time for PBKDF2 is now 2 seconds.
+
+  Increasing iteration time is in combination with PBKDF2 benchmark
+  fixes a try to keep PBKDF2 iteration count still high enough and
+  also still acceptable for users.
+
+  N.B. Long term is to replace PBKDF2 algorithm with Password Hashing
+  Competition winner - Argon2.
+
+  Distributions can still change these defaults in compilation time.
+
+  You can change iteration time and used hash function in existing LUKS
+  header with cryptsetup-reencrypt utility even without full reencryption
+  of device (see --keep-key option).
+
+* Fix PBKDF2 iteration benchmark for longer key sizes.
+
+  The previous PBKDF2 benchmark code did not take into account
+  output key length properly.
+
+  For SHA1 (with 160-bits output) and 256-bit keys (and longer)
+  it means that the final iteration value was higher than it should be.
+
+  For other hash algorithms (like SHA256 or SHA512) it caused
+  that iteration count was lower (in comparison to SHA1) than
+  expected for the requested time period.
+
+  The PBKDF2 benchmark code is now fixed to use the key size for
+  the formatted device (or default LUKS key size if running in informational
+  benchmark mode).
+
+  Thanks to A.Visconti, S.Bossi, A.Calo and H.Ragab
+  (http://www.club.di.unimi.it/) for point this out.
+  (Based on "What users should know about Full Disk Encryption
+  based on LUKS" paper to be presented on CANS2015).
+
+* Remove experimental warning for reencrypt tool.
+  The strong request for full backup before using reencryption utility
+  still applies :)
+
+* Add optional libpasswdqc support for new LUKS passwords.
+
+  If password is entered through terminal (no keyfile specified) and
+  cryptsetup is compiled with --enable-passwdqc[=/etc/passwdqc.conf],
+  configured system passwdqc settings are used to check password quality.
+
+* Update FAQ document.
+
+Cryptsetup API NOTE:
+
+Direct terminal handling and password calling callback for passphrase
+entry will be removed from libcryptsetup in next major (2.x) version
+(application should handle it itself).
+It means that application have to always provide password in API calls.
+
+Functions returning last error will be removed in next major version (2.x).
+These functions did not work properly for early initialization errors
+and application can implement better function easily using own error callback.
+
+See comments in libcryptsetup.h for more info about deprecated functions.

docs/v1.7.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.0
+
+* Code now uses kernel crypto API backend according to new
+  changes introduced in mainline kernel
+
+  While mainline kernel should contain backward compatible
+  changes, some stable series kernels do not contain fully
+  backported compatibility patches.
+  Without these patches  most of cryptsetup operations
+  (like unlocking device) fail.
+
+  This change in cryptsetup ensures that all operations using
+  kernel crypto API works even on these kernels.
+
+* The cryptsetup-reencrypt utility now properly detects removal
+  of underlying link to block device and does not remove
+  ongoing re-encryption log.
+  This allows proper recovery (resume) of reencrypt operation later.
+
+  NOTE: Never use /dev/disk/by-uuid/ path for reencryption utility,
+  this link disappears once the device metadata is temporarily
+  removed from device.
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows special "-" (standard input) keyfile handling
+  even for TCRYPT (TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt compatible) devices.
+
+* Cryptsetup now fails if there are more keyfiles specified
+  for non-TCRYPT device.
+
+* The luksKillSlot command now does not suppress provided password
+  in batch mode (if password is wrong slot is not destroyed).
+  Note that not providing password in batch mode means that keyslot
+  is destroyed unconditionally.

docs/v1.7.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.1
+
+* Update LUKS documentation format.
+  Clarify fixed sector size and keyslots alignment.
+
+* Support activation options for error handling modes in Linux kernel
+  dm-verity module:
+
+  --ignore-corruption - dm-verity just logs detected corruption
+
+  --restart-on-corruption - dm-verity restarts the kernel if corruption is detected
+
+  If the options above are not specified, default behavior for dm-verity remains.
+  Default is that I/O operation fails with I/O error if corrupted block is detected.
+
+  --ignore-zero-blocks - Instructs dm-verity to not verify blocks that are expected
+  to contain zeroes and always return zeroes directly instead.
+
+  NOTE that these options could have security or functional impacts,
+  do not use them without assessing the risks!
+
+* Fix help text for cipher benchmark specification (mention --cipher option).
+
+* Fix off-by-one error in maximum keyfile size.
+  Allow keyfiles up to compiled-in default and not that value minus one.
+
+* Support resume of interrupted decryption in cryptsetup-reencrypt utility.
+  To resume decryption, LUKS device UUID (--uuid option) option must be used.
+
+* Do not use direct-io for LUKS header with unaligned keyslots.
+  Such headers were used only by the first cryptsetup-luks-1.0.0 release (2005).
+
+* Fix device block size detection to properly work on particular file-based
+  containers over underlying devices with 4k sectors.

docs/v1.7.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.2
+
+* Fix device access to hash offsets located beyond the 2GB device boundary in veritysetup.
+
+* Set configured (compile-time) default iteration time for devices created directly through
+  libcryptsetup (default was hardcoded 1 second, the configured value applied only
+  for cryptsetup application).
+
+* Fix PBKDF2 benchmark to not double iteration count for specific corner case.
+  If the measurement function returns exactly 500 ms, the iteration calculation loop
+  doubled iteration count but instead of repeating measurement it used this value directly.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: fix memory leak if hash context was repeatedly reused.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: add support for OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+
+* Fix several minor spelling errors.

docs/v1.7.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.3
+
+* Allow to specify LUKS1 hash algorithm in Python luksFormat wrapper.
+
+* Use LUKS1 compiled-in defaults also in Python wrapper.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: Fix OpenSSL 1.1.0 support without backward compatible API.
+
+* OpenSSL backend: Fix LibreSSL compatibility.
+
+* Check for data device and hash device area overlap in veritysetup.
+
+* Fix a possible race while allocating a free loop device.
+
+* Fix possible file descriptor leaks if libcryptsetup is run from a forked process.
+
+* Fix missing same_cpu_crypt flag in status command.
+
+* Various updates to FAQ and man pages.

docs/v1.7.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Cryptsetup 1.7.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+
+Changes since version 1.7.4
+
+* Fixes to luksFormat to properly support recent kernel running in FIPS mode.
+
+  Cryptsetup must never use a weak key even if it is just used for testing
+  of algorithm availability. In FIPS mode, weak keys are always rejected.
+
+  A weak key is for example detected if the XTS encryption mode use
+  the same key for the tweak and the encryption part.
+
+* Fixes accesses to unaligned hidden legacy TrueCrypt header.
+
+  On a native 4k-sector device the old hidden TrueCrypt header is not
+  aligned with the hw sector size (this problem was fixed in later TrueCrypt
+  on-disk format versions).
+
+  Cryptsetup now properly aligns the read so it does not fail.
+
+* Fixes to optional dracut ramdisk scripts for offline re-encryption on initial boot.

docs/v2.0.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with experimental features.
+
+This version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+NOTE: This version changes soname of libcryptsetup library and increases
+major version for all public symbols.
+Most of the old functions are fully backward compatible, so only
+recompilation of programs should be needed.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption we need
+better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.0-RC1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Limit KDF requested (for format) memory by available physical memory.
+  On some systems too high requested amount of memory causes OOM killer
+  to kill the process (instead of returning ENOMEM).
+  We never try to use more than half of available physical memory.
+
+* Ignore device alignment if it is not multiple of minimal-io.
+  Some USB enclosures seems to report bogus topology info that
+  prevents to use LUKS detached header.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.0-RC0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Enable to use system libargon2 instead of bundled version.
+  Renames --disable-argon2 to --disable-internal-argon2 option
+  and adds --enable-libargon2 flag to allow system libargon2.
+
+* Changes in build system (Automake)
+  - The build system now uses non-recursive automake (except for tests).
+  (Tools binaries are now located in buildroot directory.)
+  - New --disable-cryptsetup option to disable build of cryptsetup tool.
+  - Enable build of cryptsetup-reencrypt by default.
+
+* Install tmpfiles.d configuration for LUKS2 locking directory.
+  You can overwrite this using --with-tmpfilesdir configure option.
+  If your distro does not support tmpfiles.d directory, you have
+  to create locking directory (/run/lock/cryptsetup) in cryptsetup
+  package (or init scripts).
+
+* Adds limited support for offline reencryption of LUKS2 format.
+
+* Decrease size of testing images (and the whole release archive).
+
+* Fixes for several memory leaks found by Valgrind and Coverity tools.
+
+* Fixes for several typos in man pages and error messages.
+
+* LUKS header file in luksFormat is now automatically created
+  if it does not exist.
+
+* Do not allow resize if device size is not aligned to sector size.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.0.0 RC0 Release Notes
+==================================
+
+Important features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* New command integritysetup: support for the new dm-integrity kernel target.
+
+  The dm-integrity is a new kernel device-mapper target that introduces
+  software emulation of per-sector integrity fields on the disk sector level.
+  It is available since Linux kernel version 4.12.
+
+  The provided per-sector metadata fields can be used for storing a data
+  integrity checksum (for example CRC32).
+  The dm-integrity implements data journal that enforces atomic update
+  of a sector and its integrity metadata.
+
+  Integritysetup is a CLI utility that can setup standalone dm-integrity
+  devices (that internally check integrity of data).
+
+  Integritysetup is intended to be used for settings that require
+  non-cryptographic data integrity protection with no data encryption.
+  Fo setting integrity protected encrypted devices, see disk authenticated
+  encryption below.
+
+  Note that after formatting the checksums need to be initialized;
+  otherwise device reads will fail because of integrity errors.
+  Integritysetup by default tries to wipe the device with zero blocks
+  to avoid this problem. Device wipe can be time-consuming, you can skip
+  this step by specifying --no-wipe option.
+  (But note that not wiping device can cause some operations to fail
+  if a write is not multiple of page size and kernel page cache tries
+  to read sectors with not yet initialized checksums.)
+
+  The default setting is tag size 4 bytes per-sector and CRC32C protection.
+  To format device with these defaults:
+  $ integritysetup format <device>
+  $ integritysetup open <device> <name>
+
+  Note that used algorithm (unlike tag size) is NOT stored in device
+  kernel superblock and if you use different algorithm, you MUST specify
+  it in every open command, for example:
+  $ integritysetup format <device> --tag-size 32 --integrity sha256
+  $ integritysetup open <device> <name> --integrity sha256
+
+  For more info, see integrity man page.
+
+* Veritysetup command can now format and activate dm-verity devices
+  that contain Forward Error Correction (FEC) (Reed-Solomon code is used).
+  This feature is used on most of Android devices already (available since
+  Linux kernel 4.5).
+
+  There are new options --fec-device, --fec-offset to specify data area
+  with correction code and --fec-roots that set Redd-Solomon generator roots.
+  This setting can be used for format command (veritysetup will calculate
+  and store RS codes) or open command (veritysetup configures kernel
+  dm-verity to use RS codes).
+
+  For more info see veritysetup man page.
+
+* Support for larger sector sizes for crypt devices.
+
+  LUKS2 and plain crypt devices can be now configured with larger encryption
+  sector (typically 4096 bytes, sector size must be the power of two,
+  maximal sector size is 4096 bytes for portability).
+  Large sector size can decrease encryption overhead and can also help
+  with some specific crypto hardware accelerators that perform very
+  badly with 512 bytes sectors.
+
+  Note that if you configure such a larger sector of the device that does use
+  smaller physical sector, there is a possibility of a data corruption during
+  power fail (partial sector writes).
+
+  WARNING: If you use different sector size for a plain device after data were
+  stored,  the decryption will produce garbage.
+
+  For LUKS2, the sector size is stored in metadata and cannot be changed later.
+
+LUKS2 format and features
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The LUKS2 is an on-disk storage format designed to provide simple key
+management, primarily intended for Full Disk Encryption based on dm-crypt.
+
+The LUKS2 is inspired by LUKS1 format and in some specific situations (most
+of the default configurations) can be converted in-place from LUKS1.
+
+The LUKS2 format is designed to allow future updates of various
+parts without the need to modify binary structures and internally
+uses JSON text format for metadata. Compilation now requires the json-c library
+that is used for JSON data processing.
+
+On-disk format provides redundancy of metadata, detection
+of metadata corruption and automatic repair from metadata copy.
+
+NOTE: For security reasons, there is no redundancy in keyslots binary data
+(encrypted keys) but the format allows adding such a feature in future.
+
+NOTE: to operate correctly, LUKS2 requires locking of metadata.
+Locking is performed by using flock() system call for images in file
+and for block device by using a specific lock file in /run/lock/cryptsetup.
+
+This directory must be created by distribution (do not rely on internal
+fallback). For systemd-based distribution, you can simply install
+scripts/cryptsetup.conf into tmpfiles.d directory.
+
+For more details see LUKS2-format.txt and LUKS2-locking.txt in the docs
+directory. (Please note this is just overview, there will be more formal
+documentation later.)
+
+LUKS2 use
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+LUKS2 allows using all possible configurations as LUKS1.
+
+To format device as LUKS2, you have to add "--type luks2" during format:
+
+ $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device>
+
+All commands issued later will recognize the new format automatically.
+
+The newly added features in LUKS2 include:
+
+* Authenticated disk (sector) encryption (EXPERIMENTAL)
+
+  Legacy Full disk encryption (FDE), for example, LUKS1, is a length-preserving
+  encryption (plaintext is the same size as a ciphertext).
+  Such FDE can provide data confidentiality, but cannot provide sound data
+  integrity protection.
+
+  Full disk authenticated encryption is a way how to provide both
+  confidentiality and data integrity protection. Integrity protection here means
+  not only detection of random data corruption (silent data corruption) but also
+  prevention of an unauthorized intentional change of disk sector content.
+
+  NOTE: Integrity protection of this type cannot prevent a replay attack.
+  An attacker can replace the device or its part of the old content, and it
+  cannot be detected.
+  If you need such protection, better use integrity protection on a higher layer.
+
+  For data integrity protection on the sector level, we need additional
+  per-sector metadata space. In LUKS2 this space is provided by a new
+  device-mapper dm-integrity target (available since kernel 4.12).
+  Here the integrity target provides only reliable per-sector metadata store,
+  and the whole authenticated encryption is performed inside dm-crypt stacked
+  over the dm-integrity device.
+
+  For encryption, Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) is used.
+  Every sector is processed as a encryption request of this format:
+
+   |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --|
+   | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) |              |
+   | sector_LE |  IV |  sector in/out    |  tag in/out  |
+
+  AEAD encrypts the whole sector and also authenticates sector number
+  (to detect sector relocation) and also authenticates Initialization Vector.
+
+  AEAD encryption produces encrypted data and authentication tag.
+  The authenticated tag is then stored in per-sector metadata space provided
+  by dm-integrity.
+
+  Most of the current AEAD algorithms requires IV as a nonce, value that is
+  never reused. Because sector number, as an IV, cannot be used in this
+  environment, we use a new random IV (IV is a random value generated by system
+  RNG on every write). This random IV is then stored in the per-sector metadata
+  as well.
+
+  Because the authentication tag (and IV) requires additional space, the device
+  provided for a user has less capacity. Also, the data journalling means that
+  writes are performed twice, decreasing throughput.
+
+  This integrity protection works better with SSDs. If you want to ignore
+  dm-integrity data journal (because journalling is performed on some higher
+  layer or you just want to trade-off performance to safe recovery), you can
+  switch journal off with --integrity-no-journal option.
+  (This flag can be stored persistently as well.)
+
+  Note that (similar to integritysetup) the device read will fail if
+  authentication tag is not initialized (no previous write).
+  By default cryptsetup run wipe of a device (writing zeroes) to initialize
+  authentication tags. This operation can be very time-consuming.
+  You can skip device wipe using --integrity-no-wipe option.
+
+  To format LUKS2 device with integrity protection, use new --integrity option.
+
+  For now, there are very few AEAD algorithms that can be used, and some
+  of them are known to be problematic. In this release we support only
+  a few of AEAD algorithms (options are for now hard coded), later this
+  extension will be completely algorithm-agnostic.
+
+  For testing of authenticated encryption, these algorithms work for now:
+
+  1) aes-xts-plain64 with hmac-sha256 or hmac-sha512 as the authentication tag.
+     (Common FDE mode + independent authentication tag. Authentication key
+      for HMAC is independently generated. This mode is very slow.)
+     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher aes-xts-plain64 --integrity hmac-sha256
+
+  2) aes-gcm-random (native AEAD mode)
+     DO NOT USE in production! The GCM mode uses only 96-bit nonce,
+     and possible collision means fatal security problem.
+     GCM mode has very good hardware support through AES-NI, so it is useful
+     for performance testing.
+     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher aes-gcm-random --integrity aead
+
+  3) ChaCha20 with Poly1305 authenticator (according to RFC7539)
+     $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> --cipher chacha20-random --integrity poly1305
+
+  To specify AES128/AES256 just specify proper key size (without possible
+  authentication key). Other symmetric ciphers, like Serpent or Twofish,
+  should work as well. The mode 1) and 2) should be compatible with IEEE 1619.1
+  standard recommendation.
+
+  There will be better suitable authenticated modes available soon
+  For now we are just preparing framework to enable it (and hopefully improve security of FDE).
+
+  FDE authenticated encryption is not a replacement for filesystem layer
+  authenticated encryption. The goal is to provide at least something because
+  data integrity protection is often completely ignored in today systems.
+
+* New memory-hard PBKDF
+
+  LUKS1 introduced Password-Based Key Derivation Function v2 as a tool to
+  increase attacker cost for a dictionary and brute force attacks.
+  The PBKDF2 uses iteration count to increase time of key derivation.
+  Unfortunately, with modern GPUs, the PBKDF2 calculations can be run
+  in parallel and PBKDF2 can no longer provide the best available protection.
+  Increasing iteration count just cannot prevent massive parallel dictionary
+  password attacks in long-term.
+
+  To solve this problem, a new PBKDF, based on so-called memory-hard functions
+  can be used. Key derivation with memory-hard function requires a certain
+  amount of memory to compute its output. The memory requirement is very
+  costly for GPUs and prevents these systems to operate effectively,
+  increasing cost for attackers.
+
+  LUKS2 introduces support for Argon2i and Argon2id as a PBKDF.
+  Argon2 is the winner of Password Hashing Competition and is currently
+  in final RFC draft specification.
+
+  For now, libcryptsetup contains the embedded copy of reference implementation
+  of Argon2 (that is easily portable to all architectures).
+  Later, once this function is available in common crypto libraries, it will
+  switch to external implementation. (This happened for LUKS1 and PBKDF2
+  as well years ago.)
+  With using reference implementation (that is not optimized for speed), there
+  is some performance penalty. However, using memory-hard PBKDF should still
+  significantly complicate GPU-optimized dictionary and brute force attacks.
+
+  The Argon2 uses three costs: memory, time (number of iterations) and parallel
+  (number of threads).
+  Note that time and memory cost highly influences each other (accessing a lot
+  of memory takes more time).
+
+  There is a new benchmark that tries to calculate costs to take similar way as
+  in LUKS1 (where iteration is measured to take 1-2 seconds on user system).
+  Because now there are more cost variables, it prefers time cost (iterations)
+  and tries to find required memory that fits. (IOW required memory cost can be
+  lower if the benchmarks are not able to find required parameters.)
+  The benchmark cannot run too long, so it tries to approximate next step
+  for benchmarking.
+
+  For now, default LUKS2 PBKDF algorithm is Argon2i (data independent variant)
+  with memory cost set to 128MB, time to 800ms and parallel thread according
+  to available CPU cores but no more than 4.
+
+  All default parameters can be set during compile time and also set on
+  the command line by using --pbkdf, --pbkdf-memory, --pbkdf-parallel and
+  --iter-time options.
+  (Or without benchmark directly by using --pbkdf-force-iterations, see below.)
+
+  You can still use PBKDF2 even for LUKS2 by specifying --pbkdf pbkdf2 option.
+  (Then only iteration count is applied.)
+
+* Use of kernel keyring
+
+  Kernel keyring is a storage for sensitive material (like cryptographic keys)
+  inside Linux kernel.
+
+  LUKS2 uses keyring for two major functions:
+
+   - To store volume key for dm-crypt where it avoids sending volume key in
+  every device-mapper ioctl structure. Volume key is also no longer directly
+  visible in a dm-crypt mapping table. The key is not available for the user
+  after dm-crypt configuration (obviously except direct memory scan).
+  Use of kernel keyring can be disabled in runtime by --disable-keyring option.
+
+   - As a tool to automatically unlock LUKS device if a passphrase is put into
+  kernel keyring and proper keyring token is configured.
+
+   This allows storing a secret (passphrase) to kernel per-user keyring by
+  some external tool (for example some TPM handler) and LUKS2, if configured,
+  will automatically search in the keyring and unlock the system.
+  For more info see Tokens section below.
+
+* Persistent flags
+  The activation flags (like allow-discards) can be stored in metadata and used
+  automatically by all later activations (even without using crypttab).
+
+  To store activation flags permanently, use activation command with required
+  flags and add --persistent option.
+
+  For example, to mark device to always activate with TRIM enabled,
+  use (for LUKS2 type):
+
+   $ cryptsetup open <device> <name> --allow-discards --persistent
+
+  You can check persistent flags in dump command output:
+
+  $ cryptsetup luksDump <device>
+
+* Tokens and auto-activation
+
+  A LUKS2 token is an object that can be described "how to get passphrase or key"
+  to unlock particular keyslot.
+  (Also it can be used to store any additional metadata, and with
+  the libcryptsetup interface it can be used to define user token types.)
+
+  Cryptsetup internally implements keyring token. Cryptsetup tries to use
+  available tokens before asking for the passphrase. For keyring token,
+  it means that if the passphrase is available under specified identifier
+  inside kernel keyring, the device is automatically activated using this
+  stored passphrase.
+
+  Example of using LUKS2 keyring token:
+
+  # Adding token to metadata with "my_token" identifier (by default it applies to all keyslots).
+  $ cryptsetup token add --key-description "my_token" <device>
+
+  # Storing passphrase to user keyring (this can be done by an external application)
+  $ echo -n <passphrase> | keyctl padd user my_token @u
+
+  # Now cryptsetup activates automatically if it finds correct passphrase
+  $ cryptsetup open <device> <name>
+
+  The main reason to use tokens this way is to separate possible hardware
+  handlers from cryptsetup code.
+
+* Keyslot priorities
+
+  LUKS2 keyslot can have a new priority attribute.
+  The default is "normal". The "prefer" priority tell the keyslot to be tried
+  before other keyslots. Priority "ignore" means that keyslot will never be
+  used if not specified explicitly (it can be used for backup administrator
+  passwords that are used only situations when a user forgets own passphrase).
+
+  The priority of keyslot can be set with new config command, for example
+  $ cryptsetup config <device> --key-slot 1 --priority prefer
+
+  Setting priority to normal will reset slot to normal state.
+
+* LUKS2 label and subsystem
+
+  The header now contains additional fields for label and subsystem (additional
+  label). These fields can be used similar to filesystem label and will be
+  visible in udev rules to possible filtering. (Note that blkid do not yet
+  contain the LUKS scanning code).
+
+  By default both labels are empty. Label and subsystem are always set together
+  (no option  means clear the label) with the config command:
+
+  $ cryptsetup config <device> --label my_device --subsystem ""
+
+* In-place conversion form LUKS1
+
+  To allow easy testing and transition to the new LUKS2 format, there is a new
+  convert command that allows in-place conversion from the LUKS1 format and,
+  if there are no incompatible options, also conversion back from LUKS2
+  to LUKS1 format.
+
+  Note this command can be used only on some LUKS1 devices (some device header
+  sizes are not supported).
+  This command is dangerous, never run it without header backup!
+  If something fails in the middle of conversion (IO error), the header
+  is destroyed. (Note that conversion requires move of keyslot data area to
+  a different offset.)
+
+  To convert header in-place to LUKS2 format, use
+  $ cryptsetup convert <device> --type luks2
+
+  To convert it back to LUKS1 format, use
+  $ cryptsetup convert <device> --type luks1
+
+  You can verify LUKS version with luksDump command.
+  $ cryptsetup luksDump <device>
+
+  Note that some LUKS2 features will make header incompatible with LUKS1 and
+  conversion will be rejected (for example using new Argon2 PBKDF or integrity
+  extensions). Some minor attributes can be lost in conversion.
+
+Other changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Explicit KDF iterations count setting
+
+  With new PBKDF interface, there is also the possibility to setup PBKDF costs
+  directly, avoiding benchmarks. This can be useful if device is formatted to be
+  primarily used on a different system.
+
+  The option --pbkdf-force-iterations is available for both LUKS1 and LUKS2
+  format. Using this option can cause device to have either very low or very
+  high PBKDF costs.
+  In the first case it means bad protection to dictionary attacks, in the second
+  case, it can mean extremely high unlocking time or memory requirements.
+  Use only if you are sure what you are doing!
+
+  Not that this setting also affects iteration count for the key digest.
+  For LUKS1 iteration count for digest will be approximately 1/8 of requested
+  value, for LUKS2 and "pbkdf2" digest minimal PBKDF2 iteration count (1000)
+  will be used. You cannot set lower iteration count than the internal minimum
+  (1000 for PBKDF2).
+
+  To format LUKS1 device with forced iteration count (and no benchmarking), use
+  $ cryptsetup luksFormat <device> --pbkdf-force-iterations 22222
+
+  For LUKS2 it is always better to specify full settings (do not rely on default
+  cost values).
+  For example, we can set to use Argon2id with iteration cost 5, memory 128000
+  and parallel set 1:
+  $ cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 <device> \
+    --pbkdf argon2id --pbkdf-force-iterations 5 --pbkdf-memory 128000 --pbkdf-parallel 1
+
+* VeraCrypt PIM
+
+  Cryptsetup can now also open VeraCrypt device that uses Personal Iteration
+  Multiplier (PIM). PIM is an integer value that user must remember additionally
+  to passphrase and influences PBKDF2 iteration count (without it VeraCrypt uses
+  a fixed number of iterations).
+
+  To open VeraCrypt device with PIM settings, use --veracrypt-pim (to specify
+  PIM on the command line) or --veracrypt-query-pim to query PIM interactively.
+
+* Support for plain64be IV
+
+  The plain64be is big-endian variant of plain64 Initialization Vector. It is
+  used in some images of hardware-based disk encryption systems. Supporting this
+  variant allows using dm-crypt to map such images through cryptsetup.
+
+* Deferral removal
+
+  Cryptsetup now can mark device for deferred removal by using a new option
+  --deferred. This means that close command will not fail if the device is still
+  in use, but will instruct the kernel to remove the device automatically after
+  use count drops to zero (for example, once the filesystem is unmounted).
+
+* A lot of updates to man pages and many minor changes that would make this
+  release notes too long ;-)
+
+Libcryptsetup API changes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+These API functions were removed, libcryptsetup no longer handles password
+retries from terminal (application should handle terminal operations itself):
+	crypt_set_password_callback;
+	crypt_set_timeout;
+	crypt_set_password_retry;
+	crypt_set_password_verify;
+
+This call is removed (no need to keep typo backward compatibility,
+the proper function is crypt_set_iteration_time :-)
+	crypt_set_iterarion_time;
+
+These calls were removed because are not safe, use per-context
+error callbacks instead:
+	crypt_last_error;
+	crypt_get_error;
+
+The PBKDF benchmark was replaced by a new function that uses new KDF structure
+	crypt_benchmark_kdf; (removed)
+	crypt_benchmark_pbkdf; (new API call)
+
+These new calls are now exported, for details see libcryptsetup.h:
+	crypt_keyslot_add_by_key;
+	crypt_keyslot_set_priority;
+	crypt_keyslot_get_priority;
+
+	crypt_token_json_get;
+	crypt_token_json_set;
+	crypt_token_status;
+	crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get;
+	crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set;
+	crypt_token_assign_keyslot;
+	crypt_token_unassign_keyslot;
+	crypt_token_register;
+
+	crypt_activate_by_token;
+	crypt_activate_by_keyring;
+	crypt_deactivate_by_name;
+
+	crypt_metadata_locking;
+	crypt_volume_key_keyring;
+	crypt_get_integrity_info;
+	crypt_get_sector_size;
+	crypt_persistent_flags_set;
+	crypt_persistent_flags_get;
+	crypt_set_pbkdf_type;
+	crypt_get_pbkdf_type;
+
+	crypt_convert;
+	crypt_keyfile_read;
+	crypt_wipe;
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples.
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Offline re-encrypt tool LUKS2 support is currently limited.
+  There will be online LUKS2 re-encryption tool in future.
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  (https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html) once these algorithms are available
+  in kernel (more on this later).
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collison probability is not negligible).
+  For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* Some utilities (blkid, systemd-cryptsetup) have already support for LUKS
+  but not yet in released version (support in crypttab etc).
+
+* There are some examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated soon in favor
+  of python bindings to libblockdev library (that can already handle LUKS1 devices).

docs/v2.0.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable and bug-fix release with experimental features.
+
+This version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* To store volume key into kernel keyring, kernel 4.15 with dm-crypt 1.18.1
+  is required. If a volume key is stored in keyring (LUKS2 only),
+  the dm-crypt v1.15.0 through v1.18.0 contains a serious bug that may cause
+  data corruption for ciphers with ESSIV.
+  (The key for ESSIV is zeroed because of code misplacement.)
+  This bug is not present for LUKS1 or any other IVs used in LUKS modes.
+  This change is not visible to the user (except dmsetup output).
+
+* Increase maximum allowed PBKDF memory-cost limit to 4 GiB.
+  The Argon2 PBKDF uses 1GiB by default; this is also limited by the amount
+  of physical memory available (maximum is half of the physical memory).
+
+* Use /run/cryptsetup as default for cryptsetup locking dir.
+  There were problems with sharing /run/lock with lockdev, and in the early
+  boot, the directory was missing.
+  The directory can be changed with --with-luks2-lock-path and
+  --with-luks2-lock-dir-perms configure switches.
+
+* Introduce new 64-bit byte-offset *keyfile_device_offset functions.
+
+  The keyfile interface was designed, well, for keyfiles. Unfortunately,
+  there are user cases where a keyfile can be placed on a device, and
+  size_t offset can overflow on 32-bit systems.
+
+  New set of functions that allow 64-bit offsets even on 32bit systems
+  are now available:
+
+     - crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset
+     - crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset
+     - crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset
+     - crypt_keyfile_device_read
+
+  The new functions have added the _device_ in name.
+  Old functions are just internal wrappers around these.
+
+  Also cryptsetup --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset now allows
+  64-bit offsets as parameters.
+
+* Add error hint for wrongly formatted cipher strings in LUKS1 and
+  properly fail in luksFormat if cipher format is missing required IV.
+  For now, crypto API quietly used cipher without IV if a cipher
+  algorithm without IV specification was used (e.g., aes-xts).
+  This caused fail later during activation.
+
+* Configure check for a recent Argon2 lib to support mandatory Argon2id.
+
+* Fix for the cryptsetup-reencrypt static build if pwquality is enabled.
+
+* Update LUKS1 standard doc (https links in the bibliography).
+
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples.
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Offline re-encrypt tool LUKS2 support is currently limited.
+  There will be online LUKS2 re-encryption tool in future.
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  (https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html) once these algorithms are
+  available in the kernel (more on this later).
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+  For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated soon in favor
+  of python bindings to the libblockdev library (that can already handle LUKS1
+  devices).

docs/v2.0.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable and bug-fix release with experimental features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix a regression in early detection of inactive keyslot for luksKillSlot.
+  It tried to ask for passphrase even for already erased keyslot.
+
+* Fix a regression in loopaesOpen processing for keyfile on standard input.
+  Use of "-" argument was not working properly.
+
+* Add LUKS2 specific options for cryptsetup-reencrypt.
+  Tokens and persistent flags are now transferred during reencryption;
+  change of PBKDF keyslot parameters is now supported and allows
+  to set precalculated values (no benchmarks).
+
+* Do not allow LUKS2 --persistent and --test-passphrase cryptsetup flags
+  combination. Persistent flags are now stored only if the device was
+  successfully activated with the specified flags.
+
+* Fix integritysetup format after recent Linux kernel changes that
+  requires to setup key for HMAC in all cases.
+  Previously integritysetup allowed HMAC with zero key that behaves
+  like a plain hash.
+
+* Fix VeraCrypt PIM handling that modified internal iteration counts
+  even for subsequent activations. The PIM count is no longer printed
+  in debug log as it is sensitive information.
+  Also, the code now skips legacy TrueCrypt algorithms if a PIM
+  is specified (they cannot be used with PIM anyway).
+
+* PBKDF values cannot be set (even with force parameters) below
+  hardcoded minimums. For PBKDF2 is it 1000 iterations, for Argon2
+  it is 4 iterations and 32 KiB of memory cost.
+
+* Introduce new crypt_token_is_assigned() API function for reporting
+  the binding between token and keyslots.
+
+* Allow crypt_token_json_set() API function to create internal token types.
+  Do not allow unknown fields in internal token objects.
+
+* Print message in cryptsetup that about was aborted if a user did not
+  answer YES in a query.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples.
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS, as CAESAR finalists.
+
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.

docs/v2.0.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with new features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Expose interface to unbound LUKS2 keyslots.
+  Unbound LUKS2 keyslot allows storing a key material that is independent
+  of master volume key (it is not bound to encrypted data segment).
+
+* New API extensions for unbound keyslots (LUKS2 only)
+  crypt_keyslot_get_key_size() and crypt_volume_key_get()
+  These functions allow to get key and key size for unbound keyslots.
+
+* New enum value CRYPT_SLOT_UNBOUND for keyslot status (LUKS2 only).
+
+* Add --unbound keyslot option to the cryptsetup luksAddKey command.
+
+* Add crypt_get_active_integrity_failures() call to get integrity
+  failure count for dm-integrity devices.
+
+* Add crypt_get_pbkdf_default() function to get per-type PBKDF default
+  setting.
+
+* Add new flag to crypt_keyslot_add_by_key() to force update device
+  volume key. This call is mainly intended for a wrapped key change.
+
+* Allow volume key store in a file with cryptsetup.
+  The --dump-master-key together with --master-key-file allows cryptsetup
+  to store the binary volume key to a file instead of standard output.
+
+* Add support detached header for cryptsetup-reencrypt command.
+
+* Fix VeraCrypt PIM handling - use proper iterations count formula
+  for PBKDF2-SHA512 and PBKDF2-Whirlpool used in system volumes.
+
+* Fix cryptsetup tcryptDump for VeraCrypt PIM (support --veracrypt-pim).
+
+* Add --with-default-luks-format configure time option.
+  (Option to override default LUKS format version.)
+
+* Fix LUKS version conversion for detached (and trimmed) LUKS headers.
+
+* Add luksConvertKey cryptsetup command that converts specific keyslot
+  from one PBKDF to another.
+
+* Do not allow conversion to LUKS2 if LUKSMETA (external tool metadata)
+  header is detected.
+
+* More cleanup and hardening of LUKS2 keyslot specific validation options.
+  Add more checks for cipher validity before writing metadata on-disk.
+
+* Do not allow LUKS1 version downconversion if the header contains tokens.
+
+* Add "paes" family ciphers (AES wrapped key scheme for mainframes)
+  to allowed ciphers.
+  Specific wrapped ley configuration logic must be done by 3rd party tool,
+  LUKS2 stores only keyslot material and allow activation of the device.
+
+* Add support for --check-at-most-once option (kernel 4.17) to veritysetup.
+  This flag can be dangerous; if you can control underlying device
+  (you can change its content after it was verified) it will no longer
+  prevent reading tampered data and also it does not prevent silent
+  data corruptions that appear after the block was once read.
+
+* Fix return code (EPERM instead of EINVAL) and retry count for bad
+  passphrase on non-tty input.
+
+* Enable support for FEC decoding in veritysetup to check dm-verity devices
+  with additional Reed-Solomon code in userspace (verify command).
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples (planned for 2.0.4).
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+  protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+  once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS, as CAESAR finalists.
+
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases/tag/2.17-1 that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.

docs/v2.0.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with new features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption, we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.3
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Use the libblkid (blockid) library to detect foreign signatures
+  on a device before LUKS format and LUKS2 auto-recovery.
+
+  This change fixes an unexpected recovery using the secondary
+  LUKS2 header after a device was already overwritten with
+  another format (filesystem or LVM physical volume).
+
+  LUKS2 will not recreate a primary header if it detects a valid
+  foreign signature. In this situation, a user must always
+  use cryptsetup repair command for the recovery.
+
+  Note that libcryptsetup and utilities are now linked to libblkid
+  as a new dependence.
+
+  To compile code without blockid support (strongly discouraged),
+  use --disable-blkid configure switch.
+
+* Add prompt for format and repair actions in cryptsetup and
+  integritysetup if foreign signatures are detected on the device
+  through the blockid library.
+
+  After the confirmation, all known signatures are then wiped as
+  part of the format or repair procedure.
+
+* Print consistent verbose message about keyslot and token numbers.
+  For keyslot actions: Key slot <number> unlocked/created/removed.
+  For token actions: Token <number> created/removed.
+
+* Print error, if a non-existent token is tried to be removed.
+
+* Add support for LUKS2 token definition export and import.
+
+  The token command now can export/import customized token JSON file
+  directly from command line. See the man page for more details.
+
+* Add support for new dm-integrity superblock version 2.
+
+* Add an error message when nothing was read from a key file.
+
+* Update cryptsetup man pages, including --type option usage.
+
+* Add a snapshot of LUKS2 format specification to documentation
+  and accordingly fix supported secondary header offsets.
+
+* Add bundled optimized Argon2 SSE (X86_64 platform) code.
+
+  If the bundled Argon2 code is used and the new configure switch
+  --enable-internal-sse-argon2 option is present, and compiler flags
+  support required optimization, the code will try to use optimized
+  and faster variant.
+
+  Always use the shared library (--enable-libargon2) if possible.
+
+  This option was added because an enterprise distribution
+  rejected to support the shared Argon2 library and native support
+  in generic cryptographic libraries is not ready yet.
+
+* Fix compilation with crypto backend for LibreSSL >= 2.7.0.
+  LibreSSL introduced OpenSSL 1.1.x API functions, so compatibility
+  wrapper must be commented out.
+
+* Fix on-disk header size calculation for LUKS2 format if a specific
+  data alignment is requested. Until now, the code used default size
+  that could be wrong for converted devices.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  We plan to use AEGIS and MORUS (in kernel 4.18), as CAESAR finalists.
+
+  NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+  in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+  randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+
+  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
+  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.
+

docs/v2.0.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with new features.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.4
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Wipe full header areas (including unused) during LUKS format.
+
+  Since this version, the whole area up to the data offset is zeroed,
+  and subsequently, all keyslots areas are wiped with random data.
+  This ensures that no remaining old data remains in the LUKS header
+  areas, but it could slow down format operation on some devices.
+  Previously only first 4k (or 32k for LUKS2) and the used keyslot
+  was overwritten in the format operation.
+
+* Several fixes to error messages that were unintentionally replaced
+  in previous versions with a silent exit code.
+  More descriptive error messages were added, including error
+  messages if
+   - a device is unusable (not a block device, no access, etc.),
+   - a LUKS device is not detected,
+   - LUKS header load code detects unsupported version,
+   - a keyslot decryption fails (also happens in the cipher check),
+   - converting an inactive keyslot.
+
+* Device activation fails if data area overlaps with LUKS header.
+
+* Code now uses explicit_bzero to wipe memory if available
+  (instead of own implementation).
+
+* Additional VeraCrypt modes are now supported, including Camellia
+  and Kuznyechik symmetric ciphers (and cipher chains) and Streebog
+  hash function. These were introduced in a recent VeraCrypt upstream.
+
+  Note that Kuznyechik requires out-of-tree kernel module and
+  Streebog hash function is available only with the gcrypt cryptographic
+  backend for now.
+
+* Fixes static build for integritysetup if the pwquality library is used.
+
+* Allows passphrase change for unbound keyslots.
+
+* Fixes removed keyslot number in verbose message for luksKillSlot,
+  luksRemoveKey and erase command.
+
+* Adds blkid scan when attempting to open a plain device and warn the user
+  about existing device signatures in a ciphertext device.
+
+* Remove LUKS header signature if luksFormat fails to add the first keyslot.
+
+* Remove O_SYNC from device open and use fsync() to speed up
+  wipe operation considerably.
+
+* Create --master-key-file in luksDump and fail if the file already exists.
+
+* Fixes a bug when LUKS2 authenticated encryption with a detached header
+  wiped the header device instead of dm-integrity data device area (causing
+  unnecessary LUKS2 header auto recovery).
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Authenticated encryption should use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  AEGIS and MORUS are already available in kernel 4.18.
+
+  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
+  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
+
+  Please note that authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
+  and can have performance problems for hish-speed devices and device
+  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.

docs/v2.0.6-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.0.6 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+All users of cryptsetup 2.0.x should upgrade to this version.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.x version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.5
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix support of larger metadata areas in LUKS2 header.
+
+  This release properly supports all specified metadata areas, as documented
+  in LUKS2 format description (see docs/on-disk-format-luks2.pdf in archive).
+
+  Currently, only default metadata area size is used (in format or convert).
+  Later cryptsetup versions will allow increasing this metadata area size.
+
+* If AEAD (authenticated encryption) is used, cryptsetup now tries to check
+  if the requested AEAD algorithm with specified key size is available
+  in kernel crypto API.
+  This change avoids formatting a device that cannot be later activated.
+
+  For this function, the kernel must be compiled with the
+  CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD option enabled.
+  Note that kernel user crypto API options (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API and
+  CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER) are already mandatory for LUKS2.
+
+* Fix setting of integrity no-journal flag.
+  Now you can store this flag to metadata using --persistent option.
+
+* Fix cryptsetup-reencrypt to not keep temporary reencryption headers
+  if interrupted during initial password prompt.
+
+* Adds early check to plain and LUKS2 formats to disallow device format
+  if device size is not aligned to requested sector size.
+  Previously it was possible, and the device was rejected to activate by
+  kernel later.
+
+* Fix checking of hash algorithms availability for PBKDF early.
+  Previously LUKS2 format allowed non-existent hash algorithm with
+  invalid keyslot preventing the device from activation.
+
+* Allow Adiantum cipher construction (a non-authenticated length-preserving
+  fast encryption scheme), so it can be used both for data encryption and
+  keyslot encryption in LUKS1/2 devices.
+
+  For benchmark, use:
+    # cryptsetup benchmark -c xchacha12,aes-adiantum
+    # cryptsetup benchmark -c xchacha20,aes-adiantum
+
+  For LUKS format:
+    # cryptsetup luksFormat -c xchacha20,aes-adiantum-plain64 -s 256 <device>
+
+  The support for Adiantum will be merged in Linux kernel 4.21.
+  For more info see the paper https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Authenticated encryption should use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+  https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
+  AEGIS and MORUS are already available in kernel 4.18.
+
+  For more info about LUKS2 authenticated encryption, please see our paper
+  https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00309
+
+  Please note that authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
+  and can have performance problems for high-speed devices and device
+  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+  While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+  an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+  system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+  detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+  directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+  using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+  (it is not updated for new features) and will be REMOVED in version 2.1
+  in favor of python bindings to the libblockdev library.
+  See https://github.com/storaged-project/libblockdev/releases that
+  already supports LUKS2 and VeraCrypt devices handling through libcryptsetup.

docs/v2.1.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.1.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with new features and bug fixes.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.1 version uses a new on-disk LUKS2 format as the default
+LUKS format and increases default LUKS2 header size.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported forever
+as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+When upgrading a stable distribution, please use configure option
+--with-default-luks-format=LUKS1 to maintain backward compatibility.
+
+This release also switches to OpenSSL as a default cryptographic
+backend for LUKS header processing. Use --with-crypto_backend=gcrypt
+configure option if you need to preserve legacy libgcrypt backend.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or
+in production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.6
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* The default for cryptsetup LUKS format action is now LUKS2.
+  You can use LUKS1 with cryptsetup option --type luks1.
+
+* The default size of the LUKS2 header is increased to 16 MB.
+  It includes metadata and the area used for binary keyslots;
+  it means that LUKS header backup is now 16MB in size.
+
+  Note, that used keyslot area is much smaller, but this increase
+  of reserved space allows implementation of later extensions
+  (like online reencryption).
+  It is fully compatible with older cryptsetup 2.0.x versions.
+  If you require to create LUKS2 header with the same size as
+  in the 2.0.x version, use --offset 8192 option for luksFormat
+  (units are in 512-bytes sectors; see notes below).
+
+* Cryptsetup now doubles LUKS default key size if XTS mode is used
+  (XTS mode uses two internal keys). This does not apply if key size
+  is explicitly specified on the command line and it does not apply
+  for the plain mode.
+  This fixes a confusion with AES and 256bit key in XTS mode where
+  code used AES128 and not AES256 as often expected.
+
+  Also, the default keyslot encryption algorithm (if cannot be derived
+  from data encryption algorithm) is now available as configure
+  options --with-luks2-keyslot-cipher and --with-luks2-keyslot-keybits.
+  The default is aes-xts-plain64 with 2 * 256-bits key.
+
+* Default cryptographic backend used for LUKS header processing is now
+  OpenSSL. For years, OpenSSL provided better performance for PBKDF.
+
+  NOTE: Cryptsetup/libcryptsetup supports several cryptographic
+  library backends. The fully supported are libgcrypt, OpenSSL and
+  kernel crypto API. FIPS mode extensions are maintained only for
+  libgcrypt and OpenSSL. Nettle and NSS are usable only for some
+  subset of algorithms and cannot provide full backward compatibility.
+  You can always switch to other backends by using a configure switch,
+  for libgcrypt (compatibility for older distributions) use:
+  --with-crypto_backend=gcrypt
+
+* The Python bindings are no longer supported and the code was removed
+  from cryptsetup distribution. Please use the libblockdev project
+  that already covers most of the libcryptsetup functionality
+  including LUKS2.
+
+* Cryptsetup now allows using --offset option also for luksFormat.
+  It means that the specified offset value is used for data offset.
+  LUKS2 header areas are automatically adjusted according to this value.
+  (Note units are in 512-byte sectors due to the previous definition
+  of this option in plain mode.)
+  This option can replace --align-payload with absolute alignment value.
+
+* Cryptsetup now supports new refresh action (that is the alias for
+  "open --refresh").
+  It allows changes of parameters for an active device (like root
+  device mapping), for example, it can enable or disable TRIM support
+  on-the-fly.
+  It is supported for LUKS1, LUKS2, plain and loop-AES devices.
+
+* Integritysetup now supports mode with detached data device through
+  new --data-device option.
+  Since kernel 4.18 there is a possibility to specify external data
+  device for dm-integrity that stores all integrity tags.
+
+* Integritysetup now supports automatic integrity recalculation
+  through new --integrity-recalculate option.
+  Linux kernel since version 4.18 supports automatic background
+  recalculation of integrity tags for dm-integrity.
+
+Other changes and fixes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix for crypt_wipe call to allocate space if the header is backed
+  by a file. This means that if you use detached header file, it will
+  now have always the full size after luksFormat, even if only
+  a few keyslots are used.
+
+* Fixes to offline cryptsetup-reencrypt to preserve LUKS2 keyslots
+  area sizes after reencryption and fixes for some other issues when
+  creating temporary reencryption headers.
+
+* Added some FIPS mode workarounds. We cannot (yet) use Argon2 in
+  FIPS mode, libcryptsetup now fallbacks to use PBKDF2 in FIPS mode.
+
+* Rejects conversion to LUKS1 if PBKDF2 hash algorithms
+  in keyslots differ.
+
+* The hash setting on command line now applies also to LUKS2 PBKDF2
+  digest. In previous versions, the LUKS2 key digest used PBKDF2-SHA256
+  (except for converted headers).
+
+* Allow LUKS2 keyslots area to increase if data offset allows it.
+  Cryptsetup can fine-tune LUKS2 metadata area sizes through
+  --luks2-metadata-size=BYTES and --luks2-keyslots-size=BYTES.
+  Please DO NOT use these low-level options until you need it for
+  some very specific additional feature.
+  Also, the code now prints these LUKS2 header area sizes in dump
+  command.
+
+* For LUKS2, keyslot can use different encryption that data with
+  new options --keyslot-key-size=BITS and --keyslot-cipher=STRING
+  in all commands that create new LUKS keyslot.
+  Please DO NOT use these low-level options until you need it for
+  some very specific additional feature.
+
+* Code now avoids data flush when reading device status through
+  device-mapper.
+
+* The Nettle crypto backend and the userspace kernel crypto API
+  backend were enhanced to allow more available hash functions
+  (like SHA3 variants).
+
+* Upstream code now does not require libgcrypt-devel
+  for autoconfigure, because OpenSSL is the default.
+  The libgcrypt does not use standard pkgconfig detection and
+  requires specific macro (part of libgcrypt development files)
+  to be always present during autoconfigure.
+  With other crypto backends, like OpenSSL, this makes no sense,
+  so this part of autoconfigure is now optional.
+
+* Cryptsetup now understands new --debug-json option that allows
+  an additional dump of some JSON information. These are no longer
+  present in standard debug output because it could contain some
+  specific LUKS header parameters.
+
+* The luksDump contains the hash algorithm used in Anti-Forensic
+  function.
+
+* All debug messages are now sent through configured log callback
+  functions, so an application can easily use own debug messages
+  handling. In previous versions debug messages were printed directly
+  to standard output.)
+
+Libcryptsetup API additions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+These new calls are now exported, for details see libcryptsetup.h:
+
+ * crypt_init_data_device
+ * crypt_get_metadata_device_name
+     functions to init devices with separate metadata and data device
+     before a format function is called.
+
+ * crypt_set_data_offset
+     sets the data offset for LUKS to the specified value
+     in 512-byte sectors.
+     It should replace alignment calculation in LUKS param structures.
+
+ * crypt_get_metadata_size
+ * crypt_set_metadata_size
+     allows to set/get area sizes in LUKS header
+     (according to specification).
+
+ * crypt_get_default_type
+     get default compiled-in LUKS type (version).
+
+ * crypt_get_pbkdf_type_params
+     allows to get compiled-in PBKDF parameters.
+
+ * crypt_keyslot_set_encryption
+ * crypt_keyslot_get_encryption
+     allows to set/get per-keyslot encryption algorithm for LUKS2.
+
+ * crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf
+     allows to get PBKDF parameters per-keyslot.
+
+ and these new defines:
+ * CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON (message type for JSON debug)
+ * CRYPT_DEBUG_JSON (log level for JSON debug)
+ * CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE (dm-integrity recalculate flag)
+ * CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH (new open with refresh flag)
+
+All existing API calls should remain backward compatible.
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Optional authenticated encryption is still an experimental feature
+  and can have performance problems for high-speed devices and device
+  with larger IO blocks (like RAID).
+
+* Authenticated encryption does not use encryption for a dm-integrity
+  journal. While it does not influence data confidentiality or
+  integrity protection, an attacker can get some more information
+  from data journal or cause that system will corrupt sectors after
+  journal replay. (That corruption will be detected though.)
+
+* The LUKS2 metadata area increase is mainly needed for the new online
+  reencryption as the major feature for the next release.

docs/v2.2.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.2.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with new experimental features and bug fixes.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.2 version introduces a new LUKS2 online reencryption
+extension that allows reencryption of mounted LUKS2 devices
+(device in use) in the background.
+
+Online reencryption is a complex feature. Please be sure you
+have a full data backup before using this feature.
+
+Changes since version 2.1.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+LUKS2 online reencryption
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The reencryption is intended to provide a reliable way to change
+volume key or an algorithm change while the encrypted device is still
+in use.
+
+It is based on userspace-only approach (no kernel changes needed)
+that uses the device-mapper subsystem to remap active devices on-the-fly
+dynamically. The device is split into several segments (encrypted by old
+key, new key and so-called hotzone, where reencryption is actively running).
+
+The flexible LUKS2 metadata format is used to store intermediate states
+(segment mappings) and both version of keyslots (old and new keys).
+Also, it provides a binary area (in the unused keyslot area space)
+to provide recovery metadata in the case of unexpected failure during
+reencryption. LUKS2 header is during the reencryption marked with
+"online-reencryption" keyword. After the reencryption is finished,
+this keyword is removed, and the device is backward compatible with all
+older cryptsetup tools (that support LUKS2).
+
+The recovery supports three resilience modes:
+
+  - checksum: default mode, where individual checksums of ciphertext hotzone
+    sectors are stored, so the recovery process can detect which sectors were
+    already reencrypted. It requires that the device sector write is atomic.
+
+  - journal: the hotzone is journaled in the binary area
+    (so the data are written twice)
+
+  - none: performance mode; there is no protection
+    (similar to old offline reencryption)
+
+These resilience modes are not available if reencryption uses data shift.
+
+Note: until we have full documentation (both of the process and metadata),
+please refer to Ondrej's slides (some slight details are no longer relevant)
+https://okozina.fedorapeople.org/online-disk-reencryption-with-luks2-compact.pdf
+
+The offline reencryption tool (cryptsetup-reencrypt) is still supported
+for both LUKS1 and LUKS2 format.
+
+Cryptsetup examples for reencryption
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The reencryption feature is integrated directly into cryptsetup utility
+as the new "reencrypt" action (command).
+
+There are three basic modes - to perform reencryption (change of already
+existing LUKS2 device), to add encryption to plaintext device and to remove
+encryption from a device (decryption).
+
+In all cases, if existing LUKS2 metadata contains information about
+the ongoing reencryption process, following reencrypt command continues
+with the ongoing reencryption process until it is finished.
+
+You can activate a device with ongoing reencryption as the standard LUKS2
+device, but the reencryption process will not continue until the cryptsetup
+reencrypt command is issued.
+
+
+1) Reencryption
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+This mode is intended to change any attribute of the data encryption
+(change of the volume key, algorithm or sector size).
+Note that authenticated encryption is not yet supported.
+
+You can start the reencryption process by specifying a LUKS2 device or with
+a detached LUKS2 header.
+The code should automatically recognize if the device is in use (and if it
+should use online mode of reencryption).
+
+If you do not specify parameters, only volume key is changed
+(a new random key is generated).
+
+# cryptsetup reencrypt <device> [--header <hdr>]
+
+You can also start reencryption using active mapped device name:
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt --active-name <name>
+
+You can also specify the resilience mode (none, checksum, journal) with
+--resilience=<mode> option, for checksum mode also the hash algorithm with
+--resilience-hash=<alg> (only hash algorithms supported by cryptographic
+backend are available).
+
+The maximal size of reencryption hotzone can be limited by
+--hotzone-size=<size> option and applies to all reencryption modes.
+Note that for checksum and journal mode hotzone size is also limited
+by available space in binary keyslot area.
+
+2) Encryption
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+This mode provides a way to encrypt a plaintext device to LUKS2 format.
+This option requires reduction of device size (for LUKS2 header) or new
+detached header.
+
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device> --encrypt --reduce-device-size <size>
+
+Or with detached header:
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device> --encrypt --header <hdr>
+
+3) Decryption
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+This mode provides the removal of existing LUKS2 encryption and replacing
+a device with plaintext content only.
+For now, we support only decryption with a detached header.
+
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device> --decrypt --header <hdr>
+
+For all three modes, you can split the process to metadata initialization
+(prepare keyslots and segments but do not run reencryption yet) and the data
+reencryption step by using --init-only option.
+
+Prepares metadata:
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt --init-only <parameters>
+
+Starts the data processing:
+  # cryptsetup reencrypt <device>
+
+Please note, that due to the Linux kernel limitation, the encryption or
+decryption process cannot be run entirely online - there must be at least
+short offline window where operation adds/removes device-mapper crypt (LUKS2) layer.
+This step should also include modification of /etc/crypttab and fstab UUIDs,
+but it is out of the scope of cryptsetup tools.
+
+Limitations
+~~~~~~~~~~~
+Most of these limitations will be (hopefully) fixed in next versions.
+
+* Only one active keyslot is supported (all old keyslots will be removed
+  after reencryption).
+
+* Only block devices are now supported as parameters. As a workaround
+  for images in a file, please explicitly map a loop device over the image
+  and use the loop device as the parameter.
+
+* Devices with authenticated encryption are not supported. (Later it will
+  be limited by the fixed per-sector metadata, per-sector metadata size
+  cannot be changed without a new device format operation.)
+
+* The reencryption uses userspace crypto library, with fallback to
+  the kernel (if available). There can be some specific configurations
+  where the fallback does not provide optimal performance.
+
+* There are no translations of error messages until the final release
+  (some messages can be rephrased as well).
+
+* The repair command is not finished; the recovery of interrupted
+  reencryption is made automatically on the first device activation.
+
+* Reencryption triggers too many udev scans on metadata updates (on closing
+  write enabled file descriptors). This has a negative performance impact on the whole
+  reencryption and generates excessive I/O load on the system.
+
+New libcryptsetup reencryption API
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The libcryptsetup contains new API calls that are used to setup and
+run the reencryption.
+
+Note that there can be some changes in API implementation of these functions
+and/or some new function can be introduced in final cryptsetup 2.2 release.
+
+New API symbols (see documentation in libcryptsetup.h)
+* struct crypt_params_reencrypt - reencryption parameters
+
+* crypt_reencrypt_init_by_passphrase
+* crypt_reencrypt_init_by_keyring
+  - function to configure LUKS2 metadata for reencryption;
+    if metadata already exists, it configures the context from this metadata
+
+* crypt_reencrypt
+  - run the reencryption process (processing the data)
+  - the optional callback function can be used to interrupt the reencryption
+    or report the progress.
+
+* crypt_reencrypt_status
+  - function to query LUKS2 metadata about the reencryption state
+
+Other changes and fixes
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* Add optional global serialization lock for memory hard PBKDF.
+  (The --serialize-memory-hard-pbkdf option in cryptsetup and
+  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF in activation flag.)
+
+  This is an "ugly" optional workaround for a situation when multiple devices
+  are being activated in parallel (like systemd crypttab activation).
+  The system instead of returning ENOMEM (no memory available) starts
+  out-of-memory (OOM) killer to kill processes randomly.
+
+  Until we find a reliable way how to work with memory-hard function
+  in these situations, cryptsetup provide a way how to serialize memory-hard
+  unlocking among parallel cryptsetup instances to workaround this problem.
+  This flag is intended to be used only in very specific situations,
+  never use it directly :-)
+
+* Abort conversion to LUKS1 with incompatible sector size that is
+  not supported in LUKS1.
+
+* Report error (-ENOENT) if no LUKS keyslots are available. User can now
+  distinguish between a wrong passphrase and no keyslot available.
+
+* Fix a possible segfault in detached header handling (double free).
+
+* Add integritysetup support for bitmap mode introduced in Linux kernel 5.2.
+  Integritysetup now supports --integrity-bitmap-mode option and
+  --bitmap-sector-per-bit and --bitmap-flush-time commandline options.
+
+  In the bitmap operation mode, if a bit in the bitmap is 1, the corresponding
+  region's data and integrity tags are not synchronized - if the machine
+  crashes, the unsynchronized regions will be recalculated.
+  The bitmap mode is faster than the journal mode because we don't have
+  to write the data twice, but it is also less reliable, because if data
+  corruption happens when the machine crashes, it may not be detected.
+  This can be used only for standalone devices, not with dm-crypt.
+
+* The libcryptsetup now keeps all file descriptors to underlying device
+  open during the whole lifetime of crypt device context to avoid excessive
+  scanning in udev (udev run scan on every descriptor close).
+
+* The luksDump command now prints more info for reencryption keyslot
+  (when a device is in-reencryption).
+
+* New --device-size parameter is supported for LUKS2 reencryption.
+  It may be used to encrypt/reencrypt only the initial part of the data
+  device if the user is aware that the rest of the device is empty.
+
+  Note: This change causes API break since the last rc0 release
+  (crypt_params_reencrypt structure contains additional field).
+
+* New --resume-only parameter is supported for LUKS2 reencryption.
+  This flag resumes reencryption process if it exists (not starting
+  new reencryption).
+
+* The repair command now tries LUKS2 reencryption recovery if needed.
+
+* If reencryption device is a file image, an interactive dialog now
+  asks if reencryption should be run safely in offline mode
+  (if autodetection of active devices failed).
+
+* Fix activation through a token where dm-crypt volume key was not
+  set through keyring (but using old device-mapper table parameter mode).
+
+* Online reencryption can now retain all keyslots (if all passphrases
+  are provided). Note that keyslot numbers will change in this case.
+
+* Allow volume key file to be used if no LUKS2 keyslots are present.
+  If all keyslots are removed, LUKS2 has no longer information about
+  the volume key size (there is only key digest present).
+  Please use --key-size option to open the device or add a new keyslot
+  in these cases.
+
+* Print a warning if online reencrypt is called over LUKS1 (not supported).
+
+* Fix TCRYPT KDF failure in FIPS mode.
+  Some crypto backends support plain hash in FIPS mode but not for PBKDF2.
+
+* Remove FIPS mode restriction for crypt_volume_key_get.
+  It is an application responsibility to use this API in the proper context.
+
+* Reduce keyslots area size in luksFormat when the header device is too small.
+  Unless user explicitly asks for keyslots areas size  (either via
+  --luks2-keyslots-size or --offset) reduce keyslots size so that it fits
+  in metadata device.
+
+* Make resize action accept --device-size parameter (supports units suffix).

docs/v2.2.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.2.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+This version contains a fix for a possible data corruption bug
+on 32-bit platforms.
+All users of cryptsetup 2.1 and 2.2 should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.2.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix possible data length and IV offset overflow on 32bit architectures.
+  Other 64-bit architectures are not affected.
+
+  The flawed helper function prototypes (introduced in version 2.1.0) used
+  size_t type, that is 32-bit integer on 32-bit systems.
+  This patch fixes the problem to properly use 64-bit types.
+
+  If the offset parameter addresses devices larger than 2TB, the value
+  overflows and stores incorrect information in the metadata.
+  For example, integrity device is smaller than expected size if used
+  over large disk on 32-bit architecture.
+
+  This issue is not present with the standard LUKS1/LUKS2 devices without
+  integrity extensions.
+
+* Fix a regression in TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt system partition activation.
+
+* Reinstate missing backing file hint for loop device.
+
+  If the encrypted device is backed by a file (loopback), cryptsetup now
+  shows the path to the backing file in passphrase query (as in 1.x version).
+
+* LUKS2 reencryption block size is now aligned to reported optimal IO size.
+  This change eliminates possible non-aligned device warnings in kernel log
+  during reencryption.

docs/v2.2.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.2.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.1 and 2.2 should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.2.1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Print error message if a keyslot open failed for a different reason
+  than wrong passwords (for example there is not enough memory).
+  Only an exit code was present in this case.
+
+* The progress function switches unit sizes (B/s to GiB/s) according
+  to the actual speed. Also, it properly calculates speed in the case
+  of a resumed reencryption operation.
+
+* The --version now supports short -V short option and better handles
+  common option priorities.
+
+* If cryptsetup wipes signatures during format actions through blkid,
+  it also prints signature device offsets.
+
+* Compilation now properly uses LTLIBINTL gettext setting in Makefiles.
+
+* Device-mapper backend now supports new DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION ioctl
+  (available since Linux kernel 5.4).
+  This should help to detect some kernel/userspace incompatibilities
+  earlier later after a failed device activation.
+
+* Fixes LUKS2 reencryption on systems without kernel keyring.
+
+* Fixes unlocking prompt for partitions mapped through loop devices
+  (to properly show the backing device).
+
+* For LUKS2 decryption, a device is now marked for deferred removal
+  to be automatically deactivated.
+
+* Reencryption now limits hotzone size to be maximal 1 GiB or 1/4
+  system memory (if lower).
+
+* Reencryption now retains activation flags during online reencryption.
+
+* Reencryption now allows LUKS2 device to activate device right after
+  LUKS2 encryption is initialized through optional active device name
+  for cryptsetup reencrypt --encrypt command.
+  This could help with automated encryption during boot.
+
+  NOTE: It means that part of the device is still not encrypted during
+  activation. Use with care!
+
+* Fixes failure in resize and plain format activation if activated device
+  size was not aligned to underlying logical device size.
+
+* Fixes conversion to LUKS2 format with detached header if a detached
+  header size was smaller than the expected aligned LUKS1 header size.

docs/v2.3.0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.0 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable release with new experimental features and bug fixes.
+
+Cryptsetup 2.3 version introduces support for BitLocker-compatible
+devices (BITLK format). This format is used in Windows systems,
+and in combination with a filesystem driver, cryptsetup now provides
+native read-write access to BitLocker Full Disk Encryption devices.
+
+The BITLK implementation is based on publicly available information
+and it is an independent and opensource implementation that allows
+to access this proprietary disk encryption.
+
+Changes since version 2.2.2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* BITLK (Windows BitLocker compatible) device access
+
+  BITLK userspace implementation is based on the master thesis and code
+  provided by Vojtech Trefny. Also, thanks to other opensource projects
+  like libbde (that provide alternative approach to decode this format)
+  we were able to verify cryptsetup implementation.
+
+  NOTE: Support for the BITLK device is EXPERIMENTAL and will require
+  a lot of testing. If you get some error message (mainly unsupported
+  metadata in the on-disk header), please help us by submitting an issue
+  to cryptsetup project, so we can fix it. Thank you!
+
+  Cryptsetup supports BITLK activation through passphrase or recovery
+  passphrase for existing devices (BitLocker and Bitlocker to Go).
+
+  Activation through TPM, SmartCard, or any other key protector
+  is not supported. And in some situations, mainly for TPM bind to some
+  PCR registers, it could be even impossible on Linux in the future.
+
+  All metadata (key protectors) are handled read-only, cryptsetup cannot
+  create or modify them. Except for old devices (created in old Vista
+  systems), all format variants should be recognized.
+
+  Data devices can be activated read-write (followed by mounting through
+  the proper filesystem driver). To access filesystem on the decrypted device
+  you need properly installed driver (vfat, NTFS or exFAT).
+
+  Foe AES-XTS, activation is supported on all recent Linux kernels.
+
+  For older AES-CBC encryption, Linux Kernel version 5.3 is required
+  (support for special IV variant); for AES-CBC with Elephant diffuser,
+  Linux Kernel 5.6 is required.
+
+  Please note that CBC variants are legacy, and we provide it only
+  for backward compatibility (to be able to access old drives).
+
+  Cryptsetup command now supports the new "bitlk" format and implement dump,
+  open, status, and close actions.
+
+  To activate a BITLK device, use
+
+    # cryptsetup open --type bitlk <device> <name>
+      or with alias
+    # cryptsetup bitlkOpen <device> <name>
+
+  Then with properly installed fs driver (usually NTFS, vfat or exFAT),
+  you can mount the plaintext device /dev/mapper<name> device as a common
+  filesystem.
+
+ To print metadata information about BITLK device, use
+   # crypotsetup bitlkDump <device>
+
+ To print information about the active device, use
+   # cryptsetup status <name>
+
+ Example (activation of disk image):
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+  # Recent blkid recognizes BitLocker device,just to verity
+  # blkid bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img
+    bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img: TYPE="BitLocker"
+
+  # Print visible metadata information (on-disk, form the image)
+  # cryptsetup bitlkDump bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img
+    Info for BITLK device bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img.
+    Version:        2
+    GUID:           ...
+    Created:        Wed Oct 23 17:38:15 2019
+    Description:    DESKTOP-xxxxxxx E: 23.10.2019
+    Cipher name:    aes
+    Cipher mode:    xts-plain64
+    Cipher key:     128 bits
+
+    Keyslots:
+     0: VMK
+            GUID:           ...
+            Protection:     VMK protected with passphrase
+            Salt:           ...
+            Key data size:  44 [bytes]
+     1: VMK
+            GUID:           ...
+            Protection:     VMK protected with recovery passphrase
+            Salt:           ...
+            Key data size:  44 [bytes]
+     2: FVEK
+           Key data size:  44 [bytes]
+
+  # Activation (recovery passphrase works the same as password)
+  # cryptsetup bitlkOpen bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img test -v
+    Enter passphrase for bitlocker_xts_ntfs.img:
+    Command successful.
+
+  # Information about the active device
+  # cryptsetup status test
+    /dev/mapper/test is active.
+    type:    BITLK
+    cipher:  aes-xts-plain64
+    keysize: 128 bits
+    ...
+
+  # Plaintext device should now contain decrypted NTFS filesystem
+  # blkid /dev/mapper/test
+    /dev/mapper/test: UUID="..." TYPE="ntfs"
+
+  # And can be mounted
+  # mount /dev/mapper/test /mnt/tst
+
+  # Deactivation
+  # umount /mnt/tst
+  # cryptsetup close test
+
+* Veritysetup now supports activation with additional PKCS7 signature
+  of root hash through --root-hash-signature option.
+  The signature uses an in-kernel trusted key to validate the signature
+  of the root hash during activation. This option requires Linux kernel
+  5.4 with DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG option.
+
+  Verity devices activated with signature now has a special flag
+  (with signature) active in device status (veritysetup status <name>).
+
+  Usage:
+  # veritysetup open <data_device> name <hash_device> <root_hash> \
+    --root-hash-signature=<roothash_p7_sig_file>
+
+* Integritysetup now calculates hash integrity size according to algorithm
+  instead of requiring an explicit tag size.
+
+  Previously, when integritysetup formats a device with hash or
+  HMAC integrity checksums, it required explicitly tag size entry from
+  a user (or used default value).
+  This led to confusion and unexpected shortened tag sizes.
+
+  Now, libcryptsetup calculates tag size according to real hash output.
+  Tag size can also be specified, then it warns if these values differ.
+
+* Integritysetup now supports fixed padding for dm-integrity devices.
+
+  There was an in-kernel bug that wasted a lot of space when using metadata
+  areas for integrity-protected devices if a larger sector size than
+  512 bytes was used.
+  This problem affects both stand-alone dm-integrity and also LUKS2 with
+  authenticated encryption and larger sector size.
+
+  The new extension to dm-integrity superblock is needed, so devices
+  with the new optimal padding cannot be activated on older systems.
+
+  Integritysetup/Cryptsetup will use new padding automatically if it
+  detects the proper kernel. To create a compatible device with
+  the old padding, use --integrity-legacy-padding option.
+
+* A lot of fixes to online LUKS2 reecryption.
+
+* Add crypt_resume_by_volume_key() function to libcryptsetup.
+  If a user has a volume key available, the LUKS device can be resumed
+  directly using the provided volume key.
+  No keyslot derivation is needed, only the key digest is checked.
+
+* Implement active device suspend info.
+  Add CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED bit to crypt_get_active_device() flags
+  that informs the caller that device is suspended (luksSuspend).
+
+* Allow --test-passphrase for a detached header.
+  Before this fix, we required a data device specified on the command
+  line even though it was not necessary for the passphrase check.
+
+* Allow --key-file option in legacy offline encryption.
+  The option was ignored for LUKS1 encryption initialization.
+
+* Export memory safe functions.
+  To make developing of some extensions simpler, we now export
+  functions to handle memory with proper wipe on deallocation.
+
+* Fail crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf for inactive LUKS1 keyslot.
+
+Libcryptsetup API extensions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+The libcryptsetup API is backward compatible for existing symbols.
+
+New symbols
+ crypt_set_compatibility
+ crypt_get_compatibility;
+ crypt_resume_by_volume_key;
+ crypt_activate_by_signed_key;
+ crypt_safe_alloc;
+ crypt_safe_realloc;
+ crypt_safe_free;
+ crypt_safe_memzero;
+
+New defines introduced :
+  CRYPT_BITLK "BITLK" - BITLK (BitLocker-compatible mode
+  CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING - dm-integrity legacy padding
+  CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE - dm-verity root hash signature
+  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED - device suspended info flag

docs/v2.3.1-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Support VeraCrypt 128 bytes passwords.
+  VeraCrypt now allows passwords of maximal length 128 bytes
+  (compared to legacy TrueCrypt where it was limited by 64 bytes).
+
+* Strip extra newline from BitLocker recovery keys
+  There might be a trailing newline added by the text editor when
+  the recovery passphrase was passed using the --key-file option.
+
+* Detect separate libiconv library.
+  It should fix compilation issues on distributions with iconv
+  implemented in a separate library.
+
+* Various fixes and workarounds to build on old Linux distributions.
+
+* Split lines with hexadecimal digest printing for large key-sizes.
+
+* Do not wipe the device with no integrity profile.
+  With --integrity none we performed useless full device wipe.
+
+* Workaround for dm-integrity kernel table bug.
+  Some kernels show an invalid dm-integrity mapping table
+  if superblock contains the "recalculate" bit. This causes
+  integritysetup to not recognize the dm-integrity device.
+  Integritysetup now specifies kernel options such a way that
+  even on unpatched kernels mapping table is correct.
+
+* Print error message if LUKS1 keyslot cannot be processed.
+  If the crypto backend is missing support for hash algorithms
+  used in PBKDF2, the error message was not visible.
+
+* Properly align LUKS2 keyslots area on conversion.
+  If the LUKS1 payload offset (data offset) is not aligned
+  to 4 KiB boundary, new LUKS2 keyslots area in now aligned properly.
+
+* Validate LUKS2 earlier on conversion to not corrupt the device
+  if binary keyslots areas metadata are not correct.

docs/v2.3.2-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.2 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Support compilation with json-c library version 0.14.
+
+* Update FAQ document for some LUKS2 specific information.
+
+* Add option to dump content of LUKS2 unbound keyslot:
+    cryptsetup luksDump --unbound -S <slot> <device>
+  or optionally with --master-key-file option.
+
+  The slot number --key-slot (-S) option is mandatory here.
+
+  An unbound keyslot store a key is that is not assigned to data
+  area on disk (LUKS2 allows to store arbitrary keys).
+
+* Rephrase some error messages and remove redundant end-of-lines.
+
+* Add support for discards (TRIM) for standalone dm-integrity devices.
+  Linux kernel 5.7 adds support for optional discard/TRIM operation
+  over dm-integrity devices.
+
+  It is now supported through --allow-discards integritysetup option.
+  Note you need to add this flag in all activation calls.
+
+  Note that this option cannot be used for LUKS2 authenticated encryption
+  (that uses dm-integrity for storing additional per-sector metadata).
+
+* Fix cryptsetup-reencrypt to work on devices that do not allow
+  direct-io device access.
+
+* Fix a crash in the BitLocker-compatible code error path.
+
+* Fix Veracrypt compatible support for longer (>64 bytes) passphrases.
+  It allows some older images to be correctly opened again.
+  The issue was introduced in version 2.3.1.

docs/v2.3.3-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.3 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.x should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix BitLocker compatible device access that uses native 4kB sectors.
+
+  Devices formatted with storage that natively support 4096-bytes
+  sectors can also use this sector size for encryption units.
+
+* Support large IV count (--iv-large-sectors) cryptsetup option
+  for plain device mapping.
+
+  The large IV count is supported in dm-crypt together with larger
+  sector encryption. It counts the Initialization Vector (IV) in
+  a larger sector size instead of 512-bytes sectors.
+
+  This option does not have any performance or security impact,
+  but it can be used for accessing incompatible existing disk images
+  from other systems.
+
+  Only open action with plain device type and sector size > 512 bytes
+  are supported.
+
+* Fix a memory leak in BitLocker compatible handling.
+
+* Allow EBOIV (Initialization Vector algorithm) use.
+
+  The EBOIV initialization vector is intended to be used internally
+  with BitLocker devices (for CBC mode). It can now be used also
+  outside of the BitLocker compatible code.
+
+* Require both keyslot cipher and key size options.
+
+  If these LUKS2 keyslot parameters were not specified together,
+  cryptsetup silently failed.
+
+* Update to man pages and FAQ.

docs/v2.3.4-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.4 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with a security fix (32-bit only).
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.2.x and later should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.3
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix a possible out-of-bounds memory write while validating LUKS2 data
+  segments metadata (CVE-2020-14382).
+
+  This problem can be triggered only on 32-bit builds (64-bit systems
+  are not affected).
+
+  LUKS2 format validation code contains a bug in segments validation code
+  where the code does not check for possible overflow on memory allocation.
+
+  Due to the bug, the libcryptsetup can be tricked to expect such allocation
+  was successful. Later it may read data from image crafted by an attacker and
+  actually write such data beyond allocated memory.
+
+  The bug was introduced in cryptsetup 2.2.0. All later releases until 2.3.4
+  are affected.
+
+  If you only backport the fix for this CVE, these master branch git commits
+  should be backported:
+    52f5cb8cedf22fb3e14c744814ec8af7614146c7
+    46ee71edcd13e1dad50815ad65c28779aa6f7503
+    752c9a52798f11d3b765b673ebaa3058eb25316e
+
+  Thanks to Tobias Stoeckmann for discovering this issue.
+
+* Ignore reported optimal IO size if not aligned to minimal page size.
+
+  Some USB enclosures report bogus block device topology (see lsblk -t) that
+  prevents LUKS2 format with 4k sector size (reported values are not correctly
+  aligned). The code now ignores such values and uses the default alignment.
+
+* Added support for new no_read/write_wrokqueue dm-crypt options (kernel 5.9).
+
+  These performance options, introduced in kernel 5.9, configure dm-crypt
+  to bypass read or write workqueues and run encryption synchronously.
+
+  Use --perf-no_read_workqueue or --perf-no_write_workqueue cryptsetup arguments
+  to use these dm-crypt flags.
+
+  These options are available only for low-level dm-crypt performance tuning,
+  use only if you need a change to default dm-crypt behavior.
+
+  For LUKS2, these flags can be persistently stored in metadata with
+  the --persistent option.
+
+* Added support panic_on_corruption option for dm-verity devices (kernel 5.9).
+
+  Veritysetup now supports --panic-on-corruption argument that configures
+  the dm-verity device to panics kernel if a corruption is detected.
+
+  This option is intended for specific configurations, do not use it in
+  standard configurations.
+
+* Support --master-key-file option for online LUKS2 reencryption
+
+  This can be used for reencryption of devices that uses protected key AES cipher
+  on some mainframes crypto accelerators.
+
+* Always return EEXIST error code if a device already exists.
+
+  Some libcryptsetup functions (activate_by*) now return EEXIST error code,
+  so the caller can distinguish that call fails because some parallel process
+  already activated the device.
+  Previously all fails returned EINVAL (invalid value).
+
+* Fix a problem in integritysetup if a hash algorithm has dash in the name.
+
+  If users want to use blake2b/blake2s, the kernel algorithm name includes
+  a dash (like "blake2s-256").
+  Theses algorithms can now be used for integritysetup devices.
+
+* Fix crypto backend to properly handle ECB mode.
+
+  Even though it should never be used, it should still work for testing :)
+  This fixes a bug introduced in cryptsetup version 2.3.2.
+
+* TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt compatible mode now supports the activation of devices
+  with a larger sector.
+
+  TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt always uses 512-byte sector for encryption, but for devices
+  with a larger native sector, it stores this value in the header.
+
+  This patch allows activation of such devices, basically ignoring
+  the mentioned sector size.
+
+* LUKS2: Do not create excessively large headers.
+
+  When creating a LUKS2 header with a specified --offset larger than
+  the LUKS2 header size, do not create a larger file than needed.
+
+* Fix unspecified sector size for BitLocker compatible mode.
+
+  Some BitLocker devices can contain zeroed sector size in the header.
+  In this case, the 512-byte sector should be used.
+  The bug was introduced in version 2.3.3.
+
+* Fix reading key data size in metadata for BitLocker compatible mode.
+
+  Such devices with an unexpected entry in metadata can now be activated.
+
+  Thanks to all users reporting these problems, BitLocker metadata documentation
+  is not publicly available, and we depend only on these reports.
+
+* Fix typos in documentation.

docs/v2.3.5-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.5 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with minor extensions.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.x and later should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.4
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* Fix partial reads of passphrase from an interactive terminal.
+  Some stable kernels (5.3.11) started to return buffer from a terminal
+  in parts of maximal size 64 bytes.
+  This breaks the reading of passphrases longer than 64 characters
+  entered through an interactive terminal. The change is already fixed
+  in later kernel releases, but tools now support such partial read from
+  terminal properly.
+
+* Fix maximal length of password entered through a terminal.
+  Now the maximal interactive passphrase length is exactly
+  512 characters (not 511).
+
+* integritysetup: support new dm-integrity HMAC recalculation options.
+
+  In older kernels (since version 4.19), an attacker can force
+  an automatic recalculation of integrity tags by modifying
+  the dm-integrity superblock.
+  This is a problem with a keyed algorithms (HMAC), where it expects
+  nobody can trigger such recalculation without the key.
+  (Automatic recalculation will start after the next activation.)
+
+  Note that dm-integrity in standalone mode was *not* supposed
+  to provide cryptographic data integrity protection.
+  Despite that, we try to keep the system secure if keyed algorithms
+  are used.
+  Thank Daniel Glöckner for the original report of this problem.
+
+  Authenticated encryption that provides data integrity protection (in
+  combination with dm-crypt and LUKS2) is not affected by this problem.
+
+  The fix in the kernel for this problem contains two parts.
+
+  Firstly, the dm-integrity kernel module disables integrity
+  recalculation if keyed algorithms (HMAC) are used.
+  This change is included in long-term stable kernels.
+
+  Secondly, since the kernel version 5.11, dm-integrity introduces
+  modified protection where a journal-integrity algorithm guards
+  superblock; also, journal sections are protected. An attacker cannot
+  copy sectors from one journal section to another, and the superblock
+  also contains salt to prevent header replacement from another device.
+
+  If you want to protect data with HMAC, you should always also use HMAC
+  for --journal-integrity. Keys can be independent.
+  If HMAC is used for data but not for the journal, the recalculation
+  option is disabled.
+
+  If you need to use (insecure) backward compatibility implementation,
+  two new integritysetup options are introduced:
+    - Use --integrity-legacy-recalc (instead of --integrity-recalc)
+      to allow recalculation on legacy devices.
+    - Use --integrity-legacy-hmac in format action to force old insecure
+      HMAC format.
+
+  Libcryptsetup API also introduces flags
+    CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC and
+    CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC
+  to set these through crypt_set_compatibility() call.
+
+* integritysetup: display of recalculating sector in dump command.
+
+* veritysetup: fix verity FEC if stored in the same image with hashes.
+
+  Optional FEC (Forward Error Correction) data should cover the whole
+  data area, hashes (Merkle tree), and optionally additional metadata
+  (located after hash area).
+
+  Unfortunately, if FEC data is stored in the same file as hash,
+  the calculation wrongly used the whole file size, thus overlaps with
+  the FEC area itself. This produced unusable and too large FEC data.
+  There is no problem if the FEC image is a separate image.
+
+  The problem is now fixed, introducing FEC blocks calculation as:
+    - If the hash device is in a separate image, metadata covers the
+      whole rest of the image after the hash area. (Unchanged behavior.)
+    - If hash and FEC device is in the image, metadata ends on the FEC
+      area offset.
+
+  Note: there is also a fix for FEC in the dm-verity kernel (on the way
+  to stable kernels) that fixes error correction with larger RS roots.
+
+* veritysetup: run FEC repair check even if root hash fails.
+
+  Note: The userspace FEC verify command reports are only informational
+  for now. Code does not check verity hash after FEC recovery in
+  userspace. The Reed-Solomon decoder can then report the possibility
+  that it fixed data even if parity is too damaged.
+  This will be fixed in the next major release.
+
+* veritysetup: do not process hash image if hash area is empty.
+
+  Sometimes the device is so small that there is only a root hash
+  needed, and the hash area is not used.
+  Also, the size of the hash image is not increased for hash block
+  alignment in this case.
+
+* veritysetup: store verity hash algorithm in superblock in lowercase.
+
+  Otherwise, the kernel could refuse the activation of the device.
+
+* bitlk: fix a crash if the device disappears during BitLocker scan.
+
+* bitlk: show a better error when trying to open an NTFS device.
+
+  Both BitLocker version 1 and NTFS have the same signature.
+  If a user opens an NTFS device without BitLocker, it now correctly
+  informs that it is not a BITLK device.
+
+* bitlk: add support for startup key protected VMKs.
+
+  The startup key can be provided in --key-file option for open command.
+
+* Fix LUKS1 repair code (regression since version 1.7.x).
+
+  We cannot trust possibly broken keyslots metadata in repair, so the
+  code recalculates them instead.
+  This makes the repair code working again when the master boot record
+  signature overwrites the LUKS header.
+
+* Fix luksKeyChange for LUKS2 with assigned tokens.
+
+  The token references are now correctly assigned to the new keyslot
+  number.
+
+* Fix cryptsetup resize using LUKS2 tokens.
+
+  Code needlessly asked for passphrase even though volume key was
+  already unlocked via LUKS2 token.
+
+* Print a visible error if device resize is not supported.
+
+* Add error message when suspending wrong non-LUKS device.
+
+* Fix default XTS mode key size in reencryption.
+
+  The same luksFormat logic (double key size because XTS uses two keys)
+  is applied in the reencryption code.
+
+* Rephrase missing locking directory warning and move it to debug level.
+
+  The system should later provide a safe transition to tempdir
+  configuration, so creating locking directory inside libcryptsetup
+  call is safe.
+
+* Many fixes for the use of cipher_null (empty debug cipher).
+
+  Support for this empty cipher was intended as a debug feature and for
+  measuring performance overhead. Unfortunately, many systems started to
+  use it as an "empty shell" for LUKS (to enable encryption later).
+
+  This use is very dangerous and it creates a false sense of security.
+
+  Anyway, to not break such systems, we try to support these
+  configurations.
+  Using cipher_null in any production system is strongly discouraged!
+
+  Fixes include:
+   - allow LUKS resume for a device with cipher_null.
+   - do not upload key in keyring when data cipher is null.
+   - switch to default cipher when reencrypting cipher_null device.
+   - replace possible bogus cipher_null keyslots before reencryption.
+   - fix broken detection of null cipher in LUKS2.
+     cipher_null is no longer possible to be used in keyslot encryption
+     in LUKS2, it can be used only for data for debugging purposes.
+
+* Fixes for libpasswdqc 2.0.x (optional passphrase quality check).
+
+* Fixes for problems discovered by various tools for code analysis.
+
+  Fixes include a rework of libpopt command line option string leaks.
+
+* Various fixes to man pages.

docs/v2.3.6-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.3.6 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable bug-fix release with minor extensions.
+
+All users of cryptsetup 2.x and later should upgrade to this version.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.5
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* integritysetup: Fix possible dm-integrity mapping table truncation.
+
+  While integritysetup in standalone mode (no encryption) was not
+  designed to provide keyed (and cryptographically strong) data
+  integrity protection, some options can use such algorithms (HMAC).
+
+  If a key is used, it is directly sent to the kernel dm-integrity as
+  a mapping table option (no key derivation is performed).
+  For HMAC, such a key could be quite long (up to 4096 bytes in
+  integritysetup CLI).
+
+  Unfortunately, due to fixed buffers and not correctly checking string
+  truncation, some parameter combinations could cause truncation
+  of the dm-integrity mapping table.
+  In most cases, the table was rejected by the kernel.
+  The worst possible case was key truncation for HMAC options
+  (internal_hash and journal_mac dm-integrity table options).
+
+  This release fixes possible truncation and also adds more sanity
+  checks to reject truncated options.
+  Also, integritysetup now mentions maximal allowed key size
+  in --help output.
+
+  For old standalone dm-integrity devices where the key length was
+  truncated, you have to modify (shorten) --integrity-key-size
+  resp. --journal-integrity-key-size option now.
+
+  This bug is _not_ present for dm-crypt/LUKS, LUKS2 (including
+  integrity protection), or dm-verity devices; it affects only
+  standalone dm-integrity with HMAC integrity protection.
+
+* cryptsetup: Backup header can be used to activate TCRYPT device.
+  Use --header option to specify the header.
+
+* cryptsetup: Avoid LUKS2 decryption without detached header.
+  This feature will be added later and is currently not supported.
+
+* Additional fixes and workarounds for common warnings produced
+  by some static analysis tools (like gcc-11 analyzer) and additional
+  code hardening.
+
+* Fix standalone libintl detection for compiled tests.
+
+* Add Blake2b and Blake2s hash support for crypto backends.
+  Kernel and gcrypt crypto backend support all variants.
+  OpenSSL supports only Blake2b-512 and Blake2s-256.
+  Crypto backend supports kernel notation e.g. "blake2b-512".

docs/v2.4.0-rc0-ReleaseNotes

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+Cryptsetup 2.4.0-rc0 Release Notes
+==================================
+Stable release candidate with new features and bug fixes.
+
+This version introduces support for external libraries
+(plugins) for handling LUKS2 token objects.
+
+Changes since version 2.3.6
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* External LUKS token plugins
+
+  A LUKS2 token is an object that can describe how to get a passphrase
+  to unlock a particular keyslot. The generic metadata format is part
+  of the LUKS2 specification.
+
+  Cryptsetup 2.4 adds the possibility to implement token handlers
+  in external libraries (possibly provided by other projects).
+
+  A token library allows cryptsetup to understand metadata and provide
+  basic operations (activate, resize, dump metadata, handle keyslots).
+
+  The library now provides an interface that automatically tries to load
+  an external library for a token object in LUKS2 metadata.
+
+  Token libraries should be installed in the cryptsetup subdirectory
+  (usually /lib*/cryptsetup). This path is configurable through
+  --with-luks2-external-tokens-path configure option.
+
+  The external plugin loading can be compiled entirely out if
+  --disable-external-tokens configure option is used. The external token
+  interface can also be disabled runtime on the command line by
+  --disable-external-tokens cryptsetup switch or by calling
+  crypt_token_external_disable() API function.
+
+  The name of the loaded token library is determined from the JSON LUKS
+  metadata token object type. For example, "ssh" token will load library
+  "libcryptsetup-token-ssh.so".
+
+  External projects can use this interface to handle specific hardware
+  without introducing additional dependencies to libcryptsetup core.
+
+  Examples of such tokens are already available for the systemd project
+  for TPM2 and FIDO2 interfaces.
+
+* Experimental SSH token
+
+  As a demonstration of the external LUKS2 token interface, a new SSH
+  token handler and cryptsetup-ssh utility is now provided and compiled
+  by default.
+
+  Crypsetup SSH token allows using remote keyfile through SSH protocol
+  (it will authenticate through SSH certificates).
+
+  You can disable the build of this token library with
+  --disable-ssh-token configure option.
+
+To configure the token metadata, you need cryptsetup-ssh utility.
+
+Activation of the device is then performed by the cryptsetup utility.
+
+Example (how to activate LUKS2 through remote keyfile):
+
+  - configure existing LUKS2 device with keyslot activated by a keyfile
+   # cryptsetup luksAddKey <device> keyfile --key-slot 2
+
+   - store that keyfile on a remote system accessible through SSH
+
+   - configure SSH to use certificate for authentication
+
+   - add a LUKS2 token with cryptsetup-ssh utility:
+   # cryptsetup-ssh add <device>1 --key-slot 2 \
+      --ssh-server test-vm \
+      --ssh-user test \
+      --ssh-path /home/test/keyfile \
+      --ssh-keypath  /home/test/.ssh/test_rsa_key
+
+  - you should see token metadata now with "cryptsetup luksDump ..."
+   ...
+   Tokens:
+   0: ssh
+        ssh_server: test-vm
+        ssh_user: test
+        ssh_path: /home/test/keyfile
+        ssh_key_path: /home/test/.ssh/test_rsa_key
+        Keyslot:    2
+
+
+  - activation now should be automatic
+  # cryptsetup open <device> test --verbose
+    SSH token initiating ssh session.
+    Key slot 2 unlocked.
+    Command successful.
+
+  - to remove a token, you can use "cryptsetup token remove" command
+  (no plugin library required)
+
+  Please note SSH token is just demonstration of plugin interface API,
+  it is an EXPERIMENTAL feature.
+
+* Default LUKS2 PBKDF is now Argon2id
+
+  Cryptsetup LUKS2 was using Argon2 while there were two versions,
+  data-independent (Argon2i) suitable for the KDF use case and
+  Argon2d (data-dependent). Later Argon2id was introduced as a new
+  mandatory algorithm.
+
+  We switched the password-based key derivation algorithms
+  following the latest version of Argon2 RFC draft
+  (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-argon2/) to Argon2id
+  (from Argon2i) as it is the mandatory and primary version
+  of the Argon2 algorithm.
+
+  There is no need to modify older containers; the main reason is that
+  RFC makes Argon2id the primary variant, while Argon2i subvariant is
+  only optional.
+  Argon2id provides better protection to side-channel attacks while
+  still providing protection to time-memory tradeoffs.
+
+  We will switch to OpenSSL implementation once it is available.
+  With a crystal ball as a reference, it could happen early in
+  OpenSSL 3.1 release.
+  Watch https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/4091.
+
+* Increase minimal memory cost for Argon2 benchmark to 64MiB.
+
+  This patch increases the benchmarking value to 64 MiB (as minimal
+  suggested values in Argon2 RFC). For compatibility reasons, we still
+  allow older limits if set by a parameter.
+
+  NOTE: Argon2 RFC draft defines suggested parameters for disk
+  encryption, but the LUKS2 approach is slightly different. We need to
+  provide platform-independent values. The values in the draft expect
+  64bit systems (suggesting using 6 GiB of RAM). In comparison, we need
+  to provide compatibility with all 32bit systems, so allocating more
+  than 4GiB memory is not an option for LUKS2.
+
+  The maximal limit in LUKS2 stays for 4 GiB, and by default LUKS2 PBKDF
+  benchmarking sets maximum to 1 GIB, preferring an increase of CPU cost
+  while running benchmark
+
+* Autodetect optimal encryption sector size on LUKS2 format.
+
+  While the support for larger encryption sectors is supported
+  for several releases, it required an additional parameter.
+
+  Code now uses automatic detection of 4096-bytes native sector devices
+  and automatically enables 4096-bytes encryption size for LUKS2.
+
+  If no setor size option is used, sector size is detected
+  automatically by cryptsetup. For libcryptsetup API, autodetection
+  happens once you specify sector_size to 0.
+
+  NOTE: crypt_format() function runs autodetection ONLY if you
+  recompile your application to the new API symbol version.
+  For backward compatibility, older applications ignore this parameter.
+
+* Use VeraCrypt option by default and add --disable-veracrypt option.
+
+  While TrueCrypt is no longer developed and supported since 2014,
+  VeraCrypt devices (a successor of TrueCrypt) are much more used today.
+
+  Default is now to support VeraCrypt format (in addition to TrueCrypt),
+  making the --veracrypt option obsolete (ignored as it is the default).
+
+  If you need to disable VeraCrypt support, use the new option
+  --disable-veracrypt.
+
+  This option increases the time to recognize wrong passwords because
+  some VeraCrypt modes use a high PBKDF2 iteration count, and the code
+  must try all variants. This could be limited by using --hash and
+  --cipher options mentioned below.
+
+* Support --hash and --cipher to limit opening time for TCRYPT type
+
+  If a user knows which particular PBKDF2 hash or cipher is used for
+  TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt container,  TCRYPT format now supports --hash and
+  --cipher option.
+
+  Note the value means substring (all cipher chains containing
+  the cipher substring are tried).
+
+  For example, you can use
+      # cryptsetup tcryptDump --hash sha512 <container>
+
+  Note: to speed up the scan, the hash option (used for PBKDF)2 matters.
+  Cipher variants are scanned very quickly.
+
+  Use with care.
+  It can reveal some sensitive attributes of the container!
+
+* Fixed default OpenSSL crypt backend support for OpenSSL3.
+
+  For OpenSSL version 3, we need to load legacy provider for older hash
+  and ciphers. For example, RIPEMD160 and Whirlpool hash algorithms are
+  no longer available by default.
+
+  NOTE: the plain format still uses RIPEMD160 for password hashing by
+  default. Changing the default would cause incompatibilities for many
+  old systems. Nevertheless, such a change will be needed very soon.
+
+* integritysetup: add integrity-recalculate-reset flag.
+
+  The new dm-integrity option in kernel 5.13 can restart recalculation
+  from the beginning of the device.
+  It can be used to change the integrity checksum function.
+
+  New integritysetup --integrity-recalculate-reset option is added to
+  integritysetup, and CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE_RESET flag to API.
+
+* cryptsetup: retains keyslot number in luksChangeKey for LUKS2.
+
+    In LUKS1, any change in keyslot means keyslot number change.
+
+    In LUKS2, we can retain the keyslot number.
+    Now luksKeyChange and crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase() API
+    retains keyslot number for LUKS2 by default.
+
+* Fix cryptsetup resize using LUKS2 tokens.
+
+  Fix a bug where cryptsetup needlessly asked for a passphrase even
+  though the volume key was already unlocked via LUKS2 token.
+
+* Add close --deferred and --cancel-deferred options.
+
+  All command-line utilities now understand deferred options for the
+  close command. Deferred close means that the device is removed
+  automagically after the last user closed the device.
+  Cancel deferred means to cancel this operation (so the device remains
+  active even if there a no longer active users).
+
+  CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED and CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED_CANCEL flags
+  are now available for API.
+
+* Rewritten command-line option parsing to avoid libpopt arguments
+  memory leaks.
+
+  Note: some distributions use patched lipopt that still leaks memory
+  inside internal code (see Debian bug 941814).
+
+* Add --test-args option.
+
+  New --test-args option can be used for syntax checking for valid
+  command-line arguments with no actions performed.
+  Note that it cannot detect unknown algorithm names and similar where
+  we need call API functions.
+
+* libcryptsetup C API extensions (see libcryptsetup.h for details)
+
+  - crypt_logf - a printf like log function
+  - crypt_dump_json - dump LUKS2 metadata in JSON format
+  - crypt_header_is_detached - check if context use detached header
+  - crypt_token_max - get maximal tokens number
+  - crypt_token_external_path - get path for plugins (or NULL)
+  - crypt_token_external_disable - disable runtime support for plugins
+  - crypt_activate_by_token_pin - activate by token with additional PIN
+  - crypt_reencrypt - fixed prototype
+
+  The token plugin library interface cosiste from there versioned
+  exported syblols (for details see header file and SSH token example):
+     cryptsetup_token_open
+     cryptsetup_token_open_pin
+     cryptsetup_token_buffer_free
+     cryptsetup_token_validate
+     cryptsetup_token_dump
+     cryptsetup_token_version
+
+ Since version 2.4 libcryptsetup uses exact symbol versioning
+ Newly introduced functions have CRYPTSETUP_2.4 namespace (the old
+ symbol always used CRYPTSETUP_2.0).
+ There is no change in soname (the library is backward compatible).
+
+ * Many fixes and additions to documentation and man pages.

lib/Makefile.am

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-moduledir = $(libdir)/cryptsetup
-
-pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig
-pkgconfig_DATA = libcryptsetup.pc
-
-INCLUDES = \
-	-I$(top_srcdir)				\
-	-I$(top_srcdir)/luks			\
-	-DDATADIR=\""$(datadir)"\"		\
-	-DLIBDIR=\""$(libdir)"\"		\
-	-DPREFIX=\""$(prefix)"\"		\
-	-DSYSCONFDIR=\""$(sysconfdir)"\"	\
-	-DVERSION=\""$(VERSION)"\"		\
-	-D_GNU_SOURCE				\
-	-D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE			\
-	-D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
-
-lib_LTLIBRARIES = libcryptsetup.la
-
-if STATIC_LIBRARY
-_STATIC_LIBRARY = -static
-endif
-
-libcryptsetup_la_DEPENDENCIES = libcryptsetup.sym
-
-libcryptsetup_la_LDFLAGS = \
-	$(_STATIC_LIBRARY) \
-	-Wl,--version-script=$(top_srcdir)/lib/libcryptsetup.sym \
-	-version-info @LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO@
-
-libcryptsetup_la_CFLAGS = -Wall @LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS@
-
-libcryptsetup_la_LIBADD = \
-	@UUID_LIBS@				\
-	@DEVMAPPER_LIBS@			\
-	@LIBGCRYPT_LIBS@			\
-	../luks/libluks.la
-
-libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
-	setup.c					\
-	internal.h				\
-	nls.h					\
-	blockdev.h				\
-	libcryptsetup.h				\
-	utils.c					\
-	utils_debug.c				\
-	backends.c				\
-	libdevmapper.c				\
-	gcrypt.c
-
-include_HEADERS = libcryptsetup.h
-
-EXTRA_DIST = libcryptsetup.pc.in libcryptsetup.sym

lib/Makemodule.am

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig
+pkgconfig_DATA += lib/libcryptsetup.pc
+
+lib_LTLIBRARIES += libcryptsetup.la
+
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libutils_io.la
+
+include_HEADERS += lib/libcryptsetup.h
+
+EXTRA_DIST += lib/libcryptsetup.pc.in lib/libcryptsetup.sym
+
+libutils_io_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
+
+libutils_io_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/utils_io.c			\
+	lib/utils_io.h
+
+libcryptsetup_la_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS)
+
+libcryptsetup_la_DEPENDENCIES = libutils_io.la libcrypto_backend.la lib/libcryptsetup.sym
+
+libcryptsetup_la_LDFLAGS = $(AM_LDFLAGS) -no-undefined \
+	-Wl,--version-script=$(top_srcdir)/lib/libcryptsetup.sym \
+	-version-info @LIBCRYPTSETUP_VERSION_INFO@
+
+libcryptsetup_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+
+libcryptsetup_la_LIBADD = \
+	@UUID_LIBS@		\
+	@DEVMAPPER_LIBS@	\
+	@CRYPTO_LIBS@		\
+	@LIBARGON2_LIBS@	\
+	@JSON_C_LIBS@		\
+	@BLKID_LIBS@		\
+	$(LTLIBICONV)		\
+	libcrypto_backend.la	\
+	libutils_io.la
+
+libcryptsetup_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/setup.c			\
+	lib/internal.h			\
+	lib/bitops.h			\
+	lib/nls.h			\
+	lib/libcryptsetup.h		\
+	lib/libcryptsetup_macros.h	\
+	lib/libcryptsetup_symver.h	\
+	lib/utils.c			\
+	lib/utils_benchmark.c		\
+	lib/utils_crypt.c		\
+	lib/utils_crypt.h		\
+	lib/utils_loop.c		\
+	lib/utils_loop.h		\
+	lib/utils_devpath.c		\
+	lib/utils_wipe.c		\
+	lib/utils_fips.c		\
+	lib/utils_fips.h		\
+	lib/utils_device.c		\
+	lib/utils_keyring.c		\
+	lib/utils_keyring.h		\
+	lib/utils_device_locking.c	\
+	lib/utils_device_locking.h	\
+	lib/utils_pbkdf.c		\
+	lib/utils_safe_memory.c		\
+	lib/utils_storage_wrappers.c	\
+	lib/utils_storage_wrappers.h	\
+	lib/libdevmapper.c		\
+	lib/utils_dm.h			\
+	lib/volumekey.c			\
+	lib/random.c			\
+	lib/crypt_plain.c		\
+	lib/base64.h			\
+	lib/base64.c			\
+	lib/integrity/integrity.h	\
+	lib/integrity/integrity.c	\
+	lib/loopaes/loopaes.h		\
+	lib/loopaes/loopaes.c		\
+	lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h		\
+	lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c		\
+	lib/luks1/af.h			\
+	lib/luks1/af.c			\
+	lib/luks1/keyencryption.c	\
+	lib/luks1/keymanage.c		\
+	lib/luks1/luks.h		\
+	lib/verity/verity_hash.c	\
+	lib/verity/verity_fec.c		\
+	lib/verity/verity.c		\
+	lib/verity/verity.h		\
+	lib/verity/rs_encode_char.c	\
+	lib/verity/rs_decode_char.c	\
+	lib/verity/rs.h		\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_json_format.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_luks1_convert.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_digest.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_digest_pbkdf2.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_luks2.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot_reenc.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_segment.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_token_keyring.c	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_token.c		\
+	lib/luks2/luks2_internal.h	\
+	lib/luks2/luks2.h		\
+	lib/utils_blkid.c		\
+	lib/utils_blkid.h		\
+	lib/bitlk/bitlk.h		\
+	lib/bitlk/bitlk.c

lib/backends.c

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include "libcryptsetup.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-extern struct hash_backend hash_gcrypt_backend;
-
-static struct hash_backend *hash_backends[] = {
-	&hash_gcrypt_backend,
-	NULL
-};
-
-struct hash_backend *get_hash_backend(const char *name)
-{
-	struct hash_backend **backend;
-
-	for(backend = hash_backends; *backend; backend++)
-		if (!name || strcmp(name, (*backend)->name) == 0)
-			break;
-
-	return *backend;
-}
-
-void put_hash_backend(struct hash_backend *backend)
-{
-}
-
-int hash(const char *backend_name, const char *hash_name,
-         char *result, size_t size,
-         const char *passphrase, size_t sizep)
-{
-	struct hash_backend *backend;
-	struct hash_type *hashes = NULL, *hash;
-	char hash_name_buf[256], *s;
-	size_t pad = 0;
-	int r = -ENOENT;
-
-	if (strlen(hash_name) >= sizeof(hash_name_buf)) {
-		set_error("hash name too long: %s", hash_name);
-		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-	}
-
-	if ((s = strchr(hash_name, ':'))) {
-		size_t hlen;
-		strcpy(hash_name_buf, hash_name);
-		hash_name_buf[s-hash_name] = '\0';
-		hash_name = hash_name_buf;
-		hlen = atoi(++s);
-		if (hlen > size) {
-			set_error("requested hash length (%zd) > key length (%zd)", hlen, size);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		pad = size-hlen;
-		size = hlen;
-	}
-
-	backend = get_hash_backend(backend_name);
-	if (!backend) {
-		set_error("No hash backend found");
-		return -ENOSYS;
-	}
-
-	hashes = backend->get_hashes();
-	if (!hashes) {
-		set_error("No hash functions available");
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	for(hash = hashes; hash->name; hash++)
-		if (strcmp(hash->name, hash_name) == 0)
-			break;
-	if (!hash->name) {
-		set_error("Unknown hash type %s", hash_name);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	r = hash->fn(hash->private, size, result, sizep, passphrase);
-	if (r < 0) {
-		set_error("Error hashing passphrase");
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (pad) {
-		memset(result+size, 0, pad);
-	}
-
-out:
-	if (hashes)
-		backend->free_hashes(hashes);
-	put_hash_backend(backend);
-
-	return r;
-}

lib/base64.c

@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+/* base64.c -- Encode binary data using printable characters.
+   Copyright (C) 1999-2001, 2004-2006, 2009-2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+   any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
+
+/* Written by Simon Josefsson.  Partially adapted from GNU MailUtils
+ * (mailbox/filter_trans.c, as of 2004-11-28).  Improved by review
+ * from Paul Eggert, Bruno Haible, and Stepan Kasal.
+ *
+ * See also RFC 4648 <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4648.txt>.
+ *
+ * Be careful with error checking.  Here is how you would typically
+ * use these functions:
+ *
+ * bool ok = base64_decode_alloc (in, inlen, &out, &outlen);
+ * if (!ok)
+ *   FAIL: input was not valid base64
+ * if (out == NULL)
+ *   FAIL: memory allocation error
+ * OK: data in OUT/OUTLEN
+ *
+ * size_t outlen = base64_encode_alloc (in, inlen, &out);
+ * if (out == NULL && outlen == 0 && inlen != 0)
+ *   FAIL: input too long
+ * if (out == NULL)
+ *   FAIL: memory allocation error
+ * OK: data in OUT/OUTLEN.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+/* Get prototype. */
+#include "base64.h"
+
+/* Get malloc. */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/* Get UCHAR_MAX. */
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* C89 compliant way to cast 'char' to 'unsigned char'. */
+static unsigned char
+to_uchar (char ch)
+{
+  return ch;
+}
+
+static const char b64c[64] =
+  "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+/* Base64 encode IN array of size INLEN into OUT array. OUT needs
+   to be of length >= BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), and INLEN needs to be
+   a multiple of 3.  */
+static void
+base64_encode_fast (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen, char *restrict out)
+{
+  while (inlen)
+    {
+      *out++ = b64c[(to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2) & 0x3f];
+      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4) + (to_uchar (in[1]) >> 4)) & 0x3f];
+      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[1]) << 2) + (to_uchar (in[2]) >> 6)) & 0x3f];
+      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[2]) & 0x3f];
+
+      inlen -= 3;
+      in += 3;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Base64 encode IN array of size INLEN into OUT array of size OUTLEN.
+   If OUTLEN is less than BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), write as many bytes as
+   possible.  If OUTLEN is larger than BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), also zero
+   terminate the output buffer. */
+void
+base64_encode (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+               char *restrict out, size_t outlen)
+{
+  /* Note this outlen constraint can be enforced at compile time.
+     I.E. that the output buffer is exactly large enough to hold
+     the encoded inlen bytes.  The inlen constraints (of corresponding
+     to outlen, and being a multiple of 3) can change at runtime
+     at the end of input.  However the common case when reading
+     large inputs is to have both constraints satisfied, so we depend
+     on both in base_encode_fast().  */
+  if (outlen % 4 == 0 && inlen == outlen / 4 * 3)
+    {
+      base64_encode_fast (in, inlen, out);
+      return;
+    }
+
+  while (inlen && outlen)
+    {
+      *out++ = b64c[(to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2) & 0x3f];
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4)
+                       + (--inlen ? to_uchar (in[1]) >> 4 : 0))
+                      & 0x3f];
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      *out++ =
+        (inlen
+         ? b64c[((to_uchar (in[1]) << 2)
+                   + (--inlen ? to_uchar (in[2]) >> 6 : 0))
+                  & 0x3f]
+         : '=');
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      *out++ = inlen ? b64c[to_uchar (in[2]) & 0x3f] : '=';
+      if (!--outlen)
+        break;
+      if (inlen)
+        inlen--;
+      if (inlen)
+        in += 3;
+    }
+
+  if (outlen)
+    *out = '\0';
+}
+
+/* Allocate a buffer and store zero terminated base64 encoded data
+   from array IN of size INLEN, returning BASE64_LENGTH(INLEN), i.e.,
+   the length of the encoded data, excluding the terminating zero.  On
+   return, the OUT variable will hold a pointer to newly allocated
+   memory that must be deallocated by the caller.  If output string
+   length would overflow, 0 is returned and OUT is set to NULL.  If
+   memory allocation failed, OUT is set to NULL, and the return value
+   indicates length of the requested memory block, i.e.,
+   BASE64_LENGTH(inlen) + 1. */
+size_t
+base64_encode_alloc (const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out)
+{
+  size_t outlen = 1 + BASE64_LENGTH (inlen);
+
+  /* Check for overflow in outlen computation.
+   *
+   * If there is no overflow, outlen >= inlen.
+   *
+   * If the operation (inlen + 2) overflows then it yields at most +1, so
+   * outlen is 0.
+   *
+   * If the multiplication overflows, we lose at least half of the
+   * correct value, so the result is < ((inlen + 2) / 3) * 2, which is
+   * less than (inlen + 2) * 0.66667, which is less than inlen as soon as
+   * (inlen > 4).
+   */
+  if (inlen > outlen)
+    {
+      *out = NULL;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+  *out = malloc (outlen);
+  if (!*out)
+    return outlen;
+
+  base64_encode (in, inlen, *out, outlen);
+
+  return outlen - 1;
+}
+
+/* With this approach this file works independent of the charset used
+   (think EBCDIC).  However, it does assume that the characters in the
+   Base64 alphabet (A-Za-z0-9+/) are encoded in 0..255.  POSIX
+   1003.1-2001 require that char and unsigned char are 8-bit
+   quantities, though, taking care of that problem.  But this may be a
+   potential problem on non-POSIX C99 platforms.
+
+   IBM C V6 for AIX mishandles "#define B64(x) ...'x'...", so use "_"
+   as the formal parameter rather than "x".  */
+#define B64(_)                                  \
+  ((_) == 'A' ? 0                               \
+   : (_) == 'B' ? 1                             \
+   : (_) == 'C' ? 2                             \
+   : (_) == 'D' ? 3                             \
+   : (_) == 'E' ? 4                             \
+   : (_) == 'F' ? 5                             \
+   : (_) == 'G' ? 6                             \
+   : (_) == 'H' ? 7                             \
+   : (_) == 'I' ? 8                             \
+   : (_) == 'J' ? 9                             \
+   : (_) == 'K' ? 10                            \
+   : (_) == 'L' ? 11                            \
+   : (_) == 'M' ? 12                            \
+   : (_) == 'N' ? 13                            \
+   : (_) == 'O' ? 14                            \
+   : (_) == 'P' ? 15                            \
+   : (_) == 'Q' ? 16                            \
+   : (_) == 'R' ? 17                            \
+   : (_) == 'S' ? 18                            \
+   : (_) == 'T' ? 19                            \
+   : (_) == 'U' ? 20                            \
+   : (_) == 'V' ? 21                            \
+   : (_) == 'W' ? 22                            \
+   : (_) == 'X' ? 23                            \
+   : (_) == 'Y' ? 24                            \
+   : (_) == 'Z' ? 25                            \
+   : (_) == 'a' ? 26                            \
+   : (_) == 'b' ? 27                            \
+   : (_) == 'c' ? 28                            \
+   : (_) == 'd' ? 29                            \
+   : (_) == 'e' ? 30                            \
+   : (_) == 'f' ? 31                            \
+   : (_) == 'g' ? 32                            \
+   : (_) == 'h' ? 33                            \
+   : (_) == 'i' ? 34                            \
+   : (_) == 'j' ? 35                            \
+   : (_) == 'k' ? 36                            \
+   : (_) == 'l' ? 37                            \
+   : (_) == 'm' ? 38                            \
+   : (_) == 'n' ? 39                            \
+   : (_) == 'o' ? 40                            \
+   : (_) == 'p' ? 41                            \
+   : (_) == 'q' ? 42                            \
+   : (_) == 'r' ? 43                            \
+   : (_) == 's' ? 44                            \
+   : (_) == 't' ? 45                            \
+   : (_) == 'u' ? 46                            \
+   : (_) == 'v' ? 47                            \
+   : (_) == 'w' ? 48                            \
+   : (_) == 'x' ? 49                            \
+   : (_) == 'y' ? 50                            \
+   : (_) == 'z' ? 51                            \
+   : (_) == '0' ? 52                            \
+   : (_) == '1' ? 53                            \
+   : (_) == '2' ? 54                            \
+   : (_) == '3' ? 55                            \
+   : (_) == '4' ? 56                            \
+   : (_) == '5' ? 57                            \
+   : (_) == '6' ? 58                            \
+   : (_) == '7' ? 59                            \
+   : (_) == '8' ? 60                            \
+   : (_) == '9' ? 61                            \
+   : (_) == '+' ? 62                            \
+   : (_) == '/' ? 63                            \
+   : -1)
+
+static const signed char b64[0x100] = {
+  B64 (0), B64 (1), B64 (2), B64 (3),
+  B64 (4), B64 (5), B64 (6), B64 (7),
+  B64 (8), B64 (9), B64 (10), B64 (11),
+  B64 (12), B64 (13), B64 (14), B64 (15),
+  B64 (16), B64 (17), B64 (18), B64 (19),
+  B64 (20), B64 (21), B64 (22), B64 (23),
+  B64 (24), B64 (25), B64 (26), B64 (27),
+  B64 (28), B64 (29), B64 (30), B64 (31),
+  B64 (32), B64 (33), B64 (34), B64 (35),
+  B64 (36), B64 (37), B64 (38), B64 (39),
+  B64 (40), B64 (41), B64 (42), B64 (43),
+  B64 (44), B64 (45), B64 (46), B64 (47),
+  B64 (48), B64 (49), B64 (50), B64 (51),
+  B64 (52), B64 (53), B64 (54), B64 (55),
+  B64 (56), B64 (57), B64 (58), B64 (59),
+  B64 (60), B64 (61), B64 (62), B64 (63),
+  B64 (64), B64 (65), B64 (66), B64 (67),
+  B64 (68), B64 (69), B64 (70), B64 (71),
+  B64 (72), B64 (73), B64 (74), B64 (75),
+  B64 (76), B64 (77), B64 (78), B64 (79),
+  B64 (80), B64 (81), B64 (82), B64 (83),
+  B64 (84), B64 (85), B64 (86), B64 (87),
+  B64 (88), B64 (89), B64 (90), B64 (91),
+  B64 (92), B64 (93), B64 (94), B64 (95),
+  B64 (96), B64 (97), B64 (98), B64 (99),
+  B64 (100), B64 (101), B64 (102), B64 (103),
+  B64 (104), B64 (105), B64 (106), B64 (107),
+  B64 (108), B64 (109), B64 (110), B64 (111),
+  B64 (112), B64 (113), B64 (114), B64 (115),
+  B64 (116), B64 (117), B64 (118), B64 (119),
+  B64 (120), B64 (121), B64 (122), B64 (123),
+  B64 (124), B64 (125), B64 (126), B64 (127),
+  B64 (128), B64 (129), B64 (130), B64 (131),
+  B64 (132), B64 (133), B64 (134), B64 (135),
+  B64 (136), B64 (137), B64 (138), B64 (139),
+  B64 (140), B64 (141), B64 (142), B64 (143),
+  B64 (144), B64 (145), B64 (146), B64 (147),
+  B64 (148), B64 (149), B64 (150), B64 (151),
+  B64 (152), B64 (153), B64 (154), B64 (155),
+  B64 (156), B64 (157), B64 (158), B64 (159),
+  B64 (160), B64 (161), B64 (162), B64 (163),
+  B64 (164), B64 (165), B64 (166), B64 (167),
+  B64 (168), B64 (169), B64 (170), B64 (171),
+  B64 (172), B64 (173), B64 (174), B64 (175),
+  B64 (176), B64 (177), B64 (178), B64 (179),
+  B64 (180), B64 (181), B64 (182), B64 (183),
+  B64 (184), B64 (185), B64 (186), B64 (187),
+  B64 (188), B64 (189), B64 (190), B64 (191),
+  B64 (192), B64 (193), B64 (194), B64 (195),
+  B64 (196), B64 (197), B64 (198), B64 (199),
+  B64 (200), B64 (201), B64 (202), B64 (203),
+  B64 (204), B64 (205), B64 (206), B64 (207),
+  B64 (208), B64 (209), B64 (210), B64 (211),
+  B64 (212), B64 (213), B64 (214), B64 (215),
+  B64 (216), B64 (217), B64 (218), B64 (219),
+  B64 (220), B64 (221), B64 (222), B64 (223),
+  B64 (224), B64 (225), B64 (226), B64 (227),
+  B64 (228), B64 (229), B64 (230), B64 (231),
+  B64 (232), B64 (233), B64 (234), B64 (235),
+  B64 (236), B64 (237), B64 (238), B64 (239),
+  B64 (240), B64 (241), B64 (242), B64 (243),
+  B64 (244), B64 (245), B64 (246), B64 (247),
+  B64 (248), B64 (249), B64 (250), B64 (251),
+  B64 (252), B64 (253), B64 (254), B64 (255)
+};
+
+#if UCHAR_MAX == 255
+# define uchar_in_range(c) true
+#else
+# define uchar_in_range(c) ((c) <= 255)
+#endif
+
+/* Return true if CH is a character from the Base64 alphabet, and
+   false otherwise.  Note that '=' is padding and not considered to be
+   part of the alphabet.  */
+bool
+isbase64 (char ch)
+{
+  return uchar_in_range (to_uchar (ch)) && 0 <= b64[to_uchar (ch)];
+}
+
+/* Initialize decode-context buffer, CTX.  */
+void
+base64_decode_ctx_init (struct base64_decode_context *ctx)
+{
+  ctx->i = 0;
+}
+
+/* If CTX->i is 0 or 4, there are four or more bytes in [*IN..IN_END), and
+   none of those four is a newline, then return *IN.  Otherwise, copy up to
+   4 - CTX->i non-newline bytes from that range into CTX->buf, starting at
+   index CTX->i and setting CTX->i to reflect the number of bytes copied,
+   and return CTX->buf.  In either case, advance *IN to point to the byte
+   after the last one processed, and set *N_NON_NEWLINE to the number of
+   verified non-newline bytes accessible through the returned pointer.  */
+static const char *
+get_4 (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+       char const *restrict *in, char const *restrict in_end,
+       size_t *n_non_newline)
+{
+  if (ctx->i == 4)
+    ctx->i = 0;
+
+  if (ctx->i == 0)
+    {
+      char const *t = *in;
+      if (4 <= in_end - *in && memchr (t, '\n', 4) == NULL)
+        {
+          /* This is the common case: no newline.  */
+          *in += 4;
+          *n_non_newline = 4;
+          return (const char *) t;
+        }
+    }
+
+  {
+    /* Copy non-newline bytes into BUF.  */
+    char const *p = *in;
+    while (p < in_end)
+      {
+        char c = *p++;
+        if (c != '\n')
+          {
+            ctx->buf[ctx->i++] = c;
+            if (ctx->i == 4)
+              break;
+          }
+      }
+
+    *in = p;
+    *n_non_newline = ctx->i;
+    return ctx->buf;
+  }
+}
+
+#define return_false                            \
+  do                                            \
+    {                                           \
+      *outp = out;                              \
+      return false;                             \
+    }                                           \
+  while (false)
+
+/* Decode up to four bytes of base64-encoded data, IN, of length INLEN
+   into the output buffer, *OUT, of size *OUTLEN bytes.  Return true if
+   decoding is successful, false otherwise.  If *OUTLEN is too small,
+   as many bytes as possible are written to *OUT.  On return, advance
+   *OUT to point to the byte after the last one written, and decrement
+   *OUTLEN to reflect the number of bytes remaining in *OUT.  */
+static bool
+decode_4 (char const *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+          char *restrict *outp, size_t *outleft)
+{
+  char *out = *outp;
+  if (inlen < 2)
+    return false;
+
+  if (!isbase64 (in[0]) || !isbase64 (in[1]))
+    return false;
+
+  if (*outleft)
+    {
+      *out++ = ((b64[to_uchar (in[0])] << 2)
+                | (b64[to_uchar (in[1])] >> 4));
+      --*outleft;
+    }
+
+  if (inlen == 2)
+    return_false;
+
+  if (in[2] == '=')
+    {
+      if (inlen != 4)
+        return_false;
+
+      if (in[3] != '=')
+        return_false;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      if (!isbase64 (in[2]))
+        return_false;
+
+      if (*outleft)
+        {
+          *out++ = (((b64[to_uchar (in[1])] << 4) & 0xf0)
+                    | (b64[to_uchar (in[2])] >> 2));
+          --*outleft;
+        }
+
+      if (inlen == 3)
+        return_false;
+
+      if (in[3] == '=')
+        {
+          if (inlen != 4)
+            return_false;
+        }
+      else
+        {
+          if (!isbase64 (in[3]))
+            return_false;
+
+          if (*outleft)
+            {
+              *out++ = (((b64[to_uchar (in[2])] << 6) & 0xc0)
+                        | b64[to_uchar (in[3])]);
+              --*outleft;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+  *outp = out;
+  return true;
+}
+
+/* Decode base64-encoded input array IN of length INLEN to output array
+   OUT that can hold *OUTLEN bytes.  The input data may be interspersed
+   with newlines.  Return true if decoding was successful, i.e. if the
+   input was valid base64 data, false otherwise.  If *OUTLEN is too
+   small, as many bytes as possible will be written to OUT.  On return,
+   *OUTLEN holds the length of decoded bytes in OUT.  Note that as soon
+   as any non-alphabet, non-newline character is encountered, decoding
+   is stopped and false is returned.  If INLEN is zero, then process
+   only whatever data is stored in CTX.
+
+   Initially, CTX must have been initialized via base64_decode_ctx_init.
+   Subsequent calls to this function must reuse whatever state is recorded
+   in that buffer.  It is necessary for when a quadruple of base64 input
+   bytes spans two input buffers.
+
+   If CTX is NULL then newlines are treated as garbage and the input
+   buffer is processed as a unit.  */
+
+bool
+base64_decode_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                   const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+                   char *restrict out, size_t *outlen)
+{
+  size_t outleft = *outlen;
+  bool ignore_newlines = ctx != NULL;
+  bool flush_ctx = false;
+  unsigned int ctx_i = 0;
+
+  if (ignore_newlines)
+    {
+      ctx_i = ctx->i;
+      flush_ctx = inlen == 0;
+    }
+
+
+  while (true)
+    {
+      size_t outleft_save = outleft;
+      if (ctx_i == 0 && !flush_ctx)
+        {
+          while (true)
+            {
+              /* Save a copy of outleft, in case we need to re-parse this
+                 block of four bytes.  */
+              outleft_save = outleft;
+              if (!decode_4 (in, inlen, &out, &outleft))
+                break;
+
+              in += 4;
+              inlen -= 4;
+            }
+        }
+
+      if (inlen == 0 && !flush_ctx)
+        break;
+
+      /* Handle the common case of 72-byte wrapped lines.
+         This also handles any other multiple-of-4-byte wrapping.  */
+      if (inlen && *in == '\n' && ignore_newlines)
+        {
+          ++in;
+          --inlen;
+          continue;
+        }
+
+      /* Restore OUT and OUTLEFT.  */
+      out -= outleft_save - outleft;
+      outleft = outleft_save;
+
+      {
+        char const *in_end = in + inlen;
+        char const *non_nl;
+
+        if (ignore_newlines)
+          non_nl = get_4 (ctx, &in, in_end, &inlen);
+        else
+          non_nl = in;  /* Might have nl in this case. */
+
+        /* If the input is empty or consists solely of newlines (0 non-newlines),
+           then we're done.  Likewise if there are fewer than 4 bytes when not
+           flushing context and not treating newlines as garbage.  */
+        if (inlen == 0 || (inlen < 4 && !flush_ctx && ignore_newlines))
+          {
+            inlen = 0;
+            break;
+          }
+        if (!decode_4 (non_nl, inlen, &out, &outleft))
+          break;
+
+        inlen = in_end - in;
+      }
+    }
+
+  *outlen -= outleft;
+
+  return inlen == 0;
+}
+
+/* Allocate an output buffer in *OUT, and decode the base64 encoded
+   data stored in IN of size INLEN to the *OUT buffer.  On return, the
+   size of the decoded data is stored in *OUTLEN.  OUTLEN may be NULL,
+   if the caller is not interested in the decoded length.  *OUT may be
+   NULL to indicate an out of memory error, in which case *OUTLEN
+   contains the size of the memory block needed.  The function returns
+   true on successful decoding and memory allocation errors.  (Use the
+   *OUT and *OUTLEN parameters to differentiate between successful
+   decoding and memory error.)  The function returns false if the
+   input was invalid, in which case *OUT is NULL and *OUTLEN is
+   undefined. */
+bool
+base64_decode_alloc_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                         const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out,
+                         size_t *outlen)
+{
+  /* This may allocate a few bytes too many, depending on input,
+     but it's not worth the extra CPU time to compute the exact size.
+     The exact size is 3 * (inlen + (ctx ? ctx->i : 0)) / 4, minus 1 if the
+     input ends with "=" and minus another 1 if the input ends with "==".
+     Dividing before multiplying avoids the possibility of overflow.  */
+  size_t needlen = 3 * (inlen / 4) + 3;
+
+  *out = malloc (needlen);
+  if (!*out)
+    return true;
+
+  if (!base64_decode_ctx (ctx, in, inlen, *out, &needlen))
+    {
+      free (*out);
+      *out = NULL;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+  if (outlen)
+    *outlen = needlen;
+
+  return true;
+}

lib/base64.h

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/* base64.h -- Encode binary data using printable characters.
+   Copyright (C) 2004-2006, 2009-2019 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+   Written by Simon Josefsson.
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+   any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.  */
+
+#ifndef BASE64_H
+# define BASE64_H
+
+/* Get size_t. */
+# include <stddef.h>
+
+/* Get bool. */
+# include <stdbool.h>
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+/* This uses that the expression (n+(k-1))/k means the smallest
+   integer >= n/k, i.e., the ceiling of n/k.  */
+# define BASE64_LENGTH(inlen) ((((inlen) + 2) / 3) * 4)
+
+struct base64_decode_context
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+  char buf[4];
+};
+
+extern bool isbase64 (char ch) __attribute__ ((__const__));
+
+extern void base64_encode (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+                           char *restrict out, size_t outlen);
+
+extern size_t base64_encode_alloc (const char *in, size_t inlen, char **out);
+
+extern void base64_decode_ctx_init (struct base64_decode_context *ctx);
+
+extern bool base64_decode_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                               const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
+                               char *restrict out, size_t *outlen);
+
+extern bool base64_decode_alloc_ctx (struct base64_decode_context *ctx,
+                                     const char *in, size_t inlen,
+                                     char **out, size_t *outlen);
+
+#define base64_decode(in, inlen, out, outlen) \
+        base64_decode_ctx (NULL, in, inlen, out, outlen)
+
+#define base64_decode_alloc(in, inlen, out, outlen) \
+        base64_decode_alloc_ctx (NULL, in, inlen, out, outlen)
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif /* BASE64_H */

lib/bitlk/bitlk.h

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/*
+ * BITLK (BitLocker-compatible) header definition
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Vojtech Trefny
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_BITLK_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_BITLK_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct device;
+struct volume_key;
+
+#define BITLK_NONCE_SIZE 12
+#define BITLK_SALT_SIZE 16
+#define BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE 16
+
+#define BITLK_STATE_NORMAL 0x0004
+
+typedef enum {
+	BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_NORMAL = 0,
+	BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_EOW,
+	BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
+} BITLKEncryptionType;
+
+typedef enum {
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY = 0,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_TPM,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_TPM_PIN,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_RECOVERY_PASSPHRASE,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_SMART_CARD,
+	BITLK_PROTECTION_UNKNOWN,
+} BITLKVMKProtection;
+
+typedef enum {
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_PROPERTY = 0x0000,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VMK = 0x0002,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_FVEK = 0x0003,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_STARTUP_KEY = 0x0006,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_DESCRIPTION = 0x0007,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VOLUME_HEADER = 0x000f,
+} BITLKFVEEntryType;
+
+typedef enum {
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_ERASED = 0x0000,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_KEY = 0x0001,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRING = 0x0002,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRETCH_KEY = 0x0003,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_USE_KEY = 0x0004,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_ENCRYPTED_KEY = 0x0005,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_TPM_KEY = 0x0006,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_VALIDATION = 0x0007,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_VMK = 0x0008,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_EXTERNAL_KEY = 0x0009,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_OFFSET_SIZE = 0x000f,
+	BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_RECOVERY_TIME = 0x015,
+} BITLKFVEEntryValue;
+
+struct bitlk_vmk {
+	char *guid;
+	char *name;
+	BITLKVMKProtection protection;
+	uint8_t salt[BITLK_SALT_SIZE];
+	uint8_t mac_tag[BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE];
+	uint8_t nonce[BITLK_NONCE_SIZE];
+	struct volume_key *vk;
+	struct bitlk_vmk *next;
+};
+
+struct bitlk_fvek {
+	uint8_t mac_tag[BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE];
+	uint8_t nonce[BITLK_NONCE_SIZE];
+	struct volume_key *vk;
+};
+
+struct bitlk_metadata {
+	uint16_t sector_size;
+	bool togo;
+	bool state;
+	BITLKEncryptionType type;
+	const char *cipher;
+	const char *cipher_mode;
+	uint16_t key_size;
+	char *guid;
+	uint64_t creation_time;
+	char *description;
+	uint64_t metadata_offset[3];
+	uint32_t metadata_version;
+	uint64_t volume_header_offset;
+	uint64_t volume_header_size;
+	struct bitlk_vmk *vmks;
+	struct bitlk_fvek *fvek;
+};
+
+int BITLK_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct bitlk_metadata *params);
+
+int BITLK_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, struct bitlk_metadata *params);
+
+int BITLK_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			 const char *password,
+			 size_t passwordLen,
+			 const struct bitlk_metadata *params,
+			 struct volume_key **open_fvek_key);
+
+int BITLK_activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 const char *name,
+				 const char *password,
+				 size_t passwordLen,
+				 const struct bitlk_metadata *params,
+				 uint32_t flags);
+
+int BITLK_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 const char *name,
+				 const char *volume_key,
+				 size_t volume_key_size,
+				 const struct bitlk_metadata *params,
+				 uint32_t flags);
+
+void BITLK_bitlk_fvek_free(struct bitlk_fvek *fvek);
+void BITLK_bitlk_vmk_free(struct bitlk_vmk *vmk);
+void BITLK_bitlk_metadata_free(struct bitlk_metadata *params);
+
+#endif

lib/bitops.h

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/*
+ * No copyright is claimed.  This code is in the public domain; do with
+ * it what you wish.
+ *
+ * Written by Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
+ */
+#ifndef BITOPS_H
+#define BITOPS_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#if defined(HAVE_BYTESWAP_H)
+# include <byteswap.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_ENDIAN_H)
+#  include <endian.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_ENDIAN_H)	/* BSDs have them here */
+#  include <sys/endian.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# define be16toh(x) betoh16(x)
+# define be32toh(x) betoh32(x)
+# define be64toh(x) betoh64(x)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Fallbacks
+ */
+#ifndef bswap_16
+# define bswap_16(x)   ((((x) & 0x00FF) << 8) | \
+			(((x) & 0xFF00) >> 8))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bswap_32
+# define bswap_32(x)   ((((x) & 0x000000FF) << 24) | \
+			(((x) & 0x0000FF00) << 8)  | \
+			(((x) & 0x00FF0000) >> 8)  | \
+			(((x) & 0xFF000000) >> 24))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef bswap_64
+# define bswap_64(x) ((((x) & 0x00000000000000FFULL) << 56) | \
+                      (((x) & 0x000000000000FF00ULL) << 40) | \
+                      (((x) & 0x0000000000FF0000ULL) << 24) | \
+                      (((x) & 0x00000000FF000000ULL) << 8)  | \
+                      (((x) & 0x000000FF00000000ULL) >> 8)  | \
+                      (((x) & 0x0000FF0000000000ULL) >> 24) | \
+                      (((x) & 0x00FF000000000000ULL) >> 40) | \
+                      (((x) & 0xFF00000000000000ULL) >> 56))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef htobe16
+# if !defined(WORDS_BIGENDIAN)
+#  define htobe16(x) bswap_16 (x)
+#  define htole16(x) (x)
+#  define be16toh(x) bswap_16 (x)
+#  define le16toh(x) (x)
+#  define htobe32(x) bswap_32 (x)
+#  define htole32(x) (x)
+#  define be32toh(x) bswap_32 (x)
+#  define le32toh(x) (x)
+#  define htobe64(x) bswap_64 (x)
+#  define htole64(x) (x)
+#  define be64toh(x) bswap_64 (x)
+#  define le64toh(x) (x)
+# else
+#  define htobe16(x) (x)
+#  define htole16(x) bswap_16 (x)
+#  define be16toh(x) (x)
+#  define le16toh(x) bswap_16 (x)
+#  define htobe32(x) (x)
+#  define htole32(x) bswap_32 (x)
+#  define be32toh(x) (x)
+#  define le32toh(x) bswap_32 (x)
+#  define htobe64(x) (x)
+#  define htole64(x) bswap_64 (x)
+#  define be64toh(x) (x)
+#  define le64toh(x) bswap_64 (x)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Byte swab macros (based on linux/byteorder/swab.h)
+ */
+#define swab16(x) bswap_16(x)
+#define swab32(x) bswap_32(x)
+#define swab64(x) bswap_64(x)
+
+#define cpu_to_le16(x) ((uint16_t) htole16(x))
+#define cpu_to_le32(x) ((uint32_t) htole32(x))
+#define cpu_to_le64(x) ((uint64_t) htole64(x))
+
+#define cpu_to_be16(x) ((uint16_t) htobe16(x))
+#define cpu_to_be32(x) ((uint32_t) htobe32(x))
+#define cpu_to_be64(x) ((uint64_t) htobe64(x))
+
+#define le16_to_cpu(x) ((uint16_t) le16toh(x))
+#define le32_to_cpu(x) ((uint32_t) le32toh(x))
+#define le64_to_cpu(x) ((uint64_t) le64toh(x))
+
+#define be16_to_cpu(x) ((uint16_t) be16toh(x))
+#define be32_to_cpu(x) ((uint32_t) be32toh(x))
+#define be64_to_cpu(x) ((uint64_t) be64toh(x))
+
+/*
+ * Bit map related macros. Usually provided by libc.
+ */
+#ifndef NBBY
+# define NBBY            CHAR_BIT
+#endif
+
+#ifndef setbit
+# define setbit(a,i)	((a)[(i)/NBBY] |= 1<<((i)%NBBY))
+# define clrbit(a,i)	((a)[(i)/NBBY] &= ~(1<<((i)%NBBY)))
+# define isset(a,i)	((a)[(i)/NBBY] & (1<<((i)%NBBY)))
+# define isclr(a,i)	(((a)[(i)/NBBY] & (1<<((i)%NBBY))) == 0)
+#endif
+
+#endif /* BITOPS_H */

lib/blockdev.h

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef BLOCKDEV_H
-#define BLOCKDEV_H
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
-#	include "config.h"
-#endif
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <asm/types.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-
-#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_IOR) && !defined(BLKGETSIZE64)
-#	define BLKGETSIZE64	_IOR(0x12, 114, size_t)
-#endif
-
-#endif /* BLOCKDEV_H */

lib/crypt_plain.c

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/*
+ * cryptsetup plain device helper functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2010-2021 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static int hash(const char *hash_name, size_t key_size, char *key,
+		size_t passphrase_size, const char *passphrase)
+{
+	struct crypt_hash *md = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+	int round, i, r = 0;
+
+	if (crypt_hash_init(&md, hash_name))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	len = crypt_hash_size(hash_name);
+
+	for(round = 0; key_size && !r; round++) {
+		/* hack from hashalot to avoid null bytes in key */
+		for(i = 0; i < round; i++)
+			if (crypt_hash_write(md, "A", 1))
+				r = 1;
+
+		if (crypt_hash_write(md, passphrase, passphrase_size))
+			r = 1;
+
+		if (len > key_size)
+			len = key_size;
+
+		if (crypt_hash_final(md, key, len))
+			r = 1;
+
+		key += len;
+		key_size -= len;
+	}
+
+	crypt_hash_destroy(md);
+	return r;
+}
+
+#define PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX 256
+
+int crypt_plain_hash(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *hash_name,
+		     char *key, size_t key_size,
+		     const char *passphrase, size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+	char hash_name_buf[PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX], *s;
+	size_t hash_size, pad_size;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Plain: hashing passphrase using %s.", hash_name);
+
+	if (strlen(hash_name) >= PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	strncpy(hash_name_buf, hash_name, PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX);
+	hash_name_buf[PLAIN_HASH_LEN_MAX - 1] = '\0';
+
+	/* hash[:hash_length] */
+	if ((s = strchr(hash_name_buf, ':'))) {
+		*s = '\0';
+		s++;
+		if (!*s || sscanf(s, "%zd", &hash_size) != 1) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Hash length is not a number");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (hash_size > key_size) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Hash length %zd > key length %zd",
+				hash_size, key_size);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		pad_size = key_size - hash_size;
+	} else {
+		hash_size = key_size;
+		pad_size = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* No hash, copy passphrase directly */
+	if (!strcmp(hash_name_buf, "plain")) {
+		if (passphrase_size < hash_size) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Too short plain passphrase.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		memcpy(key, passphrase, hash_size);
+		r = 0;
+	} else
+		r = hash(hash_name_buf, hash_size, key, passphrase_size, passphrase);
+
+	if (r == 0 && pad_size)
+		memset(key + hash_size, 0, pad_size);
+
+	return r;
+}

lib/crypto_backend/Makemodule.am

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libcrypto_backend.la
+
+libcrypto_backend_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @CRYPTO_CFLAGS@
+
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_backend_internal.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_cipher_kernel.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf_check.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/crc32.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2_generic.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/cipher_generic.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/cipher_check.c
+
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_GCRYPT
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_OPENSSL
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_openssl.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_NSS
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nss.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_KERNEL
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_kernel.c
+endif
+if CRYPTO_BACKEND_NETTLE
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/crypto_nettle.c
+endif
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_PBKDF2
+libcrypto_backend_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c
+endif
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_ARGON2
+libcrypto_backend_la_DEPENDENCIES = libargon2.la
+libcrypto_backend_la_LIBADD = libargon2.la
+endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+     CREATIVE COMMONS CORPORATION IS NOT A LAW FIRM AND DOES NOT PROVIDE LEGAL SERVICES. DISTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. CREATIVE COMMONS PROVIDES THIS INFORMATION ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CREATIVE COMMONS MAKES NO WARRANTIES REGARDING THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR THE INFORMATION OR WORKS PROVIDED HEREUNDER, AND DISCLAIMS LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR THE INFORMATION OR WORKS PROVIDED HEREUNDER.
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of authorship and/or a database (each, a "Work").
+
+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the purpose of contributing to a commons of creative, cultural and scientific works ("Commons") that the public can reliably and without fear of later claims of infringement build upon, modify, incorporate in other works, reuse and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever and for any purposes, including without limitation commercial purposes. These owners may contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and efforts of others.
+
+For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any expectation of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright and Related Rights in the Work, voluntarily elects to apply CC0 to the Work and publicly distribute the Work under its terms, with knowledge of his or her Copyright and Related Rights in the Work and the meaning and intended legal effect of CC0 on those rights.
+
+1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be protected by copyright and related or neighboring rights ("Copyright and Related Rights"). Copyright and Related Rights include, but are not limited to, the following:
+
+    the right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, display, communicate, and translate a Work;
+    moral rights retained by the original author(s) and/or performer(s);
+    publicity and privacy rights pertaining to a person's image or likeness depicted in a Work;
+    rights protecting against unfair competition in regards to a Work, subject to the limitations in paragraph 4(a), below;
+    rights protecting the extraction, dissemination, use and reuse of data in a Work;
+    database rights (such as those arising under Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, and under any national implementation thereof, including any amended or successor version of such directive); and
+    other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world based on applicable law or treaty, and any national implementations thereof.
+
+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of, applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently, irrevocably and unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights and associated claims and causes of action, whether now known or unknown (including existing as well as future claims and causes of action), in the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration provided by applicable law or treaty (including future time extensions), (iii) in any current or future medium and for any number of copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever, including without limitation commercial, advertising or promotional purposes (the "Waiver"). Affirmer makes the Waiver for the benefit of each member of the public at large and to the detriment of Affirmer's heirs and successors, fully intending that such Waiver shall not be subject to revocation, rescission, cancellation, termination, or any other legal or equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work by the public as contemplated by Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into account Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the extent the Waiver is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected person a royalty-free, non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive, irrevocable and unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights in the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration provided by applicable law or treaty (including future time extensions), (iii) in any current or future medium and for any number of copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever, including without limitation commercial, advertising or promotional purposes (the "License"). The License shall be deemed effective as of the date CC0 was applied by Affirmer to the Work. Should any part of the License for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, such partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims and causes of action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+    No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned, surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
+    Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or warranties of any kind concerning the Work, express, implied, statutory or otherwise, including without limitation warranties of title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non infringement, or the absence of latent or other defects, accuracy, or the present or absence of errors, whether or not discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
+    Affirmer disclaims responsibility for clearing rights of other persons that may apply to the Work or any use thereof, including without limitation any person's Copyright and Related Rights in the Work. Further, Affirmer disclaims responsibility for obtaining any necessary consents, permissions or other rights required for any use of the Work.
+    Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a party to this document and has no duty or obligation with respect to this CC0 or use of the Work.

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/Makemodule.am

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libargon2.la
+
+libargon2_la_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -std=c89 -pthread -O3
+libargon2_la_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \
+	-I lib/crypto_backend/argon2 \
+	-I lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2
+
+libargon2_la_SOURCES = \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2b.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2-impl.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/encoding.h \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.c \
+	lib/crypto_backend/argon2/thread.h
+
+if CRYPTO_INTERNAL_SSE_ARGON2
+libargon2_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-opt.h \
+			lib/crypto_backend/argon2/opt.c
+else
+libargon2_la_SOURCES += lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-ref.h \
+			lib/crypto_backend/argon2/ref.c
+endif
+
+EXTRA_DIST += lib/crypto_backend/argon2/LICENSE
+EXTRA_DIST += lib/crypto_backend/argon2/README

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/README

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+This is bundled Argon2 algorithm library, copied from
+  https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2
+
+For more info see Password Hashing Competition site:
+  https://password-hashing.net/

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.c

@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "argon2.h"
+#include "encoding.h"
+#include "core.h"
+
+/* to silent gcc -Wcast-qual for const cast */
+#define CONST_CAST(x) (x)(uintptr_t)
+
+const char *argon2_type2string(argon2_type type, int uppercase) {
+    switch (type) {
+        case Argon2_d:
+            return uppercase ? "Argon2d" : "argon2d";
+        case Argon2_i:
+            return uppercase ? "Argon2i" : "argon2i";
+        case Argon2_id:
+            return uppercase ? "Argon2id" : "argon2id";
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int argon2_ctx(argon2_context *context, argon2_type type) {
+    /* 1. Validate all inputs */
+    int result = validate_inputs(context);
+    uint32_t memory_blocks, segment_length;
+    argon2_instance_t instance;
+
+    if (ARGON2_OK != result) {
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    if (Argon2_d != type && Argon2_i != type && Argon2_id != type) {
+        return ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE;
+    }
+
+    /* 2. Align memory size */
+    /* Minimum memory_blocks = 8L blocks, where L is the number of lanes */
+    memory_blocks = context->m_cost;
+
+    if (memory_blocks < 2 * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS * context->lanes) {
+        memory_blocks = 2 * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS * context->lanes;
+    }
+
+    segment_length = memory_blocks / (context->lanes * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS);
+    /* Ensure that all segments have equal length */
+    memory_blocks = segment_length * (context->lanes * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS);
+
+    instance.version = context->version;
+    instance.memory = NULL;
+    instance.passes = context->t_cost;
+    instance.memory_blocks = memory_blocks;
+    instance.segment_length = segment_length;
+    instance.lane_length = segment_length * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS;
+    instance.lanes = context->lanes;
+    instance.threads = context->threads;
+    instance.type = type;
+
+    if (instance.threads > instance.lanes) {
+        instance.threads = instance.lanes;
+    }
+
+    /* 3. Initialization: Hashing inputs, allocating memory, filling first
+     * blocks
+     */
+    result = initialize(&instance, context);
+
+    if (ARGON2_OK != result) {
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    /* 4. Filling memory */
+    result = fill_memory_blocks(&instance);
+
+    if (ARGON2_OK != result) {
+        return result;
+    }
+    /* 5. Finalization */
+    finalize(context, &instance);
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+int argon2_hash(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                void *hash, const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                const size_t encodedlen, argon2_type type,
+                const uint32_t version){
+
+    argon2_context context;
+    int result;
+    uint8_t *out;
+
+    if (pwdlen > ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH) {
+        return ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (saltlen > ARGON2_MAX_SALT_LENGTH) {
+        return ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (hashlen > ARGON2_MAX_OUTLEN) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (hashlen < ARGON2_MIN_OUTLEN) {
+        return ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT;
+    }
+
+    out = malloc(hashlen);
+    if (!out) {
+        return ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    context.out = (uint8_t *)out;
+    context.outlen = (uint32_t)hashlen;
+    context.pwd = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)pwd;
+    context.pwdlen = (uint32_t)pwdlen;
+    context.salt = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)salt;
+    context.saltlen = (uint32_t)saltlen;
+    context.secret = NULL;
+    context.secretlen = 0;
+    context.ad = NULL;
+    context.adlen = 0;
+    context.t_cost = t_cost;
+    context.m_cost = m_cost;
+    context.lanes = parallelism;
+    context.threads = parallelism;
+    context.allocate_cbk = NULL;
+    context.free_cbk = NULL;
+    context.flags = ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
+    context.version = version;
+
+    result = argon2_ctx(&context, type);
+
+    if (result != ARGON2_OK) {
+        clear_internal_memory(out, hashlen);
+        free(out);
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    /* if raw hash requested, write it */
+    if (hash) {
+        memcpy(hash, out, hashlen);
+    }
+
+    /* if encoding requested, write it */
+    if (encoded && encodedlen) {
+        if (encode_string(encoded, encodedlen, &context, type) != ARGON2_OK) {
+            clear_internal_memory(out, hashlen); /* wipe buffers if error */
+            clear_internal_memory(encoded, encodedlen);
+            free(out);
+            return ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL;
+        }
+    }
+    clear_internal_memory(out, hashlen);
+    free(out);
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+int argon2i_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                         const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                         const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                         const size_t saltlen, const size_t hashlen,
+                         char *encoded, const size_t encodedlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       NULL, hashlen, encoded, encodedlen, Argon2_i,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2i_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                     const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                     const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                     const size_t saltlen, void *hash, const size_t hashlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, Argon2_i, ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2d_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                         const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                         const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                         const size_t saltlen, const size_t hashlen,
+                         char *encoded, const size_t encodedlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       NULL, hashlen, encoded, encodedlen, Argon2_d,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2d_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                     const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                     const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                     const size_t saltlen, void *hash, const size_t hashlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, Argon2_d, ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2id_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                          const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                          const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                          const size_t saltlen, const size_t hashlen,
+                          char *encoded, const size_t encodedlen) {
+
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       NULL, hashlen, encoded, encodedlen, Argon2_id,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+int argon2id_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                      const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                      const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                      const size_t saltlen, void *hash, const size_t hashlen) {
+    return argon2_hash(t_cost, m_cost, parallelism, pwd, pwdlen, salt, saltlen,
+                       hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, Argon2_id,
+                       ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER);
+}
+
+static int argon2_compare(const uint8_t *b1, const uint8_t *b2, size_t len) {
+    size_t i;
+    uint8_t d = 0U;
+
+    for (i = 0U; i < len; i++) {
+        d |= b1[i] ^ b2[i];
+    }
+    return (int)((1 & ((d - 1) >> 8)) - 1);
+}
+
+int argon2_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                  argon2_type type) {
+
+    argon2_context ctx;
+    uint8_t *desired_result = NULL;
+
+    int ret = ARGON2_OK;
+
+    size_t encoded_len;
+    uint32_t max_field_len;
+
+    if (pwdlen > ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH) {
+        return ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG;
+    }
+
+    if (encoded == NULL) {
+        return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    encoded_len = strlen(encoded);
+    if (encoded_len > UINT32_MAX) {
+        return ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* No field can be longer than the encoded length */
+    /* coverity[strlen_assign] */
+    max_field_len = (uint32_t)encoded_len;
+
+    ctx.saltlen = max_field_len;
+    ctx.outlen = max_field_len;
+
+    ctx.salt = malloc(ctx.saltlen);
+    ctx.out = malloc(ctx.outlen);
+    if (!ctx.salt || !ctx.out) {
+        ret = ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ctx.pwd = CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)pwd;
+    ctx.pwdlen = (uint32_t)pwdlen;
+
+    ret = decode_string(&ctx, encoded, type);
+    if (ret != ARGON2_OK) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    /* Set aside the desired result, and get a new buffer. */
+    desired_result = ctx.out;
+    ctx.out = malloc(ctx.outlen);
+    if (!ctx.out) {
+        ret = ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ret = argon2_verify_ctx(&ctx, (char *)desired_result, type);
+    if (ret != ARGON2_OK) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(ctx.salt);
+    free(ctx.out);
+    free(desired_result);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int argon2i_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen) {
+
+    return argon2_verify(encoded, pwd, pwdlen, Argon2_i);
+}
+
+int argon2d_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen) {
+
+    return argon2_verify(encoded, pwd, pwdlen, Argon2_d);
+}
+
+int argon2id_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen) {
+
+    return argon2_verify(encoded, pwd, pwdlen, Argon2_id);
+}
+
+int argon2d_ctx(argon2_context *context) {
+    return argon2_ctx(context, Argon2_d);
+}
+
+int argon2i_ctx(argon2_context *context) {
+    return argon2_ctx(context, Argon2_i);
+}
+
+int argon2id_ctx(argon2_context *context) {
+    return argon2_ctx(context, Argon2_id);
+}
+
+int argon2_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash,
+                      argon2_type type) {
+    int ret = argon2_ctx(context, type);
+    if (ret != ARGON2_OK) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (argon2_compare(CONST_CAST(uint8_t *)hash, context->out, context->outlen)) {
+        return ARGON2_VERIFY_MISMATCH;
+    }
+
+    return ARGON2_OK;
+}
+
+int argon2d_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash) {
+    return argon2_verify_ctx(context, hash, Argon2_d);
+}
+
+int argon2i_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash) {
+    return argon2_verify_ctx(context, hash, Argon2_i);
+}
+
+int argon2id_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash) {
+    return argon2_verify_ctx(context, hash, Argon2_id);
+}
+
+const char *argon2_error_message(int error_code) {
+    switch (error_code) {
+    case ARGON2_OK:
+        return "OK";
+    case ARGON2_OUTPUT_PTR_NULL:
+        return "Output pointer is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Output is too short";
+    case ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Output is too long";
+    case ARGON2_PWD_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Password is too short";
+    case ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Password is too long";
+    case ARGON2_SALT_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Salt is too short";
+    case ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Salt is too long";
+    case ARGON2_AD_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Associated data is too short";
+    case ARGON2_AD_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Associated data is too long";
+    case ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_SHORT:
+        return "Secret is too short";
+    case ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_LONG:
+        return "Secret is too long";
+    case ARGON2_TIME_TOO_SMALL:
+        return "Time cost is too small";
+    case ARGON2_TIME_TOO_LARGE:
+        return "Time cost is too large";
+    case ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_LITTLE:
+        return "Memory cost is too small";
+    case ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_MUCH:
+        return "Memory cost is too large";
+    case ARGON2_LANES_TOO_FEW:
+        return "Too few lanes";
+    case ARGON2_LANES_TOO_MANY:
+        return "Too many lanes";
+    case ARGON2_PWD_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Password pointer is NULL, but password length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_SALT_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Salt pointer is NULL, but salt length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_SECRET_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Secret pointer is NULL, but secret length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_AD_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Associated data pointer is NULL, but ad length is not 0";
+    case ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR:
+        return "Memory allocation error";
+    case ARGON2_FREE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL:
+        return "The free memory callback is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_ALLOCATE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL:
+        return "The allocate memory callback is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER:
+        return "Argon2_Context context is NULL";
+    case ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE:
+        return "There is no such version of Argon2";
+    case ARGON2_OUT_PTR_MISMATCH:
+        return "Output pointer mismatch";
+    case ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_FEW:
+        return "Not enough threads";
+    case ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_MANY:
+        return "Too many threads";
+    case ARGON2_MISSING_ARGS:
+        return "Missing arguments";
+    case ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL:
+        return "Encoding failed";
+    case ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL:
+        return "Decoding failed";
+    case ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL:
+        return "Threading failure";
+    case ARGON2_DECODING_LENGTH_FAIL:
+        return "Some of encoded parameters are too long or too short";
+    case ARGON2_VERIFY_MISMATCH:
+        return "The password does not match the supplied hash";
+    default:
+        return "Unknown error code";
+    }
+}
+
+size_t argon2_encodedlen(uint32_t t_cost, uint32_t m_cost, uint32_t parallelism,
+                         uint32_t saltlen, uint32_t hashlen, argon2_type type) {
+  if (!argon2_type2string(type, 0))
+      return 0;
+  return strlen("$$v=$m=,t=,p=$$") + strlen(argon2_type2string(type, 0)) +
+         numlen(t_cost) + numlen(m_cost) + numlen(parallelism) +
+         b64len(saltlen) + b64len(hashlen) + numlen(ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER) + 1;
+}

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/argon2.h

@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ARGON2_H
+#define ARGON2_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Symbols visibility control */
+#ifdef A2_VISCTL
+#define ARGON2_PUBLIC __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+#define ARGON2_LOCAL __attribute__ ((visibility ("hidden")))
+#elif _MSC_VER
+#define ARGON2_PUBLIC __declspec(dllexport)
+#define ARGON2_LOCAL
+#else
+#define ARGON2_PUBLIC
+#define ARGON2_LOCAL
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Argon2 input parameter restrictions
+ */
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of lanes (degree of parallelism) */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_LANES UINT32_C(1)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_LANES UINT32_C(0xFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of threads */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_THREADS UINT32_C(1)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_THREADS UINT32_C(0xFFFFFF)
+
+/* Number of synchronization points between lanes per pass */
+#define ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS UINT32_C(4)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum digest size in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_OUTLEN UINT32_C(4)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_OUTLEN UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of memory blocks (each of BLOCK_SIZE bytes) */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_MEMORY (2 * ARGON2_SYNC_POINTS) /* 2 blocks per slice */
+
+#define ARGON2_MIN(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
+/* Max memory size is addressing-space/2, topping at 2^32 blocks (4 TB) */
+#define ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY_BITS                                                 \
+    ARGON2_MIN(UINT32_C(32), (sizeof(void *) * CHAR_BIT - 10 - 1))
+#define ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY                                                      \
+    ARGON2_MIN(UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF), UINT64_C(1) << ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY_BITS)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum number of passes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_TIME UINT32_C(1)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_TIME UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum password length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_PWD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_PWD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum associated data length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_AD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_AD_LENGTH UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum salt length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_SALT_LENGTH UINT32_C(8)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_SALT_LENGTH UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Minimum and maximum key length in bytes */
+#define ARGON2_MIN_SECRET UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_MAX_SECRET UINT32_C(0xFFFFFFFF)
+
+/* Flags to determine which fields are securely wiped (default = no wipe). */
+#define ARGON2_DEFAULT_FLAGS UINT32_C(0)
+#define ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_PASSWORD (UINT32_C(1) << 0)
+#define ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_SECRET (UINT32_C(1) << 1)
+
+/* Global flag to determine if we are wiping internal memory buffers. This flag
+ * is defined in core.c and defaults to 1 (wipe internal memory). */
+extern int FLAG_clear_internal_memory;
+
+/* Error codes */
+typedef enum Argon2_ErrorCodes {
+    ARGON2_OK = 0,
+
+    ARGON2_OUTPUT_PTR_NULL = -1,
+
+    ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_SHORT = -2,
+    ARGON2_OUTPUT_TOO_LONG = -3,
+
+    ARGON2_PWD_TOO_SHORT = -4,
+    ARGON2_PWD_TOO_LONG = -5,
+
+    ARGON2_SALT_TOO_SHORT = -6,
+    ARGON2_SALT_TOO_LONG = -7,
+
+    ARGON2_AD_TOO_SHORT = -8,
+    ARGON2_AD_TOO_LONG = -9,
+
+    ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_SHORT = -10,
+    ARGON2_SECRET_TOO_LONG = -11,
+
+    ARGON2_TIME_TOO_SMALL = -12,
+    ARGON2_TIME_TOO_LARGE = -13,
+
+    ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_LITTLE = -14,
+    ARGON2_MEMORY_TOO_MUCH = -15,
+
+    ARGON2_LANES_TOO_FEW = -16,
+    ARGON2_LANES_TOO_MANY = -17,
+
+    ARGON2_PWD_PTR_MISMATCH = -18,    /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+    ARGON2_SALT_PTR_MISMATCH = -19,   /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+    ARGON2_SECRET_PTR_MISMATCH = -20, /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+    ARGON2_AD_PTR_MISMATCH = -21,     /* NULL ptr with non-zero length */
+
+    ARGON2_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR = -22,
+
+    ARGON2_FREE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL = -23,
+    ARGON2_ALLOCATE_MEMORY_CBK_NULL = -24,
+
+    ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER = -25,
+    ARGON2_INCORRECT_TYPE = -26,
+
+    ARGON2_OUT_PTR_MISMATCH = -27,
+
+    ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_FEW = -28,
+    ARGON2_THREADS_TOO_MANY = -29,
+
+    ARGON2_MISSING_ARGS = -30,
+
+    ARGON2_ENCODING_FAIL = -31,
+
+    ARGON2_DECODING_FAIL = -32,
+
+    ARGON2_THREAD_FAIL = -33,
+
+    ARGON2_DECODING_LENGTH_FAIL = -34,
+
+    ARGON2_VERIFY_MISMATCH = -35
+} argon2_error_codes;
+
+/* Memory allocator types --- for external allocation */
+typedef int (*allocate_fptr)(uint8_t **memory, size_t bytes_to_allocate);
+typedef void (*deallocate_fptr)(uint8_t *memory, size_t bytes_to_allocate);
+
+/* Argon2 external data structures */
+
+/*
+ *****
+ * Context: structure to hold Argon2 inputs:
+ *  output array and its length,
+ *  password and its length,
+ *  salt and its length,
+ *  secret and its length,
+ *  associated data and its length,
+ *  number of passes, amount of used memory (in KBytes, can be rounded up a bit)
+ *  number of parallel threads that will be run.
+ * All the parameters above affect the output hash value.
+ * Additionally, two function pointers can be provided to allocate and
+ * deallocate the memory (if NULL, memory will be allocated internally).
+ * Also, three flags indicate whether to erase password, secret as soon as they
+ * are pre-hashed (and thus not needed anymore), and the entire memory
+ *****
+ * Simplest situation: you have output array out[8], password is stored in
+ * pwd[32], salt is stored in salt[16], you do not have keys nor associated
+ * data. You need to spend 1 GB of RAM and you run 5 passes of Argon2d with
+ * 4 parallel lanes.
+ * You want to erase the password, but you're OK with last pass not being
+ * erased. You want to use the default memory allocator.
+ * Then you initialize:
+ Argon2_Context(out,8,pwd,32,salt,16,NULL,0,NULL,0,5,1<<20,4,4,NULL,NULL,true,false,false,false)
+ */
+typedef struct Argon2_Context {
+    uint8_t *out;    /* output array */
+    uint32_t outlen; /* digest length */
+
+    uint8_t *pwd;    /* password array */
+    uint32_t pwdlen; /* password length */
+
+    uint8_t *salt;    /* salt array */
+    uint32_t saltlen; /* salt length */
+
+    uint8_t *secret;    /* key array */
+    uint32_t secretlen; /* key length */
+
+    uint8_t *ad;    /* associated data array */
+    uint32_t adlen; /* associated data length */
+
+    uint32_t t_cost;  /* number of passes */
+    uint32_t m_cost;  /* amount of memory requested (KB) */
+    uint32_t lanes;   /* number of lanes */
+    uint32_t threads; /* maximum number of threads */
+
+    uint32_t version; /* version number */
+
+    allocate_fptr allocate_cbk; /* pointer to memory allocator */
+    deallocate_fptr free_cbk;   /* pointer to memory deallocator */
+
+    uint32_t flags; /* array of bool options */
+} argon2_context;
+
+/* Argon2 primitive type */
+typedef enum Argon2_type {
+  Argon2_d = 0,
+  Argon2_i = 1,
+  Argon2_id = 2
+} argon2_type;
+
+/* Version of the algorithm */
+typedef enum Argon2_version {
+    ARGON2_VERSION_10 = 0x10,
+    ARGON2_VERSION_13 = 0x13,
+    ARGON2_VERSION_NUMBER = ARGON2_VERSION_13
+} argon2_version;
+
+/*
+ * Function that gives the string representation of an argon2_type.
+ * @param type The argon2_type that we want the string for
+ * @param uppercase Whether the string should have the first letter uppercase
+ * @return NULL if invalid type, otherwise the string representation.
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC const char *argon2_type2string(argon2_type type, int uppercase);
+
+/*
+ * Function that performs memory-hard hashing with certain degree of parallelism
+ * @param  context  Pointer to the Argon2 internal structure
+ * @return Error code if smth is wrong, ARGON2_OK otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_ctx(argon2_context *context, argon2_type type);
+
+/**
+ * Hashes a password with Argon2i, producing an encoded hash
+ * @param t_cost Number of iterations
+ * @param m_cost Sets memory usage to m_cost kibibytes
+ * @param parallelism Number of threads and compute lanes
+ * @param pwd Pointer to password
+ * @param pwdlen Password size in bytes
+ * @param salt Pointer to salt
+ * @param saltlen Salt size in bytes
+ * @param hashlen Desired length of the hash in bytes
+ * @param encoded Buffer where to write the encoded hash
+ * @param encodedlen Size of the buffer (thus max size of the encoded hash)
+ * @pre   Different parallelism levels will give different results
+ * @pre   Returns ARGON2_OK if successful
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t parallelism,
+                                       const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                                       const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                                       const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                                       const size_t encodedlen);
+
+/**
+ * Hashes a password with Argon2i, producing a raw hash at @hash
+ * @param t_cost Number of iterations
+ * @param m_cost Sets memory usage to m_cost kibibytes
+ * @param parallelism Number of threads and compute lanes
+ * @param pwd Pointer to password
+ * @param pwdlen Password size in bytes
+ * @param salt Pointer to salt
+ * @param saltlen Salt size in bytes
+ * @param hash Buffer where to write the raw hash - updated by the function
+ * @param hashlen Desired length of the hash in bytes
+ * @pre   Different parallelism levels will give different results
+ * @pre   Returns ARGON2_OK if successful
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                   const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                                   const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                                   const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                                   const size_t hashlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                       const uint32_t parallelism,
+                                       const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                                       const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                                       const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                                       const size_t encodedlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                   const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                                   const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                                   const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                                   const size_t hashlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_hash_encoded(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                        const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                        const uint32_t parallelism,
+                                        const void *pwd, const size_t pwdlen,
+                                        const void *salt, const size_t saltlen,
+                                        const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                                        const size_t encodedlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_hash_raw(const uint32_t t_cost,
+                                    const uint32_t m_cost,
+                                    const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                                    const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                                    const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                                    const size_t hashlen);
+
+/* generic function underlying the above ones */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_hash(const uint32_t t_cost, const uint32_t m_cost,
+                              const uint32_t parallelism, const void *pwd,
+                              const size_t pwdlen, const void *salt,
+                              const size_t saltlen, void *hash,
+                              const size_t hashlen, char *encoded,
+                              const size_t encodedlen, argon2_type type,
+                              const uint32_t version);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a password against an encoded string
+ * Encoded string is restricted as in validate_inputs()
+ * @param encoded String encoding parameters, salt, hash
+ * @param pwd Pointer to password
+ * @pre   Returns ARGON2_OK if successful
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                 const size_t pwdlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                 const size_t pwdlen);
+
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                  const size_t pwdlen);
+
+/* generic function underlying the above ones */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_verify(const char *encoded, const void *pwd,
+                                const size_t pwdlen, argon2_type type);
+
+/**
+ * Argon2d: Version of Argon2 that picks memory blocks depending
+ * on the password and salt. Only for side-channel-free
+ * environment!!
+ *****
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_ctx(argon2_context *context);
+
+/**
+ * Argon2i: Version of Argon2 that picks memory blocks
+ * independent on the password and salt. Good for side-channels,
+ * but worse w.r.t. tradeoff attacks if only one pass is used.
+ *****
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_ctx(argon2_context *context);
+
+/**
+ * Argon2id: Version of Argon2 where the first half-pass over memory is
+ * password-independent, the rest are password-dependent (on the password and
+ * salt). OK against side channels (they reduce to 1/2-pass Argon2i), and
+ * better with w.r.t. tradeoff attacks (similar to Argon2d).
+ *****
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_ctx(argon2_context *context);
+
+/**
+ * Verify if a given password is correct for Argon2d hashing
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @param  hash  The password hash to verify. The length of the hash is
+ * specified by the context outlen member
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2d_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash);
+
+/**
+ * Verify if a given password is correct for Argon2i hashing
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @param  hash  The password hash to verify. The length of the hash is
+ * specified by the context outlen member
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2i_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash);
+
+/**
+ * Verify if a given password is correct for Argon2id hashing
+ * @param  context  Pointer to current Argon2 context
+ * @param  hash  The password hash to verify. The length of the hash is
+ * specified by the context outlen member
+ * @return  Zero if successful, a non zero error code otherwise
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2id_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context,
+                                      const char *hash);
+
+/* generic function underlying the above ones */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC int argon2_verify_ctx(argon2_context *context, const char *hash,
+                                    argon2_type type);
+
+/**
+ * Get the associated error message for given error code
+ * @return  The error message associated with the given error code
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC const char *argon2_error_message(int error_code);
+
+/**
+ * Returns the encoded hash length for the given input parameters
+ * @param t_cost  Number of iterations
+ * @param m_cost  Memory usage in kibibytes
+ * @param parallelism  Number of threads; used to compute lanes
+ * @param saltlen  Salt size in bytes
+ * @param hashlen  Hash size in bytes
+ * @param type The argon2_type that we want the encoded length for
+ * @return  The encoded hash length in bytes
+ */
+ARGON2_PUBLIC size_t argon2_encodedlen(uint32_t t_cost, uint32_t m_cost,
+                                       uint32_t parallelism, uint32_t saltlen,
+                                       uint32_t hashlen, argon2_type type);
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2-impl.h

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PORTABLE_BLAKE2_IMPL_H
+#define PORTABLE_BLAKE2_IMPL_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#define BLAKE2_INLINE __inline
+#elif defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
+#define BLAKE2_INLINE __inline__
+#else
+#define BLAKE2_INLINE
+#endif
+
+/* Argon2 Team - Begin Code */
+/*
+   Not an exhaustive list, but should cover the majority of modern platforms
+   Additionally, the code will always be correct---this is only a performance
+   tweak.
+*/
+#if (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) &&                                                \
+     (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__)) ||                           \
+    defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) || defined(__ARMEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL__) || \
+    defined(__AARCH64EL__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__) ||       \
+    defined(_M_IX86) || defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_AMD64) ||                \
+    defined(_M_ARM)
+#define NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#endif
+/* Argon2 Team - End Code */
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint32_t load32(const void *src) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    uint32_t w;
+    memcpy(&w, src, sizeof w);
+    return w;
+#else
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)src;
+    uint32_t w = *p++;
+    w |= (uint32_t)(*p++) << 8;
+    w |= (uint32_t)(*p++) << 16;
+    w |= (uint32_t)(*p++) << 24;
+    return w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t load64(const void *src) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    uint64_t w;
+    memcpy(&w, src, sizeof w);
+    return w;
+#else
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)src;
+    uint64_t w = *p++;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 8;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 16;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 24;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 32;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 40;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 48;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 56;
+    return w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void store32(void *dst, uint32_t w) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    memcpy(dst, &w, sizeof w);
+#else
+    uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void store64(void *dst, uint64_t w) {
+#if defined(NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+    memcpy(dst, &w, sizeof w);
+#else
+    uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+#endif
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t load48(const void *src) {
+    const uint8_t *p = (const uint8_t *)src;
+    uint64_t w = *p++;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 8;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 16;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 24;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 32;
+    w |= (uint64_t)(*p++) << 40;
+    return w;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void store48(void *dst, uint64_t w) {
+    uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)dst;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+    w >>= 8;
+    *p++ = (uint8_t)w;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint32_t rotr32(const uint32_t w, const unsigned c) {
+    return (w >> c) | (w << (32 - c));
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t rotr64(const uint64_t w, const unsigned c) {
+    return (w >> c) | (w << (64 - c));
+}
+
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2.h

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef PORTABLE_BLAKE2_H
+#define PORTABLE_BLAKE2_H
+
+#include "../argon2.h"
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+enum blake2b_constant {
+    BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES = 128,
+    BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES = 64,
+    BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES = 64,
+    BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES = 16,
+    BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES = 16
+};
+
+#pragma pack(push, 1)
+typedef struct __blake2b_param {
+    uint8_t digest_length;                   /* 1 */
+    uint8_t key_length;                      /* 2 */
+    uint8_t fanout;                          /* 3 */
+    uint8_t depth;                           /* 4 */
+    uint32_t leaf_length;                    /* 8 */
+    uint64_t node_offset;                    /* 16 */
+    uint8_t node_depth;                      /* 17 */
+    uint8_t inner_length;                    /* 18 */
+    uint8_t reserved[14];                    /* 32 */
+    uint8_t salt[BLAKE2B_SALTBYTES];         /* 48 */
+    uint8_t personal[BLAKE2B_PERSONALBYTES]; /* 64 */
+} blake2b_param;
+#pragma pack(pop)
+
+typedef struct __blake2b_state {
+    uint64_t h[8];
+    uint64_t t[2];
+    uint64_t f[2];
+    uint8_t buf[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES];
+    unsigned buflen;
+    unsigned outlen;
+    uint8_t last_node;
+} blake2b_state;
+
+/* Ensure param structs have not been wrongly padded */
+/* Poor man's static_assert */
+enum {
+    blake2_size_check_0 = 1 / !!(CHAR_BIT == 8),
+    blake2_size_check_2 =
+        1 / !!(sizeof(blake2b_param) == sizeof(uint64_t) * CHAR_BIT)
+};
+
+/* Streaming API */
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_init(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen);
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_init_key(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key,
+                     size_t keylen);
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_init_param(blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P);
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_update(blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen);
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_final(blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen);
+
+/* Simple API */
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b(void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen,
+                         const void *key, size_t keylen);
+
+/* Argon2 Team - Begin Code */
+ARGON2_LOCAL int blake2b_long(void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen);
+/* Argon2 Team - End Code */
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blake2b.c

@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "blake2.h"
+#include "blake2-impl.h"
+
+void clear_internal_memory(void *v, size_t n);
+
+static const uint64_t blake2b_IV[8] = {
+    UINT64_C(0x6a09e667f3bcc908), UINT64_C(0xbb67ae8584caa73b),
+    UINT64_C(0x3c6ef372fe94f82b), UINT64_C(0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1),
+    UINT64_C(0x510e527fade682d1), UINT64_C(0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f),
+    UINT64_C(0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b), UINT64_C(0x5be0cd19137e2179)};
+
+static const unsigned int blake2b_sigma[12][16] = {
+    {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
+    {14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3},
+    {11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4},
+    {7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8},
+    {9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13},
+    {2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9},
+    {12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11},
+    {13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10},
+    {6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5},
+    {10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0},
+    {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
+    {14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3},
+};
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_set_lastnode(blake2b_state *S) {
+    S->f[1] = (uint64_t)-1;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_set_lastblock(blake2b_state *S) {
+    if (S->last_node) {
+        blake2b_set_lastnode(S);
+    }
+    S->f[0] = (uint64_t)-1;
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_increment_counter(blake2b_state *S,
+                                                    uint64_t inc) {
+    S->t[0] += inc;
+    S->t[1] += (S->t[0] < inc);
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_invalidate_state(blake2b_state *S) {
+    clear_internal_memory(S, sizeof(*S));      /* wipe */
+    blake2b_set_lastblock(S); /* invalidate for further use */
+}
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE void blake2b_init0(blake2b_state *S) {
+    memset(S, 0, sizeof(*S));
+    memcpy(S->h, blake2b_IV, sizeof(S->h));
+}
+
+int blake2b_init_param(blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P) {
+    const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *)P;
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    if (NULL == P || NULL == S) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    blake2b_init0(S);
+    /* IV XOR Parameter Block */
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        S->h[i] ^= load64(&p[i * sizeof(S->h[i])]);
+    }
+    S->outlen = P->digest_length;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Sequential blake2b initialization */
+int blake2b_init(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen) {
+    blake2b_param P;
+
+    if (S == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((outlen == 0) || (outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup Parameter Block for unkeyed BLAKE2 */
+    P.digest_length = (uint8_t)outlen;
+    P.key_length = 0;
+    P.fanout = 1;
+    P.depth = 1;
+    P.leaf_length = 0;
+    P.node_offset = 0;
+    P.node_depth = 0;
+    P.inner_length = 0;
+    memset(P.reserved, 0, sizeof(P.reserved));
+    memset(P.salt, 0, sizeof(P.salt));
+    memset(P.personal, 0, sizeof(P.personal));
+
+    return blake2b_init_param(S, &P);
+}
+
+int blake2b_init_key(blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key,
+                     size_t keylen) {
+    blake2b_param P;
+
+    if (S == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((outlen == 0) || (outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((key == 0) || (keylen == 0) || (keylen > BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup Parameter Block for keyed BLAKE2 */
+    P.digest_length = (uint8_t)outlen;
+    P.key_length = (uint8_t)keylen;
+    P.fanout = 1;
+    P.depth = 1;
+    P.leaf_length = 0;
+    P.node_offset = 0;
+    P.node_depth = 0;
+    P.inner_length = 0;
+    memset(P.reserved, 0, sizeof(P.reserved));
+    memset(P.salt, 0, sizeof(P.salt));
+    memset(P.personal, 0, sizeof(P.personal));
+
+    if (blake2b_init_param(S, &P) < 0) {
+        blake2b_invalidate_state(S);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    {
+        uint8_t block[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES];
+        memset(block, 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+        memcpy(block, key, keylen);
+        blake2b_update(S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+        /* Burn the key from stack */
+        clear_internal_memory(block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void blake2b_compress(blake2b_state *S, const uint8_t *block) {
+    uint64_t m[16];
+    uint64_t v[16];
+    unsigned int i, r;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+        m[i] = load64(block + i * sizeof(m[i]));
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        v[i] = S->h[i];
+    }
+
+    v[8] = blake2b_IV[0];
+    v[9] = blake2b_IV[1];
+    v[10] = blake2b_IV[2];
+    v[11] = blake2b_IV[3];
+    v[12] = blake2b_IV[4] ^ S->t[0];
+    v[13] = blake2b_IV[5] ^ S->t[1];
+    v[14] = blake2b_IV[6] ^ S->f[0];
+    v[15] = blake2b_IV[7] ^ S->f[1];
+
+#define G(r, i, a, b, c, d)                                                    \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        a = a + b + m[blake2b_sigma[r][2 * i + 0]];                            \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 32);                                                 \
+        c = c + d;                                                             \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 24);                                                 \
+        a = a + b + m[blake2b_sigma[r][2 * i + 1]];                            \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 16);                                                 \
+        c = c + d;                                                             \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 63);                                                 \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define ROUND(r)                                                               \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        G(r, 0, v[0], v[4], v[8], v[12]);                                      \
+        G(r, 1, v[1], v[5], v[9], v[13]);                                      \
+        G(r, 2, v[2], v[6], v[10], v[14]);                                     \
+        G(r, 3, v[3], v[7], v[11], v[15]);                                     \
+        G(r, 4, v[0], v[5], v[10], v[15]);                                     \
+        G(r, 5, v[1], v[6], v[11], v[12]);                                     \
+        G(r, 6, v[2], v[7], v[8], v[13]);                                      \
+        G(r, 7, v[3], v[4], v[9], v[14]);                                      \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+    for (r = 0; r < 12; ++r) {
+        ROUND(r);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
+        S->h[i] = S->h[i] ^ v[i] ^ v[i + 8];
+    }
+
+#undef G
+#undef ROUND
+}
+
+int blake2b_update(blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen) {
+    const uint8_t *pin = (const uint8_t *)in;
+
+    if (inlen == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Sanity check */
+    if (S == NULL || in == NULL) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Is this a reused state? */
+    if (S->f[0] != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (S->buflen + inlen > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES) {
+        /* Complete current block */
+        size_t left = S->buflen;
+        size_t fill = BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES - left;
+        memcpy(&S->buf[left], pin, fill);
+        blake2b_increment_counter(S, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+        blake2b_compress(S, S->buf);
+        S->buflen = 0;
+        inlen -= fill;
+        pin += fill;
+        /* Avoid buffer copies when possible */
+        while (inlen > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES) {
+            blake2b_increment_counter(S, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES);
+            blake2b_compress(S, pin);
+            inlen -= BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;
+            pin += BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;
+        }
+    }
+    memcpy(&S->buf[S->buflen], pin, inlen);
+    S->buflen += (unsigned int)inlen;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int blake2b_final(blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen) {
+    uint8_t buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES] = {0};
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    /* Sanity checks */
+    if (S == NULL || out == NULL || outlen < S->outlen) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Is this a reused state? */
+    if (S->f[0] != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    blake2b_increment_counter(S, S->buflen);
+    blake2b_set_lastblock(S);
+    memset(&S->buf[S->buflen], 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES - S->buflen); /* Padding */
+    blake2b_compress(S, S->buf);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { /* Output full hash to temp buffer */
+        store64(buffer + sizeof(S->h[i]) * i, S->h[i]);
+    }
+
+    memcpy(out, buffer, S->outlen);
+    clear_internal_memory(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+    clear_internal_memory(S->buf, sizeof(S->buf));
+    clear_internal_memory(S->h, sizeof(S->h));
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int blake2b(void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen,
+            const void *key, size_t keylen) {
+    blake2b_state S;
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    /* Verify parameters */
+    if (NULL == in && inlen > 0) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if (NULL == out || outlen == 0 || outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if ((NULL == key && keylen > 0) || keylen > BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if (keylen > 0) {
+        if (blake2b_init_key(&S, outlen, key, keylen) < 0) {
+            goto fail;
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (blake2b_init(&S, outlen) < 0) {
+            goto fail;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (blake2b_update(&S, in, inlen) < 0) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ret = blake2b_final(&S, out, outlen);
+
+fail:
+    clear_internal_memory(&S, sizeof(S));
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Argon2 Team - Begin Code */
+int blake2b_long(void *pout, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen) {
+    uint8_t *out = (uint8_t *)pout;
+    blake2b_state blake_state;
+    uint8_t outlen_bytes[sizeof(uint32_t)] = {0};
+    int ret = -1;
+
+    if (outlen > UINT32_MAX) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    /* Ensure little-endian byte order! */
+    store32(outlen_bytes, (uint32_t)outlen);
+
+#define TRY(statement)                                                         \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        ret = statement;                                                       \
+        if (ret < 0) {                                                         \
+            goto fail;                                                         \
+        }                                                                      \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+    if (outlen <= BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {
+        TRY(blake2b_init(&blake_state, outlen));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes)));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen));
+        TRY(blake2b_final(&blake_state, out, outlen));
+    } else {
+        uint32_t toproduce;
+        uint8_t out_buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];
+        uint8_t in_buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];
+        TRY(blake2b_init(&blake_state, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes)));
+        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen));
+        TRY(blake2b_final(&blake_state, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES));
+        memcpy(out, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2);
+        out += BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+        toproduce = (uint32_t)outlen - BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+
+        while (toproduce > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {
+            memcpy(in_buffer, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES);
+            TRY(blake2b(out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in_buffer,
+                        BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL, 0));
+            memcpy(out, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2);
+            out += BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+            toproduce -= BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;
+        }
+
+        memcpy(in_buffer, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES);
+        TRY(blake2b(out_buffer, toproduce, in_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL,
+                    0));
+        memcpy(out, out_buffer, toproduce);
+    }
+fail:
+    clear_internal_memory(&blake_state, sizeof(blake_state));
+    return ret;
+#undef TRY
+}
+/* Argon2 Team - End Code */

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-opt.h

@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_OPT_H
+#define BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_OPT_H
+
+#include "blake2-impl.h"
+
+#include <emmintrin.h>
+#if defined(__SSSE3__)
+#include <tmmintrin.h> /* for _mm_shuffle_epi8 and _mm_alignr_epi8 */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__XOP__) && (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__))
+#include <x86intrin.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(__AVX512F__)
+#if !defined(__AVX2__)
+#if !defined(__XOP__)
+#if defined(__SSSE3__)
+#define r16                                                                    \
+    (_mm_setr_epi8(2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9))
+#define r24                                                                    \
+    (_mm_setr_epi8(3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 10))
+#define _mm_roti_epi64(x, c)                                                   \
+    (-(c) == 32)                                                               \
+        ? _mm_shuffle_epi32((x), _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 3, 0, 1))                      \
+        : (-(c) == 24)                                                         \
+              ? _mm_shuffle_epi8((x), r24)                                     \
+              : (-(c) == 16)                                                   \
+                    ? _mm_shuffle_epi8((x), r16)                               \
+                    : (-(c) == 63)                                             \
+                          ? _mm_xor_si128(_mm_srli_epi64((x), -(c)),           \
+                                          _mm_add_epi64((x), (x)))             \
+                          : _mm_xor_si128(_mm_srli_epi64((x), -(c)),           \
+                                          _mm_slli_epi64((x), 64 - (-(c))))
+#else /* defined(__SSE2__) */
+#define _mm_roti_epi64(r, c)                                                   \
+    _mm_xor_si128(_mm_srli_epi64((r), -(c)), _mm_slli_epi64((r), 64 - (-(c))))
+#endif
+#else
+#endif
+
+static BLAKE2_INLINE __m128i fBlaMka(__m128i x, __m128i y) {
+    const __m128i z = _mm_mul_epu32(x, y);
+    return _mm_add_epi64(_mm_add_epi64(x, y), _mm_add_epi64(z, z));
+}
+
+#define G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                                     \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        A0 = fBlaMka(A0, B0);                                                  \
+        A1 = fBlaMka(A1, B1);                                                  \
+                                                                               \
+        D0 = _mm_xor_si128(D0, A0);                                            \
+        D1 = _mm_xor_si128(D1, A1);                                            \
+                                                                               \
+        D0 = _mm_roti_epi64(D0, -32);                                          \
+        D1 = _mm_roti_epi64(D1, -32);                                          \
+                                                                               \
+        C0 = fBlaMka(C0, D0);                                                  \
+        C1 = fBlaMka(C1, D1);                                                  \
+                                                                               \
+        B0 = _mm_xor_si128(B0, C0);                                            \
+        B1 = _mm_xor_si128(B1, C1);                                            \
+                                                                               \
+        B0 = _mm_roti_epi64(B0, -24);                                          \
+        B1 = _mm_roti_epi64(B1, -24);                                          \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                                     \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        A0 = fBlaMka(A0, B0);                                                  \
+        A1 = fBlaMka(A1, B1);                                                  \
+                                                                               \
+        D0 = _mm_xor_si128(D0, A0);                                            \
+        D1 = _mm_xor_si128(D1, A1);                                            \
+                                                                               \
+        D0 = _mm_roti_epi64(D0, -16);                                          \
+        D1 = _mm_roti_epi64(D1, -16);                                          \
+                                                                               \
+        C0 = fBlaMka(C0, D0);                                                  \
+        C1 = fBlaMka(C1, D1);                                                  \
+                                                                               \
+        B0 = _mm_xor_si128(B0, C0);                                            \
+        B1 = _mm_xor_si128(B1, C1);                                            \
+                                                                               \
+        B0 = _mm_roti_epi64(B0, -63);                                          \
+        B1 = _mm_roti_epi64(B1, -63);                                          \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#if defined(__SSSE3__)
+#define DIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                            \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        __m128i t0 = _mm_alignr_epi8(B1, B0, 8);                               \
+        __m128i t1 = _mm_alignr_epi8(B0, B1, 8);                               \
+        B0 = t0;                                                               \
+        B1 = t1;                                                               \
+                                                                               \
+        t0 = C0;                                                               \
+        C0 = C1;                                                               \
+        C1 = t0;                                                               \
+                                                                               \
+        t0 = _mm_alignr_epi8(D1, D0, 8);                                       \
+        t1 = _mm_alignr_epi8(D0, D1, 8);                                       \
+        D0 = t1;                                                               \
+        D1 = t0;                                                               \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define UNDIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                          \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        __m128i t0 = _mm_alignr_epi8(B0, B1, 8);                               \
+        __m128i t1 = _mm_alignr_epi8(B1, B0, 8);                               \
+        B0 = t0;                                                               \
+        B1 = t1;                                                               \
+                                                                               \
+        t0 = C0;                                                               \
+        C0 = C1;                                                               \
+        C1 = t0;                                                               \
+                                                                               \
+        t0 = _mm_alignr_epi8(D0, D1, 8);                                       \
+        t1 = _mm_alignr_epi8(D1, D0, 8);                                       \
+        D0 = t1;                                                               \
+        D1 = t0;                                                               \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+#else /* SSE2 */
+#define DIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                            \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        __m128i t0 = D0;                                                       \
+        __m128i t1 = B0;                                                       \
+        D0 = C0;                                                               \
+        C0 = C1;                                                               \
+        C1 = D0;                                                               \
+        D0 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(D1, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(t0, t0));               \
+        D1 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(t0, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(D1, D1));               \
+        B0 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(B0, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(B1, B1));               \
+        B1 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(B1, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(t1, t1));               \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define UNDIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1)                          \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        __m128i t0, t1;                                                        \
+        t0 = C0;                                                               \
+        C0 = C1;                                                               \
+        C1 = t0;                                                               \
+        t0 = B0;                                                               \
+        t1 = D0;                                                               \
+        B0 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(B1, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(B0, B0));               \
+        B1 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(t0, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(B1, B1));               \
+        D0 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(D0, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(D1, D1));               \
+        D1 = _mm_unpackhi_epi64(D1, _mm_unpacklo_epi64(t1, t1));               \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+#endif
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1)                           \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                                    \
+        G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                                    \
+                                                                               \
+        DIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                           \
+                                                                               \
+        G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                                    \
+        G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                                    \
+                                                                               \
+        UNDIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1);                         \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+#else /* __AVX2__ */
+
+#include <immintrin.h>
+
+#define rotr32(x)   _mm256_shuffle_epi32(x, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 3, 0, 1))
+#define rotr24(x)   _mm256_shuffle_epi8(x, _mm256_setr_epi8(3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 10, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 10))
+#define rotr16(x)   _mm256_shuffle_epi8(x, _mm256_setr_epi8(2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 0, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8, 9))
+#define rotr63(x)   _mm256_xor_si256(_mm256_srli_epi64((x), 63), _mm256_add_epi64((x), (x)))
+
+#define G1_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do { \
+        __m256i ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(A0, B0); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        A0 = _mm256_add_epi64(A0, _mm256_add_epi64(B0, ml)); \
+        D0 = _mm256_xor_si256(D0, A0); \
+        D0 = rotr32(D0); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(C0, D0); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        C0 = _mm256_add_epi64(C0, _mm256_add_epi64(D0, ml)); \
+        \
+        B0 = _mm256_xor_si256(B0, C0); \
+        B0 = rotr24(B0); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(A1, B1); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        A1 = _mm256_add_epi64(A1, _mm256_add_epi64(B1, ml)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_xor_si256(D1, A1); \
+        D1 = rotr32(D1); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(C1, D1); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        C1 = _mm256_add_epi64(C1, _mm256_add_epi64(D1, ml)); \
+        \
+        B1 = _mm256_xor_si256(B1, C1); \
+        B1 = rotr24(B1); \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define G2_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do { \
+        __m256i ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(A0, B0); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        A0 = _mm256_add_epi64(A0, _mm256_add_epi64(B0, ml)); \
+        D0 = _mm256_xor_si256(D0, A0); \
+        D0 = rotr16(D0); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(C0, D0); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        C0 = _mm256_add_epi64(C0, _mm256_add_epi64(D0, ml)); \
+        B0 = _mm256_xor_si256(B0, C0); \
+        B0 = rotr63(B0); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(A1, B1); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        A1 = _mm256_add_epi64(A1, _mm256_add_epi64(B1, ml)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_xor_si256(D1, A1); \
+        D1 = rotr16(D1); \
+        \
+        ml = _mm256_mul_epu32(C1, D1); \
+        ml = _mm256_add_epi64(ml, ml); \
+        C1 = _mm256_add_epi64(C1, _mm256_add_epi64(D1, ml)); \
+        B1 = _mm256_xor_si256(B1, C1); \
+        B1 = rotr63(B1); \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define DIAGONALIZE_1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        B0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(B0, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+        C0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(C0, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        D0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(D0, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+        \
+        B1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(B1, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+        C1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(C1, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(D1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define DIAGONALIZE_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do { \
+        __m256i tmp1 = _mm256_blend_epi32(B0, B1, 0xCC); \
+        __m256i tmp2 = _mm256_blend_epi32(B0, B1, 0x33); \
+        B1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        B0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp2, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        \
+        tmp1 = C0; \
+        C0 = C1; \
+        C1 = tmp1; \
+        \
+        tmp1 = _mm256_blend_epi32(D0, D1, 0xCC); \
+        tmp2 = _mm256_blend_epi32(D0, D1, 0x33); \
+        D0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp2, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+    } while(0);
+
+#define UNDIAGONALIZE_1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        B0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(B0, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+        C0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(C0, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        D0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(D0, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+        \
+        B1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(B1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+        C1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(C1, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(D1, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define UNDIAGONALIZE_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do { \
+        __m256i tmp1 = _mm256_blend_epi32(B0, B1, 0xCC); \
+        __m256i tmp2 = _mm256_blend_epi32(B0, B1, 0x33); \
+        B0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        B1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp2, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        \
+        tmp1 = C0; \
+        C0 = C1; \
+        C1 = tmp1; \
+        \
+        tmp1 = _mm256_blend_epi32(D0, D1, 0x33); \
+        tmp2 = _mm256_blend_epi32(D0, D1, 0xCC); \
+        D0 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+        D1 = _mm256_permute4x64_epi64(tmp2, _MM_SHUFFLE(2,3,0,1)); \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_1(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do{ \
+        G1_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        G2_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        \
+        DIAGONALIZE_1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+        \
+        G1_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        G2_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        \
+        UNDIAGONALIZE_1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do{ \
+        G1_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        G2_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        \
+        DIAGONALIZE_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        \
+        G1_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        G2_AVX2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+        \
+        UNDIAGONALIZE_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    } while((void)0, 0);
+
+#endif /* __AVX2__ */
+
+#else /* __AVX512F__ */
+
+#include <immintrin.h>
+
+#define ror64(x, n) _mm512_ror_epi64((x), (n))
+
+static __m512i muladd(__m512i x, __m512i y)
+{
+    __m512i z = _mm512_mul_epu32(x, y);
+    return _mm512_add_epi64(_mm512_add_epi64(x, y), _mm512_add_epi64(z, z));
+}
+
+#define G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        A0 = muladd(A0, B0); \
+        A1 = muladd(A1, B1); \
+\
+        D0 = _mm512_xor_si512(D0, A0); \
+        D1 = _mm512_xor_si512(D1, A1); \
+\
+        D0 = ror64(D0, 32); \
+        D1 = ror64(D1, 32); \
+\
+        C0 = muladd(C0, D0); \
+        C1 = muladd(C1, D1); \
+\
+        B0 = _mm512_xor_si512(B0, C0); \
+        B1 = _mm512_xor_si512(B1, C1); \
+\
+        B0 = ror64(B0, 24); \
+        B1 = ror64(B1, 24); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        A0 = muladd(A0, B0); \
+        A1 = muladd(A1, B1); \
+\
+        D0 = _mm512_xor_si512(D0, A0); \
+        D1 = _mm512_xor_si512(D1, A1); \
+\
+        D0 = ror64(D0, 16); \
+        D1 = ror64(D1, 16); \
+\
+        C0 = muladd(C0, D0); \
+        C1 = muladd(C1, D1); \
+\
+        B0 = _mm512_xor_si512(B0, C0); \
+        B1 = _mm512_xor_si512(B1, C1); \
+\
+        B0 = ror64(B0, 63); \
+        B1 = ror64(B1, 63); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define DIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        B0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(B0, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+        B1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(B1, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+\
+        C0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(C0, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        C1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(C1, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+\
+        D0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(D0, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+        D1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(D1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define UNDIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        B0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(B0, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+        B1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(B1, _MM_SHUFFLE(2, 1, 0, 3)); \
+\
+        C0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(C0, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+        C1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(C1, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 3, 2)); \
+\
+        D0 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(D0, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+        D1 = _mm512_permutex_epi64(D1, _MM_SHUFFLE(0, 3, 2, 1)); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+        G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+\
+        DIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+\
+        G1(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+        G2(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+\
+        UNDIAGONALIZE(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define SWAP_HALVES(A0, A1) \
+    do { \
+        __m512i t0, t1; \
+        t0 = _mm512_shuffle_i64x2(A0, A1, _MM_SHUFFLE(1, 0, 1, 0)); \
+        t1 = _mm512_shuffle_i64x2(A0, A1, _MM_SHUFFLE(3, 2, 3, 2)); \
+        A0 = t0; \
+        A1 = t1; \
+    } while((void)0, 0)
+
+#define SWAP_QUARTERS(A0, A1) \
+    do { \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A0, A1); \
+        A0 = _mm512_permutexvar_epi64(_mm512_setr_epi64(0, 1, 4, 5, 2, 3, 6, 7), A0); \
+        A1 = _mm512_permutexvar_epi64(_mm512_setr_epi64(0, 1, 4, 5, 2, 3, 6, 7), A1); \
+    } while((void)0, 0)
+
+#define UNSWAP_QUARTERS(A0, A1) \
+    do { \
+        A0 = _mm512_permutexvar_epi64(_mm512_setr_epi64(0, 1, 4, 5, 2, 3, 6, 7), A0); \
+        A1 = _mm512_permutexvar_epi64(_mm512_setr_epi64(0, 1, 4, 5, 2, 3, 6, 7), A1); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A0, A1); \
+    } while((void)0, 0)
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_1(A0, C0, B0, D0, A1, C1, B1, D1) \
+    do { \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A0, B0); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(C0, D0); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A1, B1); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(C1, D1); \
+        BLAKE2_ROUND(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A0, B0); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(C0, D0); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(A1, B1); \
+        SWAP_HALVES(C1, D1); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_2(A0, A1, B0, B1, C0, C1, D0, D1) \
+    do { \
+        SWAP_QUARTERS(A0, A1); \
+        SWAP_QUARTERS(B0, B1); \
+        SWAP_QUARTERS(C0, C1); \
+        SWAP_QUARTERS(D0, D1); \
+        BLAKE2_ROUND(A0, B0, C0, D0, A1, B1, C1, D1); \
+        UNSWAP_QUARTERS(A0, A1); \
+        UNSWAP_QUARTERS(B0, B1); \
+        UNSWAP_QUARTERS(C0, C1); \
+        UNSWAP_QUARTERS(D0, D1); \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#endif /* __AVX512F__ */
+#endif /* BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_OPT_H */

lib/crypto_backend/argon2/blake2/blamka-round-ref.h

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Argon2 reference source code package - reference C implementations
+ *
+ * Copyright 2015
+ * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves
+ *
+ * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0
+ * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of
+ * these licenses can be found at:
+ *
+ * - CC0 1.0 Universal : https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0
+ * - Apache 2.0        : https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of both of these licenses along with this
+ * software. If not, they may be obtained at the above URLs.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_H
+#define BLAKE_ROUND_MKA_H
+
+#include "blake2.h"
+#include "blake2-impl.h"
+
+/* designed by the Lyra PHC team */
+static BLAKE2_INLINE uint64_t fBlaMka(uint64_t x, uint64_t y) {
+    const uint64_t m = UINT64_C(0xFFFFFFFF);
+    const uint64_t xy = (x & m) * (y & m);
+    return x + y + 2 * xy;
+}
+
+#define G(a, b, c, d)                                                          \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        a = fBlaMka(a, b);                                                     \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 32);                                                 \
+        c = fBlaMka(c, d);                                                     \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 24);                                                 \
+        a = fBlaMka(a, b);                                                     \
+        d = rotr64(d ^ a, 16);                                                 \
+        c = fBlaMka(c, d);                                                     \
+        b = rotr64(b ^ c, 63);                                                 \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#define BLAKE2_ROUND_NOMSG(v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8, v9, v10, v11,   \
+                           v12, v13, v14, v15)                                 \
+    do {                                                                       \
+        G(v0, v4, v8, v12);                                                    \
+        G(v1, v5, v9, v13);                                                    \
+        G(v2, v6, v10, v14);                                                   \
+        G(v3, v7, v11, v15);                                                   \
+        G(v0, v5, v10, v15);                                                   \
+        G(v1, v6, v11, v12);                                                   \
+        G(v2, v7, v8, v13);                                                    \
+        G(v3, v4, v9, v14);                                                    \
+    } while ((void)0, 0)
+
+#endif